Proposed Rule2026-20143
Rule on Impersonation of Government and Businesses
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
October 1, 2026
Issuing agencies
Federal Trade Commission
Abstract
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission") proposes to commence a rulemaking proceeding to prevent certain unfair or deceptive acts or practices by search engine, social media, and other digital marketplace platforms that further government and business impersonation scams to defraud consumers. The Commission is soliciting written comment, data, and arguments concerning the need for such rulemaking.
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 189 (Thursday, October 1, 2026)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 62347-62357]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-20143]
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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
16 CFR Part 461
RIN 3084-AB90
Rule on Impersonation of Government and Businesses
AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission.
ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking (``ANPRM''); request for
public comment.
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SUMMARY: The Federal Trade Commission (``FTC'' or ``Commission'')
proposes to commence a rulemaking proceeding to prevent certain unfair
or deceptive acts or practices by search engine, social media, and
other digital marketplace platforms that further government and
business impersonation scams to defraud consumers. The Commission is
soliciting written comment, data, and arguments concerning the need for
such rulemaking.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before November 30, 2026.
ADDRESSES: Interested parties may file a comment online or on paper, by
following the instructions in the Request for Comments part of the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section below. Write ``16 CFR part 461--
Impersonation Rule, Matter No. R207000'' on your comment and file your
comment online at <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a>, by following the
instructions on the web-based form. If you prefer to file your comment
on paper, write ``16 CFR part 461--Impersonation Rule, Matter No.
R207000'' on your comment and on the envelope, and mail it to the
following address: Federal Trade Commission, Office of the Secretary,
600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20580.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Hong Park (202-326-2158) and Elyse
McNamara (202-725-3101), Attorneys, Division of Enforcement, Bureau of
Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue
NW, Washington, DC 20580.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Overview
Every year, American citizens lose tens of billions of dollars to
scams. In 2025, consumers reported losing approximately $16 billion to
fraud, a 25% increase compared to 2024.\1\ In our annual Protecting
Older Consumers Report, the FTC estimated that the true cost of fraud
in 2024, adjusted to account for underreporting, may be as high as
$195.9 billion.\2\ The top fraud reported by consumers to the FTC is
impersonation--where an imposter pretends to be a real business,
government agency, family member, or other trusted source to elicit
money from the victim.\3\ Last year, the FTC received over 1 million
imposter reports, with consumers reporting nearly $3.5 billion in
losses.\4\
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\1\ Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Data Show People Reported Losing $3.5
Billion to Imposter Scams in 2025 (June 15, 2026), <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/06/ftc-data-show-people-reported-losing-3-point-5-billion-imposter-scams-2025">https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/06/ftc-data-show-people-reported-losing-3-point-5-billion-imposter-scams-2025</a>.
\2\ Fed. Trade Comm'n, Protecting Older Consumers Report 2024-
2025, at 28 (2025), <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/P144400-OlderAdultsReportDec2025.pdf">https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/P144400-OlderAdultsReportDec2025.pdf</a>.
\3\ See Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Data Show People Reported Losing
$3.5 Billion to Imposter Scams in 2025, supra note 1.
\4\ Fed. Trade Comm'n, The Big View: All Sentinel Reports, Top
Reports 2025, Tableau Public (July 28, 2026), <a href="https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/federal.trade.commission/viz/TheBigViewAllSentinelReports/TopReports">https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/federal.trade.commission/viz/TheBigViewAllSentinelReports/TopReports</a>.
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Some of the most pernicious impersonation scams involve government
and business impersonations. Consumers rely on government agencies and
businesses on a daily basis to comply with the law (such as by paying
tolls) and to conduct routine transactions (such as online bank
transfers). Impersonation scams exploit this trust, often inflicting
considerable harm on consumers while causing legitimate businesses to
lose revenue and suffer reputational damage.
The Commission previously determined that these impersonation scams
are prevalent in the U.S. economy and promulgated the Rule on
Impersonation of Government and Businesses \5\ (``Impersonation Rule''
or ``Rule'') to address them. The Commission has vigorously enforced
the Rule and other laws to stop these scams. Notwithstanding these
efforts, however, scams--especially those perpetrated by foreign bad
actors--continue to proliferate. In recent years, these scams have been
amplified by search engine, social media, and other digital marketplace
platforms that profit from optimizing online ads for third parties,
regardless of whether the third parties are legitimate, while avoiding
the social cost of the impersonation scams furthered by such ad
optimization.\6\ The Commission now seeks public comment on whether it
should address this misalignment of platform incentives, which is not
covered by the current Rule, by initiating a rulemaking that would
force such platforms to internalize the cost of optimizing fraudulent
ads.
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\5\ 16 CFR part 461; 89 FR 15017 (Mar. 1, 2024).
\6\ Firms that do not internalize the costs their activities
impose on others can create harmful spillovers or ``externalities.''
See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960);
infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text discussing negative
externalities. Among other things, because many consumers who fall
victim to impersonation scams blame the impersonated business or
scammer--not the digital platform furthering the impersonation--
digital platforms face little to no market discipline to correct the
problem and have even less incentive to internalize the cost of
scams, leaving the social harm unaddressed.
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[[Page 62348]]
II. March 2024 Impersonation Rule and Proposed Means-and-
Instrumentalities Provision
The Impersonation Rule prohibits the impersonation of government,
businesses, and their officers or agents as unfair or deceptive acts or
practices under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act \7\
(``FTC Act''), 15 U.S.C. 45. In December 2021, the Commission began its
consideration of a rule to address impersonation fraud by soliciting
public comment on an advance notice of proposed rulemaking.\8\ The
following year, the Commission determined it had reason to believe
these acts or practices are prevalent in the U.S. economy and published
a notice of proposed rulemaking (``2022 NPRM'') formally proposing to
promulgate a new rule.\9\ In March 2024, the Commission finalized and
promulgated the Rule, finding that consumer complaint data from the
Consumer Sentinel Network, the Commission's enforcement record, data
from a wide range of commenters, and other evidence in the rulemaking
record supported its prevalence determination.\10\
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\7\ 45 U.S.C. 41 et seq.
\8\ 86 FR 72901 (Dec. 23, 2021).
\9\ 87 FR 62741 (Oct. 17, 2022).
\10\ 89 FR 15017 (Mar. 1, 2024).
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During the course of that rulemaking, the Commission had also
considered expanding the Rule to prohibit two additional types of
unfair or deceptive acts or practices: first, the impersonation of
individuals; and second, the provision of the means and
instrumentalities used in prohibited impersonations.\11\ However, after
further consideration, the Commission did not adopt the proposed means
and instrumentalities prohibition.\12\ With respect to the
impersonation of individuals provision, the Commission held an informal
hearing in January 2025 and is still evaluating its options.\13\
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\11\ 87 FR 62741 (Oct. 17, 2022) (2022 NPRM); 89 FR 15072 (Mar.
1, 2024) (Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ``2024
SNPRM''). In the 2024 SNPRM, the proposed definition of
``individual'' was ``a person, entity, or party, whether real or
fictitious, other than those that constitute a business or
government under this Part.'' 89 FR at 15077. The Commission
initially proposed a means and instrumentalities provision in the
2022 NPRM. The 2024 SNPRM subsequently modified that proposal to
read: ``It is a violation of this part, and an unfair or deceptive
act or practice to provide goods or services with knowledge or
reason to know that those goods or services will be used to: (a)
materially and falsely pose as, directly or by implication, a
government entity or officer thereof, a business or officer thereof,
or an individual, . . . ; or (b) materially misrepresent, directly
or by implication, affiliation with, including endorsement or
sponsorship by, a government entity or officer thereof, a business
or officer thereof, or an individual . . . .'' 89 FR at 15083.
\12\ In the December 26, 2024 Initial and Final Notice of
Informal Hearing, the Commission stated it ``has decided not to
proceed with the SNPRM's proposed means and instrumentalities
provision at this time.'' 89 FR 104905, 104906 (Dec. 26, 2024).
Commenters responding to the SNPRM proposal raised a number of
concerns, including that the proposed language covering any means
and instrumentality was overbroad and that the Commission should
have introduced the proposal through an ANPRM instead of an SNPRM.
See, e.g., FTC-2023-0030-0059, FTC-2023-0030-0070, FTC-2023-0030-
0082, and FTC-2023-0030-0092. Comments to the 2024 SNPRM can be
found at <a href="https://www.regulations.gov/document/FTC-2023-0030-0031/comment">https://www.regulations.gov/document/FTC-2023-0030-0031/comment</a>. The Commission does not take a position on these issues.
Regardless, the Commission's action here moots these commenters'
concerns as any means-and-instrumentalities provision that the
Commission considers in this proceeding will focus on ad-
optimization practices by digital marketplace platforms and will
therefore necessarily be narrower than the 2024 SNPRM's proposed
provision covering any means and instrumentality. In addition, the
Commission begins its consideration of any such provision through
this ANPRM, not an SNPRM.
\13\ See Trade Regulation Rule on Impersonation of Government
and Business, 2026 Regulatory Plan and the Unified Agenda of Federal
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (July 2026), <a href="https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202510&RIN=3084-AB71">https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202510&RIN=3084-AB71</a>.
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III. Digital Marketplace Platforms and the Growing Threat of
Impersonation Scams
Digital marketplace platforms (``Platforms'') \14\ have become
essential infrastructure of the U.S. economy. They have achieved near-
universal adoption in the United States, serving as a primary gateway
through which consumers discover products and services, interact with
businesses, and gather information.\15\ Indeed, about 85% of U.S.
consumers shop online, with e-commerce Platform <a href="http://Amazon.com">Amazon.com</a> leading in
online retail sales.\16\
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\14\ As used herein, Platforms are public-facing websites or
apps on which third parties offer goods, services, or opportunities
through paid advertisements or other listings. These Platforms
typically integrate ads for third-party products and services into
the platform user experience, such as through posts on social media
feeds and search engine results, and often embed hyperlinks into the
ads for the interested consumer to use to contact the third party.
