Notice2026-22132
Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE American LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Modify Binary Return Derivatives Rules
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
October 30, 2026
Issuing agencies
Securities and Exchange Commission
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 209 (Friday, October 30, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 209 (Friday, October 30, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 68563-68571]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-22132]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-106743; File No. SR-NYSEAMER-2026-96]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE American LLC; Notice of
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Modify
Binary Return Derivatives Rules
October 27, 2026.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that
on October 21, 2026, NYSE American LLC (``NYSE American'' or
``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I and
II below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The
Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the
proposed rule change from interested persons.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to modify Rule 900ByRDs (Applicability;
Definitions), Rule 910ByRDs (Determination of the Settlement Price),
Rule 915ByRDs (Criteria for Underlying Securities), Rule 916ByRDs
(Withdrawal of Approval of Underlying Securities), Rule 958ByRDs
(Maximum Bid-Ask Differentials), Rule 980ByRDs (Automatic Exercise of
Binary Return Derivatives) and Rule 928.1NYP (Price Reasonability
Checks--Orders and Quotes) with respect to the trading of Binary Return
Derivatives (``ByRDs'') on the Exchange. The proposed rule change is
available on the Exchange's website at <a href="http://www.nyse.com">www.nyse.com</a> and at the
principal office of the Exchange.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization
included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at
the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared
summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most
significant parts of such statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The Exchange proposes to modify Rule 900ByRDs (Applicability;
Definitions), Rule 910ByRDs (Determination of the Settlement Price),
Rule 915ByRDs (Criteria for Underlying Securities), Rule 916ByRDs
(Withdrawal of Approval of Underlying Securities), Rule 958ByRDs
(Maximum Bid-Ask Differentials), Rule 980ByRDs (Automatic Exercise of
Binary Return Derivatives) and Rule 928.1NYP (Price Reasonability
Checks--Orders and Quotes) with respect to trading of ByRDs on the
Exchange. More specifically, the Exchange proposes to use the closing
price of the security underlying a ByRD options contract as reported by
the primary listing market (``Closing Price'') in place of using the
``composite price'' volume weighted average price (``VWAP'') to
determine the settlement price of the ByRD options contract on the date
of expiration and adopt a new initial and continued listing criteria
for ByRDs whose underlying security is an individual stock. The
Exchange also proposes to eliminate settlement price rounding
practices, instead redefining Finish High ByRDs to return the
settlement amount if the underlying security closes at or above the
strike price.
[[Page 68564]]
Overview of ByRDs <SUP>3</SUP>
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\3\ ByRDs have been approved since 2007. See note 5, infra.
Under the current rules, ByRDs would be available for trading during
the Exchange's Core Trading Session, i.e., from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00
p.m., and until 4:15 p.m. for certain highly liquid ETPs that are
approved for trading until such time. While the Exchange does not
anticipate that ByRDs on such ETPs would trade after 4:00 p.m. on
the day of expiration, the Exchange's trading system is currently
configured to allow ByRDs to trade until 4:15 p.m. because the
Exchange's trading system currently operates ByRDs on the same
session schedule as standard options and cannot apply a different
close time for ByRDs on such ETPs. Because ByRDs would be settled on
the 4:00 p.m. Closing Price, the Exchange does not expect trading in
ByRDs on such ETPs to occur between 4:00 p.m. and 4:15 p.m. on the
day of expiration, after the settlement price has been determined.
The Exchange represents to monitor trading activity after 4:00 p.m.
on expiration day, and to examine making trading system changes to
prevent the trading of a ByRDs option contract on such ETPs after
4:00 p.m. on the day of expiration. The Exchange will submit a
proposed rule change to reflect such changes to the trading system.
ByRDs are not currently available for trading during Extended
Trading Hours (ETH), even if an underlying security is eligible for
trading during ETH. ByRDs are also not currently available for
trading as FLEX Options or Complex Options.
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ByRDs \4\ are European-style option contracts on individual stocks,
exchange-traded funds (``ETFs'') and Index-Linked Securities that have
a fixed return in cash based on a set strike price; satisfy specified
listing criteria; \5\ and are auto-exercised at expiration pursuant to
the Rules of the Options Clearing Corporation (the ``OCC'').\6\ ByRDs
are binary options and, as such, differ from traditional options traded
on U.S. options exchanges by providing a discontinuous or non-linear
payout. The payout of a ByRD options contract is an amount contingent
upon the occurrence of the option being in- or at-the-money at
expiration rather than the degree to which the option is in-the-
money.\7\ An in-the-money ByRD options contract will pay a fixed sum at
expiration regardless of the magnitude of the difference between the
option's strike price and the settlement price.\8\ A ``Finish High''
ByRD (equivalent to a call option) returns $100 per contract if the
settlement price of the underlying security is above the strike price
at expiration, and a ``Finish Low'' ByRD (equivalent to a put option)
returns $100 per contract if the settlement price of the underlying
security is below the strike price at expiration.\9\
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\4\ ByRDs were approved for listing and trading under their
prior name, Fixed Return Options, or FROs. See Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 56251 (August 14, 2007), 72 FR 46523 (August 20,
2007) (Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 4 to a Proposed Rule Change
and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to a Proposed Rule Change,
as Modified by Amendment Nos. 2, 3, and 4 Thereto, Relating to the
Listing and Trading of Fixed Return Options). See also Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 71957 (April 16, 2014), 79 FR 22563 (April
22, 2014) (SR-NYSEMKT-2014-06) (Order approving name change from
FROs to Binary Return Derivatives (ByRDs) and re-launch of these
products, with certain modification, and amending Obvious Errors
rules to include ByRDs).
