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Rule2026-19688

Disadvantaged Business Enterprise and Airport Concession Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program Revisions

Primary source

Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.

Published
September 25, 2026
Effective
September 25, 2026

Issuing agencies

Transportation Department

Abstract

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT or Department) is finalizing amendments to its Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) and Airport Concession Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (ACDBE) program regulations. With few modifications, this final rule follows the interim final rule (IFR) published on October 3, 2025, which eliminated race- and sex-based presumptions that DOT determined to be unconstitutional. This action completes the transition to a system of individualized determinations of social and economic disadvantage to ensure program constitutional compliance and addresses administrative challenges identified by stakeholders during the public comment period.

Full Text

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 185 (Friday, September 25, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 185 (Friday, September 25, 2026)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 60885-60900]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-19688]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary

49 CFR Parts 23 and 26

[Docket No. DOT-OST-2025-0897]
RIN 2105-AF33


Disadvantaged Business Enterprise and Airport Concession 
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program Revisions

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary (OST), U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT or the Department).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT or Department) is 
finalizing amendments to its Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) 
and Airport Concession Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (ACDBE) 
program regulations. With few modifications, this final rule follows 
the interim final rule (IFR) published on October 3, 2025, which 
eliminated race- and sex-based presumptions that DOT determined to be 
unconstitutional. This action completes the transition to a system of 
individualized determinations of social and economic disadvantage to 
ensure program constitutional compliance and addresses administrative 
challenges identified by stakeholders during the public comment period.

DATES: This rule is effective September 25, 2026.

Electronic Access and Filing

    This document, the IFR, all comments received, and all background 
material may be viewed online at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a> using the docket 
number listed above. Electronic retrieval assistance and guidelines are 
available on the website. It is available 24 hours each day, 365 days 
each year. An electronic copy of this document may also be downloaded 
from the Office of the Federal Register's website at 
<a href="http://www.federalregister.gov">www.federalregister.gov</a> and the Government Publishing Office's website 
at <a href="http://www.GovInfo.gov">www.GovInfo.gov</a>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Allen Gutierrez, Director, Office of 
Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, Office of the Secretary, 
U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 
Washington, DC 20590 at (202) 738-6263 or <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#7e1f12121b1050190b0a171b0c0c1b043e1a110a50191108"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="1e7f72727b7030796b6a777b6c6c7b645e7a716a30797168">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Executive Summary

    The Department issues this final rule to finalize, with few 
modifications, the October 3, 2025 IFR.\1\ The IFR was a direct 
response to legal developments, including Executive Order 14151, Ending 
Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing; 
Executive Order 14173, Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring 
Merit-Based Opportunity; recent developments in case law; the Attorney 
General's March 21, 2025 memorandum to all Federal agencies, 
Implementation of Executive Orders 14151 and 14173; Eliminating 
Unlawful DEI Programs in Federal Operations; \2\ and the Solicitor 
General's conclusion that the DBE program's presumptions violate the 
U.S. Constitution in a June 2025 letter advising the Speaker of the 
House that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) would no longer defend 
the presumptions.\3\ The Solicitor General's conclusion and letter 
concern litigation about the race- and sex-based presumptions of the 
DBE program. In that litigation, on September 23, 2024, the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky determined that the 
DBE program's statutory race- and sex-based presumptions likely do not 
comply with the Constitution's promise of equal protection under the 
law.\4\ The Court held that the Government may only use a racial 
classification to ``further a compelling government interest'' and may 
only use race in a ``narrowly tailored fashion.'' It held that although 
courts have identified a compelling government interest in 
``remediating specific, identified instance[s] of past discrimination 
that violated the constitution or a statute,'' the Government did not 
present evidence of such discrimination by DOT against each of the 
groups covered by the DBE program's presumptions. The Court held, 
moreover, that the presumptions were not narrowly tailored because 
Congress used an unexplained ``scattershot'' approach in identifying 
the covered groups, and because the presumptions had no ``logical end 
point.'' The Court also held that the sex-based presumptions failed 
heightened scrutiny. Accordingly, the Court issued a preliminary 
injunction that prohibited DOT from mandating the use of presumptions 
with respect to contracts on which the two plaintiff entities bid. 
Following these developments, DOT determined that the race- and sex-
based presumptions of the DBE and ACDBE programs were unconstitutional.
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    \1\ 90 FR 47982.
    \2\ Memorandum from the Attorney General for All Federal 
Agencies, Implementation of Executive Orders 14151 and 14173; 
Eliminating Unlawful DEI Programs in Federal Operations (March 21, 
2025), available at <a href="https://www.justice.gov/ag/media/1409556/dl?inline">https://www.justice.gov/ag/media/1409556/dl?inline</a>.
    \3\ Letter from Solicitor General D. John Sauer to Hon. Mike 
Johnson (June 25, 2025), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/oip/media/1404871/dl?inline">https://www.justice.gov/oip/media/1404871/dl?inline</a>.
    \4\ Mid-America Milling Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., No. 3:23-
cv-00072, 2024 WL 4267183 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2024).
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    In light of this determination, the Department removed these 
presumptions, requiring all firms to demonstrate disadvantaged 
ownership through an individualized personal narrative (PN) process. 
The Department expects that the minor modifications made in this final 
rule will have no additional economic impacts beyond those described in 
the regulatory analysis supporting the IFR, which is available in the 
docket for this rulemaking. This final rule adopts, with minor 
clarifications, the regulatory framework established by the IFR. The 
Department's economic analysis supporting the IFR, including the 
Regulatory Impact Analysis published on October 3, 2025, remains valid 
and applicable to this final rule. As this final rule makes no 
substantive changes to the IFR's policy framework, there are no 
additional economic impacts beyond those previously analyzed. The minor