Examples of Platforms include <a href="http://Google.com">Google.com</a>, <a href="http://Facebook.com">Facebook.com</a>, <a href="http://Amazon.com">Amazon.com</a>,
Apple App Store, and <a href="http://LinkedIn.com">LinkedIn.com</a>.
\15\ See Colleen McClain & William Bishop, What we know about
internet use, smartphone ownership and digital divides in the U.S.,
Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Jan. 8, 2026), <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/01/08/internet-use-smartphone-ownership-digital-divides-in-u-s/#_What%E2%80%99s_the_current">https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/01/08/internet-use-smartphone-ownership-digital-divides-in-u-s/#_What%E2%80%99s_the_current</a> (``Nine-in-ten U.S. adults use
the internet daily, including 41% who say they're online almost
constantly. This is on par with what we found in 2023 and 2024.'');
Jeffrey Gottfried & Eugenie Park, Americans' Social Media Use 2025,
Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Nov. 20, 2025), <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2025/11/20/americans-social-media-use-2025/#changes-in-use-of-online-platforms">https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2025/11/20/americans-social-media-use-2025/#changes-in-use-of-online-platforms</a> (52% of surveyed adults said they used Facebook
at least once a day; 48% reported using YouTube at least once a
day); Holiday Shopping 2025: US Fact Sheet, McAfee (Nov. 11, 2025),
<a href="https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/mcafee-news/holiday-shopping-2025-us-fact-sheet/">https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/mcafee-news/holiday-shopping-2025-us-fact-sheet/</a> (97% of respondents use at least one social media
platform); State of Search 2025: Insights into American Online
Search Behavior, Claneo, <a href="https://www.claneo.com/en/state-of-search-us/">https://www.claneo.com/en/state-of-search-us/</a> (last visited Aug. 19, 2026) (72% of surveyed respondents used
search engines like Google, Bing, and Yahoo multiple times a week);
U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales 1st Quarter
2026, at 1-2 (May 18, 2026), <a href="https://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecomm/26q1.pdf">https://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecomm/26q1.pdf</a> (e-commerce retail sales
accounted for 16.8% of total retail sales in the first quarter
of2026, totaling over $300 billion).
\16\ See Xin Ou, Online shopping behavior in the United States--
statistics & facts, Statista (Dec. 17, 2025), <a href="https://www.statista.com/topics/2477/online-shopping-behavior/#editorsPicks">https://www.statista.com/topics/2477/online-shopping-behavior/#editorsPicks</a>.
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A key driver of Platforms' expanding role in e-commerce is
advertising. Platforms have revolutionized how advertisers reach
consumers by offering ad-optimization tools and services that enhance
an ad's effectiveness in engaging consumers. These tools and services
can develop ad content, including through ad copy creation, image and
video generation, ad enhancements, and product listing creation or
enhancement. They can also use detailed consumer data--including the
consumer's demographic profile, websites visited, and search history--
to tailor the content and delivery of advertisements. For example, Meta
offers its advertisers Meta Advantage+, a ``suite of products that
helps advertisers maximize performance by using AI to optimize
campaigns in real-time and match ads to the people most likely to take
action.'' \17\ Similarly, Google offers tools that will ``find the best
performing ad combinations'' from advertiser-supplied assets to
optimize delivery and consumer response.\18\ These capabilities benefit
both businesses and consumers. But they also
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create serious risks: the same tools and services that rapidly generate
and deliver highly-targeted ads are often readily available and easy
for both legitimate entities and scammers to use.\19\
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\17\ Meta Advantage+ features, Meta, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/business/help/2486309305148646">https://www.facebook.com/business/help/2486309305148646</a> (last visited Aug. 19, 2026)
(features include audience automation, ad creative automation, ad
placement automation, and more). See also Jeff Horwitz, Meta is
earning a fortune on a deluge of fraudulent ads, documents show,
Reuters (Dec. 28, 2025), <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigations/meta-is-earning-fortune-deluge-fraudulent-ads-documents-show-2025-11-06/">https://www.reuters.com/investigations/meta-is-earning-fortune-deluge-fraudulent-ads-documents-show-2025-11-06/</a> (``The [Meta] documents further note that users who click on
scam ads are likely to see more of them because of Meta's ad-
personalization system, which tries to deliver ads based on a user's
interests'').
\18\ How to set up your first Google Ads campaign, Google Ads,
<a href="https://business.google.com/us/google-ads/how-ads-work/">https://business.google.com/us/google-ads/how-ads-work/</a> (last
visited Aug. 20, 2026) (``Add your campaign assets and preview your
keywords, images, logos, and videos in different ad formats.
Google's AI will then find the best performing ad combinations to
multiply campaign results for your goal.''). See also FTC v. Doxo
Inc. et al., No. 2:24-cv-00569, 2026 WL 1429295, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
May 21, 2026) (according to defendants' search engine optimization
expert, the advertiser did ``not manually dictate the precise order
or static nature of the text in ad headlines'' displayed on search
engine platform; ``rather, advertisers submit up to 15 ad headlines
elements, three of which are dynamically assembled by the search
engine platform'').
\19\ See Consumer Fed'n of Am., The Scam Economy: The True Cost
of Online Scams and Crimes in America, at 3 (2026) <a href="https://consumerfed.org/media/legacy/post_32705/The-Scam-Economy_The-True-Cost-of-Online-Scams.pdf">https://consumerfed.org/media/legacy/post_32705/The-Scam-Economy_The-True-Cost-of-Online-Scams.pdf</a> (``AI is supercharging these scams, social
media platforms are enabling the spread, and data brokers facilitate
targeting of victims, allowing criminals to reach consumers at
massive scales while exploiting highly precise profiling.''). See
also Creative solutions, bring your brand story to life, Amazon Ads,
<a href="https://advertising.amazon.com/creative-solutions">https://advertising.amazon.com/creative-solutions</a> (last visited Aug.
18, 2026) (``Amazon Ads creative solutions are a suite of tools and
services designed to help advertisers of all types and sizes to
bring their brand story to life. Our creative solutions include
self-service tools as well as hands-on support across creative
ideation and strategy, creative production and editing, ad policy,
and creative effectiveness.''); supra notes 17-18.
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The root of the problem lies in how Platforms' incentives are
structured. In economic terms, Platforms may be thought of as multi-
sided markets that connect consumers on one side with sellers who may
advertise on the other, and their incentive structure reflects their
intermediary role. Currently, Platforms financially benefit from all
paid advertisements posted on their platform, including scam
advertisements.\20\ As with other ads, Platforms can generate revenue
from scam ads in multiple ways, including when Platform services are
used to develop the ads, when the ads are posted on the Platform, or
when consumers engage with the ads.\21\ However, Platforms do not bear
meaningful responsibility for the enormous social cost that results
when consumers are victimized by scam ads that Platforms display and
optimize.\22\ These costs may represent negative externalities--costs
that are not borne by the parties best positioned to reduce them--in
this case, the Platforms.\23\ The result is Platforms seeking to
maximize their ad-related revenues with insufficient financial
disincentive to avoid generating those revenues from scam ads.\24\ In
other words, Platforms internalize the revenue but externalize the
risk.
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\20\ See Google, How Google makes money with ads, <a href="https://publicpolicy.google/article/how-google-makes-money-with-ads/">https://publicpolicy.google/article/how-google-makes-money-with-ads/</a> (last
visited Aug. 20, 2026) (``If you find an ad useful and click on it
to learn more, the advertiser pays Google.''). See also Alphabet
Inc., Alphabet Announces First Quarter 2026 Results, at 2 (2026),
<a href="https://s206.q4cdn.com/479360582/files/doc_financials/2026/q1/2026q1-alphabet-earnings-release.pdf">https://s206.q4cdn.com/479360582/files/doc_financials/2026/q1/2026q1-alphabet-earnings-release.pdf</a> (Google and YouTube advertising
alone generated over $77 billion in earnings in the first quarter of
2026--70% of Alphabet's total revenues that quarter); <a href="http://Investing.com">Investing.com</a>,
Meta Q1 2026 slides: 33% revenue surge driven by ad momentum (Apr.
29, 2026), <a href="https://www.investing.com/news/company-news/meta-q1-2026-slides-33-revenue-surge-driven-by-ad-momentum-93CH-4647470">https://www.investing.com/news/company-news/meta-q1-2026-slides-33-revenue-surge-driven-by-ad-momentum-93CH-4647470</a> (Meta's
total reported revenue for the first quarter of 2026 was $56.3
billion, of which $55 billion was attributed to advertising); Q1
earnings: Amazon CEO Andy Jassy discusses what's powering Amazon
Ads, Amazon News, <a href="https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/andy-jassy-amazon-ads-q1-2026-earnings">https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/andy-jassy-amazon-ads-q1-2026-earnings</a> (last visited Aug. 20, 2026)
(reporting that Amazon Ads generated a revenue of $17.2 billion in
the first quarter of 2026, which was up 22% year-over-year);see also
infra notes 30-32.
\21\ See, Consumer Fed'n of Am., supra note 19, at 19 (``For
some scams and crimes, social media platforms directly profit via
advertising revenue, revenue splits, and monetized content''); How
Google makes money with ads, supra note 20.
