Suspension of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Economic Vitality & Security Travel Authorization Program (EVS-TAP)

Issuing agencies

Abstract

This notice announces the decision of the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) to suspend the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Economic Vitality & Security Travel Authorization Program (EVS-TAP). EVS-TAP allows prescreened nationals of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to travel to the CNMI without a visa for temporary visits under specified conditions. Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations, the Secretary has broad authority to suspend the program for good cause, including threats to national security, law enforcement interests, and immigration enforcement. The Secretary has determined that there is good cause to suspend EVS-TAP, while DHS, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Interior, evaluates the program.

Full Text

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 206 (Tuesday, October 27, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 206 (Tuesday, October 27, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 67595-67598]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-21880]


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY


Suspension of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 
(CNMI) Economic Vitality & Security Travel Authorization Program (EVS-
TAP)

AGENCY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, DHS.

ACTION: General notice.

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SUMMARY: This notice announces the decision of the Secretary of 
Homeland Security (Secretary) to suspend the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Economic Vitality & Security Travel 
Authorization Program (EVS-TAP). EVS-TAP allows prescreened nationals 
of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to travel to the CNMI without a 
visa for temporary visits under specified conditions. Pursuant to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act and Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) regulations, the Secretary has broad authority to suspend the 
program for good cause, including threats to national security, law 
enforcement interests, and immigration enforcement. The Secretary has 
determined that there is good cause to suspend EVS-TAP, while DHS, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the 
Interior, evaluates the program.

DATES: Suspension of the CNMI EVS-TAP is effective at 1400 EDT on 
October 30, 2026.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Melanie Mataxas, Traveler 
Authorization and Communications Program Management Office, Office of 
Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, at (202) 325-
1372, or via email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ec8189808d828589c288c2818d988d948d9fac8f8e9cc288849fc28b839a"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="8be6eee7eae5e2eea5efa5e6eaffeaf3eaf8cbe8e9fba5efe3f8a5ece4fd">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Generally, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 
U.S.C. 1101 et. seq., aliens seeking admission to the United States, 
including nonimmigrants visiting temporarily for business or pleasure, 
must obtain a visa before traveling to the United States. See section 
212(a)(7)(B)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(B)(i). In 2008, 
Congress enacted the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008 (CNRA), 
Public Law 110-229, 122 Stat. 754, which generally applied the INA, 
including the standard visa requirements, to Guam and the Commonwealth 
of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). See 48 U.S.C. 1806(a); sections 
212 and 214 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182 and 1184. Under the standard visa 
application process, nonimmigrant visitors must complete an 
application, submit fingerprints and certain biometrics, and 
participate in an interview at a U.S. Consulate or Embassy, subject to 
certain exceptions. See section 222 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1202; 8 CFR 
103.2; 22 CFR part 42.
    As a part of the CNRA, however, Congress also authorized the 
creation of a specific visa waiver program for travel specific to Guam 
and the CNMI.\1\ Section 212(l) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l), as 
amended by the CNRA, sets forth the general parameters of this specific 
visa waiver authority. The

[[Page 67596]]

