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Notice2026-22832

United States of America, et al. v. RealPage, Inc., et al.; Response of the United States to Public Comments

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Published
November 9, 2026

Issuing agencies

Justice DepartmentAntitrust Division

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 215 (Monday, November 9, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 215 (Monday, November 9, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70898-70905]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-22832]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


United States of America, et al. v. RealPage, Inc., et al.; 
Response of the United States to Public Comments

    Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and 
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that the Response of the United 
States to Public Comments on the Proposed Final Judgment in United 
States of America et al. v. RealPage et al., Civil Action No. 24-cv-
00710, regarding Defendant Willow Bridge Property Company, LLC, has 
been filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of North Carolina, together with the comments. Copies of the public 
comments and the United States' Response are also available for 
inspection on the Antitrust Division's website at <a href="http://www.justice.gov/atr">http://www.justice.gov/atr</a>.

Suzanne Morris,
Deputy Director Civil Enforcement Operations, Antitrust Division.

In the United States District Court for the Middle District of North 
Carolina

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff, vs. WILLOW BRIDGE PROPERTY 
COMPANY, LLC, Defendant.

No. 1:24-cv-00710

Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comments on the Proposed 
Final Judgment

    Pursuant to the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and 
Penalties Act (the ``APPA'' or ``Tunney Act''), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), 
the United States submits this response to the two public comments 
received regarding the proposed Final Judgment as to Defendant Willow 
Bridge Property Company, LLC (Doc. 200-1).\1\
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    \1\ The United States has redacted personally identifiable 
information from the comments prior to filing them with this 
response. If the Court requests unredacted versions, the United 
States will provide unredacted comments under seal.
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    After careful consideration of the submitted comments, the United 
States continues to believe that the proposed Final Judgment will 
provide an effective and appropriate remedy for the antitrust 
violations alleged in the Complaint.
    After this response and the public comments have been published in 
the Federal Register pursuant to 15 U.S.C Sec.  16(d), the United 
States will move the Court to enter the proposed Final Judgment.

I. Procedural History

    On August 23, 2024, the United States, along with several States 
(``Plaintiffs''), filed a civil antitrust Complaint against RealPage, 
Inc. (``RealPage'') (Doc. 1). On January 7, 2025, Plaintiffs amended 
their civil Complaint (the ``Complaint'') to add Willow Bridge Property 
Company, LLC (``Willow Bridge'') and five other landlords as Defendants 
(Doc. 47) alleging that Willow Bridge's agreements with RealPage and 
other landlords to share information and align pricing violate Section 
1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The Complaint seeks to enjoin 
Defendants from sharing and exploiting competitively sensitive data.
    On July 6, 2026, the United States filed a proposed Final Judgment 
(Doc. 200-1) as to Willow Bridge, which is designed to remedy the loss 
of competition alleged in the Complaint due to Willow Bridge's conduct, 
and a Stipulation and Proposed Order (Doc. 200), in which Willow Bridge 
consented to entry of the proposed Final Judgment after compliance with 
the requirements of the Tunney Act.\2\ Also on the same date, the 
United States filed a Competitive Impact Statement describing the 
proposed Final Judgment as to Willow Bridge. (Doc. 202)
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    \2\ The Stipulation and Proposed Order, and the proposed Final 
Judgment, pertain only to Willow Bridge's conduct. They do not 
propose to resolve the anticompetitive conduct alleged in the 
Complaint against any other Defendant. Nor do they resolve the 
claims of any other Plaintiff besides the United States.
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    The United States arranged for the publication of the Complaint, 
proposed Final Judgment, and Competitive Impact Statement in the 
Federal Register on July 16, 2026, see 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(c); 91 FR 
43,774 (July 16, 2026), and caused notice regarding the same, together 
with directions for the submission of written comments relating to the 
proposed Final Judgment, to be published in the Washington Post and the 
Greensboro News and Record from July 14 to July 21, 2026. The 60-day 
period for public comment has now ended. The United States received two 
comments in response, which are described below and attached as 
Exhibits 1 & 2 hereto.

II. The Complaint and The Proposed Final Judgment

    The Complaint alleges that, by unlawfully sharing its confidential 
and competitively sensitive information with RealPage for use in its 
and competing landlords' pricing, Willow Bridge violated Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Under their licensing agreements with 
RealPage, Willow Bridge and competing landlords have provided RealPage 
with daily, competitively sensitive, nonpublic information for use in 
RealPage's revenue management software relating to the landlords' 
leasing businesses, including details like how many leases have been 
renewed, for what terms, and at what price. The transactional data that 
Willow Bridge and other landlords have agreed to provide to RealPage 
includes current, forward-looking, granular, and highly competitively 
sensitive information. RealPage has

[[Page 70899]]