\22\ For example, Commission staff has reviewed Consumer
Sentinel Network complaints about third parties perpetrating scams
advertised on Platforms that do not mention the role the Platform
tools/services played in optimizing the scam ad.
\23\ The externalities--and corresponding costs--this proposal
is addressing are what economists refer to as technological or non-
pecuniary externalities, i.e., a cost that affects another party's
ability to produce or consume, without operating through prices or
the price system. In other words, the price system does not
internalize the externality through compensation or price
adjustments. See, e.g., Tibor Scitovsky, Two Concepts of External
Economies, 62 J. Pol. Econ. 143 (1954).
\24\ See Cristobal Cheyre, Meta ad tools `potent instruments'
for scammers, Cornell Chronicle (Nov. 6, 2025), <a href="https://news.cornell.edu/media-relations/tip-sheets/meta-ad-tools-potent-instruments-scammers">https://news.cornell.edu/media-relations/tip-sheets/meta-ad-tools-potent-instruments-scammers</a> (``Meta's response underscores a deeper failure
of incentives: it bans only the most flagrant offenders while
allowing others under suspicion to remain active, so long as they
pay higher ad rates. This structure perversely rewards the most
profitable scams--and ensures the platform takes a larger share of
their proceeds.'').
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Recent data, lawsuits, and press reports demonstrate the real-life
impact of these misaligned incentives. Consumer data indicate that
``scams perpetrated online [are] . . . more likely to result in a
monetary loss'' than those initiated by phone or text message,\25\ with
social media ranking among scammers' most frequently used contact
methods and the costliest channel for consumers by total reported
losses.\26\ In 2025 alone, almost 30% of consumers who reported losing
money to scammers said the contact started on social media platforms,
with reported losses reaching $2.1 billion.\27\ Consistent with that
data, public opinion research shows broad consumer consensus that
online scams through Platforms are a national problem.\28\ In parallel,
the Commission has brought several recent enforcement actions against
scams perpetrated on Platforms.\29\ And State law enforcers, consumer
advocacy organizations, and private parties have recently filed legal
actions against Platforms, alleging that Platforms have enabled and
profited from scam advertisements.\30\
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\25\ Better Bus. Bureau, 2024 BBB Scam Tracker Risk Report, at
26 (2025), <a href="https://bbbmarketplacetrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/2024-RiskReport-US.pdf">https://bbbmarketplacetrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/2024-RiskReport-US.pdf</a>.
\26\ See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Reported losses to scams on social
media eight times higher than in 2020 (Apr. 27, 2026), <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/data-visualizations/data-spotlight/2026/04/reported-losses-scams-social-media-eight-times-higher-2020#ft1">https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/data-visualizations/data-spotlight/2026/04/reported-losses-scams-social-media-eight-times-higher-2020#ft1</a>
(listing social media as the top fraud contact method based on total
reported monetary loss; nearly 30% of people who reported losing
money to scams in 2025 said the scam started on social media); Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Protecting Older Consumers Report 2024-2025, supra
note 2, at 25-26 (``In 2024, older adults filed more loss reports
and reported losing more money in the aggregate to fraud that
started on social media than to fraud that reached them by any other
method of contact''); Better Bus. Bureau, supra note 25, at 26-29
(36.2% of BBB survey respondents said that the scam incident they
reported to the BBB that year involved social media, with roughly
half of those incidents beginning when consumers responded to an
advertisement or post); Horwitz, Meta is earning a fortune on a
deluge of fraudulent ads, documents show, supra note 17 (internal
May 2025 presentation by Meta's safety staff further estimated that
the company's platforms were implicated in approximately one-third
of successful scams in the United States).
\27\ Fed. Trade Comm'n, Reported losses to scams on social media
eight times higher than in 2020, supra note 26. And independent
analyses suggest the true monetary losses are far higher due to
widespread underreporting. Id. (citing K.B. Anderson, To Whom Do
Victims of Mass-Market Consumer Fraud Complain?, at 1 (2021) <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3852323">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3852323</a> (finding only
4.8% of people who experienced mass-market consumer fraud complained
to a Better Business Bureau or a government entity). See also
Consumer Fed'n of Am., supra note 19, at 6-8 (considering various
surveys and research to measure underreporting).
\28\ Pew Rsch. Ctr., Online Scams and Attacks in America Today,
at 16 (2025), <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2025/07/PI_2025.07.31_Scams_REPORT.pdf">https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2025/07/PI_2025.07.31_Scams_REPORT.pdf</a> (62% of respondents said
scams are a major problem on social media platforms, and 50% said
scams were a major problem on shopping platforms). See also Utah
Dep't of Com., NEWS RELEASE: 42 State and Territory Attorneys
General Urge Meta to Take Action Against Investment Scam Ads (June
11, 2025), <a href="https://commerce.utah.gov/2025/06/11/42-state-and-territory-attorneys-general-urge-meta-to-take-action-against-investment-scam-ads/">https://commerce.utah.gov/2025/06/11/42-state-and-territory-attorneys-general-urge-meta-to-take-action-against-investment-scam-ads/</a> (42 attorneys general sent a letter to Meta
``urging the company to take immediate and meaningful action to
address the proliferation of fraudulent investment
advertisements'').
\29\ See, e.g., FTC v. Clickprofit, LLC et al., No. 1:25-cv-
20973 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2025) (alleging that a company used Google
advertisements to fraudulently induce consumers into purchasing e-
commerce stores); FTC v. Arise Virtual Sols, No. 24-cv-61152 (S.D.
Fla. July 3, 2024) (settling allegations that a company used Google
to advertise unsubstantiated earnings claims); FTC et al. v.
Grubhub, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-12923 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2025) (settling
allegations that a company used Google ads to make unsubstantiated
earnings claims).
\30\ See, e.g., People of the State of Cal. v. Meta Platforms,
Inc., No. 26-CV-4934491 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 11, 2026) (alleging
Meta knowingly facilitates and profits from billions of scam
advertisements on its platforms, including through its provision of
ad tools that create/refine fraudulent ads on its platforms);
Consumer Fed'n of Am. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2026-CAB-002643 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 2026) (alleging Meta misleads users about the
steps it claims to be taking to fight fraud on its platform; while
promising users that it is meaningfully fighting scams and removing
scam content from its platform, Meta has instead allegedly adopted
policies and practices that it knows allow scam advertisements to
proliferate and simultaneously profits off those ads); Bouck et al.
v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 25-cv-05194 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2025)
(alleging Meta enabled stock investment scams via Facebook and
Instagram with its ad content generation tools and ad-targeting
tools, which are used to push scams to vulnerable users); Forrest v.
Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 22-cv-03699 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2024)
(alleging Meta played a role in creation of fraudulent ads that ran
on Meta's platforms in which scammers impersonated plaintiff's
endorsement of sham cryptocurrency investments).
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[[Page 62350]]
In late 2025, Reuters published a special investigative report
detailing how these misaligned incentives operate at Meta. According to
the report, Meta generates substantial revenues from providing powerful
advertising tools that enable scammers to reach vulnerable consumers,
often charging these scammers premium rates.\31\ In fact, Meta
allegedly earned an estimated 10% of its 2024 revenue--or $16 billion--
by running scam advertisements.\32\ Consequently, internal documents
and other reports indicate that Meta has been hesitant to harm its
advertising revenue stream by implementing more rigorous enforcement
procedures against scam advertisers.\33\
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\31\ Horwitz, Meta is earning a fortune on a deluge of
fraudulent ads, documents show, supra note 17. The report analyzed
various internal Meta documents, including an assessment that
estimated users on Meta platforms were shown roughly 15 billion
``higher-risk'' scam ads per day, and that under Meta's policies,
advertisers were typically banned only when automated ad review
models reached at least 95% certainty of fraud, with lesser
suspicions triggering higher pricing instead of takedowns. See also
Jeff Horwitz, Meta created `playbook' to fend off pressure to crack
down on scammers, documents show (Jan. 5, 2026), <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigations/meta-created-playbook-fend-off-pressure-crack-down-scammers-documents-show-2025-12-31/">https://www.reuters.com/investigations/meta-created-playbook-fend-off-pressure-crack-down-scammers-documents-show-2025-12-31/</a> (``As
regulators press Meta to crack down on rogue advertisers on Facebook
and Instagram, the social media giant has drafted a `playbook' to
stall them.'').
\32\ Horwitz, Meta is earning a fortune on a deluge of
fraudulent ads, documents show, supra note 17.
\33\ Id. (2023 internal Meta report allegedly uncovered that
Meta ignored or incorrectly rejected 96% of roughly 100,000 valid
weekly user reports of scam messages; some high-spending advertisers
received leniency, with certain ``High Value Accounts'' accruing
more than 500 strikes); Jeff Horwitz & Angel Au-Yeung, Meta Battles
an `Epidemic of Scams' as Criminals Flood Instagram and Facebook,
Wall St. J. (May 15, 2025), <a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/meta-fraud-facebook-instagram-813363c8">https://www.wsj.com/tech/meta-fraud-facebook-instagram-813363c8</a> (``Current and former employees say Meta
is reluctant to add impediments for ad-buying clients . . . [e]ven
after users demonstrate a history of scamming, Meta balks at
removing them.''); Ctr. for Countering Digital Hate, New
Investigation Finds Meta Allowed Medicare Scammers to Generate More
Than 215 Million Views on Ads, Mostly from Seniors (May 12, 2026),
<a href="https://counterhate.com/blog/meta-allowed-medicare-scammers-to-generate-more-than-215-million-views-on-ads-mostly-from-seniors/">https://counterhate.com/blog/meta-allowed-medicare-scammers-to-generate-more-than-215-million-views-on-ads-mostly-from-seniors/</a>
(``Nearly every scam advertiser studied had ads removed for
violations, averaging 151 removals each. One advertiser had 1,335
ads removed.'').