\5\ For an initial listing of a ByRD, individual stocks must
meet the criteria set forth in Rule 915 and must also meet the
following additional criteria: (i) a minimum market capitalization
of at least $40 billion, (ii) a minimum trading volume (in all
markets in which the underlying security is traded) of at least 1
billion shares in the preceding twelve (12) months, (iii) a minimum
average daily trading volume of 4 million shares, (iv) a minimum
average daily trading value of at least $200 million during the
prior six (6) months and (v) an underlying market price per share of
at least $10 over the previous five (5) consecutive business days
preceding the date on which the Exchange submits a certificate to
the OCC for listing and trading, as measured by the closing price
reported in the primary listed market in which the underlying
security is traded. See Rule 915ByRDs, Commentary .01. For an
initial listing of a ByRD, ETFs and Index-Linked Securities must
also meet the criteria set forth in Rule 915 and must also meet the
criteria for individual stocks set forth in Commentary .01 except
for the minimum market capitalization requirement in Commentary
.01(i). See Rule 915ByRDs, Commentary .02.
\6\ See Rule 900ByRDs(b)(1).
\7\ The Exchange proposes to add this sentence to the definition
of Binary Return Derivatives in Rule 900ByRDs(b)(1). The purpose for
amending the current definition is to illustrate that a transaction
in a ByRDs contract is an `all-or-none' proposition.
\8\ Under Rule 900ByRDs(b)(5), the term ``settlement price''
means the all-day VWAP of the composite prices of the security
underlying the Binary Return Derivatives during regular trading
hours on the business day of their expiration, or, in the case of an
option contract expiring on a day that is not a business day, on the
last trading day prior to expiration.
\9\ See Rule 900ByRDs(b)(2) and (3). Each of the ``Finish High''
or ``Finish Low'' ByRDs option contract may be bought or sold.
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Currently, Rule 910ByRDs(a) provides that the Exchange will use the
``composite price'' VWAP during regular trading hours for the entire
business day of their expiration, or, in the case of an option contract
expiring on a day that is not a business day, the entire business day
immediately preceding the expiration date. The rule further provides
that to calculate the VWAP, the Exchange would use composite prices
during regular trading hours as reported by industry price vendors.\10\
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\10\ Composite prices are prices reported to the consolidated
tape from any participating exchange or market. The OCC currently
uses composite pricing in connection with the settlement of expiring
equity options. The composite closing price is the last reported
sale price from any eligible trade source (i.e., primary listing
market or participating regional market). It is not an average
price. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 49045 (January 8,
2004), 69 FR 2377 (January 15, 2004) (notice of filing and immediate
effectiveness of File No. SR-OCC-2003-01).
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If the security underlying a ByRDs option contract does not trade
or is unavailable during regular trading hours at expiration, the
settlement price may be fixed pursuant to the OCC's rules on a basis
that the OCC believes is appropriate under the circumstances, including
using the last sale price during regular trading hours on the most
recent trading day for which a last sale price is available.\11\
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\11\ See Rule 910ByRDs, Commentary .01.
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Exchange rules also currently provide that the settlement price is
calculated such that it will always round up $.01 in those instances
when the settlement price exactly equals an expiring strike price.\12\
For example, if the calculated settlement price is $20.00, and there
are expiring ByRDs Finish High and Finish Low contracts with a strike
price of $20.00, the settlement price is rounded up to $20.01 so that
the Finish High options will pay off. The effect of rounding is to have
long $20.00 strike Finish High holders receiving $100.00 and long
$20.00 strike Finish Low holders receiving $0. Absent this rounding, a
participant may potentially have a position that appears to guarantee a
pay-off of $100 at expiration but would instead receive $0. For
example, if an investor holds both a $20.00 strike Finish High contract
and a $20.00 strike Finish Low contract, the investor will receive $0
if the settlement price was calculated to exactly equal the $20.00
strike price. Although the risk of the settlement price equaling the
strike price is small, the Exchange believes that this could cause
problems both for hedging and explaining to investors what would happen
in the unusual circumstance where the settlement price matched the
strike price of an expiring ByRDs option contract exactly. This
rounding method ensures that either the Finish High or the Finish Low
ByRDs option contracts will always pay off at expiration. The Exchange
believes this results in less opportunity for investor confusion and
less uncertainty for participants as a whole.
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\12\ See Rule 910ByRDs, Commentary .02.
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Proposed Rule Change
The purpose of the proposed rule change is to determine the
settlement price of a ByRDs options contract by using the underlying
security's Closing Price, in place of using the security's composite
price VWAP on the day of expiration. In connection with the proposed
rule change, the Exchange proposes the following changes to certain of
the rules that permit the listing and trading of ByRDs.
First, the Exchange proposes to modify Rule 900ByRDs(b)(1) by
amending the definition of ``Binary Return Derivatives,'' maintaining
that ByRDs are European-style, but specifying more clearly via a new
sentence that ``ByRDs are automatically exercised at expiration
pursuant to the
[[Page 68565]]
Rules of the Options Clearing Corporation, returning the settlement
amount, equal to $100, if the underlying security closes (1) at or
above the strike price at expiration for Finish High ByRDs or (2) below
the strike price at expiration for Finish Low ByRDs.'' The Exchange
also proposes to modify Rule 900ByRDs(b)(2) and Rule 900ByRDs(b)(3) to
reflect the elimination of settlement price rounding practices,
specifying instead that ``Finish High'' ByRDs return $100 if the
underlying security closes at or above the strike price at expiration
(i.e., in- or at-the-money) and ``Finish Low'' ByRDs return $100 if the
underlying security closes below the strike price at expiration (i.e.,
in-the-money).
