Rule2026-23320
Appellate Procedures for the Board of Immigration Appeals
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
November 17, 2026
Effective
December 17, 2026
Issuing agencies
Justice DepartmentExecutive Office for Immigration Review
Abstract
In February 2026, the Department issued an interim final rule ("IFR"), effective March 9, 2026, to streamline Board of Immigration Appeals ("Board" or "BIA") procedures. The IFR's comment period closed on April 8, 2026. In this final rule, the Department responds to comments received and finalizes the IFR with minor changes.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 220 (Tuesday, November 17, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 220 (Tuesday, November 17, 2026)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 73876-73914]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-23320]
[[Page 73875]]
Vol. 91
Tuesday,
No. 220
November 17, 2026
Part II
Department of Justice
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Executive Office for Immigration Review
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8 CFR Parts 1003, 1208, and 1240
Appellate Procedures for the Board of Immigration Appeals; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 220 / Tuesday, November 17, 2026 /
Rules and Regulations
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Executive Office for Immigration Review
8 CFR Parts 1003, 1208, and 1240
[Docket No. EOIR-26-AB37; Dir. Order No. 12-2026]
RIN 1125-AB37
Appellate Procedures for the Board of Immigration Appeals
AGENCY: Executive Office for Immigration Review (``EOIR''), Department
of Justice (``DOJ'' or ``Department'').
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: In February 2026, the Department issued an interim final rule
(``IFR''), effective March 9, 2026, to streamline Board of Immigration
Appeals (``Board'' or ``BIA'') procedures. The IFR's comment period
closed on April 8, 2026. In this final rule, the Department responds to
comments received and finalizes the IFR with minor changes.
DATES: This rule is effective on December 17, 2026.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jamee E. Comans, Assistant Director,
Office of Policy, Executive Office for Immigration Review, 5107
Leesburg Pike, Suite 2500, Falls Church, Virginia, 22041, telephone
(703) 305-0289.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
On February 6, 2026, the Department published an IFR that: (1)
streamlined the process for the Board to review Immigration Judge
decisions by making such review discretionary regarding certain aspects
of the review; (2) established briefing schedules for cases being
reviewed; and (3) streamlined other aspects of the appellate process to
ensure timely adjudications and avoid adding to the Board's backlog.
See Appellate Procedures for the Board of Immigration Appeals, 91 FR
5267 (Feb. 6, 2026). The IFR also made technical and non-substantive
changes to EOIR's regulations. See id. These changes are discussed in
more detail in Section I.C of this preamble.
The comment period for the IFR opened on February 6, 2026, and,
after an extension,\1\ closed on April 8, 2026, with 1,615 comments
received.
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\1\ See Appellate Procedures for the Board of Immigration
Appeals; Extension of Comment Period, 91 FR 9705 (Feb. 27, 2026).
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In this final rule, the Department adopts as final the amendments
made by the IFR with some changes. These changes are described in
Section II of this preamble. In Section III of this preamble, the
Department summarizes and responds to public comments received on the
IFR.
A. Purpose of This Rulemaking
As discussed in the IFR, the Department issued the IFR in an effort
to address lengthy and unprecedented appeal backlogs at the Board. See
91 FR 5270. The Department has attempted to address the Board's backlog
multiple times over the years, see 91 FR 5268-70, yet the Board's
pending caseload has continued to increase. Specifically, the Board's
pending caseload increased from 35,837 cases in Fiscal Year (``FY'')
2017 to 325,774 cases in FY 2026--a nearly ninefold increase.\2\
Lengthy backlogs and their accompanying adjudication delays
significantly undermine the Government's efforts to effectively
administer the Nation's immigration system, where many aliens with non-
meritorious claims know they can potentially remain in the United
States for years upon the filing of an appeal with the Board. See INS
v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (``[A]s a general matter, every
delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely
to remain in the United States.'').
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\2\ See EOIR, Adjudication Statistics: All Appeals Filed,
Completed, and Pending (Oct. 22, 2026), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344986/dl?inline">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344986/dl?inline</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/3K4F-N2CJ">https://perma.cc/3K4F-N2CJ</a>].
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These unsustainable numbers required the Department to
fundamentally ``reconsider[ ] the Board's role as an appellate
tribunal'' and, in turn, implement significant reforms to the Board's
adjudicatory role and processes to better allow it to simultaneously
keep up with incoming filings and meaningfully reduce its backlog. See
91 FR 5270. In issuing this rule, the Department ultimately determined
that anything less than a significant departure from past practice
would not achieve the necessary outcomes. Indeed, when the Department
proposed its streamlining reforms in 2002, it laid out similar
objectives to those animating this rulemaking: ``(1) Eliminating the
current backlog of cases pending before the Board; (2) Eliminating
unwarranted delays in the adjudication of administrative appeals; (3)
Utilizing the resources of the Board more efficiently; and (4) Allowing
more resources to be allocated to the resolution of those cases that
present difficult or controversial legal questions--cases that are most
appropriate for searching appellate review.'' See Board of Immigration
Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 FR 7309,
7310 (Feb. 19, 2002) (notice of proposed rulemaking). Learning from
that effort, the Department decided here that, rather than continuing a
path of modest and likely ineffectual changes, fundamental reform was
needed.
Importantly, although the changes made in this rule are a
significant departure from past Board processes--in particular, the
switch to summary dismissal as the default outcome--this rule does not
alter an alien's statutory right to obtain Federal court review. See
generally INA 242, 8 U.S.C. 1252.
B. Legal Authority
The Department issues this final rule through authority granted by
section 103(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (``INA'' or ``the
Act''), 8 U.S.C. 1103(g), as amended by the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (``HSA''), Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. See 91 FR 5267-68.
C. Summary of Regulatory Changes Made by IFR
The IFR revised 8 CFR 1003.1-1003.3, 1003.5-1003.6, 1003.18,
1003.38, 1003.42, 1003.55, 1208.31, 1208.35, 1240.15, 1240.26, and
1240.53 in Chapter V of title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(``CFR'').
The IFR amended EOIR's regulations to:
(1) Require appeals to be summarily dismissed by a single Board
Member within 15 days of the appeal being filed, except where the
appeal has been referred for consideration by the Board en banc and a
majority of permanent Board members vote to accept the appeal for
further consideration within 10 days of the appeal being filed, 91 FR
5270-71;
(2) Shorten the timeline for filing an appeal with the Board
(except for appeals of asylum decisions on the merits) from 30 days to
10 days, 91 FR 5272;
(3) Standardize briefing schedules by requiring simultaneous
briefing in all appeals that are not summarily dismissed within 20 days
of the Board setting the briefing schedule, with no reply briefs
permitted and grants of extensions of time limited to ``exceptional
circumstances,'' 91 FR 5272-73;
(4) Eliminate the requirement that Immigration Judges review
transcripts of their oral decisions before the Board adjudicates
appeals of their decisions, 91 FR 5273-74;
(5) Remove or revise regulatory provisions authorizing the Chief
[[Page 73877]]
Appellate Immigration Judge to either extend adjudication deadlines in
particular cases or to hold cases based on pending action, 91 FR 5274;
(6) Codify the requirement that all arguments must be raised in a
Notice of Appeal to the Board, and that all other arguments will be
deemed waived, 91 FR 5278;
(7) Correct outdated regulatory cross-references, 91 FR 5274; and
(8) Align the regulatory terminology with statutory terminology by
updating the term ``noncitizen'' to ``alien'' and the term
``unaccompanied child'' or ``unaccompanied children'' to
``unaccompanied alien child'' or ``unaccompanied alien children,'' as
appropriate, 91 FR 5274.
D. Procedural Validity of the Final Rule
A few weeks after the IFR published, a group of advocacy
organizations challenged it in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia. On March 8, 2026, the court partially vacated the IFR,
holding that certain portions violated the Administrative Procedure
Act's (``APA'') notice-and-comment requirements. See Amica Ctr. for
Immigrant Rights v. EOIR, 822 F. Supp. 3d 119, 168 (D.D.C. 2026).
Specifically, the court vacated the following three of the IFR's
amendments \3\ because, in the court's view, the procedural rule and
foreign affairs exemptions to the APA's notice-and-comment requirement
did not apply: (1) shortening the timeline for filing an appeal with
the Board (except for appeals of the merits of certain asylum
decisions) from 30 days to 10 days; (2) requiring that issues not
raised in the Notice of Appeal be deemed waived; and (3) requiring that
appeals be summarily dismissed by a single Board Member within 15 days
of the appeal being filed, unless referred for consideration by the
Board en banc and a majority of permanent Board members vote to accept
for further consideration within 10 days of the appeal being filed.
Amica, 822 F. Supp. 3d at 156-60 (procedural rule exemption analysis),
163-65 (foreign affairs exemption analysis).
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\3\ For all other provisions of the IFR, either no challenge was
raised or the court affirmatively determined that a stay was not
warranted. See Amica, 822 F. Supp. 3d at 141-46, 165-68.
Accordingly, those provisions are currently in effect.
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However, in issuing this final rule, the Department has fully
complied with the requirements of the APA, thereby obviating the basis
for the Amica court's decision regarding these three provisions. As the
Supreme Court has explained, an IFR containing all of the APA-required
elements of a notice of proposed rulemaking (``NPRM''), as provided in
5 U.S.C. 553(b)-(d), satisfies the APA's procedural requirements. See
Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,
591 U.S. 657, 682-86 (2020). That notice of a final rule's provisions
was provided via an IFR rather than an NPRM does not itself invalidate
a final rule; rather, the focus is on whether fair notice was provided
to the public. Id. at 684 (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v.
Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007)).
Here, the IFR contained all APA-required elements of an NPRM: a
reference to legal authority, as required by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(2) (91 FR
5267-68); a description of the terms and substance of the rule, as
required by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3) (91 FR 5270-74); and a request for
public comment, as required by 5 U.S.C. 553(c) (91 FR 5267).
Additionally, this final rule provides a statement of the rule's
purpose and basis, as required by 5 U.S.C. 553(c). Further, this final
rule is being published 30 days prior to its effective date, as
required by 5 U.S.C. 553(d) and reiterated in Little Sisters. See 591
U.S. at 686.
In sum, this final rule is now being issued after the notice-and-
comment procedures required by the APA, thus alleviating the procedural
concerns raised by the Amica court. As such, all provisions of the rule
are presumed operative on the effective date.
E. Severability
To the extent that any portion of this rule is stayed, enjoined, or
held invalid by a court, the Department intends for all other parts of
the rule to remain in effect. Each change may operate independently of
the others and would be unaffected if any other part of the rule were
stayed, enjoined, or held invalid.
II. Revisions to IFR in Final Rule
This final rule adopts the provisions of the IFR, with the
following revisions:
A. Clarifying Effect of a Summary Dismissal Order
First, in response to some commenters' confusion, the Department is
updating regulatory language at 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(2)(ii) to clarify the
contents and effect of a summary dismissal order for Federal court
review purposes.
In the IFR, the Department included regulatory language stating
that, when an appeal is summarily dismissed under the relevant
paragraph, ``the Immigration Judge's decision is adopted by the Board
and articulates the rationale for removal that is subject to judicial
review.'' 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(2)(ii). The IFR explained that this language
``would not change any existing understandings regarding when a removal
order becomes final or when a petition for review must be filed.'' 91
FR 5271. Nevertheless, commenters expressed confusion over various
issues relating to the processes for Board appeals and Federal circuit
court petitions for review (``PFRs''), such as exhaustion or issue-
preservation requirements.
Therefore, the Department is replacing this language with more
specific procedures to ensure that parties and courts understand the
effect of a summary dismissal order under this rule, including that
such dismissal is done after consideration of the substance of the
appeal. To do so, the new regulatory language mirrors the Board's pre-
existing affirmance-without-opinion language in 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(4). For
example, under this rule's summary dismissal procedures, when the Board
summarily dismisses an appeal, the new regulatory language states that
the Board will issue an order stating: ``The Board dismisses, without
opinion, the appeal from the Immigration Judge's decision. The decision
below is, therefore, the final agency determination. See 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(2)(ii).'' 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(2)(ii). Moreover, the newly added
regulatory language at 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(2)(ii)(C) states that no further
explanation or reasoning will be included and explains what this means
for purposes of summary dismissals without opinion. Specifically, a
summary dismissal without opinion shall, like affirmances without
opinion, be deemed to reflect the following considerations: (1) that
the result reached in the Immigration Judge's decision under review was
correct; (2) that it does not necessarily imply approval of all of the
reasoning of the Immigration Judge's decision; (3) that any errors in
the decision under review were harmless or nonmaterial; and (4) that
either the issues on appeal are squarely controlled by existing Board
or Federal court precedent and do not involve the application of
precedent to a novel factual situation, or the factual and legal issues
raised on appeal are not so substantial that the case warrants the
issuance of a written opinion in the case.
These changes will standardize the contents of summary dismissal
orders issued pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(2)(ii) and specify the
impacts of such orders, thereby reducing confusion over the scope of
such orders and, relatedly, the attendant impacts they will have on
issue exhaustion or
[[Page 73878]]
preservation requirements before the Federal circuit courts.
Finally, the Department is also inserting language in 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(2)(ii) to make clear that the new summary dismissal procedure
remains subject to the Board's existing prohibition on ``issu[ing] a
decision affirming or granting to an alien an immigration status,
relief or protection from removal, or other immigration benefit, as
provided in 8 CFR 1003.47(b), that requires completion of identity, law
enforcement, or security investigations or examinations if'' those
checks have not been completed or need to be updated. 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(6)(i); see also 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(5)(A)(i) (prohibiting the
granting of asylum until appropriate checks have been completed
regarding the applicant). Because such checks are required to be
complete and current before an Immigration Judge grants status, relief,
protection, or a benefit, see 8 CFR 1003.47(g), under the new
procedures, it is unlikely that those checks will have expired by the
time the Board would summarily dismiss any appeal. Nevertheless, the
inserted language makes clear that if the checks expire between the
date of the Immigration Judge order and the Board's decision to
summarily dismiss the appeal, then the Board must wait until the checks
have been updated.
B. Clarifying Appeal Deadline for Practitioner Discipline Cases
In the IFR, the Department stated that it had reconsidered the
appeal timeline before the Board and was ``reducing the appeal period
from 30 days to 10 days for all cases'' except for certain cases
involving asylum applications. See 91 FR 5272. Other than the narrow
exception for certain cases involving asylum applications, the
Department intended for the 10-day appeal deadline to apply to all
appeals, including appeals from decisions of an adjudicating official
in practitioner discipline cases. See 8 CFR 1003.1(b)(13) (providing
the Board with jurisdiction over appeals filed from ``[d]ecisions of
adjudicating officials in disciplinary proceedings involving
practitioners or recognized organizations as provided in [subpart G of
8 CFR 1003]'').
To clarify this intent, the Department is now amending 8 CFR
1003.106(c) to explicitly state that appeals from decisions in
practitioner discipline cases must also be filed with the Board within
10 calendar days of the decision issued under 8 CFR 1003.106(b). The
10-day deadline applies regardless of which party files the appeal. See
8 CFR 1003.106(c) (noting either or both parties may file an appeal
with the Board). This change will ensure that the intent of the IFR--to
harmonize appellate deadlines across EOIR--is fully effectuated. See,
e.g., 28 CFR 68.54(a) (10-day deadline to appeal a decision of an
Administrative Law Judge to the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer);
8 CFR 1003.6(c)(1) (10-day deadline for the Department of Homeland
Security (``DHS'') to file an appeal of an Immigration Judge's order to
maintain an automatic stay of a custody redetermination order pursuant
to 8 CFR 1003.19(i)). Further, this change will ensure that EOIR can
swiftly impose sanctions on practitioners subject to discipline as a
result of criminal, unethical, or unprofessional conduct, or frivolous
behavior. 8 CFR 1003.101(a). This change will apply only prospectively
to appeals of decisions in practitioner discipline cases issued on or
after the effective date of this final rule.
C. Clarifying Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge Authority To
Summarily Dismiss Cases
The IFR introduced, and this rule finalizes, streamlining
provisions involving the Board's expanded use of summary dismissal. 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(2)(ii); see also 91 FR 5270-71. The Department is now
amending 8 CFR 1003.1(a)(4) to clarify that Temporary Appellate
Immigration Judges (``TAIJs'') have the authority to issue written
orders summarily dismissing cases pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(2). This
was the intent of the IFR, and this change merely makes that intent
explicit in the regulations to avoid confusion.
TAIJs possess all of the authority of permanent Appellate
Immigration Judges, except they do not vote in the Board's en banc
process. See 8 CFR 1003.1(a)(4). They also have the experience
necessary to make appropriate decisions on whether to issue orders
summarily dismissing cases. See 8 CFR 1003.1(a)(4) (listing individuals
qualified to serve as TAIJs, including ``immigration judges, retired
Board members, retired immigration judges, and administrative law
judges'' and ``senior EOIR attorneys with at least ten years of
experience in the field of immigration law''). Further, TAIJs are often
appointed to help address fluctuations in the Board's caseload or
changes in Board priorities. See Reducing the Size of the Board of
Immigration Appeals, 90 FR 15525, 15527 (Apr. 4, 2025) (explaining role
and purpose of TAIJs). Allowing TAIJs to summarily dismiss cases will
thus further advance this rule's goal of streamlining Board procedures
and increasing the efficient processing of appeals. Although TAIJs do
``not have the authority to vote on any matter decided by the Board en
banc,'' including whether a case should be decided pursuant to the
procedures finalized in this rule or if a decision should be designated
as precedent, see 8 CFR 1003.1(a)(4)-(5), (d)(2)(ii), (g)(3), under
this rule, TAIJs will summarily dismiss cases or refer them to the
permanent Appellate Immigration Judges for an en banc vote.
The Department is not making any changes to existing regulations
limiting en banc voting to permanent Appellate Immigration Judges.
However, TAIJs ``may serve as the author or panel member for a
precedent decision'' or may adjudicate a case assigned to them if a
majority of the Board votes to decide an appeal with full briefing. See
90 FR 15527 n.3.
D. Other Technical Changes
The Department is also making technical changes in this final rule
to ensure consistency, clarity, and accuracy in the regulatory text.
First, the Department is making formatting changes to 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(2)(ii) to add subparagraphs for readability.
Second, the Department is making a minor correction to 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(ii) to remove a reference to an ``extension period.'' The
IFR amended 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(ii) to remove language that previously
authorized the Chief Appellate Immigration Judge to extend adjudication
deadlines or hold cases based on a pending precedential decision or new
regulatory actions, explaining that the previous language allowed the
Chief Appellate Immigration Judge to ``delay cases at whim, either to
avoid applying established regulatory adjudicatory timeframes or to
effectuate policy goals of delaying cases.'' See 91 FR 5274. Consistent
with the removal of language authorizing the extension of adjudication
deadlines, this final rule removes a reference to an ``extension
period'' in 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(ii) and clarifies that if a dissenting
or concurring panel member fails to complete his or her opinion by the
end of the established time limits for adjudicating cases, the majority
decision will be issued without the separate opinion.
Third, the Department is amending 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(2)(ii) to remove
the date previously listed in that provision (March 9, 2026) and
clarify that all appeals of any decision issued on or
[[Page 73879]]
after the effective date of this final rule--and not the IFR--are
subject to this rule's summary dismissal procedures.
Fourth, the Department is making minor terminology amendments
updating the terms ``Chairman'' and ``Vice Chairman'' to ``Chief
Appellate Immigration Judge'' and ``Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration
Judge,'' respectively, in a relevant section of this rule. See 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(ii). These changes will conform the regulatory text to
current EOIR terminology and thereby promote clarity and consistency.
