L Krenk DBA Maui Clinic Pharmacy; Decision and Order

Issuing agencies

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 195 (Friday, October 9, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 195 (Friday, October 9, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64689-64692]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-20750]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration


L Krenk DBA Maui Clinic Pharmacy; Decision and Order

    On November 19, 2025, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or 
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to L Krenk DBA Maui 
Clinic Pharmacy of Kahului, Hawaii (Registrant). Request for Final 
Agency Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 1, at 1, 6. The OSC proposed the 
revocation of Registrant's DEA registration, No. BL3161178, alleging 
that its continued registration would be inconsistent with the public 
interest. Id. at 1, 3 (citing 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), 824(a)(4)).
    More specifically, the OSC alleged that Registrant and its owner, 
from March 2023 to July 9, 2024, violated federal and state law by 
dispensing controlled substance prescriptions from an unregistered 
location, and violated federal law by failing to comply with 
recordkeeping requirements as evidenced by ``significant unexplained 
overages and shortages of controlled substances.'' Id. at 4.
    On April 16, 2026, the Government submitted an RFAA requesting that 
the Agency issue a default final order revoking Registrant's 
registration. RFAA, at 3. After carefully reviewing the entire record 
and conducting the analysis set forth below, the Agency grants the 
Government's RFAA and revokes Registrant's registration.

I. Default Determination

    Under 21 CFR 1301.43, a registrant entitled to a hearing who fails 
to file a timely hearing request ``within 30 days after the date of 
receipt of the [OSC] . . . shall be deemed to have waived their right 
to a hearing and to be in default'' unless ``good cause'' is 
established for the failure. 21 CFR 1301.43(a), (c)(1). In the absence 
of a determination of good cause, a registrant who fails to timely file 
an answer also is ``deemed to have waived their right to a hearing and 
to be in default.'' 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(2). Unless excused, a default is 
deemed to constitute ``an admission of the factual allegations of the 
[OSC].'' 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
    The OSC informed Registrant that it has a right to file a written 
request for hearing and answer, and that if it failed to file such a 
request and answer, it would be deemed to have waived its right to a 
hearing and to be in default.\1\ RFAAX 1, at 5 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). 
Here, Registrant did not request a hearing or file an answer. RFAA, at 
1-2. Further, the Agency notes that more than forty-five days have 
passed since the OSC was served on Registrant, yet the Agency has not 
received a motion by Registrant to be excused from default for good 
cause. 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(1). Thus, the Agency determines that 
Registrant is in default and, therefore, Registrant is deemed to admit 
the factual allegations in the OSC. 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(1), (e), (f)(1).
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    \1\ According to a Declaration that a DEA Special Agent (SA) 
signed under penalty of perjury, SA and a Task Force Officer 
personally served the OSC on the owner of Registrant, Mr. Leslie 
Krenk, at Registrant's registered address on November 21, 2025. 
RFAA, SA Declaration Attachment, at 1. The record also includes a 
signed Form DEA-12, which supports the content of the SA Declaration 
that the OSC was personally served on Registrant's owner on November 
21, 2025. RFAA, Exhibit 2, at 1. The Agency, thus, determines that 
service of the OSC on Registrant was legally sufficient and took 
place on November 21, 2025. It is now more than thirty days since 
Registrant received service of the OSC.
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II. Public Interest Determination

A. Overview of Law

    Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) ``to conquer 
drug abuse and control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in 
controlled substances.'' Gonzales v. Raich, 545

[[Page 64690]]