statute authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security (the Secretary), 
in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of 
State, to designate countries whose nationals can seek admission to 
Guam or the CNMI as nonimmigrant visitors for business or pleasure for 
a period up to 45 days without first obtaining a nonimmigrant visa if 
certain conditions are met. See section 212(l)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 
1182(l)(1). The statute also provides for a consultation process that 
allows the Governors of Guam and the CNMI to request that certain 
countries be added to the list of countries whose nationals are 
eligible for admission without a visa. See section 212(l)(6) of the 
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(6).
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    \1\ The CNRA's Guam-CNMI Visa Waiver Program replaced the pre-
existing Guam-only Visa Waiver Program authorized under section 
212(l) of the INA. See Public Law 99-396, sec. 14 (1986). The Guam-
CNMI Visa Waiver Program is separate from the U.S. Visa Waiver 
Program (U.S. VWP), which is authorized under section 217 of the 
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1187. That program allows for citizens or nationals of 
countries designated as U.S. VWP participating countries to travel 
to the entire United States, after obtaining an Electronic System 
for Travel Authorization (ESTA), for business or tourism stays for 
up to 90 days without a visa.
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    Importantly, section 212(l)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(5), 
directs the Secretary to monitor the admission of nonimmigrant visitors 
admitted under the Guam-CNMI Visa Waiver Program (G-CNMI VWP), and 
mandates suspension of participation, on a country-by-country basis, if 
admissions lead to an unacceptable number of visitors from a country 
remaining unlawfully in Guam or the CNMI, unlawfully obtaining entry to 
other parts of the United States or seeking asylum or withholding of 
removal, or such visitors pose a risk to U.S. security, law 
enforcement, or immigration enforcement interests. Additionally, the 
statute further authorizes the Secretary to suspend the program at any 
time, on a country-by-country basis, for other good cause. See section 
212(l)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(5). And it also provides that 
the Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of the Interior 
and the Secretary of State, may discontinue the G-CNMI VWP on a 
country-by-country basis entirely after considering relevant factors. 
See section 212(l)(3), (4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(3), (4).
    As required by statute, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
has issued a series of regulations and regulatory actions to create and 
implement the G-CNMI VWP and the above discussed statutory framework. 
See section 212(l)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(3) (directing DHS to issue 
``all necessary regulations'' to implement the G-CNMI visa waiver 
authority); 8 CFR 212.1(q), (r). In January 2009, DHS issued an interim 
final rule (IFR) amending DHS regulations to, among other things, set 
forth the requirements and procedures for an authorized country's 
nationals to participate in G-CNMI VWP. See 74 FR 2824 (Jan. 16, 2009) 
(2009 IFR). The 2009 IFR also codified in DHS's regulations the 
Secretary's authority to suspend or terminate that participation on a 
country-by-country basis. See 74 FR 2825-29.
    At the time, the 2009 IFR announced the Secretary's determination, 
after appropriate consultations, that the nationals of several 
countries were eligible for participation in the G-CNMI VWP. 74 FR 
2827; see also 8 CFR 212.1(q)(2)(ii). DHS determined that PRC nationals 
would not be eligible to participate in the G-CNMI VWP due to political 
and security concerns. 74 FR 2826-27. However, in recognition of the 
economic significance of visitors from the PRC to the CNMI, the then-
Secretary also announced that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
would favorably consider eligible PRC nationals for parole into the 
United States, on a case-by-case basis, pursuant to INA 212(d)(5), 8 
U.S.C. 1182(d)(5), rather than requiring these individuals to obtain 
nonimmigrant visas. See 89 FR 3299, 3302.
    In 2024, DHS published an IFR updating the G-CNMI-VWP, requiring, 
among other things, that nationals from authorized countries must seek 
electronic travel authorization under the G-CNMI VWP, and creating a 
restricted sub-program for PRC nationals seeking visa-exempt travel to 
the CNMI only. 89 FR 3299 (Jan. 18, 2024) (2024 IFR). This sub-program 
is known as the CNMI EVS-TAP. EVS-TAP regulations, codified at 8 CFR 
212.1(r), were developed following consultations between the Federal 
Government of the United States and the Government of the CNMI, and 
were structured to balance the importance of the PRC tourism industry 
to the CNMI with national security, public safety, and immigration 
concerns related to PRC nationals traveling visa-exempt to the CNMI. 
See 89 FR 3302-3304, 3306. To that end, EVS-TAP regulations include 
additional restrictions that do not currently pertain to the rest of 
the G-CNMI VWP. For example, under EVS-TAP, travel authorizations are 
granted for a period of one year; travelers from the PRC are allowed to 
enter only the CNMI without a visa, are not permitted to enter Guam, 
the mainland, or any other U.S. location, and are generally authorized 
to remain in the CNMI for a maximum of 14 days per visit. See 8 CFR 
212.1(r)(2), (9). In creating this regulatory program, DHS also 
explicitly preserved the Secretary's broad statutory authority in 
section 212(l)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(5), to suspend EVS-TAP. 
The applicable DHS regulation, 8 CFR 212.1(r)(3)(i), authorizes the 
Secretary to suspend EVS-TAP for good cause, including where the 
admission of PRC national visitors to the CNMI under EVS-TAP creates 
unacceptable risks to U.S. security interests, law enforcement, or 
immigration interests.
    At the time these programs were established, to fully integrate the 
two automated systems in an efficient and cost-effective manner, DHS 
determined that EVS-TAP should be implemented after the system for G-
CNMI VWP automation became fully operational. See 89 FR 3303, 3310 and 
8 CFR 212.1(r)(11). The G-CNMI VWP automation became fully operational 
in November 2024 after a transition period provided by the IFR. See 90 
FR 658, 659 (Jan. 6, 2025). On January 6, 2025, DHS published the 
required notice in the Federal Register, 90 FR 658, announcing 
implementation of EVS-TAP with an effective date of February 20, 
2025.\2\ Concurrently, the previous parole policy for PRC nationals 
seeking to enter the CNMI was discontinued on February 20, 2025. See 
id.
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    \2\ Note that the January 6, 2025, Federal Register notice 
contained a typo listing the implementation year as 2024 instead of 
2025.
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Suspension of EVS-TAP

