Proposed Rule2026-22396
Pipeline Safety: Amendments to Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities
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Published
November 3, 2026
Issuing agencies
Transportation DepartmentPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Abstract
PHMSA proposes updating its regulations for liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities to incorporate by reference the most recent industry safety standards and to make other changes to account for more than two decades of improvements and technological advancements. This rulemaking also responds to congressional mandates directing PHMSA to integrate risk-based regulatory approaches for certain LNG facilities.
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 211 (Tuesday, November 3, 2026)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 69314-69388]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-22396]
[[Page 69313]]
Vol. 91
Tuesday,
No. 211
November 3, 2026
Part II
Department of Transportation
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Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
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49 CFR Parts 191 and 193
Pipeline Safety: Amendments to Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities;
Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 91 , No. 211 / Tuesday, November 3, 2026 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 69314]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 191 and 193
[Docket No. PHMSA-2019-0091]
RIN 2137-AF45
Pipeline Safety: Amendments to Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
SUMMARY: PHMSA proposes updating its regulations for liquefied natural
gas (LNG) facilities to incorporate by reference the most recent
industry safety standards and to make other changes to account for more
than two decades of improvements and technological advancements. This
rulemaking also responds to congressional mandates directing PHMSA to
integrate risk-based regulatory approaches for certain LNG facilities.
DATES: Comments on this NPRM must be submitted by January 4, 2027. A
public meeting of PHMSA's statutory advisory committees will be held on
a date to be announced in the Federal Register.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments by any of the following methods, identifying
docket number PHMSA-2019-0091 at the top of the first page:
<bullet> On <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a>, follow instructions to
``submit a comment.''
<bullet> By mail or hand delivery to Docket Management System, U.S.
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC
20590-0001. Hand delivery is available to this address between 9:00
a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday (except Federal holidays).
Include two copies if submitting by mail and include a self-addressed
and stamped postcard to receive confirmation of receipt.
Comments may be viewed at <a href="https://www.regulations.gov/docket/PHMSA-2019-0091">https://www.regulations.gov/docket/PHMSA-2019-0091</a>. Comments are posted without changes or edits, including any
personal information provided. DOT's privacy statement can be reviewed
at <a href="https://www.dot.gov/privacy">https://www.dot.gov/privacy</a>. A plain language summary of the
proposed rule is also available in section I.B. that is placed on the
rulemaking docket, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(4).
Confidential Business Information (CBI): You may designate a
comment as CBI if your comment contains commercial or financial
information that is customarily treated as private and that you
actually treat as private by sending to Brianna Wilson, at the contact
information listed below, the following: (1) the original document with
each page containing CBI marked as ``confidential;'' (2) a redacted
copy with the CBI deleted; and (3) an explanation of why the
information you are submitting is CBI. See 49 CFR 190.343. Any comment
not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brianna Wilson, Standards and
Rulemaking Division, by phone at (771) 215-0969 or by email at
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#eb8999828a85858ac59c8287988485ab8f849fc58c849d"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="5537273c343b3b347b223c39263a3b15313a217b323a23">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
II. Background
III. Section-by-Section Discussion of the Proposed Changes in Part
191
IV. Section-by-Section Discussion of the Proposed Changes in Part
193
V. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose and Scope of the Regulatory Action
PHMSA has been regulating the safety of LNG facilities for more
than five decades. When PHMSA issued the first Federal safety standards
in 1970, the U.S. LNG industry comprised mostly relatively small
``peak-shaving'' facilities used to liquefy and store natural gas for
delivery to local markets during times of peak demand. The handful of
large-scale LNG facilities at that time were primarily built to import
natural gas for domestic consumption. The U.S. LNG industry did not
have a significant role as an exporter of natural gas.
Market conditions have changed dramatically since the 1970s. U.S.
natural gas production has increased significantly, particularly in the
past two decades as technological advancements in the oil and gas
industry have led to the development of energy resources from the
Nation's shale plays. Domestic natural gas demand has continued to
grow, and an increasing number of U.S.-based facilities are exporting
LNG to foreign markets. These changes have created a need for the
construction of new LNG facilities and for the expansion of existing
LNG facilities.
Modern operational and maintenance practices within the LNG
industry are considerably more sophisticated and robust, reflecting
many thousands of hours of experience since the 1970s. New technologies
have emerged, such as ``membrane'' tanks (which employ a thin cryogenic
steel inner liner with a load-bearing, concrete outer tank--an approach
offering improved storage capacity, reduced material costs, and faster
construction schedules than earlier LNG storage tank designs) and pipe-
in-pipe (PIP) transfer systems (which provide enhanced containment of
releases from cryogenic piping).
PHMSA's oversight of the LNG industry has not kept pace with these
dramatic changes. PHMSA's LNG regulations are largely based on the 2001
edition of an industry standard, NFPA 59A, Standard for the Production,
Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and have not been
updated since 2006. NFPA 59A-2001 is now seven editions out of date,
and multiple stakeholders have called on PHMSA to update its
regulations to account for the latest practices in the siting, design,
construction, operation, and maintenance of LNG facilities. For
example, in the Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and
Enhancing Safety Act of 2016 (PIPES Act of 2016), Congress directed
PHMSA to develop regulations for permanent, small-scale LNG facilities,
an issue specifically addressed in the more recent editions of NFPA
59A.\1\ In the Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing
Safety Act of 2020 (PIPES Act of 2020), Congress directed PHMSA to
develop alternative, risk-based operations and maintenance requirements
for large-scale LNG facilities, an approach consistent with modern
regulatory frameworks that apply in other industries.\2\ The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has also advised PHMSA to update its
regulations to align better with current editions of consensus industry
standards.\3\
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\1\ PIPES Act of 2016, Public Law 114-183 (June 22, 2016).
\2\ PIPES Act of 2020, Public Law 116-260 (Dec. 27, 2020).
\3\ GAO, Natural Gas Exports: Updated Guidance and Regulations
Could Improve Facility Permitting Processes (Aug. 6, 2020) (GAO
Report).
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To address these concerns, PHMSA proposes a comprehensive revision
to its safety standards for LNG facilities. The proposed amendments
would enhance public safety by incorporating the latest consensus
industry standards for the siting, design, construction, operation, and
maintenance of LNG facilities. These changes will promote the use of
new technologies, reduce unnecessary barriers to investment, and
provide regulatory certainty for
[[Page 69315]]
interested stakeholders. PHMSA's proposals will also address
outstanding Congressional mandates and GAO recommendations and advance
the President's commitments to unleashing American energy, sustaining
U.S. defense operations, and ensuring the energy security of the U.S.
and its allies.
B. Summary of the Major Regulatory Provisions
Below is a high-level summary of the most substantial changes
proposed in this document. This NPRM discusses each change in more
detail in the ``Section-by-Section Discussion of the Proposed
Changes.''
1. Calibrating Reporting Requirements to Public Safety Risks
PHMSA proposes to amend the reporting requirements for safety-
related conditions and incidents. First, PHMSA proposes to clarify that
operators of LNG facilities must report safety-related conditions and
incidents during initial startup. This clarification would help ensure
that operators are reporting incidents and safety-related conditions
that occur at the earliest phase in the operational lifetime of an LNG
facility, which is critical in determining its long-term integrity.
PHMSA also proposes to broaden the definition of incidents and safety-
related conditions to encompass hazardous fluids beyond LNG alone; this
proposed change will improve risk mitigation and incident response by
focusing on the various materials involved in gas processing activities
at LNG facilities. Second, PHMSA proposes to revise the incident and
annual report forms to eliminate content with little or no safety
value, and to update the operator identification number (OPID) and
annual report forms to accommodate the new requirements for permanent,
small-scale LNG facilities in subpart D.
2. Incorporation by Reference Updated Editions of Leading Industry
Standards
PHMSA proposes to incorporate by reference the 2026 edition of NFPA
59A.\4\ PHMSA currently incorporates the 2001 edition of NFPA 59A for
most purposes. Incorporating the 2026 edition is consistent with
PHMSA's longstanding practice of integrating NFPA 59A as a key
component of its regulations for LNG facilities. As part of that
process, PHMSA proposes to redesignate or to remove certain duplicative
or unnecessary regulatory requirements and to modify or to supplement
certain provisions in NFPA 59A-2026 (e.g., design wind resistance of
certain LNG facilities; design spill assumptions in hazard modeling) to
accommodate significant public safety risks or to facilitate
implementation.
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\4\ National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), 59A-2026
Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied
Natural Gas (LNG) (Dec. 9, 2025) (NFPA 59A-2026).
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Incorporating NFPA 59A-2026 would enhance the requirements for the
siting, design, installation, construction, operations, and maintenance
of LNG facilities and align PHMSA's regulations with the latest safety-
enhancing practices and technologies. It would also reduce certain
compliance costs by allowing LNG operators to use those practices and
technologies without obtaining special permits or waivers and address
outstanding Congressional mandates and GAO recommendations.
3. Improved Alignment Between Facility Siting Requirements and Safety
Risks
PHMSA proposes to incorporate by reference the traditional,
prescriptive siting requirements in chapter 5 of NFPA 59A-2026.
Incorporating chapter 5 would expand the universe of hazards operators
must evaluate to comply with the part 193, subpart B siting
requirements, ensuring that those analyses are consistent with current
knowledge of the public safety risks posed by releases of hazardous
fluids from LNG facilities.
PHMSA also proposes to incorporate the new risk-based siting
requirements in chapter 19 (Performance-Based LNG Plant Siting Using
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)) of NFPA 59A-2026. PHMSA expects that
the QRA-based approach will improve facility safety by allowing a more
sophisticated understanding of public safety risks, enhancing the
allocation of resources, and incentivizing deployment of innovative
operational practices and technology. PHMSA expects that improved
flexibility regarding LNG facility siting and internal layout under the
QRA-based approach could enable investment in additional capacity at
existing locations.
4. Introduction of Targeted Requirements for Permanent, Small-Scale LNG
Facilities
PHMSA proposes to establish requirements for permanent, small-scale
LNG facilities by incorporating chapter 17 of NFPA 59A-2026 by
reference into a new subpart D. Permanent, small-scale LNG facilities
entail lower risks to public safety and the environment than larger LNG
facilities, primarily due to their distinguishable liquefaction
processes, lower liquefaction capacity, and smaller LNG storage
volumes, and should be regulated accordingly. Incorporating the chapter
17 requirements would also address the rulemaking mandate in section
27(b) of the PIPES Act of 2016 for permanent, small-scale LNG
facilities.
5. Integration of an Alternative, Risk-based Operations and Maintenance
Framework
Consistent with section 110 of the PIPES Act of 2020, PHMSA
proposes to adopt an alternative, risk-based operations and maintenance
(O&M) program for FERC-jurisdictional LNG facilities in a new subpart
F. The risk-based O&M alternative would be a structured program with
procedures developed and implemented to identify, to evaluate, and to
mitigate or to eliminate hazards and the resulting risks. Operators
employing this approach would have flexibility to tailor a risk-based
approach to the specific risks from their facilities. Operators
electing to use the risk-based O&M alternative would be required to
submit an implementation plan specifying a timeline for integration of
program elements.
C. Costs and Benefits
PHMSA estimates the annualized cost savings from the proposed rule
to be approximately $98 million (discounted at three percent). PHMSA
notes that some of the new compliance costs and many of the cost
savings of the proposed rule could not be quantified based on the
available data.
PHMSA anticipates significant unquantified safety benefits would
result from adopting the safety-enhancing elements of NFPA 59A-2026, as
supplemented and qualified by other proposed part 193 amendments.
Because LNG facilities are complex systems whose failure generally
involves multiple ``but for'' causes, PHMSA was not able to quantify a
reduction in incident risk pursuant to the proposed rule. Other
unquantified benefits include increased flexibility for LNG facility
siting under the QRA-based approach in NFPA 59A-2026 chapter 19,
increased regulatory flexibility for permanent, small-scale LNG
facilities subject to the requirements in NFPA 59A-2026 chapter 17, and
the use of new technologies, such as membrane tanks, single-walled ASME
(American Society of Mechanical Engineers) containers, and PIP systems,
which PHMSA was not able to quantify due to uncertainty around
potential uptake of the proposed flexibilities.
The preliminary regulatory impact analysis (PRIA) provided in the
docket for this rulemaking includes additional information about the
costs, benefits,
[[Page 69316]]
and other impacts of the proposed rule. The PRIA's quantification of
costs and benefits reflects assumptions and estimates based on the
information and data available. PHMSA requests information and data
from the public regarding the PRIA's evaluation of expected costs and
benefits of its proposed requirements. PHMSA has preliminarily
determined that, notwithstanding the uncertainties and data limitations
discussed in the PRIA, the proposals in the NPRM would be justified by
their corresponding compliance costs savings, enhanced regulatory
flexibility, or improved public safety benefits.
II. Background
A. LNG as an Energy Source, Industry Growth, and Regulatory Safety
1. LNG as an Energy Source
Natural gas is vital to the energy and economic security of the
United States and its allies abroad, serving as an economic driver and
essential fuel source for residential, commercial, and industrial
purposes. Total annual U.S. natural gas consumption has increased from
5.0 Tcf in 1949 to 33.5 Tcf in 2025.\5\ Global natural gas consumption
similarly is expected to grow from 152.9 Tcf to 194.3 Tcf by 2050 due
to increasing demand in emerging markets and developing economies.\6\
Domestic U.S. and international demand for natural gas has made it an
important driver of the U.S. economy; a smaller U.S. natural gas sector
in 2018 contributed over 3.4 million jobs and $408 billion to U.S.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\7\
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\5\ U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (EIA), Natural Gas: U.S Gas Total
Consumption, available at: <a href="https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9140us2a.htm">https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9140us2a.htm</a> (last visited Apr. 23, 2026).
\6\ EIA, International Energy Outlook 2023 Table: World Natural
Gas Consumption by Region, available at: <a href="https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=6-IEO2023®ion=0-0&cases=Reference&start=2020&end=2050&f=A&linechart=Reference-d230822.21-6-IEO2023&map=&ctype=linechart&sourcekey=0">https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=6-IEO2023®ion=0-0&cases=Reference&start=2020&end=2050&f=A&linechart=Reference-d230822.21-6-IEO2023&map=&ctype=linechart&sourcekey=0</a>.
\7\ Am. Gas Ass'n (AGA), Benefits to the Economy through the
Direct Use of Natural Gas (July 9, 2020), available at: <a href="https://www.aga.org/research-policy/resource-library/benefits-to-the-economy-through-the-direct-use-of-natural-gas/">https://www.aga.org/research-policy/resource-library/benefits-to-the-economy-through-the-direct-use-of-natural-gas/</a>.
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Increased reliance on natural gas from a variety of applications is
contributing to this growing demand. First, natural gas is a critical
source of electric power generation capacity and grid stability. In
addition to providing dispatchable electricity, natural gas electric
power generation also supplies grid attributes (e.g., inertia)
increasingly vital to grid stability as more intermittent renewable
energy generation capacity joins the grid and baseload coal and nuclear
plants retire. Second, natural gas is essential for many industrial
feedstock and process heat applications, as well as commercial and
residential heating and cooking purposes. Third, natural gas is an
increasingly vital fuel source in the transportation sector, powering
maritime vessels (i.e., marine bunkering), fueling truck fleets, and
providing an alternative gas supply during pipeline testing activities.
But many regions--both within the United States and the wider
world--do not have reliable access to natural gas. Some regions are
far-removed from natural gas supply reservoirs; others have limited
pipeline infrastructure enabling transportation of natural gas in
gaseous form or are vulnerable to supply interruptions on natural gas
pipelines. Reliable natural gas supply in such circumstances may turn
on access to LNG--natural gas that has been cooled to low temperatures
(minus 260 [deg]F or minus 162 [deg]C) and converted to a liquid state.
This conversion process, known as liquefaction, reduces the volume of
natural gas to approximately 1/600th of its volume in a gaseous state.
The reduction in volume makes LNG efficient for transportation and
storage purposes in areas with limited natural gas resources or limited
pipeline supply of natural gas.
Prior to liquefaction, the natural gas must be treated (pre-
treatment) to remove impurities and extract heavy hydrocarbons
(extraction). The pre-treatment, hydrocarbon extraction, and
liquefaction processes may involve a number of hazardous fluids--
including materials that are flammable (e.g., methane, ethane,
ethylene, propane, butane, pentane, other heavy hydrocarbons including
aromatic hydrocarbons, hydrogen sulfide, and anhydrous ammonia); toxic
(e.g., aromatic hydrocarbons, hydrogen sulfide, and anhydrous ammonia);
and corrosive (e.g., anhydrous ammonia, amine solution, and aromatic
hydrocarbons). Such hazardous materials can be present in either
gaseous or liquid form at different stages of these processes. Larger
LNG facilities, such as import or export terminals, will typically
employ more complex liquefaction processes (and different, and larger
quantities of, hazardous fluids) than smaller LNG facilities, such as
peak shavers and mobile and temporary facilities. After liquefaction,
LNG is stored and transported in specialized tanks that are insulated
and refrigerated to maintain low temperatures. When needed for use, LNG
undergoes a regasification process in which it is warmed and converted
back into its gaseous state. The vaporized natural gas can then be
injected into a pipeline system for distribution or used as fuel for
natural gas-operated equipment.
The flexibility arising from the transportation and storage of LNG
has made it a vital element in natural gas supply infrastructures
around the world. Within the United States, LNG peak shaving facilities
provide local customers with access to natural gas during times of peak
demand. There is also increasing interest in developing small-scale,
mobile, or temporary LNG facilities to support novel applications
(e.g., ensuring continuity of power to data centers and for industrial
applications). And U.S. LNG export facilities are a critical energy
resource for a variety of countries--including strategic U.S. allies in
Asia and Europe--which either have limited native energy resources,
desires to diversify their energy portfolios, or plans to transition
away from coal for electric power and process heat generation. Recent
supply disruptions of LNG exports from international LNG suppliers like
Qatar have also underscored the unique value of U.S. LNG exports to the
energy security of America's trading partners.
2. Growth and Increasing Domestic and International Significance of the
U.S. LNG Industry
The U.S. LNG industry has undergone significant changes in the two
decades since PHMSA last amended its part 193 regulations. The design
and configuration of the 117 regulated LNG facilities in service at
that time reflected the more limited role of natural gas within the
domestic U.S. economy and consisted mostly of the following:
<bullet> Peak-shaving plants designed to store surplus natural gas
for use during high demand periods, such as summer and winter. Peak-
shaving plants ensure reliability by liquefying and storing natural gas
when demand is low and re-gasifying and distributing natural gas when
demand is high. Natural gas shortages in the 1970s drove a wave of
construction of peak-shaving plants. Operators began slowly retiring
those plants in subsequent decades. The number of peak-shaving plants
decreased from 75 in 2006 to 67 in 2018.
<bullet> Satellite plants serving peak-shaving purposes but lacking
the processing equipment required to convert natural gas to LNG.
Specially equipped trucks (or tanks transported on rail flatcars)
deliver LNG to satellite plants, where the LNG is stored and later re-
gasified and injected into natural gas distribution systems to meet
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demand. In 2006, there were 23 satellite plants.
<bullet> Mobile and temporary LNG plants designed to be easily
movable rather than permanent structures. Mobile LNG plants, such as
skid-mounted or trailer-mounted units, can be relocated as needed.
Temporary LNG plants are used for short-term applications, providing
supply during planned construction and maintenance activities or to
meet unanticipated demand. Mobile and temporary LNG plants are compact
and often located near end users to minimize transportation costs and
enhance accessibility. In 2006, there were nine mobile and temporary
facilities.
<bullet> Large-scale terminals for importing LNG for domestic use,
exporting LNG to foreign markets, or both. In 2006, the United States
was a net importer of natural gas; there were four import terminals and
one export terminal representing an aggregate 4.877 Bcf/d vaporization
capacity. These terminals played a relatively small role in the U.S.
and global energy economy in 2006.