U.S. 1, 12 (2005). A particular concern of Congress was ``the need to 
prevent the diversion of drugs from legitimate to illicit channels,'' 
and it ``devised a closed regulatory system making it unlawful to 
manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substance 
except in a manner authorized by the CSA.'' Id. at 12-13.
    The CSA requires, under this closed regulatory system, that 
``[e]very person who dispenses, or who proposes to dispense, any 
controlled substance, shall obtain from the [DEA] a registration.'' 21 
U.S.C. 822(a)(2); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. at 27-28. To protect the 
American people and ensure compliance with the CSA, Congress empowered 
the Agency to deny, suspend, or revoke a registration if granting or 
continuing a registration ``would be inconsistent with the public 
interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), 824(a)(4); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 
U.S. 243, 251 (2006).
    In determining whether a registrant's registration would be 
inconsistent with the public interest, the Agency analyzes five 
statutorily established ``public interest factors.'' Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. at 251; 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1)(A)-(E). The five factors 
are:

    (A) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board 
or professional disciplinary authority.
    (B) The [registrant]'s experience in dispensing, or conducting 
research with respect to controlled substances.
    (C) The [registrant]'s conviction record under Federal or State 
laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 
controlled substances.
    (D) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws 
relating to controlled substances.
    (E) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and 
safety.

    21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1).
    These five public interest factors are considered in the 
disjunctive. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. at 292-93 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Robert A. Leslie, M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). Each 
factor is weighed on a case-by-case basis. David H. Gillis, M.D., 58 FR 
37507, 37508 (1993). Any one factor, or combination of factors, may be 
decisive, Gillis, 58 FR at 37508, and the Agency `` `may give each 
factor the weight . . . deem[ed] appropriate in determining whether a 
registration should be revoked or an application for registration 
denied.' '' Morall v. Drug Enf't Admin., 412 F.3d 165, 185 n.2 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) (Henderson, J., concurring) (quoting Robert A. Smith, M.D., 
70 FR 33207, 33208 (2005)); see Penick Corp., Inc. v. Drug Enf't 
Admin., 491 F.3d 483, 490 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Agency has taken this 
approach for decades. See Henry J. Schwarz, Jr., M.D., 54 FR 16422, 
16424 (1989) (determining, in 1989, that ``[t]he [Agency] need not make 
findings as to all of the factors . . . [and that the Agency] may give 
each factor the weight [it] deems appropriate,'' and basing denial on 
only two factors); Neveille H. Williams, D.D.S., 53 FR 23465, 23466 
(1988) (holding, in 1988, and citing a 1986 case, that ``[a]ll factors 
need not be present for the [Agency] to'' issue a sanction and that the 
Agency ``may accord each factor the weight [it] deems appropriate in 
determining the public interest'' (citing Paul Stepak, M.D., 51 FR 
17556 (1986))).
    While the Agency is required to consider each of the factors, it 
``need not make explicit findings as to each one.'' MacKay v. Drug 
Enf't Admin., 664 F.3d 808, 816 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Volkman v. 
U.S. Drug Enf't Admin., 567 F.3d 215, 222 (6th Cir. 2009)); Jones Total 
Health Care Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug Enf't Admin., 881 F.3d 823, 830 (11th 
Cir. 2018); Hoxie v. Drug Enf't Admin., 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 
2005). ``In short, . . . the Agency is not required to mechanically 
count up the factors and determine how many favor the Government and 
how many favor the registrant. Rather, it is an inquiry which focuses 
on protecting the public interest; what matters is the seriousness of 
the registrant's misconduct.'' Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 FR 459, 462 
(2009). Accordingly, Agency decisions have explained that findings 
under a single factor can support the revocation of a registration. 
MacKay, 664 F.3d at 821.
    The Government has the burden of proof in this proceeding, 21 CFR 
1301.44(e), and the Agency must make its findings based on 
``substantial [record] evidence.'' 5 U.S.C. 556(d); see 5 U.S.C. 
706(2); 21 U.S.C. 877. If the Government meets its burden of 
establishing a prima facie case that Registrant's registration is not 
in the public interest, then the burden shifts to Registrant to rebut 
the Government's case. Pharmacy Doctor Enters., Inc. v. Drug Enf't 
Admin., 789 Fed. Appx. 724, 729 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Jones Total 
Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 830).
    In this matter, the Government's evidence is confined to Factors B 
and D. RFAA, at 1-3. The Agency considers evidence under Factors B and 
D when the evidence concerns Registrant's experience in dispensing 
controlled substances, and Registrant's compliance with applicable 
State, Federal, or local laws relating to controlled substances, 
respectively. See Ashraf v. United States, 153 F.4th 1161, 1160-70 
(11th Cir. 2025); Kareem Hubbard, M.D., 87 FR 21156, 21162 (2022).
    The CSA also addresses the role of states in the enforcement of its 
provisions. According to 21 U.S.C. 903, ``Application of State law,'' 
``[n]o provision of . . . [Subchapter I] shall be construed as 
indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in 
which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the 
exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would 
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a 
positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that 
State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.'' 21 
U.S.C. 903 (the CSA's non-preemption provision); Gonzales v. Oregon, 
546 U.S. at 270-71.
    The ramifications of the CSA's non-preemption provision are 
significant for the Agency's enforcement of the CSA. As the Supreme 
Court explains in Gonzales v. Oregon, in the context of physicians 
dispensing controlled substances, the CSA and Supreme Court case law 
``amply support the conclusion that Congress regulates medical practice 
insofar as it bars doctors from using their prescription-writing powers 
as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and trafficking as 
conventionally understood.'' Id. at 269-70. The Court continues, 
explaining that, ``beyond this, however, the . . . [CSA] manifests no 
intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally. The silence is 
understandable given the structure and limitations of federalism, which 
allow the States `great latitude under their police powers to legislate 
as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of 
all persons.' Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475, 116 S.Ct. 
2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 
(1985)).'' Id. at 270 (citation modified).
    The Supreme Court also states that the ``structure and operation of 
the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning medical profession 
regulated under the States' police powers.'' Id. (citing the provisions 
of 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), formerly 21 U.S.C. 823(f), and pointing out 
that the ``Attorney General can register a physician to dispense 
controlled substances `if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . 
controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he 
practices' ''). Further, the Supreme Court states, ``[w]hen considering 
whether to revoke a physician's registration, the Attorney General 
looks not just to violations of federal laws; but he `shall' also 
consider