    After careful consideration, and consistent with the authorities 
provided under section 212(l)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(5), and 
the CNRA, as well as the DHS regulations at 8 CFR 212.1(r) establishing 
EVS-TAP and giving the Secretary broad authority to suspend the 
program, see 8 CFR 212.1(r)(3), the Secretary has determined there is 
good cause to suspend the EVS-TAP. This suspension is effective at 1400 
EDT on October 30, 2026 for potential new applicants to EVS-TAP as well 
as previously approved travelers with an existing EVS-TAP travel 
authorization.\3\ PRC nationals already admitted under EVS-TAP and 
legally present in the CNMI on the effective date of this notice will 
be permitted to remain for their current authorized period of stay, 
however, these travelers will need to

[[Page 67597]]

obtain a visa for any future travel to the CNMI.
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    \3\ In addition to providing the Secretary with broad authority 
to suspend the Guam-CNMI visa waiver program on a country-by-country 
basis, section 212(l)(5) of the INA and the Department's EVS-TAP 
regulations give the Secretary broad authority to take action to 
ensure the suspension is effective, including by authorizing the 
Secretary to revoke previously approved travel authorizations. See 
section 212(l)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(5) (authorizing the 
Secretary to suspend the ``admission of nationals'' when the 
nationals of that country pose a risk to law enforcement or the 
security interests of Guam, the CNMI, or the United States, and to 
suspend the ``program at any time, on a country-by-country basis for 
good cause''); see also 8 CFR 212.1(r)(9)(vi)(C) (authorizing the 
Secretary to ``revoke'' in his discretion a determination under EVS-
TAP that an alien is eligible to travel to the CNMI to apply for 
admission under the EVS-TAP).
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    The Secretary has found good cause for the suspension because the 
United States is facing evolving and sophisticated threats which, 
combined with a significant number of PRC nationals entering the CNMI 
under EVS-TAP, creates a significant risk to the security and law 
enforcement interests of the United States. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2025, 
more than 3,000 PRC nationals utilized EVS-TAP to enter the CNMI under 
the streamlined travel authorization process.\4\ These PRC nationals 
are vetted through CBP instead of by a State Department consular 
officer. While the program was intended to facilitate economic travel 
and enhance security over the prior parole policy, this volume of visa-
exempt entries presents unacceptable security and law enforcement 
risks. DHS judges that PRC nationals are almost certainly exploiting 
EVS-TAP. Prior incidents involving PRC nationals who used the former 
parole process or other streamlined travel to the CNMI demonstrate an 
enduring vulnerability involving unauthorized onward travel and 
activity near sensitive military installations. EVS-TAP continued to 
permit travel without the additional screening associated with a 
nonimmigrant visa and therefore did not eliminate this underlying 
vulnerability.
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    \4\ Data obtained from internal CBP Arrival and Departure 
Information System, October 2025.
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    One significant national security concern is that EVS-TAP may be 
exploited to facilitate PRC espionage and intelligence collection 
directed against sensitive U.S. defense infrastructure in the region. 
The Indo-Pacific region and the security of Guam and the CNMI are of 
vital strategic importance to the United States. In the CNMI, the 
Department of War (DOW) is restoring the Tinian Air Base to support 
U.S. military strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, 
neighboring Guam is also home to several DOW military installations 
critical to homeland defense and U.S. military interests. Despite the 
strict regulatory prohibition against PRC nationals traveling beyond 
the CNMI, PRC nationals have the ability to illegally travel from the 
CNMI to Guam aboard smuggling vessels.
    For example, prior to the implementation of EVS-TAP, in March 2024, 
the United States Attorney for the Districts of Guam and the Northern 
Mariana Islands, announced sentencing of a PRC national for conspiring 
to transport illegal aliens. In this case, the PRC national smuggler 
was engaged in smuggling nine other PRC nationals from CNMI to Guam.\5\ 