used Willow Bridge's competitively sensitive, nonpublic information to 
influence rental prices and other recommendations across rental 
properties managed by competing landlords. Willow Bridge's rental 
prices and related recommendations were likewise influenced by its 
competitors' competitively sensitive, nonpublic information obtained 
from RealPage. In each relevant market, RealPage and participating 
landlords, including Willow Bridge, have sufficient market power, 
including market and data penetration, to harm renters and the 
competitive process through this unlawful sharing of confidential and 
competitively sensitive information. Moreover, Willow Bridge and other 
landlords can achieve any procompetitive objective of revenue 
management software without sharing this kind of information.
    The Complaint also alleges that Willow Bridge and other landlords, 
by adopting and using RealPage's revenue management software, agreed 
with RealPage to align their pricing and thereby violate Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. RealPage has entered into agreements with 
Willow Bridge and its competing landlords relating to how to price 
rental units, including through the licensing of its revenue management 
software--AI Revenue Management (``AIRM''), YieldStar, and Lease Rent 
Options (``LRO'')--to landlords, and the provision by landlords of 
their competitively sensitive, nonpublic transactional data to RealPage 
for training and running its revenue management software. Adoption and 
use of RealPage's revenue management software by Willow Bridge and 
other landlords have the likely effect of causing competing landlords 
to employ the same or very similar strategies, processes, and decisions 
relating to their pricing of rental units. Willow Bridge and other 
landlord users understand this likely effect, which here dampens the 
competitive process that benefits renters.
    The proposed Final Judgment imposes several requirements and 
restrictions on Willow Bridge that address the United States' 
anticompetitive concerns regarding Willow Bridge's conduct alleged in 
the Complaint. Specifically:
    i. Willow Bridge must not license or use any revenue management 
product that uses third-party nonpublic data to recommend or set 
prices;
    ii. Willow Bridge must not license or use any revenue management 
product that pools information from Willow Bridge properties that have 
different owners;
    iii. Willow Bridge must not disclose, solicit, or use competitively 
sensitive information from competitors that can be used to set rental 
prices or generate pricing;
    iv. Willow Bridge must cooperate in this civil antitrust proceeding 
(United States et al. v. RealPage et al.);
    v. Willow Bridge must adopt a written antitrust compliance policy 
and designate a chief antitrust compliance officer who will train 
Willow Bridge employees on the policy;
    vi. Willow Bridge must allow the United States to inspect its 
documents and to interview its employees to ensure compliance with the 
Final Judgment;
    vii. If Willow Bridge uses a revenue management product, Willow 
Bridge will be subject to a monitor unless Willow Bridge obtains a 
certification that meets certain requirements, including an affirmation 
that the product complies with all required limitations regarding use 
of competitors' competitively sensitive data; and
    viii. If, in the future, the Court finds that Willow Bridge has 
violated the terms of the proposed Final Judgment, Willow Bridge will 
be subject to a court-appointed monitor.
    Under the terms of the Stipulation and Order, Willow Bridge must 
abide by and comply with the provisions of the proposed Final Judgment 
until it is entered by the Court or until the time for all appeals of 
any Court ruling declining entry of the proposed Final Judgment has 
expired.
    The United States and Willow Bridge have stipulated that the 
proposed Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance 
with the APPA. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will terminate this 
action with respect to the United States' claims against Willow Bridge, 
except that the Court will retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or 
enforce the provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish 
violations thereof by Willow Bridge.

III. Standard of Judicial Review

    The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed 
consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be 
subject to a 60-day comment period, after which the Court shall 
determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment ``is in the 
public interest.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In making that determination, 
the Court, in accordance with the Tunney Act as amended in 2004, is 
required to consider:
    (A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination 
of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, 
duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies 
actually considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and any other 
competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment 
that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether the 
consent judgment is in the public interest; and
    (B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the 
relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and individuals 
alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint 
including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived 
from a determination of the issues at trial.
    15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In considering these statutory 
factors, the Court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one, as the 
government is entitled to ``broad discretion to settle with the 
defendant within the reaches of the public interest.'' United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co., No. 25-CV-00951-PCP, 2026 WL 2349970, 
at *16 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2026); United States v. U.S. Airways Grp., 
Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining that the 
``court's inquiry is limited'' in Tunney Act settlements); United 
States v. InBev N.V./S.A., No. 08-1965 (JR), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
84787, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that a court's review of a 
consent judgment is limited and only inquires ``into whether the 
government's determination that the proposed remedies will cure the 
antitrust violations alleged in the complaint was reasonable, and 
whether the mechanism to enforce the final judgment are clear and 
manageable''); United States v. Keyspan Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 633, 
637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 673 
F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2012) (``We are bound in such matters to give 
deference to an executive agency's assessment of the public 
interest.'').
    As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
has held, under the APPA, a court considers, among other things, the 
relationship between the remedy secured and the specific allegations in 
the government's complaint, whether the proposed Final Judgment is 
sufficiently clear, whether its enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, 
and whether it may positively harm third parties. See Microsoft, 56 
F.3d at 1458-62; United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 631 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1458, 1461-62). With 
respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by the proposed

[[Page 70900]]