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The consequences of these misaligned Platform incentives are
particularly concerning with respect to scam ads that impersonate
trusted government and business entities. Consumers routinely turn to
these trusted entities for transactions ranging from everyday purchases
to banking to important government benefits. Once a consumer believes
that a scammer is a trusted entity, the consumer may review the terms
of the transaction with less scrutiny, leading to harm that is both
immediate and far-reaching.
Consider these common examples. Scammers are using Meta's powerful
ad-optimization and targeting tools to deliver Medicare-impersonation
ads to seniors--a group particularly impacted by such scams.\34\ They
are also using these tools to impersonate consumer brands--for example,
impersonating McCormick Spice with fake ``giveaway'' ads on Meta
platforms that redirect consumers to fraudulent websites.\35\ Another
common tactic, known as search-engine malvertising, involves scammers
purchasing high-ranking sponsored placements on search engines for
their deceptive ads that impersonate legitimate businesses, often
incorporating the business's trademarks or brand names in the ads' text
or associated web addresses that redirect users to imposter--or in some
cases malicious--websites.\36\ Search-engine malvertising is a popular
method for travel and banking impersonation schemes: deceptive third-
party hotel and booking portals use Google Ads to appear above genuine
hotel websites and steer consumers to lookalike reservation portals;
\37\ meanwhile, according to industry sources, scammers frequently use
search-engine ads to impersonate legitimate banking institutions and
obtain placement at the top of sponsored search results for consumer
banking searches.\38\ Given the pervasiveness of these impersonation
scams, the FTC and other government agencies have brought law
enforcement actions targeting Platform-enabled business and government
impersonation scams,\39\ and issued alerts urging consumers to be
vigilant for impersonation scam advertisements on Platforms.\40\
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\34\ Ctr. for Countering Digital Hate, SCAMBOOK How Meta helps
Medicare scammers target seniors, at 10-11 (2026), <a href="https://counterhate.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Scambook_CCDH_Final.pdf">https://counterhate.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Scambook_CCDH_Final.pdf</a>
(watchdog report finding Medicare scammers promising ``free''
benefits, like groceries or money, paid Meta to run Medicare scam
ads targeted at seniors on the Meta platform; ``73% of ad
impressions from top Medicare scammers were people over the age of
65''). The watchdog report also details that, in 2025, the top 30
known Medicare scammers on Meta generated around 215 million
Medicare-scam impressions, earning Meta an estimated $12 million in
ad revenue that year. Id. at 4. See also Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Protecting Older Consumers Report 2024-2025, supra note 2, at 18-19,
22-25 (``Older adults were much more likely than younger adults to
report losing money on tech support scams, prize, sweepstakes, and
lottery scams, romance scams, and government impersonation
scams.''); Fed. Trade Comm'n, Explore Age and Fraud Loss, Tableau
Public (June 30, 2026), <a href="https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/federal.trade.commission/viz/AgeandFraud/Infographic">https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/federal.trade.commission/viz/AgeandFraud/Infographic</a> (comparing
fraud loss reports, median reported monetary loss, fraud types, and
payment/contact methods by age of reporter).
\35\ Horwitz & Au-Yeung, supra note 33.
\36\ See N.J. Cybersecurity & Commc'ns Integration Cell, Beware
of SEO Poisoning and Malvertising (July 17, 2023), <a href="https://www.cyber.nj.gov/Home/Components/News/News/225/">https://www.cyber.nj.gov/Home/Components/News/News/225/</a>. See also Fed.
Bureau of Investigation, Public Service Announcement: Cyber
Criminals Impersonating Brands Using Search Engine Advertisement
Services to Defraud Users (Dec. 21, 2022), <a href="https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2022/PSA221221">https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2022/PSA221221</a> (warning consumers of cyber criminals' use of
``search engine advertisement services to impersonate brands and
direct users to malicious sites'').
\37\ See People of the State of Cal. v. <a href="http://BookOnline.com">BookOnline.com</a>, LLC, et
al., No. CGC26639469 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 29, 2026), available at
<a href="https://media.api.sf.gov/documents/2026-7-29_People_v_BookOnline_Complaint.pdf">https://media.api.sf.gov/documents/2026-7-29_People_v_BookOnline_Complaint.pdf</a> (alleging booking portals
<a href="http://GuestReservations.com">GuestReservations.com</a> and <a href="http://BookingOnline.com">BookingOnline.com</a> used Google and other
search engines to rank their impersonation ads above genuine hotel
websites and funnel consumers to lookalike booking portals with
considerable rate markups, up-front payment requirements, and
inflexible cancellation policies); Better Bus. Bureau, BBB Scam
Alert: How to avoid scams when booking a hotel online (May 2, 2025),
<a href="https://www.bbb.org/article/scams/28768-bbb-scam-alert-how-to-avoid-scams-when-booking-a-hotel-online">https://www.bbb.org/article/scams/28768-bbb-scam-alert-how-to-avoid-scams-when-booking-a-hotel-online</a>.
\38\ See U.S. Dep't of Just., Justice Department Announces
Seizure of Stolen-Password Database Used in Bank Account Takeover
Fraud (updated Dec. 30, 2025), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-seizure-stolen-password-database-used-bank-account-takeover">https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-seizure-stolen-password-database-used-bank-account-takeover</a> (scammers delivered fraudulent advertisements
through search engines, including Google and Bing, that imitated the
sponsored search engine advertisements used by legitimate banking
entities and sent consumers to malicious websites that impersonated
legitimate banks).
\39\ See, e.g., Complaint, FTC v. MediaAlpha, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-
07263 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025) (alleging defendant impersonated the
government by placing deceptive search text ads on search engines
like Google when consumers searched for government-related health
care terms or State-run marketplaces); Complaint, FTC v. Doxo, Inc.,
et al., No. 2:24-cv-00569 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2024) (alleging
defendants use misleading search ads to impersonate consumers'
billers); Complaint FTC v. Mercury Marketing, LLC, et al., No. 1:25-
cv-02021 (D. Md. Jun. 24, 2025) (alleging defendants impersonated
substance use disorder clinics in Google search ads to deceptively
route consumers trying to call those clinics to defendants'
clinics); Complaint FTC v. Innovative Partners LP, No. 0:26-cv-60976
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2026) (alleging defendants impersonated
government and large insurance companies by deceptively using
government-related URLs and names in online advertisements,
including search engine advertisements).
\40\ See, e.g., Off. of the Att'y Gen. Conn., Attorney General
Tong Warns Connecticut Against Investment Scams on Meta Platforms
(Apr. 6, 2026), <a href="https://portal.ct.gov/ag/press-releases/2026-press-releases/attorney-general-tong-warns-connecticut-against-investment-scams-on-meta-platforms">https://portal.ct.gov/ag/press-releases/2026-press-releases/attorney-general-tong-warns-connecticut-against-investment-scams-on-meta-platforms</a>; N.Y. Att'y Gen., INVESTOR ALERT: Attorney
General James Warns New Yorkers of Investment Scams on Meta
Platforms (Apr. 6, 2026), <a href="https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2026/investor-alert-attorney-general-james-warns-new-yorkers-investment-scams-meta">https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2026/investor-alert-attorney-general-james-warns-new-yorkers-investment-scams-meta</a>; Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Social Media and Stock Tip
Scams--Investor Alert (2024), <a href="https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/litreleases/2024/26187-investor-alert-investor.pdf">https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/litreleases/2024/26187-investor-alert-investor.pdf</a>; Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, Public Service Announcement, supra note 36.
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[[Page 62351]]
Beyond harming individual consumers, these impersonation scams
undermine the conditions that markets need to function efficiently.
Efficient markets allocate a society's scarce resources to the most
valued uses by allowing consumers to discover and choose among
competing sellers, thereby channeling consumer spending to firms that
produce goods and services that consumers value, and away from firms
that do not. Markets can, however, only perform this important role
efficiently when material information is transparent and consumers
trust the market enough to engage. Information asymmetries--when a
buyer has less information than a seller--can hinder consumer
purchasing decisions that reflect what consumers value. In this way,
economic theory explains, markets with imperfect information can harm
both consumers and legitimate businesses.\41\
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\41\ See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for ``Lemons'':
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ., 488-500
(1970). This seminal paper demonstrates how asymmetric information
can lead to a reduction in the average quality of goods and the size
of the market. Imperfect information about quality can harm sellers
of high-quality goods by driving them out of business.
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Impersonation scams erode both the transparency and trust required
for optimal market outcomes. Through sham advertisements, impersonation
scammers conceal a critical piece of information--their real
identities--and exploit consumers' trust in legitimate businesses and
government entities.\42\ The resulting harm is not merely academic: it
is a concrete market failure that leaves consumers exposed and distorts
fair competition. Indeed, consumer victims lose hundreds of millions in
hard-earned money to online impersonation scams each year,\43\ while
the legitimate businesses being impersonated suffer lost revenue and
serious reputational harm.\44\ And because the marketplace does not
incentivize Platforms to absorb or address the costs of the
impersonation scams they further,\45\ market discipline alone is
insufficient to correct the problem.
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\42\ This is likely because ``consumers [are] more likely to
click ads appearing to come from known brands or local businesses.''
Consumer Fed'n of Am., supra note 19, at 15-16 (2026).