Fifth, the Department is making a minor technical edit to 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(3) to avoid confusion regarding the production of
transcripts. After issuance of the IFR, 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(3) stated that
``[i]n any case that has not been summarily dismissed, the case
management system shall arrange for the prompt completion of the record
of proceeding and transcript, and the issuance of a briefing schedule,
as appropriate.'' The phrase ``as appropriate'' may not clearly convey
that transcripts need not be produced in every Board case that has not
been summarily dismissed. For example, the Board routinely considers
several types of appeals that do not have transcripts, such as where
there was no hearing to transcribe in the underlying proceeding (e.g.,
appeals of motions to reopen or reconsider decisions and appeals of
certain visa decisions by DHS), the hearing in the underlying
proceeding was not recorded (e.g., appeals of custody redetermination
decisions), or a new transcript is not necessary or germane to the
procedural posture of the case (e.g., interlocutory appeals;
consideration of appeals remanded from Federal court). Thus, the
Department is making a minor edit to 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(3) to make clear
that, in any case not summarily dismissed, the Board will produce a
transcript only if a transcript is otherwise warranted, which excludes
the examples given above where the Board has historically not created a
transcript.
III. Public Comments and Responses
A. General
The Department received 1,615 public comments on the IFR. Many
commenters opposed the IFR based on policy disagreements, while several
commenters wrote in support. In general, comments in opposition raised
policy concerns about the IFR's narrowing of appellate review before
the Board, and the burdens that the IFR would place on aliens and their
counsel. Commenters also noted legal concerns based on purported
violations of due process and the APA. In contrast, supportive
commenters reiterated and reinforced the Department's concerns
regarding the need to efficiently process appeals and reduce the
Board's significant backlog, which they argued encourages illegal
immigration into the United States due to lengthy adjudication delays.
The Department has thoroughly reviewed and considered all comments
received and responds to specific concerns raised by commenters
below.\4\ While the Department appreciates the policy-based opposition
comments, ultimately, they are not persuasive for the reasons outlined
below. Similarly, the Department disagrees with the results-oriented
view of due process raised by many commenters, and the issues raised
relating to the Department foregoing notice and comment are obviated by
the issuance of this final rule, as discussed in Section I.D of this
preamble.
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\4\ The Department does not address comments seeking changes to
U.S. laws, regulations, or agency policies that are unrelated to the
changes made by the IFR, nor does this rule resolve issues raised by
commenters that are outside the scope of this rule, including
comments related to broader immigration policies, immigration
enforcement activities, the scope of detention policies, and
specific hiring advertisements or practices.
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B. Ineffectiveness of/Improper Motivation for IFR
1. Rule Based on Inappropriate Data and Reasoning
Comment: Commenters argued that the IFR relies on erroneous data to
support its determination that it is appropriate to increase the use of
summary dismissal on the basis that the appealing party rarely succeeds
before the Board. Commenters stated that the cited statistics were
misleading because the Department's data related to successful appeals
did not accurately capture cases that were remanded to an Immigration
Judge. Commenters posited that the Department counted appeals given the
specific decision code of ``SUS,'' which stands for ``sustained,'' but
did not count the many cases that were both sustained and remanded,
coded ``REM,'' that also reflect disagreement with the decision below.
In support of their assertion, commenters provided separate data
purporting to show at least 450 appeals in an approximately 14-month
period that had been sustained but not marked ``SUS.'' Commenters also
asserted that the Department should have considered other decision
codes as representative of the Board's disagreement with the
Immigration Judge, referencing ``TER'' (termination) and ``ACR''
(administrative closure).
Commenters also objected to the IFR's statement that the data
related to the number of sustained appeals established that ``the Board
generally agrees with the outcome of the decision below,'' because
cases where the Board remands a case to the Immigration Judge or
terminates removal proceedings altogether do not reflect agreement with
the Immigration Judge's decision. Commenters asserted that these
remanded cases, which they estimated--without citing any data or
evidence to support--to number in the thousands or tens of thousands,
suggest that the Board identified an error that required correction
before the Immigration Court. Commenters stated that such remands
should be calculated as a ``substantive win'' for the appealing party
because the Board is required to defer to Immigration Judges on factual
issues.
More broadly, commenters stated that the Department did not
sufficiently explain why the Board should relinquish its appellate
review function, even if there were only a small portion of sustained
appeals. Commenters claimed that the fact that the Board sustained any
appeals or remanded any cases to the Immigration Judge is sufficient
proof that careful appellate review is warranted. Commenters also
stated that the IFR's justification based on backlog statistics is
flawed and said the Department has admitted that EOIR historically has
not tracked case processing times accurately and has ignored Inspector
General recommendations related to data integrity.
Response: The Department disagrees with commenter assertions on
this topic. As an initial point, the Department's decision to expand
the use of summary dismissal rests on many grounds, not solely on the
basis of the statistics with which commenters take issue. See, e.g., 91
FR 5270. Even so, it is undisputed--even by opposition commenters--that
the vast majority of appeals to the Board are not sustained or
remanded; instead, they result in decisions upholding the underlying
decisions of Immigration Judges. Thus, whether one counts Board
decisions sustaining an appeal or all Board decisions resulting in a
remand,\5\ the
[[Page 73880]]
overall picture remains the same: the overwhelming majority of appeals
to the Board--just like the overwhelming majority of appeals in court
systems in the United States generally \6\--do not result in a
different outcome for the appellant.\7\
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\5\ Contrary to some commenters' assertions, the Department
acknowledged in the IFR that it was not counting all remanded cases
because ``the Board may remand a case for many reasons,'' 91 FR 5270
n.8, and certain types of common remands (e.g., solely to update
background checks or address defects in a transcript) are not
indicative of the merits of the case. Regardless, whether all
remands are counted or not, the fundamental conclusion remains the
same regarding the scope of appeals which result in a change in the
overall outcome of a case.
\6\ See generally Barry C. Edwards, Why Appeals Courts Rarely
Reverse Lower Courts: An Experimental Study to Explore Affirmation
Bias, 68 Emory L. J. Online 1035 (2019), <a href="https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&">https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&</a>;context=elj-online.
\7\ Indeed, commenters neglected to place their numbers in
context. Between FY 2020 and FY 2025, the Board completed at least
30,000 cases each year. See EOIR Workload and Adjudication
Statistics, All Appeals Filed, Completed, and Pending (Oct. 22,
2026), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344986/dl?inline">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344986/dl?inline</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/3K4F-N2CJ">https://perma.cc/3K4F-N2CJ</a>]. Thus, even using commenters' data, the
Department's conclusion remains valid.
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Similarly, counting actions that typically do not reflect a
judgment regarding the merits of an Immigration Judge's decision, such
as terminations or administrative closures, does not change the overall
picture. Both actions, particularly in recent years, reflect policy
choices, generally tied to exercises of prosecutorial discretion, that
provide no commentary on the specific issues on appeal.\8\ Thus, in
most cases, they reflect no judgment about the merit of the appeal,
only a decision that the case should not be resolved on the merits.
Contrary to commenter suggestions that an ``ACR'' decision should be
considered reflective of the Board's disagreement with an underlying
Immigration Judge decision, administrative closure has been used
primarily as a policy tool to avoid reaching the merits in cases where
a straightforward conclusion of the case would have likely resulted in
an order of removal. See generally EOIR, Cancellation of Director's
Memorandum 22-03 (Apr. 18, 2025), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1397161/dl">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1397161/dl</a>?inline [<a href="https://perma.cc/SH9J-CKXL">https://perma.cc/SH9J-CKXL</a>]. Before the Board, this
could have involved cases where the Appellate Immigration Judge agreed
with an Immigration Judge that, on the merits, an alien was properly
ordered removed, but, for policy reasons, allowed the indefinite delay
of proceedings through administrative closure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Between 2011 and 2017, there were various memoranda issued
by DHS setting enforcement priorities and encouraging DHS attorneys
to seek administrative closure of cases those memoranda deemed to be
low priority. See, e.g., Memorandum from Peter S. Vincent, Principal
Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't, to All OPLA
Attorneys, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't, Case-by-Case Review of
Incoming and Certain Pending Cases 2 (Nov. 17, 2011), <a href="https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/case-by-case-review-incoming-certain-pending-cases-memorandum.pdf">https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/case-by-case-review-incoming-certain-pending-cases-memorandum.pdf</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/2YCT-6GTB">https://perma.cc/2YCT-6GTB</a>]. Between 2022 and 2025, DHS attorneys were
similarly encouraged to seek dismissal of cases then viewed as low
priority. See Memorandum from Kerry A. Doyle, Principal Legal
Advisor, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't, to All OPLA Attorneys,
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't, Guidance to OPLA Attorneys
Regarding the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Laws and the Exercise
of Prosecutorial Discretion 10 (Apr. 3, 2022), <a href="https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/opla/OPLA-immigration-enforcement_guidanceApr2022.pdf">https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/opla/OPLA-immigration-enforcement_guidanceApr2022.pdf</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/565Z-6ABV">https://perma.cc/565Z-6ABV</a>]. And
EOIR similarly issued memoranda in 2022 and 2023 encouraging the use
of administrative closure and dismissal in cases of aliens who were
not priorities for removal under the then-effective DHS memoranda.
See EOIR, DM 22-03: Administrative Closure 2-3 (Nov. 22, 2021)
(``[I]t is important that adjudicators focus on two categories of
cases: those in which the . . . [DHS] deems the respondent to be an
immigration enforcement priority, and those in which the respondent
desires a full adjudication of his or her claim or claims. Being
able to administratively close low priority cases will help
adjudicators do this.''); EOIR, DM 23-04: Department of Homeland
Security Enforcement Priorities and Prosecutorial Discretion
Initiatives 6 (Sept. 28, 2023) (``[W]here the respondent is not[ a
civil immigration priority], giv[e] the parties an opportunity to
make requests in light of the respondent's nonpriority status. . . .
[A]ppellate immigration judges should adjudicate motions to dismiss
as is appropriate under the law, taking into account any objection
to dismissal from the respondent.''). Those DHS and EOIR memoranda
have since been canceled or otherwise superseded. See E.O. 14159,
sec. 3(a), 90 FR 8443 (Jan. 20, 2025) (revoking Executive Orders
from 2021 setting immigration priorities); EOIR, PM 25-16:
Cancellation of Director's Memorandum 23-04 (Feb. 3, 2025), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1388051/dl?inline">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1388051/dl?inline</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/6QBZ-AXGC">https://perma.cc/6QBZ-AXGC</a>]; EOIR, PM 25-29: Cancellation of Director's Memorandum 22-03
(Apr. 18, 2025), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1397161/dl">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1397161/dl</a>
[<a href="https://perma.cc/SH9J-CKXL">https://perma.cc/SH9J-CKXL</a>].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even where not used for policy purposes, termination or
administrative closure generally has no bearing on whether the
Appellate Immigration Judge believes the Immigration Judge erred. Thus,
codes for both administrative closure and termination were properly
excluded.
Additionally, the Department disagrees with commenters' claims that
remands reflect disagreement with the decision below. A remand for new
background checks often means that DHS was the appellant for a grant of
relief to an alien and the Board dismissed DHS's appeal, but that the
length of time the Board took to decide the appeal meant that the
background checks had expired and new ones were required.\9\ And a
remand to correct a defective transcript says nothing about the merits
of a case and therefore is not a ``win'' for either party.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ This may also arise where an alien is granted one form of
relief or protection but appeals the denial of another form of
relief or protection they sought before the Immigration Judge. If
the Board affirmed the decision denying relief or protection but DHS
did not cross appeal to challenge the grant of relief or protection,
then background checks may have expired while the case was pending
before the Board and the Board had to remand for new background
checks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remands for further factfinding are similarly not a ``win'' for
either party. As commenters stated, the Board is, with limited
exception, precluded from engaging in factfinding and may remand a
decision to the Immigration Court where it has determined that further
factfinding is needed. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv). A remand for further
factfinding does not, by itself, signal that the Board agrees or
disagrees with the Immigration Judge's ultimate conclusions pertaining
to removability or relief and protection, or whether the alien or DHS
will ultimately prevail before EOIR. Rather, a remand for such purpose
represents only that the Board has determined that additional
factfinding is required in a particular case. The Department reiterates
that including these types of remands as ``wins'' for the appellant--
regardless of whether the appellant is an alien or DHS--is
inappropriate and misleading.
Thus, although the Department appreciates commenters' views, it
does not find them persuasive. Instead, the Department has determined
that the small number of cases where an appeal has been explicitly
coded as sustained in recent years, as opposed to remanded, represents
the most accurate and representative dataset because it captures only
those cases where the Board has definitively determined that the
outcome of the proceedings before the Immigration Judge should be
reversed without further consideration.
Moreover, even according to some commenters' own assessments, on
average over the past 25 years, fewer than 20 percent of the Board's
cases were remanded to the Immigration Courts and, of that small
subset, only a little more than half resulted in an ``outcome that was
favorable'' to the alien. Extrapolating commenters' assessment to the
current pending caseload, approximately 289,000 of the 325,774
currently pending cases will not be remanded or result in an outcome
that the commenter would deem ``favorable'' to the alien.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See EOIR. Workload and Adjudication Statistics: All Appeals
Filed, Completed, and Pending (Oct. 22, 2026), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344986/dl?inline">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344986/dl?inline</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/3K4F-N2CJ">https://perma.cc/3K4F-N2CJ</a>].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, at bottom, commenters did not present any data or analyses
that undermine the Department's position that the Board affirms the
Immigration Judge's underlying decision in the vast majority of cases.
91 FR 5270. Therefore, the Department continues to believe that it is
prudent to develop a framework for
[[Page 73881]]
administrative review that focuses Board resources on adjudicating
cases that will be most impactful to EOIR due to the novel or complex
issues involved.
The Department also disagrees with commenters' characterization
that the Board is relinquishing its appellate review authority. On the
contrary, under this rule, the Board is taking more control over its
appellate review authority to focus on only those cases it deems in
need of further consideration. Notably, nothing in this rule precludes
the Board from adjudicating any case that the Board deems in need of
correction, notwithstanding the requirement that it vote to take the
case within 10 days of the appeal being filed. See 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(2)(ii)(A) (only requiring a ``majority of the permanent Board
members vote en banc to accept the appeal for further review''). And,
to the extent that an alien believes further administrative review of
his or her case is needed beyond the parameters of this rule, the alien
may file any available motions to reopen or reconsider before the
Immigration Court or the Board. See, e.g., INA 240(c)(6)-(7), 8 U.S.C.
1229a(c)(6)-(7). Further, where an alien has concerns over the agency's
final determination, the alien may pursue any statutorily available
review of the agency's determinations before the Federal courts. See
generally INA 242, 8 U.S.C. 1252.
Separately, the Department stands by the accuracy of the IFR's
statistics on EOIR's pending caseload and case processing times. As
noted by commenters, in 2012, the Department's Office of Inspector
General (``DOJ OIG'') found that EOIR failed to implement models for
case processing that captured accurate tracking and reporting of case
processing times.\11\ Although the Department disagrees with some of
the conclusions in the report, even accepting them as true the report
in no way affects the base justifications in the IFR that EOIR has
significant case backlogs in need of addressing, regardless of the
case-counting methodologies employed. As such, this rule is motivated
in part to clarify potentially confusing metrics by establishing clear,
uniform guidance to avoid the reported inaccuracies and confusion
resulting from prior methods that EOIR has used to track and report
case processing times.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See DOJ OIG, Management of Immigration Cases and Appeals by
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (Oct. 2012), <a href="https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2012/e1301.pdf">https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2012/e1301.pdf</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/TPZ8-47JC">https://perma.cc/TPZ8-47JC</a>].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comment: Commenters disagreed with the Department's claim that the
IFR will only affect a ``relatively small'' number of aliens unable to
find legal counsel within 10 days. Moreover, commenters stated that,
even if the affected population is ``relatively small,'' any violation
of the right to counsel is unacceptable.
Response: The Department is unpersuaded by commenters' assertions
and data. Indeed, commenters' data, which appears to have been taken
from advocacy and policy groups and did not account for the nature of
how representation is reflected in EOIR's system,\12\ even if it were
accurate, pertains to cases pending before the Immigration Courts, not
cases pending appeal before the Board. As noted in EOIR's statistics,
in completed case appeals from FY 2025, a significant majority of
aliens (76 percent) had representation before the Board.\13\ Commenters
did not meaningfully dispute that most aliens are represented when
their cases are considered by the Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ EOIR's system only counts a case as represented when an
attorney or accredited representative files a notice of appearance.
However, by practice, many such representatives do not file a notice
of appearance until the day of the alien's hearing. Thus, many
aliens have representation but are not yet coded as such in EOIR's
system because they have not yet had a hearing. Similarly, aliens
newly placed in immigration proceedings are counted as
``unrepresented,'' even though they have not been given time to
secure representation. In short, EOIR's data on representation at
the Immigration Court level both significantly undercounts actual
representation and is distorted by newer cases where the alien has
not yet had time to seek representation and by the fact that a
certain percentage of aliens do not want to retain representation,
either because they do not want to pay for it or because they have
no intention of appearing at their hearing. In EOIR's experience,
most aliens who genuinely seek representation are able to obtain it.
\13\ EOIR, Current Representation Rates (Nov. 18, 2025), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344931/dl?inline">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344931/dl?inline</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/QC5J-3DD6">https://perma.cc/QC5J-3DD6</a>].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the Department does not view the length of time
available to file an appeal as singularly impacting the likelihood that
an alien will have representation. Indeed, by statute aliens are only
entitled to 10 days to secure counsel at the Immigration Court level,
see INA 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229(b)(1), so a similar period for an
appeal should be no more onerous, especially for aliens who already had
representation at the Immigration Court level. Additionally, the Board
appeal window begins only after the completion of removal proceedings,
during which the alien will have maintained the opportunity to obtain
representation, and in which the majority of aliens do in fact obtain
representation.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See id. (noting that over half of aliens with cases
completed by the Immigration Courts in 2025 had representation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Likewise, aliens may also seek limited assistance from
practitioners for preparation of legal documents, including the Notice
of Appeal and legal briefs outside of the scope of full representation,
through EOIR's limited appearance procedures before the Board. See 8
CFR 1003.38(g)(2). The Department expects that the availability of
limited appearances in particular can be leveraged for assistance
during the administrative appellate process, which is largely paper
based.
Taken together, the opportunity to obtain counsel during the often-
lengthy removal proceedings period and the availability of limited
assistance forecloses any argument that the failure of some aliens to
obtain counsel for a Board appeal, by itself, undermines any right to
counsel.
Comment: Commenters characterized the Department's justification
for the IFR as a ``deterrence'' justification and asserted that such a
justification was both unfounded and improper as a policy matter. More
specifically, commenters stated that there is no evidence that aliens
entered the United States unlawfully based on an expectation of lengthy
delays of their proceedings. Commenters stated that, even if this
theory were supportable, the Board is an appellate adjudicatory body
and should ensure that the procedures it establishes afford aliens due
process in their adjudications beyond what the law requires.