Final Judgment, a court may ``not make de novo determination of facts 
and issues.'' United States v. W. Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1577 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted); see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 
1460-62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 
2001); United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 
2000); InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3. Instead, ``[t]he 
balancing of competing social and political interests affected by a 
proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first instance, 
to the discretion of the Attorney General.'' W. Elec. Co., 993 F.2d at 
1577 (quotation marks omitted). ``The court should bear in mind the 
flexibility of the public interest inquiry: the court's function is not 
to determine whether the resulting array of rights and liabilities is 
one that will best serve society, but only to confirm that the 
resulting settlement is within the reaches of the public interest.'' 
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460 (quotation marks omitted); see also United 
States v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 19-2232 (TJK), 2020 WL 1873555, at 
*7 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 2020). More demanding requirements would ``have 
enormous practical consequences for the government's ability to 
negotiate future settlements,'' contrary to congressional intent. 
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1456. ``The Tunney Act was not intended to create 
a disincentive to the use of the consent decree.'' Id.\3\
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    \3\ See also United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 464 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (holding that the court's ``ultimate authority under the 
[APPA] is limited to approving or disapproving the consent 
decree''); United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. 
Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way, the court is constrained to 
``look at the overall picture not hypercritically, nor with a 
microscope, but with an artist's reducing glass'').
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    ``Because enforcement by consent decree is an alternative to 
enforcement by trial or abandonment of the litigation altogether and 
often reflects the United States's assessment of litigation risk, a 
proposed settlement does not need to replicate the full relief that 
[the] United States sought in its complaint.'' Hewlett Packard Enter., 
2026 WL 2349970, at *17. The United States' predictions about the 
efficacy of the remedy are to be afforded deference by the Court. See, 
e.g., Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (recognizing courts should give ``due 
respect to the Justice Department's . . . view of the nature of its 
case''); United States v. Iron Mountain, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 146, 
152-53 (D.D.C. 2016) (``In evaluating objections to settlement 
agreements under the Tunney Act, a court must be mindful that [t]he 
government need not prove that the settlements will perfectly remedy 
the alleged antitrust harms[;] it need only provide a factual basis for 
concluding that the settlements are reasonably adequate remedies for 
the alleged harms.'') (internal citations omitted); United States v. 
Republic Servs., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 157, 160 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting 
``the deferential review to which the government's proposed remedy is 
accorded''); United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 272 F. Supp. 
2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (``A district court must accord due respect to 
the government's prediction as to the effect of proposed remedies, its 
perception of the market structure, and its view of the nature of the 
case''). In determining whether a proposed settlement is in the public 
interest, a district court ``is not permitted to reject the proposed 
remedies merely because the court believes other remedies are 
preferable.'' United States v. Morgan Stanley, 881 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting United States v. Abitibi-Consol. Inc., 584 F. 
Supp. 2d 162, 165 (D.D.C. 2008)). The ultimate question is whether 
``the remedies [obtained by the Final Judgment are] so inconsonant with 
the allegations charged as to fall outside of the `reaches of the 
public interest.' '' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (quoting W. Elec. Co., 
900 F.2d at 309).
    Moreover, the Court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing 
the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has 
alleged in its complaint and does not authorize the Court to 
``construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree 
against that case.'' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459; see also U.S. Airways, 
38 F. Supp. 3d at 75 (noting that the court must simply determine 
whether there is a factual foundation for the government's decisions 
such that its conclusions regarding the proposed settlements are 
reasonable); United States v. Keyspan Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 633 637-38 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (``The Court's function is not to determine whether the 
proposed [d]ecree results in the balance of rights and liabilities that 
is the one that will best serve society, but only to ensure that the 
resulting settlement is `within the reaches of the public interest.''' 
(quoting United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 235, 
238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)); InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (``the 
`public interest' is not to be measured by comparing the violations 
alleged in the complaint against those the court believes could have, 
or even should have, been alleged''). Because the ``court's authority 
to review the decree depends entirely on the government's exercising 
its prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first place,'' 
it follows that ``the court is only authorized to review the decree 
itself,'' and not to ``effectively redraft the complaint'' to inquire 
into other matters that the United States did not pursue. Microsoft, 56 
F.3d at 1459-60. See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) 
(quoting U.S. Const. art. II, Sec.  3) (recognizing that the decision 
about which claims to bring ``has long been regarded as the special 
province of the Executive Branch.'').
    In its 2004 amendments to the APPA, Congress made clear its intent 
to preserve the practical benefits of using consent judgments proposed 
by the United States in antitrust enforcement, Public Law 108-237 Sec.  
221, and added the unambiguous instruction that ``[n]othing in this 
section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to 
intervene.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2); see also U.S. Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d 
at 76 (indicating that a court is not required to hold an evidentiary 
hearing or to permit intervenors as part of its review under the Tunney 
Act). This language explicitly wrote into the statute what Congress 
intended when it first enacted the Tunney Act in 1974. As Senator 
Tunney explained: ``[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or 
to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect of 
vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through the 
consent decree process.'' 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement of 
Sen. Tunney). ``A court can make its public interest determination 
based on the competitive impact statement and response to public 
comments alone.'' U.S. Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (citing Enova 
Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d at 17).

IV. Summary of Public Comments and the United States' Response

    The United States received two public comments in response to the 
proposed Final Judgment. The comments were submitted by private 
individuals, whom the United States will refer to by each individual's 
initials: MC (``MC Comment'') and JD (``JD Comment'').

A. The MC Comment

    MC's comment requests that the United States consider whether the 
proposed Final Judgment adequately addresses the role of pricing 
algorithms in renewal pricing, including situations where renewal 
prices offered are materially higher than prices quoted to prospective 
tenants for the same apartment unit, and ``whether monitoring under the 
decree should

[[Page 70901]]

examine the differences between renewal and new-tenant prices.'' \4\ 
The terms of the proposed Final Judgment with Willow Bridge do not make 
a distinction between renewal pricing and new-tenant pricing. 
Therefore, the limitations imposed on the use, disclosure, pooling, 
combination, or training of Nonpublic Data apply equally to 
recommendations regarding renewal pricing and new-tenant pricing 
generated by revenue management software.\5\
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    \4\ MC Comment at 2 (requests nos. 1, 2, and 5).
    \5\ Willow Bridge Proposed Final Judgment, ]] IV.A-C and V.A.1 
(Doc. 200-1).
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    Furthermore, the Complaint did not allege anticompetitive conduct 
related to differences between renewal pricing and new-tenant pricing. 
(See, e.g., Doc. 47, ] 62 (``Every morning, the landlord's property 
manager chooses whether to accept the floor plan price recommendation, 
keep the previous day's rent, or override the recommendation. These 
options are the same for new leases and renewal leases.'') & ] 107 
(``Specifically, he urged the group to `push up new and renewal pricing 
where demand [is] solid' and warned against over-relying on 
concessions. They were instead to `trust the science' of 
YieldStar.'').) MC's requests therefore are not relevant to the United 
States' claims and not germane to Tunney Act review.
    The fact that Willow Bridge may choose to price its apartment units 
differently to existing tenants and prospective tenants does not, in of 
itself, present a competitive concern, absent evidence that such a 
pricing strategy uses Nonpublic Data shared by Willow Bridge's 
competitors or aligns with the pricing strategy used by Willow Bridge's 
competitors in a local rental market. The terms of the proposed Final 
Judgment ensure that any differential pricing of renewals and new 
leases by Willow Bridge is not a result of the types of anticompetitive 
conduct alleged in the Complaint.
    MC further requests that the United States consider whether the 
proposed Final Judgment should require Willow Bridge to provide 
notification to tenants on a property's use of ``automated revenue 
management systems.'' \6\ Such a requirement would go beyond addressing 
the United States' claims regarding the sharing of competitively 
sensitive data among landlords and the use of revenue management 
software to align their pricing. The use of an ``automated revenue 
management system'' or software with a rental property, standing alone, 
does not raise competitive concerns. What matters is whether such a 
system or software is being trained on or otherwise uses Nonpublic Data 
shared by Willow Bridge's competitors and whether such a system or 
software, during operation, ``automates'' pricing recommendations and/
or decision-making for Willow Bridge and its competitors who are also 
using the system or software. The proposed Final Judgment effectively 
addresses such scenarios associated with Willow Bridge's use of an 
``automated revenue management system.'' More is therefore not 
required.
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    \6\ MC Comment at 2 (request no. 3).
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    Finally, MC requests that the United States consider whether the 
proposed Final Judgment should require Willow Bridge to provide 
``meaningful human review'' of renewal prices.\7\ Similar to MC's other 
requests, this request questions whether a landlord like Willow Bridge 
should be allowed to use revenue management software, and specifically 
software that may automatically generate pricing recommendations for 
renewals and new leases. As explained above, the United States' 
Complaint does not allege that Willow Bridge's use of a revenue 
management system or software, standing alone, is anticompetitive. What 
matters is whether such a system or software is being trained on or 
otherwise uses Nonpublic Data shared by Willow Bridge's competitors and 
whether such a system or software, during operation, ``automates'' 
pricing recommendations and/or decision-making for Willow Bridge and 
its competitors who are also using the system or software. The proposed 
Final Judgment effectively addresses such scenarios associated with 
Willow Bridge's use of revenue management software, and a requirement 
of ``meaningful human review'' is neither relevant nor necessary to 
address the competitive concerns raised by the Complaint.
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    \7\ Id. at 2 (request no. 4).
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B. The JD Comment