Similarly, in February 2025, the United States Attorney for the 
Districts of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands in Saipan and Guam 
announced sentencing of a PRC national who had engaged in conspiracy to 
transport illegal aliens, by smuggling seven other PRC nationals from 
CNMI to Guam. Most of these PRC nationals were later encountered in or 
near sensitive military installations. As the United States Attorney at 
the time stated, these aliens ``took advantage of unique federal 
immigration regulations that permit certain foreign nationals to visit 
the CNMI as tourists. Any local economic benefits from these provisions 
are lost when those persons later attempt to unlawfully enter another 
part of the United States'' and linger around sensitive military 
installations.\6\ DHS believes that circumventing onward travel 
restrictions, potentially exposing critical U.S. military 
installations, present unacceptable risks to U.S. national security 
interests, which DHS must take action to prevent.
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    \5\ The Department of Justice, PRC Citizen Sentenced for 
Conspiring to Transport Illegal Aliens to Guam, Mar. 20, 2024. 
<a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-gu/pr/prc-citizen-sentenced-conspiring-transport-illegal-aliens-guam">https://www.justice.gov/usao-gu/pr/prc-citizen-sentenced-conspiring-transport-illegal-aliens-guam</a>, last accessed: Sept. 30, 2026.
    \6\ The Department of Justice, Citizen from the People's 
Republic of China Sentenced for Conspiracy to Transport Illegal 
Aliens, Feb. 25, 2025. <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-gu/pr/citizen-peoples-republic-china-sentenced-conspiracy-transport-illegal-aliens">https://www.justice.gov/usao-gu/pr/citizen-peoples-republic-china-sentenced-conspiracy-transport-illegal-aliens</a>, last accessed: Sept. 30, 2026.
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    In addition to espionage, EVS-TAP may create immigration 
enforcement challenges by aliens who seek to exploit EVS-TAP to engage 
in birth tourism and secure U.S. citizenship for children with no 
lasting ties to the United States. While birth tourism has long been an 
issue in the CNMI, the availability of visa-exempt travel and reduced 
vetting under EVS-TAP may lower barriers to this practice. Birth 
tourism can strain medical infrastructure in the CNMI and harm local 
citizens. Additionally, birth tourism may also be utilized to 
facilitate long-term intelligence or espionage activities. Suspending 
EVS-TAP allows DHS to evaluate measures to mitigate this threat.
    Furthermore, the CNMI's history of PRC-linked criminal activity 
demonstrates the risks that must be considered when assessing 
streamlined, visa-exempt travel under EVS-TAP. The CNMI has previously 
experienced criminal activity, including significant money laundering 
and labor abuses from enterprises operated by PRC-linked entities, most 
notably the development of a casino gaming operation in Saipan. While a 
permanent casino was under construction, a PRC company opened a 
temporary casino that was linked to money laundering and labor abuses. 
This temporary facility, located in a former shopping mall, reported 
more than $2 billion monthly in VIP bets, rivaling Macau.\7\ Meanwhile, 
the construction of the permanent facility was plagued by labor 
violations resulting in millions of dollars in fines. The executives of 
the operating company were eventually indicted on Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act charges.\8\ Yet, open-source 
reporting indicates that individuals linked to the prior operators have 
since purchased and resumed construction on the permanent casino.\9\ 
Given these developments, DHS believes that facilitating visa-exempt 
access to the CNMI for PRC nationals contributes to an unacceptable 
risk of fueling organized criminal networks, financial crimes, and 
labor abuses in the CNMI.
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    \7\ Campbell, Matthew. ``A Chinese Casino Has Conquered a Piece 
of America.'' Bloomberg, Feb. 15, 2018.
    \8\ U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs. 
``Imperial Pacific International and MCC International Saipan 
Executives Indicted on Federal Charges.'' Press release, Aug. 4, 
2020. Updated Feb. 5, 2025.
    \9\ Dale, Oliver. ``Failed Saipan Casino Sells for $13 Million 
After Years of Controversy.'' Parameter, Aug. 27, 2025.
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Consideration of Potential Reliance Interests