Response: Commenters conflate the Department's reasoning in
promulgating the rule (to improve adjudicatory efficiency), one of the
Department's bases for issuing an IFR rather than an NPRM under the APA
(a foreign affairs function which may include deterrence of illegal
immigration), and the specific procedures applied by the Board in
individual cases. The only deterrence-related language in the IFR was
focused on the foreign affairs exception to APA procedures. See 91 FR
5275. Regardless, the rule's stated justifications have no bearing on
the Board's case-by-case adjudications. The Board continues to follow
its duty to resolve cases impartially, as required by regulation. See 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(1). This impartiality applies to all aspects of
adjudication, including a Board member's consideration of any newly
filed appeal for potential referral for en banc consideration. See 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(2)(ii). At no point does this rule require, or even
suggest, that a Board member consider broader deterrent effects in
adjudicating a specific case.
The Department also declines to add additional Board procedures,
which
[[Page 73882]]
would negate the significant efficiency improvements made by this rule.
The procedures implemented by this rule fully comply with due process,
as more fully addressed in Sections C.1 & 2 of this preamble; more is
not necessary.
2. Rule Will Not Effectively Address Backlog
Comment: Commenters stated that the IFR does not meaningfully
address the root causes of the Board backlog. Commenters believe that
the backlog is not created by the existence of full appellate review
but by multiple other factors, including understaffing, expanding DHS
enforcement priorities, insufficient EOIR resources, inconsistent
Immigration Judge decision-making, politicized adjudications, and
agency mismanagement. Commenters also disagreed with the Department's
characterization that the backlog of pending appeals is a result of
inefficiency. Further, commenters asserted that the IFR will not reduce
the existing backlog of pending cases because it only applies
prospectively. Commenters stated that a backlog is not a legal
justification for shrinking individual rights and expressed that
efficiency cannot come at the expense of due process. Additionally,
commenters proposed several policy alternatives to the IFR that, they
asserted, would reduce the backlog of pending appeals and improve
efficiency.
Response: The Department shares commenters' concerns about the
Board's sizeable backlog of pending appeals. The Board's backlog
impairs the timely adjudication of appeals, delays aliens' ability to
access judicial review in Federal courts and hinders the efficient
administration of the Nation's immigration laws. However, the
Department disagrees with commenters that this rule will not
effectively address the backlog.
As explained in the IFR, since 2021, the only regulatory change
implemented to increase case completions was a rule to increase the
number of Board members to 28, despite a rapidly growing backlog of
pending appeals. 91 FR 5270 (discussing Expanding the Size of the Board
of Immigration Appeals, 89 FR 22630 (Apr. 2, 2024)). That measure
failed to result in a meaningful reduction of the backlog of pending
appeals, and the Board's current backlog exceeds 320,000 pending
appeals.\15\ See id. Even if the Board were to have additional
resources and better case management, it would be unable to resolve the
significant backlog of pending appeals while keeping pace with new
incoming filings using the current procedures and tools available. Id.
Accordingly, given the size of the current backlog of pending appeals
and the demonstrated insufficiency of currently available procedures,
the Department assessed--and continues to believe--that the
streamlining changes implemented in this rule are the best way to
efficiently and expeditiously resolve new appeal filings and free up
adjudicatory resources to address the backlog. Commenters are correct
that this rule does not apply to appeals already pending before the
Board. But they are incorrect in asserting that this rule will not
impact the existing backlog. The rule's streamlining measures--to wit,
the implementation of default summary dismissals, condensed
adjudicatory timelines, standardized filing and briefing, and more
efficient transcription procedures--give the Board additional
adjudicatory resources to resolve its backlog of pending appeals in a
more timely and efficient manner and will prevent the backlog from
continuing to grow at an unsustainable rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ EOIR, Adjudication Statistics: All Appeals Filed,
Completed, and Pending (Oct. 22, 2026), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344986/dl?inline">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344986/dl?inline</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/3K4F-N2CJ">https://perma.cc/3K4F-N2CJ</a>].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department acknowledges that EOIR's backlog of pending cases at
the Immigration Court level is impacted by the number of initial
receipts of cases from DHS, which in turn impacts the number of appeals
filed with the Board. However, comments about DHS enforcement
operations and its determinations about how to exercise prosecutorial
authority are outside of the scope of this rulemaking and are more
appropriately directed to DHS. Instead, measures such as those outlined
in this rule are intended to improve EOIR's ability to efficiently
complete removal proceedings and appeals even as DHS continues to
enforce the immigration laws.
The Department also disagrees with comments suggesting that the
Department restore the Board to a larger size to reduce the backlog. As
the Department has explained, ``increasing the size of the Board has
not necessarily equated to a corresponding increase in the number of
cases adjudicated or a reduction in the pending caseload.'' 90 FR
15526. In reality, an increased number of Board members created
difficulties in administrative oversight and coherent management and
strained the Board's limited legal staff. Id. The Department believes
that this rule's procedural changes will be a far more effective way to
reduce the backlog of pending cases.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ As reflected in the reactions to expansions of the Board in
2020 and 2024, the Department notes that many commenters' views
about expanding the size of the Board vary considerably depending on
the Administration in power at the time of the expansion. As a
result, many comments about Board expansion are inherently less
persuasive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the Department continues to prioritize hiring
Immigration Judges who are committed to following the law and to
remaining neutral and free of bias, as well as other attorney and non-
attorney support staff to aid EOIR's ongoing efforts to reduce the
backlog at both the Immigration Court and Board levels. The Department
is also utilizing Temporary Immigration Judges and TAIJs to provide
additional support in reducing EOIR's backlog of cases and appeals.
Still, the Department has determined that increased staffing alone is
insufficient to fully address the Board's backlog absent the broader
reshaping of the Board's procedures as implemented by this rule.
Separately, the Department appreciates commenters who provided
streamlining and case management suggestions to improve the efficient
processing of appeals, and the Department will continue to evaluate
additional measures to maximize efficiency in the Board's internal
operations. Overall, the Department believes that this rule is the best
option for responding to the current, untenable situation at the Board.
The Department has fully considered all of commenters' proposed
policy alternatives. Many of them--e.g., changes to DHS immigration
enforcement priorities--are well beyond the scope of this rule.
Others--e.g., hiring politically neutral Board members--are based on
inaccurate factual premises, as all Board members are career positions
chosen based on merit. Others--e.g., expanding Immigration Judges'
training or hiring more Immigration Judges who would hear more cases
leading to more appeals--are poorly tailored to improving efficiency at
the Board. Moreover, EOIR has been hiring more Immigration Judges and
the likely resulting increase in appeals only underscores the
importance of implementing this rule. Others--e.g., allowing aliens to
waive production of a hearing transcript--raise both due process
concerns and would do little to address efficiency because DHS may
still need a transcript for an appeal. Still others--e.g., consulting
with stakeholders outside of the notice-and-comment process--would
accomplish little due to the binary polarization of
[[Page 73883]]
opinions on immigration by stakeholders. Most, if not all, stakeholders
in the immigration field want EOIR to adopt measures that will lead to
more of their preferred case outcomes--either more or fewer aliens
being allowed to remain in the United States--rather than measures that
improve the efficiency and performance of EOIR itself. Further, the
comment period for this rule has provided stakeholders ample ability to
make their thoughts known. In sum, none of the proposals is persuasive
enough to warrant changing the final rule in the ways such commenters
would prefer.
Comment: Commenters stated that the Department did not consider a
2017 Booz Allen Hamilton (``BAH'') report referenced in litigation over
a previous rulemaking, which commenters claimed recommended other
backlog-reduction ideas, including a requirement that Immigration
Judges issue written, rather than oral decisions.
Response: The Department is aware of the 2017 BAH report, commonly
called a Legal Case Study (``LCS''). However, the Department has
repeatedly debunked the LCS as unscientific and unsound, first in 2018,
see EOIR, LOP Cohort Analysis 7 n.13 (Sept. 5, 2018), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1091801/dl?inline=">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1091801/dl?inline=</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/E96E-556M">https://perma.cc/E96E-556M</a>], and, more recently, in 2025, see EOIR, PM 25-15, Office of Legal
Access Programs 2 n.3 (Jan. 31, 2025), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1387916/dl?inline">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1387916/dl?inline</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/DM54-B8DU">https://perma.cc/DM54-B8DU</a>] (``The 2017 [LCS]
was methodologically flawed due to a selection bias issue regarding its
interviews with EOIR personnel and a failure to control for the biases
or valences of its non-EOIR subjects. In light of these flaws, EOIR
cannot necessarily validate any of the conclusions of the 2017
[LCS].''). Due to the methodological flaws in creating it, the
Department does not consider any of the 2017 LCS's recommendations to
be scientifically or analytically sound. Moreover, requiring written
decisions--which necessarily take longer than oral decisions, slow the
completion of cases, and would potentially force detained aliens to
remain in custody longer--in all Immigration Court cases would delay
the overall adjudication of cases at the Board, not make it more
efficient.
3. Impacts to Board's Role and Functions
Comment: Commenters stated that the Board serves an important
error-correction and accountability function and asserted that the IFR
functionally removes the ability of most aliens to remedy errors in
decisions in their cases via an appeal to the Board. Commenters stated
that the purpose of administrative appeals is to have a more careful
review of a particular case, and that the IFR undermines that purpose.
Commenters also asserted that Immigration Judges are more likely to
engage in rushed or less detailed decision-making if they believe their
decisions are unlikely to be reviewed substantively by the Board.
Commenters expressed concern that the Board would issue fewer
precedential decisions if considering fewer cases with full procedures.
Commenters stated that precedential decisions are important to provide
clarity and uniformity across immigration adjudications. However, other
commenters disagreed and asserted that fewer precedential decisions
would be preferable--because commenters perceived that precedential
decisions tend to disfavor aliens--and expressed policy-driven concerns
regarding the IFR's stated goal of focusing Board resources to permit
the Board to issue more precedential decisions.
Response: The Department disagrees with commenters that this rule
prevents aliens from raising alleged factual or legal errors for
correction. First, nothing in this rule prevents the Board from
accepting an appeal for further review and full briefing where an alien
identifies errors of law or fact in the underlying Immigration Judge
decision. Second, this rule does not change the availability of
existing procedures for seeking error correction through a motion to
reconsider. Indeed, aliens have a statutory right to file a motion to
reconsider a decision determining that an alien is removable from the
United States. INA 240(c)(6), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(6). Such motions allow
aliens to ``specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order.''
INA 240(c)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(6)(C). To the extent that an alien
feels unable to raise an error of law or fact through a Notice of
Appeal, he or she may do so through a motion to reconsider. Third, this
rule does not change existing Federal court review of issues over which
the Federal courts have jurisdiction. See INA 242, 8 U.S.C. 1252.
Accordingly, several avenues remain available for an alien to raise an
alleged error in an Immigration Judge's decision.
Further, commenters' suggestion that Board review is necessary to
correct errors that may arise as a result of concerns related to EOIR's
personnel practices and training are misplaced.\17\ Immigration Judges
must be qualified, are evaluated through a competitive process before
being selected for their role, and receive significant training before
being appointed to the bench. See 8 CFR 1003.0(b)(1)(vii) (stating that
the Director has authority to ``[p]rovide for comprehensive, continuing
training and support for Board members, immigration judges, and EOIR
staff in order to promote the quality and consistency of
adjudications''), 1003.9(b)(2) (providing the Chief Immigration Judge
with authority to ``[p]rovide for appropriate training of the
immigration judges and other [Office of the Chief Immigration Judge]
staff on the conduct of their powers and duties''), 1003.10(a)
(requirement that Immigration Judges be attorneys); see also EOIR, Fact
Sheet: Immigration Judge Training Fact Sheet (Aug. 2026), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1513996/dl?inline">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1513996/dl?inline</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/Q3AK-N7ZF">https://perma.cc/Q3AK-N7ZF</a>]. EOIR monitors the performance of Immigration Judges and
Appellate Immigration Judges and has an established process if an
adjudicator's conduct falls short of EOIR's professional
expectations.\18\
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\17\ Many of these comments are also well beyond the scope of
this rule. Moreover, the Department finds insinuations by commenters
that its adjudicators are commonly incompetent or unethical to be
wholly unsupported.
\18\ EOIR, PM 26-03, Judicial Conduct and Professionalism (Mar.
20, 2026), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1432036/dl?inline">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1432036/dl?inline</a>
[<a href="https://perma.cc/FC8R-ZRHS">https://perma.cc/FC8R-ZRHS</a>] (clarifying EOIR's Judicial Complaint
Process for all adjudicators).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, commenters' concerns related to the Board issuing fewer
precedential decisions are unwarranted. As explained in the IFR, one
goal of the streamlining measures adopted in this final rule is to
allow the Board to focus on resolving cases presenting novel or complex
legal issues, and the Department expects that the Board will have
greater bandwidth to issue precedential decisions clarifying the law
for Immigration Judges to ensure consistent adjudications. See 91 FR
5271 (``This change will allow the Board to focus on appeals with
particularly novel or complex legal questions without becoming bogged
down in mine-run or straightforward cases that may already be subject
to being affirmed without an opinion or summarily affirmed.''). The
Department also disagrees with the assertion that precedential cases
will favor one party; the Board adjudicates cases based on the relevant
facts and applicable law using the appropriate standard of review.
[[Page 73884]]
C. Opposition to Specific Rule Provisions
1. Summary Dismissal
a. Due Process Concerns
Comment: Commenters expressed concern that the IFR's summary
dismissal procedures undermine an alien's due-process rights by
prioritizing efficiency at the expense of constitutional protections.
According to these commenters, the IFR's summary dismissal procedures
effectively deprive aliens of due process by eliminating
individualized, meaningful review of most Board appeals. Commenters
claimed this procedure diminishes the Board's function from an
appellate tribunal into a discretionary screening body that will
essentially ``rubber stamp'' Immigration Judge decisions through
summary dismissal. Commenters similarly asserted that by making
meaningful review of appeals by the Board discretionary rather than a
guaranteed right, the IFR sacrifices fundamental fairness for the sake
of efficiency.
Commenters further stated that the IFR's summary dismissal
procedures restricting meaningful review by the Board will force aliens
to seek judicial review in Federal court as the only recourse to
meaningful review of their cases. However, commenters also pointed out
that, due to jurisdiction stripping provisions in the INA, Federal
courts do not have jurisdiction to review Immigration Judge decisions
on discretionary applications for relief, such as adjustment of status.
Commenters explained that if cases involving discretionary applications
for relief are subjected to default summary dismissal, then the
decisions in those cases are final and aliens will not have an
opportunity to seek meaningful review of the discretionary decisions
made in their cases.
Another commenter raised due-process concerns in cases involving a
bilateral or multilateral agreement as described in section
208(a)(2)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(A) (``Asylum Cooperative
Agreement'' or ``ACA''), asserting that Immigration Judge review is
limited in those cases and that the Board is unlikely to accept such
cases for review under the IFR's provisions, leaving only Federal court
review, at which point aliens may be subject to prolonged detention.
Separately, commenters stated that the IFR undermines the purpose
of the DOJ Recognition and Accreditation program and the work of
nonprofit legal service providers. Additionally, commenters also stated
that the Department did not adequately consider or address the fact
that aliens will have more limited access to representation before the
Federal courts because EOIR authorizes Accredited Representatives to
provide immigration legal services before administrative bodies, but
they cannot provide representation in Federal court.
Further, as several commenters noted, when an alien files an appeal
before the Board, he or she is generally subject to an automatic stay
of removal pending adjudication of the appeal. However, in the Federal
courts, aliens are not subject to automatic stays of removal while
their PFRs are pending. INA 242(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(3)(B).
Therefore, if an alien's case is summarily dismissed under the IFR, and
he or she seeks judicial review of his or her case before the Federal
courts, the alien must file a motion requesting a discretionary stay of
removal. If the alien's request for a discretionary stay of removal is
denied, the alien could be removed before the Federal court issues a
decision.
Response: The Department disagrees that the IFR's summary dismissal
procedures violate due process. As a general matter, comments on this
issue either proceeded from a flawed or inaccurate understanding of due
process in immigration proceedings or highlighted issues that exist
under the current regulations, which are unaffected by the rule.
As an initial point, the well-established definition of ``due
process'' is notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See,
e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970). Neither of those
principles is violated by the rule. Nothing in this rule alters the
substantial procedural protections available to aliens when presenting
their claims before an Immigration Judge. See generally INA 240(b)(4),
8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(4). And, as discussed further below in this section,
there is no constitutional due process right entitling an alien to an
administrative appeal before the Board. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228,
242 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also Alexander-Mendoza v. Att'y Gen.,
55 F.4th 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2022) (``An alien's right to
administratively appeal a removal order is not grounded in the
Constitution.''). Nevertheless, beyond the underlying proceedings
before an Immigration Judge, which themselves guarantee due process
before EOIR, aliens still have notice of the right to appeal to the
Board, and they still have a meaningful opportunity to do so. That the
rule no longer guarantees that the Board will take more than a certain
amount of time to decide an appeal does not change those fundamental
facts.
However, many commenters used the term ``due process'' in a
different, outcome-determinative sense--e.g., an alien who is not
granted relief or protection necessarily did not receive due
process.\19\ Further, many commenters considered ``due process'' on a
continuum related to outcomes, such that their criticisms were couched
in terms of ``due process'' because, according to commenters, ``due
process'' means more favorable outcomes for aliens. Yet, due process is
not measured by outcome, and viewing due process through a results-
oriented lens is incorrect. See, e.g., Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321 (1985) (noting that ``we must
keep in mind . . . that the very nature of the due process inquiry
indicates that the fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does
not turn on the result obtained in any individual case''). Because this
is not the appropriate view of due process implicated by the rule, the
Department strongly disagrees with commenters' assertions that the rule
violates due process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Indeed, few--if any--of the commenters acknowledged that
the government has a compelling interest in administering and
enforcing the law as well as in decisional finality, underscoring
both the inappropriate, results-oriented focus of their due process
arguments and the overall unpersuasiveness of their comments on this
topic.
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The Department emphasizes that the summary dismissal procedures
employed by this rule are simply common-sense measures to help address
the backlog of immigration cases pending before the Board and ensure
efficient processing of cases moving forward. These procedures increase
efficiency by streamlining appellate review of Immigration Judge
decisions and promote fairness through expeditious review of
meritorious claims. Prior to this rule, review of such cases would have
been delayed behind a backlog of meritless claims. Importantly, the
rule's summary dismissal procedures affect only the Board's review
process, which exists only as an exercise of the Attorney General's
discretion, not as a result of any constitutional requirement. Put more
directly, there is no constitutional due process right entitling an
alien to an administrative appeal before the Board. Dia, 353 F.3d at
242 (quoting Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 376 (1st Cir. 2003));
Guentchev v. INS, 77 F.3d 1036, 1037-38 (7th Cir. 1996); see also
Alexander-Mendoza, 55 F.4th at 204.
Congress has afforded aliens subject to removal the right to a
trial-type
[[Page 73885]]
hearing (removal proceedings) before an Immigration Judge. See INA 240,
8 U.S.C. 1229a. Congress has also provided aliens with substantial
procedural protections during removal proceedings to ensure that due
process is not undermined, including notice of the charges against
them, the right to be represented by counsel, and the right to examine
and present evidence, among others. See generally INA 239, 240, 8
U.S.C. 1229, 1229a.
Thus, the provisions in the INA ensure removal proceedings are
conducted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner to afford
aliens full and fair hearings in accordance with standards of due
process. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires nothing
more. See Antia-Perea v. Holder, 768 F.3d 647, 656 (7th Cir. 2014)
(``Any proceeding that meets the requirements of the [INA] also
satisfies the requirements of constitutional due process.''). And, as
already noted, due process does not require substantive review of every
determination made by an Immigration Judge in removal proceedings. See,
e.g., Dia, 353 F.3d at 242; Guentchev, 77 F.3d at 1037.