    JD first requests that the United States investigate whether their 
specific rental property uses a RealPage or other third-party revenue 
management product and whether their specific property's rental prices 
were calculated with the use of competitively sensitive information.\8\ 
JD further requests that the United States explain ``whether 
potentially affected renters will have any process to learn whether 
their property or its data was within the investigation or remedial 
program.'' \9\ A renter can ``evaluate whether the decree protects that 
renter.'' \10\ In the United States' judgment, the type of process 
requested by JD is not necessary. The proposed Final Judgment applies 
to all conventional multifamily rental properties, located within the 
United States or its territories, that are serviced by Willow Bridge 
(defined as ``Willow Bridge Properties'').\11\ It therefore would apply 
to JD's specific rental property if it is a Willow Bridge Property. As 
for JD's request for any investigative information specific to their 
rental property, the United States is prohibited by statute from 
disclosing these materials.\12\ The United States notes, however, that 
the Complaint identifies multiple geographic markets in Appendices A & 
B, which the public may consult to understand the scope and extent of 
the competitive harms being addressed by the proposed Final Judgment.
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    \8\ JD Comment at 1-2.
    \9\ Id. at 2.
    \10\ Id.
    \11\ Willow Bridge Proposed Final Judgment ] II.T (Doc. 200-1); 
Willow Bridge Competitive Impact Statement at 12 (Doc. 202).
    \12\ See 15 U.S.C. 1313(c)(3).
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    JD also requests that the proposed Final Judgment require 
independent technical verification of third-party revenue management 
products.\13\ Although the proposed Final Judgment does not require 
independent technical verification, it requires third-party revenue 
management providers to provide certifications that the software 
complies with the terms of the proposed Final Judgment.\14\ 
Furthermore, the United States has the right to obtain and inspect the 
code and pseudocode of Willow Bridge's proprietary revenue management 
software.\15\
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    \13\ JD Comment at 3.
    \14\ Willow Bridge Proposed Final Judgment ] V.E (Doc. 200-1).
    \15\ Willow Bridge Proposed Final Judgment ] X.D (Doc. 200-1).
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    JD recommends that the United States require Willow Bridge's 
internal annual audit to include a ``statistically and operationally 
meaningful sample.'' \16\ The proposed Final Judgment requires an 
internal audit of employees ``engaged in or overseeing Willow Bridge's 
revenue management of multifamily rental properties in the United 
States and its territories,'' and at least 12 ``randomly selected, 
local, regional, or supervisory employees who manage property 
operations.'' \17\ This is sufficient to capture the scope and 
diversity of Willow Bridge's revenue management operations, and there 
is no need to expand or otherwise modify the

[[Page 70902]]