[[Page 64691]]

`[t]he recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board or 
professional disciplinary authority' and the registrant's compliance 
with state and local drug laws.'' Id. The Supreme Court also highlights 
the fact that the ``very definition of a `practitioner' eligible to 
prescribe [controlled substances] includes physicians `licensed, 
registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or the 
jurisdiction in which he practices' to dispense controlled 
substances.'' Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 802(21)). Finally, the Supreme 
Court even presaged, cautioned against, and debunked, ``conclusions 
that the CSA effectively displaces the States' general regulation of 
medical practice.'' Id.
    As the Supreme Court stated, ``[i]n the face of the CSA's silence 
on the practice of medicine generally[,] and its recognition of state 
regulation of the medical profession[,] it is difficult to defend'' a 
statement that state legal requirements for practitioners play no role 
in enforcement of the CSA. Id. at 272. Instead, the CSA's non-
preemption provision means that, except for one instance, the CSA 
respects, and enforces, state laws regulating the professional actions 
of federal controlled substance registration holders.\2\
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    \2\ The only circumstance in which Congress set such a uniform 
national standard in connection with the CSA is in 42 U.S.C. 290bb-
2a, a provision concerning the ``appropriate methods of professional 
practice in the medical treatment of the narcotic addiction of 
various classes of narcotic addicts.'' Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 
at 270-71. According to the Supreme Court's analysis, the existence 
of this provision concerning the appropriate methods of professional 
practice in the medical treatment of classes of narcotic addicts 
``strengthens the understanding of the CSA as a statute combating 
recreational drug abuse,'' and ``also indicates that when Congress 
wants to regulate medical practice in the given scheme, it does so 
by explicit language in the statute.'' Id. at 272 [emphasis added].
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    As specifically relevant to this Registrant and this OSC, for 
example, the CSA's non-preemption provision means that Hawaii legal 
provisions concerning the dispensing of controlled substances from 
registered locations apply to Registrant along with federal dispensing 
of controlled substances from registered location requirements. 
Further, if the alleged violations of Hawaii law are established, they 
may contribute to a prima facie case for revocation of Registrant's 
registration. 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1)(D).