Furthermore, the Department finds commenters' assertion that aliens
will be deprived of due process because they will be unable to seek
meaningful review of decisions on discretionary applications for relief
before the Federal courts after summary dismissal is meritless.
Fundamentally, there is no constitutionally protected due process
interest in purely discretionary forms of relief. Alkotof v. U.S. Att'y
Gen., 106 F.4th 1289, 1298 (11th Cir. 2024). Moreover, Federal courts
retain jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims and questions of
law raised in a PFR of a discretionary decision. See INA 242(a)(2)(D),
8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D). And to the extent a discretionary decision
turns on a factual determination, aliens retain their statutory right
to file a motion to reconsider with the Immigration Judge. See INA
240(c)(6), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(6).
The Department similarly disagrees with commenters' generalized due
process concerns about detention and the availability of counsel before
the Federal courts. Nothing in this rule affects detention decisions
made by DHS, EOIR, or the Federal courts, nor prevents aliens from
obtaining counsel for the PFR process. Moreover, the rule does not
affect the Department's Recognition and Accreditation Program at all,
nor does it prohibit Accredited Representatives from providing
representation to aliens on appeal. To the extent commenters have
concerns about the lack of representation in Federal court, those
concerns (1) reflect the status quo, which is unchanged by the rule and
(2) are beyond the authority of EOIR to address.
Lastly, although commenters may prefer an automatic stay at the
Board to a discretionary stay before the Federal courts, they have not
alleged any colorable argument as to why a Federal court's denial of a
motion for stay amounts to a due process violation. Congress explicitly
made such stays discretionary, see INA 242(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C.
1252(b)(3)(B), and this rule in no way affects Federal court
adjudication of any such stay motions. See generally Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009) (explaining stay factors in the PFR
context). Moreover, the scenario raised by commenters already existed
prior to the promulgation of the IFR--i.e., once the Board dismisses or
denies an appeal of a removal order, then the removal order is subject
to execution, absent a stay from a Federal court--and nothing in this
rule would alter that situation. Further, the Department is unaware of
any creditable argument that the status quo constitutes a due process
violation. To be sure, aliens may not receive as lengthy a stay of
removal from the Board as they currently enjoy, but a reduction in the
length of a stay does not change the conclusion. If the Board's
decision results in an administratively final removal order, then
affected aliens will need to seek a further stay from Federal courts,
just as they are required to do now in such circumstances.
Moreover, longstanding Board precedent recognizes that the stay of
removal that accompanies an appeal to the Board encourages frivolous
appeals. See Matter of Holguin, 13 I&N Dec. 423, 424 (BIA 1969). The
Board has been combatting appellate delays for over 55 years, and
commenters' desires for continued delays are simply unpersuasive,
particularly in light of the Board's increasing backlog of cases. See
id. at 424-25 (``Frivolous and dilatory appeals are extremely wasteful
of . . . this Board's limited resources. They require needless
transcription of the records of deportation hearings. They impinge upon
the time and professional attention needed for truly meritorious cases,
of which there are many. Effective administration of the immigration
laws requires that we discourage frivolous appeals. We try to do this
by expediting our consideration and decision in appeals of that
sort.'').
b. Statutory Concerns
Comment: Numerous commenters expressed concern that the IFR's
summary dismissal procedures violate the INA. Commenters stated that
the INA creates a statutory right to ``meaningful'' administrative
review before the Board, citing for example, to sections 101(a)(47)(B),
240(c)(4)(C) and (c)(5), and 292 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(47)(B),
1229a(c)(4)(C) and (c)(5), and 1362, as well as Supreme Court precedent
such as DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), and Garland v. Ming
Dai, 593 U.S. 357 (2021). Commenters claimed that the IFR's summary
dismissal procedures violate this statutory right to appeal by treating
such appeals as discretionary, with many appeals likely to be summarily
dismissed without any review.
Further, some commenters claimed that certain INA provisions also
provide for baseline procedural requirements. For example, commenters
pointed to language in section 101(a)(47)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(47)(B), referencing a ``determination'' by the Board
``affirming'' an order as requiring a substantive review and decision
on each appeal. Similarly, commenters argued that the statutory right
to counsel ``in any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General'' in
section 292 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1362, and the rebuttable presumption
of credibility ``on appeal'' in section 240(c)(4)(C) of the Act, 8
U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4)(C), would be rendered superfluous if the Board did
not conduct a substantive review in each case. Also, commenters
asserted, Congress would not have set such a significant Board appeal
filing fee in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act \20\ if appeals were going
to be summarily dismissed as the default.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ See generally One Big Beautiful Bill Act, Public Law 119-
21, sec. 100013(d)-(e), 139 Stat. 72 (2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters further stated that the IFR's summary dismissal
procedures are contrary to the INA's exhaustion requirements in section
242(d)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1), because the summary
dismissal procedures make the Board's administrative appeal process
discretionary, which conflicts with the exhaustion statute's references
to exhausting all administrative ``remedies'' that are available to the
alien ``as of right.'' Citing Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411
(2023), commenters explained that this statutory language provides an
administrative remedy through the Board appeal process as a matter of
right, and they argued that the IFR's summary dismissal procedures
violate this right by treating appeals as discretionary by default,
thereby preventing aliens from receiving meaningful review of their
claims.
[[Page 73886]]
Commenters further argued that to hold otherwise would render section
242(d)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1), superfluous, as there are no
other administrative remedies available under the INA for aliens in
removal proceedings to exhaust other than a Board appeal.
Response: The Department disagrees with commenters that the IFR's
summary dismissal procedures violate the INA. As an initial matter,
commenters mischaracterize the appellate process contained in the rule
as discretionary; it is not. The rule still allows an alien to file an
appeal and requires the Board to review the appeal. It does not
authorize the Board to reject an appeal out of hand without review, as
a matter of discretion or otherwise. This mischaracterization compounds
commenters' confusion of an alien's ability to file an appeal--which
the rule does not alter--with an alien's alleged entitlement to a non-
summary decision by the Board, which is not located in any text of the
INA. Assuming there is a statutory right to an appeal to the Board
located in the INA,\21\ this rule does not alter that right. In other
words, this rule's summary dismissal procedures do not address an
alien's ability to file an appeal; rather, the rule modifies the
Board's procedures after such an appeal has been filed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ The Department does not concede such a statutory right
exists. But even if it does, ``[b]ased on the fact that [8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(47)(B)] contains the only mention of the BIA in the INA, it
seems clear that Congress has left all procedural aspects of the
BIA, especially how it hears cases, entirely to the Attorney
General's discretion.'' Dia, 353 F.3d at 237.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, as some commenters acknowledged, the INA does not contain
any explicit references to--let alone mandates for--specific Board
procedures. Rather, the statute contains one explicit reference to the
Board, see INA 101(a)(47)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(47)(B), and a handful of
cursory references to ``appeals'' or ``administrative appeals,'' see,
e.g., INA 208(d)(5)(A)(iii)-(iv), 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii)-(iv); INA
238(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1228(a)(3)(A); INA 240(c)(5), 8 U.S.C.
1229a(c)(5); INA 292, 8 U.S.C. 1362.
Most importantly, far from creating a detailed statutory framework
for administrative appeals, these provisions are silent as to the form
or structure of such appeals. Indeed, Congress could have--and can at
any time--provide for specific procedures for administrative appeals,
just as Congress provided extensive procedures for removal proceedings
before Immigration Judges. See INA 240, 8 U.S.C. 1229a et seq. But
Congress has not done so. Rather, to the extent the statute creates any
right to an administrative appeal, Congress has remained silent as to
the procedures for adjudicating any such appeals; those procedures are
thus left to the Attorney General to prescribe by regulation. See HSA
1102, 116 Stat. at 2273-74; INA 103(g)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1103(g)(2); see
also Dia, 353 F.3d at 237; Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d
272, 280 (4th Cir. 2004) (``One section of the INA refers to the
existence of the BIA . . . and other sections refer to an
administrative appeal for asylum seekers . . . . But the INA is simply
silent as to what procedures should apply to that appeal . . . . This
fact suggests that the INA vests broad discretion in the Attorney
General to fashion the procedures of the BIA.'').
So long as such procedures are constitutionally permissible and
such regulations comply with the APA--as the Department believes the
IFR and this final rule are and do--the Attorney General has the full
authority to modify such procedures by regulation to address problems
as they arise. See Zhang v. Dep't of Justice, 362 F.3d 155, 157 (2d
Cir. 2004); Blanco, 362 F.3d at 280; see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (``Even
apart from the Administrative Procedure Act this Court has for more
than four decades emphasized that the formulation of procedures was
basically to be left within the discretion of the agencies to which
Congress had confided the responsibility for substantive judgments.'').
Under the Attorney General's authority, the Department has
carefully reviewed Board processes in an attempt to address critical
backlogs at the Board, just as it did over 25 years ago in its past
streamlining efforts, see, e.g., Executive Office for Immigration
Review; Board of Immigration Appeals; Streamlining, 64 FR 56135, 56137-
38 (Oct. 18, 1999), and attempted to further address in 2020, see
Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration
Proceedings; Administrative Closure, 85 FR 81588 (Dec. 16, 2020).
Recognizing that past streamlining efforts, while beneficial, have not
kept pace with unprecedented appeal numbers, the Department understood
that dramatic changes were necessary. See 91 FR 5268-70. Those changes
include, as relevant here, shifting the administrative appellate
process to expand the use of summary dismissal to allow the Board to
focus its resources on issuing written opinions in cases presenting
novel or complex legal issues. The Department believes that this
summary dismissal change will create significant efficiencies and make
a meaningful difference in addressing the Board's lengthy backlog.
Additionally, the Department disagrees that any of the statutory
references or cases cited by commenters create any specific procedural
requirements before the Board. Some commenters pointed to references in
section 101(a)(47)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(47)(B), to a
``determination'' by the Board ``affirming'' an order as creating
requirements for the Board to review each appeal and issue a
substantive opinion. However, commenters read too much into this
language, and that argument has been rejected by Federal courts
previously during litigation over prior regulations streamlining Board
procedures. See, e.g., Dia, 353 F.3d at 237 (explaining that section
101(a)(47)(B) ``says absolutely nothing about procedures to be employed
by the BIA, or the right to, or manner of, review generally''). This
definitional language simply explains when an order of deportation is
final, which is when a Board's order is issued or, if no appeal is
taken, when the appeal period ends. In no way does this language convey
any substantive requirements for what such a Board order must contain,
much less the procedures by which the Board must issue an order.
Atemnkeng v. Barr, 948 F.3d 231, 239 (4th Cir. 2020); Blanco, 362 F.3d
at 280; Dia, 353 F.3d at 237.
Furthermore, this rule is consistent with the INA's language. Under
this rule's summary dismissal procedures, if the Board does not vote en
banc to accept an appeal for full briefing and further review, the
Board will dismiss the appeal without opinion by issuing an order
summarily dismissing the alien's appeal. However, in no way does that
suggest that the Board did not review the appeal; instead, it simply
means the Board did not find it worthy of further consideration. See 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(2)(ii).
Commenters' references to other sections of the INA are similarly
misplaced. The ability to retain counsel during the Board appeals
process, INA 292, 8 U.S.C. 1362, or to maintain a rebuttable
presumption of credibility on appeal, INA 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), are discrete provisions that provide exactly what
they state--no more, no less. Neither provision is affected by the
IFR's summary dismissal procedures; aliens continue to have the
statutory right to counsel during the Board appeals process, as well as
a rebuttable presumption of credibility during the appeals process,
when applicable.
[[Page 73887]]
Similarly, commenters argued that the INA's exhaustion statute for
Federal court review in section 242(d)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
1252(d)(1), requires aliens to exhaust administrative remedies
available ``as of right,'' which in turn requires Board appeals to be
treated as a legal entitlement with no discretion to deny review under
Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 424-26. However, as explained in the IFR,
the Department drafted the IFR with the intention that the rule ``would
not change any existing understandings regarding when a removal order
becomes final or when a petition for review must be filed.'' See 91 FR
5271. Put differently, nothing about the rule affects section 242(d)(1)
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1), because the rule does not affect an
alien's ability to seek review by the Board.
In sum, ``[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely
compelling circumstances, the administrative agencies should be free to
fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry
capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.''
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 543 (internal quotations
omitted). That is all the Department has done here.
c. Additional Concerns With Summary Dismissal
Commenters raised a number of additional miscellaneous concerns
regarding the IFR's summary dismissal procedures. The Department
acknowledges the comments and has thoroughly considered them; however,
none is persuasive, and the criticisms in them are vastly outweighed by
the efficiency benefits that the rule would provide.
Comment: Commenters stated that summarily dismissing most appeals
will allow erroneous legal decisions by Immigration Judges to stand,
thereby undermining EOIR's mission to adjudicate immigration cases by
fairly and uniformly interpreting immigration laws, as well as likely
leading to erroneous removals.
Response: If an alien's appeal to the Board is summarily dismissed,
the alien may raise any alleged legal errors made by the agency before
the Federal circuit courts for further review, except where Congress
has expressly stated that Federal court review is not available.
Additionally, the alien may file a motion to reconsider before the
Immigration Court or the Board, as applicable. Under the current
procedures, there is also a risk of erroneous decisions by Immigration
Judges being affirmed by the Board.\22\ Because the Board will still
review each appeal, however, the rule does not alter the possibility of
the Board making an erroneous decision. Moreover, as is the case now,
erroneous decisions by the Board will still be subject to correction by
Federal courts.
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\22\ Indeed, legal error is inherent in any system of
adjudication and is impossible to eliminate--even by an appeals
court. C.f. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 427 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (``There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme
Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts
would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible,
but we are infallible only because we are final.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comment: Commenters similarly noted that summary dismissal will
functionally exhaust all appeal options for most types of claims for
discretionary immigration relief.
Response: This point describes the situation currently, which is
unchanged by the rule. Once the Board rules on an appeal regarding a
discretionary form of relief other than asylum, there is limited
recourse to Federal court. The rule does not alter that dynamic.
Comment: Commenters argued that Federal court review is not
sufficient, as Federal courts have narrower jurisdiction and use more
deferential standards of review than the Board, and that PFRs serve a
fundamentally different purpose: to review the appellate determinations
made by the Board.
Response: The scope of Federal court review, including comments
related to jurisdiction and applicable standards of review, is outside
the scope of the rule, and the Department declines to predict how
Federal courts will interpret the provisions of the rule. The
Department emphasizes, however, that this rule does not change any
procedures related to seeking Federal court review or existing
substantive standards that constrain Federal court jurisdiction.
Nothing in this rule affects the baseline process of filing a PFR
to allege errors in the underlying proceedings. Immigration Judges will
continue to issue decisions in removal proceedings, which may then be
addressed by the Board through a summary dismissal order or an
adjudication with briefing. Regardless of how the Board chooses to
handle a specific appeal, the alien will then maintain the existing
ability to further file a PFR of that decision with the relevant
Federal court, which will accept briefing and provide further review of
the alleged issues according to existing procedures. See, e.g., INA
242(b), 8 U.S.C. 1252(b) (providing requirements and standards for
PFRs).
With regard to the alleged limitations of Federal court review, the
Department notes that Congress explicitly exempted from review denials
of certain discretionary forms of relief and factual issues when the
alien is removable on certain criminal grounds. See INA 242(a)(2)(B)-
(D); 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)-(D). If Congress wished to provide specific
procedures for administrative review of such claims in lieu of or in
addition to Federal court review, or to provide certain standards of
review for any administrative appeals, it could certainly do so; but it
has not. Instead, Congress chose to explicitly limit Federal court
review while leaving any administrative appellate processes and
standards to the Attorney General. See, e.g., Dia, 353 F.3d at 237
(``[I]t seems clear that Congress has left all procedural aspects of
the BIA, especially how it hears cases, entirely to the Attorney
General's discretion.''). As a result, in implementing this rule's
summary dismissal procedures, the Department balanced any limitations
on the availability of Federal court review, among other concerns, with
the strong need to address the Board's growing backlog of
overwhelmingly straightforward cases. See 91 FR 5271.
In doing so, the Department also notes that, in addition to PFRs in
the Federal courts, Congress explicitly provided aliens with a
statutory right to file a motion to reconsider an Immigration Judge's
removability decision. See INA 240(c)(6), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(6). As the
statute clearly states, such motions are intended to address ``errors
of law or fact in the previous order . . . .'' INA 240(c)(6)(C), 8
U.S.C. 1229a(c)(6)(C). Thus, to address the kinds of potential
Immigration Judge errors raised by commenters, Congress provided aliens
with an additional statutory process for correcting such errors.
Comment: Commenters stated that the IFR did not include a timeline
for single Board members to refer a case for consideration by the Board
en banc. Commenters asserted that this could result in a scenario where
a case is automatically dismissed because the timeline to vote to
consider an appeal has passed. Commenters also noted that if the Board
does not have a quorum, it will be unable to vote to consider an
appeal, and all cases would be summarily dismissed until a quorum is
available. Commenters worried that meritorious appeals could be
summarily dismissed if the Board lacks sufficient members.
Alternatively, commenters claimed that without a quorum, DHS would
instead refer all potential Board appeals to the Attorney General in
lieu of Board review.
Response: The Department is confident that the Board will have no
[[Page 73888]]
issues establishing a quorum to vote on whether to accept appeals for
full briefing and further consideration and thus does not share
commenters' concerns that DHS will make large numbers of referrals
directly to the Attorney General to bypass the Board. Further, it is
unnecessary to provide specific timelines for single member referrals
in this rule, as the Department expects that the Board will implement
internal case-processing procedures to ensure compliance with the
timelines in this rule.
Comment: Commenters noted that the rule does not contain any
standards for determining whether an issue is sufficiently novel or
complex to warrant further Board adjudication.
Response: There is no universal standard for determining novelty or
complexity, and the Department believes that it is an issue best
reserved for the Board to determine on a case-by-case basis.
The Department also clarifies that the rule itself does not
explicitly limit the Board to only adjudicating ``novel or complex''
issues and, as such, has no need to set any such regulatory standards
interpreting these terms. See 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(2)(ii)(A) (only requiring
a Board vote on whether to accept an appeal for full briefing and
further consideration). Rather, the Department expects that the Board
will, in its discretion, focus its resources on requesting further
briefing and issuing written opinions in appeals presenting novel or
complex legal or factual issues, rather than mine-run appeals involving
issues sufficiently addressed by the Immigration Judge or controlled by
existing Board or Federal court precedent.
Comment: Commenters raised concerns that summary dismissal will
occur before briefing, which is where novel or complex legal issues
often surface. Commenters also stated that Board members will have to
vote whether to accept a case for adjudication without the benefit of a
full record or briefing, which will prevent Board members from fully
determining the legal and factual issues in the proceedings before the
Immigration Judge.
Response: These comments proceeded from erroneous factual premises.
First, even under current rules, issues must be raised in the Notice of
Appeal--before briefing--or else they will be waived. Thus, if an issue
does not surface until briefing, it will be waived anyway, and the
Board will not consider it. Consequently, the commenters' concerns are
misplaced.
