By Grace Inc. Counseling Services; Decision and Order

Issuing agencies

Full Text

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 190 (Friday, October 2, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 190 (Friday, October 2, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 62748-62754]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-20226]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration


By Grace Inc. Counseling Services; Decision and Order

I. Introduction

    On October 29, 2024, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or 
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to By Grace Inc. 
Counseling Services of Baltimore, Maryland (Respondent). OSC, at 1. The 
OSC proposed the revocation of Respondent's DEA registration, No. 
RB0369733, alleging that Respondent, a narcotic treatment program 
(NTP), ``demonstrated a lack of effective controls and procedures to 
guard against the diversion of controlled substances'' and committed 
numerous recordkeeping violations that rendered DEA unable to determine 
an accurate and complete inventory of the controlled substances on 
hand. Id. at 2-4 (citing 21 U.S.C. 823(g); 21 U.S.C. 824(a); \1\ 21 CFR 
1304.11(a)-(c), 1304.11(c), 1304.21(a), (d), 1304.04(a), (f)(2), 
1304.24(a), 1305.05). The Government additionally alleged in its 
Prehearing Statement that Respondent materially falsified its 
application for a DEA registration by falsely responding ``no'' to 
Liability Question 4--which asks whether any officer of the corporation 
has ever been convicted of a crime in connection with controlled 
substances--and by failing to disclose that its owner was convicted of 
unlawful possession of controlled substances in Maryland. 
Administrative Law Judge Exhibit (ALJX) 6, at 2-3.\2\
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    \1\ In addition to alleging that Respondent violated 21 U.S.C. 
823(h) by failing to maintain adequate records of its dispensing of 
controlled substances, the OSC alleged that Respondent's 
recordkeeping violations rendered its registration inconsistent with 
the public interest under 21 U.S.C. 824(a). OSC, at 2. Because the 
Government's Post-Hearing Brief discussed Respondent's recordkeeping 
violations in the context of 21 U.S.C. 823(h) rather than analyzing 
the public interest factors, the Agency treats the public interest 
allegation as abandoned and does not consider it.
    \2\ The Government also alleged that Respondent ordered 
controlled substances when it lacked state authority. The Agency 
agrees with the ALJ that the Government did not provide notice in 
the OSC of the laws violated by this conduct, nor did the Government 
demonstrate through substantial evidence that Respondent lacked 
state authority when it ordered the controlled substances. RD, at 
18-19.
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    After conducting a hearing, Administrative Law Judge Paul E. 
Soeffing (ALJ) issued his Recommended Rulings, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
(Recommended Decision or RD) on May 14, 2025. The RD recommended that 
the Agency revoke Respondent's registration. RD, at 28. On June 3, 
2025, the Government timely filed exceptions. The Agency adopts and 
hereby incorporates by reference the ALJ's credibility findings,\3\ 
findings of fact, conclusions of law related to the Government's 
recordkeeping allegations, sanctions analysis, and recommended 
sanction, and summarizes and clarifies portions thereof herein. The 
Agency does not adopt the ALJ's conclusions of law related to the 
Government's material falsification allegation. Specifically, the 
Agency disagrees with the ALJ's conclusion that the Agency does not 
have authority to revoke an NTP's registration based on the material 
falsification of a DEA application and the Agency finds that the 
Government's material falsification allegation is supported by 
substantial evidence.
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    \3\ The Agency adopts the ALJ's summary of each witness's 
testimony, as well as the ALJ's assessment of each witness's 
credibility. See RD, at 2-13.
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II. Respondent's Recordkeeping Violations

A. Applicable Law

    Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) ``to conquer 
drug abuse and control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in 
controlled substances.'' Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 (2005). A 
particular concern of Congress was ``the need to prevent the diversion 
of drugs from legitimate to illicit channels,'' and it ``devised a 
closed regulatory system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, 
dispense, or possess any controlled substance except in a manner 
authorized by the CSA.'' Id. at 12-13.
    The CSA's requirements under this closed regulatory system include 
that ``every person who dispenses, or who proposes to dispense, any 
controlled substance, shall obtain from the [DEA] a registration.'' 21 
U.S.C. 822(a)(2); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. at 27-28. To 
protect the American people and ensure compliance with the CSA, 
Congress empowered the Agency to deny, suspend, or revoke a DEA 
registration if the registrant failed to comply with the CSA's 
recordkeeping requirements. 21 U.S.C. 824(a); 21 U.S.C. 823(h); 
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 251 (2006).
    The Respondent in this case is registered as an NTP under 21 U.S.C. 
823(h). Under Section 304 of the CSA, ``a registration pursuant to 
section 823(h)[ ] of this title to dispense a narcotic drug for 
maintenance treatment or detoxification treatment may be suspended or 
revoked by the Attorney General upon a finding that the registrant has 
failed to comply with any standard referred to in section 823(h)[ ] \4\ 
of this title.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a). Section 823(h) outlines three 
prerequisites for a practitioner applying for a registration to 
dispense narcotic drugs for maintenance treatment or detoxification 
treatment:
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    \4\ The subsection of 21 U.S.C. 823 applicable to narcotic 
treatment programs was modified on December 2, 2022, and again on 
December 28, 2022. Prior to the modifications, the relevant 
subsection applicable to narcotic treatment programs was designated 
as 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), and it had three subparts, A-B, which 
outlined the prerequisites for registration as a narcotic treatment 
program. On December 2, 2022, the subsection was redesignated as 21 
U.S.C. 823(h)(1), and it retained the same three subparts as the 
previous version, A-B. On December 28, 2022, the subsection was 
again redesignated as 21 U.S.C. 823(h), and the three subparts 
outlining the registration prerequisites were redesignated as 1-3. 
The December 28, 2022, citation is used throughout this decision.
     21 U.S.C. 824(a), which authorizes the Attorney General to 
suspend or revoke the registration of a narcotic treatment if the 
registration prerequisites are not met, references back to the 
relevant subsections of 21 U.S.C. 823. Prior to December 2, 2022, 
the revocation provisions of Sec.  824(a) referred to the 
registration prerequisites in Sec.  823(g)(1)(A-B). On December 2, 
2022, 21 U.S.C. 824(a) was modified to reference the registration 
prerequisites in Sec.  823(h)(1)(A-B). However, 21 U.S.C. 824(a) was 
not modified again to reflect the December 28, 2022 redesignation 
from 823(h)(1) to 823(h). As explained below, this was clearly an 
unintentional technical error.
    As currently written, 21 U.S.C. 824(a) would only authorize the 
Attorney General to revoke a registration if the applicant is not 
``qualified . . . to engage in the treatment with respect to which 
registration is sought,'' because it only references 823(h)(1), and 
not (h)(2) or (h)(3). However, there have not been any substantive 
changes to Sec.  823 or Sec.  824 that reflect an intent to limit 
the Attorney General's authority to revoke or suspend. Section 
823(h) continues to clearly state that a registrant is not qualified 
to possess a registration unless all three subparts are met. 
Therefore, the Agency concludes that the failure to modify Sec.  
824(a) on December 22, 2022, was an oversight, and that Congress 
intended for the Attorney General to retain authority to suspend or 
revoke a registration if a registrant fails to adhere to any of the 
three registration prerequisites or standards referred to in section 
823(h). See Dept. of Def., Army Air Force Exchange Serv. v. Fed. 
Labor Relations Auth., 659 F.2d 1140, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982) (A statute should be read in a ``manner 
which effectuates rather than frustrates the major purpose of the 
legislative draftsmen.'').