B. Applicable Federal and State Law

    The OSC alleges that Registrant (1) dispensed controlled substances 
from an unregistered location and (2) could not account for controlled 
substances. RFAAX 1, at 4.
    As for the unregistered location allegations, the CSA's 
implementing regulations require every person to obtain a registration 
to dispense a controlled substance, absent an exemption. 21 CFR 
1301.11(a). The CSA's implementing regulations also require a separate 
registration for each principal place of business where controlled 
substances are dispensed. 21 CFR 1301.12(a).
    Similarly, Hawaii law requires a separate registration for each 
principal place of business where Registrant dispenses controlled 
substances. Haw. Code R. Stat. 23-200-10 (2000).\3\ Hawaii law also 
requires a Board of Pharmacy permit before operating, or changing the 
location of, a pharmacy. Haw. Rev. Stat. 461-14(a) (2008). Further, 
Hawaii law requires registered pharmacists in charge of a pharmacy to 
comply with all laws and rules, including a requirement to notify the 
Pharmacy Board within ten days of changes of business address. Haw. 
Rev. Stat. 461-11 (2001).
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    \3\ All but one of the alleged Hawaii legal authority violations 
involves a statute or regulation currently in effect. The exception 
is Hawaii Revised Statute 461-21, whose current iteration dates from 
May 27, 2025. Accordingly, due to the dates of Registrant's OSC-
alleged violations, the Agency is applying the previous iteration of 
this statute, effective from July 3, 2017, to May 26, 2025, to this 
adjudication.
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    As for the unaccounted-for controlled substances allegations, the 
CSA's implementing regulations specify, among other things, 
requirements for inventories, including initial and biennial 
inventories.\4\ 21 CFR 1304.11 (a)-(c). The CSA's implementing 
regulations also state that registrants required to keep records shall 
maintain, on a current basis, a complete and accurate record of each 
controlled substance received, sold, or otherwise disposed of. 21 CFR 
1304.21(a). Further, the CSA's implementing regulations state that 
inventory and other required records must be kept and be available for 
at least two years for inspection and copying by DEA employees. 21 CFR 
1304.04(a).
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    \4\ The OSC does not identify a Hawaii legal authority 
specifically supporting the unaccounted-for controlled substances 
allegations.
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C. Findings of Fact