The Exchange next proposes to modify current Rule 900ByRDs(b)(5) by
amending the definition of ``Settlement Price'' to mean the closing
price of the security underlying the Binary Return Derivatives as
reported by the primary listing market on the business day of their
expiration, or, in the case of an option contract expiring on a day
that is not a business day, on the last trading day prior to
expiration. In connection with this change, the Exchange also proposes
to delete Rule 900ByRDs(b)(4) in its entirety and renumber current Rule
900ByRDs(b)(5) and current Rule 900ByRDs(b)(6) (while also implementing
minor language changes to current Rule 900ByRDs(b)(6) to further
specify that the ByRDs settlement amount is a fixed amount in cash
equal to $100) as Rule 900ByRDs(b)(4) and Rule 900ByRDs(b)(5),
respectively.
Next, the Exchange proposes to modify the first sentence of Rule
910ByRDs(a) to specify that ByRDs are ``at-the-money,'' ``in-the-
money,'' or ``out-of-the-money'' as a function of the settlement price
of the underlying security in relation to the type of ByRDs option
(i.e., Finish High or Finish Low) and the exercise price. The Exchange
also proposes to revise the second sentence of Rule 900ByRDs(a). As
proposed, the revised sentence would be as follows: ``The Exchange will
use the closing price of the security underlying the Binary Return
Derivative as reported by the primary listing market on the business
day of their expiration, or, in the case of an option contract expiring
on a day that is not a business day, the business day immediately
preceding the expiration date as reported by industry price vendors.''
Next, the Exchange proposes to delete current rule text in Rule
910ByRDs, Commentary .02, which discusses current settlement price
rounding practices, and replace it with proposed new rule text on how
Finish High ByRDs will instead return the settlement amount if the
underlying security closes at or above the strike price, while Finish
Low ByRDs will return the settlement amount if the underlying security
closes below the strike price.
The Exchange also proposes to amend Rule 915ByRDs, Commentary .01,
to (a) raise the minimum market capitalization requirement in Rule
915ByRDs, Commentary .01(i) from $40 billion to $290 billion; and (b)
adopt a new listing standard in Rule 915ByRDs, Commentary .01(vi),
which would require a newly listed ByRDs option contract to ``maintain
an average daily trading value in the primary listing market's closing
auction of at least $10 million over the prior six months.'' The
Exchange proposes to adopt the same listing criteria as a continued
listing requirement in Rule 916ByRDs, Commentary .01(vi), for a ByRDs
option contract.
Pursuant to Rule 958ByRDs, a Market Maker appointed to a ByRDs
option contract is expected to quote with no more than $0.25 between
the bid and the offer for each ByRDs contract, except during the last
trading day prior to expiration, when the maximum width may be
$0.50.\13\ The Exchange proposes to adopt new Commentary .02 under Rule
958ByRDs, which would provide that a Market Maker is not required to
enter quotations in the ByRDs option contract in which it is appointed,
but will be subject to the expectations set forth in Rule 958ByRDs if
it chooses to do so. The Exchange believes not requiring Market Makers
to continuously enter quotations in their appointed ByRDs class is
appropriate because Market Maker appointments apply at the underlying
security level, and a Market Maker appointed in an underlying security
is therefore automatically appointed in that security's corresponding
ByRDs option contract as well, regardless of whether the Market Maker
has chosen to participate in that product. Given that an appointment
occurs automatically rather than by a Market Maker's election, the
Exchange does not believe it would be appropriate to enforce continuous
quoting obligations in a ByRDs option contract absent some affirmative
indication, such as entering a quote, that the Market Maker has chosen
to participate in a particular series. If the Exchange required Market
Makers to meet continuous quoting obligations in ByRDs option contracts
regardless of this automatic appointment, a Market Maker could be
penalized for choosing not to quote despite never having elected to
make a market in that product. The Exchange believes providing Market
Makers with this flexibility promotes clarity and would encourage
Market Maker participation without inadvertently penalizing them for
not continuously quoting in a product in which they were automatically,
rather than voluntarily, appointed.
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\13\ See Rule 958ByRDs.
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The Exchange also proposes to amend Rule 980ByRDs to specify that
at-the-money Finish High ByRDs will be automatically exercised in
accordance with changes made to eliminate settlement price rounding
practices, as proposed in amended Rule 910ByRDs, Commentary .02,
discussed above.
Finally, the Exchange proposes to add new paragraph (v) to current
Rule 928.1NYP(a)(3) to specify that the Arbitrage Checks for buy orders
or quotes set forth in Rule 928.1NYP(b) and the Intrinsic Value Checks
for sell orders or quotes set forth in Rule 928.1NYP(c) would not apply
to Binary Return Derivatives. The Price Reasonability Checks are
intended to prevent erroneous executions by automatically rejecting or
cancelling orders that breach historical boundaries or arbitrage limits
(such as buying a put option for more than its strike price). However,
since ByRDs have a non-linear, ``all-or-nothing'' payout, the
protections provided in Rule 928.1NYP are not needed. At expiration,
they pay a completely flat, fixed return of exactly $100.00 per
contract if they finish in-the-money or at-the-money, regardless of
whether the stock clears the strike price by one penny or one hundred
dollars; If they finish out-of-the-money, they pay $0.00. Because ByRDs
lack traditional standard intrinsic value curves, the Exchange's
standard algorithmic checks designed for traditional equity options
would not apply.\14\ In connection with this change, the Exchange
proposes to adopt new Rule 928.1NYP(e) to reject all Limit Orders and
quotes for ByRDs above the Exchange-designated maximum price for that
class as determined on a class basis.\15\ Pursuant to Rule
[[Page 68566]]
975NY(d)(3)(A), any transaction in ByRDs that is (1) higher or lower
than the Theoretical Price by $0.50 or more or (2) at a price greater
than $1.02 shall be deemed a Catastrophic Error, subject to the
adjustment procedures of Rule 975NY(d)(3) unless such adjustment would
result in a price higher than $1.02, in which case the adjustment price
shall be $1.02. As a result, the Exchange believes it is appropriate to
reject all Limit Orders and quotes for ByRDs above the Exchange-
designated maximum price, i.e., $1.02.