    (1) ``the applicant . . . is determined by the Secretary to be 
qualified . . . to engage in the treatment with respect to which 
registration is sought;''

[[Page 62749]]

    (2) ``the Attorney General determines that the applicant will 
comply with standards established by the Attorney General respecting 
(A) security of stocks of narcotic drugs for such treatment, and (B) 
the maintenance of records (in accordance with section 827 of this 
title) on such drugs''; and
    (3) ``the Secretary determines that the applicant will comply 
with standards established by the Secretary . . . respecting the 
quantities of narcotic drugs which may be provided for unsupervised 
use by individuals in such treatment.''
21 U.S.C. 823(h).
    As the Agency has previously observed, ``in contrast to every other 
category of registration set forth in section 823, Congress did not 
characterize these three provisions as `factors' to be considered and 
given discretionary weight `[i]n determining the public interest.' . . 
. Rather, the three subparagraphs of section 823[h] are conditions for 
registration.'' Turning Tide, Inc., 81 FR 47411, 47413 (2016).
    In this matter, the Government's evidence in support of its prima 
facie case relates to Respondent's failure to comply with the 
requirements of 21 U.S.C. 823(h)(2) regarding ``maintenance of 
records'' for narcotic drugs. RFAAX 3, at 1-4.
i. Continuing Records
    According to the CSA and its implementing regulations, every 
registrant dispensing controlled substances, including NTPs, ``shall 
maintain, on a current basis, a complete and accurate record of each 
controlled substance . . . received, sold, delivered, or otherwise 
disposed of . . . .'' 21 U.S.C. 827(a)(3); 21 CFR 1304.21(a).\5\ These 
records must include ``the date on which the controlled substances are 
actually received, distributed, otherwise transferred, or destroyed.'' 
21 CFR 1304.21(d). NTPs also must maintain a dispensing log with the 
following details about each narcotic controlled substance dispensed: 
``(1) Name of substance; (2) Strength of substance; (3) Dosage form; 
(4) Date dispensed; (5) Adequate identification of patient (consumer); 
(6) Amount consumed; (7) Amount and dosage form taken home by patient; 
and (8) Dispenser's initials.'' Id. Sec.  1304.24(a). The Agency has 
repeatedly emphasized the importance of maintaining an accurate count 
of controlled substances on hand, observing that ``the inability to 
account for a significant number of dosage units creates a grave risk 
of diversion.'' Houston Maintenance Clinic, 83 FR 42144, 42157 (2018) 
(citing Med. Shoppe-Jonesborough, 73 FR 364, 367 (2008); Paul H. 
Volkman, M.D., 73 FR 30630, 30644 (2008)).
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    \5\ Pursuant to 21 CFR 1304.03, 1304.21, every registrant, 
unless exempted, must comply with the recordkeeping and inventory 
requirements outlined in DEA's implementing regulations. NTPs are 
explicitly named in 21 CFR 1304.04(f) as a registrant that must 
maintain records.
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    ii. Inventories
    NTPs also must maintain an ``initial inventory . . . of all stocks 
of controlled substances on hand on the date [the pharmacy] first 
engages in the . . . dispensing of controlled substances,'' as well as 
a ``biennial inventory . . . of all stocks of controlled substances on 
hand.'' 21 CFR 1304.11(a)-(c); see also 21 U.S.C. 827 (``every 
registrant . . . shall . . . as soon [] as such registrant first 
engages in the . . . dispensing of controlled substances, and every 
second year thereafter, make a complete and accurate record of all 
stocks thereof on hand''). A biennial inventory ``may be taken either 
as of opening of business or as of the close of business on the 
inventory date and it shall be indicated on the inventory.'' 21 CFR 
1304.11(a). A biennial inventory shall include, for each controlled 
substance in finished form: (1) the name of the substance; (2) the 
finished form of the substance (e.g., 10 mg tablet); (3) the number of 
units or volume of each finished form in each commercial container 
(e.g., 100-tablet bottle); and (4) the number of commercial containers 
of each such finished form (e.g., four 100-tablet bottles). 21 CFR 
1304.11(e)(1)(iii); see 21 CFR 1304.11(e)(6) (``Each person registered 
or authorized to dispense or conduct research with controlled 
substances shall include in the inventory the same information required 
of manufacturers pursuant to paragraphs (e)(1)(iii) and (iv) of this 
section.''). The registrant must make an exact count or measure of 
controlled substances listed in Schedule I or II. 21 CFR 
1304.11(e)(6)(i). For substances in Schedules III, IV, or V, the 
registrant must ``make an estimated count or measure of the contents, 
unless the container holds more than 1,000 tablets or capsules in which 
case he/she must make an exact count of the contents.'' 21 CFR 
1304.11(e)(6)(ii). Inventories and other records must be retained in a 
readily retrievable manner ``for at least 2 years from the date of such 
inventory or records, for inspection and copying.'' 21 CFR 1304.04(a).
iii. DEA Form 222
    The CSA's implementing regulations specify the manner in which a 
DEA registrant authorized to order Schedule I and II controlled 
substances must fill out and execute a DEA Form 222. When a purchaser 
initiates an order of controlled substances, the purchaser fills out 
the form according to 21 CFR 1305.12. Then, the purchaser makes a copy 
of the original Form 222 and submits the original to the supplier from 
which it is ordering. 21 CFR 1305.13(a). Once the order is filled, the 
purchaser must record on its copy of the Form 222 the number of 
commercial or bulk containers furnished on each item and the dates on 
which the containers are received by the purchaser. 21 CFR 1305.13(e). 
If a DEA Form 222 cannot be filled for any reason, ``the supplier must 
return the original DEA Form 222 to the purchaser with a statement as 
to the reason,'' and the purchaser must maintain these records. 21 CFR 
1305.15(b), (d). ``The purchaser must retain a copy of each executed 
DEA Form 222 and all copies of unaccepted or defective forms with each 
statement attached.'' 21 CFR 1305.17(a). ``DEA Forms 222 must be 
maintained separately from all other records of the registrant . . . 
[and] are required to be kept available for inspection for a period of 
two years.'' 21 CFR 1305.17(c).
iv. Powers of Attorney
    Generally, only persons who are registered to handle Schedule I or 
II controlled substances may obtain and use a DEA Form 222 or issue 
electronic orders for Schedule I or II controlled substances. 21 CFR 
1305.04(a). However, a registrant may execute a power of attorney to 
authorize one or more individuals to issue orders for Schedule I and II 
controlled substances on the registrant's behalf. 21 CFR 1505.05. If 
the registrant is not an individual, the power of attorney must be 
executed by an officer of the registrant in addition to the person to 
whom the power of attorney is being granted and two witnesses. 21 CFR 
1305.05(d). A power of attorney may be revoked at any time by the 
person who signed the most recent application for DEA registration or 
reregistration, and the revocation form must be signed by two 
witnesses. 21 CFR 1305.05(e), (f). Powers of attorney must be 
``retained in the files, with executed Forms 222 where applicable, for 
the same period as any order bearing the signature of the attorney,'' 
and they ``must be available for inspection together with other 
records.'' 21 CFR 1305.05(a).