    In light of Registrant's default, the factual allegations in the 
OSC are deemed admitted and are proven by substantial evidence, indeed, 
proven incontrovertibly and unequivocally, as follows.\5\ 21 CFR 
1301.43(e).
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    \5\ Registrant is also deemed to admit that it is registered to 
handle controlled substances in Schedules II through V under DEA 
registration No. BL3161178, that its registered address is 22 Hana 
Highway, Suite B, Kahului, Hawaii, 96732, that it is licensed in the 
State of Hawaii as a pharmacy with license number PHY-476, and that 
it is also licensed by the State of Hawaii Narcotics Enforcement 
Board with license number E17037. Given these deemed admissions, 
Registrant does not contest that it is subject to the Agency's 
administrative enforcement of the CSA.
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    Prior to mid-March of 2023, Registrant's registered location was 53 
S. Pruunene Street, Suite 120, Kahului, Hawaii 96732. RFAAX 1, at 4. In 
mid-March, Registrant ceased operations at 53 S. Pruunene Street and 
began operating from a new location at 22 Hana Highway, Suite B, 
Kahului, Hawaii 96732. Id. Prior to relocating, Registrant failed to 
inform the Hawaii Pharmacy Board and the State of Hawaii Narcotics 
Enforcement Board of its intent to move from the S. Pruunene Street 
location to the Hana Highway location. Id. Further, Registrant failed 
to notify the Hawaii Pharmacy Board of its new address within 10 days 
of the move. Id. Between April 1, 2023, and August 23, 2023, Registrant 
dispensed approximately 300 prescriptions for various controlled 
substances, including Schedule II opioids, from the new, unregistered 
location. Id.
    For the inspection period of May 1, 2023, through July 9, 2024, 
Registrant had significant record keeping and inventory discrepancies, 
resulting in significant, unexplained overages and shortages of 
controlled substances. Id. at 4-5. Between July 9, 2024, and September 
17, 2024, DEA collected the necessary documents to conduct an 
accountability audit of various controlled substances at Registrant for 
the period of May 1, 2023, through July 9, 2024. Id. at 4. The 
accountability audit revealed a significant number of record keeping 
and inventory discrepancies by Registrant totaling 4,779 unaccounted-
for dosage units. See id. at 4-5. Of that total number, 1,804 dosage 
units are Schedule II (shortage of oxycodone 15 mg and overages of 
hydrocodone acetaminophen and oxycodone acetaminophen), 708 dosage 
units are Schedule III (shortage of buprenorphine/naloxone 8-2), and 
2,267 dosage units are Schedule IV (shortage of alprazolam 1 mg as well 
as an overage of Tramadol).\6\ See id. at 5.
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    \6\ Tramadol is mis-labeled a Schedule V controlled substance in 
the OSC.
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D. Conclusions of Law

    The Agency determines that the OSC's deemed-admitted factual 
allegations present prima facie cases that Registrant dispensed 
controlled substances from an unregistered location, in violation of 21 
CFR 1301.11(a), 21 CFR 1301.12(a), Haw. Code R. Stat. 23-200-10 (2000), 
Haw.

[[Page 64692]]

Rev. Stat. 461-14(a) (2008), and Haw. Rev. Stat. 461-11 (2001). Supra 
Section II.C. The Agency further determines that the OSC's deemed-
admitted factual allegations present prima facie cases that Registrant 
had unaccounted-for controlled substances, in violation of 21 CFR 
1304.11(a-c), 21 CFR 1304.21(a), and 21 CFR 1304.04(a). Id.

E. Public Interest Conclusion

    While the Agency considered all the public interest factors of 21 
U.S.C. 823(g)(1), its determinations are relevant to Factor B 
(experience dispensing controlled substances) and Factor D (compliance 
with applicable State, Federal, or local laws relating to controlled 
substances). 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1); Pharmacy Doctors, 789 Fed. App'x at 
729-30, accord Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 829-30, 
Hoxie v. Drug Enf't Admin., 419 F.3d at 481-82; Kareem Hubbard, M.D., 
87 FR at 21162. Accordingly, the Agency determines that, after 
considering the public interest factors, and the facts deemed admitted 
by virtue of Registrant's default, the Government satisfied its prima 
facie burden of showing that Registrant ``has committed such acts as 
would render [its] registration under section 823 of this title 
inconsistent with the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). The 
Agency further finds that, in light of Respondent's failure to respond, 
there is no mitigating evidence to rebut the Government's prima facie 
case. Thus, the only remaining issue is whether revocation of 
Registrant's registration is the appropriate sanction.