    Section 212(l)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(5), and 8 CFR 
212.1(r)(3)(i) authorize suspension for good cause based on risks to 
national security, law enforcement, and immigration enforcement. These 
provisions do not require the Secretary to balance national security or 
law enforcement interests, including immigration, against any economic 
or other reliance interests that may be impacted by a suspension. 
Rather, the statute and regulation commit the evaluation of good cause 
to the broad and sole discretion of the Secretary, focusing squarely on 
whether the admission of PRC nationals threatens the security and law 
enforcement interests of the United States and its territories, 
including the CNMI.
    Although the suspension standard does not prescribe a separate 
economic balancing test, the Secretary has considered the potential 
reliance interests of CNMI businesses and affected travelers. DHS 
acknowledges that certain businesses in the CNMI may have developed 
business plans based on tourism and commercial travel from EVS-TAP or 
the prior parole policy that

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EVS-TAP replaced. Similarly, DHS recognizes that prospective travelers 
from the PRC may be inconvenienced or face financial loss from this 
suspension and revocation of travel authorizations. DHS believes, 
however, that any such impacts are mitigated by the fact that bona fide 
visitors for business or pleasure from the PRC remain able to obtain a 
nonimmigrant visa to travel to the CNMI. See 8 CFR 212.1(r)(9)(vi)(B). 
In any event, DHS has determined that the identified acute risks to the 
national security, immigration, and law enforcement interests of the 
United States outweigh any countervailing personal or economic 
interests.

Notice of Suspension of EVS-TAP

    For the above discussed reasons, and in accordance with section 
212(l)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(5), and 8 CFR 212.1(r)(3), the 
Secretary is suspending EVS-TAP, which includes both future applicants 
for EVS-TAP travel authorization as well as any currently active EVS-
TAP travel authorizations, except that PRC nationals already admitted 
under EVS-TAP and legally present in the CNMI on the effective date of 
this notice will be permitted to remain for their authorized period of 
stay. This suspension is effective at 1400 EDT on October 30, 2026.
    As of 1400 EDT on October 30, 2026, PRC nationals seeking to travel 
to the CNMI for a temporary visit for business or pleasure must obtain 
an appropriate nonimmigrant visa before traveling to the CNMI unless 
another lawful exception applies. This suspension does not reinstate 
the prior parole policy for PRC nationals seeking to enter the CNMI, 
which was discontinued on February 20, 2025. See 90 FR 658.

Markwayne Mullin,
Secretary of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2026-21880 Filed 10-26-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-14-P


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