audit requirement. Importantly, the proposed Final Judgment provides 
the United States broad rights to ensure compliance with the Final 
Judgment. These include access to ``electronic copies of all books, 
ledgers, accounts, records, data, and documents'' and to Willow 
Bridge's employees for interviews relating to any matters contained in 
the Final Judgment.\18\
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    \16\ JD Comment at 3.
    \17\ Willow Bridge Proposed Final Judgment ] VII.A (Doc. 200-1).
    \18\ Willow Bridge Proposed Final Judgment ] X.A (Doc. 200-1).
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    JD also requests that Willow Bridge be required to provide a public 
annual compliance report. The compliance report should include, 
according to the commenter, ``the number of properties and units under 
each category of revenue-management product'' and information regarding 
compliance and corrective actions.\19\ An annual compliance report of 
this nature is not necessary. Moreover, such a report would be at odds 
with the proposed Final Judgment's prohibitions against public 
disclosure of information and documents obtained pursuant to any of its 
provisions.\20\ Disclosure would also create a risk that competitively 
sensitive information relating to Willow Bridge will be made public 
which could lead to coordination among competing landlords.
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    \19\ JD Comment at 3-4.
    \20\ Willow Bridge Proposed Final Judgment ] XI (Doc. 200-1).
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    JD recommends that the proposed Final Judgment make ``unmistakably 
clear'' that structured datasets containing competitors' nonpublic 
information may not be accessed, used, combined, retained without 
controls, and require ``documented segregation, access restriction, 
deletion or defensible inaction, and testing to prevent legacy data 
from entering recommendations or model training.'' \21\ The proposed 
Final Judgment already includes such a provision. Paragraph VI.C. of 
states that Willow Bridge must not ``use or access, as part of setting 
rental prices or generating rental pricing recommendations for any 
Willow Bridge property, any External Nonpublic Data . . . including 
such data derived from any RealPage Revenue Management Product.'' \22\
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    \21\ JD Comment at 4.
    \22\ Willow Bridge Proposed Final Judgment ] VI.C (Doc. 200-1).
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    JD also points to the definition of ``Willow Bridge Property'' and 
notes that it excludes ``student, affordable, age-restricted or senior, 
and military housing.'' \23\ The commenter requests that if 
``operational differences justify particular exceptions, those 
exceptions should be narrowly tailored.'' The United States' Complaint 
alleges a product market for conventional multifamily conventional 
housing that does not include student, age-restricted, and military 
housing (Doc. 47, ] 183). This portion of the commenter's request is 
therefore outside the scope of the Complaint and is not subject to 
Tunney Act consideration.
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    \23\ JD Comment at 4.
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    JD proposes that early termination of the Final Judgment by the 
United States should be based on a ``reasoned public determination,'' 
and involve a process that includes ``public notice.'' \24\ The 
proposed Final Judgment already provides that a request for early 
termination would involve a public notice to the Court (and to Willow 
Bridge) that continuation of the Final Judgment is no longer necessary 
or in the public interest.\25\
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    \24\ Id.
    \25\ Willow Bridge Proposed Final Judgment ] XIV (Doc. 200-1).
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    JD questions the proposed Final Judgment's cap of 15 employees and 
60 total hours for cooperation with the litigation.\26\ This comment 
fails to recognize that cooperation is not the only way that the United 
States can develop evidence. In any investigation or litigation, the 
United States always has procedural tools to compel the production of 
documents and testimony.\27\ The cap in the proposed Final Judgment, 
which is the product of a negotiated settlement, does not in any way 
hamstring the United States' ability to obtain discovery in its 
litigation against any other defendant in this action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ JD Comment at 4.
    \27\ See 15 U.S.C. 1312, Fed. R. Civ. P. 30, 34 & 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, JD asks why the proposed Final Judgment does not include 
any monetary relief.\28\ The proposed Final Judgment does not provide 
for restitution because it is not one of the remedies sought by the 
United States in its Complaint.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ JD Comment at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
    To the extent that commenters wish to raise the possibility of 
additional unlawful conduct not addressed by the Complaint brought in 
this matter, members of the public are encouraged to submit information 
about any antitrust violation, including potentially unlawful exchanges 
of information between competitors, to the Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division's Citizen Complaint Center (<a href="https://www.justice.gov/atr/webform/pcsf-citizen-complaint">https://www.justice.gov/atr/webform/pcsf-citizen-complaint</a>).

V. Conclusion

    After careful consideration of the public comments, the United 
States continues to believe that the proposed Final Judgment provides 
an effective and appropriate remedy for the antitrust violations 
alleged in the Complaint against Willow Bridge and is therefore in the 
public interest. The United States will move this Court to enter the 
proposed Final Judgment after the comments and this response are 
published in a manner approved by the Court, as required by 15 U.S.C. 
16(d).

Dated: November 5, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Henry C. Su

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Henry C. Su,
David A. Geiger,
Danielle G. Hauck
Attorneys
United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth 
Street NW, Suite 7100, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 307-
6200, Email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#442c212a363d6a3731043137202b2e6a232b32"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="88e0ede6faf1a6fbfdc8fdfbece7e2a6efe7fe">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.

Certificate of Service

    I hereby certify that on November 5, 2026, I electronically 
filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF 
system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel 
of record.

By: /s/ Henry C. Su
 /s/ Henry C. Su-------------------------------------------------------
Henry C. Su

Certificate of Word Count

    I hereby certify that, based on the word count tool in Microsoft 
Word, the foregoing document contains 4,814 words, exclusive of the 
caption, signature lines, certificate of service, and any cover page 
or index, and it therefore complies with the limitation on length 
set forth in Local Civil Rule 7.3(d).
Dated: November 5, 2026

By: /s/ Henry C. Su
 /s/ Henry C. Su-------------------------------------------------------
Henry C. Su

EXHIBIT 1--MC Comment (Redacted)

From: [REDACTED]
To: ATR-Public-Comments-Tunney-Act-MB
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Public Comment--Willow Bridge Proposed Final 
Judgment--1:24-cv-00710
    Date: Monday, September 14, 2026 11:54:14 p.m.
Attachments: image0.png, image1.png, image2.png, image3.png

Good evening,

    I am submitting this comment regarding the proposed Final 
Judgment involving Willow Bridge Property Company LLC in United 
States et al. v. RealPage, Inc. et al., Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-
00710.
    I am a current resident of [REDACTED] in Dallas, Texas, a Willow 
Bridge-managed community.
    My current lease expires [REDACTED]. On [REDACTED], I received a 
renewal offer for my apartment that included the following rates:


[[Page 70903]]


10 months--$1,734/month
11 months--$1,628/month
13 months--$1,622/month
14 months--$1,629/month
15 months--$1,631/month

    I recently checked my property's public website and discovered 
that my exact apartment, is already being marketed to a prospective 
new resident, with availability beginning [REDACTED].
    The publicly advertised rates for Apartment [REDACTED] include:

10 months--$1,536/month
11 months--$1,526/month
13 months--$1,517/month
14 months--$1,524/month
15 months--$1,527/month
16 months--$1,517/month