[[Page 60886]]

clarifications contained in this final rule--such as replacing 
``similarly situated'' with ``non-disadvantaged individuals with 
comparable qualifications'' and establishing specific reevaluation 
deadlines--are administrative refinements that do not alter the 
compliance costs or burden hours estimated in the IFR. Accordingly, the 
Department incorporates the economic analysis performed for the IFR. 
This final rule responds to the 637 public comments the Department 
received in its docket for the rulemaking.

II. Background

    Congress authorized the DBE program in 1983 and has since 
reauthorized the DBE program numerous times, having most recently 
authorized the program in Section 11101(e) of the Infrastructure 
Investment and Jobs Act (Pub. L. 117-58) (November 15, 2021). Congress 
codified the ACDBE program in 1987. See 49 U.S.C. 47107(e).
    The DBE program requires recipients of DOT highway, transit, and 
airport funding to set goals for participation by contractors that are 
small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals. The ACDBE program imposes similar 
requirements on airport concessionaires. Congress mandated by statute 
that DOT ``presume'' that members of specific groups (e.g., Black 
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific 
Americans, Subcontinent Asian Americans, and women) were socially and 
economically disadvantaged. Other individuals did not benefit from that 
statutory presumption. This meant that two individuals with comparable 
qualifications may have faced different standards for entering the 
program, based solely on their race, ethnicity, or sex.
    On October 3, 2025, the Department issued an IFR (90 FR 47979) that 
immediately eliminated the use of these presumptions, based on the 
Department's determination that the presumptions were unconstitutional. 
The IFR required all firms--both applicants and currently certified 
firms--to prove social and economic disadvantaged ownership through an 
``individualized determination'' as described in 49 CFR 26.67. This 
shift was necessary to ensure that the program is lawful.
    The Department received 637 public comments on the IFR from a range 
of stakeholders, including DBE firms, prime contractors, State 
departments of transportation, airports, transit authorities, trade 
associations, and advocacy groups. The Department has made minor 
changes in this final rule to clarify some provisions in response to 
comments received during the comment period. The following sections 
provide a comprehensive analysis of these comments and the Department's 
responses.

III. Discussion of Public Comments and Final Rule

    Stakeholders expressed divided views on the IFR, its compliance 
with the rulemaking process required by the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA), its removal of the rebuttable presumption, its provisions 
concerning the content of PNs, the reevaluation of currently certified 
firms, and the goal setting process to be used by recipients of DOT 
financial assistance. Some commenters took an explicit position either 
supporting or opposing the IFR, and a substantial group of commenters 
also asked a variety of questions about how to implement its 
provisions.