The shale gas revolution has fundamentally reshaped domestic and
international energy markets over the past two decades. Newly abundant
natural gas supplies have resulted in a rapid expansion of natural gas
power generation capacity and industrial and commercial applications
within the United States--a trend that is expected to accelerate due to
onshoring of industrial capacity and skyrocketing demand for continuous
electric generation capacity supporting super intelligence and data
centers.\8\ The number of part 193-regulated U.S. LNG facilities has
increased in response to these recent market developments. As of 2025,
there are 69 peak shaving plants, many of which are larger, and more
complex, than the smaller plants typical in 2006. The number of other
PHMSA-jurisdictional LNG plants has increased as well: in 2004, there
were 22 satellite plants, 8 mobile or temporary facilities, and 4
import terminals (representing 4.877 Bcf/d import capacity); in 2025
there were 32 satellite plants, 43 mobile or temporary facilities, and
9 import terminals (representing 14.934 Bcf/d import capacity).
Abundant natural gas supplies have also resulted in proliferation of
so-called ``small-scale'' applications of LNG catering to niche
markets, including off-grid power generation, localized peak-shaving,
industrial equipment usage (such as oil and gas drilling equipment),
and transportation fuels for vehicles, rail, or maritime use.\9\
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\8\ See Sturgeon (Xcel) & Hummel (Chart Industries), Transcript
of Oct. 2025 Public Meeting, Docket ID PHMSA-2019-0091-7624, at
67:12-70:20, 72:20-77:16 (Oct. 25, 2025).
\9\ See Hummel (Chart Industries), Transcript of Oct. 2025
Public Meeting, Docket ID PHMSA-2019-0091-7624, at 72:20-77:16 (Oct.
25, 2025); Christa Marshall, Data Centers Increasingly Turn to Off-
Grid Gas, EE News (Feb. 5, 2026).
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But the most significant change since 2006 has been the emergence
of enormous U.S. natural gas export capacity. The United States now
boasts eight operational, PHMSA-jurisdictional export terminals
providing ca. 17.0 Bcf/d of capacity. Sixteen additional projects
(providing an additional ca. 31.28 Bcf/d capacity) either are in
construction or are expected to begin construction in the near
future.\10\ And the United States--a net importer of natural gas in
2006--exported approximately 15.1 Bcf/d of LNG in 2024, making it the
world's largest LNG exporter, responsible for roughly 21 percent of
worldwide LNG supply.
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\10\ PHMSA, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Annual Data--2010 to
Present, available at: <a href="https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/gas-distribution-gas-gathering-gas-transmission-hazardous-liquids">https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/gas-distribution-gas-gathering-gas-transmission-hazardous-liquids</a> (last visited Apr. 14, 2026); FERC, U.S. LNG
Export Terminals--Existing, Approved Not Yet Built, and Proposed,
available at: <a href="https://www.ferc.gov/media/us-lng-export-terminals-existing-approved-not-yet-built-and-proposed">https://www.ferc.gov/media/us-lng-export-terminals-existing-approved-not-yet-built-and-proposed</a> (last visited Apr. 14,
2026).
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LNG exports have become critical to U.S. economic prosperity and
national security. A 2026 study predicts that through 2040 U.S. LNG
exports will contribute an aggregate of around $1.4 trillion to U.S.
GDP, more than $2.9 trillion in total revenues for U.S. businesses,
$206 billion in Federal and State tax revenues, and more than $630
billion in labor income. The industry will support an average of over a
half-million U.S. jobs annually.\11\ U.S. LNG exports also reduce trade
deficits with economic competitors and have become a focal point for
U.S. policymakers in recent tariff negotiations with U.S. trading
partners.\12\ U.S. LNG exports are a vital form of support for key U.S.
allies as well. Europe and Asia were the top destinations for U.S. LNG
exports in 2025.\13\ Japan alone imported 222.9 Bcf of U.S. LNG in
2025, roughly 4.0 percent of the U.S. LNG exports for 2025. The
Netherlands imported 645.8 Bcf of U.S. LNG in 2025, the most of any
country and roughly 11.7 percent of U.S. LNG exports that year.\14\
Exports to Europe increased following Russia's invasion of Ukraine; in
2022, Europe received 69 percent of all LNG exports from the United
States, up from 34 percent in 2021. From January through November 2025,
Europe received 68 percent of U.S.-origin volumes.\15\
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\11\ S&P Global, Price and Economic Impacts of an Accelerating
Export Industry: U.S. LNG Impact Study--Phase 4 (July 2026).
\12\ Reuters, U.S. LNG Producers Climb as EU Agrees to $750
Billion in Energy Purchases (July 28, 2025), available at: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-lng-producers-climb-eu-agrees-750-billion-energy-purchases-2025-07-28/">https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-lng-producers-climb-eu-agrees-750-billion-energy-purchases-2025-07-28/</a>.
\13\ EIA, Today in Energy: U.S. Natural Gas Exports to Grow
Nearly 30% by 2027 as LNG Facilities Ramp Up (Apr. 16, 2026),
available at: <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67484">https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67484</a>.
\14\ EIA, U.S. Natural Gas Exports and Re-Exports by Country,
available at: <a href="https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/NG_MOVE_EXPC_S1_A.htm">https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/NG_MOVE_EXPC_S1_A.htm</a>
(last visited Apr. 22, 2026).
\15\ EIA, Today in Energy: Ten Years After First Sabine Pass
Cargo, U.S. LNG Exports are Still on the Rise (Feb. 24, 2026),
available at: <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67224">https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67224</a>.
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3. The Regulatory Framework and Industry Efforts To Ensure LNG Facility
Safety
Multiple Federal agencies play a role in ensuring the safety of
onshore LNG facilities.\16\ These agencies exercise their respective
authorities through a variety of administrative tools--including
implementing regulations, guidance, orders, and enforcement actions--
that can govern different phases of the lifecycle (including
authorization, construction, and operations) of LNG facilities. The
States also have a role in administering the Federal safety framework
for intrastate LNG facilities. Industry, too, has pursued continuous
safety improvement, developing voluntary (but widely adopted) consensus
and industry codes, standards, recommended practices, guidelines
reflecting safety-enhancing best practices, and technological advances
that have outpaced the development of Federal safety regulatory
regimes. These mutually reinforcing approaches have yielded a strong
historical safety record for all PHMSA-jurisdictional LNG facilities.
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\16\ PHMSA has not attempted to identify here the entire
universe of Federal agencies whose regulatory schemes could touch on
the diverse activities of PHMSA-jurisdictional LNG facilities but
instead focused on those playing the most prominent role in their
safety regulation.
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a. The Regulatory Framework Ensuring Safety
Guardrails for Federal agencies' exercise of their respective
regulatory authorities over the safety of LNG facilities are set forth
in a series of interagency agreements and memoranda of understanding.
Noteworthy among those interagency efforts are: a 2004 Interagency
Agreement between PHMSA, FERC, and the USCG governing waterfront LNG
facilities (typically FERC-jurisdictional import and export
facilities); \17\ a 2018
[[Page 69318]]
Memorandum of Understanding between FERC and PHMSA regarding PHMSA's
role in FERC's environmental analyses supporting LNG facility
certificate applications; \18\ and a 2020 Annex to a 2004 Memorandum of
Understanding between DOT and DHS outlining the respective roles of
PHMSA and the DHS agencies (including TSA, USCG, and CISA) regarding
the physical and cybersecurity of PHMSA-jurisdictional LNG
facilities.\19\
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\17\ Interagency Agreement Among the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, United States Coast Guard, and Research and Special
Programs Administration for the Safety and Security Review of
Waterfront Import/Export Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities (Feb. 10,
2004), available at: <a href="https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/InteragencyAgreementLNG%2CFeb2004.pdf">https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/InteragencyAgreementLNG%2CFeb2004.pdf</a> (2004 Interagency
Agreement).
\18\ Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of
Transportation and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Regarding Liquefied Natural Gas Transportation Facilities (Aug. 31,
2018), available at: <a href="https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/news/64706/ferc-phmsa-mou.pdf">https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/news/64706/ferc-phmsa-mou.pdf</a> (2018 Memorandum of
Understanding).
\19\ Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation
Concerning Transportation Security Administration and Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Cooperation on Pipeline
Transportation Security and Safety (Feb. 26, 2020), available at:
<a href="https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/regulatory-compliance/phmsa-guidance/73466/phmsa-tsa-mou-annexexecuted.pdf">https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/regulatory-compliance/phmsa-guidance/73466/phmsa-tsa-mou-annexexecuted.pdf</a>
(2020 Annex).
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PHMSA
PHMSA's authority to regulate the safety of LNG facilities is
derived from the Pipeline Safety Laws (49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq.). The
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 authorized DOT to prescribe and
to enforce minimum Federal safety standards for gas pipeline facilities
and persons engaged in the transportation of gas, including the
conversion and storage of gas by LNG facilities.\20\ Subsequent
amendments to the Pipeline Safety Laws directed DOT to establish and to
enforce safety standards specific to LNG facilities.\21\ The PHMSA
Administrator exercises this authority on behalf of the Secretary
pursuant to a delegation at 49 CFR 1.97.\22\
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\20\ Public Law 90-481.
\21\ 49 U.S.C. 60103; see Public Law 114-183; Public Law 116-
260.
\22\ For additional information on the history of PHMSA's
authority to regulate the safety of LNG facilities, see RSPA,
Associate Administrator Decision Denying Petition for Rulemaking
from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the State of Rhode
Island, Docket ID PHMSA-RSPA-2004-19208-0007 (Oct. 25, 2006).
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PHMSA has prescribed comprehensive minimum safety standards for LNG
facilities at part 193. These safety standards consist of siting,
design, installation, construction, testing, maintenance, and
operations (including fire protection and physical security)
requirements. PHMSA also requires owners and operators of LNG
facilities to submit annual, incident, and safety-related condition
reports. PHMSA oversees compliance with the part 193 regulations by
conducting inspections; investigating incidents; and, if necessary,
initiating enforcement actions.\23\ PHMSA also plays an important role
in FERC's exercise of its authority under sections 3 or 7 of the
Natural Gas Act (NGA, 15 U.S.C. 717 et seq.). Pursuant to the 2004
Interagency Agreement between PHMSA, FERC, and the USCG, PHMSA serves
as a cooperating agency supporting FERC's compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) in connection
with certificates for new and modified LNG facilities. The 2018
Memorandum of Understanding elaborated on that historical role, as it
provides that PHMSA's participation in FERC's NEPA reviews will also
entail issuance of a letter of determination on an applicant's
compliance with PHMSA's part 193, subpart B siting requirements.
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\23\ 49 U.S.C. 60112 and 49 CFR 190.233 (corrective action order
authority based on PHMSA decision that a pipeline facility is or
would be ``hazardous''); 49 U.S.C. 60117(m) and 49 CFR 190.239
(notice of proposed safety order authority based on PHMSA
determination that a pipeline facility has a condition posing a
``pipeline integrity risk''); 49 U.S.C. 60117(p) and 49 CFR 190.235-
190.237 (emergency order authority based on PHMSA determination that
an unsafe condition or practice ``constitutes or is causing an
imminent hazard''); 49 U.S.C. 60122 and 49 CFR 190.221-190.225
(civil penalty authority based on PHMSA determination that a person
violated a pipeline safety law, regulation, or order); 49 U.S.C.
60118(b) and 49 CFR 190.217 (compliance order authority based on
PHMSA determination that a person is violating a pipeline safety
law, regulation, or order).
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PHMSA's enabling statutes and implementing regulations also
prescribe important limits on its authority to regulate LNG facilities.
For example, because PHMSA's statutory authority only extends to the
transportation of gas by pipeline, part 193 has historically only
applied to LNG facilities that receive gas from or deliver gas to a
part 192-regulated pipeline.\24\ Part 193 has also not applied to LNG
facilities used either by ultimate consumers of LNG or natural gas
(Sec. 193.2001(b)(1)) or in natural gas treatment or hydrocarbon
extraction that do not store LNG (Sec. 193.2001(b)(2)). The Pipeline
Safety Laws at 49 U.S.C. 60101(a)(14)(B) explicitly prohibit PHMSA from
regulating structures or equipment at LNG facilities located in
navigable waters as defined by the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 796), a
prohibition codified by regulation at 49 CFR 193.2001(b)(4). In
addition, part 193 regulations codify at Sec. 193.2001(b)(3) the
allocation of regulatory authority between the USCG and the Research
and Special Projects Administration (RSPA, PHMSA's predecessor agency)
memorialized within a 1978 Memorandum of Understanding, whereby RSPA
disclaimed regulatory authority for matters other than siting with
respect to the ``marine cargo transfer system and associated
facilities'' at waterfront LNG facilities.\25\
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\24\ See, e.g., PHMSA, LNG Plant Requirements: Frequently Asked
Questions, at G1, available at: <a href="https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/liquified-natural-gas/lng-plant-requirements-frequently-asked-questions">https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/liquified-natural-gas/lng-plant-requirements-frequently-asked-questions</a> (last visited Sep. 11, 2025) (LNG FAQs).
\25\ See MTB, Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities; New Federal
Safety Standards, 45 FR 9184, 9188 (Feb. 11, 1980).
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Other documents inform PHMSA's exercise of its statutory authority
over LNG facilities. The 2004 Memorandum of Understanding between DOT
and DHS reflects post-9/11 legislation re-allocating primary
responsibility for transportation security from DOT to the then newly
established DHS (though the Memorandum contemplates that DOT operating
administrations will support DHS security efforts and retain their pre-
existing statutory authority to ensure the safety of different modes of
transportation in ways that could overlap with DHS's security mission).
Subsequently negotiated annexes (most recently the 2020 Annex
negotiated between TSA and PHMSA) elaborate on each agency's respective
responsibilities and commit to mutual collaboration on information
sharing, critical infrastructure security and resilience, strategic
planning, and development of standards and guidance. The 2004
Interagency Agreement between PHMSA, FERC, and USCG similarly
memorializes commitments among those agencies for cooperation in their
respective operations-phase inspections of LNG facilities.
PHMSA exercises jurisdiction over 23 FERC-authorized (including
existing, certificated but not-yet-built) onshore LNG import and export
terminals; there are two additional LNG import and export terminal
applications currently under FERC review that would be regulated by
PHMSA as well. PHMSA also regulates more than 69 LNG peak-shaving
facilities, 43 mobile/temporary facilities, and 32 satellite
facilities.\26\
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\26\ PHMSA, LNG Annual Data--2010 to Present.
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
Under the NGA, FERC issues orders authorizing the siting,
construction, expansion, and operation of LNG import and export
terminals (NGA, section 3
[[Page 69319]]
(codified at 15 U.S.C. 717b and 717b-1)) and certificates of public
convenience and necessity for some LNG peak shaving facilities (NGA,
section 7 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 717f)).\27\ As part of the application
process, FERC requires operators to submit detailed site-specific
engineering, design, and operations information; evidence that the
facility will safely receive or deliver LNG; and procedures and design
features to mitigate potential hazards to the public resulting from
accidental releases or natural catastrophes.\28\ Most of the
information submitted to FERC during the application process would be
considered process safety information required to be addressed under
the PIPES Act of 2020.
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\27\ See 15 U.S.C. 717a(11), b(e), f. FERC also has the
authority to approve the design, construction, and siting of natural
gas import and export facilities. See 15 U.S.C. 717b(a); see also 42
U.S.C. 7151(b) (2012); U.S. Dep't of Energy, Delegation Order No.
00-004.00A (May 16, 2006).
\28\ See 18 CFR part 153; 18 CFR 380.12(m)-(o).
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Furthermore, FERC requires applicants to explain how the proposed
project will comply with applicable Federal regulations, including part
193, in implementing NEPA and the NGA.\29\ FERC engages PHMSA as a
cooperating agency as part of the application review process in
analyzing compliance with the part 193 siting requirements. In
addition, FERC evaluates the engineering information submitted by an
applicant against the applicable regulations and additional codes,
standards, and other recommended and generally accepted good
engineering practices (RAGAGEPs) listed by the applicant or that are
routinely applied to LNG facilities. FERC similarly engages USCG as
another cooperating agency under NEPA in reviewing waterway suitability
assessments (WSAs).
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\29\ See 18 CFR 380.12(o)(14).
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FERC orders for LNG facilities typically contain conditions
memorializing a broad range of applicant commitments and FERC-imposed
requirements directed toward safety and environmental protection. Such
conditions include, but are not limited to, submitting for review and
approval: final designs of various engineering and process safety
information, completed process hazard analyses (PHAs), management of
change (MOC) procedures and logs, pre-start-up safety reviews (PSSRs),
O&M procedures, including preventative and predictive maintenance plans
(e.g., mechanical integrity procedures), hot work procedures,
contractor oversight procedures, and emergency response plans developed
in consultation with Federal, State, and local emergency management
agencies and emergency responders. Moreover, FERC requires an
implementation plan and schedule for meeting the conditions in its
orders, authorizes initiation of various activities, and conducts
annual or biennial inspections to verify compliance during
construction, commissioning, and operations. FERC also requires
operators to notify its staff of significant non-scheduled events,
including safety and security-related incidents, and to submit semi-
annual reports of modifications in design of facilities and operating
conditions and abnormal operating and maintenance experiences,
including release of hazardous fluids.
FERC exercises jurisdiction over 23 (including existing,
certificated but not-yet-built) LNG import and export terminals onshore
or in State waters, as well as 13 LNG peak-shaving plants involved in
interstate gas transportation.\30\ Additional LNG import and export
terminal applications are currently under FERC formal application or
pre-filing review.
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\30\ FERC, U.S. LNG Export Terminals--Existing, Approved Not Yet
Built, and Proposed; FERC, U.S. LNG Import Terminals--Existing,
Approved Not Yet Built, and Proposed, available at: <a href="https://www.ferc.gov/media/us-lng-import-terminals-existing-approved-not-yet-built-and-proposed">https://www.ferc.gov/media/us-lng-import-terminals-existing-approved-not-yet-built-and-proposed</a> (last visited Apr. 14, 2026); FERC,
Jurisdictional Peakshavers (Nov. 2, 2020), available at: <a href="https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/lng-peakshavers.pdf">https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/lng-peakshavers.pdf</a>.
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--United States Coast Guard (USCG)
USCG's regulatory authority over onshore, waterfront LNG facilities
arises from statutes governing the safety and security of ports and
navigable waterways.\31\ USCG exercises primary regulatory authority
for safety within marine cargo transfer areas at waterfront LNG plants,
which USCG refers to as the marine transfer area for LNG, and has
adopted regulations at 33 CFR part 127 governing the design,
construction, maintenance and operations of those facilities--but has
historically deferred to PHMSA's evaluation under 49 CFR part 193,
subpart B of the hazards arising from their siting. USCG also exercises
primary responsibility for physical security of the marine cargo
transfer area as well as the entirety of waterfront LNG facilities and
has issued regulations at 33 CFR part 105 governing the submission and
approval of FSPs. Title 33 CFR part 101 (Subpart F) also governs
cybersecurity requirements of LNG facilities under 33 CFR part 105.
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\31\ E.g., Magnuson Act of 1950 (46 U.S.C. 70051); Ports and
Waterways Safety Act of 1972, as amended (46 U.S.C. Ch. 700);
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (46 U.S.C. Ch. 701).
PHMSA notes that the proposed amendments to 49 CFR parts 191 and 193
do not modify, limit, supersede, or otherwise affect existing Coast
Guard authorities or requirements applicable to waterfront LNG
facilities, marine transfer areas, mobile or temporary LNG
facilities at or near waterfront locations where Coast Guard
requirements may apply, including facility security, waterway
suitability, and Captain of the Port authorities. In addition, PHMSA
clarifies that compliance with 49 CFR part 193, including any
incorporated NFPA 59A-2026 provisions, does not relieve an operator
of any applicable Coast Guard requirement.
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USCG regulations address the suitability of waterways for LNG
marine traffic in connection with waterfront LNG facilities (33 CFR
127.007 and 127.009), and vessel engineering and construction safety
(46 CFR part 154) and security (33 CFR part 104) for LNG ship traffic
in connection with waterfront LNG facilities; USCG reviews operator-
submitted WSAs documenting compliance with those regulations for each
such LNG facility. USCG also performs reasonable examinations and
inspections at waterfront LNG facilities to verify compliance with its
regulations and any obligations imposed in connection with its review
of FSPs and WSAs.\32\ In addition, USCG regulations require that
operators notify the appropriate Federal agency of suspicious
activities, security breaches, and transportation security
incidents.\33\
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\32\ 33 CFR 127.011.