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\14\ The proposal to exclude Price Reasonability Checks from
applying to ByRDs is not novel. See Rules 967NY, Commentary .01, and
967.1NY, Commentary .01. These rules applied to the trading of ByRDs
on the Exchange's legacy trading platform before the Exchange
migrated to Pillar, the Exchange's current trading platform. With
this proposed rule change, the Exchange proposes to re-establish the
exclusion that previously applied to ByRDs.
\15\ See proposed Rule 928.1NYP(e), which provides that the
``Exchange will apply a maximum price protection for Binary Return
Derivatives on a class basis, pursuant to which the Exchange rejects
all Limit Orders and quotes for Binary Return Derivatives above the
Exchange-designated maximum price for that class.''
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The Exchange believes adopting the Closing Price to determine the
settlement price of an expiring ByRDs option contract has several
benefits and is appropriate for four reasons. First, the Closing Price
is considered the most carefully determined price of the day. The
Closing Price is determined by a call auction process run by the
underlying security's primary listing exchange, which allows market
participants to participate in real-time price discovery. It represents
the consensus value after a full day of price discovery, with maximum
participation from all market participants. Second, auctions are the
among the most transparent parts of the market. Primary listings
markets disseminate auction information frequently during a prescribed
period of time, providing transparency to all market participants. This
real-time flow of data--including indicative prices, imbalances, and
matched volumes--gives all participants equal visibility in where the
market is heading before the price is set. Third, Closing Prices
(especially in highly-liquid securities such as those that qualify for
ByRDs listings) are stable and not susceptible to manipulation. Because
the Closing Price is set through a structured, transparent, rules-based
auction aggregating broad order flow, it is far less susceptible to
end-of-day price manipulation than other point-in-time benchmarks.
Closing auction mechanisms are designed to make Closing Prices more
reliable and less vulnerable to manipulation, providing a more robust
and manipulation-resistant closing price discovery mechanism that
reflects true supply and demand. Fourth, there is a concentration of
liquidity to determine the Closing Price. Closing auctions within U.S.
equity markets have grown significantly--in 2026, they have matched
just over $100 billion per day and accounted for 9.4% of total notional
value traded.\16\ This concentration of liquidity makes closing
auctions an especially efficient execution point, as large orders can
be filled with minimal price impact.\17\
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\16\ NYSE TAQ Consolidated Trade Data. Data through August 21,
2026.
\17\ Id.
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The continually-growing liquidity in closing auctions has been
highlighted by numerous market practitioners and academics. NYSE and
Nasdaq, in their capacity as primary listing exchanges, have each
published several articles detailing liquidity trends and price-
formation dynamics in their respective closing auctions.\18\ Due to the
significant liquidity now present in closing auctions, auction ``price
impact is lower than during continuous trading.'' \19\ Closing
auctions' growing liquidity encourages market participants to optimize
their participation,\20\ in turn adding still more liquidity and
contributing to rising closing auction trade sizes. As State Street
Investment Management recently stated:
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\18\ See <a href="https://www.nyse.com/data-insights/nyse-closing-auction-price-discovery-opportunities-reach-new-highs">https://www.nyse.com/data-insights/nyse-closing-auction-price-discovery-opportunities-reach-new-highs</a> and <a href="https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/market-close-most-important-price-day">https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/market-close-most-important-price-day</a>.
\19\ Vincent Bogousslavsky, Dmitriy Muravyev, Who trades at the
close? Implications for price discovery and liquidity, Journal of
Financial Markets, Volume 66, 2023, 100852, ISSN 1386-4181, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.finmar.2023.100852">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.finmar.2023.100852</a>.
\20\ ``We are spending as much time as we ever have to
understand the close and to optimizing engaging in the close,''
Reyes said. From <a href="https://www.tradersmagazine.com/featured_articles/liquidity-remains-holy-grail-in-equities/">https://www.tradersmagazine.com/featured_articles/liquidity-remains-holy-grail-in-equities/</a>.
``If the rise of Market-on-Close volume is best viewed as a
structural response to the growth of indexing and benchmark-centric
execution, we believe this cycle will continue: more indexing leads
to more reliance on the close, which deepens liquidity at the final
print and further anchors execution to that benchmark.'' \21\
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\21\ <a href="https://www.ssga.com/us/en/intermediary/insights/how-passive-investing-reshaping-microstructure">https://www.ssga.com/us/en/intermediary/insights/how-passive-investing-reshaping-microstructure</a>.
Additionally, the Commission has also recently issued Release No.
34-105882, ``. . . Granting Conditional Exemptive Relief to the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange Inc. from the Opening Price Settlement Requirements
of Rule 6h-1(b) Under the Exchange Act for Certain Cash-Settled
Security Futures.'' \22\ To establish a single-stock futures product,
which like binary options, is cash-settled, CME has received an
exemption to use a closing price rather than an opening price
settlement. In their application for this exemption, CME highlighted
the growth in closing auction volumes in US equity markets and the use
of official closing prices in other products to support the position
that closing auction liquidity was sufficiently robust to absorb any
additional liquidity needs related to new derivative products.\23\
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\22\ <a href="https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/exorders/2026/34-105882.pdf">https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/exorders/2026/34-105882.pdf</a>.
\23\ <a href="https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/exorders/2026/34-104786.pdf">https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/exorders/2026/34-104786.pdf</a>.