\43\ See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Fraud Reports: Subcategory Payment &
Contact Method, Tableau Public (July 28, 2026), <a href="https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/federal.trade.commission/viz/FraudReports/FraudFacts">https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/federal.trade.commission/viz/FraudReports/FraudFacts</a> (displaying reported consumer monetary loss
by contact method and fraud type, including business and government
imposter frauds); Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Data Show People Reported
Losing $3.5 Billion to Imposter Scams in 2025, supra note 1
(reporting $3.5 billion in reported consumer monetary loss to
imposter scams, regardless of contact method, in 2025). Consumer
scam victims also report experiencing non-financial harms such as
lost time, compromised personal information, and emotional impacts.
Better Bus. Bureau, 2024 BBB Scam Tracker Risk Report, supra note
25, at 9-10.
\44\ See Horwitz & Au-Yeung, supra note 33 (recounting harm to
legitimate businesses); Ben Rogers, The Hidden Costs of Brand
Impersonation, Allure Security (Jan. 16, 2026), <a href="https://alluresecurity.com/blog/hidden-costs-impersonation/">https://alluresecurity.com/blog/hidden-costs-impersonation/</a> (recounting
reputational harms legitimate businesses suffer due to brand
impersonation). Government entities also suffer both financial and
reputational harm from being impersonated, as entities must divert
resources to alert the public and implement consumer education,
enforcement, and other measures to combat the impersonation. See,
e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Data Show People Reported Losing $3.5
Billion to Imposter Scams in 2025, supra note 1 (recounting various
FTC consumer education and enforcement efforts in response to
impersonation scams, including FTC impersonations); Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Federal Trade Commission Warns of Scammers Pretending to be
Agency Staff (Mar. 19, 2024), <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/03/federal-trade-commission-warns-scammers-pretending-be-agency-staff">https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/03/federal-trade-commission-warns-scammers-pretending-be-agency-staff</a> (alerting consumers about FTC
impersonation scams). Government entities may also suffer financial
harm to the extent impersonation scams divert money that consumers
owe to government entities.
\45\ See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text discussing
negative externalities of Platform ad-optimization tools and
services.
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Recognizing the prevalence of these pernicious impersonation scams
throughout the economy, the Commission promulgated the Government and
Business Impersonation Rule to curb such conduct.\46\ The Rule does
not, however, expressly address Platform conduct that furthers
impersonation scams. In light of the foregoing record indicating that
certain Platform conduct could constitute unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act--and that such
conduct is widespread--the Commission issues this Notice to solicit
public comment on whether rulemaking is needed.
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\46\ 16 CFR part 461; see also 86 FR 72901, 72901-03 (Dec. 23,
2021) (providing a detailed prevalence description of government and
business impersonation scams generally).
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IV. Commission's Authority To Address Platform Misconduct Through
Rulemaking
The Commission is well-positioned to address this growing threat of
online impersonation scams by targeting Platform conduct that furthers
the threat. Nearly ninety years ago, Congress amended section 5 of the
FTC Act to authorize the Commission to protect consumers from ``unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.'' \47\
Platform conduct falls squarely within the Commission's authority
defined by long-established FTC Act jurisprudence.\48\ A Platform's act
or practice is deceptive where: (1) its representation, omission, or
practice misleads or is likely to mislead the consumer; (2) a
consumer's interpretation of the representation, omission, or practice
is considered reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) the
misleading representation, omission, or practice is a fact material to
the consumer's choice or conduct.\49\ A Platform's act or practice is
``unfair'' if it: (1) ``causes or is likely to cause substantial
injury''; (2) the injury is not ``reasonably avoidable by consumers'';
and (3) the injury is not ``outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition.'' \50\
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\47\ Wheeler-Lea Act, Public Law 75-447, 52 Stat. 111 (1938)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)).
\48\ The FTC Act provides the Commission plenary authority to
prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices and only includes
limited exemptions from its jurisdiction, none of which apply to
Platforms. These include status-based exemptions for ``banks,
savings and loan institutions described in section 57a(f)(3) of this
title, Federal credit unions described in section 57a(f)(4) of this
title, common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, air
carriers and foreign air carriers subject to part A of subtitle VII
of Title 49, and persons, partnerships, or corporations insofar as
they are subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as
amended, except as provided in section 406(b) of said Act.'' 15
U.S.C. 45(a)(2).
\49\ FTC Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), appended
to In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984); see
also FTC v. Corpay, Inc., 164 F.4th 807, 834 (11th Cir. 2026); FTC
v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2016).
\50\ 15 U.S.C. 45(n); FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness (Dec.
17, 1980), appended to In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949,
1070 (1984); see also Corpay, 164 F.4th at 839-40 (confirming the
three requirements for determining unfairness under section 5(n) and
rejecting defendant's argument that the section contains a fourth
requirement). Privity with the consumer is not necessary for section
5 to apply. See FTC v. Five-Star Auto Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 502, 530
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (``One who places into the hands of another a means
of consummating a fraud or competing unfairly in violation of the
Federal Trade Commission Act is himself guilty of a violation of the
Act.'') (citing Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir.
1963)); Order Reopening and Setting Aside Order, In re Rytr LLC, No.
C-4806 (Dec. 22, 2025) (same; identifying situations in which courts
and the Commission have applied means and instrumentalities
liability); see also Complaint, FTC v. Amare Glob. Holdings, Inc.,
No. 2:26-cv-05900 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2026) (alleging section 5
violations against multilevel marketing defendants, including for
providing deceptive instructional and marketing materials to their
brand partners).
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Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act does not deprive the
Commission of this authority over Platform conduct. In relevant part,
section 230 states that ``[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service
[[Page 62352]]
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.'' \51\ This statutory
language provides Platforms an affirmative defense for liability that
arises from merely hosting third-party content.\52\ Beyond that,
however, courts have held that section 230 immunity does not extend to
all Platform conduct that involves third-party content. For instance,
the immunity does not apply to Platform conduct involving unlawful
content that the Platform materially contributed to developing, even if
the content includes third-party material.\53\ Likewise, the Third
Circuit recently held that a Platform's recommendation or curation of
third-party content constitutes the Platform's own expressive conduct,
which may fall outside section 230 protection.\54\ More broadly, any
Platform service that enhances the effectiveness of ads may fall
outside the ``publisher or speaker'' categorization of the activity
protected by section 230.\55\ In any event, whether a particular type
of Platform conduct falls outside section 230 immunity involves a fact-
intensive inquiry, and the Commission has posed specific questions
below to solicit information relevant to making that determination. To
the extent Platform conduct falls outside section 230 and is unfair or
deceptive, the Commission may exercise its authority to protect
consumers from such conduct.
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\51\ 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1). A provider of ``interactive computer
service'' includes search engines, see, e.g., Marshall's Locksmith
Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2019), and
social media platforms, see, e.g., Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d
53, 64 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2761 (2020).
``Information content provider'' is defined as ``any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the internet or any
other interactive computer service.'' 47 U.S.C. 230(f)(3).
\52\ ``Section 230 immunity is an affirmative defense'' to
liability that a Platform would need to raise and prove in
litigation. U.S. v. EZ Lynk, SEZC, 149 F.4th 190, 198 (2d Cir.
2025).
\53\ Platforms ``materially contributing'' to violative
content's alleged unlawfulness are considered to be developing the
Platform's own content for section 230 purposes. See Fair Hous.
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1166 (9th Cir. 2008); Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1269 n.4
(9th Cir. 2016) (``Our sister circuits have generally adopted
Roommates.Com's `material contribution' to activity test.'').
\54\ Anderson v. TikTok, Inc., 116 F.4th 180, 184 (3d Cir.
2024). While a number of circuits have held that section 230
protects a Platform's recommendation or curation of third-party
content, many of these cases follow precedent that predate the
Supreme Court's decision in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707
(2024). See, e.g., Force., 934 F.3d 53; Jones v. Dirty World Ent.
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014); Klayman v. Zuckerberg,
753 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In Moody, the Court held that a
Platform's ``presenting a curated compilation of speech originally
created by others'' constitutes the Platform's own ``expressive
conduct'' for First Amendment purposes. 603 U.S. at 728. The Court
has yet to address the section 230 implications of Moody, but the
Third Circuit held that Moody excludes Platform curation/
recommendation activities from section 230 immunity, and two
Justices have indicated a willingness to take the same approach. See
Anderson, 116 F.4th at 184 (``Given the Supreme Court's observations
that platforms engage in protected first-party speech under the
First Amendment when they curate compilations of others' content via
their expressive algorithms, id. at 2409, it follows that doing so
amounts to first-party speech under Sec. 230, too.''); Doe Through
Roe v. Snap, Inc., 144 S. Ct. 2493, 2494 (2024) (proposing the Court
consider the implications of Moody for narrowing section 230
immunity) (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial
of cert.); but see Computer & Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n v. Paxton, No.
24-50721, 2026 WL 2130729, at *14 (5th Cir. July 24, 2026) (``The
argument that we must choose between [Moody and circuit precedent on
section 230] presents a false choice.''); Doe 1 v. Meta Platforms,
Inc., 174 F.4th 1159, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2026) (following circuit
precedent immunizing algorithmic recommendations, and without
discussion, declining to apply Moody to section 230).
\55\ The statutory text of section 230 does not appear to
support the expansive reading of ``publisher or speaker'' activity
that some courts have given in an effort to advance their
understanding of Congress's policy choice. See, e.g., Universal
Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007)
(noting courts ``have generally interpreted Section 230 immunity
broadly, so as to effectuate Congress's policy choice'') (internal
quotes removed); see also Snap, Inc., 144 S. Ct. at 2493 (Thomas,
J., joined by Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of cert.)
(``Notwithstanding the statute's narrow focus, lower courts have
interpreted Sec. 230 to `confer sweeping immunity' for a platform's
own actions.''). Its language appears to limit immunity to a
platform's passive hosting of third-party content. See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, 2022 WL 17650509, at *13-20.