Second, the Board will have the full record of proceedings from the
Immigration Court when it considers the appeal, including the
Immigration Judge's written decision, if applicable, as well as access
to the hearing recordings and the Notice of Appeal, which, for purposes
of notifying the Board of the legal and factual issues for review,
serves a similar function to the appellant's brief, as it must identify
the alleged errors made by the Immigration Judge. Should the Board
decide it needs further information and orders briefing, the appellant
would expand upon those issues in his or her brief. See Matter of
Valencia, 19 I&N Dec. 354, 355 (BIA 1986) (``Depending on the
complexity of the issues raised, a brief may be essential to an
adequate presentation of the appeal. In all cases, however, the reasons
for an appeal must be meaningfully identified on the Notice of
Appeal.'').
Novel or complex issues or obvious errors in an Immigration Judge
decision can be easily signaled in a Notice of Appeal. For example,
underlying criminal convictions often create complex issues in
immigration law, but those issues can be succinctly summarized in the
Notice of Appeal sufficient to flag for the Board a specific legal
issue on which the Board could determine whether to accept the appeal
for full briefing and further review. If the Board then voted
affirmatively, a briefing schedule would subsequently be issued to
fully develop the arguments.
Comment: Commenters stated that summary dismissal would affect
cases where administrative review is most necessary, such as appeals
filed pro se or under emergency conditions.
Response: The Board will determine whether fulsome review is
necessary, and there is no statutory, regulatory, or other legal basis
to mandate that all appeals of a particular category automatically
receive full review. Moreover, the Department does not believe that
there is a policy justification weighing in favor of requiring full
briefing of appeals filed by certain classes of aliens. The most
efficient use of the Board's limited resources is to decide appeals
involving novel or complex legal or factual situations. Commenters
offered no data indicating that the personal characteristics of a
specific alien (for example, pro se or detained) make the substantive
legal basis of the alien's appeal any more likely to involve such
issues. Thus, rather than treating certain categories of aliens as
automatically entitled to further consideration after additional
briefing, it is better policy for the Board to consider all appeals
equally and determine whether the legal claims themselves merit further
consideration.
Comment: Commenters also stated that the rule would favor DHS. For
example, because a single Board member would decide whether to refer a
case to en banc review solely based on the Notice of Appeal, commenters
claimed that aliens will be required to fully frame issues from the
outset, but DHS will not have an obligation to fully respond unless the
Board orders briefing.
Response: Commenters either misunderstood the rule or were
mischaracterizing it, but in either case, the comments proceeded from a
false premise. The rule does not favor either party. DHS has the same
obligations as an alien when it is the party filing the appeal, and the
alien is in the same position as DHS when an alien files an appeal. The
rule does not provide DHS with any special treatment. The Board's
decision to accept a case for full briefing and further review will be
based solely on the Board's determination that the case would benefit
from further review, and not who the filing party is. Moreover, if a
case is accepted for full briefing and further review, both parties
will have the ability to file briefs explaining their position on the
relevant issues on appeal. These comments are misplaced.
Comment: Relatedly, commenters expressed concerns that aliens would
not have an opportunity to file a written response to DHS-filed Notices
of Appeal before the Board decides whether to accept the appeal.
Specifically, commenters were concerned that this would give DHS
disproportionate power to frame issues in such a way that the Board
will accept their appeals, thereby resulting in decisions that narrow
the rights of aliens.
Response: Again, these comments mischaracterize the rule. Both
parties, regardless of which one is the appellant, are subject to the
same regulations and have the same responsibilities, depending on the
procedural posture of the case. And the parties will have an
opportunity to submit briefs in most cases not summarily dismissed by
the Board,\23\ so no decision will result from such appeals without the
alien having an opportunity to respond to the issues raised in DHS's
Notice of Appeal, an
[[Page 73889]]
aspect of the process that commenters failed to acknowledge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ The Board's longstanding practice has been to not issue a
separate briefing schedule for most interlocutory appeals, though
the party against whom such an appeal is sought may always file an
opposition to the appeal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comment: Commenters also argued that the recently increased filing
fee for appeals is exceedingly high for appeals that, in a majority of
cases, would be summarily dismissed by the Board, and that the
Department should therefore reduce or eliminate the fee. Relatedly,
commenters claimed that restrictions on fee waivers would make such
waivers largely unavailable, citing the Board's recent decision in
Matter of Garcia Martinez, 29 I&N Dec. 169 (BIA 2025).
Response: Comments on Department fees are beyond the scope of this
rulemaking; however, the Department has fully considered the impact of
the increased fees--as well as the continued availability of fee
waivers--in promulgating this rule and has determined that such an
impact on aliens does not outweigh the beneficial effects of the rule.
See 91 FR 5270 n.10. The Department notes that Congress--not the
Department--recently increased the appeal filing fee before the Board.
See One Big Beautiful Bill Act, Public Law 119-21, sec. 100013(d)-(e),
139 Stat. 72 (2025) (``OBBBA''). As such, the Department has no ability
to change this fee. The Department also disagrees with commenters that
the increased fee justifies any particular type or amount of
administrative review. As explained in the IFR and earlier in this
section of this preamble, Congress left Board procedures to the
Attorney General to address through regulation, and the Department has
determined that the procedures in this rule best address the Board's
overwhelming caseload. See 91 FR 5268.
Moreover, neither OBBBA nor this rule affects the ability of aliens
to request fee waivers under existing regulations. See 8 CFR
1003.8(a)(3). The Department disagrees with commenters' allegations
regarding the availability of fee waivers. Although this rule does not
make any changes to fee waivers, the Department disagrees with
commenters' characterization of the Board's decision in Matter of
Garcia Martinez, which at base merely explains that aliens requesting a
fee waiver must provide sufficient evidence of their inability to pay
the requisite filing fee. See 29 I&N Dec. at 171-72.
Comment: Commenters further questioned the IFR's justification that
the summary dismissal changes would help offset asymmetry in review
available to aliens and DHS. Commenters stated that, if DHS appeals are
subject to summary dismissal at the same rate as appeals from aliens,
the status quo would remain the same, with one more level of review
available to aliens than DHS.
Commenters raised concerns that the IFR's summary dismissal
procedures will occur before transcripts are produced, which prevents
aliens from identifying issues evident in the transcript, including
potential due process concerns. As such, commenters stated that aliens
will need access to the transcript to survive summary dismissal at the
Notice of Appeal stage. Commenters also questioned whether transcripts
would be produced for the PFR process before the Federal courts. If so,
commenters claimed that any such transcript production could delay
Federal court review by months or years.
Response: The Department reiterates that the rule applies to both
parties. Thus, its requirements apply equally to DHS and an alien, and
there is no expectation that one party or the other will benefit from
the rule's changes.
EOIR regulations already provide for several categories of summary
dismissals of appeals to the Board without the production of a
transcript, see, e.g., 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(2)(A), (C), (F), (G), (H), so
the addition of another category does not alter the fundamental
structural dynamic.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ The Board also considers several types of appeals already
that do not have transcripts, e.g., appeals of motion to reopen and
reconsider decisions, interlocutory appeals, appeals of custody
redetermination decisions, and appeals of certain visa decisions by
DHS. Commenters failed to acknowledge that these other categories of
appeals are processed without any evident concerns even though they
do not generate transcripts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, it has long been the case that issues must be raised in
the Notice of Appeal or risk summary dismissal; thus, even under pre-
IFR procedures, the parties could not wait until a transcript is
produced to raise issues. See 8 CFR 3.3(b) (1997), adopted by Executive
Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in Immigration
Proceedings, 61 FR 18900, 18906 (Apr. 29, 1996); 8 CFR 1003.3(b) (2026)
(``The party taking the appeal must identify the reasons for the appeal
in the Notice of Appeal (Form EOIR-26 or Form EOIR-29) or in any
attachments thereto, in order to avoid summary dismissal pursuant to
Sec. 1003.1(d)(2)(i).'').
To be clear, the Board does not--and did not prior to this rule--
produce transcripts at the Notice of Appeal stage. Rather, aliens
filing a Notice of Appeal focus on defects in the Immigration Judge's
decision and, only once an appeal is accepted for full briefing and
further review and docketed--and not summarily dismissed under an
existing provision--is a transcript of proceedings produced, provided
the appeal warrants a transcript in the first instance.\25\ This rule
follows that general understanding: aliens will continue to allege
errors in the Immigration Judge's decision in their Notice of Appeal
and, like before, if an alien believes that any errors were the result
of testimonial issues necessitating review of the transcripts, he or
she can explain this in the Notice of Appeal and the Board will then
determine whether such issues warrant further review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ For example, a transcript is generally not prepared for
interlocutory appeals, appeals of motion to reopen decisions by
Immigration Judges, custody redetermination appeals, and appeals of
visa petition decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To the extent there are concerns about the potential for defective
transcripts, those will always exist, regardless of this rule, and can
be addressed on a case-by-case basis, as they are now. In short, none
of the concerns about transcripts outweigh the efficiency benefits of
the rule. Finally, as to commenters' questions about transcripts during
the PFR process, EOIR will produce transcripts for PFRs if needed, and
there is no expectation that such production would delay Federal court
review by any significant amount of time.
Comment: One commenter expressed confusion over which EOIR
determination the Federal courts will review after summary dismissal.
Response: To address the commenter's confusion over which EOIR
determination Federal courts will review, the Department notes this
final rule's changes to 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(2)(ii). The Department is
revising 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(2)(ii) to clarify the language the Board will
include in a summary dismissal order issued under that paragraph and
the effect of such a summary dismissal order for Federal court review.
The added language--which is similar to longstanding language
applicable in cases where the Board affirms a decision without
opinion--clarifies that a summary dismissal order shall be deemed to
reflect the same considerations as an order where the Board affirms a
decision without opinion: that the result reached in the decision was
correct, without necessarily implying approval of all the reasoning;
that any errors were harmless or nonmaterial; and that the issues are
either squarely controlled by existing Board or Federal court precedent
and do not present the application of precedent to a novel factual
situation or the factual and legal issues raised on appeal are not so
[[Page 73890]]
substantial to warrant a written opinion. See 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(2)(ii)(C).
Comment: Commenters provided recommendations related to the summary
dismissal provisions, asserting that the recommendations would improve
transparency and preserve core adjudicatory functions while aligning
with the Department's efficiency goal. Commenters suggested
establishing criteria to guide the selection of cases for review with
briefing, stating that while discretion is essential, the lack of any
established criteria could lead to inconsistency. Commenters stated
that regular sampling and assessment would allow the agency to refine
its selection process.
Response: The Department considered adopting regulatory criteria to
guide the Board's consideration whether to summarily dismiss appeals
but ultimately determined that the Board is best suited to adopt
internal procedures and criteria for selecting cases where further
briefing is necessary for review. The Department agrees that regular
auditing of internal procedures is useful to ensure the success of the
program; however, codifying such a program through rulemaking is
unnecessary, as the Department already has such standard management
practices. See, e.g., 8 CFR 1003.1(e) (``The Chief Appellate
Immigration Judge, under the supervision of the Director, shall be
responsible for the success of the case management system.'').
Comment: Commenters expressed concern that an appellate framework
that consists of a Notice of Appeal followed by summary dismissal may
incentivize unscrupulous attorneys to perform substandard work.
Response: The Department does not share commenters' concerns that
the provisions of this rule will incentivize any attorneys to perform
substandard work, as all practitioners appearing before the Immigration
Courts and the Board remain subject to EOIR's professional conduct
regulations. See, e.g., 8 CFR 1003.101 et seq. Further, State bars may
always analyze and address, or decline to address, a practitioner's
conduct, including any alleged substandard work, according to their own
rules if the practitioner is an attorney subject to their disciplinary
authority.
2. 10-Day Appeal Deadline
a. Due Process Concerns
Comment: Numerous commenters asserted that by shortening the appeal
deadline from 30 days to 10 days, the IFR deprives aliens of their
constitutional guarantee of a full and fair hearing under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by severely restricting their
right to representation by counsel and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard. Commenters asserted these impacts would be particularly acute in
cases of detained aliens, pro se aliens, and unaccompanied alien
children (``UACs'').
Commenters also argued that the 10-day appeal deadline imposed by
the IFR deprives aliens of due process by creating another procedural
barrier to meaningful review, as 10 days, according to commenters, is
an insufficient amount of time for an alien to either apply for a fee
waiver or to gather funds to pay the substantial filing fee for
appeals. Commenters stated that other appellate tribunals provide
longer deadlines to file appeals.
Response: The Department disagrees with commenters' assertion that
the 10-day appeal deadline deprives aliens of due process by
restricting their right to be represented by counsel or to a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.
To begin, commenters misconstrued an alien's right to counsel in
immigration proceedings and the alleged due process implications. Under
the Fifth Amendment, aliens are guaranteed due process in immigration
proceedings, see Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993), but the
Sixth Amendment's right to counsel applies only to ``criminal
prosecutions,'' U.S. Const. amend. VI. Notably, Congress has provided
aliens with substantial due process protections by statute, including
the ``privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government,
by counsel of the alien's choosing who is authorized to practice in [ ]
[immigration] proceedings'' including ``any appeal proceedings before
the Attorney General from any such removal proceedings.'' INA
240(b)(4)(A), 292, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362.
But importantly, an alien's failure to obtain counsel in
immigration proceedings does not constitute a due process violation.
See Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir. 1986). The IFR
focuses entirely on the appellate process before the Board and does not
address or affect an alien's statutory privilege of being represented
by counsel of the alien's choosing, at no expense to the Government,
regardless of whether initially placed into removal proceedings or at
any other point in time during the pendency of the case. See INA
240(b)(4)(A), 292, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362. Moreover, the IFR's
10-day appeal deadline aligns with the existing 10-day statutory
timeframe aliens are afforded to find counsel prior to the initial
immigration hearing after the commencement of immigration proceedings.
INA 239(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229(b)(1). If that timeline is sufficient to
find counsel for the initial hearing, it is unclear why it would not
also be sufficient for an appeal. See generally Dakane v. Att'y Gen.,
399 F.3d 1269, 1273 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005) (``[T]he Supreme Court has
held that [aliens] are ensured a fundamentally fair hearing through
statutory protections provided for by Congress'').
Commenters also artificially limited their due process arguments to
the narrow Board appeal window, rather than acknowledging that Board
appeals are only part of an often-lengthy administrative process before
EOIR. Aliens placed in proceedings before an Immigration Judge are
advised of their right to self-funded counsel and are often provided
continuances to find counsel. See, e.g., 8 CFR 1240.10(a)(1). Removal
proceedings then proceed to determine removability and adjudicate any
potential applications for relief or protection. Only once an
Immigration Judge issues a decision does the appeal period begin to
run. Throughout this entire process, aliens have the ability to retain
counsel. So, arguing that the 10-day appeal period after the conclusion
of removal proceedings is the only relevant period to consider due
process concerns misrepresents the actual, lengthy process of such
cases. Being given a reasonable amount of time to obtain counsel in a
proceeding where counsel is not guaranteed does not rise to the level
of a due process violation. Thus, the Department finds commenters'
allegations that the IFR's 10-day appeal deadline deprives aliens of
due process by restricting their right to counsel are without merit.
The Department similarly finds meritless commenters' assertion that
the IFR's 10-day appeal deadline undermines due process by imposing
procedural barriers that deprive aliens of a meaningful opportunity to
be heard. The Department stresses that the IFR's 10-day appeal deadline
does not prevent any class of aliens--e.g., aliens represented by
counsel, pro se aliens, detained aliens, or UACs--from seeking an
appeal, paying the appeal fee, or applying for a fee waiver. The
procedures for filing an appeal, just as they existed before the IFR,
simply require aliens to complete the appeal form by providing, with
specificity, the reasons for disagreement with the Immigration Judge's
decision. Similarly, this rule does not change an alien's ability to
apply for a fee waiver, which only requires completion of a simple form
listing the alien's monthly income
[[Page 73891]]
sources and expense sources. Likewise, even for those aliens who do not
qualify for a fee waiver, having to pay the requisite appeal fee should
be accounted for throughout their removal proceedings and not come as a
surprise.\26\ None of these requirements--even under a 10-day appeal
period--prevents aliens from having a meaningful opportunity to file a
Board appeal. Thus, even if due process required access to an
administrative appeal, none of these requirements would violate due
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ EOIR notifies aliens that there may be fees associated with
any filed appeals in multiple publicly available locations. See,
e.g., 8 CFR 1103.7; EOIR, Types of Appeals, Motions, and Required
Fees (Feb. 1, 2026), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/types-appeals-motions-and-required-fees">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/types-appeals-motions-and-required-fees</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/V8AD-VJDT">https://perma.cc/V8AD-VJDT</a>]; EOIR, EOIR
Forms & Fees (Feb. 1, 2026), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-forms">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-forms</a>
[<a href="https://perma.cc/2VX5-KCUE">https://perma.cc/2VX5-KCUE</a>]; EOIR, EOIR Payment Portal, <a href="https://epay.eoir.justice.gov/">https://epay.eoir.justice.gov/</a>index [<a href="https://perma.cc/E8QS-QREY">https://perma.cc/E8QS-QREY</a>].
Additionally, both the INA and EOIR's regulations require that
Immigration Judges provide aliens with notice about the appeals
process. See INA 240(c)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(5) (requiring the
Immigration Judge, if ordering an alien removed, to ``inform the
alien of the right to appeal that decision''); 8 CFR 1240.10(a)(3)
(requiring the Immigration Judge to ``[a]scertain that the
respondent has received a copy of appeal rights''). This ordinarily
includes oral and written advisals that a fee may be required for
any such appeals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any due process concerns regarding the 10-day deadline are further
obviated by the availability of electronic filing and electronic fee
payments to EOIR, including the ability of pro se aliens to
electronically file the Notice of Appeal with the Board. See generally
EOIR, Respondent Access Portal, <a href="https://respondentaccess.eoir.justice.gov/en/">https://respondentaccess.eoir.justice.gov/en/</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/7W3Y-JH5R">https://perma.cc/7W3Y-JH5R</a>].
Instead, the 10-day appeal deadline treats all classes of aliens
equally and serves to expedite the appellate process by allowing aliens
to have their appeals reviewed by the Board faster, instead of being
delayed as a result of backlogged claims. This will allow aliens to
receive expeditious final administrative decisions in their cases and
pursue Federal court review faster which, in turn, will aid the Board
in addressing its backlog of pending appeals.
Moreover, the IFR's 10-day appeal deadline only affects the Board's
review process, which is wholly within the authority of the Attorney
General. It does not impact any of the procedural protections afforded
to aliens in immigration proceedings as set by Congress. See INA
240(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(4). The Board is a regulatory creation of
the Attorney General; there is no due process or statutory right
entitling an alien to an administrative appeal before the Board because
the Attorney General has the authority to eliminate the Board entirely
and could delegate his power elsewhere. Guentchev, 77 F.3d at 1037
(``Even litigants in the federal courts are not constitutionally
entitled to multiple layers of review. The Attorney General could
dispense with the Board and delegate her powers to the immigration
judges[.]'').
Comment: Commenters also stated that the Ninth Circuit previously
determined that a 10-day appeal filing deadline violates the Due
Process Clause, citing Gonzales-Julio v. INS, 34 F.3d 820 (9th Cir.
1994). Commenters asserted that in promulgating the IFR, the Department
failed to acknowledge that precedent or explain how the IFR's 10-day
deadline does not violate the same constitutional provision.