\33\ 33 CFR 101.305.
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USCG exercises jurisdiction over 23 (including existing,
certificated but not-yet-built) waterfront LNG import and export
terminals, as well as 4 bunkering facilities.\34\
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\34\ Int'l Mar. Org, Fuel Supply: Supply of Alternative Fuels,
available at: <a href="https://futurefuels.imo.org/latest-information/fuel-supply/">https://futurefuels.imo.org/latest-information/fuel-supply/</a> (last visited Apr. 21, 2026).
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--Transportation Security
Agency (TSA) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(CISA)
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 consolidated homeland security
responsibilities within DHS. Congress transferred two DOT operating
administrations to DHS in that legislation: the USCG and TSA.\35\
Subsequently, Congress passed the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency Act of 2018, establishing CISA within DHS and
[[Page 69320]]
assigning CISA primary responsibility for coordinating cybersecurity
protection for the Nation's energy infrastructure.\36\
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\35\ Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2249-50 (codified as
amended at 6 U.S.C. 468(b)) (transferring the USCG's authorities,
functions, personnel, and assets to DHS). Congress established TSA
in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (Pub. L.
107-71, 115 Stat. 597, 597-98 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
114)) and assigned it primary responsibility for transportation
security in all modes of transportation. 49 U.S.C. 114(d).
\36\ Public Law 115-278, 132 Stat. 4169-72.
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In 2010, TSA issued the initial edition of its Pipeline Security
Guidelines to assist operators of gas pipelines and LNG facilities in
the development and evaluation of comprehensive security programs at
their facilities. TSA's Pipeline Security Guidelines, which have been
updated several times (most recently in April 2021), set forth non-
binding guidance pertaining to corporate security policies, security
vulnerability assessments, physical security measures, and
cybersecurity efforts.\37\ TSA conducts voluntary visits with pipeline
operators as part of its Corporate Security Review Program. TSA
personnel work with operator personnel during these visits to analyze
FSPs and policies and compare practices against the Pipeline Security
Guidelines.
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\37\ TSA, Pipeline Security Guidelines (Apr. 2021), available
at: <a href="https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/pipeline_security_guidelines.pdf">https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/pipeline_security_guidelines.pdf</a>.
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Following the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack, TSA issued
Security Directives imposing mandatory cybersecurity requirements on a
limited number of critical pipeline facilities, including certain peak
shaving facilities. TSA issued Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01
(Security Directive) requiring owners and operators of critical
pipeline facilities to take crucial measures to enhance pipeline
cybersecurity.\38\ This Security Directive requires operators of those
facilities (1) to report confirmed and potential cybersecurity
incidents to CISA; (2) to designate a Cybersecurity Coordinator to be
available 24 hours a day, seven days a week; (3) to review current
practices by performing a cybersecurity vulnerability assessment; and
(4) to identify any gaps and related remediation measures to address
cyber-related risks and report the results to TSA and CISA.\39\
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\38\ On May 8, 2021, the Colonial Pipeline Company announced
that it had halted its pipeline operations due to a ransomware
attack. This attack temporarily disrupted critical supplies of
gasoline and other refined petroleum products throughout the East
Coast of the United States. See TSA, Ratification of Security
Directive, Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01, 86 FR 38209 (July
20, 2021); DHS, DHS Announces New Cybersecurity Requirements for
Critical Pipeline Owners and Operators (May 27, 2021), available at:
<a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/05/27/dhs-announces-new-cybersecurity-requirements-critical-pipeline-owners-and-operators">https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/05/27/dhs-announces-new-cybersecurity-requirements-critical-pipeline-owners-and-operators</a>.
\39\ TSA, Ratification of Security Directive, Security Directive
Pipeline-2021-01, 86 FR 38209 (July 20, 2021).
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On July 20, 2021, TSA issued Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02
requiring operators of TSA-designated critical facilities to implement
additional protections against cyber intrusions and degradation of
critical infrastructure, including development and execution of
Cybersecurity Implementation, Response, and Assessment Plans as well as
annual Cybersecurity Assessment Plan reporting to CISA.\40\ Subsequent
renewals of each of those Security Directives have clarified and
expanded pertinent programmatic and reporting requirements.\41\
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\40\ TSA, Ratification of Security Directive, Security Directive
Pipeline-2021-02, 86 FR 52953 (Sep. 24, 2021).
\41\ TSA, Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01G (Jan. 6, 2026);
TSA, Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02F (May 1, 2025). TSA
Pipeline Security Directives are maintained at <a href="https://www.tsa.gov/sd-and-ea">https://www.tsa.gov/sd-and-ea</a>.
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States
The Federal Pipeline Safety Laws preserve a role for States in
regulating the safety of LNG facilities. State authorities may obtain a
certification from PHMSA to regulate the safety of intrastate LNG
facilities not subject to the jurisdiction of FERC under the NGA--
typically peak shaving, mobile/temporary, and satellite LNG
facilities.\42\ Certified State authorities may prescribe and enforce
additional or more stringent safety standards for intrastate LNG
facilities, so long as those safety standards are compatible with the
Federal requirements in the Pipeline Safety Regulations (49 CFR parts
190-199). As of February 2026, 41 State authorities are certified to
regulate approximately 149 intrastate LNG facilities.\43\
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\42\ PHMSA also notes that most LNG facilities not subject to
FERC authority under the NGA are approved by State regulators (e.g.,
public utility commissions). Those State regulators may either list
safety requirements among the terms and conditions of such approvals
or accept regulatory commitments by project sponsors to adopt
certain safety requirements.
\43\ The Pipeline Safety Laws at 49 U.S.C. 60106 also permit
PHMSA to make an agreement with a State authority authorizing it to
participate in the oversight of interstate LNG facilities and other
gas pipeline facilities. No State with interstate LNG facilities has
entered into such an agreement. See PHMSA, LNG Plant Safety
Programs: Participating States in the Federal/State Cooperative
Partnership (Apr. 2026), available at: <a href="https://www.npms.phmsa.dot.gov/Documents/LNG_CoopAgreementsMap.pdf">https://www.npms.phmsa.dot.gov/Documents/LNG_CoopAgreementsMap.pdf</a>.
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b. Industry Efforts Promoting LNG Facility Safety
The LNG industry plays an active role in ensuring the safety of
PHMSA-jurisdictional LNG facilities, particularly through the
development of voluntary consensus industry standards and recommended
practices. The leading industry standard for LNG facilities is NFPA
59A. First published in 1967, PHMSA has incorporated NFPA 59A by
reference into the Federal safety standards for LNG facilities since
1972.\44\ The most recent edition of NFPA 59A, published in 2026,
includes mandatory standards for the siting, design, construction,
operation, and maintenance of LNG facilities. This edition incorporates
a comprehensive list of other consensus industry standards addressing
particular topics as well as several informational annexes providing
guidance to facilitate compliance with its mandatory provisions.\45\
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\44\ 37 FR 21638 (amending part 192 to create a new Sec. 192.12
that will establish Federal safety standards for liquefied natural
gas facilities at Sec. 192.12 and incorporating, by reference, the
1971 edition of NFPA 59A).
\45\ Standards listed in NFPA 59A-2026's mandatory provisions
and informational annexes are also generally themselves mature
documents (building on successive editions issued over many years)
resulting from extensive discussions among industry technical
experts and government regulators on technical issues.
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A technical committee (Technical Committee) is responsible for
drafting each edition of NFPA 59A to ensure its provisions reflect the
latest safety-enhancing advances in operator practices and
technologies. The Technical Committee consists of 35 principal experts
and 21 alternates from State and Federal government and the LNG
industry. Collectively, the Technical Committee has extensive expertise
on all aspects of LNG safety. PHMSA and FERC are among the government
participants on the Technical Committee, with representatives of each
of those agencies serving as voting members.
The process employed by the Technical Committee in updating NFPA
59A has been accredited by the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI). Development of each edition of NFPA 59A lasts between three to
five years and involves a four-step process: (1) public input; (2)
public comment; (3) NFPA Technical Committee meeting; and (4) standards
council action. Public input from industry stakeholders and members of
the general public is accepted for consideration in the Technical
Committee's development of the initial draft of an updated edition.
Once the initial draft is developed, the Technical Committee posts that
initial draft (accompanied by reports summarizing and responding to
input from the public and Technical Committee members) on a publicly
available website and solicits comments. After analyzing any comments
received, the Technical Committee prepares the second draft (and
potentially subsequent drafts)
[[Page 69321]]
pursuant to a similar process and posts its responses to the comments
received on the previous draft. After the Technical Committee approves
the revised draft, the NFPA Standards Council approves issuance of the
updated standard.
c. The LNG Industry's Strong Safety Record Since 2006
The U.S. LNG industry has a remarkably strong safety record. Since
2010, there has been more than a 50 percent increase in the number of
all PHMSA-jurisdictional LNG facilities--121 facilities in 2010
compared to the 181 facilities in 2024. That increase has not led to
more incidents. Incident data across all PHMSA-jurisdictional LNG
facilities shows that there have been three or fewer significant
incidents reported in each of the past 15 years.\46\ In 11 out of those
15 years, one or fewer significant incidents were reported. Zero
significant incidents were reported in six of those years, and only two
reportable injuries occurred during that entire 15-year period--one at
a peak shaving facility in 2014 and one at a mobile and temporary
facility in 2023. And there was only a single fatality (at a mobile/
temporary facility--not the more complex LNG export or peak shaving
facilities).
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\46\ PHMSA, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Incident Data--January
2011 to Present, available at: <a href="https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/distribution-transmission-gathering-lng-and-liquid-accident-and-incident-data">https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/distribution-transmission-gathering-lng-and-liquid-accident-and-incident-data</a> (LNG Incident Report Data). By
``significant'' PHMSA means an incident involving fatality, injury,
or total property damage of $50K or more in 1984 dollars.
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The same strong safety record holds if the 15-year data is examined
for each type of LNG facility. For LNG export facilities, there were no
significant incidents reported in 10 out of the 15 years even as the
number of those facilities has more than doubled between 2010 and 2024.
Peak shaving facilities reported only three significant incidents, and
mobile and temporary LNG facilities had only one significant incident--
even as the number of each of those facilities increased since 2010.
And non-marine baseload and satellite facilities had no significant
incidents during the 15-year period even as the number of those
facilities increased more than 100 percent.
4. Broad Demand for Updated PHMSA Regulations on LNG Facility Safety
Despite the significant changes that have occurred throughout the
LNG industry, PHMSA has not updated its part 193 regulations since
2006. Instead, PHMSA has leaned more heavily on guidance in the form of
its LNG FAQs implementing its part 193 regulations to accommodate
innovations in facility design, function, construction and operational
practices, and technology. But PHMSA's LNG FAQs--which have been
updated nine times since their introduction in 2014--are not legally
binding and do not provide interested stakeholders with the regulatory
certainty needed to make informed decisions. PHMSA's delay in updating
its part 193 regulations has in turn encouraged FERC to exercise its
statutory authority to impose more legally binding, safety-related
conditions in authorizing new LNG projects. Although this case-by-case
approach is done with PHMSA and USCG as cooperating agencies and
includes a fairly consistent set of conditions, PHMSA's or USCG's
recommendations are subject to FERC's consideration, which can inject
further uncertainty into the regulatory framework. As discussed in more
detail below, a broad consensus has been reached about the need to
update part 193 regulations to address these and other concerns.
Executive Orders
Noting that modern LNG facilities ``bear little resemblance to the
small peak shaving facilities'' typical when PHMSA first issued its
part 193 regulations in February 1980, President Trump in his first
term issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13868, Promoting Energy
Infrastructure and Economic Growth, directing PHMSA to issue a final
rule updating its part 193 regulations no later than May 2020.\47\ E.O.
13868 directed PHMSA to ensure that those updated regulations employed
``risk-based standards to the maximum extent possible.''
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\47\ E.O. 13868, Promoting Energy Infrastructure and Economic
Growth, 84 FR 15495 (Apr. 19, 2019).
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In his second term, President Trump has issued a series of
executive orders encouraging investment in the Nation's energy
infrastructure and the use of risk-informed regulations ensuring the
safety of those facilities. On his first day in office for his second
term, the President issued E.O. 14156, Declaring a National Energy
Emergency, identifying the integrity and expansion of U.S. energy
infrastructure to support affordable domestic energy prices and robust
energy exports as a U.S. national and economic security priority.\48\
That same day, President Trump issued E.O. 14154, Unleashing American
Energy, requiring agencies to reduce undue burdens on the
identification, development, or use of domestic energy resources to
protect U.S. energy and national security, singling out the
contribution of LNG exports to U.S. national security and economic
growth.\49\ Later his first month in office, President Trump issued
E.O. 14192, Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, requiring
agencies to identify opportunities to alleviate unnecessary regulatory
compliance burdens imposed on industry and the general public.\50\
Lastly, in response to disruptions in LNG supply routes due to regional
conflicts, President Trump issued a Determination under the Defense
Production Act of 1950 (Pub. L. 81-774) to promote expansion of (inter
alia) U.S. LNG export capacity to sustain U.S. defense operations and
ensure the energy security of U.S. allies.\51\
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\48\ E.O. 14156, Declaring a National Energy Emergency, 90 FR
8433 (Jan. 29, 2025).
\49\ E.O. 14152, Unleashing American Energy, 90 FR 8353 (Jan.
29, 2025).
\50\ E.O. 14192, Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, 90
FR 9065 (Feb. 6, 2025).
\51\ Presidential Determination Pursuant to Section 303 of the
Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, on Natural Gas
Transmission, Processing, Storage and Liquefied Natural Gas Capacity
(Apr. 20, 2026).
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Congressional Mandates
Congress has repeatedly called on PHMSA to update its part 193
regulations. On June 22, 2016, Congress enacted the PIPES Act of
2016.\52\ Section 27 directed PHMSA to review and to update the minimum
safety standards for LNG facilities and to ensure that those
regulations appropriately address the public safety risks posed by
permanent, small-scale LNG pipeline facilities.
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\52\ Public Law 114-183.
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On December 27, 2020, Congress enacted the PIPES Act of 2020.\53\
Section 110 of that legislation directed PHMSA to review existing part
193 regulations governing operations and maintenance (including those
pertaining to fire protection, security, and training) and to establish
a framework by which operators of ``large-scale'' LNG facilities can
design and employ alternative, risk-based regulatory approaches.
PHMSA's regulatory framework governing operators' risk-based
alternatives must achieve a level of safety that is equivalent to, or
greater than, the level of safety required by the minimum part 193
standards existing as of December 2020. Section 110 also requires PHMSA
to review and to approve LNG facility implementation plans created
under that alternative regulatory framework specifying a timeline for
integration of elements mandated by statute. Congress
[[Page 69322]]
directed that PHMSA codify the regulatory amendments required by
section 110 by no later than December 2023.
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\53\ Public Law No. 116-260.
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GAO Recommendations
On August 6, 2020, GAO published a report titled Natural Gas
Exports: Updated Guidance and Regulations Could Improve Facility
Permitting Processes (GAO-20-619).\54\ In that report, GAO made nine
recommendations, including one to PHMSA that ``the Administrator of
PHMSA should conduct a standards-specific review of regulations that
incorporate standards and, if necessary, update the regulations or
document its decision for not updating them. (Recommendation 5).'' \55\
This rulemaking, if codified, would update the incorporated-by-
reference standards and resolve Recommendation 5.
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\54\ GAO Report.
\55\ Id.
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Regulated Community and Members of the Public--Historical Petitions for
Rulemaking and Public Meetings
Industry and members of the public have repeatedly called on PHMSA
to update its part 193 regulations. Since 2006, PHMSA has received
several petitions for rulemaking on diverse topics including: pressure
relief device (PRD) inspection periodicities; \56\ application of
updated editions of NFPA 59A to peak-shaving, satellite and small-scale
LNG facilities; \57\ targeted application of updated editions of NFPA
59A to LNG export terminals; \58\ incorporation by reference of
consensus industry standards governing concrete LNG storage containers;
\59\ and implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 section 110
mandate.\60\ PHMSA has also received petitions for rulemaking from
members of the public, including a number of petitions submitted by a
single commenter pertaining to vapor cloud dispersion modeling
methodologies within PHMSA's siting analyses.\61\ The discussions in
section IV below respond to those petitions.
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\56\ AGA & Interstate Nat. Gas Ass'n of Am. (INGAA), Petition to
Modify Language in 49 CFR 193.2619, Docket ID PHMSA-2018-0070-0001
(June 19, 2018).
\57\ AGA, Petition to Amend part 193 NFPA 59A 2020, Docket ID
PHMSA-2019-0091-0005 (Jan. 21, 2020).
\58\ Ctr. for LNG (CLNG), Petition for Rulemaking, Docket ID
PHMSA-2019-0091-0004 (Oct. 5, 2020). This petition was subsequently
withdrawn in 2021. See CLNG, Request to Withdraw Petition for
Rulemaking, Docket ID PHMSA-2019-0091-0007 (May 1, 2021).
\59\ Am. Concrete Inst. (ACI), Petition for Rulemaking to Amend
49 CFR part 193, Docket ID PHMSA-2019-0091-0008 (May 3, 2021); ACI,
Letter Update to ACI Petition_ACI, Docket ID PHMSA-2019-0091-0011
(Nov. 9, 2023); ConocoPhillips, Support for PHMSA Rulemaking--ACI
376, Docket ID PHMSA-2019-0091-0009 (Nov. 18, 2021).
\60\ See Am. Petrol. Inst. (API), CLNG & INGAA, Pipeline Safety
Amendments to Large-Scale LNG Facilities, Docket ID PHMSA-2019-0091-
7623 (Nov. 18, 2025).
\61\ Havens, Workshop on LNG Regulation--Petition for
Rulemaking, Docket ID PHMSA-2022-0076-0001 (June 8, 2022).
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In addition, PHMSA has held multiple public meetings in the last
two decades focused on improved safety at LNG facilities, including: a
February 2005 workshop on LNG safety regulations; a May 2016 public
workshop on LNG regulations; a February 2020 meeting; and a November
2022 forum on LNG research and development to improve part 193
regulations.\62\ PHMSA has also held several meetings (including
meetings in December 2007 and January 2025) of the Gas Pipeline
Advisory Committee (GPAC) to consider proposed revisions to regulations
pertinent to part 193-regulated facilities. In each of the meetings
above, stakeholders from industry and environmental advocacy groups
alike have emphasized the need for review and update of PHMSA's part
193 regulations.
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\62\ Materials for each of those meetings are available on
PHMSA's Public Meetings web page, available at: <a href="https://primis-meetings.phmsa.dot.gov/">https://primis-meetings.phmsa.dot.gov/</a> (last visited Jan. 25, 2026).
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2025 Advance Notices of Proposed Rulemaking and Public Meeting
In response to the Presidential directives, Congressional mandates,
and broad stakeholder interest in updated part 193 regulations, PHMSA
in May 2025 issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM)
soliciting stakeholder feedback on a variety of LNG-related topics
informing its development of this NPRM.\63\ PHMSA received over 7,618
comments. In parallel, PHMSA issued another ANPRM responding to E.O.
14154 soliciting stakeholder feedback on opportunities to ``unleash
American energy'' by reducing undue burdens imposed by its Pipeline
Safety Regulations--including its part 193 regulations.\64\ PHMSA
received another 528 comments in response to that ANPRM, with 79 of
those comments identifying potential amendments of part 193
regulations. In October 2025, PHMSA also held a public meeting to
discuss LNG issues consisting of moderated panel discussions
supplementing the administrative record developed from those ANPRMs and
earlier public meetings.\65\ A diverse spectrum of stakeholders--
including LNG industry operators and trade associations, State
regulatory officials, and members of the public--expressed a uniform
desire in each of these proceedings for PHMSA to update its
regulations, even as they expressed diverse opinions as to the form
those updates should take. PHMSA addressed those comments and
discussions where pertinent within the discussions in section IV below.
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\63\ PHMSA, Pipeline Safety: Amendments to Liquefied Natural Gas
Facilities, 90 FR 18949 (advanced proposal May 5, 2025) (May 2025
ANPRM).