Moreover, a growing body of cases suggests a shift in section 230
jurisprudence to limit ``publisher or speaker'' immunity to reflect
this strict construction of the statutory text. See, e.g., Doe v.
Snap, Inc., 88 F.4th 1069 (5th Cir. 2023) (stating section 230 does
not immunize design defect claims against platform) (Elrod, J.,
joined by Smith, Willett, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, Wilson, Js.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Lemmon v. Snap, Inc.,
995 F.3d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding section 230 does not
bar claim based on Snapchat design); Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th
871, 913 & 922 (9th Cir. 2021) (stating section 230 does not
immunize platform conduct to amplify and develop third-party
content) (Berzon, J., concurring; Gould, J., concurring in part);
Force, 934 F.3d at 76 (stating section 230 does not immunize
platform recommendations of third-party content) (Katzmann, C.J.,
concurring); FTC v. LeadClick Media, 838 F.3d at 176 (2d Cir. 2016)
(holding that a claim based on provider's involvement in editing
third-party's deceptive content is ``not derived from . . . status
as a publisher or speaker''); FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d
1187, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating section 230 does not
immunize provider against liability ``for its conduct rather than
for the content of the information it was offering'') (Tymkovitch,
J., concurring).
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The Commission's authority includes not only the power to pursue
enforcement actions against Platforms engaged in unfair or deceptive
acts or practices but also the power to promulgate rules that define
with specificity the violative acts and practices. This rulemaking
authority includes the power to promulgate regulatory ``requirements
prescribed for the purpose of preventing'' the violative acts and
practices.\56\ The Commission has already exercised its rulemaking
authority to promulgate the Impersonation Rule. The Commission now
solicits public comment on whether it should exercise that authority
again to enhance the Rule, or to promulgate some other measure, to
combat the impersonation fraud proliferating on social media, search
engines, and other digital marketplace platforms.
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\56\ 15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B).
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V. Anticipated Benefits of Rulemaking
The Commission anticipates multiple benefits from using rulemaking
to address growing concern about impersonation fraud on Platforms.
First, rulemaking would provide the Commission a powerful enforcement
tool to address Platform-optimized impersonation scams by targeting the
market failure generating such conduct. As explained above, misaligned
Platform incentives appear to drive the proliferation of impersonation
scam ads. A rule could realign those incentives by subjecting Platforms
to court-imposed monetary sanctions for their involvement in furthering
those ads. Such a rule would effectively impose the social costs of
Platform-optimized impersonation scams on the Platforms that are likely
in the best position to reduce them.\57\
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\57\ See H. Beales, et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer
Information, 24 J.L. & Econ., 491-539 (1981) for an overview of
government interventions in response to market failures. The paper
argues that intervention is often warranted in cases where injury is
substantial.
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Second, rulemaking would enable the Commission to craft rule
requirements that build on the existing scaffolding of legally mandated
and voluntary measures that Platforms have already implemented. While
these existing measures lack the scope and rigor to adequately address
the conduct at issue, they provide monitoring, takedown, and other
processes that the Commission could harness in crafting an appropriate
rule. For instance, section 3 of the TAKE IT DOWN ACT requires
Platforms to establish a process for individuals to request the removal
of offensive posted material but only if it qualifies as a non-
consensual intimate visual depiction (e.g., ``revenge porn'').\58\
Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act requires internet
service providers,
[[Page 62353]]
including Platforms, to implement a process for copyright owners to
request the removal of infringing copyrighted material but not
infringing trademarked material typically used in impersonation
scams.\59\ The INFORM Consumers Act (``INFORM Act'') requires Platforms
to verify third-party sellers and provide consumers a way to report
suspicious conduct relating to these sellers, including impersonation
scams--but only if the sellers are deemed ``high volume third party
sellers'' and only if the Platform qualifies as an ``online
marketplace.'' \60\ Moreover, the INFORM Act does not require online
marketplaces to investigate reported cases of suspicious sellers or
terminate services for confirmed cases.
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\58\ 47 U.S.C. 223a.
\59\ 17 U.S.C. 512. Section 512 addresses safe harbor
requirements, including the process to request removal of infringing
material, for ``infringement of copyright'' only.
\60\ 15 U.S.C. 45f.
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In addition to these measures prescribed by law, many Platforms
highlight their adoption of some voluntary measures aimed at reducing
fraudulent ads in their ecosystem.\61\ However, the type and quality of
such measures vary across Platforms, and the Platforms could even
degrade or scrap these voluntary measures altogether if the current
media scrutiny lessens and impersonation scams remain profitable.
Moreover, the studies and articles discussed above explain why these
voluntary measures are inadequate at curbing widescale impersonation
scams on Platforms.\62\
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\61\ See, e.g., Kaitlyn Huamani, AI Is A Gold Mine for Spammers
and Scammers, but Google Is Using It as a Tool to Fight Back,
Associated Press (Apr. 16, 2026), <a href="https://apnews.com/article/google-ads-safety-report-ai-scams-defense-06d9ef869958555884989e8ec25974be">https://apnews.com/article/google-ads-safety-report-ai-scams-defense-06d9ef869958555884989e8ec25974be</a>;
Asim BN, Meta Removes 134 Million Scam Ads and Disrupts 12 Million
Accounts to Combat Online Scams, Digital Information World (Dec. 4,
2025), <a href="https://www.digitalinformationworld.com/2025/12/meta-removes-134-million-scam-ads-and.html">https://www.digitalinformationworld.com/2025/12/meta-removes-134-million-scam-ads-and.html</a>. According to these articles, Google
attempts to use AI to screen potential scam ads before they run,
while Meta attempts to identify and remove scam ads after they are
posted.
\62\ See supra Section III.
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These existing legally mandated and voluntary measures, while
inadequate for combatting impersonation scams, nonetheless provide the
Commission with a starting point. Platforms are already engaged in some
practices that could prevent their current amplification of
impersonation scams. Rulemaking would allow the Commission to tailor
rule requirements that build on these existing efforts and thereby
minimize unnecessary compliance costs for Platforms.
Third, a rule that targets this core market failure would enable
the Commission to maximize its law enforcement efforts. Enforcement
actions are time- and resource-intensive. Rather than expend the
Commission's efforts only on investigating and litigating a limited
number of impersonation scams at a time, a rule would potentially
prevent or mitigate substantially more impersonation scams by
addressing the Platform conduct that optimizes or otherwise contributes
to the scams. By defining, with specificity, the Platform conduct that
is unfair or deceptive, the rule would give Platforms the guidance they
need to refrain from problematic practices that further impersonation
scams, while also allowing the Commission to pursue enforcement actions
against Platforms based on the defined conduct itself, without the need
to demonstrate that the defined conduct is unfair or deceptive. The
result is a framework that both prevents and mitigates a universe of
impersonation scams by addressing the underlying Platform practices
that drive them.
Finally, a rule would provide the Commission a more efficient means
to recover money under section 19 for consumers injured by the
prohibited Platform conduct.\63\ More specifically, a rule would enable
the Commission to seek court-ordered consumer redress in one Federal
district court action brought under section 19(a)(1), rather than the
longer, less efficient, two-step process for obtaining redress under
section 19(a)(2).\64\
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\63\ Since 2021, when the Supreme Court held that section 13(b)
of the FTC Act (15 U.S.C. 53(b)) did not authorize equitable
monetary relief, section 19 (15 U.S.C. 57b) is the only statutory
authorization for the Commission to obtain monetary relief to
redress consumers harmed by unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
See AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 593 U.S. 67, 81-82 (2021).
\64\ See 15 U.S.C. 57b(a)(1) and (2). When the Commission has
reason to believe that a rule has been violated, the Commission can
commence a Federal court action to ask a Federal judge to determine
liability and, if proven, require violators to provide redress. See
15 U.S.C. 57b(a)(1), (b). Without a rule, the path to court-ordered
redress is longer. The Commission must first conduct an
administrative proceeding to determine whether the respondent
engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of
section 5(a) of the FTC Act. If the Commission finds that the
respondent did so, the Commission issues a cease-and-desist order,
which might not become final until after the resolution of any
resulting appeal to a Federal court of appeals. Then, to obtain
redress, the Commission must initiate a second action in Federal
district court, in which it must prove that the violator engaged in
objectively fraudulent or dishonest conduct in order to obtain
court-ordered redress. See 15 U.S.C. 57b(a)(2), (b).
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VI. Objectives, Regulatory Alternatives, and Request for Comments
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission seeks comments on whether
it should commence a rulemaking proceeding to amend the Rule, or to
adopt some other measure, to address unfair or deceptive practices by
Platforms that further government and business impersonation scams
through their ad-optimization tools and services. While the materials
cited above and in the prior proceeding promulgating the Rule indicate
the pervasiveness of such practices,\65\ the Commission now solicits
additional public comment to supplement that record and ensure its
rulemaking adequately responds to concerns from consumers, industry,
and other stakeholders.
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\65\ See supra Section III; 86 FR 72901 (Dec. 23, 2021); 87 FR
62741 (Oct. 17, 2022); 89 FR 15017 (Mar. 1, 2024); 89 FR 15072 (Mar.
1, 2024).
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Specifically, the Commission seeks information on Platforms'
business operations and financial incentives relating to advertising
and advertising optimization; how those operations and incentives
intersect with impersonation scams advertised on those Platforms;
whether Platforms are engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in furthering impersonation scams through their advertising-
optimization tools and services (e.g., content creation, audience
targeting); and whether any of these acts or practices are prevalent in
the U.S. economy. The Commission also seeks information regarding ways
to address these acts or practices, including amending the
Impersonation Rule, promulgating a new rule, or implementing
alternatives to regulation. Potential alternatives to regulation could
include educating consumers and businesses on avoiding impersonation
scams on Platforms or implementing measures to encourage voluntary
industry-wide efforts aimed at combatting impersonation scams.