Response: The Department believes that commenters misunderstood the
breadth of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Gonzales-Julio and,
regardless, the circumstances underlying the case have changed over the
intervening 30-plus years, such that any due-process concerns raised
regarding a 10-day appeal deadline in that case are no longer
applicable.\27\ In Gonzales-Julio, the Ninth Circuit considered the
case of an alien who lived in Hawaii and had to file a Notice of Appeal
by mail with an office in San Diego, California, within 10 days and
concluded that the alien's due process rights were violated. 34 F.3d at
825. But the facts presented in that case are important. At the time,
the ability to electronically file an appeal did not exist; all
documents had to be filed with the Office of the Chief Immigration
Judge; and filing fees were paid separately to an office of the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. at 822. Further, in cases
where an alien sought a fee waiver, ``the notice of appeal [wa]s sent
directly to the Office and [wa]s not filed until the fee waiver [wa]s
approved.'' Id. Finally, ``no record [wa]s kept of when the notice of
appeal [wa]s received, nor [wa]s a notice of appeal date-stamped upon
receipt.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ As noted above, courts have determined that the Due Process
Clause does not require an opportunity to file an administrative
appeal in immigration proceedings. See, e.g., Dia, 353 F.3d at 242;
Guentchev, 77 F.3d at 1037. The Department acknowledges that because
the Government has nonetheless granted aliens the right to do so, it
cannot impose procedural requirements that unduly restrict that
right. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541
(1985). For the reasons explained below, however, this rule's
procedural changes do not impose any problematic burden on the
pursuit of administrative appeals from decisions of Immigration
Judges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within the context of these now-outdated appeal procedures, the
court concluded that ``[w]here a petitioner residing in Hawaii has only
ten days to appeal an order of deportation, has no control over the
delivery of the mail, and has no control over whether the appeal is
filed upon receipt in the Office of the Immigration Judge (especially
when a fee waiver is requested),'' the alien's due process rights were
violated. Id. at 825. The Ninth Circuit did not hold that a 10-day
filing deadline is per se violative of due process rights in all cases
and under all circumstances. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit in Gonzales-
Julio did not address the possibility of equitable tolling of the
filing deadline, which would obviate the concerns raised, and which may
be available under this rule. See Matter of Morales-Morales, 28 I&N
Dec. 714 (BIA 2023).\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ The Department recognizes that the legal foundation for an
administrative agency to exercise equitable authority such as
equitable tolling is unclear. Nevertheless, current Board precedent
allows for it, and it would mitigate many of the concerns raised by
commenters about ``one-off'' situations in which the new deadline
could affect the exercise of a party's appeal rights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly after the Gonzales-Julio decision, the Eighth Circuit
considered a similar challenge from an alien asserting that the 10-day
period to file an appeal violated her due process rights. See
Talamantes-Penalver v. INS, 51 F.3d 133 (8th Cir. 1995). But the Eighth
Circuit held ``that the ten-day filing deadline comports with due
process, even as applied to aliens living in remote locations who make
reasonable efforts to comply with the regulation.'' Id. at 135.
Seemingly in recognition of the importance of evaluating the facts and
circumstances of each individual case, the court explained that ``[t]he
ten-day filing period arguably could be unconstitutional as applied to
a petitioner in Hawaii, a somewhat `remote' location, but
constitutional as applied to a petitioner in a location not so remote
from the place where the notice of appeal is to be filed.'' Id. at 136.
In determining that the agency's procedures provided sufficient due
process, the Eighth Circuit emphasized the Government's ``significant''
interest in the filing deadline, explaining that filing deadlines aid
the Government in ``bring[ing] litigation to an end'' and
``determin[ing] with certainty when an alien's right to appeal is cut
off and the [Immigration Judge]'s deportation order is conclusive.''
Id. at 137. And, as remains true today, ``[e]nforcement of this
nation's immigration laws is enhanced by the speedy adjudication of
cases and the prompt deportation of offenders.'' Id.
Accordingly, the Department does not read the Ninth Circuit's
holding in
[[Page 73892]]
Gonzales-Julio as precluding the adoption of a 10-day appeal deadline
in this rule. EOIR has made several changes to its appeal filing
procedures since that decision that have alleviated the concerns
identified by the Ninth Circuit. Most significantly, the Board
implemented electronic filing in 2021 and further expanded electronic
filing to allow pro se aliens to file Notices of Appeal with the Board.
91 FR 5272; see also Irigoyen-Briones v. Holder, 644 F.3d 943, 951 (9th
Cir. 2011) (``To protect its important interest in proceeding
expeditiously with these cases, yet avoid subjecting aliens to the risk
of losing their appeals due to bad weather or delivery service error,
all the Board need do is what courts and private companies routinely
do: allow people to send their notices of appeal over the internet.'').
Electronic filing ``allows parties to submit Notices of Appeal at any
time of day from any location with internet access, removing concerns
related to mail delays and the restrictions business hours create to
meet filing deadlines.'' 91 FR 5272.
Similarly, appeal filing fees are also paid directly to the Board
via EOIR's Payment Portal, and regulations clearly establish the
Board's procedure for assessing fee waivers submitted with a Notice of
Appeal. See 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3) (``If the fee waiver request does not
establish the inability to pay the required fee, the appeal or motion
will not be deemed properly filed, provided the Board grants 15 days to
re-file the rejected document with the filing fee or new fee waiver
request and tolls any applicable filing deadline during the 15-day cure
period.'').
Taken together, the availability of electronic filing for appeals
and electronic payments for appeal fees represents a significant shift
from the circumstances the Ninth Circuit was considering in Gonzales-
Julio, particularly as internet access and usage has become ubiquitous
even for pro se aliens. Given the ability to immediately file a Notice
of Appeal from any place at any time, the Department believes a 10-day
appeal deadline comports with due process. And, even if the specific
circumstances presented by an alien's case could result in the
violation of an alien's due process rights, the Board has the authority
to equitably toll the appeal deadline, as discussed above.
b. Statutory Concerns
Comment: Commenters stated that a 10-day timeline for appeals
violates the INA. Specifically, commenters stated that a 10-day
timeline is insufficient for aliens to prepare their claims, including
obtaining counsel and obtaining documents that they wish to submit in
support of their claims. Commenters asserted that the IFR violates
provisions of the INA guaranteeing aliens the right to counsel in
removal proceedings, citing sections 240(b)(4) and 292 of the Act, 8
U.S.C. 1229a(b)(4) and 1362. Commenters noted that section 292 of the
Act, 8 U.S.C. 1362, specifically provides aliens with a right to
counsel ``in any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from
any such removal proceedings.'' Commenters acknowledged, however, that
the INA does not guarantee representation in every case.
Commenters alleged that the IFR's provisions shortening appeal
deadlines will violate this statutory right to counsel by interfering
with aliens' ability to find counsel, particularly if the alien is
detained, indigent, or appeared pro se before the Immigration Judge
during removal proceedings. Commenters further stated that the
shortened appeal deadlines impede counsel's ability to accept
representation in a new case, request the oral record of proceedings,
review the case, and prepare an appeal in the allotted time frame,
thereby contravening the INA's right to counsel, which commenters
claimed could reduce the availability of competent counsel.
Response: Nothing in the INA precludes the Department from
establishing a 10-day deadline to file most appeals with the Board, as
is supported by legislative history and prior Departmental policy.
Indeed, a 10-day deadline to file an administrative appeal of an
Immigration Judge decision is not unprecedented. Notably, after a
reorganization consolidated Immigration Judges and the Board into the
newly created EOIR, the agency issued a rule establishing ``a uniform
procedure for filing administrative appeals relating to Immigration
Judge proceedings.'' Aliens and Nationality; Rules of Procedure for
Proceedings Before Immigration Judges, 52 FR 2931 (Jan. 29, 1987). As
part of the uniform procedures, the regulatory deadline to file an
appeal of a decision of an Immigration Judge was 10 days after service
of the decision or 13 days if the decision was mailed. See, e.g., 8 CFR
3.36(b) (1987); 52 FR 2935. These appeal deadlines remained in place
for almost a decade, including following Congress' directive in the
Immigration Act of 1990 for the Attorney General to issue regulations
with respect to ``the time period for the filing of administrative
appeals in deportation proceedings.'' Public Law 101-649, 545(d), 104
Stat. 4978, 5066 (1990); see also Executive Office for Immigration
Review; Rules of Procedures, 57 FR 11568 (Apr. 6, 1992) (amending
regulations to implement various provisions of the Immigration Act of
1990 but maintaining existing 10-day appeal deadline); 8 CFR 3.38(b)
(1993) (``The notice of appeal of the decision shall be filed with the
Office of the Immigration Judge having administrative control over the
Record of Proceeding within ten (10) calendar days after service of the
decision. Time will be 13 days if mailed.''), 3.1(b) (1993).
Subsequently, in passing the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Public Law 104-208, sec.
604(d)(5)(A)(iv), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-694 (Sept. 30, 1996),
Congress enacted a 30-day timeline for filing an appeal for certain
asylum-related cases, which overrode the regulatory 10-day period as it
applied to such cases. See INA 208(d)(5)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C.
1158(d)(5)(A)(iv); Liadov v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1003, 1009 (8th Cir.
2008) (``Without question, the statute trumped the ten-day appeal
period previously adopted in the regulations.''). At the same time,
Congress remained silent with respect to timelines for filing appeals
from other types of Immigration Judge decisions. Congress's silence in
this regard, against the backdrop of an existing regulatory 10-day
filing deadline, indicates that Congress made a determination not to
intervene with respect to the 10-day filing deadlines applicable to the
other remaining appeal types before the Board.
Nor has Congress taken action since then to codify additional
filing deadlines for appeals beyond those specified in section
208(d)(5)(A)(iv) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(5)(A)(iv). However, DOJ
subsequently amended EOIR's regulations to implement a 30-day filing
deadline to appeal from Immigration Judge decisions. See 61 FR 18902.
In that rule, DOJ stated that it was increasing the deadline for filing
an appeal from 10 to 30 days in order to respond to concerns raised by
the Ninth Circuit and commenters regarding the sufficiency of time to
initiate the appellate process. However, as already discussed above in
this section, circumstances have changed in intervening years, and the
Department has therefore determined that a 10-day filing deadline is
more appropriate.
The 10-day deadline to file most appeals with the Board is also
wholly consistent with the INA's provisions related to obtaining
counsel in Immigration Court proceedings. The INA provides aliens in
removal proceedings with ``the privilege of being represented, at no
expense to the
[[Page 73893]]
Government, by counsel of the alien's choosing who is authorized to
practice in such proceedings.'' INA 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C.
1229a(b)(4)(A). The INA's privilege of representation extends to ``any
appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such removal
proceedings.'' INA 292, 8 U.S.C. 1362. Consistent with the INA's
requirements, EOIR's regulations clearly state that an alien may be
represented in removal proceedings. See 8 CFR 1003.16(b), 1240.3.
Nothing in the IFR nor in this final rule changes any of EOIR's
regulations ensuring that aliens may be represented by counsel of their
choosing, at their expense. This rule is focused on streamlining the
administrative appellate process, and nothing in this rule prevents,
precludes, or limits an alien's ability to seek counsel. Arguments to
the contrary ignore the reality that aliens often have a significant
amount of time to seek and obtain counsel prior to their Immigration
Court hearing and entry of a removal order, despite the fact that the
INA requires aliens be provided only 10 days to seek counsel prior to
an initial hearing before an Immigration Judge. See INA 239(b)(1), 8
U.S.C. 1229(b)(1) (``In order that an alien be permitted the
opportunity to secure counsel before the first hearing date in
proceedings . . . , the hearing date shall not be scheduled earlier
than 10 days after the service of the notice to appear, unless the
alien requests in writing an earlier hearing date.'').
Moreover, aliens often receive multiple continuances to seek
representation before the Immigration Judge. See, e.g., Matter of C-B-,
25 I&N Dec. 888, 889-90 (BIA 2012). Further, an Immigration Judge is
required to advise an alien of his or her right to representation, to
inquire as to whether the alien desires representation, and to advise
the alien about the availability of pro bono legal services. INA
239(a)(1)(E), 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1)(E); 8 CFR 1240.10(a)(1)-(2).
Indeed, many aliens are represented in proceedings before an
Immigration Judge and may retain the same counsel throughout the
appellate process, obviating commenters' concerns regarding finding and
obtaining counsel. The Department also anticipates that, as a potential
response to this rule, counsel will likely begin explaining the
shortened appeal deadline to clients earlier in removal proceedings and
increasing the amount of representation agreements that include
administrative appeals as part of the initial agreement.
In cases where an alien is not represented before the Immigration
Judge, the Department acknowledges that aliens whose cases are subject
to the 10-day appeal period may face difficulties securing
representation prior to the deadline for filing a Notice of Appeal with
the Board.\29\ See 91 FR 5272 n.16 (``The Department acknowledges that
some aliens proceed pro se before the Immigration Judge and may seek
counsel after an adverse decision and that in those circumstances
changing the deadline from 30 to 10 days, except for asylum appeals by
aliens not barred from applying, may impact their ability to obtain
counsel to file a Notice of Appeal.''). However, such aliens likely
will have had multiple opportunities to seek and secure counsel prior
to the Immigration Judge's decision, particularly as Immigration Judges
generally provide right-to-counsel advisals during the very first
hearing in removal proceedings. Functionally, the change in appeal
deadline implemented by this rule is 20 fewer days to seek counsel in
an often years-long process. And an alien unable to obtain counsel
prior to the deadline for filing a Notice of Appeal will also have
additional time to continue seeking counsel if the Board accepts the
appeal for further consideration with briefing prior to seeking Federal
court review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Although the representation rate is higher for appeals
before the Board when compared to completed cases before the
Immigration Court, it is not clear whether that is due to the nature
of cases that are appealed (i.e., a greater percentage of cases with
representation file appeals, leading to a higher representation rate
at the Board overall) or due to aliens who were unrepresented before
the Immigration Courts deciding to obtain representation at the
appellate stage. EOIR's experience is that the former explanation is
likely correct, but regardless of the reason, the Department has
considered the impact of this final rule on the population of aliens
unrepresented at the trial level and ultimately determined that the
efficiency benefits of this rule outweigh any potential costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Difficulties in securing legal representation are not unique to
aliens, and many aliens affirmatively elect to forgo legal
representation for their own personal reasons. The INA does not
guarantee that every alien will obtain legal counsel, nor does it
require the Department to delay the efficient completion of removal
proceedings beyond the statutorily delineated period of time that an
alien must be provided to seek counsel prior to the beginning of
removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge. See INA 239(b)(3), 8
U.S.C. 1229(b)(3) (``Nothing in this subsection may be construed to
prevent the Attorney General from proceeding against an alien . . . if
the [10-day time period] has elapsed and the alien has failed to secure
counsel.''). Had Congress intended to provide another minimum period of
time for aliens to seek counsel prior to filing an appeal with the
Board, it easily could have done so. Accordingly, this rule's changes
to the appeal deadline do not violate the INA's requirements.
The Department is further unpersuaded by commenters' concerns
related to counsel's ability to provide effective legal representation
to clients. The Department is unaware of any reason why 10 days is an
insufficient amount of time for counsel to file a Notice of Appeal that
adequately identifies the issues being raised on appeal. Counsel must
only preserve issues in a Notice of Appeal with appropriate
specificity; the rule does not require full legal briefing at the
Notice of Appeal stage.
Despite commenter assertions to the contrary, the Department
considered the impact of the IFR on aliens' ability to obtain counsel
for an appeal to the Board. See 91 FR 5272 n.16. The Department has
further considered comments related to legal representation and
continues to believe that ``the interest in timely adjudications
outweighs'' potential concerns related to aliens' ability to obtain
counsel and that ``the benefits of the reforms in this rule outweigh
that potential impact, especially given that such aliens would have had
time prior to the removal order to seek the assistance of counsel.''
Id. In short, the Department has considered all of the comments and
concerns, but it continues to believe that the benefits of the rule
outweigh any potential--and highly speculative--costs related to legal
representation.
Comment: Commenters argued that the IFR violates section
240(b)(4)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(4)(C), which requires EOIR
to maintain a complete record of proceedings, and that the 10-day
appeal period also conflicts with section 240(c)(6) of the Act, 8
U.S.C. 1229a(c)(6), which provides a 30-day window for motions to
reconsider.
Response: This rule is wholly consistent with section 240(b)(4)(C)
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(4)(C), which states that ``a complete
record shall be kept of all testimony and evidence produced at the
proceedings.'' Nothing in this rule affects the development of a record
in removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge, on which this
statutory section focuses. See also 8 CFR 1003.36 (``The Immigration
Court shall create and control the Record of Proceeding.'').
Separately, the 10-day appeal filing deadline does not foreclose
the statutory availability of motions to reconsider, and any change to
the appeal filing deadline is irrelevant to such
[[Page 73894]]
availability. See INA 240(c)(6), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(6). Nothing in this
rule changes the potential avenues for addressing alleged errors in an
Immigration Judge's decision: an alien may choose to file a motion to
reconsider with the Immigration Judge, an appeal with the Board, and
even a subsequent motion to reconsider following a Board appeal denial.
Moreover, should an alien choose to file a motion to reconsider with
the Immigration Judge, the alien may appeal any Immigration Judge
denial of such motion to the Board and seek further review in the
Federal courts if necessary. See, e.g., Form EOIR-26, Notice of Appeal
from a Decision of an Immigration Judge, Question 5 (Sept. 2019),
<a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/eoir26/dl">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/eoir26/dl</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/P3PP-7T3H">https://perma.cc/P3PP-7T3H</a>] (providing an option to file ``an appeal from the Immigration
Judge's decision denying a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider.
. . .'') (emphasis in original); Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012, 1020
(9th Cir. 2017) (reviewing Immigration Judge's denial of motion to
reconsider).
Comment: Commenters argued that the IFR violates section
208(d)(5)(A)(iv) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(5)(A)(iv), which they
asserted requires 30 days for an administrative appeal of any decision
granting or denying asylum. Commenters argued that the INA does not
have a carve-out from the 30-day appeal deadline based on the
Immigration Judge's reasoning in an asylum denial. Further, commenters
asserted that the Department's position in the IFR that asylum seekers
whose applications are barred under section 208(a)(2) of the Act, 8
U.S.C. 1158(a)(2), are not entitled to the 30-day appeal deadline has
no support in the statute. Commenters expressed that if Congress had
intended for there to be a different appeal deadline for asylum
applications denied under section 208(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
1158(a)(2), it would have specified it in the INA.
Further, commenters alleged that the Department ignored the second
part of section 208(d)(5)(A)(iv) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
1158(d)(5)(A)(iv), which states that an administrative appeal must be
filed within 30 days of a decision granting or denying asylum ``or
within 30 days of the completion of removal proceedings before an
immigration judge under section 240, whichever is later.'' Commenters
also noted that, functionally, the appeal deadline for nearly all
asylum cases will be 10 days because asylum cases almost always include
claims for withholding of removal or protection under the regulations
implementing the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No.
100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S 85 (``CAT''), and the appeal deadline for
those claims remains 10 days.
Commenters also stated that the IFR's exception for some asylum
cases is confusing. Commenters stressed that in order for an alien or
the alien's counsel to know which filing deadline applies, the alien or
counsel must understand whether the Immigration Judge denied the asylum
application on its merits or on a ground subject to a 10-day appeal
deadline. Commenters expressed that it is unclear which deadline
applies if an application is denied for multiple reasons, providing as
an example an asylum case where an Immigration Judge finds that the
one-year bar applies, but also finds that the alien did not demonstrate
a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Commenters also stated that although the Department justified the
10-day deadline by asserting it would harmonize administrative
appellate deadlines, the Department did not explain how doing the
opposite for asylum appeals by implementing two deadlines contributes
to this goal. Moreover, commenters asserted that the rule creates
different appeal deadlines for pretermitted cases, where cases
pretermitted because of an applicable ACA are subject to the 10-day
deadline and cases pretermitted due to, for example, failure to pay the
fee or not adequately completing the application are subject to the
longer 30-day deadline, which is inconsistent with the Department's
stated harmonization goal. Commenters further expressed that the IFR
does not explain how disputes over the applicable deadline should be
determined.