[[Page 62750]]

B. Findings of Fact

    Respondent has a history of recordkeeping violations that have 
resulted in the issuance of Letters of Admission (LOA) by DEA. Tr. 23; 
RD, at 3-4. The first LOA in 2015 cited several recordkeeping 
violations, including failing to maintain a biennial inventory, failing 
to properly fill out DEA Forms 222, and storing 70 bottles of methadone 
(a Schedule II controlled substance) on the floor of the nurses' 
station. Tr. 27; GX 2, at 1; RD, at 3. Respondent entered a Memorandum 
of Agreement (``MOA'') with DEA in 2018 in which Respondent agreed that 
it had committed numerous recordkeeping violations, including failing 
to maintain a biennial inventory, failing to accurately record the 
number of packages received on DEA Forms 222, and failing to maintain a 
functioning alarm system. Tr. 27-29; GX 3, at 1; RD, at 3, 16. The MOA 
referenced recordkeeping violations that DEA investigators had 
discovered during audits in 2009, 2014, and 2017. GX 3, at 1; RD, at 
17.
    DEA issued another LOA in 2022 outlining further recordkeeping 
violations found during a September 7, 2022 inspection, including 
failing to indicate on the biennial inventory whether it was taken at 
the beginning of business or the close of business, failing to have two 
witnesses execute a power of attorney, and failing to maintain a 
written record of individuals authorized to receive controlled 
substances. Tr. 30-32; GX 4, at 1; RD, at 3. Respondent denied these 
violations in its Answer to the OSC, ALJX 3, at 1, but the Government 
submitted a letter written by Respondent on January 23, 2023, 
indicating that Respondent was taking corrective action to remedy the 
violations outlined in the 2022 LOA. GX 4, at 3; RD, at 17. This letter 
indicates that Respondent was aware of the recordkeeping violations in 
2022 and did not contest them.
    DEA received a complaint from the Maryland Behavioral Health 
Administration about Respondent in February of 2024 and DEA conducted 
an onsite inspection of Respondent on March 28, 2024. Tr. 20-21, 158; 
RD, at 4. DEA investigators \6\ were unable to complete the inspection 
on that date because Respondent's owner, Pamela Dukes (Ms. Dukes), was 
unable to provide access to the dispensing room or to retrieve 
requested records, including dispensing records and DEA Forms 222. Tr. 
37-38, 160; RD, at 4.
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    \6\ Two Diversion Investigators, DI1 and DI2, testified at the 
hearing about the investigation. They are referred to collectively 
throughout this Decision as ``DEA investigators,'' or individually 
as DI1 and DI2.
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    DEA investigators returned to Respondent on April 17, 2024, to 
complete the audit. Tr. 39-40, 160. Ms. Dukes, S.R. (a nurse), and 
Respondent's attorney were present. Tr. 40, 45; RD, at 4. DEA 
investigators retrieved some DEA Forms 222 and dispensing records and 
conducted a closing count and an alarm test. Tr. 40-41, 43-44, 46; GX 
8, 10, 13. At the conclusion of the April 17, 2024 onsite visit, DEA 
investigators requested, but did not receive, powers of attorney, an 
alarm testing report, medical licenses, and additional DEA Forms 222. 
Tr. 47-48. Subsequently, Respondent provided investigators with the 
powers of attorney via email on April 19 and April 20, 2024. Tr. 48-49, 
161; GX 9. Respondent also provided two additional dispensing reports 
via email. Tr. 51-53; GX 18.
    DEA uncovered numerous recordkeeping violations during the 2024 
audit.
Continuing Records
    DEA's audit of Respondent's controlled substances revealed overages 
and shortages. Tr. 94-134; GX 12; RD, at 5, 23-24. These included an 
overage of 102,043 milligrams of methadone liquid,\7\ an overage of 
four 5-mg tablets of methadone,\8\ a shortage of eleven 10-mg tablets 
of methadone, and a shortage of 378 40-mg tablets of methadone. Tr. 
106-07, 112-23, 135, 143; GX 12; RD, at 24. The audit also showed that 
Respondent had commingled 40-mg methadone tablets from various 
manufacturers into one column of dispensing thereby failing to keep a 
complete and accurate count of the controlled substances. Tr. 74, 120-
21, 174; RD, at 24.
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    \7\ The overage indicates that Respondent dispensed more 
methadone than Respondent had on hand. Tr. 106-07, 143; RD, at 6.
    \8\ A shortage indicates that tablets that should be on site are 
missing. Tr. 112-14; RD, at 6. Respondent's only explanation for the 
shortage was that the methadone had been used. Tr. 114-15; RD, at 6.
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    Respondent did not provide any reconciliation for the overages and 
had no comment on the overages during the closing discussion on July 
22, 2024. Tr. 108, 175; RD, at 6. The closing discussion was conducted 
with S.R. and Ms. Dukes' child because Ms. Dukes excused herself before 
the closing discussion began. Tr. 124; RD, at 6. DEA investigators were 
therefore unable to do a reconciliation that reduced the shortage. Tr. 
166. At the hearing, Ms. Dukes disputed the Government's calculations 
of the overages and shortages, but even under Ms. Dukes' calculations, 
there were still minor overages and shortages.\9\ ALJX 18, at 7-8.
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    \9\ Ms. Dukes testified that there were ``glitches'' in the 
software Respondent used to conduct inventories and testified that 
the electronic reports would never be accurate. Tr. 241, 244, 249; 
RD, at 10. Ms. Dukes testified that Respondent maintained hand count 
inventories that reconciled the shortages. Tr. 244; RD, at 10. For 
example, Ms. Dukes testified that Respondent's hand count 
inventories for the 12-month period from April 2023 to April 2024 
showed that only 1.25 tablets of Methadone and 0.08 milligrams of 
liquid Methadone were missing. Tr. 244-45.
    DI1 testified that she did not accept Ms. Dukes' reconciliation 
because the hand records did not contain adequate information. Tr. 
129, 135; GX 11. For example, they did not contain the name of the 
controlled substance, they did not adequately identify the patients, 
they did not indicate how much of a particular controlled substance 
was consumed at the window during the dispensing or how much was 
taken home by the patient, and, other than the first page, they did 
not include the dosage form. Tr. 132-134; GX 11, at 1-17.
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    Accordingly, the Agency finds substantial evidence that 
Respondent's controlled substances inventory contained unexplained 
overages and shortages, which demonstrates that Respondent failed to 
maintain a complete and accurate record of controlled substances.
    Further, DEA investigators reviewed the dispensing records supplied 
by Respondent on July 22, 2024, and they did not include all the 
information required by 21 CFR 1304.24(a). Tr. 127, 131-34; GX 11; RD, 
at 24. The records were missing the patient's full name, the name of 
the controlled substance and/or the dosage form, the amount 
administered on site, and/or the take-home dosage. Tr. 132-34; GX 11, 
at 1-17; RD, at 7, 24. Accordingly, the Agency finds substantial record 
evidence that Respondent's dispensing records did not contain the 
information required by 21 CFR 1304.24(a)(3).
Inventories
    DEA investigators received five biennial inventories, dated April 
4, 2022, October 24, 2022, April 4, 2023, October 1, 2023, and April 4, 
2024. Tr. 55; GX 8; RD, at 4, 20. The testimony and evidence 
demonstrated and the Agency finds substantial evidence that all five 
inventories failed to include the number of units in each commercial 
container, Tr. 57-62; GX 8; that the inventories on April 4, 2022, 
October 24, 2022, and April 4, 2023, failed to indicate whether the 
inventory was taken at the beginning or the close of business, Tr. 57-
59; GX at 3-5; and that the inventory on April 4, 2024, failed to 
properly name the substance. Tr. 61-62; GX 8, at 1; RD, at 20.