    Thus, Willow Bridge is currently offering prospective new 
renters materially lower rents for the exact same apartment than it 
offered me to remain in the apartment. Additionally, a concession of 
4 weeks free is being offered to all one bedroom floor plans that 
has been explicitly denied to me.
    For example, my 10-month renewal rate was $1,734, while the 
publicly advertised 10-month rate for my apartment is $1,536--a 
difference of $198 per month. My 14-month renewal rate was $1,629 
compared with an advertised $1,524, and my 15-month renewal rate was 
$1,631 compared with an advertised $1,527.
    I have screenshots of the public listing and a copy of my 
written renewal offer documenting these amounts.
    I do not know whether my renewal rates or the currently 
advertised rates were generated, recommended, or influenced by 
RealPage, AIRM, YieldStar, or another revenue-management system. I 
am not asserting that this pricing discrepancy alone proves an 
antitrust violation.
    However, because the government's allegations against Willow 
Bridge concern algorithmic rental pricing and the use of 
competitively sensitive information in determining rents, I believe 
this current pricing experience is relevant to whether the proposed 
Final Judgment adequately protects renters.
    In particular, I respectfully ask the Department to consider 
whether the proposed decree adequately addresses:
    1. pricing algorithms used for lease renewals, not merely rents 
quoted to prospective tenants;
    2. situations in which incumbent tenants are offered materially 
higher prices than the contemporaneous public price for their own 
apartment;
    3. whether tenants should be told when an automated revenue-
management system materially influenced their renewal rate;
    4. whether Willow Bridge should be required to provide 
meaningful human review of renewal prices; and
    5. whether monitoring under the decree should examine 
differences between renewal pricing and new-tenant pricing at the 
same property.
    I am providing this information so that the Department and Court 
have the benefit of a current Willow Bridge resident's experience 
while evaluating whether the proposed relief is sufficient to 
protect competition and renters.
    Thank you for considering my comment.
[REDACTED]
Dallas, Texas

[Screenshots Redacted]

    Exhibit 2--JD Comment (Redacted)
From: [REDACTED]
To: ATR-Public-Comments-Tunney-Act-MB
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Public Comment--Proposed Willow Bridge Final 
Judgment--U.S. v. RealPage, No. 1:24-cv-00710
Date: Friday, September 11, 2026 1:27:48 p.m.

Dear Ms. Hauck:

    I am a [REDACTED] resident of [REDACTED] in Chula Vista, 
California, a multifamily community publicly listed/managed by 
Willow Bridge Property Company.
    I have lived at [REDACTED] for approximately one year, and 
Willow Bridge has managed the community throughout my residency. My 
own tenancy has raised unresolved financial and pricing-related 
concerns involving Willow Bridge's administration of rent and other 
housing charges. I do not claim in this comment that those concerns 
resulted from RealPage, competitor data, or an antitrust violation. 
They are why the adequacy and verifiability of this decree are 
concrete questions for me rather than abstract policy concerns. I am 
willing to provide relevant records through a nonpublic channel if 
the Department determines that a property-level inquiry is 
warranted.
    I respectfully ask the Antitrust Division to strengthen the 
proposed Final Judgment with Willow Bridge Property Company LLC, or 
explain on the public record why the existing provisions are 
sufficient, before asking the Court to find the settlement in the 
public interest.
    My relationship to a Willow Bridge-managed community explains 
why the decree matters to me; it is not offered as evidence that the 
alleged antitrust conduct occurred at [REDACTED]. This comment 
relies only on the public record: the amended complaint, proposed 
Final Judgment, Competitive Impact Statement, Federal Register 
notice, Willow Bridge's public property listing, and the 
Department's public case materials. It does not ask the Department 
to decide any private tenancy dispute. The amended complaint 
contains allegations, not adjudicated facts, and Willow Bridge's 
consent to the proposed judgment is not an admission of liability. 
Those limits make independent verification of future compliance more 
important, not less.

Property-Specific Public-Interest Question: [REDACTED]

    My concern is not abstract. Willow Bridge's current public 
website presents [REDACTED] as one of its communities. The 
California Department of Real Estate currently lists the [REDACTED] 
address as a branch of Willow Bridge Management Inc., a corporation 
using the DBAs ``Willow Bridge'' and ``Willow Bridge Property 
Company.'' A 2022 City of Chula Vista staff report described 
[REDACTED] as a [REDACTED] property owned by John Hancock Life 
Insurance Company (U.S.A.) since 2015. I cite the City report as a 
dated public representation, not as proof of current title.
    DOJ's amended complaint alleges that Willow Bridge used 
RealPage's AIRM and YieldStar products. It also alleges more broadly 
that RealPage obtained confidential transactional data through 
products including OneSite, Performance Analytics with Benchmarking, 
and Business Intelligence--including data from units that did not 
necessarily use AIRM or YieldStar--and made such data available for 
pricing recommendations. The complaint does not identify [REDACTED] 
or Chula Vista, and I do not claim that [REDACTED] used any of these 
products or that its data entered the challenged system. The absence 
of property-level public information is precisely why I ask DOJ to 
examine the question.
    I respectfully request that the Department, within its existing 
investigative, preservation, and compliance authority:
    1. determine whether [REDACTED] used AIRM, YieldStar, LRO, 
OneSite, Performance Analytics with Benchmarking, Business 
Intelligence, or another RealPage or third-party revenue-management 
or data product during the period relevant to the complaint and 
proposed judgment;
    2. determine whether [REDACTED] nonpublic rents, concessions, 
applications, lease terms, renewals, occupancy, availability, or 
other competitively sensitive information were transmitted, pooled, 
benchmarked, used for model training, or made available to generate 
recommendations for [REDACTED] or competing properties;
    3. determine whether pricing or leasing recommendations used at 
[REDACTED] were influenced by competitors' nonpublic information;
    4. preserve the relevant property-level contracts, product 
records, data-flow records, configurations, recommendations, 
overrides, communications, and audit trails, and ensure that the 
decree's legacy-data and compliance provisions reach [REDACTED] and 
similarly situated properties managed for third-party owners; and
    5. to the extent consistent with law-enforcement and 
confidentiality constraints, explain in DOJ's response to public 
comments whether potentially affected renters will have any process 
to learn whether their property or its data was within the 
investigation or remedial program.
    These requests do not assume the answers. They ask DOJ to test a 
concrete property against the precise data flows, products, owner-
manager relationships, and renter harms alleged in its own 
complaint.
    They also expose a practical transparency problem: a renter 
cannot evaluate whether the decree protects that renter if property-
level coverage is known only to Willow Bridge, its vendors, and the 
government.