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When ByRDs were designed, the Exchange noted that by using a VWAP a
trader may ``smooth'' the average price paid or realized for a large
position. Specifically, the VWAP for a given underlying security means
the sum of the dollar value of trades reported to the Consolidated Tape
(price multiplied by number of shares traded) divided by the total
number of shares traded during the entire last day of trading on the
business day of their expiration. The concern at the time was that a
single closing price could be more susceptible to manipulation, and
that smoothing over a full day of trading would produce a more
representative settlement value. The Exchange believes that rationale
has been substantially overtaken by market structure developments over
the last 2 decades, and that the Closing Price is now a superior
alternative. For one, a VWAP settlement requires aggregating all trades
reported to the Consolidated Tape across the entire trading day. This
creates several practical problems: it depends on data vendor accuracy
and timeliness, it requires handling of out-of-sequence and late
reported trades (which can distort the calculation), and it is not a
number any participant can observe in real time. By contrast, the
closing price from the primary listing market is a single, publicly
observable, instantaneous value produced by a supervised exchange
auction process, available immediately and unambiguously at 4:00 p.m.
Second, a full-day VWAP creates hedging complexity and mismatch.
Because ByRDs currently settle on the full-day VWAP, a holder trying to
hedge a ByRDs position on expiration day cannot do so cleanly--their
hedge would need to track the cumulative weighted average of all trades
from open to close, which shifts continuously throughout the day in
ways that are difficult to replicate. A closing-price settlement, by
contrast, would allow hedgers to concentrate their activity in the
closing auction, which is exactly what participants in standard listed
equity options already do. This alignment with standard options hedging
practice would reduce friction and basis risk. The Exchange
acknowledges that for cash-settled options generally, settlement based
on the Closing Price may concentrate the unwinding of hedge positions
in the
[[Page 68567]]
closing auction, which adds a layer of mechanical flow that can amplify
volatility. The Exchange believes, however, that this consideration
does not raise significant concerns with respect to ByRDs, for the
following reasons. First, ByRDs are subject to comparatively low
position limits. Pursuant to Rule 904ByRDs, Binary Return Derivatives
on each underlying security are subject to a position limit of 25,000
contracts on the same side of the market. This is the lowest position
limit applicable to any options product under Rule 904, Commentary
.07(e). The Exchange believes that this limit constrains the size of
any hedge position that a market participant could be required to
unwind at expiration. Second, the need to unwind positions in the
underlying security at or near expiration is not a new risk introduced
by closing-price settlement. Such activity was equally present under
the VWAP settlement methodology when ByRDs were initially approved.
Accordingly, the Exchange believes that the proposal does not introduce
a new category of hedging activity. Third, the universe of eligible
underlying securities is highly liquid. As set forth in Rule 915ByRDs,
Commentary .01, an underlying security must satisfy heightened
eligibility requirements, including a minimum market capitalization of
$290 billion and a minimum average daily trading value of $10 million
in the primary listing market's closing auction. In light of these
requirements, the Exchange believes that any hedge unwinding at the
close can be absorbed by the market without undue price impact. Lastly,
VWAP is more susceptible to intraday manipulation than a supervised
closing auction. This is somewhat counterintuitive given the original
rationale for VWAP, but it is well-supported. ``Marking the close''--
where participants deliberately transact in the final period to move
the VWAP toward a favorable settlement--is classified as market
manipulation. Because VWAP is computed from all Consolidated Tape
prints throughout the day, large coordinated order flow at any point
during the session can shift the VWAP in ways that are difficult to
detect in real time. A closing auction, by contrast, is a supervised,
transparent, single-price process with published imbalance information
that regulators and surveillance systems can monitor closely.\24\
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\24\ NYSE improved transparency by moving the publication of
auction imbalance information to 3:50 p.m., further hardening the
auction against manipulation by giving market participants more time
to respond to imbalances. See Securities Exchange Act Release No.
100327 (June 13, 2024), 89 FR 51918 (June 20, 2024) (SR-NYSE-2024-
13) (Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change Amending Rule 7.35 and
Rule 7.35B).
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To reinforce the resilience of the ByRDs settlement price against
manipulation, the Exchange proposes to condition ByRDs listing
eligibility on the presence of sufficient closing auction liquidity.
Specifically, as noted above, the Exchange proposes to amend Rule
915ByRDs, Commentary .01, to add a new eligibility requirement for the
initial listing of a ByRDs option contract on an underlying stock.
Proposed Rule 915ByRDs, Commentary .01(vi) would provide that to be
eligible for an initial listing, individual stocks ``maintain an
average daily trading value in the primary listing exchange's closing
auction of at least $10 million over the prior six months.'' \25\ The
proposed new eligibility requirement would apply to the initial and
continued listing of ETFs and Section 107 Securities also as the
current rule provides that to be eligible for an initial listing of a
ByRDs option contract, an ETF or Section 107 Security must meet the
criteria for individual stocks set forth in Rule 915ByRDs, Commentary
.01. Additionally, the proposed increase to the minimum market
capitalization requirement, from $40 billion to $290 billion, would
limit the number of underlying securities that would be eligible for an
initial listing of a ByRDs option contract.\26\
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\25\ The Exchange proposes amending Rule 916ByRDs, Commentary
.01, which would require the proposed new eligibility requirement
for the continued listing of a ByRD contract also.
\26\ The Exchange represents that it will monitor both initial
and continued listing criteria applicable to ByRDs on an ongoing
basis and will submit a proposed rule change to make changes no
later than four months from the date that ByRDs begin to trade on
the Exchange.
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Applying both the amended ByRDs listing liquidity thresholds and
the newly-proposed auction liquidity threshold to eligible listed
securities yields 100 eligible ByRDs underliers, as opposed to the 305
eligible ByRDs underliers without the newly proposed criteria. The
median closing auction value traded across these 100 eligible
securities is $92.5 million per day, based on a recent review conducted
by the Exchange.