[[Page 62751]]

Powers of Attorney
    The Government introduced four powers of attorney into evidence. 
Tr. 65-71; GX 9. The testimony and evidence demonstrated and the Agency 
finds substantial evidence that all four powers of attorney lacked the 
requisite witness signatures and therefore were improperly executed 
and/or improperly revoked. Tr. 65-71; GX 9; RD, at. Specifically, the 
powers of attorney for J.M. and Y.B. and two powers of attorney for 
S.R. were missing the second witness signature needed for proper 
execution, and the revocation of the power of attorney for Y.B. was 
missing the witness signatures needed for proper revocation. Tr. 66-71; 
GX 9; RD, at 21.
DEA Forms 222
    The testimony and evidence demonstrated and the Agency finds 
substantial evidence that fifteen DEA Forms 222 were not properly 
executed because they did not include the proper name or strength of 
the controlled substance, they did not include the date the controlled 
substances were received or included incorrect dates, and/or they 
indicated the wrong number of packages or package size. Tr. 74-85, 88-
91; GX 13, RD, at 5, 22. The testimony and evidence also demonstrated, 
and the Agency finds substantial evidence that, S.R. executed fourteen 
DEA Forms 222 without a properly executed power of attorney authorizing 
her to order controlled substances on Respondent's behalf. Tr. 92-93; 
GX 13, 15; RD, at 22. Finally, the testimony and evidence demonstrated 
and the Agency finds substantial evidence that Respondent failed to 
attach a cancellation form to a DEA Form 222 for an order that was 
cancelled by the distributor. Tr. 89-90; GX 13; RD, at 23.