Voucher-Assisted Residents and Public Funds

    [REDACTED] makes the property-level pricing question more 
consequential. In the federal [REDACTED] program, the public housing 
agency may not approve the initial rent until it determines that the 
rent to owner

[[Page 70904]]

is reasonable, must redetermine reasonableness before an increase, 
and must compare the requested rent with comparable unassisted 
units. The payment standard and gross rent also affect the housing-
assistance-payment calculation. See 24 CFR 982.505 and 982.507.
    Accordingly, if competitor-informed or algorithmically 
influenced pricing affected a requested initial rent, renewal 
increase, comparable-unit submission, concession, or other pricing 
input for a voucher-assisted unit, the effects could reach the 
resident's housing cost, the agency's rent-reasonableness process, 
and the expenditure of public subsidy funds. I do not assert that 
this occurred in my tenancy. I ask DOJ to determine whether it 
occurred at [REDACTED] or other Willow Bridge-managed properties 
and, if the evidence indicates an effect on assisted units or agency 
rent determinations, to coordinate as appropriate with HUD and the 
administering public housing agencies.
    The final judgment should also require Willow Bridge to identify 
whether covered products or data practices were used in connection 
with voucher-assisted units at otherwise conventional properties. 
Its exclusion of ``affordable housing'' must not be interpreted to 
remove an entire conventional property--or individual units--from 
the decree merely because some residents use tenant-based rental 
assistance.
    I have separately submitted housing-accountability reports to 
the HUD Office of Inspector General and VA Office of Inspector 
General and initiated a housing intake with the California Civil 
Rights Department. These are distinct processes. I do not represent 
that any of those agencies has opened an investigation, accepted a 
formal complaint, or made findings. I identify them only because 
overlapping voucher, rent, property-management, and communications 
records may warrant preservation or appropriate interagency referral 
if DOJ identifies a nexus to the conduct alleged in this case.
    The proposed judgment contains meaningful protections. It 
broadly restricts the use and disclosure of competitors' nonpublic, 
property-specific information; limits revenue-management products 
that pool data across different owners; prohibits agreements with 
other property managers or owners to use a product; restricts price 
floors, automatic acceptance, and financial incentives tied to 
accepting recommendations; bars participation in RealPage meetings; 
preserves Department inspection rights; and provides contempt and 
cost-shifting remedies. These are material safeguards.
    The public-interest question, however, is whether those 
safeguards can be verified and enforced across Willow Bridge's 
national operating footprint. The Competitive Impact Statement 
states that Willow Bridge manages more than 240,000 units. Against 
that scale, several provisions appear too dependent on self-
reporting, vendor assurances, small samples, and nonpublic 
oversight.

1. Require Independent Technical Verification and an Initial Monitoring 
Period

    The proposed judgment permits Willow Bridge to use a third-party 
revenue-management product if the provider certifies that the 
product meets the decree's requirements. It also appears to permit 
use of a RealPage product without a separate certification if a 
final judgment is entered against RealPage. A monitoring trustee is 
not automatic: monitoring is principally tied to use of an 
uncertified product or a judicial finding of a violation.
    Vendor certification is useful evidence, but it is not 
independent verification. The alleged conduct involved data flows, 
model training, product settings, information exchanges, and 
operational practices that can change after a certification is 
issued. Reliance on a separate judgment against RealPage also does 
not establish that Willow Bridge's configuration and use of a 
product are compliant in practice.
    I ask the Department to require:

--independent technical validation before initial use and after 
material product, model, data-source, or configuration changes;
--testing of actual data inputs, model-training data, access 
controls, recommendation settings, overrides, and outputs--not only 
review of a vendor's written representations; and
--an independent monitoring trustee for at least the first two 
years, with risk-based authority to examine products and practices 
whether or not a violation has already been proved.

    If the Department believes these protections are unnecessary, 
its response should explain how vendor certification and a 
contingent monitor provide equivalent assurance.

2. Scale the Audit Program to Willow Bridge's Footprint and Risk

    The proposed judgment requires an annual audit of revenue-
management personnel and at least 12 randomly selected local, 
regional, or supervisory property-operations employees. A minimum 
sample of 12 employees is difficult to reconcile with a company 
managing more than 240,000 units. Random selection alone can also 
miss markets, properties, transition periods, or teams presenting 
the greatest risk.
    The final judgment should require a statistically and 
operationally meaningful sample tied to the number of properties, 
units, markets, products, and owners involved. The sample should 
include risk-based selections, not merely random ones, and should 
test management transitions, complaints, unusual override patterns, 
product changes, and markets where multiple competing properties use 
the same software. The audit should examine owners' instructions and 
approvals when those instructions affect product use or pricing 
practices.

3. Add Public, Aggregated Compliance Reporting

    The proposed judgment gives the Department access to significant 
nonpublic information, but it does not appear to require a public 
annual compliance report. Monitoring reports are generally protected 
from disclosure, and the public may never learn whether a monitor 
was appointed, what products were used, whether violations were 
detected, or whether corrective action occurred.
    Confidential business information should remain protected. But 
confidentiality does not require complete public opacity. The final 
judgment should require an annual public report stating, in 
aggregated and noncommercial terms:

--the number of properties and units using each category of revenue-
management product;
--the number and type of audits, technical tests, complaints, and 
substantiated violations;
--the general nature and completion status of corrective actions;
--whether a monitoring trustee is serving and the scope of completed 
review; and
--whether the Department has granted, rejected, or conditioned any 
request affecting compliance.