Response: The Department disagrees that appeal deadlines for cases
involving asylum applications are confusing but nonetheless appreciates
the opportunity to provide clarity. The INA requires that the Attorney
General establish procedures for considering asylum applications
``filed under'' section 208(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a). INA
208(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(1). Those procedures must provide that
``any administrative appeal shall be filed within 30 days of a decision
granting or denying asylum, or within 30 days of the completion of
removal proceedings before an immigration judge . . . whichever is
later.'' INA 208(d)(5)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. 1158 (d)(5)(A)(iv). But those
procedures, including the 30-day appeal deadline, do not apply where an
alien is ineligible to apply for asylum at all under section 208(a)(1)
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(1). Said differently, if an alien is
ineligible to even apply for asylum pursuant to section 208(a)(1) of
the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(1), the alien is not entitled to subsequent
procedures implementing a 30-day appeal deadline. See 91 FR 5272 n.15.
The INA provides three such scenarios in which an alien is barred
from applying for asylum: (1) the alien may be removed to a safe third
country pursuant to an agreement commonly referred to as an ACA; (2)
the alien does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that his or
her application has been filed within one year after the date of the
alien's arrival in the United States, subject to narrow exceptions; or
(3) the alien has previously applied for asylum and had such
application denied, subject to narrow exceptions. INA 208(a)(2)(A),
(B), (C), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(A), (B), (C).
Accordingly, in any case where an alien is deemed ineligible to
apply for asylum pursuant to one of these three subparagraphs, the
applicable appeal deadline, in accordance with this rule, is 10 days.
This 10-day appeal period similarly applies to cases where application
of these ineligibility provisions is followed by alternative
substantive holdings denying asylum, as these ineligibility provisions
serve as the baseline denial reason in addressing whether the alien is
even eligible to apply for asylum. To use an example provided by
commenters, if an Immigration Judge determines an alien is subject to
the one-year bar and also concludes that the alien failed to establish
a well-founded fear of future persecution, the 10-day deadline applies.
In any other asylum case, the appeal deadline remains 30 days,
consistent with the INA's requirements. For clarity, in such cases, the
30-day appeal deadline attaches to the entire case, not to the asylum
claim itself. Indeed, the relevant regulatory provision applies in
``cases'' where an Immigration Judge has adjudicated an asylum
application and did not deny the application under 208(a)(2)(A), (B),
or (C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(A), (B), or (C)--not to
individual claims within those cases. 91 FR 5278 (amending 8 CFR
1003.38(b)(2)). For example, in cases where an alien has applied for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT
regulations, if the alien's asylum application was not denied due to
application of an ACA, failure to apply for asylum within one year of
entry, or because he or she previously has been denied asylum, the
alien has 30 days to appeal the decision in his or
[[Page 73895]]
her case, which includes all claims for relief and protection from
removal.
Additionally, commenters' assertion that the Department did not
consider the ``whichever is later'' statutory language is incorrect.
The Department analyzed the language in section 208(d)(5)(A)(iv) of the
Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(5)(A)(iv), and determined that, for clarity 8 CFR
1003.38(b) should provide that the appeal filing period begins to run
with the ``date of the stating of an Immigration Judge's oral decision
or the mailing or electronic notification of an Immigration Judge's
written decision.'' In rare cases, an Immigration Judge might
adjudicate an asylum application earlier in the proceedings and then
issue a final decision fully resolving removal proceedings at a later
date. In these circumstances, the appeal period under 8 CFR 1003.38(b)
would not begin to run until that later date because that is the date
when the Immigration Judge completes the case, rather than simply
disposing of a single claim. Thus, because the appeal period would
begin to run from this later date, 8 CFR 1003.38(b) is consistent with
the requirement in section 208(d)(5)(A)(iv) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
1158(d)(5)(A)(iv), that the time period in which to appeal a decision
granting or denying asylum run from ``whichever [of the relevant dates]
is later.'' Accordingly, the Department believes that the language as
drafted complies with the INA.
The Department further disagrees with commenters that it will be
unclear which deadline applies to an asylum case because it will be
unclear on what basis an Immigration Judge denies an asylum
application. The Department is confident that Immigration Judges will
clearly articulate any basis for denying an alien's asylum application
such that the applicable appeal-filing deadline will be readily
apparent. Additionally, the Department expects that Immigration Judges
will advise aliens of the applicable appeal deadline as part of the
obligation to advise an alien of his or her appeal rights. See
generally INA 240(c)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(5) (requiring the
Immigration Judge, if ordering an alien removed, to ``inform the alien
of the right to appeal that decision''); 8 CFR 1240.10(a)(3) (requiring
the Immigration Judge to ``[a]scertain that the respondent has received
a copy of appeal rights''); EOIR, Policy Manual, pt. II, ch. 3.15(h)
(Feb. 10, 2026), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/policy-manual-eoir/part-II/icpm/chapter-3-15">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/policy-manual-eoir/part-II/icpm/chapter-3-15</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/HK27-PJAZ">https://perma.cc/HK27-PJAZ</a>] (stating that ``the
Immigration Judge informs the parties of the deadline for filing an
appeal with the Board, unless the right to appeal is waived'').
Finally, commenters are correct that the changes to appeal filing
deadlines will result in different appeal deadlines for asylum cases
depending on the reason for denial. But the Department has determined
that the different appeal deadlines for asylum cases--which are a
function of statutory requirements and, thus, cannot be altered by
EOIR--do not meaningfully detract from the Department's appellate
deadline harmonization goal.
c. Additional Concerns With 10-Day Appeal Deadline
Comment: Commenters opposed decreasing the time to file an appeal
with the Board to 10 days, describing the new deadline as unworkable,
unrealistic, and not enough time to prepare and file a Notice of
Appeal. Commenters expressed concern that the 10-day appeal deadline
will exacerbate existing barriers to access to justice.
Commenters also stated that the IFR did not provide any empirical
evidence that the 30-day period in which to file an appeal has
contributed to an increase in appeal filings or the Board's backlog,
pointing out that appeals tripled between 2015 and 2025 while the
deadline to file an appeal was 30 days and asserting that such increase
was likely related to immigration enforcement activity and evolving
substantive law. Commenters said that, absent data showing the 30-day
deadline drives delay, shortening the appeal deadline risks impairing
access to appellate review without corresponding efficiency gains.
Commenters also stated that the IFR puts pressure on Immigration Judges
who are already overwhelmed by implicitly forcing them to produce
immediate written decisions and a review-ready record to make appeals
possible, which commenters alleged risks incentivizing rushed oral
decisions and increasing post-hearing confusion, litigation, and
motions.
Commenters also stated that the IFR does not explain whether
Immigration Judges will inform aliens if the 10-day or 30-day deadline
applies in their cases.
Lastly, commenters believed that the use of electronic filing
through the EOIR Courts & Appeals System (``ECAS'') was not sufficient
to ameliorate their concerns.
Response: The Department declines to retain the 30-day appeal
deadline in all cases. The Department disagrees with commenters' claims
that the 10-day deadline is unworkable or unrealistic. First, as the
Department explained in the IFR, other types of appeals before EOIR are
already subject to a 10-day filing deadline. See 8 CFR 1003.6(c)(1)
(10-day deadline for DHS to appeal an Immigration Judge's order to
maintain an automatic stay of a custody redetermination order pursuant
to 8 CFR 1003.19(i)); 28 CFR 68.54(a) (10-day deadline to appeal
Administrative Law Judge's decision to Chief Administrative Hearing
Officer). Second, the Board's adoption of electronic filing in 2021,
and the further expansion allowing pro se aliens to file Notices of
Appeal with the Board, allow parties to submit a Notice of Appeal
electronically, obviating the need to account for mail difficulties or
delays in filing deadlines in the vast majority of Board cases. 91 FR
5272.
The Department does not find persuasive commenters' arguments that
the length of the appeal deadline is unrelated to the number of appeals
filed or the backlog. Several factors contribute to how many appeals
are filed in any given year. Although factors like the scope of
immigration enforcement activity by DHS or changes in the substantive
law as a result of Federal court decisions are outside the Department's
control, the Department can control its own procedures, like filing
deadlines, to keep cases moving expeditiously before the Board. And the
shortened appeal deadline--which applies equally to aliens and DHS--
will work in concert with the expanded summary dismissal procedures to
ensure that EOIR is efficiently and expeditiously completing appeals.
See 91 FR 5272 (explaining that the 10-day deadline applies to both DHS
and aliens ``so neither side will be procedurally advantaged or
disadvantaged by the change'').
Further, as previously discussed, a 10-day deadline to file an
administrative appeal of an Immigration Judge decision is not
unprecedented: A 1987 rule set the regulatory deadline to file an
appeal of a decision of an Immigration Judge at 10 days after service
of the decision or 13 days if the decision was mailed. That rule was in
place for almost a decade. See, e.g., 8 CFR 3.36(b) (1987); 52 FR 2935.
In 1996, EOIR established a centralized process for filing Notices
of Appeal directly with the Board and increased the appeal deadline to
30 days. 61 FR 18903; 8 CFR 3.38(b) (1996). The Department increased
the time frame to file an appeal to address concerns ``regarding the
sufficiency of time to initiate the appellate process'' and concerns
raised by Federal courts related to the 10-day filing period and the
requirement that parties file a Notice
[[Page 73896]]
of Appeal in one forum and pay the requisite fee in another forum. 61
FR 18903. But importantly, when implementing the 30-day deadline, the
Department did not indicate that such a change was required by law.
Rather, the deadline was implemented as a matter of policy, reflective
of the Department's judgment regarding the appropriate procedures at
that time. The decision to now revert the deadline to 10 days is
similarly reflective of the Department's judgment that, as a matter of
policy, the 10-day deadline, in combination with other streamlining
measures implemented by this rule, is the best way for the Department
to address present circumstances, which include a significant backlog
of pending cases at the Immigration Courts and Board.
Regarding commenters' concerns that some aliens may not understand
the appeal deadline applicable to their cases, the Department does not
believe that determining the applicable case deadline will be a
challenge, as the appeal deadline will be 10 days in most cases, except
for cases involving certain asylum applications. Nonetheless, the
Department expects that Immigration Judges will advise aliens of the
applicable appeal deadline as part of the obligation to advise an alien
of his or her appeal rights. See INA 240(c)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(5)
(requiring the Immigration Judge, if ordering an alien removed, to
``inform the alien of the right to appeal that decision''); 8 CFR
1240.10(a)(3) (requiring the Immigration Judge to ``[a]scertain that
the respondent has received a copy of appeal rights''); see also EOIR,
Policy Manual, pt. II, ch. 3.15(h) (Feb. 10, 2026), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/policy-manual-eoir/part-II/icpm/chapter-3-15">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/policy-manual-eoir/part-II/icpm/chapter-3-15</a>
[<a href="https://perma.cc/HK27-PJAZ">https://perma.cc/HK27-PJAZ</a>] (stating that ``the Immigration Judge
informs the parties of the deadline for filing an appeal with the
Board, unless the right to appeal is waived''). Commenters' concerns
related to the 10-day deadline's impact on Immigration Judges are
misplaced, as this rule does not alter any requirements for an
Immigration Judge when issuing a decision.
Next, the Department believes that the 10-day filing deadline is a
key piece of efforts to streamline immigration proceedings and that a
``deadline for filing a notice of appeal is essential for the overall
working of an immigration court system in order to bring cases to a
final conclusion.'' Morales-Morales, 28 I&N Dec. at 716. Indeed,
without deadlines, an alien could attempt to delay proceedings
indefinitely. Id. ``Moreover, `[f]iling deadlines, like statutes of
limitations, necessarily operate harshly and arbitrarily with respect
to individuals who fall just on the other side of them, but if the
concept of a filing deadline is to have any content, the deadline must
be enforced.' '' Id. (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 101
(1985)).
Although this final rule does not change the general 10-day filing
deadline, the Department notes that if the unique circumstances in a
case warrant equitable tolling pursuant to the Board's existing
standards, nothing in this rule prevents the Board from accepting an
untimely appeal through that mechanism. The Department believes that
this existing authority is sufficient to address truly exceptional
circumstances that may arise in an individual case and provides the
Board with sufficient flexibility to account for the facts presented by
each individual case.
Finally, to the extent that commenters expressed concerns about
ECAS reliability, EOIR has provided clear guidance in the event of any
technical issues affecting electronic filing. See 8 CFR 1003.3(g)(2)
(addressing ECAS system outages for Board appeals).
Comment: Commenters questioned the interplay between the 10-day
appeal filing deadline and fee waiver requests. Specifically,
commenters requested clarity on what happens in cases where a fee
waiver is denied and whether the pre-existing 15-day cure period in 8
CFR 1003.8(a)(3) will still apply, as commenters stated it is unclear
how the Board will construe this regulation in light of the 10-day
deadline.
Response: Neither the IFR nor this final rule alters existing Board
practice with respect to fee waivers. Aliens seeking a waiver of the
appeal filing fee must file a fee waiver request, Form EOIR-26A,
alongside the Notice of Appeal. 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3). If the fee waiver
request does not demonstrate an inability to pay, the appeal will not
be considered properly filed, ``provided the Board grants 15 days to
re-file the rejected document with the filing fee or new fee waiver
request and tolls any applicable filing deadline during the 15-day cure
period.'' Id. Accordingly, if an alien files a fee waiver request and
Notice of Appeal prior to the 10-day deadline, if the fee waiver is
denied, the alien will have 15 days to pay the filing fee or correct
the filing.
Comment: Commenters stated that, in some cases, the Immigration
Judge will signal an intention to rule a particular way from the bench
but will expand on their reasoning through a written decision that is
later mailed or uploaded. Commenters cited the precedential Board
decision Matter of Iskandarani, 29 I&N Dec. 26 (BIA 2025), which,
according to commenters, held that if the Immigration Judge issues an
oral decision that is later memorialized in writing, the appeal
deadline clock begins to run on the date of the oral decision.
Commenters recommended that, because the alien's Notice of Appeal--
which will generally be their only communication with the Board--must
be filed within 10 days, the filing deadline should not start to run
with the issuance of the oral decision.
Response: Commenters misinterpreted the Board's holding in
Iskandarani, which merely held that when an Immigration Judge renders
an oral decision, the appeal deadline begins on that date, regardless
of any summary of the oral decision later provided to the alien. See 29
I&N Dec. at 28 (``An oral decision is not transformed into a written
decision merely because the Immigration Judge prepares a memorandum
summarizing the oral decision.''). When an Immigration Judge issues an
oral decision, that is the official decision of the Immigration Judge
for appeal purposes. Immigration Judges may also provide the parties
with a summary of the oral decision's holding, generally on an EOIR-
provided template. But any accompanying summary is just that--a summary
of the oral decision.
As such, this rule does not change EOIR's existing regulations
governing the issuance of Immigration Judge decisions or EOIR's
existing practice related to calculating when the time for an appeal
begins to run. Immigration Judges may issue decisions orally or in
writing. 8 CFR 1003.37(a). When issuing a decision orally, the
Immigration Judge must state the decision in the presence of the
parties, and ``a memorandum summarizing the oral decision shall be
served on the parties.'' Id. In those cases, the time in which to file
an appeal is calculated ``from the date of the stating of an
Immigration Judge's oral decision.'' 8 CFR 1003.38(b). As noted by
commenters, the Board has held that the beginning of the appeal period
in such cases ``is unaffected by the subsequent mailing of a memorandum
summarizing the oral decision.'' Iskandarani, 29 I&N Dec. at 28.
The Department does not believe that the shortened appeal deadline
presents concerns related to the issuance of oral decisions where
aliens are represented. The alien and his or her representative will be
present for the issuance of an oral decision, and representatives also
have access to the hearing recording containing the oral decision
through ECAS. The Department is confident that Immigration Judges will
explain the
[[Page 73897]]
bases for their decisions with clarity sufficient for aliens to
identify any alleged errors of fact or law for Board appeals. Any
subsequent written memorandum summarizing the oral decision is not
intended to provide separate bases for appeal, although it may provide
further explanation of points raised in the oral decision that may be
used in any Notice of Appeal. See id. (noting that the memorandum
summarizing the oral decision was not a separate written decision).
The Department has considered that, in some cases, the shortened
appeal deadline may be less than optimal for certain unrepresented
aliens to file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days when a decision is
rendered orally. But in all cases, the alien will be present when an
oral decision is issued, and the Department expects that Immigration
Judges will deliver decisions to unrepresented aliens in a manner they
understand, and aliens may use that knowledge when preparing and
submitting a Notice of Appeal, consistent with longstanding practice.
Aliens will also have additional time in which to review the decision
if seeking further review in Federal court.
Congress entrusted decisions related to the conduct of removal
proceedings to the Attorney General's discretion. And given the
unprecedented scope of the backlog of appeals pending before the Board,
the shortened appeal deadline is necessary to ensure the efficient and
expeditious processing of appeals; the benefit of implementing such
changes outweighs any costs. See 91 FR 5276.
Comment: Commenters argued that two comparative 10-day appeal
deadlines cited in the IFR--8 CFR 1003.6(c)(1) related to appeals of
certain custody-related stays and 28 CFR 68.54(a) related to certain
appeals before the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer--
were not comparable to regular Board appeals because the former is only
available to DHS and the latter is necessary under the relevant
statutory framework.
Response: The Department cited those two EOIR provisions in the IFR
to make the basic point that a 10-day appeal deadline is not unusual in
EOIR administrative proceedings. See 91 FR 5272 (noting only that the
30-day Board appeal deadline ``differs from other EOIR administrative
appellate deadlines''). Separate from that point, the Department
explained that a 10-day Board appeal deadline begins after an
appellant's claim has already been fully considered by EOIR at the
Immigration Court and was broadly intended to improve the efficient
consideration of Board appeals, particularly in light of the expansion
of electronic filing with EOIR. See id.
3. Issue Waiver in Notice of Appeal
Comment: Commenters raised concerns with the IFR's appeal-waiver
language in 8 CFR 1003.38(b)(3), which states that ``[a]ny issue not
raised in the Notice of Appeal from a Decision of an Immigration Judge
(Form EOIR-26) shall be deemed waived.''
Commenters argued that, particularly in combination with the 10-day
filing deadline, this language risks forfeiture of meritorious issues
on appeal, and that the risks would be greater for certain groups.
Other commenters claimed that the appeal form now requires an entire
page of legal arguments as to why the appeal is being filed, which,
they asserted, transforms the Notice of Appeal into a legal brief.
Response: The Department disagrees with commenters' concerns
regarding the IFR's waiver language in 8 CFR 1003.38(b)(3). Pre-
existing regulations limit the Board to ``resolv[ing] the questions
before it.'' See 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1). To place an issue before the
Board, aliens must provide the basis for their appeal for the Board to
consider. See 8 CFR 1003.3(b) (``Statement of the basis of appeal.'').
Similarly, pre-existing regulatory language already requires that a
notice of appeal include sufficient specificity. Under current
regulations, the notice must ``specifically'' identify the findings of
fact, the conclusions of law, or both, that are being challenged,
including, if applicable, ``specific'' contested facts and ``specific''
factual and legal findings. 8 CFR 1003.3(b). These requirements were
not altered by the IFR and are well established. In short, the IFR does
not change expectations or legal requirements regarding what
information must be included in a Notice of Appeal and what the
consequences are for omitting that information.