C. Conclusions of Law

    Evidence is considered under section 823(h)(2) when it reflects a 
failure to comply with ``standards established by the Attorney General 
respecting . . . the maintenance of records (in accordance with [21 
U.S.C.] 827 . . .) on such drugs.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(h)(2). Here, based on 
Respondent's admissions and the findings above, the Agency finds 
substantial evidence that Respondent: failed to maintain a complete and 
accurate record of each controlled substance received and disposed of, 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. 827(a)(3) and 21 CFR 1304.21(a); failed to 
maintain a dispensing log containing the details required by 21 CFR 
1304.24(a); failed to conduct and maintain a biennial inventory with 
the details required by 1304.11(e)(1)(iii); failed to properly execute 
fifteen DEA Forms 222, in violation of 21 CFR 1305.13, 1305.15, 
1307.74; failed to properly execute and/or revoke four powers of 
attorney, in violation of 21 CFR 1305.05(d), (e); allowed an individual 
without a properly executed power of attorney to order controlled 
substances, in violation of 21 CFR 1305.04; and failed to attach a 
cancellation form to one DEA Form 222, in violation of 21 CFR 
1305.17(a) and 1305.15(d).
    The Agency finds that the Government's evidence satisfies its prima 
facie burden of demonstrating that Respondent has failed to comply with 
the requirements of 823(h)(2) regarding ``maintenance of records'' for 
narcotic drugs.\10\ 21 U.S.C. 823(a); 21 CFR 1301.44. The Agency also 
finds that there is insufficient mitigating evidence to rebut the 
Government's prima facie case.
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    \10\ Respondent's recordkeeping violations provide an 
independent and sufficient basis to revoke Respondent's 
registration. As discussed below, Respondent repeatedly committed 
recordkeeping violations over the course of nearly a decade despite 
DEA's multiple attempts to bring Respondent into compliance. 
Respondent's failure to unequivocally accept responsibility for 
these violations demonstrates that DEA cannot trust Respondent with 
a registration and that revocation is necessary to achieve goals of 
specific and general deterrence.
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III. Allegation That Respondent Materially Falsified DEA Applications

A. Applicable Law

i. Material Falsification of an Application by an NTP
    In this case, there is disagreement about whether DEA has authority 
under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1) to deny, suspend, or revoke an NTP's 
registration if the NTP has materially falsified an application for a 
DEA registration. The ALJ concluded that DEA does not have such 
authority and declined to consider the Government's material 
falsification allegation. The Government filed Exceptions disagreeing 
with the ALJ. The Agency agrees with the Government and finds that the 
CSA authorizes DEA to suspend or revoke an NTP's registration if DEA 
makes a finding under any of the subsections of 21 U.S.C. 824(a), 
including that the registrant has materially falsified an application 
((a)(1)), has been convicted of a felony related to controlled 
substances ((a)(2)), has lost state authority to handle controlled 
substances ((a)(3)), or has been excluded from participation in a 
federal healthcare program ((a)(5)).\11\ This interpretation is 
supported by a plain language reading of Section 824(a) and is the most 
logical implementation of Congress' intent.
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    \11\ The Agency believes that the most logical, plain language 
interpretation of 21 U.S.C. 824(a) authorizes DEA to revoke an NTP's 
registration if DEA determines that the NTP's registration is 
inconsistent with the public interest under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). 
However, 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4) instructs the Agency to consider the 
public interest factors applicable to the registrant under 21 U.S.C. 
823, and 21 U.S.C. 823(h) does not identify public interest factors 
applicable to NTPs. The registration provisions for other 
registrants--such as practitioners and manufacturers--do identify 
applicable public interest factors. If the Agency were confronted 
with a public interest case involving an NTP, the Agency would apply 
the set of public interest factors under section 823 that are most 
relevant to the entity's operation considering the facts of the 
case.
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Background
    The CSA's provisions governing registration requirements to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances are outlined 
in 21 U.S.C. 823. Section 823 contains separate subsections identifying 
the registration requirements for different categories of registrants, 
including manufacturers (section 823(a), (c), (e)), distributors 
(sections 823(b), (f)), practitioners (section 823(g)), and NTPs 
(section 823(h)).
    The CSA's provisions governing DEA's authority to revoke or suspend 
DEA registrations are outlined in 21 U.S.C. 824(a). Section 824(a) has 
two unlettered paragraphs that outline the circumstances under which 
DEA is authorized to suspend or revoke a registration. The first 
unlettered paragraph outlines DEA's authority to suspend or revoke any 
registration granted under 21 U.S.C. 823 if DEA makes a finding related 
to any of 824(a)'s five subsections (material falsification, felony 
conviction, loss of state authority, public interest, or federal 
healthcare exclusion). The second paragraph of Section 823(a) outlines 
an additional ground for DEA to revoke an NTP's registration if the NTP 
``has failed to comply with any standard referred to in section 
823(h),'' which outlines the registration requirements for NTPs.
DEA's Authority To Revoke an NTP's Registration
    The ALJ, referencing prior Agency decisions, concluded that the 
second paragraph of section 824(a)--which was added in 1974 with the 
passage of the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act of 1974 (NATA)--identifies 
the only grounds available for DEA to revoke the registration of an 
NTP, and that DEA is not authorized to revoke an NTP's registration 
based on the grounds in section 824(a)(1)-(5). RD, at 14-16

[[Page 62752]]