    Public reporting would allow affected renters and the Court to 
assess whether the decree is functioning without disclosing rents, 
algorithms, personal data, or competitively sensitive information.

4. Clarify Legacy-Data Controls and the Housing-Category Exclusions

    The proposed judgment requires Willow Bridge to identify certain 
structured datasets containing competitors' nonpublic information, 
but states that the identification provisions do not apply to data 
maintained in OneSite, Yardi Voyager, or other property-management 
software. The final judgment should make unmistakably clear that 
this storage-location language is not permission to access, use, 
combine, retain without controls, or repurpose prohibited 
information. It should require documented segregation, access 
restriction, deletion or defensible inactivation, and testing 
sufficient to prevent legacy data from entering recommendations or 
model training.
    The definition of ``Willow Bridge Property'' also excludes 
student, affordable, age-restricted or senior, and military housing. 
The public record should explain why residents and owners in those 
sectors do not require the decree's core protections against 
competitor data exchange and cross-owner pooling. The judgment 
should also clarify that an otherwise conventional multifamily 
property is not excluded merely because individual households use 
tenant-based rental assistance. If operational differences justify 
particular exceptions, those exceptions should be narrowly tailored; 
the core information-sharing prohibitions should apply wherever the 
competitive risk exists.

5. Condition Any Early Termination on a Public Compliance Record

    The proposed judgment lasts five years but permits termination 
after three years upon notice by the United States. Early 
termination should require a reasoned public determination based on 
completed independent testing, a record of corrective action, and 
the absence of unresolved material violations. The Department should 
provide public notice before early termination and give the Court 
and the public a meaningful opportunity to assess the compliance 
record.

[[Page 70905]]

6. Explain the Limits of the Remedy and Cooperation Provisions

    The proposed judgment requires cooperation but caps voluntary 
interviews under that provision at 15 employees and 60 total hours. 
Formal discovery and civil investigative demands remain available. 
Even so, given the alleged duration, nationwide scope, and technical 
nature of the conduct, the Department should explain why those 
ceilings are appropriate for voluntary cooperation, or replace them 
with a reasonable-necessity standard.
    The Competitive Impact Statement also recognizes that private 
parties may pursue damages and that the proposed judgment will have 
no prima facie effect in private litigation. The settlement contains 
no restitution or monetary relief for renters. I recognize that a 
Tunney Act review is not an individual claims process and that the 
Court's role is not to rewrite the government's case. Still, the 
Department should explain why forward-looking relief without 
monetary redress is adequate in light of the complaint's allegations 
and what public compliance information will allow potentially 
affected renters to understand whether the challenged practices have 
actually stopped.

Requested Disposition

    I respectfully ask the Department to modify the proposed Final 
Judgment to include the safeguards above before entry. At minimum, 
the Department's response to public comments should address each 
concern with enough specificity for the Court to evaluate whether 
the decree's verification, transparency, duration, coverage, and 
cooperation provisions are adequate for a company of Willow Bridge's 
scale.
    The decree should not depend on the public simply trusting the 
participants and vendors whose future conduct it is designed to 
constrain. Durable relief requires independent testing, 
proportionate auditing, limited but meaningful transparency, and a 
public basis for any early termination.

Respectfully submitted,

[REDACTED]

Sources Used:

1. U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, case page, *U.S. 
and Plaintiff States v. RealPage, Inc.*, updated Sept. 4, 2026: 
<a href="https://www.justice.gov/atr/case/us-and-plaintiff-states-v-realpage-inc">https://www.justice.gov/atr/case/us-and-plaintiff-states-v-realpage-inc</a>
2. Proposed Final Judgment as to Willow Bridge Property Company LLC, 
filed July 6, 2026:
3. Competitive Impact Statement as to Willow Bridge Property Company 
LLC, filed July 6, 2026: <a href="https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1451166/dl">https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1451166/dl</a>
4. Amended Complaint, filed Jan. 7, 2025: <a href="https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1383471/dl">https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1383471/dl</a>
5. Federal Register public-inspection notice, scheduled for 
publication July 16, 2026: <a href="https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-14345.pdf">https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-14345.pdf</a>
6. U.S. Department of Justice, ``Justice Department Reaches Proposed 
Settlement with Willow Bridge, One of America's Largest Landlords,'' 
July 7, 2026: <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-proposed-settlement-willow-bridge-one-americas-largest-landlords">https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-proposed-settlement-willow-bridge-one-americas-largest-landlords</a>
7. Willow Bridge Property Company, [REDACTED]
8. California Department of Real Estate, Willow Bridge Management 
Inc., corporation license 01319176 and branch listing: <a href="https://www2.dre.ca.gov/publicasp/pplinfo.asp?License_id=01319176">https://www2.dre.ca.gov/publicasp/pplinfo.asp?License_id=01319176</a>
9. City of Chula Vista, 2022 staff report describing [REDACTED]
10. Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, 24 CFR 982.505, housing-
assistance-payment calculation: <a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-24/subtitle-B/chapter-IX/part-982/subpart-K/section-982.505">https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-24/subtitle-B/chapter-IX/part-982/subpart-K/section-982.505</a>
11. Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, 24 CFR 982.507, 
reasonable rent: <a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-24/subtitle-B/chapter-IX/part-982/subpart-K/section-982.507--">https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-24/subtitle-B/chapter-IX/part-982/subpart-K/section-982.507--</a>

[REDACTED]
    ``It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or 
even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation 
except a good will.''
    --Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals)

[FR Doc. 2026-22832 Filed 11-6-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-P


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