\64\ PHMSA, Pipeline Safety: Mandatory Regulatory Reviews To
Unleash American Energy and Improve Government Efficiency, 90 FR
23660 (advanced proposal June 4, 2025).
\65\ PHMSA, Pipeline Safety: Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities
Public Meeting 2025, 90 FR 47901 (Oct. 2, 2025).
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III. Section-by-Section Discussion of the Proposed Changes in Part 191
PHMSA proposes to delete Sec. 193.2011. Section 193.2011 simply
directs operators of LNG facilities to report incidents, safety-related
conditions, and annual pipeline summary data in accordance with the
requirements in 49 CFR part 191. Part 191 applies on its own terms to
LNG facilities, rendering the reference in Sec. 193.2011 unnecessary.
PHMSA discusses proposed revisions to part 191 reporting requirements
in this section.\66\
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\66\ PHMSA acknowledges multiple industry comments on the May
2025 ANPRM regarding the burden imposed on some stakeholders from
occasionally overlapping USCG, FERC, and PHMSA reporting
requirements. See, e.g., API, CLNG, INGAA, AGA, Am. Pub. Gas Ass'n
(APGA), Northeast Gas Ass'n (NGA) (Joint Trade Associations),
Comments on the ANPRM, Docket ID PHMSA-2019-0091-7611, at 12 (July
7, 2025). PHMSA notes that each agency imposes different timing,
content, and format requirements, complicating review of such
information for trend analysis purposes. In addition, such
facilities are a minority of those subject to PHMSA part 191
requirements. PHMSA therefore expects that synchronization of
reporting requirements across Federal agencies will require
additional coordination among the affected agencies.
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A. Section 191.3--Definitions
Incident
PHMSA proposes to revise the definition of an ``incident'' to
include the release of any hazardous fluid (as defined under proposed
Sec. 193.5) from an LNG facility. Section 191.3 is currently limited
to releases of LNG, LPG, refrigerants, or natural gas. PHMSA has
preliminarily determined that releases of hazardous fluids involved in
the processing of gas within an LNG facility--including LNG, LPG,
natural gas (which is composed predominantly of methane), ethane,
ethylene, propane, butane, pentane, other heavy hydrocarbons (including
[[Page 69323]]
aromatic hydrocarbons, hydrogen sulfide, and anhydrous ammonia), as
well as toxic (e.g., aromatic hydrocarbons, hydrogen sulfide, and
anhydrous ammonia), and corrosive (e.g., anhydrous ammonia, amine
solution, and aromatic hydrocarbons) materials--should be treated as
reportable incidents. Such reporting will facilitate Federal and State
emergency response actions as well as regulatory oversight in
identifying facility/operator-specific or industry-wide safety
concerns.
LNG Facility
PHMSA proposes to revise the definition of an ``LNG facility'' to
reflect the new code sections for part 193 proposed in this NPRM.
Specifically, PHMSA proposes to revise the definition of ``LNG
facility'' in Sec. 191.3 to cite proposed Sec. 193.5 instead of the
current Sec. 193.2007.
LNG Plant
PHMSA proposes to add a definition for an ``LNG plant'' aligned
with the definition of that term in NFPA 59A-2026 (``an LNG facility or
collection of LNG facilities functioning as a unit'') for clarity.
B. Section 191.22--National Registry of Operators
On September 12, 2014, PHMSA issued an advisory bulletin to owners
and operators of gas and hazardous liquid pipelines to clarify the
notifications required for certain construction-related events.\67\
PHMSA believes that the guidance in that advisory bulletin could also
assist LNG operators in determining what constitutes new construction
or construction-related activities and clarify when to make required
notifications proposed in this rulemaking.
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\67\ PHMSA, ADB-2014-03, Pipeline Safety: Construction
Notification, 79 FR 54777 (Sep. 14, 2014).
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Accordingly, PHMSA encourages operators to provide the required
notification(s) no later than 60 days prior to whichever of the
following construction-related activities occur first: material
purchasing and manufacturing; plant site or right-of-way acquisition;
construction equipment move-in activities; onsite or offsite
fabrications; or plant site or right-of-way clearing, grading, and
ditching. Although the notification prior to the first occurring
construction-related activity is strongly encouraged and will benefit
both PHMSA and the operator, these activities may not necessarily
represent the commencement of construction for purposes of triggering
the minimum 60-day notice period under the regulations.\68\ PHMSA does
not in this NPRM propose any modification to corresponding Sec. 191.22
regulatory text but solicits comment as to how it can clarify the 60-
day notice period for new construction in Sec. 191.22 or any other
sections of part 191.
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\68\ Id.
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PHMSA also proposes updating OPID forms and instructions to require
operators of permanent, small-scale LNG facilities availing themselves
of the regulatory flexibilities in subpart D to memorialize that
designation. Existing facilities opting for that designation would need
to update their OPIDs consistent with a new Sec. 191.22(c)(2)(vi).
C. Section 191.15--Incident Reporting
PHMSA is not proposing any changes to the regulatory text at Sec.
191.15 governing incident reporting for LNG facilities. However, PHMSA
is proposing changes to the incident report form for LNG facilities
(PHMSA F7100.3) and its accompanying instructions to address the
proposed revisions to Sec. Sec. 191.3 and 193.5 related to the
addition of ``hazardous fluids.'' PHMSA also proposes to delete blocks
C.1f to C.1i on PHMSA F7100.3 consistent with comments on its May 2025
ANPRM. The comments noted that the ``cost of commodity'' information
did not contribute to safety or inform the calculation of the monetary
threshold for incident reporting.\69\ PHMSA notes that proposed changes
to calculation of the monetary threshold within the Sec. 191.3
definition of ``incident'' under consideration in a parallel rulemaking
would--if adopted--apply to LNG facility incident reporting as
well.\70\
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\69\ Joint Trade Associations, Comments on the ANPRM, Docket ID
PHMSA-2019-0091-7611, at 11.
\70\ See PHMSA, Pipeline Safety: Property Damage Definition for
Reporting Incidents on Gas Pipelines and Accidents on Hazardous
Liquid and Carbon Dioxide Pipelines, 91 FR 22096 (proposed Apr. 24,
2026).
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D. Section 191.17--Annual Reporting
PHMSA is proposing to revise the annual report form for LNG
facilities (PHMSA F7100.3-1) and its accompanying instructions to
address the proposed revisions to Sec. Sec. 191.3 and 193.5 related to
releases of ``hazardous fluids'' generally, as well as to memorialize
operator election as a ``permanent, small-scale LNG facility'' pursuant
to the requirements in proposed subpart D.\71\
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\71\ In parallel with issuance of this NPRM, PHMSA has notified
the public of its intention to modify previously approved
information collections to replace the annual National Pipeline
Mapping System filing requirement for LNG facilities with a one-time
submission via the LNG facility annual report form. See PHMSA,
Pipeline Safety: Information Collection Activities, 91 FR 36946
(June 18, 2026). Should PHMSA adopt those modifications, any final
rule in this rulemaking proceeding would make a conforming revision
to Sec. 191.29(a) to delete the reference in that provision to ``or
liquefied natural gas facility.''
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E. Section 191.23--Reporting Safety-Related Conditions
PHMSA proposes to revise the safety-related condition reporting
requirements for LNG facilities to enhance safety monitoring and
oversight. These changes would expand the scope of reporting to include
releases of all hazardous fluids at LNG facilities and clarify that
safety-related conditions during initial start-up (but not during
earlier commissioning activities) must be reported.
First, PHMSA proposes to revise the list of safety-related
conditions in Sec. 191.23(a) to include the release of hazardous
fluids involved in the processing of LNG. As discussed earlier, PHMSA
proposes in Sec. 191.3 to expand the definition of an ``incident'' to
include releases of all hazardous fluids at an LNG facility. That
change would require operators to notify PHMSA of incidents that
involved releases of hazardous fluids. Similarly, PHMSA proposes to
revise the notification requirements at Sec. 191.23 to specify that
releases of hazardous fluids at an LNG facility are reportable safety-
related conditions. Including all hazardous fluids would ensure that
PHMSA has a complete picture of safety-related conditions and would
help identify potential risks and hazards associated with the release
of substances used in processing activities--not just LNG--at an LNG
facility.
Second, PHMSA proposes in Sec. 191.23 to add a new paragraph (c)
to clarify that each operator of an LNG facility must report any
safety-related condition that occurs during initial startup as
equipment and components begin commercial operation. Currently, Sec.
191.23 requires LNG operators to notify PHMSA of safety-related
conditions that occur while an LNG facility is ``in service.'' PHMSA
has interpreted ``in service'' for these purposes to mean any time a
hazardous fluid is introduced into an LNG facility, including during
both commissioning and subsequent initial startup. PHMSA understands
that historical reading is appropriate as to the latter but not the
former.
Safety-related conditions present risks that are relevant
throughout the life of
[[Page 69324]]
an LNG facility, beginning at the point of initial start-up.\72\ In
contrast, commissioning activities pertain to equipment and components
that are not yet ``in service,'' but rather are being evaluated for
subsequent placement ``in service.'' Though PHMSA acknowledges that
some commissioning activities involve the introduction of hazardous
fluids, commissioning activities are necessarily directed toward
identifying and curing potential issues under controlled and closely
monitored conditions as a predicate for subsequent initial start-up
activities; requiring operators to report these issues as safety-
related conditions is not appropriate in such circumstances. However,
should an event occur during commissioning that qualifies as an
``incident,'' operators would still remain obliged to notify PHMSA
pursuant to Sec. 191.3.\73\ PHMSA expects that this revision to Sec.
191.23 will allow operators to focus on identifying, evaluating, and
curing system integrity concerns exposed during commissioning
activities, rather than on filing safety related condition reports to
PHMSA with potentially limited safety value.
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\72\ PHMSA is also aware that FERC requires reporting of safety-
related conditions occurring during initial startup activities.
Given that PHMSA regulates LNG facilities not under FERC
jurisdiction (such as intrastate and small-scale facilities), PHMSA
cannot solely rely on communications with FERC to have awareness of
safety-related conditions arising during initial start-up
activities.
\73\ PHMSA is also aware that other regulators (e.g., FERC) may
impose their own reporting requirements and closely monitor
commissioning-related activities for LNG facilities within their
jurisdiction. PHMSA is also aware that individual operators may
(e.g., by contract) conflate ``commissioning'' and ``initial start-
up'' activities; however, both PHMSA and NFPA 59A-2023 understand
these phases to be generally distinguishable and sequential. See,
e.g., NFPA 59A-2026 at 18.8.1 (characterizing testing and
verification activities during commissioning as a condition
precedent to start-up operations).
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F. Section 191.25--Filing Safety-Related Condition Reports
PHMSA proposes to change Sec. 191.25 to streamline the reporting
process for safety-related conditions identified under Sec. 191.23.
These changes include adding references to the newly proposed Sec.
191.23(c) for LNG facilities and an editorial change for underground
natural gas facilities, ensuring clarity and completeness in reporting
procedures.
IV. Section-by-Section Discussion of the Proposed Changes in Part 193
PHMSA proposes to update part 193 by referencing the latest edition
of NFPA 59A and, where necessary, providing exceptions from or
modifications to certain requirements. These changes would retain NFPA-
59A-2026 as the core of the part 193 regulations for LNG facilities,
subject to certain additional or unique requirements. PHMSA also
proposes to redesignate and to renumber various provisions throughout
part 193 for clarity.
A. Incorporation by Reference of NFPA 59A-2026
PHMSA has incorporated NFPA 59A by reference into its regulations
for LNG facilities since the early 1970s.\74\ Part 193 currently
incorporates by reference the 2001 edition of NFPA 59A into various
requirements. The 2006 edition is incorporated by reference for
purposes of certain specific requirements pertaining to LNG storage
tanks.\75\
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\74\ See Office of Pipeline Safety, Liquefied Natural Gas
Systems, 37 FR 21638 (Oct. 13, 1972). PHMSA subsequently
incorporated updates to NFPA-59A again in 1976 (NFPA 59A-1972, in
MTB, Part 192--Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline;
Minimum Federal Safety Standards, 41 FR 13586, 13590 (Mar. 13,
1976)), 1980 (NFPA 59A-1979, in MTB, Liquefied Natural Gas
Facilities; New Federal Safety Standards, 45 FR 9184, 9185 (Feb. 11,
1980)), and 2000 (NFPA 59A-1996 in RSPA, Pipeline Safety:
Incorporation of Standard NFPA 59A in the Liquefied Natural Gas
Regulations, 65 FR 10950 (Mar. 1, 2000)).
\75\ PHMSA, Update of Regulatory References to Technical
Standards, 71 FR 33402 (June 9, 2006); PHMSA, Periodic Updates of
Regulatory References to Technical Standards and Miscellaneous
Edits, 75 FR 48593 (Aug. 11, 2010).
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PHMSA's historical approach to incorporating NFPA 59A-2001 has
presented challenges to operators in developing their compliance
strategies. First, PHMSA does not incorporate the entirety of NFPA 59A-
2001 by reference; rather, part 193 limits that incorporation to NFPA
59A-2001's siting requirements (Sec. 193.2051), design requirements
(Sec. 193.2101), construction requirements (Sec. 193.2301), equipment
requirements (Sec. 193.2401), and certain fire protection requirements
(Sec. 193.2801). Moreover, the broad language PHMSA uses in
incorporating NFPA 59A-2001 within these requirements creates
regulatory uncertainty. Stakeholders have expressed concern regarding
the extent to which specific NFPA 59A-2001 provisions are incorporated
by reference into certain regulatory requirements (e.g., design or
construction).\76\ The conflict preemption clause that PHMSA employs in
connection with its incorporation by reference of NFPA 59A-2001 only
contributes to that uncertainty. Part 193 fails to provide a clear
standard as to what qualifies as a ``conflict'' between the pertinent
sections of NFPA 59A-2001 and applicable regulations.
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\76\ Pipeline Safety Tr. (PST), Comments on the ANPRM, Docket ID
PHMSA-2019-0091-7613, at 9-10 (July 7, 2025).
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Second, NFPA 59A-2001 does not reflect the latest advancements in
LNG facility design, function, construction, operational practices, and
technologies. NFPA has been updated seven times since the publication
of the 2001 edition; the current edition is a far more comprehensive
and detailed document than its predecessor.\77\ PHMSA has attempted to
bridge the gap between the 2001 and more recent editions of NFPA 59A by
providing industry with additional guidance on certain topics, but
stakeholders are correct that agency guidance cannot itself create
legally binding obligations.\78\ The 2026 edition of NFPA 59A
incorporates more recent editions of other industry standards (e.g.,
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code) that are used in manufacturing
LNG equipment. Continuing to reference an outdated edition of NFPA 59A
(which, in turn, incorporates older editions of other industry
standards) imposes unnecessary regulatory burdens. Operators must
either order manufacturers to follow older standards in designing and
constructing LNG equipment or overcome expensive and time-consuming
procedural hurdles (e.g., special permit applications or a finding of
``safety equivalence'' pursuant to section 1.2 of NFPA 59A-2001) simply
to follow the latest manufacturing techniques.\79\
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\77\ NFPA 59A-2001 contained 36 pages of mandatory provisions
across 11 chapters, supplemented by 6 pages of non-mandatory,
informational annexes. In contrast, NFPA 59A-2026 contains 65 pages
of mandatory content across 19 chapters, supplemented by 28 pages of
non-mandatory, informational annexes.
\78\ See, e.g., Blue Eng'g & Consulting (BLUE), Comments on the
ANPRM, Docket ID PHMSA-2019-0091-7503 (July 1, 2025) (discussing LNG
FAQs).
\79\ See, e.g., Williams Cos., Comments on the ANPRM, Docket ID
PHMSA-2019-0091-7612 (July 7, 2025).
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To address these concerns, PHMSA proposes to incorporate the latest
edition of NFPA 59A by reference and to expand reliance on the
mandatory provisions in that standard in part 193.\80\ NFPA 59A-2026 is
a consensus standard generated by industry and Federal and State
regulators; public safety advocates have also endorsed its
[[Page 69325]]
incorporation by reference in part 193.\81\ PHMSA expects that greater
reliance on NFPA 59A-2026 will improve LNG safety, as the mandatory
provisions in that standard contain far more detailed and comprehensive
requirements than its 2001 counterpart. The technically rigorous,
transparent process employed in the development of each edition of NFPA
59A ensures that the latest edition aligns with current practices in
the LNG industry.\82\ NFPA 59A-2026 also includes informational annexes
to assist stakeholders in understanding its mandatory requirements.
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\80\ PHMSA understands ``mandatory provisions'' consists of
those provisions with imperative language (e.g., ``shall'') within
chapters 4 through 19 of NFPA 59A-2026. PHMSA proposes to exclude
the contents of chapter 1 (Administrative) from those mandatory
provisions of NFPA 59A-2026 due to potential tension with statutory
provisions pertaining to the scope of PHMSA's jurisdiction,
retroactive application of certain safety requirements, and special
permits granting waivers from part 193 requirements.
\81\ Earthjustice & Env't Def. Fund (EDF), Comments on the
ANPRM, Docket ID PHMSA-2019-0091-7596, at 1 (July 7, 2025).
\82\ The NFPA website (<a href="https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/nfpa-59a-standard-development/59a">https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/nfpa-59a-standard-development/59a</a>) contains extensive documentation
elaborating on the technical basis for revisions within each of the
post-2006 editions of NFPA 59A and memorializing the Technical
Committee's consideration of those revisions.
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B. Subpart A--General
Subpart A sets forth general rules governing application,
interpretation, and implementation of part 193 regulations. It also
contains a general requirement for operators to have and maintain plans
and procedures as required by part 193.
PHMSA proposes to retain the existing provisions in subpart A,
subject to the redesignation and revision of certain provisions. PHMSA
is not proposing to incorporate the ``Administrative'' provisions in
NFPA 59A-2026 due to potential inconsistencies with the requirements in
the Pipeline Safety Laws.\83\
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\83\ Among those provisions of NFPA 59A-2026 that PHMSA declines
to incorporate by reference is the ``equivalency'' language at
section 1.4. PHMSA has in the past employed similar language in
section 1.2 of NFPA 59A-2001 to assist operators in overcoming the
practical consequences of PHMSA's delay in updating its part 193
regulations. See LNG FAQs, D5-D6. However, PHMSA understands that
NFPA 59A-2001 language was never explicitly incorporated by
reference into its part 193 regulations. In addition, PHMSA
regulations at Sec. 190.341 allow operators to apply for special
permits requesting waivers of part 193 requirements, and PHMSA has
broad authority to exercise its enforcement discretion to minimize
liability risks arising from future delays in updating its
regulations.
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B.1. Section 193.1--Scope of Part
PHMSA proposes to redesignate in a new Sec. 193.1 much of the
language currently located in Sec. 193.2001 describing the scope of
the part 193 requirements. To provide additional clarity and ensure
consistency with the terminology used in the USCG regulations for
waterfront LNG facilities, PHMSA proposes to modify the exception in 49
CFR 193.1(b)(3). The exception, as currently codified at Sec.
193.2001(b)(3), limits the applicability of part 193 to marine cargo
transfer systems at waterfront LNG facilities to matters related to
siting.
The term ``marine cargo transfer system'' is not defined in part
193 or used in the parallel USCG regulations for waterfront LNG
facilities. Instead, the USCG regulations use the term ``marine
transfer area for LNG,'' which is defined as ``that part of a
waterfront facility handling LNG between the vessel, or where the
vessel moors, and the last manifold or valve immediately before the
receiving tanks.'' That definition is consistent with the current
limitation on part 193 applicability in Sec. 193.2001(b)(3), which
also refers to ``the marine vessel and the last manifold (or in the
absence of a manifold, the last valve) located immediately before a
storage tank'' in describing a marine cargo transfer system.
Rather than having parallel provisions that use slightly different
terminology, PHMSA proposes to incorporate the phrase ``marine transfer
area for LNG as defined in 33 CFR 127.005'' directly into the new
version of the scope requirements in Sec. 193.1(b)(3). PHMSA also
proposes to eliminate the remaining language from the current provision
in Sec. 193.2001(b)(3), which is not necessary as the definition of
``marine transfer area for LNG'' in 33 CFR 127.005 incorporates the
relevant breakpoints used in delineating the scope of part 193 at
waterfront LNG facilities. PHMSA does not intend this change to be
substantive in nature or to alter the longstanding approach used in
prescribing the scope of part 193's applicability at waterfront LNG
facilities.