The Exchange believes the proposed new eligibility requirement
makes using Closing Price to determine the settlement price less
susceptible to manipulation. Because the Closing Price is set through a
single, centralized auction that consolidates the full day's residual
buying and selling interest into one print, influencing that price
requires trading against the entire pool of auction liquidity rather
than a thin, point-in-time quote. At the liquidity levels required by
proposed new Rule 915ByRDs, Commentary .01(vi), a participant seeking
to move the close by any meaningful amount would have to commit
substantial capital against prevailing order flow and absorb the
offsetting interest of other participants, all within a brief and
closely observed window. The closing auction's transparency compounds
that burden: with indicative prices, imbalances, and matched volumes
disseminated in real time, a distortive order becomes visible to the
market and tends to draw offsetting liquidity that both counters it and
further stabilizes the Closing Price. The economic cost and ready
detectability of such conduct, together with the deep and growing
liquidity of U.S. closing auctions described above, make the closing
auction a robust and manipulation-resistant basis for determining ByRDs
settlement prices.
Similarly, the Exchange believes eliminating the settlement price
rounding convention is reasonable and appropriate because it removes an
unnecessary and artificial adjustment to price data that is no longer
needed to achieve its intended purpose. Under the current rules, the
Settlement Price is rounded up $0.01 whenever it would otherwise
exactly match the strike price of an expiring ByRDs option contract,
solely to ensure that a Finish High contract pays off rather than
leaving both the Finish High and Finish Low contracts unexercised.
However, because Finish High ByRDs as proposed would be defined to pay
off whenever the underlying security closes at or above the strike
price--a category that already includes an exact match--this outcome is
achieved automatically by the definition itself, without requiring any
adjustment of the reported price.
The Exchange believes that removing the rounding convention has
several benefits. First, it allows the Settlement Price to reflect the
underlying security's actual, unadjusted Closing Price, rather than an
artificial value that may not correspond to any price at which the
security actually traded or was reported. This promotes transparency
and consistency between the Settlement Price used for ByRDs and the
Closing Price used elsewhere for the same underlying security. Second,
it would simplify the rule structure by resolving the at-the-money
scenario through the proposed payout definitions of a Finish High ByRD
and a Finish Low ByRD, rather than through a separate, purpose-built
rounding mechanism layered on top of such rules. Lastly, it would
eliminate any potential investor
[[Page 68568]]
confusion that could arise from a reported Settlement Price that
differs by $0.01 from the security's actual closing price for no
economic reason other than avoiding a tie. For these reasons, the
Exchange believes the proposed change is consistent with accurately and
transparently determining ByRDs settlement outcomes and does not
disadvantage either side of an expiring Finish High or Finish Low ByRDs
option contract.
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with
Section 6(b) of the Act \27\ in general, and furthers the objectives of
Section 6(b)(5) of the Act.\28\ Specifically, the Exchange believes the
proposed rule change is consistent with the Section 6(b)(5)
requirements that the rules of an exchange be designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and
equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination
with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing
information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in
securities to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free
and open market and a national market system and, in general, to
protect investors and the public interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
\28\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifically, the Exchange believes that adopting the Closing Price
to determine the settlement price of an expiring ByRDs option contract
would increase participation among investors to trade in binary options
given the importance of the closing auction on primary listing markets
and, as discussed above, would reduce the hedging friction and basis
risk associated with the current full-day VWAP methodology by aligning
ByRDs settlement with the closing-auction hedging practices already
standard among listed options market participants, a benefit that also
furthers the protection of investors by reducing the difficulty of
explaining and managing settlement risk for ByRDs holders. The NYSE
closing auction remains the largest liquidity event in the U.S. equity
market. The closing price produced by these auctions reflects a deep
concentration of institutional and retail order flow precisely
calibrated to produce a single, authoritative reference price, and
thereby remove any impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free
and open market.
The Exchange believes the proposal to adopt the Closing Price to
determine the settlement price of an expiring ByRDs option contract
would remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market for several reasons. First, the Closing Price is considered
the most carefully determined price of the day as it is determined by a
call auction process run by the underlying security's primary listing
exchange, which allows market participants to participate in real-time
price discovery. Second, primary listing markets disseminate auction
information frequently during a prescribed period of time, providing
transparency to all market participants. This real-time flow of data
gives all participants equal visibility in where the market is heading
before the price is set. Third, closing prices (especially in highly-
liquid securities such as those that qualify for ByRDs listings) are
stable and not susceptible to manipulation. Because the Closing Price
is set through a structured, transparent, rules-based auction
aggregating broad order flow, it is far less susceptible to end-of-day
price manipulation than other point-in-time benchmarks consistent with
the Section 6(b)(5) requirement that exchange rules be designed to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices. By contrast,
because VWAP is computed by aggregating trades reported to the
Consolidated Tape across the entire trading day, it can be moved by
coordinated trading at any point during the session in ways that are
difficult to detect in real time, a vulnerability the proposed change
eliminates by settling ByRDs against a single, supervised auction print
instead. Closing auction mechanisms are designed to make Closing Prices
more reliable and less vulnerable to manipulation, providing a more
robust and manipulation-resistant closing price discovery mechanism
that reflects true supply and demand. Lastly, closing auctions within
U.S. equity markets have grown significantly. This concentration of
liquidity makes closing auctions an especially efficient execution
point, as large orders can be filled with minimal price impact.
The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change would remove
impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and
a national market system because it would determine the settlement
price of a ByRDs option contract using the Closing Price of the
underlying security at expiration, while also reinforcing the
resistance of that settlement price to manipulation. The Closing Price
is a carefully designed, rules-based reference anchored to a closing
auction process: transparent, liquidity-rich, resistant to
manipulation, and widely trusted. Using it to settle an expiring ByRDs
option contract further perfects the mechanism of a free and open
market because it would yield a settlement price that reflects the most
recent and reliable market information available. The proposed rule
change also furthers the Act's objective of fostering cooperation and
coordination among persons engaged in facilitating transactions in
securities by relying directly on the auction process conducted by the
underlying security's primary listing market rather than requiring the
Exchange to independently construct a settlement value. The Exchange
does not believe that using Closing Price to determine the settlement
price of a ByRDs option contract at expiration would render the
marketplace for such options more susceptible to manipulative
practices. The Exchange notes that, as discussed above, the Commission
has recognized the robustness of closing auction liquidity in an
analogous context, granting the Chicago Mercantile Exchange conditional
exemptive relief to use a closing, rather than opening, price to settle
certain cash-settled single-stock futures based in part on the growth
of closing auction volumes and the use of official closing prices in
other products, which the Exchange believes further supports the
reliability of the Closing Price as a settlement benchmark for ByRDs.