(citing Turning Tide, Inc., 81 FR 47411, 47413 (2016) \12\; Houston 
Maintenance Clinic, 83 FR 42144, 42156 (2018)). The Agency does not 
find support for this interpretation in 21 U.S.C. 823 or 824(a). A 
plain language reading of the first paragraph of section 824(a)--which 
gives DEA authority to revoke ``[a] registration pursuant to section 
823 of this title to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled 
substance or list I chemical'' for five enumerated reasons--supports 
the Agency's interpretation that it may revoke the registration of an 
NTP (which is ``a registration pursuant to section 823'') for any of 
the five enumerated reasons. There is no language in section 824(a) or 
823 that contradicts the straightforward language in the first 
paragraph or implies that DEA may not revoke the registration of an NTP 
based on the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph.
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    \12\ In Turning Tide, a prior administration determined that DEA 
did not have authority to revoke an NTP's registration on public 
interest grounds in part because the NTP registration provision, 21 
U.S.C. 823(h), does not seem to authorize DEA to deny an NTP's 
application on public interest grounds, in contrast to the 
registration provisions for manufacturers, distributors, and 
practitioners. 21 U.S.C. 823. The prior administration also inferred 
that because the revocation provision in 21 U.S.C. 824(a) contains a 
second paragraph that states that it specifically applies to NTPs, 
Congress did not intend for the first paragraph to apply to NTPs. As 
discussed herein, the Agency interprets these provisions 
differently. Nevertheless, in this case, the Agency is tasked with 
determining whether it has authority to revoke an NTP's registration 
based on a material falsification allegation, not a public interest 
allegation, as in Turning Tide. The potential complexities 
associated with applying the public interest factors to an NTP are 
not present in a material falsification case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ALJ did not identify any authority suggesting that Congress 
intended for NTPs--which dispense the most addictive and dangerous of 
the controlled substances--to have fewer guardrails than other 
registrants. Of course, an NTP who materially falsifies an application 
or whose owner has commited a felony related to controlled substances 
is just as likely to pose a threat to the public as any other 
registrant who does the same. Thus, the Agency believes that its plain 
language interpretation implements Congress' intent.
    In its Exceptions, the Government identifies a portion of NATA's 
legislative history that supports the Agency's conclusion that Congress 
did not intend to limit the Agency's authority to revoke registrations 
of NTPs. NATA was passed on May 14, 1974, and amended the CSA to 
require, among other things, that ``[p]ractitioners who dispense 
narcotic drugs to individuals for maintenance treatment or 
detoxification treatment'' must ``obtain annually a separate 
registration for that purpose.'' 88 Stat. 124, sec. 3, codified at 21 
U.S.C. 823(g) (1974). NATA also added the subparagraph referenced above 
to section 21 U.S.C. 824(a) adding additional grounds for revocation of 
NTPs' registrations.
    The Senate Bill that introduced these amendments (S. 1115, Mar. 6, 
1973) proposed to add ``or'' between the already-included revocation 
grounds (which, at the time, were limited to material falsification, 
felony conviction, and loss of state authority) and the new paragraph 
containing the additional revocation ground for NTPs. S. 1115, 93rd 
Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 (Mar. 6, 1973). The inclusion of ``or'' would 
have removed any ambiguity as to whether an NTP's registration could be 
revoked on the original revocation grounds. The bill that was 
ultimately passed included alternate language from the text of the 
House Bill, introduced as H.R. 12503 by Representative Hastings on 
February 4, 1974, which laid out the new revocation grounds for NTPs as 
a separate sentence and did not include the word ``or.'' H.R. 12503, 
93rd Cong., 2d Sess., at *3 (Feb. 4, 1974). However, as the Government 
observes in its Exceptions, ``nothing in the legislative history 
suggests that there is any meaningful difference between the bills' 
differing approaches to amending 21 U.S.C. 824(a), or that Congress 
intended the House bill's approach to limit the Attorney General's 
authority for revoking/suspending NTP registrations.'' Government's 
Exceptions, at 5.
    Accordingly, the Agency concludes that it has authority to revoke 
an NTP's registration based on the material falsification of an 
application.
ii. Material Falsification of an Application
    A DEA registration may be denied, suspended, or revoked upon a 
finding that the applicant or registrant materially falsified any 
application filed pursuant to or required by the CSA. 21 U.S.C. 
824(a)(1).\13\ To present a prima facie case for material 
falsification, the Government's record evidence must show (1) the 
submission of an application, (2) containing a false statement and/or 
omitting information that the application requires, (3) when the 
submitter knew or should have known that the statement is false and/or 
that the omitted information existed and the application required its 
disclosure, and (4) the false statement and/or required but omitted 
information is material, that is, it ``connect[s] to at least one of 
[the section 823] factors that, according to the CSA, [the 
Administrator] `shall' consider'' when analyzing ``whether issuing a 
registration `would be inconsistent with the public interest.' '' Frank 
Joseph Stirlacci, M.D., 85 FR 45229, 45238 (2020) (citing 21 U.S.C. 823 
and Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771); see also Sasha Melissa Ikramelahai, 90 FR 
32017, 32019 (2025); Michael Bouknight, 90 FR 31247, 31249 (2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ A statutory basis to deny an application pursuant to 
section 823 is also a basis to revoke or suspend a registration 
pursuant to section 824, and vice versa, because doing ``otherwise 
would mean that all applications would have to be granted only to be 
revoked the next day . . . .'' Robert Wayne Locklear, M.D., 86 FR 
33738, 33744-45 (2021) (collecting cases).
     The Supreme Court's decision in Kungys v. United States, 485 
U.S. 759 (1988), and its progeny, guide the Agency's implementation 
of these CSA provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding materiality, Kungys holds that a statement is material if 
it is ``predictably capable of affecting, i.e., had a natural tendency 
to affect, the [Agency's] official decision,'' or stated differently, 
``had a natural tendency to influence the decision.'' Kungys, 485 U.S. 
at 771-72. As already discussed, materiality, for the purposes of the 
CSA, is tied to the factors that the Administrator ``shall'' consider 
when determining whether issuance of a registration ``would be 
inconsistent with the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 823; Kungys, 485 
U.S. at 771-72; Stirlacci, 85 FR at 45234, 45238. The Government must 
establish material falsification with record evidence that is clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 772; Stirlacci, 85 FR 
at 45230-39.

B. Findings of Fact

    Respondent submitted its initial application for a DEA registration 
in 2008 and has submitted at least 16 renewal applications since then. 
Tr. 193:24-194:7, GX 14a, 14b. On each application, Respondent answered 
``no'' to Liability Question 4, which states, ``If the applicant is a 
corporation, association, partnership, or pharmacy, has any officer, 
partner, stockholder or proprietor been convicted of a crime in 
connection with controlled substances under state or federal law[ . . . 
]?'' GX 14b. The testimony and evidence demonstrated, and the Agency 
finds clear and convincing record evidence, that these responses were 
false. Ms. Dukes, the owner of Respondent and signatory on Respondent's 
DEA registration applications, was convicted of Controlled Dangerous 
Substance unlawful possession--a crime related to controlled 
substances--on June 5, 1991, in Anne Arundel District Court. GX 15.