In responding to the questions below, the Commission invites the
public to submit any market studies, economic data, or other empirical
evidence. The Commission reminds commenters that, while it reviews all
submissions, comments may be more persuasive when substantiated with
evidence, particularly economic data.
A. Questions About the Marketplace for Advertising on Platforms
1. How many Platforms allow users to post advertisements on their
platform(s)? How many Platforms offer advertising-optimization tools/
services, such as audience targeting or advertisement content creation
services? \66\
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\66\ For instance, audience targeting services include such
services as target audience profiling, as well as targeting based on
demographics, employment background, location, interests, user
activity, and shopping history. Advertisement content creation
services include such services as ad copy creation, image and video
generation, ad enhancements, and product listing creation or
enhancement.
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[[Page 62354]]
2. What are the names of the Platforms identified in response to
Question A.1, and for each, what are the gross annual revenues
generated from advertising and advertising-optimization tools/services,
respectively? Which of these Platforms, if any, are small businesses?
\67\
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\67\ Please use the U.S. Small Business Administration's
(``SBA'') standards for defining ``small business'' to answer any
questions regarding small businesses in Section VI. See Size
Standards, <a href="https://www.sba.gov/federal-contracting/contracting-guide/size-standards">https://www.sba.gov/federal-contracting/contracting-guide/size-standards</a>. SBA defines ``small business'' by NAICS code
based on either employment levels or annual receipts. To the extent
any questions regarding small businesses in Section VI implicate any
other ``small entities''--small governmental jurisdictions or small
nonprofit organizations as defined by section 601 of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612)--please provide information for
those ``small entities.''
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3. Do Platforms generate revenue from providing advertising and/or
advertising-optimization tools/services for deceptive ads? If so, what
financial incentives, if any, do Platforms have to prevent the use of
their digital platforms and advertising-optimization tools/services for
deceptive ads?
4. What kinds of businesses advertise on Platforms or use Platform
advertising-optimization tools/services?
a. Which industries, if any, have the types of businesses that do
not advertise on Platforms or use these tools/services? Why do
businesses in these industries not advertise on Platforms or use these
tools/services?
b. What percentage of ads on Platforms advertise small businesses?
What percentage of these ads utilize Platform advertising-optimization
tools and services?
B. Questions About the Role of Platforms in Advertising Optimization
1. What advertising-optimization tools/services does each Platform
identified in response to Question A.2 provide its advertisers?
a. How does each tool/service work? What capabilities or functions
does each type of tool/service provide advertisers?
b. To what extent does each tool/service create, develop, or modify
the content (including images) of the advertisement? What specific
actions does the tool/service perform to create, develop, or modify the
content of the advertisement?
c. To what extent does each tool/service control the delivery of
the advertisement, including when, where, and to whom the advertisement
is displayed? What specific actions does the tool/service take to
control the delivery of the advertisement?
d. To what extent does each tool/service optimize the advertisement
in ways other than those referenced in Questions B.1.b and B.1.c? What
specific action(s) does the tool/service perform?
e. For each tool/service, what percentage of businesses advertising
on the Platform utilize the tool/service? What percentage of businesses
utilizing the service are small businesses?
2. What measures does each Platform identified in response to
Question A.2 employ to prevent the use of their advertising-
optimization tools/services for deceptive advertising involving
government or business impersonation (``Impersonation Ads'')?
a. Does the Platform verify the advertiser's identity prior to
providing access to its tools/services? If so, how? What criteria,
factors, and/or metrics does the Platform use to perform the
verification?
b. Does the Platform perform any steps other than verifying the
advertiser's identity to determine whether to provide access to its
tools/services? If so, what and how? For instance, does the Platform
evaluate the advertiser's website for signs that the advertiser is
engaged in Impersonation Ads? What criteria, factors, and/or metrics
does the Platform use to determine whether to provide access to its
tools/services?
c. Does the Platform restrict the use of trademarks, tradenames, or
other names or symbols identifying government or business entities
unaffiliated with the advertiser, when optimizing the content or
delivery of advertisements? If so, how? What criteria, factors, and/or
metrics does the Platform use to determine whether to restrict the use
of particular trademarks, tradenames, or other identifying names or
symbols?
d. Does the Platform screen or monitor advertisements to determine
whether they are Impersonation Ads? If so, how? What criteria, factors,
and/or metrics does the Platform use to determine whether an
advertisement is an Impersonation Ad?
e. Does the Platform take any steps to remediate Impersonation Ads
that have already been posted and/or optimized? If so, what steps? What
criteria, factors, and/or metrics does the Platform use to determine
which steps to take to remediate the posted and/or optimized
Impersonation Ad?
f. Does the Platform take any steps to discipline advertisers who
have engaged in Impersonation Ads? If so, what steps? What criteria,
factors, and/or metrics does the Platform use to determine whether to
discipline the advertiser and which disciplinary steps to take?
g. Does revenue or any other benefit that the Platform derives from
posting, or from providing tools/services for optimizing, Impersonation
Ads play a role in the Platform's setting or use of the criteria,
factors, and/or metrics referenced in response to Questions B.2.a
through B.2.f above? If so, how?
C. Questions About the Prevalence of Unfair or Deceptive Acts or
Practices (``UDAP'') by Platforms That Further Impersonation Ads
1. Which of the Platform practices identified in response to
Questions B.1 and B.2 do you consider unfair or deceptive in furthering
Impersonation Ads (hereinafter, ``Platform UDAPs'')?
a. Specifically for Platform advertising-optimization tools/
services that tailor the ad content or delivery to the consumer,\68\ do
Platforms either actively encourage or fail to take reasonable steps to
prevent the use of such tools/services for Impersonation Ads? If so,
how?
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\68\ For instance, Platform tools/services may tailor third-
party ad content to appeal to a particular consumer, or target the
delivery of the ad to a particular consumer, based on the consumer's
profile (e.g., demographic information) or the consumer's online
activity (e.g., specific search terms entered by the consumer).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. To what extent do Platform advertising-optimization tools/
services that tailor the ad content or delivery to search queries using
government or business names constitute a Platform UDAP?
c. Do any of these Platform UDAPs further other types of deceptive
advertising, apart from Impersonation Ads? If so, which Platform UDAPs,
and how?
d. Are there any limitations on the types of deceptive ads that
each of these Platform UDAPs can further? If so, please identify and
explain those limitations.
2. Do non-advertising posts on Platforms contribute to
impersonation fraud (e.g., sham LinkedIn or Facebook profiles used to
bolster the credibility of an impersonation scam conducted via text or
phone)? If so, how?
a. What Platform UDAPs enable the use of non-advertising posts for
impersonation fraud?
b. Do Platforms either actively encourage, or fail to take
reasonable steps to prevent, the use of non-advertising posts for
impersonation fraud? If so, how?
c. Do Platforms generate revenue from non-advertising posts? If so,
how?
[[Page 62355]]
3. How do the Platform UDAPs identified in response to Questions
C.1 and C.2 impact:
a. Competition among Platforms?
b. Competition among businesses advertising on Platforms?
4. Do the Platform UDAPs identified in response to Questions C.1
and C.2 impact small businesses differently than other businesses? If
so, how?
5. Do the Platform UDAPs identified in response to Questions C.1
and C.2 have any benefits for businesses or consumers? If so, what are
these benefits?
6. Congress authorized the Commission to propose a rule defining
unfair or deceptive acts or practices with specificity when the
Commission ``has reason to believe that the unfair or deceptive acts or
practices which are the subject of the proposed rulemaking are
prevalent.'' \69\ A determination about prevalence can be made either
on the basis of previous Commission cease-and-desist orders regarding
such acts or practices, or when the Commission has ``any other
information'' that ``indicates a widespread pattern of unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.'' \70\ For each Platform UDAP identified
in your response to Questions C.1 and C.2, please answer the following:
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\69\ 15 U.S.C. 57a(b)(3).
\70\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. What information or data indicates that the Platform UDAP is
prevalent or is not prevalent?
b. How frequently do consumers encounter Impersonation Ads
furthered by the Platform UDAP?
c. How many consumers have encountered Impersonation Ads furthered
by the Platform UDAP?
d. What proportion of consumers have encountered Impersonation Ads
furthered by the Platform UDAP?
e. What is the consumer harm caused by Impersonation Ads furthered
by the Platform UDAP? Consumer harm can include monetary losses as well
as wasted time (e.g., time spent initiating chargebacks, seeking
refunds, or resolving identity fraud).
7. Do you expect future developments in the Platform marketplace to
change any of your responses to the above questions? If so, how?
D. Questions About Regulations and Regulatory Alternatives to Address
Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices by Platforms
1. Is there a need for new regulations to prevent Platform UDAPs?
Why or why not?
a. If new regulations are needed, should the Impersonation Rule be
amended, or should a new rule or rules be created? Should the new
regulations prohibit Platform conduct that further deceptive
advertising other than those involving impersonation scams? Why or why
not?
b. Should the Commission consider alternatives to new regulation,
such as the publication of additional consumer and business education?
If so, what are these alternatives, and how effectively would they
prevent Platform UDAPs?
c. What are the benefits and costs to consumers and businesses
under your proposed approach compared to the other options, whether
issuing a new rule(s), amending the existing Rule, or implementing an
alternative to new regulation?