B.2. Section 193.3--Applicability
PHMSA proposes to redesignate the applicability requirements
currently prescribed in Sec. 193.2005 under a new Sec. 193.3.
Consistent with historical practice, Sec. 193.3 would continue to
reference the effective date of any final rule in this proceeding in
prescribing the applicability of any part 193 subparts governed by the
statutory retroactivity prohibition at 49 U.S.C. 60103(c) and
60104(b)(2). PHMSA also proposes to clarify the scope of that
prohibition by stating in Sec. 193.3(a) that the requirements in the
non-retroactive subparts do not apply to existing LNG facilities or to
proposed LNG facilities that an appropriate authority approved before
those requirements went into effect. In addition, PHMSA proposes to
remove from Sec. 193.3(b) the current requirement at Sec.
193.2005(b)(2) that PHMSA approve exceptions from retroactive
application of updated part 193 design, installation, and construction
requirements for so-called ``in-kind'' replacements of facilities
designed, installed, and constructed in accordance with original
facility specifications. This proposed change will improve alignment
with analogous provisions (particularly section 1.4.4) in NFPA 59A-
2026. PHMSA also proposes a revision to Sec. 193.3(b)(2) to clarify
application of the ``in-kind'' replacement provision to LNG storage
tanks replacement projects that increase capacity or relocate the
tank(s).
B.3. Section 193.5--Definitions
PHMSA proposes to redesignate the existing Sec. 193.2007 as a new
Sec. 193.5 and to incorporate by reference the definitions in chapter
3 of NFPA 59A-2026 in lieu of the existing definitions in Sec.
193.2007, subject to certain exceptions and modifications as discussed
below. PHMSA understands that the definitions listed in NFPA 59A-2026
chapter 3 as supplemented or substituted by the definitions in the new
Sec. 193.5 would govern the meaning of both NFPA 59A-2026 and part
193.
Administrator
PHMSA proposes to retain the existing definition of
``Administrator'' in Sec. 193.5. NFPA 59A-2026 includes a definition
of an ``Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ)'' and in various places
references the need for AHJ approval. For purposes of PHMSA's
application of the NFPA 59A-2026 provisions being incorporated into
part 193 referencing an AHJ or ``approval,'' the AHJ will typically
(unless PHMSA has resolved the issue generically via part 193
regulatory text) be the PHMSA Administrator (or his delegate) by way of
an operator-specific Sec. 190.341 special permit process.\84\ However,
some NFPA 59A-2026 references to an ``AHJ'' may implicate the
prerogative of other regulatory authorities; in those cases, PHMSA
proposes to include within part 193 provisions disclaiming
administration of an AHJ authorization called for by NFPA 59A-2026
language.\85\
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\84\ PHMSA does not generally understand references within NFPA
59A-2026 to ``AHJ approvals'' to implicate the procedural machinery
at Sec. 190.9--an exception from this general rule being approval
of model evaluation protocols (MEPs) and model validation databases
(MVDs) in connection with siting analyses.
\85\ PHMSA acknowledges requests by multiple industry
stakeholders for improved allocation of responsibilities among
different Federal agencies with statutory authority over LNG
facilities--with some calling for each agency to have primary
responsibility for one or another dimension of LNG facilities
activities. See, e.g., Joint Trade Associations, Comments on the
ANPRM, Docket ID PHMSA-2019-0091-7611, at 2-3. The fact that
multiple Federal agencies share overlapping regulatory oversight
authority over LNG facilities reflects congressional intent; PHMSA
is, therefore, constrained in its ability to impose by amendments to
its part 193 regulations boundaries on other agencies' exercise of
their statutory prerogatives. That said, PHMSA will work with other
Federal agencies to update pertinent interagency agreements to
address this concern.
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[[Page 69326]]
Component
PHMSA proposes to retain within Sec. 193.5 the existing definition
of ``component,'' albeit with revisions to improve readability. PHMSA
also proposes to add a reference to ``pressure vessel'' within the list
of examples of ``components'' for additional clarity.
Design Pressure
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 the existing definition of
``design pressure.'' Section 193.2007 currently defines ``design
pressure'' to mean ``the pressure used in the design of components for
the purpose of determining the minimum permissible thickness or
physical characteristics of its various parts . . . .'' NFPA 59A-2026
adopts a similar definition for ``design pressure'' but, unlike NFPA
59A-2001, omits the statement ``when applicable, the static head must
be included in the design pressure to determine the thickness of any
specific part.'' Because NFPA 59A-2026 removed that statement, PHMSA
proposes to retain the current definition in part 193.
Design Spill
PHMSA proposes to add at Sec. 193.5 a new definition for the term
``design spill,'' which would mean ``a potential spill or release from
LNG and hazardous fluid containers, piping, and equipment at
liquefaction, storage, transfer, or other process areas in an LNG
facility.'' NFPA 59A-2026 uses but does not define the term ``design
spill.'' PHMSA proposes to address that omission by defining the term
``design spill'' in the new Sec. 193.5.
Determine
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 the existing definition of
``determine.'' Section 193.2007 currently defines ``determine'' as
meaning to ``make a decision based on an appropriate investigation
using scientific methods and sound engineering judgment, including
documentation that demonstrates the basis of the decision.'' NFPA 59A-
2026 uses but does not define the term ``determine.'' PHMSA proposes to
retain the existing definition in part 193 to address that gap and
provide interested stakeholders with additional regulatory certainty.
Emergency
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 and to revise for clarity
the existing definition of ``emergency.'' Section 193.2007 currently
defines an ``emergency'' to mean ``a deviation from normal operation, a
structural failure, or severe environmental conditions that probably
would cause harm to people or property.'' NFPA 59A-2026 does not define
the term ``emergency.'' PHMSA proposes to retain the current definition
to address that gap and to provide interested stakeholders with
additional regulatory certainty.
Exclusion Zone
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 and to revise the existing
definition of ``exclusion zone'' with minor revisions. Section 193.2007
currently defines ``exclusion zone'' to mean ``an area surrounding an
LNG facility in which an operator or government agency legally controls
all activities in accordance with Sec. 193.2057 and Sec. 193.2059 for
as long as the facility is in operation.'' NFPA 59A-2026 does not
define or use the term ``exclusion zone.'' PHMSA proposes to retain the
existing definition in part 193 with an updated reference to subpart B
siting requirements to accommodate other changes proposed in the NPRM.
PHMSA is also proposing a minor revision to the existing regulatory
text (``area within or surrounding an LNG facility'') to account for
the fact that exclusion zones may surround an LNG facility even as they
may be within the boundary of an LNG plant consisting of multiple LNG
facilities.
Gas
PHMSA proposes to retain at the new Sec. 193.5 the existing
definition of ``gas.'' Section 193.2007 currently defines ``gas'' as
``except when designated as inert, . . . natural gas, other flammable
gas, or gas which is toxic or corrosive.'' NFPA 59A-2026 does not
define the term ``gas.'' PHMSA proposes to retain the existing
definition to provide interested stakeholders with additional
regulatory certainty.
Hazardous Fluid
PHMSA proposes to retain at the new Sec. 193.5 the existing
definition of ``hazardous fluid,'' albeit with certain revisions.
Section 193.2007 currently defines the term ``hazardous fluid'' to mean
``gas or hazardous liquid.'' The terms ``gas'' and ``hazardous liquid''
are further defined, respectively, as ``except when designated as
inert, . . . natural gas, other flammable gas, or gas which is toxic or
corrosive'' and ``LNG or a liquid that is flammable or toxic.'' NFPA
59A-2026 provides a slightly different definition for ``hazardous
fluid'' in that it uses the term ``ignitible'' in lieu of
``flammable,'' ostensibly to improve the scientific precision of the
defined term. NFPA 59A-2026 also refers to both ``gas'' and ``hazardous
liquids'' as potentially including corrosive substances.
PHMSA proposes to retain the existing reference to ``flammable''
rather than to substitute the term ``ignitible'' in the definition. The
term ``flammable'' has long been used in the existing definition at
Sec. 193.2007 and mirrors corresponding statutory language at 49
U.S.C. 60101(a)(2)-(a)(4). PHMSA notes that the substitution of
``ignitible'' may not entirely resolve ambiguity in the regulatory
language.\86\
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\86\ See BLUE, Comments on the ANPRM, Docket ID PHMSA-2019-0091-
7503, at 11 (criticizing the introduction of the ``ignitable''
language as ``add[ing] additional vagueness.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA expects that the revised definition of ``hazardous fluid'' at
Sec. 193.5 will enhance safety at LNG facilities. Both the existing
part 193 regulations and comparable provisions of NFPA 59A-2001 are
largely directed toward addressing the public safety risks associated
with LNG. However, subsequent editions of NFPA 59A have increasingly
used the broader term ``hazardous fluid,'' expanding the scope of
public safety risks (and corresponding LNG facility equipment,
components, and processing activities) addressed under the provisions
in that standard. PHMSA further notes that the revised definition
conforms with the proposed revisions to the reporting requirements for
LNG facilities at Sec. 191.3, which would expand the incident, annual,
and safety-related condition reporting to include the non-exhaustive
list of ``hazardous fluids'' described in section III.A above.
Hazardous Liquid
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 and to revise the existing
definition of ``hazardous liquid.'' Section 193.2007 currently defines
``hazardous liquid'' as ``LNG or a liquid that is flammable or toxic.''
NFPA 59A-2026 does not define this term. PHMSA's enabling statute
acknowledges at 49 U.S.C. 60101(a)(4)(B)-(C) that a hazardous liquid
can be a substance that is ``corrosive,'' and some of the materials
present in liquid form within processes at LNG facilities (e.g.,
hydrogen sulfide, anhydrous ammonia) are in fact corrosive for human
tissue. For that reason, PHMSA proposes to add the term ``corrosive''
to the existing
[[Page 69327]]
definition of hazardous liquid in part 193.
Impounding System
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 and to revise the existing
definition of ``impounding system.'' Section 193.2007 currently defines
``impounding system'' as ``an impounding space, including dikes and
floors for conducting the flow of spilled hazardous liquids to an
impounding space.'' NFPA 59A-2026 does not define an ``impounding
system'' but uses the term throughout the document. To provide
additional regulatory certainty, PHMSA proposes to retain the
definition for ``impounding system'' in part 193. However, PHMSA
proposes to replace the term ``impounding space'' with ``impounding
area'' for clarity by adopting the more modern term used by newer
editions of NFPA 59A.
Liquefied Natural Gas or LNG
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 and to revise for editorial
clarity the existing definition of LNG. Section 193.2007 currently
defines ``LNG'' as ``natural gas or synthetic gas having methane
(CH<INF>4</INF>) as its major constituent which has been changed to a
liquid.'' PHMSA proposes to clarify that definition by replacing the
word ``which'' with ``that'' to ensure a more precise definition.
LNG Facility
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 and to revise the existing
definition of ``LNG facility.'' Section 193.2007 currently defines
``LNG facility'' as a ``pipeline facility that is used for liquefying
natural gas or synthetic gas or transferring, storing, vaporizing
liquefied natural gas, including on-site power generation facilities.''
PHMSA proposes to add to this definition an explicit reference to ``on-
site power generation facilities.'' That addition is consistent with
PHMSA's longstanding understanding that ``on-site power facilities''
are ``LNG facilities'' subject to the requirements in part 193.\87\
PHMSA further notes that this addition enhances public safety by
ensuring that on-site power generation facilities (some of which may
use fuels that are themselves flammable or explosive) are subject to
the same safety standards as other LNG facilities.
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\87\ A 1980 final rule explicitly included power generation
facilities within the scope of LNG facilities. See RSPA, Liquefied
Natural Gas Facilities; New Federal Safety Standards, 45 FR 9184,
9189, 9197-98 (Feb. 11, 1980). PHMSA consistently has held this to
be the case since, even as a reference to power generation
facilities in Sec. 193.2051 was omitted for other reasons. See,
e.g., RSPA, Pipeline Safety: Incorporation of Standard NFPA 59A in
the Liquefied Natural Gas Regulations, 65 FR 10958 (Mar. 1, 2000).
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Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP)
PHMSA proposes to retain in Sec. 193.5 the current definition of
``maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP).'' Section 193.2007
currently defines MAWP as ``the maximum gauge pressure permissible at
the top of the equipment, containers, or pressure vessels while
operating at design temperature.'' NFPA 59A-2026 adopts a similar
definition, except that it specifies the maximum pressure permissible
at the top of ``completed equipment.'' PHMSA is not aware of the
reasoning behind the reference in NFPA 59A-2026 to ``completed
equipment'' in defining MAWP. To avoid introducing unnecessary
confusion as to whether ``equipment'' is completed or not, PHMSA
proposes to retain the existing part 193 definition of MAWP.
Normal Operation
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 and to revise for clarity
the existing definition of ``normal operation.'' Section 193.2007
currently defines ``normal operation'' as ``functioning within
allowable ranges of pressure, temperature, flow, and other operating
criteria consistent with the requirements of this part.'' NFPA 59A-2026
does not define this term. Accordingly, PHMSA proposes to retain the
current definition without change.
Operator
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 and to revise the existing
definition of the term ``operator'' to align with the definition of
``liquefied natural gas pipeline facility'' in 49 U.S.C. 60101(a)(14).
Section 193.2007 currently defines LNG facility as ``a pipeline
facility that is used for liquefying natural gas or synthetic gas or
transferring, storing, or vaporizing liquefied natural gas.'' Though an
LNG facility is a type of ``pipeline facility'' as that term is defined
in the Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 60101(a)(18) and 49 CFR 193.2007,
NFPA 59A-2026 does not define this term. Moreover, section 193.2007
currently defines an ``operator'' as a ``person who owns or operates an
LNG facility.'' To ensure consistency with the definitions in the
Pipeline Safety Act and implementing regulations, PHMSA proposes to
revise the definition of ``operator'' in part 193 to mean ``a person
who owns or operates a pipeline facility.'' PHMSA notes that a person
seeking authorization to construct and operate planned LNG facilities
is an ``operator'' for purposes of this definition.
Person
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 and to revise for
readability the existing definition of ``person'' in part 193. Section
60101(a)(17) of the Pipeline Safety Act defines a ``person'' as ``in
addition to its meaning under section 1 of title 1 (except as to
societies), includes a State, a municipality, and a trustee, receiver,
assignee, or personal representative of a person.'' \88\ Similarly,
section 193.2007 currently defines a ``person'' as ``any individual,
firm, joint venture, partnership, corporation, association, State,
municipality, cooperative association, or joint stock association, and
includes any trustee, receiver, assignee, or personal representative
thereof.'' NFPA 59A-2026 does not define this term. The proposed
definition improves readability by replacing the phrase ``and
includes'' with ``including'' and standardizing capitalization for
regulatory entities (e.g., State), thereby ensuring the language is
consistent with conventions elsewhere in part 193 regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ 1 U.S.C. 1 (defining ``person'' to ``include corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint
stock companies, as well as individuals'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pipeline Facility
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 but to revise for
readability the existing definition of ``pipeline facility'' in part
193. Section 193.2007 currently defines ``pipeline facility'' to mean
``new and existing piping, rights-of-way, and any equipment, facility,
or building used in the transportation of gas or in the treatment of
gas during the course of transportation.'' An LNG facility is a type of
pipeline facility. NFPA 59A-2026 does not define this term. The
proposed definition includes LNG facilities to reinforce that an LNG
facility is a type of pipeline facility.
Piping
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 but to revise for clarity
the existing definition of ``piping'' in part 193. Section 193.2007
currently defines ``piping'' as ``pipe, tubing, hoses, fittings,
valves, pumps, connections, safety devices or related components for
containing the flow of hazardous fluids.'' NFPA 59A-2026 does not
define this term. The proposed definition enhances specificity by
replacing the general term ``pipe'' with the more precise ``line pipe''
language used elsewhere in PHMSA regulations.
[[Page 69328]]
Transfer Piping
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 but to revise for clarity
the existing definition of ``transfer piping'' in part 193. Section
193.2007 currently defines ``transfer piping'' as ``a system of
permanent and temporary piping used for transferring hazardous fluids
between any of the following: Liquefaction process facilities, storage
tanks, vaporizers, compressors, cargo transfer systems, and facilities
other than pipeline facilities.'' PHMSA believes that, as currently
written, the phrase ``a system of permanent and temporary piping''
might imply the transfer system must include both permanent and
temporary piping for the term to meet the definition, which is not the
case.\89\ Therefore, PHMSA proposes to revise the definition of
``transfer piping'' to mean ``a system of permanent or temporary
piping, or both, used for transferring hazardous fluids between any of
the following: liquefaction process facilities, storage tanks,
vaporizers, compressors, cargo transfer systems, and facilities other
than pipeline facilities.''
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\89\ See PHMSA, PI-10-0200, Interpretation Response re Mount Bay
Hope Liquefied Natural Gas Transfer System (Mar. 25, 2010),
available at: <a href="https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulations/title49/interp/pi-10-0020">https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulations/title49/interp/pi-10-0020</a> (discussing definition of ``transfer piping'' and
``transfer system'').
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Transfer System
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 the existing definition of
``transfer system'' in part 193. Section 193.2007 currently defines
``transfer system'' to ``include [ ] transfer piping and cargo transfer
systems.'' NFPA 59A-2026 does not define a transfer system; however,
the term is used throughout the document and part 193. PHMSA proposes
to retain the definition to support operators' understanding of the
regulations.
Vaporization
PHMSA proposes to retain at Sec. 193.5 the existing definition of
``vaporization'' in part 193. NFPA 59A-2026 does not define
vaporization; however, the term is used throughout the document and
part 193. PHMSA proposes to retain the definition to support operators'
understanding of the regulations.
B.4. Section 193.7--Rules of Regulatory Construction
PHMSA proposes to revise the requirements in the existing Sec.
193.2009 and to relocate them to a new Sec. 193.7. The provision
defines regulatory terms used in part 193, such as ``must'' and
``shall.''
B.5. Section 193.9--What documents are incorporated by reference partly
or wholly in this part?
PHMSA proposes to incorporate by reference new or updated editions
of consensus industry standards currently referenced in part 193. PHMSA
also proposes to incorporate by reference additional consensus industry
standards to improve enforceability. Below is a list of new or updated
standards proposed for incorporation by reference into part 193; any
standards not listed below that are currently incorporated by reference
into PHMSA regulations would no longer be incorporated by reference
into part 193.
As discussed in section IV.A. above, PHMSA proposes to incorporate
the mandatory provisions in the latest 2026 edition of NFPA 59A as the
core of its regulatory framework for LNG facilities. NFPA 59A-2026 is
therefore discussed first in this section IV.B.5, with other standards
proposed to be incorporated by reference in PHMSA regulations appearing
by the issuing standards development organizations thereafter. Most of
the standards listed thereafter for incorporation by reference within
part 193 are listed as mandatory references in chapter 2 of NFPA 59A-
2026.
PHMSA also proposes incorporation by reference of one additional
standard currently incorporated by reference at Sec. 193.2013 and
another standard informing compliance with the alternative risk-based
O&M approach at subpart F. In contrast, PHMSA does not propose to
include within Sec. 193.9 standards not discussed below--even if those
standards were listed among the mandatory references listed in NFPA
59A-2026 chapter 2 or the informational references within NFPA 59A-2026
Annex C. Instead, those standards should be considered non-binding
guidance assisting operators in developing their part 193 compliance
strategies. Similarly, PHMSA does not propose to incorporate by
reference some of the consensus industry standards discussed in section
IV.G below, even as PHMSA understands those resources could function as
non-binding guidance informing operators' development of the risk-based
O&M alternative framework mandated by section 110 of the PIPES Act of
2020. PHMSA invites public comment on whether to incorporate any
industry standard referenced in NFPA 59A-2026 or otherwise applicable
to the LNG industry.