[[Page 62753]]

C. Conclusions of Law

    As the Agency found above, Respondent submitted at least 17 
applications for a DEA registration that contained false 
statements.\14\ These false statements were material because they 
``deprived [DEA] of information potentially relevant to'' the Agency's 
analysis. Stirlacci, 85 FR at 45234-35; 21 U.S.C. 823(h). Respondent's 
falsities are connected to two of the determinations that must be made 
before registering an applicant to dispense narcotic drugs to 
individuals for maintenance treatment or detoxification treatment. 21 
U.S.C. 823(h). First, the falsity is potentially relevant to DEA's 
determination of whether the applicant will ``comply with standards 
established by the Attorney General respecting (A) security of stocks 
of narcotic drugs for such treatment, and (B) the maintenance of 
records . . . on such drugs.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(h)(2). Second, the falsity 
is potentially relevant to the Health and Human Services analysis 
regarding whether the applicant will ``respect[] the quantities of 
narcotic drugs which may be provided for unsupervised use by 
individuals in such treatment.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(h)(3). Because 
Respondent's false statements deprived the Agency of information 
potentially relevant to its analysis, they were ``predictably capable 
of affecting . . . [DEA's] official decision'' regarding whether 
Applicant met ``the requirements for'' registration. Kungys, 485 U.S. 
at 771. DI2 testified that if Respondent had disclosed Ms. Dukes' 
conviction, DEA would have conducted ``further research into the 
charges and how it could potentially affect [Respondent's] handling 
controlled substances in their proposed business activity.'' Tr. 195.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Ms. Dukes testified at the hearing that she did not know 
that she had been convicted of a crime because ``it [ ] showed up as 
nolle processed.'' Tr. 215-16. Respondent seems to concede in its 
Post-Hearing Brief that Ms. Dukes knew about the conviction, but 
that her ``failure to disclose was the result of a good-faith belief 
that the aged conviction, having long since been resolved, was not 
material to the registration process.'' ALJX 18, at 13. Accordingly, 
the Agency finds that Ms. Dukes knew about the conviction that she 
failed to disclose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In sum, the Agency finds clear, unequivocal, and convincing record 
evidence that Respondent submitted materially false applications for 
registration.\15\ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1).\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Respondent argues in its Post-Hearing Brief that Ms. Dukes' 
failure to disclose her criminal conviction was not a material 
misrepresentation because the conviction occurred in 1991, nearly 
three decades ago and approximately seventeen years before 
Respondent's first DEA application. ALJX 18, at 13. According to 
Respondent, the conviction occurred during ``a period of Ms. 
Duke[s'] life that has no bearing on her current professional 
conduct or eligibility,'' and ``[s]ince that time, Ms. Dukes has 
fully been rehabilitated, maintained an unblemished professional 
record, and had no further interactions with law enforcement or 
disciplinary authorities.'' Id. In support of Respondent's argument 
regarding materiality, Respondent asserts that ``[c]ourts have 
repeatedly rejected attempts to use `distant, isolated convictions 
as dispositive grounds for denial without evidence of current risk 
or misconduct''' and provides a citation to a case that the Agency 
was unable to locate. Respondent's Post-Hearing Brief, at 14 (citing 
Garcia v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 24307 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013)). Because it was unable to locate this case, the Agency 
cannot verify Respondent's assertion.
     Respondent further argues that the Government has not met its 
burden of proof regarding materiality because it ``has not shown 
that this seventeen-year-old conviction--if it had been disclosed--
would have led to a denial of the application.'' ALJX 18, at 13. 
However, the Government need not prove that the application would 
have been denied, but rather that the information that was omitted 
was ``predictably capable of affecting . . . [DEA's] official 
decision'' regarding whether Applicant met ``the requirements for'' 
registration. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771. DEA has held that information 
is material if it ``connect[s] to at least one of [the section 823] 
factors that, according to the CSA, [the Administrator] `shall' 
consider'' when analyzing whether or not to register an applicant. 
Frank Joseph Stirlacci, M.D., 85 FR 45229, 45238 (2020) (citing 21 
U.S.C. 823 and Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771); see also Sasha Melissa 
Ikramelahai, 90 FR 32017, 32019 (2025); Michael Bouknight, 90 FR 
31247, 31249 (2025). As discussed above, Respondent's conviction 
relates to two such factors and DI2 testified that DEA would have 
conducted further research if Respondent had disclosed this 
conviction. Therefore, the Agency concludes that Respondent's 
failure to disclose Ms. Dukes' conviction was material.
    \16\ Although Respondent's material falsification of its DEA 
applications provides an additional ground to revoke Respondent's 
registration, the Agency would have revoked Respondent's 
registration solely based on the substantial evidence that 
Respondent has repeatedly violated recordkeeping regulations over 
the course of nearly a decade. Based on Respondent's recidivism, 
revocation is necessary to achieve goals of specific and general 
deterrence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a result of this established violation, the Agency finds that 
the Government has established a prima facie case for sanction, that 
Registrant did not rebut that prima facie case, and that there is 
clear, unequivocal, and convincing record evidence supporting the 
revocation of Registrant's registration. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1).

IV. Sanction

    Where, as here, the Government has met its prima facie burden of 
showing that Respondent's continued registration is inconsistent with 
the public interest due to its numerous violations pertaining to 
controlled substances, the burden shifts to Respondent to show why it 
can be entrusted with a registration. Morall, 412 F.3d. at 174; Jones 
Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d 823, 830 (11th Cir. 2018); Garrett 
Howard Smith, M.D., 83 FR 18882 (2018). The issue of trust is 
necessarily a fact-dependent determination based on the circumstances 
presented by the individual respondent. Jeffrey Stein, M.D., 84 FR 
46968, 46972 (2019); see also Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 
F.3d at 833. Moreover, as past performance is the best predictor of 
future performance, DEA Administrators have required that a registrant 
who has committed acts inconsistent with the public interest must 
accept responsibility for those acts and demonstrate that it will not 
engage in future misconduct. Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d 
at 833. A registrant's acceptance of responsibility must be 
unequivocal. Id. at 830-31. In addition, a registrant's candor during 
the investigation and hearing has been an important factor in 
determining acceptance of responsibility and the appropriate sanction. 
Id. Further, DEA Administrators have found that the egregiousness and 
extent of the misconduct are significant factors in determining the 
appropriate sanction. Id. at 834 and n.4. DEA Administrators have also 
considered the need to deter similar acts by the respondent and by the 
community of registrants. Jeffrey Stein, M.D., 84 FR at 46972-73.