This rule's waiver language in 8 CFR 1003.38(b) therefore merely
states the obvious: a failure to raise an issue in the Notice of Appeal
necessarily waives that issue. Although a shortened appellate period
might require identifying those issues more quickly, stating the basis
for an appeal is a baseline prerequisite without which the Board (or
any appellate body) cannot function. Moreover, well-established Board
precedent already treats issues not raised on appeal as waived, see,
e.g., Matter of R-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 657, 658 n.2 (BIA 2012), the rule
merely incorporates that precedent.
Commenters appeared to obliquely express concerns that the appeal-
waiver language will indirectly cause aliens to fail to exhaust their
administrative remedies for purposes of a subsequent petition for
review pursuant to section 242(d)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1).
However, those concerns are not persuasive for several reasons. First,
the Board already deems issues not raised on appeal to be waived, and
aliens already encounter exhaustion hurdles pursuant to section
242(d)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1). The rule does not alter that
dynamic, nor does it prohibit aliens from arguing that they have
exhausted their administrative remedies under the statute. Second,
Federal circuit courts of appeal will ultimately set the binding
interpretation of section 242(d)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1),
just as they do now. Because this provision of the rule merely codifies
in regulation the status quo, the Department does not believe there is
a basis for a circuit court to change its view of section 242(d)(1) of
the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1); however, that is ultimately a question
for those courts, and the Department cannot predict whether the new
rule will cause them to revisit prior interpretations of that statute.
The Department has merely considered the interaction between the rule
and that statutory provision and found any concerns to be unavailing.
Third, administrative exhaustion is inherently a fact-specific
question. As such, the Department cannot state a general position on
whether section 242(d)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1), will bar
review of an issue without reference to the specific facts of a
particular case. Even general hypotheticals raised by commenters--e.g.,
pro se aliens--resist a generalized statement due to the nearly
infinite number of factual permutations among a backlog of over 3
million cases.
Furthermore, contrary to commenters' concerns, this rule does not
address the Board's longstanding specificity requirements with regard
to issues raised on appeal. See 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(A) (stating that
the Board may summarily dismiss any appeal or portion of any appeal in
any case in which ``the party concerned fails to specify the reasons
for the appeal on Form EOIR-26 or Form EOIR-29 (Notices of Appeal) or
other document filed therewith''); 8 CFR 1003.3(b) (reiterating same).
As explained by the Ninth Circuit, ``[t]he purpose of the BIA's
strict specificity requirement is to ensure that the BIA is adequately
apprised of the issues on appeal so that the BIA is not left to search
through the record and
[[Page 73898]]
speculate on what possible errors the [petitioner] claims.'' Singh v.
Gonzales, 416 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). Thus,
``when the BIA receives ample specific advice about the reasons for an
appeal, the BIA can deal promptly with appeals and focus resources on
nonfrivolous appeals to reach a correct resolution.'' See id.
This is a common sense understanding of the appellate process. For
example, Federal courts follow the principle of party presentation, in
that they ``rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and
assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties
present.'' See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375
(2020). Similarly, the Board must be sufficiently apprised of the
issues on appeal so that it can properly exercise its duties.
To be clear, this rule does not change the level of specificity
required, it merely codifies the existing requirement that aliens must
affirmatively raise issues on appeal to the Board or else risk waiver.
In raising any relevant issues on appeal, existing specificity
requirements apply. Just as before the IFR, aliens are not required to
file a lengthy brief on each issue at the time the Notice of Appeal is
filed. Rather, the appeal form must simply include enough specific
information so that the Board can review the issues being appealed and,
under this rule's procedures, determine whether to accept the appeal en
banc for full briefing and further review. See Form EOIR-26, Notice of
Appeal from a Decision of an Immigration Judge, Sec. 6, (Sept. 2019),
<a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/eoir26/dl">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/eoir26/dl</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/P3PP-7T3H">https://perma.cc/P3PP-7T3H</a>] (``State in detail the reasons for this appeal.''); see also
Nolasco-Amaya v. Garland, 14 F.4th 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2021) (alien
must ``provide meaningful guidance to the BIA by informing it of the
issues contested on appeal; a generalized and conclusory statement
about the proceedings before the [Immigration Judge] does not
suffice'') (cleaned up).
The pre-existing instructions for the Form EOIR-26 appeal form
provide clear guidance on what such specificity entails: ``Give
specific details why you disagree with the Immigration Judge's
decision. Specify the findings of fact, the conclusions of law, or
both, that you are challenging. If a question of law is presented, cite
supporting legal authority. If the dispute is over the findings of
fact, identify the specific facts you are challenging.'' Form EOIR-26
Instructions, Section F (Sept. 2019), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/eoir26/dl">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/eoir26/dl</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/P3PP-7T3H">https://perma.cc/P3PP-7T3H</a>].
4. Briefing Schedules
Comments: Commenters raised concerns regarding the IFR's briefing
changes, including the simultaneous 20-day briefing schedule, the
general prohibition on reply briefs, and the limitations on briefing
extensions.
Commenters argued that, taken together, these changes would not
leave aliens with sufficient time to fully present their arguments nor
rebut arguments made by DHS counsel, though they did not explain why
DHS would not be similarly disadvantaged. They also claimed that the
Department did not consider the purposes underlying prior briefing
schedules.
Commenters also noted that these briefing changes would force
attorneys to compress complex briefing into truncated timelines, which
would be further compounded if the attorneys were taking on
representation for the first time on appeal to the Board. Commenters
contended that limiting extensions to only ``exceptional''
circumstances of the alien--and not counsel--would reduce the amount of
representation on appeal. Commenters also asserted that these changes
would be particularly challenging for pro se and detained aliens, as
well as UACs. Commenters suggested that the IFR not taking into account
workload concerns for purposes of extending briefing schedules would
impose difficulties on attorneys. Overall, commenters posited that the
result of these briefing provisions would be to negatively impact the
Board's ability to produce well-reasoned decisions.
Commenters argued that sequential briefing and reply briefs would
benefit the Board under the summary dismissal provisions of this rule,
since the rule focuses Board resources on cases with novel or complex
legal issues. Commenters suggested that if the Department was to move
forward with simultaneous briefing in all cases, reply briefs would
serve a more important purpose than they did previously. Commenters
also stated that the Department did not acknowledge that reply briefs
serve an important role before other appellate bodies, including
Federal courts. Commenters claimed the tradeoff in quality for
expediency is not worthwhile and would lead to erroneous decision-
making in cases the Board does decide to adjudicate.
Finally, commenters noted possible alternatives to these briefing
changes, including increasing EOIR staffing levels and expanding the
use of motions to reopen or reconsider before an Immigration Judge.
Response: The Department has considered commenters' concerns
regarding the IFR's briefing schedule changes but does not believe that
any stated concerns outweigh the rule's benefits.
First, the Board has long used simultaneous briefing for detained
cases without incident. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural
Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 FR 54878, 54904 (Aug. 26, 2002)
(implementation of simultaneous briefing for detained aliens).
Moreover, since the simultaneous briefing requirement of the IFR went
into effect in March 2026, there has been no notable change in the
quality of briefs or the handling of cases. Of course, in reviewing the
comments on this rule, the Department understands that an attorney
would wish to request as much time as possible to file and respond to
briefs. But, as the Amica court noted in litigation over the IFR,
``Plaintiffs offer no evidence . . . that [the pre-IFR simultaneous
briefing requirement in detained cases has] proven unworkable.'' 822 F.
Supp. 3d at 167. Similarly, since March 2026, there is scant evidence
that simultaneous briefing has proven unworkable. The Department agrees
with the Amica court: the Board has longstanding expertise in
adjudicating administrative appeals and has found simultaneous briefing
sufficient to address the relevant issues on appeal. As explained in
the IFR, simultaneous briefing ``provides both parties sufficient
opportunity to address any issues needed to be resolved on appeal or to
identify any reasons for opposing the appeal, while balancing the need
to expeditiously resolve the case.'' 91 FR 5273.
As to reply briefs, the Board retains the discretion to accept
further briefing as needed. See 8 CFR 1003.3(c). Thus, under this rule,
once the Board has accepted a case for full briefing and further
review, the Board can review the evidence and briefs provided and
determine whether the facts of the particular case warrant additional
briefing. Allowing reply briefs as standard practice merely delays
adjudication in the many cases where the Board does not require further
argument. Moreover, as with simultaneous briefing, the general
prohibition on reply briefs has not proven unworkable or problematic
since it went into effect in March 2026.
Third, limitations on briefing extensions are necessary to ensure
that the Board efficiently perfects the record so that Board members
can begin adjudicating appeals within the
[[Page 73899]]
prescribed timelines. See generally 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8) (Board
adjudication timeline requirements). Notwithstanding EOIR's
longstanding policy that briefing extensions are disfavored, under the
prior ``good cause'' standard, see, e.g., 8 CFR 1003.3(c)(1) (2002)
(``The Board, upon written motion, may extend the period for filing a
brief or a reply brief for up to 90 days for good cause shown.''),
attorneys often came to feel entitled to a briefing extension as a
matter of course, even when the basis was entirely foreseeable and
raised only at the last minute. In the IFR, the Department tightened
the standard to ensure that briefing extensions are provided only when
truly necessary. The Department also believes that prohibiting
``workload concerns'' as a reason for an extension is consistent with
both common sense and an attorney's responsibility not to take on more
work than the attorney can reasonably handle. See, e.g., 8 CFR
1003.102(q)(1) (stating that a ``practitioner's workload must be
controlled and managed so that each matter can be handled
competently''); see also ABA Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 1.3, comment 2 (``A lawyer's work load must be
controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.''). Indeed,
in the Board's experience, many attorneys routinely seek briefing
extensions citing workload concerns, suggesting an alarming pattern of
problematic behavior. A de facto entitlement to a briefing extension
could inadvertently encourage practitioners to take on more cases than
they can handle and violate their professional responsibility
obligations.
The Department also clarifies a potential point of confusion: under
this rule, the briefing schedule only begins once the Board has
determined not to summarily dismiss an appeal and instead has accepted
it for full briefing and further review. For example, in a case where
the Board accepts an appeal for such briefing and review and
transcripts are ordered, attorneys will often have a significant amount
of time to prepare a brief. As such, the Department does not share
commenters' concerns that a stricter standard for briefing extensions
will result in fewer represented aliens or lower-quality briefing.
Further, the Department has not been presented with evidence that such
concerns have materialized since March 2026 when that portion of the
IFR went into effect.
Taken together, the IFR's briefing provisions fully allow the Board
to make well-informed and well-reasoned decisions. And, despite
commenters' claims to the contrary, in no way do these procedures rise
to the level of a due process violation. See, e.g., Gutierrez v.
Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that, to
violate due process, procedures must be ``so fundamentally unfair that
the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case''); Singh
v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding due process
violation where alien was prevented from filing a brief after Board
mailed briefing schedule to wrong address).
Under these changes, aliens fully retain their ability to file a
brief in cases accepted for full briefing and further consideration by
the Board, thus satisfying their opportunity to raise alleged issues
with the Immigration Judge's decision. Moreover, due process does not
require reply briefs. Initial briefs are intended to raise any alleged
issues at the Immigration Judge level and provide the parties with the
opportunity to be heard; the Board can choose to request further
briefing if additional clarification is needed. And simultaneous
briefing in detained cases has been in effect at the Board for decades
without issue--and no court, to the Department's knowledge, has deemed
simultaneous briefing in such cases a due process violation.
Separately, the Department does not believe commenters' proposed
alternatives would be viable substitutes for the rule's briefing-
schedule changes. Although EOIR is increasing its staffing, including
administrative support staff at the Board, ultimately, hiring is
controlled by the Congressional budget process and is well beyond the
scope of this rule. Additionally, the increased usage of motions
practice before the Immigration Courts would not impact the efficiency
of the Board, which is the subject of this rule.
Lastly, in response to commenters' claims that the ``exceptional
circumstances'' briefing extension language only applies to aliens and
not their counsel, the Department reiterates for clarity this rule's
language that workload concerns, travel plans, or similar concerns
within the control of either party ``or their representatives'' do not
constitute exceptional circumstances. 8 CFR 1003.3(c)(1). This language
is clear that exceptional circumstances may therefore apply to counsel
but must still meet the requisite exceptionality as described in
section 240(e)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(e)(1).
5. Transcription Procedures
Comment: Some commenters raised concerns about the IFR's
elimination of Immigration Judge transcript review in 8 CFR 1003.5.
Commenters asserted that removing the ability of Immigration Judges to
review hearing transcripts for Board appeals will leave errors
uncorrected on the record and heighten the risk of mistakes in the
record. Commenters also contended that this change would place a burden
on aliens to request copies of the Digital Audio Recordings (``DAR'')
of their proceedings. As a result, commenters argued, this would lead
to erroneous Board decisions and, in turn, incorrect removal orders.
Response: The Department disagrees regarding the effects of
eliminating Immigration Judge transcript review. Immigration Judge
transcript review in EOIR's regulations is a vestige of outdated
technology at the Immigration Courts from a time when hearings were
manually recorded on tapes. See 67 FR 54878-901 (2002 rulemaking adding
Immigration Judge transcript review timelines). Now, EOIR's courtrooms
use advanced digital recording technology, which produces significantly
better recordings and lessens the potential for mistakes in subsequent
transcription.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Press Release, EOIR Completes Digital Audio Recording
Implementation (Sept. 2, 2010), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2015/08/20/eoircompletesdar09022010.pdf">https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2015/08/20/eoircompletesdar09022010.pdf</a> [<a href="https://perma.cc/EMK4-QSY9">https://perma.cc/EMK4-QSY9</a>] (``This
new system improves the quality of recordings and transcriptions
through the use of more microphones throughout each courtroom.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And, to the extent there are potential mistakes in any
transcriptions, there are longstanding procedures for addressing such
mistakes, rather than having busy Immigration Judges take time away
from their dockets to pore over transcripts for typographical errors.
See EOIR Policy Manual, pt. III, ch. 3.2(f)(3) (Mar. 18, 2026), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/policy-manual-eoir/part-III/bia/chapter-3-2">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/policy-manual-eoir/part-III/bia/chapter-3-2</a>
[<a href="https://perma.cc/HWM3-9QDP">https://perma.cc/HWM3-9QDP</a>]. Obvious defects should be brought to the
attention of the Board's Clerk's Office. Id. Where the Clerk's Office
does not or cannot remedy the defects and the party believes the defect
to be significant to the party's argument or the adjudication of the
appeal, the party should identify the defect and argue its significance
with specificity in the appeal brief for the Board to consider. Id.
Further, there is no practical purpose to Immigration Judge
transcription review. Immigration Judges cannot make substantive
changes to transcripts without potentially violating due process, and
requiring Immigration
[[Page 73900]]
Judges to review transcripts solely to correct typographical errors is
a waste of adjudicatory resources.
Additionally, commenters' argument regarding the necessity of
requesting a copy of the DAR is unrelated to the transcription-review
change described above. As it relates to transcription, this rule makes
only a small modification to remove Immigration Judge transcription
review during the transcript production process at the Board. Once
produced, that transcript is made available to the parties and any
transcription errors can then be addressed by the parties. None of this
happens at the initial Notice of Appeal stage, so commenters' arguments
regarding the availability of a copy of the DAR at that point are
irrelevant to this rule.
Finally, the Department is making a minor, technical edit to 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(3) to avoid confusion regarding the production of
transcripts. That section currently states that ``[i]n any case that
has not been summarily dismissed, the case management system shall
arrange for the prompt completion of the record of proceeding and
transcript, and the issuance of a briefing schedule, as appropriate.''
There may be confusion surrounding the concluding phrase ``as
appropriate'' and whether it modifies ``transcript,'' leaving the
incorrect impression that the provision requires the production of a
transcript in all cases. However, the Board has for many years
considered several types of appeals that do not have transcripts. Thus,
the Department is making a minor edit to 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(3) to make it
clear that the Board will produce a transcript only in cases not
subject to summary dismissal and where a transcript is otherwise
warranted, which excludes those where the Board has historically not
created a transcript.
6. Other Procedural Changes
Comment: A few commenters disagreed with the IFR's changes to
remove the Chief Appellate Immigration Judge's ability to extend
adjudication deadlines or hold certain cases. Commenters stated that
this change eliminates flexibility, particularly in managing complex or
time-sensitive appeals. Commenters also argued that removing the
ability to hold a case pending resolution of a Federal court case,
including a Supreme Court case, would create inefficiencies, stating
that aliens would effectively have to file a motion to reopen or an
additional appeal after the new controlling decision is issued.
Separately, another commenter raised concerns with the IFR's
harmonization of the 90- and 180-day Board adjudication timelines to
both start from when the record is complete. The commenter stated that
these timelines will prolong the backlog because this rule only applies
prospectively to new cases. The commenter also claimed that further
assignment of cases not meeting the deadlines to the Chief Appellate
Immigration Judge or Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge will only
lead to rushed decisionmaking.
Response: This rule was promulgated to address significant backlogs
facing the Board, with a particular aim of reducing any delays in
adjudicating cases before the Board. One means to that end is reducing
rarely used mechanisms that provide for delays in certain
circumstances. Fundamentally, in light of the significant backlog
facing the Board, appeals must be adjudicated within the timelines
provided, see 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8), or else the Board will never be able
to gain control of its caseload. Moreover, in removing the hold
provision, the Department recognizes a simple maxim--cases ready to be
adjudicated should be adjudicated--and not delayed pending some
uncertain outside action beyond the agency's control. Otherwise, as the
Department learned from the past use of administrative closure, for
example, delays can quickly compound into crises. See EOIR, PM 25-29,
Cancellation of Director's Memorandum 22-03 (Apr. 18, 2025), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1397161/dl">https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1397161/dl</a>?inline [<a href="https://perma.cc/SH9J-CKXL">https://perma.cc/SH9J-CKXL</a>] (``Administrative closure merely `kicks the can down the road,'
increasing the overall backlog while leaving ripple effects--e.g.
multiple continuances and lost adjudication time--in its wake, which
further exacerbate the backlog.'').
With regard to the harmonization of the adjudication timelines, the
commenter misread the effect of this rule. The adjudication timelines
and further referral processes already existed in EOIR's regulations.
For consistency, this rule merely modifies the date on which the record
is deemed complete for these adjudication timelines to begin running.
Finally, as with other changes made by the IFR that were allowed to
go into effect in March 2026, these changes have not created any
notable issues or concerns with Board procedures or case processing.
7. Terminology
Comment: Commenters disagreed with the IFR's replacement of
``noncitizen'' and ``unaccompanied child'' with ``alien'' and
``unaccompanied alien child,'' respectively. Commenters claimed the use
of the term ``alien'' is pejorative and is a rhetorical move towards
more dehumanizing language as compared to neutral, immigration-status
focused words like ``noncitizen.''
Response: The terms ``noncitizen'' and ``unaccompanied child'' are
inconsistent with the statutory language. ``Alien'' is the statutory
term defined in the INA and uniformly used throughout title 8 of the
United States Code. See generally INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. (using the
term ``alien,'' not ``noncitizen,'' when referring to persons who are
not citizens or nationals of the United States). Similarly, the term
``unaccompanied alien child'' has a specific statu
[…truncated; see source link]Indexed from Federal Register on November 17, 2026.
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.