The Exchange believes that the trading of ByRDs would provide
investors with a potentially useful investment choice, which aids in
perfecting the mechanism of a free and open market and a national
market system. In addition, and consistent with the Commission's
findings when initially approving ByRDs for listing, listing ByRDs
``will extend to certain binary options the benefits of a listed
exchange market, which include: A centralized forum for price
discovery; pre- and post-trade transparency; standardized contract
specifications; and the guarantee of the OCC.'' \29\ The Exchange
believes those benefits are reinforced, rather than diminished, by a
settlement price that is itself transparent and manipulation-resistant,
since the value of a centralized, standardized, OCC-guaranteed market
depends in part on the integrity of the price used to determine the
payout of an auto-exercised contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ See supra note 5 at 46524.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange also believes that eliminating the settlement price
rounding convention in favor of
[[Page 68569]]
allowing the Finish High and Finish Low definitions to resolve the at-
the-money scenario is consistent with Section 6(b)(5) and, in
particular, promotes just and equitable principles of trade and
protects investors and the public interest. The proposed change is
intended to add clarity and transparency to Exchange rules making them
easier to navigate and comprehend and does not change the outcome of a
position in a ByRDs option contract under the current rules. Because
Finish High ByRDs as proposed are defined to pay off whenever the
underlying security closes at or above the strike price, the existing
rounding convention is an unnecessary artificial adjustment to the
reported Closing Price that is no longer needed to produce a definitive
outcome for expiring at-the-money contracts. Removing this convention
ensures that the settlement price used for ByRDs reflects the
underlying security's actual, unadjusted Closing Price, consistent with
the transparency and manipulation-resistance benefits described above,
rather than a value adjusted for a purpose unrelated to the integrity
of that price. The Exchange believes this promotes investor
understanding of how ByRDs are settled and removes an impediment to a
free and open market by eliminating a divergence between the settlement
price used for ByRDs and the actual Closing Price of the underlying
security.
The Exchange believes the proposed increase to the minimum market
capitalization requirement coupled with the proposed addition of the
new eligibility requirement for the initial and continued listing of a
ByRDs option contract would remove impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market because only a select list of 100
underlying securities would meet the qualification requirement to have
a ByRDs option contract listed on, which further ensures that a ByRDs
option contract would only be listed on some of the most liquid and
actively-traded underlying securities. Applying both the existing ByRDs
listing liquidity thresholds, with an increased minimum market
capitalization requirement, and the newly-proposed $10 million average
daily closing auction trading value threshold yields approximately 100
eligible ByRDs underliers, with a median closing auction value traded
of $92.5 million per day across those securities. At these liquidity
levels, a participant seeking to move the Closing Price by a meaningful
amount would need to commit substantial capital against prevailing
order flow within a brief, closely observed window, and the closing
auction's real-time dissemination of indicative prices and imbalances
would make such an attempt visible to the market and likely to draw
offsetting liquidity, consistent with the Exchange's own recent
enhancement moving publication of auction imbalance information earlier
in the day.\30\ The Exchange believes the proposed eligibility criteria
to qualify the listing of a ByRDs option contract is consistent with
Section 6(b) of the Act, in general, and furthers the objectives of
Section 6(b)(5), in particular, because it is designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and
equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination
with persons engaged in facilitating transactions in securities, to
remove impediments to, and perfect the mechanism of, a free and open
market and a national market system and, in general, to protect
investors and the public interest because only large, well-capitalized,
and highly liquid issuers would qualify. Securities with high market
capitalization and liquid markets are generally less susceptible to
manipulation because of the substantial capital required to
artificially influence prices of those securities. The depth and
breadth of trading activity for securities with significant market
capitalization make it unlikely that a single market participant would
be able to exert undue influence on the price of such a stock, as large
volumes of buyers and sellers are what ultimately continuously reflect
the true market value of the stock.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ See note 25, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule change to use the Closing Price to determine the
settlement price on the 100 underlying securities is designed to
promote just and equitable principles of trade in that the proposal
would give market participants an alternative to trading similar
products in the over-the-counter (OTC) market. By trading a product in
an exchange-traded environment (that is currently traded in the OTC
market or other platforms that trade binary options), the Exchange
would be able to compete more effectively with the OTC market. The
Exchange believes the proposed rule change is designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices in that it would lead to
the migration of options currently trading in the OTC market and other
platforms to trading on the Exchange, where such trading would become
subject to the Exchange's surveillance, audit trail, and member conduct
rules that do not apply to comparable OTC or other-platform trading
today. Also, any migration to the Exchange from such other markets
would result in increased market transparency. Additionally, the
Exchange believes the proposed rule change is designed to remove
impediments to and to perfect the mechanism for a free and open market
and a national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and
the public interest in that it should create greater trading and
hedging opportunities and flexibility. The proposed rule change should
also result in enhanced efficiency in initiating and closing out
positions and heightened contra-party creditworthiness due to the role
of OCC as issuer and guarantor of ByRDs option contracts. Further, the
proposed rule change would result in increased competition by
permitting the Exchange to offer products that are currently available
for trading in the OTC market and other platforms.