The standards listed below for inclusion within the new Sec. 193.9
are reasonably available to interested parties in several ways. First,
PHMSA has negotiated agreements with some standards development
organizations to make viewable copies of the standards available to the
public at no cost. Organizations that have agreed to the public access
requirements of the statutory mandate discussed above include the
American Petroleum Institute (API), the American Gas Association (AGA),
ASTM International (formerly the American Society for Testing and
Materials), and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Those
organizations' standards can be accessed through the websites listed in
the proposed Sec. 193.9 regulatory text. Second, interested persons
may obtain (on loan from PHMSA) physical copies of standards issued by
organizations with which PHMSA has not at the time of publication of
this NPRM been able to reach a general agreement for free online
access. Those organizations include the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME), the American Society for Nondestructive Testing
(ASNT), American Concrete Institute (ACI), American Society of Civil
Engineers (ASCE), Brazed Aluminum Plate-fin Heat Exchanger
Manufacturers' Association (ALPEMA), Center for Chemical Process Safety
(CCPS), Compressed Gas Association (CGA), CSA Group (CSA),
International Society of Automation (ISA), National Board of Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Inspectors (NBBI), and UL Solutions. Interested persons
seeking a loan of a physical copy of a standard issued by those
organizations may contact the PHMSA standards library (at the email
address: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#73031b1e0012031b030007121d171201170033171c075d141c05"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="fc8c94918f9d8c948c8f889d92989d8e988fbc989388d29b938a">[email protected]</span></a>; such requests should include a
phone number, physical address, and an email address), or through the
contact information listed in the proposed Sec. 193.9 amendatory text.
Additional information regarding standards availability can be found at
<a href="https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/standards-rulemaking/pipeline/standards-incorporated-reference">https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/standards-rulemaking/pipeline/standards-incorporated-reference</a>.
NFPA 59A-2026
As discussed in section IV.A. above, PHMSA proposes to incorporate
by reference into part 193 the mandatory provisions in the 2026 edition
of NFPA 59A. PHMSA proposes to delete all existing references to the
2001 and 2006 editions of NFPA 59A. NFPA 59A-2026 provides minimum fire
protection and safety requirements for the location, design,
construction, security, operation, and maintenance of liquefied natural
gas (LNG) plants.
[[Page 69329]]
Standards Incorporated by Reference in NFPA 59A-2026
PHMSA proposes to incorporate by reference into part 193 certain
consensus industry standards that are referenced in the mandatory
provisions in chapter 2 of NFPA 59A-2026. PHMSA identifies these new
standards in the table below, which would be incorporated into the new
Sec. 193.9. PHMSA has reviewed the content and preliminarily concluded
that each standard contributes to the improvement of public safety.
PHMSA notes in the table below the provisions of NFPA 59A-2026 that are
proposed for incorporation and the purpose for doing so. PHMSA solicits
comment on these provisions and on any additional standards that should
be incorporated by reference within a final rule.\90\
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\90\ PHMSA acknowledges that the above table does not identify
every mandatory standard listed in chapter 2 of NFPA 59A-2026. PHMSA
has tried to limit the standards proposed for incorporation by
reference to those that are most critical to the understanding and
enforceability of the design, installation, construction, and
operations and maintenance requirements in NFPA 59A-2026.
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American Gas Association (AGA)
PHMSA also proposes to incorporate by reference in Sec. 193.403(a)
AGA's Purging Manual, Fourth edition, published in September 2018. The
Purging Manual provides principles and general procedures for purging
pipeline
[[Page 69345]]
systems containing flammable gas to maintain safety.
In this NPRM, PHMSA proposes new purging requirements in Sec.
193.403, which are discussed in more detail in section IV.F.5. As part
of those requirements, PHMSA proposes that purging be performed in
accordance with the Purging Manual as well as NFPA 59A-2026. Chapter 1
of the Purging Manual contains requirements such as requiring operators
to prepare written site-specific purging procedures and hazard
assessments detailing the sequence of events, a predetermined rate of
introduction of a purge medium, and verification of endpoints at
properly vented locations. These steps must be followed and carried out
by properly trained and qualified individuals. Chapter 1 further
requires operators to plan for the safety of plant personnel, such as
requiring appropriate personal protective equipment and the
identification of hazardous materials. Chapter 6 of the Purging Manual
contains specific purging requirements for different types of LNG
storage tanks.
The Fourth edition of the AGA Purging Manual contains a substantial
revision to the currently incorporated Third edition to include more
comprehensive guidance and modern purging techniques. For example,
chapter 1 now requires management of change, lock out/tag out, and
instruction and assignment of personnel to be included in written
plans. Chapter 6 also expands the general requirements and includes a
description of LNG facilities and the physical properties of LNG. The
Fourth edition adds LNG trucking cargo tanks to the purging
requirements as well. Finally, the Fourth edition also changes the name
of the standard from ``Purging Principles and Practices'' to ``Purging
Manual.'' PHMSA believes that these updates will be beneficial to
safety.
American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Center for Chemical Process
Safety
PHMSA proposes to incorporate by reference into Sec. 193.503 the
Center for Chemical Process Safety's (CCPS's) Guidelines for Hazard
Evaluation Procedures (Guidelines), Third edition, published in April
2008. The Guidelines provide principles and general procedures for
performing process hazard assessments (PHAs) and evaluating and
implementing of the results of PHAs. As discussed in section IV.G,
PHMSA proposes in Sec. 193.503 that FERC jurisdictional LNG facilities
design and implement their subpart F, PHA-based O&M programs consistent
with the Guidelines.
B.6. Section 193.11--Plans and Procedures
PHMSA proposes to revise the existing plans and procedures
regulations in Sec. 193.2017. First, PHMSA proposes to redesignate the
current Sec. 193.2017(a) as a new Sec. 193.11(a) and to modify the
regulation to specify that operators must maintain written plans and
procedures in accordance with part 193 and NFPA 59A-2026. Currently,
Sec. 193.2017 requires operators to maintain plans and procedures and
to make them available to PHMSA upon request. Each change to a plan or
procedure must be available at the LNG plant for review and inspection
within 20 days after the change is made. PHMSA's proposed modifications
would retain the current requirements and adopt the provisions in NFPA
59A-2026.
PHMSA proposes to remove Sec. 193.2017(b). Section 193.2017(b)
currently states that operators must amend their plans and procedures
as necessary to ensure safety. The same obligation is also imposed by
regulation in Sec. 190.206. To avoid unnecessary duplication, PHMSA
proposes to delete Sec. 193.2107(b) and to maintain this requirement
in Sec. 190.206.
PHMSA proposes to redesignate the existing Sec. 193.2017(c)
requirements for periodic review of plans and procedures with a new
Sec. 193.11(b). PHMSA further notes that, on or before the effective
date of a final rule in this proceeding, operators would need to
review, and if necessary, to update their plans and procedures to
reflect the requirements of the new part 193.
PHMSA proposes in a new Sec. 193.11(c) to require operators to
record and to maintain a change log detailing changes to plans and
procedures, showing revisions from the previous version. This change
log is consistent with widely employed quality control practices to
ensure documentation of effective plans and procedures to facilitate
continual process improvement, system integrity evaluation, and failure
investigations. Unless a different timeframe for specific plans and
procedures is required by another provision of part 193 (and, by
extension, NFPA 59A-2026), PHMSA proposes that operators keep a record
of the change log for the lifetime of the component(s) governed by the
procedures.
B.7. Section 193.13--Mobile and Temporary LNG Facilities
PHMSA proposes to update the regulations governing mobile and
temporary LNG facilities currently found at Sec. 193.2019.\91\ These
revisions involve a redesignation to a new Sec. 193.13, as well as
editorial changes to enhance readability. PHMSA proposes to align these
regulations with the latest safety standards by requiring operators of
mobile and temporary LNG facilities to follow the governing provisions
in chapter 14 of NFPA 59A-2026.
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\91\ PHMSA also solicits comment on whether to amend Sec.
193.2019 (repeated in Sec. 193.13 as proposed) to communicate
better that PHMSA has regulatory authority to ensure compliance of
mobile and temporary facilities with the requirements of part 193
(including those provisions of chapter 14 of NFPA 59A-2026
incorporated therein).
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PHMSA is proposing these changes to address the ambiguity in the
existing language of Sec. 193.2019. Similar to other provisions in
part 193, Sec. 193.2019 currently includes a broad reference to
``applicable sections of NFPA 59A-2001'' in describing the requirements
applicable to mobile and temporary LNG facilities. The ``applicable''
provision of NFPA 59A-2001 (specifically, section 2.3.4) contains a
limited set of personnel training, design, and operations requirements
commensurate with the lower public safety risks posed by those
facilities, but lacks threshold criteria defining which facilities are
or are not eligible for those regulatory flexibilities. In fact,
section 2.3.4 is directed principally at temporary LNG facilities,
though NFPA 59A-2001 provides no criteria for distinguishing between
``temporary'' and more permanent, ``stationary'' LNG facilities. In
addition, the language at current Sec. 193.2019 is potentially
overbroad in that it could be read to suggest mobile and temporary
facilities are exempted from the entirety of part 193--including the
provisions (regulatory definitions, statements of scope, etc.) of
subpart A.
Chapter 14 of the updated NFPA 59A-2026 addresses these omissions
and enhances the safety requirements governing mobile and temporary LNG
facilities. In addition to being explicitly directed toward temporary
and mobile LNG facilities, chapter 14 introduces a default, six-month
durational criteria for distinguishing between ``mobile and temporary''
and other (e.g., permanent) LNG facilities. Chapter 14 also includes a
process that allows operators to extend that six-month period, either
by requesting permission from PHMSA via a special permit application or
by complying with additional safety and security requirements for
permanent, small-scale LNG facilities.
Further, NFPA 59A-2026 chapter 14 contains more robust safety
requirements as compared to section 2.3.4 of NFPA 59A-2001. Chapter 14
of
[[Page 69346]]
NFPA 59A-2026 retains all of its predecessor's content while
introducing references to detailed new requirements for qualification
and training of personnel; facility and process equipment design,
construction and installation; fire protection systems and physical
security; transfer operations; operation and maintenance; and corrosion
protection.\92\ NFPA 59A-2026 also explicitly authorizes the use of
cryogenic PIP systems within mobile and temporary LNG facilities.
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\92\ PHMSA notes that design, installation, and construction
requirements in chapter 14 would--pursuant to the statutory
retroactivity prohibitions at 49 U.S.C. 60103(c) and 60104(b)--not
apply to existing mobile and temporary facilities as those
facilities are relocated from place-to-place. However, PHMSA expects
that the proposed spacing requirements at NFPA 59A-2026, Table 6.3.1
would apply to these facilities each time they are relocated given
that those facilities are (by definition) relocated throughout their
lifecycles.
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Lastly, PHMSA proposes to make clear that the provisions of part
193, subpart A apply to mobile and temporary LNG facilities in addition
to the requirements in chapter 14 of NFPA 59A-2026. Consistent with
current part 193 requirements, operators of mobile and temporary LNG
facilities that meet the requirements of NFPA 59A-2026 would be exempt
from the other requirements of part 193.
B.8. Section 193.15--Investigations of Failures
PHMSA proposes to retain and to update the failure investigation
requirements currently found at Sec. 193.2515. The proposed revisions
include redesignating the current Sec. 193.2515 as a new Sec. 193.15
and adding requirements to improve the quality of information on
failures at LNG facilities. The current requirements in Sec. 193.2515
are similar to the incident analysis and documentation requirement at
section 18.2.2(7) of NFPA 59A-2026. However, the NFPA provision is
limited to safety-related incidents and has no minimum property damage
threshold. And though section 18.5 of NFPA 59A-2026 helpfully requires
operators to establish incident investigation procedures, the language
within that provision provides few specifics on the content that must
be included in those procedures. PHMSA proposes the following revisions
to address these concerns.
First, in paragraph (a), PHMSA proposes to expand the scope of
failure investigation requirements to include hazardous fluid releases.
Section 193.2515(a) currently limits the failure investigation
requirements to explosions, fires, LNG spills, or leaks. Adding
hazardous fluid releases to the list will promote public safety and is
consistent with the changes that PHMSA is proposing elsewhere to part
193.
Second, in paragraph (a), PHMSA proposes to expand the scope of the
failure investigation requirements to include events that occur during
commissioning or operation. This modification will ensure that
investigations cover all phases of LNG facility development and
operation and is consistent with the other changes that PHMSA is
proposing elsewhere to part 193.
Third, in paragraph (a)(2), PHMSA proposes to increase the property
damage threshold for failure investigations from the current $10,000 to
align with the incident reporting requirements in part 191. When PHMSA
introduced the property damage threshold in the failure investigation
requirements in 1980, the incident reporting criteria did not include
any comparable limitation and set a $5,000 property damage threshold
for serious leaks requiring prompt telephonic reporting.\93\ PHMSA
subsequently amended the incident reporting requirements in part 191 to
add a monetary property damage threshold, which is now adjusted on a
periodic basis to account for inflation,\94\ but has never updated the
property damage threshold at Sec. 193.2515. PHMSA proposes to address
that omission by aligning the current language at Sec. 193.2515 with
the property damage threshold for LNG facility incident reporting in
part 191. This change would account both for historic and future
inflation and address concerns expressed by some commenters in
responding to the recent ANPRMs that expanding the failure
investigation requirements to include hazard fluids releases could
significantly increase their compliance burdens with little safety
benefit.\95\
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\93\ See MTB, Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities; Federal Safety
Standards, 45 FR 70390, 70393-94 (Oct. 23, 1980).
\94\ See RSPA, Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by
Pipeline; Annual Reports and Incident Reports, 49 FR 18956 (May 3,
1984); PHMSA, Pipeline Safety: Gas Pipeline Regulatory Reform, 86 FR
2210 (Jan. 11, 2021).
\95\ See, e.g., Williams Cos., Comments on the ANPRM, Docket ID
PHMSA-2019-0091-7612.
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In a new Sec. 193.15(c), PHMSA proposes that operators maintain
investigation records for a minimum of five years. The proposed five-
year recordkeeping requirement is consistent with Sec. 193.2521, which
currently requires operators to maintain records from each inspection,
test, and investigation for a period of at least five years. NFPA 59A
requires tests, surveys, and inspection records to be maintained for
the life of the facility but does not address the retention of
investigation records. This five-year duration also aligns with the
record retention requirements for maintenance activity on components
prescribed in section 18.13.1 of NFPA 59A-2026, and the five-year
incident investigation report recordkeeping requirements in the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) process safety
management (PSM) regulations at 29 CFR 1910.119(m)(7).
C. Subpart B--LNG Facility Siting
PHMSA's siting requirements for LNG facilities date to a rulemaking
proceeding initiated in the 1970s and completed in 1980. As with the
other regulations adopted in that proceeding, PHMSA incorporated
multiple levels of conservatism into the siting requirements to address
uncertainties and limitations in the data available at that time.
Although PHMSA has updated certain aspects of those requirements over
time, including by approving more modern versions of the models used to
determine the amount of property that must be owned or controlled to
site an LNG facility at a particular location, the underlying
conservatism embodied in the 1980 regulations has remained largely
unchanged. That degree of conservatism is no longer justified given the
significant advancements in LNG safety that have occurred in the past
two decades, many of which are reflected in the enhanced safety
requirements throughout recent editions of NFPA 59A.
As discussed in more detail below, PHMSA is proposing substantial
revisions to its siting requirements to address these concerns. First,
PHMSA proposes adopting an updated version of the traditional,
prescriptive approach for siting LNG facilities. The prescriptive
approach would be consistent with the provisions in NFPA 59A-2026
chapter 5 and would serve as the default set of siting requirements.
Second, PHMSA proposes adopting a more sophisticated quantitative risk
assessment (QRA)-based approach for siting LNG facilities. The QRA-
based approach would be consistent with the provisions in NFPA 59A-2026
chapter 19 and would only apply on an elective basis.
PHMSA believes that adopting these changes would eliminate much of
the unnecessary conservatism embodied in the current regulations,
generating significant cost savings without compromising safety.
Additional information about the development of
[[Page 69347]]
PHMSA's siting regulations, and the proposed prescriptive and QRA-based
siting approaches, is provided in the following sections.
C.1. Role of Siting in PHMSA's Safety Framework
By way of background, the siting requirements in subpart B date to
a rulemaking proceeding initiated by one of PHMSA's predecessor
agencies, the Materials Transportation Board (MTB), in the late 1970s.
MTB undertook that effort to address concerns with the then-current
version of the Federal safety standards for LNG facilities, which
relied almost entirely on the provisions in a historical edition of
NFPA.\96\ MTB subsequently divided that rulemaking effort into two
different proceedings, one of which focused on establishing O&M
requirements for LNG facilities,\97\ and the other of which focused on
establishing design, construction, installation, testing, and siting
requirements for LNG facilities.\98\
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\96\ See MTB, LNG Facilities; Federal Safety Standards, 42 FR
20776, 20778 (advanced proposal Apr. 21, 1977).
\97\ See generally MTB, Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities;
Federal Safety Standards, 45 FR 70390, 70391 (Oct. 23, 1980)
(describing safety value of each of the different operations and
maintenance proposals for the new part 193).
\98\ See MTB, LNG Facilities; Federal Safety Standards, 44 FR
8142, 8151 (proposed Feb. 8, 1979) (discussing the mutually-
reinforcing and (at times) redundant layers of design, construction,
and installation requirements).
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Of particular importance for this proceeding, MTB took a very
conservative approach in both proceedings, issuing final rules in 1980
that included layers of mutually reinforcing requirements, many of
which incorporated cautious assumptions or relied on near-worst-case
scenarios selected to provide robust protective safety margins.\99\ MTB
recognized that this approach imposed significant costs on operators,
but concluded that those costs were justified by the limited historical
release data for LNG facilities and the potential consequences of an
incident.
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\99\ See RSPA, LNG Facilities: Federal Safety Standards, 45 FR
9220, 9221-92 (proposed Feb. 11, 1980) (evaluating operations and
maintenance requirements); RSPA, Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities;
New Federal Safety Standards, 45 FR 9184, 9186-87, 9195 (Feb. 11,
1980) (evaluating construction, design, installation, testing, and
siting requirements).
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The original part 193 siting regulations were a product of that
philosophy. Highlighting the lack of meaningful safety standards in
effect at the time, MTB focused on addressing the risks associated with
two hazards: (1) thermal radiation, i.e., the amount of heat that would
be produced if an LNG spill ignited and (2) vapor-gas dispersion, i.e.,
the dimensions of the vapor-gas cloud that would form as a result of an
LNG spill, which could ignite or act as an asphyxiant.\100\ MTB
proposed an inherently conservative approach employed in regulating
other high-consequence industrial facilities to address these risks.
MTB required owners or operators to exercise control over an
``exclusion zone,'' i.e., a buffer area around an LNG facility that
could not be accessed by the public.\101\
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\100\ MTB, LNG Facilities; Federal Safety Standards, 42 FR 20776
(advanced proposal Apr. 21, 1977).
\101\ Notably, exclusion area boundaries employed in the context
of commercial nuclear power facilities pursuant to 10 CFR 100.11,
which were often characterized as posing similarly high-consequence
public safety risks to those posed by LNG facilities. See, e.g.,
Comptroller General, Report No. EMD78-28, Liquefied Energy Gases
Safety, Vol. 1, at 21-5 (July 31, 1978).
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To provide broad safety margins, MTB required operators to use
conservative assumptions (e.g., emissive heat flux, flame length, flame
tilt angle, and radiant heat exposure levels; neglect of active
mitigation measures; assumption of 100 percent fatality or harm within
exclusion zones) in calculating the extent of the exclusion zone for
thermal radiation. The calculation needed to be made either by using a
simple, default mathematical model that would yield ``conservatively
safe exclusion zone[s]'' or by using an alternative, MTB-approved model
that incorporated ``additional and more valid information when it
becomes available.'' \102\ MTB employed a similar approach in setting
the boundaries of the exclusion zone for flammable vapor-gas
dispersion, requiring the use of near-worst case assumptions (e.g., a
uniform concentration of methane half its actual lower flammable limit
(LFL); default worst-case wind and atmospheric stability and design
spill parameters) in response to an ignition scenario that MTB admitted
was far less likely than the localized fire risk addressed in its
thermal radiation hazard analysis.\103\ This approach addressed
probability of release characteristics and operating conditions by
selecting assumptions MTB judged appropriately conservative in light of
occurrence frequency and potential consequence magnitude.