A. Acceptance of Responsibility

    Here, the ALJ found, and the Agency agrees, that Respondent did not 
unequivocally accept responsibility for its misconduct. RD, at 27. 
Although Respondent stated multiple times in its post-hearing brief 
that it accepts responsibility for the recordkeeping violations, e.g., 
ALJX 18, at 7, 14, Respondent repeatedly minimized these violations. 
For example, Respondent referred to them as ``technical missteps'' and 
argued that it was ``grossly misguided'' for the Government to assert 
that these errors warranted revocation. Id. Respondent's attempts to 
minimize this egregious misconduct undermine any purported acceptance 
of responsibility. Michael A. White v. Drug Enf't Admin., 626 F. App'x 
493, 496-97 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Phong H. Tran, M.D., 90 FR at 
14385.
    Respondent also attempted to shift blame for the overages and 
shortages to ``glitches'' in the Methasoft software it used and 
suggested that it was ``not fair'' that DEA investigators conducted a 
physical hand count of controlled

[[Page 62754]]

substances at the nurse's station and did not provide her with 
documentation. RD, at 26 (citing tr. 241, 249). Ms. Dukes opted out of 
the closing discussion on July 22, 2024, which would have been her 
opportunity to reconcile any overages or shortages. Tr. 108, 175; RD, 
at 6. Respondent's implication that DEA's investigation was unfair is 
not supported by the record and undermines any acceptance of 
responsibility. Cf. Ester Mark, M.D., 86 FR 16760, 16762 (2021) 
(finding that the respondent did not accept responsibility because she 
``pass[ed] blame on DEA for not telling her how to comply with 
recordkeeping requirements'').
    Respondent also provided incredulous testimony about the material 
falsification charge that amounted to a denial of responsibility and 
raised significant concerns about the Agency's ability to trust 
Respondent moving forward. Ms. Dukes initially testified that she did 
not disclose her criminal conviction in response to Liability Question 
#4 because she did not know that she was convicted of any crime until 
she was served with the OSC. Tr. 215. She further testified that she 
answered ``no'' because:

    I didn't understand it. I don't know. It was . . . so long ago, 
and it looked like--it was [sic] showed up as nolle processed. [ ] I 
don't know what I thought. I don't know. I was told that. I don't 
know. I just--I'm not going to sit here. I don't know. I just don't 
know. I was confused. I don't know.

    Tr. 215-16. She continued to explain that she did not know about 
the conviction until she received the OSC and discussed it with her 
lawyer. Tr. 216. It is not credible for Ms. Dukes to testify that she 
did not know that she was convicted of a crime when court records show 
that she pled guilty and served one year of probation. GX 15, at 1. 
Moreover, if Ms. Dukes was uncertain how to truthfully respond to 
Liability Question #4, she should have investigated and inquired rather 
than submitting a falsified form to a federal Agency.

B. Remedial Measures

    When a registrant fails to make the threshold showing of acceptance 
of responsibility, the Agency need not address the registrant's 
remedial measures. Ajay S. Ahuja, M.D., 84 FR 5479, 5498 n.33 (2019) 
(citing Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 81 FR at 79202-03); Daniel A. 
Glick, D.D.S., 80 FR 74800, 74801, 74810 (2015). Even so, the Agency 
finds that Respondent's evidence of remedial measures would not change 
the result of this case even if Respondent had unequivocally accepted 
responsibility. Respondent's limited remedial evidence consisted of Ms. 
Dukes' testimony that she has employed engineers to rectify issues with 
Respondent's electronic inventory system and that Respondent now 
utilizes two large, graduated cylinders to accurately measure its 
Methadone. ALJX 18, at 8. The Agency finds that these remedial efforts 
are trivial considering Respondent's decade of recordkeeping errors, 
and they are not sufficient to restore the Agency's trust.

C. Deterrence and Egregiousness

    In addition to unequivocally accepting responsibility, the Agency 
considers both specific and general deterrence when determining an 
appropriate sanction. Daniel A. Glick, 80 FR at 74810. In this case, 
the Agency agrees with the ALJ that the interests of specific 
deterrence militate in favor of revocation given Respondent's repeated 
recordkeeping violations over nearly a decade and Respondent's failure 
to remediate despite ``repeated actions by DEA to educate the 
Respondent and bring it into compliance with DEA requirements.'' RD, at 
28. The interests of general deterrence also support revocation, as a 
lack of sanction in the current matter would send a message to the 
registrant community that the failure to maintain accurate records can 
be excused. Id. As the ALJ stated, where Respondent has ``failed to 
comply with the requirements concerning controlled substances, despite 
numerous attempts by the agency to bring the respondent into long-term 
compliance, the unmistakable message to the regulated community of 
imposing no sanction or a limited sanction that permits the continued 
handling of controlled substances by the respondent would be that such 
conduct can be overlooked.'' Id.
    Moreover, the Agency agrees with the ALJ that Respondent's actions 
were egregious. As the ALJ stated, ``Respondent's violations were not 
limited to a single instance or a single type of violation, but 
consisted of widespread violations involving numerous biennial 
inventories over several years, overages and shortage of controlled 
substances, improper combination of controlled substances in its 
records, incorrectly filling out DEA 222 forms, and incorrectly 
executing powers of attorney.'' \17\ RD, at 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Respondent's Post-Hearing Brief cites to a 2010 DEA 
decision and asserts that, in that case, ``DEA declined to revoke a 
pharmacy's registration despite `significant' recordkeeping issues, 
noting the absence of diversion and the registrant's good-faith 
corrective measures.'' East Main Street Pharmacy, 75 FR 66149 
(2010). Respondent misrepresents the case's holding--the Agency 
determined that the case was moot. Moreover, the Agency affirmed the 
issuance of an Immediate Suspension Order and noted that, ``[w]hile 
there is only the suspension order to review . . . , had Respondent 
filed a renewal application, I would have denied it.'' Id. at 66165.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, the Agency will order the revocation of Respondent's 
registration.

Order

    Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 
U.S.C. 824(a) and 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate 
of Registration No. RB0369733 issued to By Grace Inc. Counseling 
Services. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested 
in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a) and 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby deny any 
pending applications of By Grace Inc. Counseling Services to renew or 
modify the named registrations, as well as any other pending 
application of By Grace Inc. Counseling Services for additional 
registration in Maryland. This Order is effective November 2, 2026.

Signing Authority

    This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on 
September 25, 2026, by DEA Administrator Terrance C. Cole. That 
document with the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For 
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of 
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal 
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the 
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document 
of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect 
of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.

Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2026-20226 Filed 10-1-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P


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