2. In certain industries, companies cooperate to combat abuses in
the marketplace. For instance, banks and payment processors use the
MATCH database to identify merchants that pose a high risk to the
payment system.\71\ What barriers, if any, do Platforms face in working
together as an industry to combat impersonation scams?
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\71\ MATCH stands for Member Alert to Control High-Risk
Merchants. Mastercard maintains the database. See MATCH Pro,
<a href="http://Mastercard.com">Mastercard.com</a>, <a href="https://developer.mastercard.com/match/documentation/">https://developer.mastercard.com/match/documentation/</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. To what extent do Platforms share information with each other
regarding confirmed or suspected impersonation scams and/or related
scam advertisers? Would additional information sharing within the
industry assist Platforms in combatting impersonation scams? What
prevents such additional information sharing?
b. What steps could the Commission take to lower or remove these
barriers to the Platforms working together to more effectively combat
impersonation scams?
E. Questions About Specific Rule Provisions
The Commission may consider a range of measures in proposing any
new or amended regulations to address prevalent Platform UDAPs. For
instance, the Commission may tailor the previously proposed means-and-
instrumentalities provision by requiring Platforms to evaluate
advertisements prior to posting, and by prohibiting Platforms from
providing advertising optimization services to those engaged in
Impersonation Ads. The Commission also may require Platforms to take
affirmative steps to address Impersonation Ads that are posted,
including: implementing a program to detect suspected Impersonation
Ads; providing consumers a clear and conspicuously placed tool to
report suspected Impersonation Ads; investigating suspected
Impersonation Ads; removing confirmed Impersonation Ads; discontinuing
advertising optimization services for confirmed Impersonation Ads; and
taking appropriate disciplinary action against the offending
advertiser. Instead of serving as affirmative requirements, these
measures may form the basis of a safe harbor provision by which
Platforms' compliance could provide a defense to liability under any
new regulations. In addition, the Commission may consider ancillary
measures, such as requiring Platforms to maintain records documenting
their compliance, to facilitate enforcement of the new or amended rule.
The following questions solicit comments on these and other potential
regulatory measures.
1. What regulatory requirements, if any, would be helpful for
mitigating Platform UDAPs that are prevalent in the marketplace? What
regulatory requirements would not be helpful? For each requirement
(helpful or unhelpful), please provide the following information:
a. What benefit would the requirement provide, including time and
money saved, for consumers?
b. What benefit would the requirement provide for legitimate
businesses advertising on Platforms and for the Platforms themselves?
c. What costs would the requirement impose on consumers?
d. What costs would the requirement impose on Platforms and on
legitimate businesses advertising on Platforms? For each discrete
requirement, describe each component of such costs, including costs to
read and understand the rule, costs to update procedures and train
personnel on compliance, costs to revise web pages and apps for
compliance, costs for record keeping, and any other compliance costs,
and state whether said costs would be imposed on Platforms, legitimate
businesses, or both. If Platforms were to pass along the costs imposed
on them to others, please state to what extent and to whom (e.g., small
business advertisers, consumers).
e. To what extent could Platforms comply with the requirement by
scaling processes Platforms currently use to comply with the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, TAKE IT DOWN Act, INFORM Act, and any other
law or voluntary effort to identify and/or remove problematic online
content? What impact would such scaling have on the costs to comply
with the requirement?
f. What modifications, if any, should the Commission make to the
requirement to reduce the costs imposed
[[Page 62356]]
on legitimate businesses advertising on Platforms, particularly small
businesses?
g. Should the requirement be limited to advertisers of certain
types of products and services? If so, why and which types of products
and services?
h. Would the requirement interfere with a Platform's provision of
services to legitimate businesses not engaged in deceptive advertising?
i. If so, what kinds of Platform services and how?
ii. How can the Commission modify the requirement to accommodate
Platform services to legitimate businesses not engaged in deceptive
advertising?
i. Would the requirement discourage Platforms from innovating their
services or tools, particularly with respect to services or tools
incorporating the use of artificial intelligence?
i. If so, what kinds of Platform services and how?
ii. How can the Commission modify the requirement to avoid
discouraging Platform innovation?
j. Does the requirement overlap or conflict with existing Federal,
State, or local laws or regulations?
i. If so, what laws or regulations, and how?
ii. Should any Rule amendment address such overlaps or conflicts?
If so, why, and how? If not, why not?
k. To what extent does the requirement address Platform UDAPs that
materially contribute to the development of impersonation-specific ad
content?
l. To what extent does the requirement address Platform UDAPs that
provide audience targeting for impersonation fraud ads?
m. To what extent does the requirement address Platform UDAPs that
enhance the effectiveness of impersonation fraud ads, other than
through developing impersonation-specific ad content and audience
targeting?
n. Should the requirement trigger liability only if the Platform
has some level of knowledge of, or participation in, the Impersonation
Ad? If so, what level of knowledge or participation should trigger
liability?
o. Does the requirement help prevent other kinds of deceptive
advertising that do not involve impersonation? If so, what kind of
deceptive advertising, and how?
2. Specifically for Platform advertising-optimization tools/
services that tailor the ad content or delivery to the consumer, what
requirements would be a cost-effective way to prevent the use of such
tools/services for deceptive advertising?
3. Would requiring Platforms to verify the identity of the
advertiser before providing advertising-optimization tools/services be
a cost-effective way to help mitigate Platform UDAPs? Why or why not?
Which specific verification requirements would be helpful?
4. Would requiring Platforms to screen and/or monitor for
Impersonation Ads be a cost-effective way to help mitigate Platform
UDAPs? Why or why not? Which specific monitoring requirements would be
helpful?
5. Would requiring Platforms to investigate and/or take other steps
to respond to complaints identifying suspected Impersonation Ads be a
cost-effective way to help prevent Platform UDAPs? Why or why not?
Which specific requirements would be helpful?
a. What types of complaints (e.g., consumer complaints, competitor
complaints, complaints from those being impersonated), and what volume
of complaints (by individuals, small businesses, or others) should
trigger a duty for Platforms to investigate a suspected Impersonation
Ad?
b. What steps should Platforms take to investigate and confirm a
suspected Impersonation Ad?
c. Should Platforms be required to respond to complaints by taking
down confirmed Impersonation Ads? If so, how much time do Platforms
need to take down the confirmed Impersonation Ads?
d. Should Platforms be required to respond to complaints by
terminating advertising-optimization tools/services for the confirmed
Impersonation Ads? If so, how much time do Platforms need to terminate
such services?
F. Miscellaneous
1. For each of your responses to the questions above, please answer
the following:
a. What timeframe(s) does your response cover?
b. Do you expect your response to change significantly in the next
few years? If so, how and why?
c. What evidence supports your response?
VII. Comment Submissions
You can file a comment online or on paper. For the FTC to consider
your comment, we must receive it on or before November 30, 2026. Write
``16 CFR part 461--Impersonation Rule, Matter No. R207000'' on your
comment. Your comment--including your name and your State--will be
placed on the public record of this proceeding, including, to the
extent practicable, on the <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a> website.
We encourage you to submit comments through the <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a> website. Postal mail addressed to the Commission
will be subject to delay because of heightened security screening. If
you prefer to file your comment on paper, write ``16 CFR part 461--
Impersonation Rule, Matter No. R207000'' on your comment and on the
envelope, and send it via overnight service to: Federal Trade
Commission, Office of the Secretary, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Mail
Stop H-144 (Annex P), Washington, DC 20580.
Because your comment will be placed on the publicly accessible
website at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a>, you are solely responsible for making
sure that your comment does not include any sensitive or confidential
information. In particular, your comment should not include any
sensitive personal information, such as your or anyone else's Social
Security number; date of birth; driver's license number or other State
identification number, or foreign country equivalent; passport number;
financial account number; or credit or debit card number. You are also
solely responsible for making sure that your comment does not include
any sensitive health information, such as medical records or other
individually identifiable health information. In addition, your comment
should not include any ``trade secret or any commercial or financial
information which . . . is privileged or confidential''--as provided by
section 6(f) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 46(f), and FTC Rule 4.10(a)(2),
16 CFR 4.10(a)(2)--including competitively sensitive information such
as costs, sales statistics, inventories, formulas, patterns, devices,
manufacturing processes, or customer names.
Comments containing material for which confidential treatment is
requested must be filed in paper form, must be clearly labeled
``Confidential,'' and must comply with FTC Rule 4.9(c), 16 CFR 4.9(c).
In particular, the written request for confidential treatment that
accompanies the comment must include the factual and legal basis for
the request, and must identify the specific portions of the comment to
be withheld from the public record. See FTC Rule 4.9(c). Your comment
will be kept confidential only if the General Counsel grants your
request in accordance with the law and the public interest. Once your
comment has been posted publicly at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a>, we cannot
redact or remove your comment from that website, unless you submit a
[[Page 62357]]
confidentiality request that meets the requirements for such treatment
under FTC Rule 4.9(c), and the General Counsel grants that request.
The FTC Act and other laws that the Commission administers permit
the collection of public comments to consider and use in this
proceeding as appropriate. For information on the Commission's privacy
policy, including routine uses permitted by the Privacy Act, see
<a href="https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/privacy-policy">https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/privacy-policy</a>.
VIII. Regulatory Review
E.O. 12866 states that agencies should assess the costs and
benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is
necessary, select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety
effects, and distributive impacts). E.O. 14215 requires all executive
branch departments and agencies to submit all their proposed and final
significant regulatory actions to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) for review. OMB determined that this ANPRM is a significant
regulatory action under E.O. 12866.
By direction of the Commission.
April J. Tabor,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2026-20143 Filed 9-30-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6750-01-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on October 1, 2026.
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.