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\102\ See MTB, LNG Facilities; Federal Safety Standards, 44 FR
8142, 8149-50 (proposed Feb. 8, 1979); RSPA, Liquefied Natural Gas
Facilities; New Federal Safety Standards, 45 FR 9184, 9191-94 (Feb.
11, 1980); MTB, Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities; Reconsideration of
Safety Standards for Siting, Design, and Construction, 45 FR 57402,
57406-08 (Aug. 28, 1980).
\103\ See MTB, LNG Facilities; Federal Safety Standards, 44 FR
8142, 8150-51 (proposed Feb. 8, 1979); RSPA, Liquefied Natural Gas
Facilities; New Federal Safety Standards, 45 FR 9184, 9195 (Feb. 11,
1980); MTB, Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities; Reconsideration of
Safety Standards for Siting, Design, and Construction, 45 FR 57401,
57047 (Aug. 28, 1980).
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Although subject to minor adjustments over time, the underlying
approach of layering conservativism upon conservatism is still embodied
in the current siting regulations. Subsequent rulemakings have adopted
newer, and more accurate, models for calculating exclusion zones--even
as they rejected stakeholder calls to update some of the conservative
parameters that had been employed in addressing historical
uncertainties.\104\ PHMSA has continued to rely on legacy editions of
NFPA 59A that incorporate additional layers of conservatism within the
modeling of hazard distances (which subpart B regulations then
translate into exclusion zones). Specifically, subpart B has since 2004
referenced NFPA 59A-2001 chapter 2's prescriptive siting requirements,
which employ many of the conservative assumptions for modeling thermal
radiation (section 2.2.3.2) and flammable vapor-gas (sections 2.2.3.3
and 2.2.3.4) hazards that PHMSA's predecessors had previously adopted
in regulation.\105\ In other places where NFPA 59A-2001 departed from
historical, conservative modeling assumptions, PHMSA and its
predecessors either retained those assumptions in subpart B text or
supplemented them in FAQs.\106\ These extra layers of conservatism
affect the design and layout of LNG facilities, either by constraining
the configuration or spacing of components and systems within a site or
requiring the installation of additional onsite mitigation measures
(e.g., vapor shields) to accommodate the exclusion zone requirements.
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\104\ See RSPA, Liquefied Natural Gas Regulations--Miscellaneous
Amendments, 62 FR 8402 (Feb. 27, 1997) (adopting the LNGFIRE I
computer model for thermal radiation hazards and the DEGADIS model
for flammable vapor dispersion hazards); RPSA, Pipeline Safety:
Incorporation of Standard NFPA 59A in the Liquefied Natural Gas
Regulations, 65 FR 10950, 10952-53 (Mar. 1, 2000) (adopting LNGFIRE
III for thermal radiation modeling while rejecting less demanding
thermal radiation wind speed and flammable vapor cloud explosive
limit assumptions).
\105\ Sec. Sec. 193.2051, 2057(a), 2059(a).
\106\ See, e.g., Sec. 193.2059(b)(1) (assuming a safety factor
of 2--or a 2.5 percent concentration of methane--when calculating
hazard distances for flammable vapor cloud dispersion). PHMSA
initially issued its LNG FAQs March 2014, and has supplemented or
revised them ten times since, most recently in September 2025. PHMSA
notes that even as it is proposing to discard some of the historical
assumptions in LNG FAQs, operators would retain discretion to use
those conservative, proven assumptions going forward as appropriate
for their facility.
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Finally, PHMSA and its predecessors have supplemented the subpart B
exclusion zone framework with additional siting requirements. For
[[Page 69348]]
example, RSPA's incorporation by reference in 2004 of the siting
requirements within chapter 2 of NFPA 59A-2001 introduced prescriptive
requirements covering everything from soil and geotechnical site
investigation (section 2.1.4) to process equipment spacing (section
2.2.6). PHMSA has also read broad language at section 2.1.1(d) of NFPA
59A-2001 to require operators to consider ``[o]ther [siting-related]
factors,'' including releases of hazardous fluids other than LNG, in
conducting their exclusion zone analyses.\107\ These changes, when
combined with the inherent conservatism used in developing the
exclusion zone requirements, have resulted in a siting regime for LNG
facilities that no longer appropriately reflects the risks to public
safety, particularly given the significant advancements in industry
standards and practices that have occurred in the past four decades.
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\107\ LNG FAQs, H1-H3. The expansion of part 193 siting
requirements over time has been accompanied by expansion of other
part 193 elements enhancing defense-in-depth from the safety risks
of releases.
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C.2. Prescriptive Siting Requirements (NFPA 59A-2026, Chapter 5)
This rulemaking proposes to modernize PHMSA's default, prescriptive
siting requirements in subpart B. These requirements are currently
governed by a patchwork of industry standards, part 193 regulatory
provisions, and non-binding guidance--all of which magnify the inherent
conservatism already provided through the other requirements (design,
installation, testing, construction, operations, and maintenance) in
part 193. Although the LNG industry has an excellent safety record as
discussed in section II.A.3.c above, PHMSA does not agree that the
conservative approach traditionally used in the siting requirements is
necessary to maintain that level of safety. Rather, PHMSA believes that
a more modern approach consistent with the enhanced safety provisions
in NFPA 59A-2026 can be used to determine whether an LNG facility can
be safely sited at a particular location.
PHMSA therefore proposes to incorporate by reference into subpart B
the prescriptive siting requirements in chapter 5 of NFPA 59A-2026.
Those requirements would serve as the default siting provisions in lieu
of the current reference to chapter 2 of NFPA 59A-2001. PHMSA also
proposes to supplement the provisions in NFPA 59A-2026 chapter 5 with a
handful of additional regulatory requirements in subpart B. Adopting
these changes would align the siting requirements with the latest
hazard modeling techniques and current standards and practices in the
LNG industry. In addition, PHMSA proposes to codify or to eliminate
current non-binding guidance on LNG facility siting to improve
regulatory certainty and to reduce unnecessary compliance burdens.
PHMSA expects the proposed changes to the default, prescriptive siting
requirements in subpart B will reduce public safety risks, particularly
when combined with the other safety-enhancing proposals discussed
elsewhere in this NPRM.
a. Sections 193.101 and 193.103(a)--Improved Hazard Modeling Under NFPA
59A-2026
PHMSA proposes to incorporate by reference into new Sec. Sec.
193.101 and 193.103 certain enhanced hazard assessment and modeling
requirements from chapter 5 of NFPA-2026. Specifically, PHMSA proposes
to incorporate sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, and 5.3.2 of NFPA 59A-2026 into
these regulations, subject to certain exceptions and supplemental
provisions as discussed below. PHMSA proposes to incorporate by
reference into other subparts of part 193 provisions in chapter 5 of
NFPA 59A-2026 that are better understood as design, rather than siting,
requirements. PHMSA's discussion of those proposals is included in
section IV.D of this NPRM.
The hazard modeling requirements in subpart B are currently based
on the provisions in chapter 2 of NFPA 59A-2001 and certain additional
regulatory requirements. NFPA 59A-2001 at section 2.1.1(d)--and, by
extension, PHMSA's subpart B regulations at Sec. 193.2051--requires
operators to evaluate all ``factors . . . that have a bearing on the
safety of plant personnel and the surrounding public'' when siting a
new LNG facility or making significant expansions or other alterations
to an existing LNG facility. PHMSA guidance at LNG FAQ H1 characterizes
that regulatory language as requiring evaluation of releases from
systems containing any hazardous fluid.
In addition, Sec. 193.2051 requires operators to consider the
effects of failure of certain equipment (e.g., storage tank
penetrations, piping ruptures) resulting in the release of LNG in
conducting a siting analysis. The specific LNG releases that must be
considered, otherwise known as ``design spills,'' generally reflect
industry understanding of (in some cases) worst-case, plausible
failures based on historical data. Sections 193.2057 and 193.2059
require operators to use certain models to predict the extent of the
thermal radiation and flammable vapor-gas dispersion that would result
from such a failure. The models, authorized by regulation or approved
by PHMSA after an evaluation, calculate ``hazard distances'' bounding a
``hazard footprint'' at certain prescribed thresholds or ``endpoints.''
\108\ NFPA 59A-2001 (at sections 2.2.3.2 and 2.2.3.3) assigns
escalating safety requirements based on the magnitude of safety
consequence associated with different endpoints. Operators must
establish (or otherwise maintain) legal control of all activities
within hazard footprints bounded by endpoints correlating to the most
consequential risks: fatality and irreversible harm. The exclusion zone
requirements in subpart B incorporate these concepts from NFPA 59A-
2001.
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\108\ <a href="https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/liquified-natural-gas/lng-exclusion-zones">https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/liquified-natural-gas/lng-exclusion-zones</a>. PHMSA has developed model evaluation protocols
(MEPs) for source term calculation, flammable vapor cloud dispersion
hazards, toxic vapor cloud dispersion hazards, vapor cloud explosion
hazards, and boiling liquid expanding vapor cloud explosion hazards.
PHMSA expects to issue an MEP for thermal radiation hazards in
spring 2026.
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The hazard modeling requirements in chapter 5 of NFPA 59A-2026 are
more advanced than the comparable provisions in NFPA 59A-2001, improve
subpart B's hazard analyses with the risk profiles of modern facilities
(many of which can contain large quantities of hazardous fluids other
than LNG), and provide a more robust evaluation of hazard phenomena.
For example, rather than providing that operators merely ``consider''
unspecified siting-related factors potentially affecting safety as
provided by NFPA 59A-2001, NFPA 59A-2026 section 5.2.1 specifies
illustrative factors (process hazards, security threats, adjacent
facility hazards, weather and geological conditions, and safety
measures incorporated in facility design and operational practices) for
operators to consider in conducting site evaluations. In addition,
section 5.3.2.13 of NFPA 59A-2026 provides more detailed requirements
for qualitative consideration of the potential for cascading damage
than the analogous provisions in section 2.2.3.6 of NFPA 59A-2001.\109\
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\109\ Although PHMSA has approved an MEP and MVD for boiling
liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) hazards, PHMSA understands
that neither NFPA 59A-2026 chapter 5, nor Sec. 193.103 as proposed
in this NPRM, necessarily require operators to model such hazards.
Nor would each operator need to address the BLEVE hazards
qualitatively in its siting evaluation pursuant to Sec. 193.103
unless the characteristics of its facility suggest that the
probability of a BLEVE hazard merits discussion among other
cascading damage scenarios as required by NFPA 59A-2026 section
5.3.2.13. PHMSA understands that the probability of BLEVEs at LNG
facilities is typically low and would in any event be exemplary of
cascading damage rather than an independent hazard; as such, the
probability (and consequence magnitude) associated with BLEVEs would
also be mitigated by the suite of part 193 defense-in-depth
requirements. PHMSA also understands the more specific language in
those NFPA 59A-2026 provisions must be understood against a rule of
reason: operators' written siting evaluations could briefly and
qualitatively reference information on the factors identified within
other documentation supporting regulatory compliance or approvals
for their facilities without having to include an exhaustive
(quantitative or qualitative) evaluation of those or other factors
within a siting analysis.
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[[Page 69349]]
Chapter 5 of NFPA 59A-2026 expands the requirements for hazard
modeling as well. Rather than requiring that operators ``consider''
most releases of LNG and other hazardous fluids, section 5.3.2.1 of
NFPA 59A-2026 explicitly requires modeling of additional hazards
(including overpressure effects from vapor cloud explosions (VCEs),
toxic effects from toxic vapor dispersion, and thermal radiation
effects from fireballs) from releases of hazardous fluids generally.
Chapter 5 also provides that such modeling should be informed by
specific endpoints correlating to fatality and irreversible harm for
each of these new hazard modeling requirements.\110\
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\110\ PHMSA solicits stakeholder comment on whether existing
hazard modeling focused on thermal radiation and flammable vapor
cloud dispersion provides adequate protection of public safety such
that its proposed expansion of modeling to account for new hazards
as contemplated by NFPA 59A-2026 would be unnecessary. PHMSA also
solicits comment on the appropriateness of the NFPA 59A-2026
endpoints for each of the hazards for which that standard requires
modeling. Finally, PHMSA solicits stakeholder comment on whether and
to what extent any new hazard modeling requirement should be limited
based on the quantity or type of hazardous fluids other than LNG
present at a particular facility.
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b. Enhancements on NFPA 59A-2026 Hazard Modeling Requirements
PHMSA proposes a series of additional enhancements to the expanded
hazard modeling requirements of chapter 5 of NFPA 59A-2026 through
targeted subpart B provisions that are intended to address safety risks
and lessons learned from recent LNG facility incidents, to ensure
continuity with longstanding PHMSA guidance, and to facilitate
implementation by operators.
Section 193.103(a)--Siting Package Submission
Consistent with the documentation requirements at NFPA 59A-2026
section 5.2.2, PHMSA proposes to codify LNG FAQ G7, which directs
operators to submit a Design Spill Package to PHMSA with engineering
drawings, piping and instrument drawings, reports from hazard analyses
(including an exclusion zone), and similar items that will inform its
review of siting analyses. In codifying this requirement, PHMSA
proposes a comprehensive list of information needed in ensuring
compliance with subpart B to provide additional regulatory certainty.
PHMSA expects that, when submitting the information specified in Sec.
193.103(a), operators will provide it in the form and manner consistent
with LNG FAQ DS3.
PHMSA has clarified in its proposed regulatory text codifying the
LNG FAQ DS3 submission requirement that operators must submit a written
assessment of the effect of active and passive mitigation measures on
their hazard analysis. PHMSA acknowledges that operators and hazard
modeling practitioners are generally in the best position to identify
precisely how a particular mitigation measure will affect the risk
profile of an LNG facility. PHMSA will exercise continuing regulatory
oversight in reviewing operator submissions.
Section 193.103(b)--Design Spill Criteria
PHMSA proposes to codify in Sec. 193.103(b) the design spill
criteria in LNG FAQ DS2 in lieu of the analogous criteria in Table
5.3.2.3 of NFPA 59A-2026. PHMSA's experience is that the undefined term
``single accidental leakage source'' (SALS) at Table 2.2.3.5 of NFPA
59A-2001 (for spills from process and transfer systems) has been a
source of confusion. PHMSA, FERC, and NFPA have developed a series of
clarifications characterizing (in some cases) worst-case, plausible
spills from different types of transfer and process systems, including
the design spill criteria in current LNG FAQs DS2(A) (hole size on
process & transfer systems), DS2(B) (full-bore ruptures of single-ply
construction expansion bellows), DS2(C) (hole size for pipe-in-pipe
systems), and DS2(D) (hole size for truck transfer hoses). Each of
these assumptions has been employed in subpart B siting analyses for
multiple LNG facilities in the last decade.
First, LNG FAQ DS2(A) provides that a design spill should assume
full-bore (or guillotine break) ruptures on transfer and process piping
with a diameter less than six inches (i.e., assuming a hole equal to
the diameter of the pipe), while operators need only assume a two-inch
hole on piping of six inches in diameter and larger. This line-drawing
is based on identifying the largest plausible failures on such piping,
since historical failure data demonstrates that full-bore ruptures are
plausible failure modes on smaller piping, but not on large piping--
failures of two inches or smaller hole size represent most of all
failure data on piping of six inches or larger. PHMSA acknowledges that
NFPA 59A-2026 (at section 5.3.2.3, referencing Table 5.3.2.3) employs
different assumptions requiring full-bore ruptures only for piping
smaller than three inches in diameter. Having objected to that
provision during the standards development process as inconsistent with
the results of PHMSA research,\111\ PHMSA proposes to adopt the
criteria in LNG FAQ DS2(A) instead of the provisions in Table 5.2.3.2
of NFPA 59A-2026.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\ Gas Tech. Inst. (GTI), Contract No. DTPH56-15-T-00008,
Statistical Review and Gap Analysis of LNG Failure Rate Table (Jan.
2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, NFPA 59A-2001 does not include provisions for cryogenic PIP
technology, and more recent editions of NFPA 59A exempt PIP transfer
systems from the design spill requirements in favor of using (in Table
6.3.1) setback distances. PHMSA recommends in its LNG FAQ DS2(C) that
operators evaluate design spills from a one-inch hole on all PIP
transfer systems, regardless of diameter. That design spill parameter
reflects PHMSA's understanding that, while unlikely, releases from PIP
transfer systems are nevertheless possible--as evinced by the failure
of such a system in the 2022 Freeport incident. PHMSA therefore
proposes to codify its one-inch hole design spill requirement for PIP
transfer systems within the new Sec. 193.103(b).\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ PHMSA is not proposing codification of other prescriptive
criteria in LNG FAQs DS2(C)(1)-(3) addressed in provisions of NFPA
59A-2026 setting forth design requirements for pipe-in-pipe systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, for single-ply construction expansion bellows and truck
transfer hoses, PHMSA proposes to codify at the new Sec. 193.103(b)
current guidance in LNG FAQ DS2(B) and (C). That guidance requires
modeling of a hole size equivalent to a full-bore rupture for all
single-ply construction expansion bellows and truck transfer hoses,
regardless of diameter. PHMSA understands these conservative
assumptions are warranted as single-ply construction expansion bellows
and truck transfer hoses are less robust components with a higher
likelihood of full-bore ruptures than fixed piping of equivalent size.
Moreover, a fatal incident in September 2023 in Toppenish, Washington,
in which a full-bore rupture occurred after a transfer hose detached as
a truck pulled away from an LNG facility during transfer operations,
demonstrates the
[[Page 69350]]
importance of adopting this modeling requirement.\113\
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\113\ Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Cascade Nat. Gas Co.,
Docket No. PG-230800, Compl., at ] 16 (Mar. 27, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 193.103(c)--Models for Calculating Source Terms and Hazard
Footprints Reviewed Against PHMSA Reference Materials
PHMSA proposes to consolidate and to enhance within a new Sec.
193.103(c) current guidance at LNG FAQs H6 and H7 for the modeling of
release source terms (the characterization of immediate-post release
parameters) and hazard footprints. Specifically, PHMSA proposes to
require that operators perform source term calculation and hazard
modeling pursuant to computer programs reviewed against PHMSA-approved
MEPs and data sets (MVDs). PHMSA understands that evaluation of those
computer models by a software developer or a facility operator (rather
than PHMSA) against PHMSA-approved MEPs and MVDs will satisfy the
comparable provisions in NFPA 59A-2026 at sections 5.3.2.6 and 5.3.2.7.
Subpart B initially required the use of certain specific models for
calculating endpoints (and, by extension, hazard footprints) for
thermal radiation and flammable vapor-gas hazards from LNG
releases.\114\ RSPA subsequently revised subpart B to allow approval of
alternative hazard models,\115\ and sections 193.2057(a) and
193.2059(a) provide criteria that inform such reviews. Subpart B does
not prescribe an analogous process for reviewing and approving source
term models.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ MTB, Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: New Federal Safety
Standards, 45 FR 9184 (Feb. 11, 1980) (codifying Sec. Sec.
193.2057(c) (thermal exclusion zones) and 193.2059(c) (flammable
vapor-gas exclusion zones)).
\115\ See RSPA, Incorporation of NFPA 59A in the Liquefied
Natural Gas Regulations, 65 FR 10950 (Mar. 1, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To address that gap, PHMSA has provided guidance in the form of an
Advisory Bulletin (ADB-10-07) and LNG FAQs (initially H5-H6) for model
developers to use in seeking PHMSA approval of flammable vapor cloud
dispersion models evaluated against MEPs and experimental data.\116\
PHMSA declined in LNG FAQ H7 to prescribe particular software for
calculating source terms for flammable vapor-gas dispersion hazards.