The Exchange believes not requiring Market Makers to continuously
enter quotations in their appointed ByRDs class is consistent with the
Act, protects investors, and prevents fraudulent and manipulative acts
because Market Maker appointments apply at the underlying security
level, and a Market Maker appointed in an underlying security is
therefore automatically appointed in that security's corresponding
ByRDs option contract as well, regardless of whether the Market Maker
has chosen to participate in that product. Given that an appointment
occurs automatically rather than by a Market Maker's election, the
Exchange does not believe it would be appropriate to enforce continuous
quoting obligations in a ByRDs option contract absent some affirmative
indication, such as entering a quote, that the Market Maker has chosen
to participate in a particular series.
The Exchange believes the proposed amendments to Rule 928.1NYP
promotes just and equitable principles of trade and removes impediments
to and perfects the mechanism of a free and open market and a national
market system and protects investors, to not apply the Price
Reasonability Checks to ByRDs is a reasonable and justified product-
specific accommodation that promotes orderly trading and clear,
consistent treatment of transactions in these contracts. Additionally,
applying a maximum execution price protection for ByRDs on a class
basis, pursuant to which any execution price for a ByRDs option
contract above the Exchange-designated maximum execution price for that
class would be rejected would promote just and equitable principles of
trade and remove impediments to and perfects the mechanism of a free
and
[[Page 68570]]
open market and a national market system and protects investors. This
protection provides investors with an additional safeguard against
executions at potential erroneous prices, which the Exchange believes
protects investors and the public interest.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will
impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The Exchange does not
believe that the proposed rule change will impose any burden on
intramarket competition that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act, because the proposed rule
change to use the Closing Price to determine the settlement price of
ByRDs option contracts will apply equally to all market participants
who wish to trade such options on the same terms and in the same manner
(including with respect to the payout terms and amount). All market
participants will be subject to the same rules applicable to ByRDs
option contracts, as described in this proposed rule change. Except as
set forth in this proposed rule change, ByRDs option contracts will
trade in the same manner as other options on the Exchange.
The Exchange does not believe the proposed rule change will impose
any burden on intermarket competition that is not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act, because other
options exchanges may propose similar binary options. Additionally,
substantively similar products to ByRDs option contracts are available
in the OTC market and various other trading platforms.
The Exchange notes that it operates in a highly competitive market
in which market participants can readily direct order flow to competing
venues who offer similar products. The Exchange believes the proposed
rule change will provide investors with a comparable alternative to the
OTC market and other trading venues. The Exchange believes it may be a
more attractive alternative to the OTC market and these other venues,
as market participants will benefit from being able to trade these
options in an exchange environment, which provides, among other things:
(1) enhanced efficiency in initiating and closing out positions; (2)
increased market transparency; and (3) heightened contra-party
creditworthiness. As a result, the Exchange believes that the proposed
rule change may relieve any burden on, or otherwise promote,
competition, as it will allow the Exchange to offer a securities
exchange-listed alternative to the products currently available in
these other markets.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the
proposed rule change.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
Because the foregoing proposed rule change does not (i)
significantly affect the protection of investors or the public
interest; (ii) impose any significant burden on competition; and (iii)
become operative for 30 days after the date of the filing, or such
shorter time as the Commission may designate, it has become effective
pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A) of the Act \31\ and subparagraph (f)(6)
of Rule 19b-4 thereunder.\32\
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\31\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
\32\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6). In addition, Rule 19b-4(f)(6)(iii)
requires the Exchange to give the Commission written notice of its
intent to file the proposed rule change, along with a brief
description and text of the proposed rule change, at least five
business days prior to the date of filing of the proposed rule
change, or such shorter time as designated by the Commission. The
Exchange has satisfied this requirement.
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A proposed rule change filed under Rule 19b-4(f)(6) \33\ normally
does not become operative prior to 30 days after the date of the
filing. However, pursuant to Rule 19b-4(f)(6)(iii),\34\ the Commission
may designate a shorter time if such action is consistent with the
protection of investors and the public interest. The Exchange has asked
the Commission to waive the 30-day operative delay so that the proposed
rule change may become operative upon filing. The proposed rule change
is designed to provide market participants with additional trading and
hedging opportunities that could be better tailored to their investment
objectives. The Exchange has proposed heightened eligibility criteria
that would limit the underlying equity securities on which the Exchange
could list a ByRDs option contract to 100 highly-liquid securities.
This limitation should help mitigate the impact (if any) of ByRDs on
the closing process of the underlying equity securities and the concern
that using an equity security's Closing Price to determine the
settlement price at expiration for a ByRDs option contract overlying
that equity security could cause excessive volatility or an increased
potential for manipulation at the close in the underlying security. For
these reasons, the Commission finds that waiver of the 30-day operative
delay is consistent with the protection of investors and the public
interest. Accordingly, the Commission hereby waives the operative delay
and designates the proposal operative upon filing.\35\
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\33\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6).
\34\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6)(iii).
\35\ For purposes only of waiving the 30-day operative delay,
the Commission has considered the proposed rule's impact on
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C.
78c(f).
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At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission will institute proceedings to
determine whether the proposed rule change should be approved or
disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
<bullet> Use the Commission's internet comment form (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml">https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml</a>); or
<bullet> Send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#4331362f266e202c2e2e262d3730033026206d242c35"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="4f3d3a232a622c2022222a213b3c0f3c2a2c61282039">[email protected]</span></a>. Please include
file number SR-NYSEAMER-2026-96 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
<bullet> Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to file number SR-NYSEAMER-2026-96. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml">https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml</a>). Copies of the filing will be available for inspection and
copying at the principal office of the Exchange. Do not include
personal identifiable information in submissions; you should submit
only information that you wish
[[Page 68571]]
to make available publicly. We may redact in part or withhold entirely
from publication submitted material that is obscene or subject to
copyright protection. All submissions should refer to file number SR-
NYSEAMER-2026-96 and should be submitted on or before November 30,
2026.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\36\
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\36\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Sherry R. Haywood,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2026-22132 Filed 10-29-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
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