III. Sanction

    Where, as here, the Government presented a prima facie case that 
Registrant's continued registration would be inconsistent with the 
public interest, the burden shifts to Registrant to show why it can be 
entrusted with a registration. Morall, 412 F.3d at 174; Jones Total 
Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 830; Garrett Howard Smith, M.D., 83 
FR 18882, 18904 (2018). The issue of trust is necessarily a fact-
dependent determination based on the circumstances presented by the 
individual registrant. Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 
833; Jeffrey Stein, M.D., 84 FR 46968, 46972 (2019). Moreover, as 
``past performance is the best predictor of future performance,'' the 
Agency requires that a registrant who has committed acts inconsistent 
with the public interest accepts responsibility for those acts, 
understands the gravity and seriousness of the misconduct, and 
demonstrates that the registrant will not engage in future misconduct. 
ALRA Labs., Inc. v. Drug Enf't Admin., 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 
1995); Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 831-33. The Agency 
requires a registrant's unequivocal acceptance of responsibility. Janet 
S. Pettyjohn, D.O., 89 FR 82639, 82641 (2024); Mohammed Asgar, M.D., 83 
FR 29569, 29573 (2018); Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 
830-31. In addition, a registrant's candor during the investigation and 
hearing, if one is requested, is an important factor in determining 
acceptance of responsibility and the appropriate sanction. Jones Total 
Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 830-31; Hoxie, 419 F.3d at 483-84. 
Further, the Agency considers the egregiousness and extent of the 
misconduct as significant factors in determining the appropriate 
sanction. Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 834 & n.4. The 
Agency also considers the need to deter similar acts by a registrant 
and by the community of registrants. Stein, 84 FR at 46972-73.
    Here, Registrant did not timely request a hearing or timely answer 
the allegations, and is, therefore, deemed to have waived its right to 
a hearing and to be in default. 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(1), (e), (f)(1); 
RFAA, at 1-2. Thus, there is no record evidence that Registrant takes 
responsibility, let alone unequivocal responsibility, for the founded 
violations. Further, the record evidence is that, on or about September 
30, 2019, Registrant and the United States Attorney's Office for the 
District of Hawaii entered into a settlement agreement in which 
Registrant agreed to pay a fine and comply with the CSA and its 
implementing regulations. RFAAX 1, at 3. The existence of the OSC and 
this adjudication show that Registrant violated that settlement 
agreement. Accordingly, Registrant has not convinced the Agency that 
its future controlled-substance-related actions will comply with the 
CSA such that the Agency should continue to entrust it with a 
registration.
    Further, the interests of specific and general deterrence weigh in 
favor of revocation. Registrant's founded violations concern the CSA's 
``strict requirements regarding registration'' and, therefore, go to 
the heart of the CSA's ``closed regulatory system'' specifically 
designed ``to conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and 
illegitimate traffic in controlled substances,'' and to the heart of 
the Agency's law enforcement mission. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. at 
12-14. Registrant's egregious violations also involve dispensing 
controlled substances from an unregistered location, and a combined 
4,779 unaccounted-for overages and shortages of controlled substance 
dosage units. If the Agency were to allow Registrant to maintain its 
registration under these circumstances, it would send an inaccurate 
message--that dispensing controlled substances according to minimal 
state standards and in compliance with state and federal law is not 
essential to maintaining a registration.
    In sum, Registrant has not submitted any record evidence that 
rebuts the Government's prima facie case for revocation of its 
registration, and that convinces the Agency that it should continue to 
entrust Registrant with a DEA registration. The record, thus, supports 
the imposition of a sanction. Accordingly, the Agency will order the 
revocation of Registrant's registration.

Order

    Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 
U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No. 
BL3161178 issued to L Krenk DBA Maui Clinic Pharmacy. Further, pursuant 
to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 
823(g)(1), I hereby deny any pending applications of L Krenk DBA Maui 
Clinic Pharmacy to renew or modify this registration, as well as any 
other pending application of L Krenk DBA Maui Clinic Pharmacy for 
additional registration in Hawaii. This Order is effective November 9, 
2026.

Signing Authority

    This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on 
October 5, 2026, by DEA Administrator Terrance C. Cole. That document 
with the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For 
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of 
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal 
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the 
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document 
of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect 
of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.

Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2026-20750 Filed 10-8-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P


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