PHMSA has continued to work with subject matter experts to develop MEPs
and MVDs appropriate for use in reviewing and approving computer models
for calculating source terms and hazard footprints with respect to each
of the hazards identified in NFPA 59A-2026 section 5.3.2.1. PHMSA's
website provides links to those MEPs and the MVD data sets against
which the MEPs require models be validated.\117\ PHMSA's website also
lists the handful of alternative models approved for use in modeling
flammable vapor-gas dispersion hazards--each of which were approved
only after protracted delay.\118\ To date, no one has sought PHMSA
approval for software for calculating source terms or for use in
modeling other hazards identified in section 5.3.2.1 of NFPA 59A-2026.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ See PHMSA, ADB-10-07, Obtaining Approval for Alternative
Vapor-Gas Dispersion Models, 75 FR 33771 (Aug. 31, 2010); LNG FAQs,
H5-H6 (Dec. 7, 2015). ADB-10-07 was itself the result of extensive
work effort by PHMSA and subject matter experts within the Federal
Government and industry on developing robust MEPs and MVDs.
\117\ <a href="https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/liquified-natural-gas/lng-exclusion-zones">https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/liquified-natural-gas/lng-exclusion-zones</a>.
\118\ PHMSA review of each of the three alternative models
listed on its web page lasted a year or longer--with one (Phast 8.4)
review lasting nearly three years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA proposes to establish a developer-and-operator-led review and
approval process at Sec. 193.103(c). Software developers will need to
review source term and hazard modeling software against the PHMSA-
approved MEPs and MVDs; however, such software will no longer require
explicit PHMSA approval before use.\119\ This approach will ensure the
more efficient use of PHMSA's limited resources. PHMSA notes this
concern about diversion of resources is particularly acute given this
NPRM's proposed expansion of modeling requirements to hazards that had
formerly only been addressed qualitatively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\ In the interests of regulatory certainty, PHMSA does not
propose that Sec. 193.103(c) would be construed either (1) to
require operators to re-validate their computer models should the
MEP or MVD for a particular hazard be updated during regulatory
review (either in preliminary or final design phases) or subsequent
construction and pre-operational phases of a project; or (2) to
prohibit operators from validating their computer models against
older versions of PHMSA-approved MEPs or MVDs unless PHMSA
explicitly prohibits the use of older versions of the MEPs or MVDs
when approving updated versions of the same. Should the continued
use of a historical MEP or MVD entail unacceptable safety risk,
PHMSA (or another cognizant regulatory authority) may exercise its
statutory authority to restrict the use of that particular MEP or
MVD either generically or in connection with a specific LNG facility
project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA also expects that its proposed approach will encourage
industry investment in more sophisticated source term and hazard models
by eliminating the delays associated with the PHMSA review and approval
process, which have served as a barrier to innovation and investment.
PHMSA does not expect this approach to have an adverse effect on public
safety. Each source term and hazard model would still need to be
evaluated by operators against robust, PHMSA-approved, hazard-specific
MEPs and comprehensive MVDs, and PHMSA--as well as other (Federal or
State) regulators--will continue to have the ability to take
appropriate action through the enforcement and oversight process to
address any safety concerns.
Lastly, PHMSA acknowledges that pertinent language in NFPA 59A-2026
(at sections 5.3.2.6 and 5.3.2.7) and within the MEPs and MVDs reflect
the existing Sec. 190.9 approval process. Should this proposal be
adopted, PHMSA will interpret those provisions of NFPA 59A-2026 and its
MEPs and MVDs as if they memorialized this updated approach. In
parallel, PHMSA will work with other stakeholders to ensure that each
of NFPA 59A and its MEPs and MVDs are updated to conform with revised
regulatory text.
Section 193.103(d)--Cloud Height for Vapor Dispersion Modeling
PHMSA proposes to retain, but to redesignate as a new Sec.
193.103(d), language at existing Sec. 193.2059(b)(3) requiring that
operators use an elevation parameter of 0.5 meters when modeling vapor
dispersion hazard footprints. This requirement ensures that vapor
dispersion modeling focuses on impacts at ground level where members of
the public will be located. NFPA 59A-2026 chapter 5 does not address
this modeling consideration. Accordingly, PHMSA proposes to maintain
the existing requirement.
Section 193.103(e)--Modeling Duration for Vapor Dispersion
PHMSA proposes to adopt within a new Sec. 193.103(e) the duration
assumptions for modeling flammable vapor cloud dispersion hazards in
LNG FAQ DS8(B). Pursuant to section 5.3.2.4 of NFPA 59A-2026, design
spill duration can be capped at 10 minutes--and potentially less when
an LNG facility is equipped with automatic shutdown systems--consistent
with an expectation that vapor clouds will typically reach a maximum
extent well before 10 minutes following initiation of a spill. But
vapor clouds may continue expanding after the 10-minute spill duration
ends in certain scenarios (e.g., spills from long and large-bore piping
with widely spaced isolation valves, or from process and storage
vessels). Therefore, PHMSA proposes to qualify incorporation by
reference of NFPA 59A-2026 section 5.3.2.4 to require operators
continue flammable and toxic vapor dispersion simulation modeling until
the vapor cloud reaches its maximum extent--even if that is longer than
the design spill duration.
[[Page 69351]]
Notwithstanding this regulatory language, PHMSA expects operators may
continue to use a 10-minute modeling cut-off time as a placeholder
during the preliminary design phase, since the final modeling will
depend on factors that are determined later in the design process.
Section 193.103(f)--Uncertainty Factors for Hazard Modeling
Subpart B regulations do not prescribe a safety factor for use in
modeling thermal radiation hazards. In contrast, subpart B regulations
at Sec. 193.2059(b)(1) require that operators incorporate a safety
factor in calculating flammable vapor-gas dispersion footprints:
operator modeling of flammable vapor-gas hazards must be based not on
the LFL of methane (5.0 percent concentration in air), but half of that
value--2.5 percent methane concentration in air (or a safety factor of
``2''). The LFL safety factor of 2 was consistent with then-current
edition of NFPA 59A when adopted in 1980 and addressed historical
concerns with the limitations of contemporaneous modeling
approaches.\120\ But subsequent NFPA 59A editions no longer incorporate
a specific, universally-applicable safety factor,\121\ and the PHMSA-
approved MEPs contain a methodology for calculating model-specific
uncertainty factors based on evaluation of a model results against
experimental data within PHMSA-approved MVDs--an approach consistent
with NFPA 59A-2026 section 5.3.2.12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ See MTB, Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: New Federal
Safety Standards, 45 FR 9184, 9185 (Feb. 11, 1980).
\121\ See, e.g., RSPA, Incorporation of NFPA 59A in the
Liquefied Natural Gas Regulations, 65 FR 10950, 10953 (Mar. 1,
2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA proposes to adopt at a new Sec. 193.103(f) a requirement to
use uncertainty factors derived from application of PHMSA-approved MEPs
and MVDs. That approach is consistent with the comparable provisions in
NFPA 59A-2026. PHMSA expects that the robust, hazard-specific
evaluation processes and data sets for calculation of uncertainty
factors will ensure adequate conservatism in the calculation of hazard
endpoints. PHMSA also expects that software developers will have a
commercial incentive to improve the accuracy of their computer models
to capture increasingly lower uncertainty factors after evaluation
against PHMSA-approved MEPs and MVDs.
Section 193.103(g)--Consideration of Active Mitigation Measures in
Hazard Modeling
PHMSA proposes a new Sec. 193.103(g) adopting the approach in
section 5.3.2.2.1 of NFPA 59A-2026 for adjusting calculated hazard
endpoints to reflect the installation of active mitigation measures.
PHMSA has historically allowed operators to adjust modeled hazard
endpoints to reflect certain passive design features (e.g., vapor
fences). But PHMSA has been reluctant to allow an adjustment for active
mitigation measures, an issue not addressed in NFPA 59A-2001.\122\
Subsequent editions of NFPA 59A (including NFPA 59A-2026) permit
operators to take credit for active mitigation measures in calculating
hazard footprints.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\ See LNG FAQ, H8. PHMSA acknowledges that some ``active''
mitigation measures may involve both procedural elements requiring
human intervention as well as design (passive) elements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA therefore proposes within a new Sec. 193.103(g) a process
for considering active mitigation measures in calculating hazard
footprints. This updated approach should align calculated hazard
footprints more appropriately with genuine risks and incentivize
operators to deploy novel, robust mitigation measures enhancing
safety--a particularly valuable result given that PHMSA is elsewhere
proposing to expand its hazard modeling requirements to address new
hazards (e.g., toxic vapor dispersion) that may warrant different
mitigation strategies.
PHMSA has drafted Sec. 193.103(g) to ensure that consideration of
active mitigation measures in hazard modeling will be based on a sound,
proven basis consistent with evolution of industry best practices and
lessons learned. Specifically, the proposal would require each active
mitigation measure to be incorporated into the documentation submitted
to PHMSA in the Sec. 193.103(a) siting package. Adequate supporting
documentation could consist of test or experimental results, reference
to the use of the same or a similar active mitigation measure at
another LNG facility, or a special permit issued either for that or
another facility.\123\ Although this may place a burden on first
adopters of active mitigation measures, PHMSA expects that burden to be
reduced for subsequent users of the same measures, because PHMSA will
have already considered whether and how an active mitigation measure
should be accounted for in hazard modeling. Adequate supporting
documentation could also reference any active mitigation measures
accounted for in calculating exclusion zones for approved LNG
facilities pursuant to the alternative QRA-based approach in proposed
Sec. 193.107. PHMSA expects that this requirement will ensure that use
of active mitigation techniques within Sec. 193.103 hazard modeling
will be supported by robust quantification of the safety value of such
measures that have been endorsed by a cognizant regulatory authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\ PHMSA will also consider stakeholder input on whether it
should accept active mitigation measures for releases of certain
(specifically, toxic chemicals appearing in an LNG facility)
hazardous fluids incorporated into offsite consequence analyses
supporting EPA-approved risk management plans pursuant to 49 CFR
part 68.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lastly, PHMSA will (as discussed above) defer to an operator's
assessment of precisely how an active mitigation measure would affect
the performance (or output) of its hazard modeling, provided such
assessment is documented in the siting package as contemplated by Sec.
193.103(a). Operators--and not PHMSA--are generally best-positioned to
evaluate the facility-specific factors (including, but not limited to,
the characteristics of the hazard and the technical/operational
practicability and cost of mitigation measures) demonstrating the value
of particular mitigation measures.
c. Rescission of LNG FAQs and Miscellaneous Clarifications of NFPA 59A-
2026 Hazard Modeling Boundaries
PHMSA proposes to rescind its LNG FAQs if the proposals in this
NPRM are adopted in a final rule. Some of those LNG FAQs (in
particular, those discussed above) will be redundant with, or
superseded by, changes in the hazard modeling methods provided for in
the revised subpart B. Other LNG FAQs prescribe a one-size-fits-all
(and, in some cases, worst-case) approach on the choice of hazard
evaluation parameters that may not resemble plausible release scenarios
for particular facilities or hazards.\124\ In lieu of following those
parameters, operators should adhere to provisions in NFPA 59A-2026; for
other parameters on which NFPA 59A-2026 is silent or explicitly allows
flexibility, operators should use sound engineering judgment in
selecting plausible, conservative parameters and document their
reasoning as required by proposed
[[Page 69352]]
Sec. 193.103(a) and NFPA 59A-2026 section 5.2.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ Among those LNG FAQs are those demanding the use of high-
consequence assumptions regarding hole size (DS4), release height
and location (DS5), release location (DS6), process conditions
(DS7), system inventory (DS8), and pump configuration and operation
(DS10-11).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA discusses below two issues regarding the scope of subpart B
hazard modeling analyses that merit additional clarification.
Exemption of Feed Gas and Send-Out Gas Lines From Subpart B Hazard
Modeling
LNG facilities are typically connected to pipelines that either
supply gas for liquefaction (called ``feed gas'' lines) or receive gas
after regasification (called ``send out'' lines). These pipelines are
collectively referred to as ``supply lines'' and have historically been
considered subject to PHMSA's part 192 requirements rather than its
part 193 regulations (and by extension, NFPA 59A). Although neither
NFPA 59A-2001 nor current subpart B regulations address the boundary
between these regulatory regimes, PHMSA's practice has been to give
operators discretion in designating the precise boundary--the ``spec
break''--where each of the part 192 and 193 regulatory regimes would
begin to apply. Operators in practice have typically chosen the first
aboveground segment of a supply line within the LNG facility boundary
as the ``spec break'' marking the boundary of part 193 regulations.
This approach is consistent with the practical realities that most
modeled hazards are pertinent to aboveground (rather than buried)
piping and that operators are unlikely to have legal control of areas
outside the property lines of their facilities as may be required if
they were to draw exclusion zones as supply piping crossed into their
facility.
Consistent with that historical practice, NFPA 59A-2026 at section
5.3.2.1 (as well as section 1.1.2(6)) now explicitly excludes ``feed
gas and send out gas lines'' from hazard modeling requirements--but
remains silent regarding the meaning of those terms. PHMSA proposes to
continue its current policy of deferring to operators in determining
the precise boundary between part 193-regulated piping (which would be
subject to subpart B hazard modeling requirements) and part 192-
regulated as supply lines (which would not be subject to subpart B
hazard modeling requirements). This approach ensures continuity with
PHMSA's historical approach, which has proven effective in ensuring
public safety. Because PHMSA is merely affirming its longstanding
approach on this issue, PHMSA does not propose regulatory text
memorializing that understanding.
d. Sections 193.5 and 193.105--Retention of Exclusion Zone Framework
and Extension to Newly Modeled Hazards
PHMSA proposes in redesignated and revised Sec. Sec. 193.5 and
193.105 to apply the subpart B ``exclusion zone'' framework to
additional hazards. Consistent with the current definition of
``exclusion zone'' at Sec. 193.2007, an operator or a governmental
authority would be required by the redesignated Sec. 193.5 to have
legal control for the life of an LNG facility over activities within
certain modeled hazards' footprints--not merely at initial siting as
contemplated by the letter of NFPA 59A-2026. PHMSA also proposes to
codify at Sec. 193.105(b) longstanding and common-sense guidance
providing certain exceptions to the Sec. 193.5 requirement that an
operator or a governmental authority maintain legal control over all
activities within certain hazard footprints. Specifically, LNG FAQ H5
recognizes exceptions to the default legal control requirement--for
exclusion zones that would otherwise extend past a property line onto a
public road or a navigable waterway--as a concession to the practical
reality that legal control may not be possible in some cases and may
not meaningfully contribute to safety given that those areas are not
typically locations of prolonged activity by individuals.
In addition, PHMSA proposes a new Sec. 193.105 that would
reference NFPA 59A-2026 provisions providing for exclusion zones based
on the modeled thermal radiation and flammable vapor dispersion hazard
footprints, similar to current regulations at Sec. Sec. 193.2057 and
193.2059. PHMSA also proposes that Sec. 193.105 would extend PHMSA's
traditional exclusion zone framework to the newly modeled hazards
discussed above. This proposed expansion will ensure LNG facilities are
sited in a manner minimizing risk to nearby commercial, residential, or
sensitive establishments.
PHMSA proposes in Sec. 193.105(a) to limit extension of its
exclusion zone approach to some hazard endpoints that are newly modeled
and that correlate to the most compelling risks of fatality or
irreversible harm. Other, less consequential hazard endpoints will be
subject to the occupancy and other restrictions set forth in tables
(Tables 5.2.9, 5.2.10, and 5.2.11) in NFPA 59A-2026. For toxic vapor
dispersion, exclusion zones and occupancy restrictions will (consistent
with the approach taken in the quantitative risk assessment siting
framework at NFPA 59A-2026 Table 19.8.4.1.1) be based on exposure times
of one hour or less for each of AEGL-2 and AEGL-3. Longer exposure
times for AEGL-2 and AEGL-3, as well as all AEGL-1 exposure times,
would require development of public notification procedures in
consultation with applicable State and local emergency response
organizations that are consistent with LNG facility emergency response
plans.
Extension of the exclusion zone approach to lower consequence (or,
for AEGL-2 and AEGL-3, duration-determined) endpoints as contemplated
by NFPA 59A-2026 could provide additional safety margin; however, PHMSA
expects any incremental benefits would not outweigh the potentially
significant additional compliance costs for several reasons. First, the
particular public safety risks at issue are either less severe or more
contingent (e.g., for AEGL-2 and AEGL-3, time intervals allowing for
public notification and evacuation/sheltering) than the acute fatality
and irreversible harm risks associated with endpoints to which PHMSA
proposes extension of its exclusion zone framework. Second, the
incremental safety benefit from broader application of exclusion zones
would likely be mitigated by the universe of other elements (e.g.,
exclusion zones for other hazards; design, construction, O&M
requirements) providing defense-in-depth from public safety risks.
Third, should the characteristics of any particular LNG facility
warrant broader exclusion zones, other regulatory authorities (e.g.,
FERC within certificate conditions) may apply such requirements on an
as-needed basis.
PHMSA has not compared the differences between the size of the
exclusion zones that would be produced under the current regulations at
Sec. Sec. 193.2057 and 193.2059 and changes proposed in the NPRM.
PHMSA expects that some of the changes (e.g., codification of
conservative FAQ design spill assumptions) may increase the size of
exclusion zones for currently modeled hazards, while others (e.g.,
consideration of active mitigation measures) may reduce them. The
cumulative effect of any such changes will turn on the unique
characteristics of each LNG facility and the results of computer models
for source term and hazard footprint calculation that PHMSA has not yet
reviewed.
PHMSA also understands that a before-and-after comparison would
provide a poor measure of the safety impact of the proposed amendments;
as discussed above, exclusion zones are a single, conservative element
within a multi-layer defense-in-depth strategy for addressing public
safety risks. PHMSA
[[Page 69353]]
subject matter experts expect that largest exclusion zones calculated
pursuant to the default, prescriptive subpart B approach proposed in
Sec. Sec. 193.103 and 193.105 could be comparable in size to those
calculated under current regulations. Moreover, PHMSA's proposed
changes to hazard modeling and exclusion zones would provide a more
accurate evaluation of public safety risks than current regulations, as
PHMSA's proposals would require operators to model and to develop
exclusion zones for additional hazards using more realistic
assumptions.
C.3. Risk-Based Siting Alternative Using Quantitative Risk Analysis
(NFPA 59A-2026, Chapter 19)
PHMSA proposes to retain a set of default, prescriptive siting
requirements for all PHMSA-regulated LNG facilities at Sec. 193.103.
For operators willing to invest more resources, PHMSA also proposes at
Sec. 193.107 to adopt an alternative, QRA-based siting approach
consistent with the provisions in NFPA 59A-2026 chapter 19.
As explained in more detail below, the QRA-based approach leverages
decades of industry experience to provide a modern, comprehensive
siting framework for LNG facilities. It also complements PHMSA's
extensive experience administering risk-based regulatory frameworks for
other pipeline facilities, including through gas transmission integrity
management (part 192, subpart O), gas distribution integrity management
(part 192, subpart P), and hazardous liquid pipeline integrity
management (Sec. 195.452) programs. As discussed further in section
IV.G, those risk-based regulatory regimes have resulted in improved
safety outcomes since their adoption. And chapter 19 itself is the
product of 15 years of effort to establish and refine a QRA-based
alternative to historical, prescriptive siting requirements elsewhere
within NFPA 59A, with the first attempt at a QRA-based siting
alternative included within an optional Annex E to the 2009 edition of
NFPA 59A.
The table below summarizes anticipated benefits of PHMSA's proposed
QRA-based siting approach compared to the default, prescriptive siting
requirements at Sec. 193.103:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 193.107--QRA-based
Sec. 193.103--Default, prescriptive siting approach (NFPA 59A-2026,
siting approach (NFPA 59A-2026, ch. 5) ch. 19)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primarily qualitative consideration of Explicit quantification of
probability employing conservative, probabilities (e.g., component
simplified assumptions (e.g., failure, release parameters)
homogenous risk with a hazard when evaluating siting risks.
footprint) when evaluating siting
risks.
Rigid exclusion zones that constrain Enhanced flexibility to adjust
spacing of key equipment and systems dimensions of exclusion zones
within the facility--thereby limiting by adopting active and passive
expanded capacity. mitigation measures--thereby
facilitating expanded
capacity.
Obscures policy judgments regarding Identifies consensus,
acceptable levels of siting risks and quantified values for
trade-offs between mitiga
[…truncated; see source link]Indexed from Federal Register on November 3, 2026.
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.