1. Removal of the Presumptions

Comments
Support for the IFR
    Several advocates argued that the elimination of race- and sex-
based presumptions is necessary to align the DBE and ACDBE programs 
with the Constitution. They contended that awarding contracts based on 
group identity rather than merit violates the Equal Protection Clause 
of the 14th Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment. 
These commenters frequently cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard 
College (SFFA),\5\ and the U.S. District Court's preliminary injunction 
in Mid-America Milling,\6\ as legal mandates for the Department's 
action to eliminate the presumptions.
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    \5\ 600 U.S. 181 (2023).
    \6\ Mid-America Milling Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., No. 3:23-
cv-00072, 2024 WL 4267183 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2024).
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    Commenters, principally prime contractors and non-DBE 
subcontractors, argued that the previous regulatory framework distorted 
market competition by favoring specific demographic groups regardless 
of individual circumstances, effectively operating as a subsidy that 
displaced merit-based firms and leading to the hiring of more costly 
and less competent businesses. Some individual engineers and business 
owners commented that the prior rules discouraged non-DBE firms from 
pursuing public work because they felt excluded by what they 
characterized as quotas or set-asides that did not prioritize 
qualifications or value.
    One advocacy group summarized both legal and policy objections to 
the presumptions, saying that assuming all members of certain groups 
are disadvantaged is ``grossly overinclusive.'' It supported the new 
standards to ensure resources go to businesses that ``actually 
demonstrate need'' relative to their peers, rather than relying on 
``proxies'' that may allow wealthy or well-connected individuals to 
qualify.
    In addition, some commenters asserted that the IFR would reduce 
waste and fraud within the program. These commenters argued that the 
presumptions allowed individuals to bypass scrutiny, enabling ``pass-
through'' entities or firms owned by wealthy individuals to secure 
contracts intended for the truly disadvantaged. One construction trade 
association noted that the goals established under the prior program 
failed to increase genuine participation and instead created 
bureaucratic inefficiencies that harmed the industry. Another supporter 
of the IFR opined that there was a need to ``dismantle'' the DBE 
program.
Opposition to the IFR
    Most commenters, including not only numerous individual small 
business owners but also advocacy groups and most trade associations 
and recipients commenting, strongly opposed the IFR's removal of the 
presumptions. An advocacy group and a trade association argued that the 
removal of presumptions ignored the legislative record and empirical 
evidence, including disparity studies covering many years, 
demonstrating that systemic discrimination against women and minority 
groups persists in transportation contracting. They and many of the 
individual small business commenters asserted that the DBE program was 
Congress's specific remedy for these documented barriers and that the 
IFR undermines the program's ability to level the playing field by 
placing new, undue burdens on small DBE and ACDBE firms.
    Many commenters argued that the Department misapplied SFFA, noting 
that the decision addressed university admissions rather than 
government contracting, where the Government has a distinct, compelling 
interest in ensuring public funds do not finance private 
discrimination. Others contended that the IFR is an ultra vires act 
that effectively nullifies statutory provisions enacted by Congress via 
Executive Order and DOT action,

[[Page 60887]]

violating the separation of powers doctrine.
    Stakeholders also expressed deep concern regarding the economic 
impact of the rule. Many small business owners stated that the 
immediate suspension of goals and the requirement for individualized 
narratives would cause irreparable financial harm, forcing firms to lay 
off employees or cease operations. One comment estimated that tens of 
thousands of firms could go out of business as a result. Commenters 
emphasized that the ``race-neutral'' approach ignores the reality that 
economic power in the transportation contracting field is dominated by 
large, established white-owned firms. The IFR effectively would 
eliminate minority participation, one commenter added. Many business 
owners said that it was only the DBE program as it existed prior to the 
IFR that enabled them to start and grow successful businesses.
DOT Response
    The Department acknowledges the variety of perspectives regarding 
the IFR. The Department agrees with commenters who stated that the IFR 
is necessary to ensure the DBE and ACDBE programs comply with the 
Constitution. As noted in the preamble to the IFR, DOJ and DOT have 
concluded that the race- and sex-based presumptions previously used in 
these programs are unconstitutional considering recent Federal court 
cases, including SFFA and Mid-America Milling. There is simply no room 
under constitutional law for a presumption that someone is 
disadvantaged just because they are a woman or a member of a minority 
group. The Department has no compelling justification in authorizing 
race- and sex-based presumptions under the DBE or ACDBE program. 
Participation in the DBE and ACDBE programs requires clear, 
individualized evidence that a firm's owner is socially and 
economically disadvantaged, without reliance on unconstitutional race- 
and sex-based presumptions.
    Regarding comments that the IFR ignores persistent discrimination, 
the Department emphasizes that the IFR does not end the DBE or ACDBE 
programs, nor does it deny that discrimination exists. Rather, it 
modifies the certification standards to require individualized evidence 
of discrimination that caused actual social and economic harm. This 
ensures that the program benefits those who have truly faced 
discrimination and economic hardship, regardless of presumptions 
related to their race or sex.
    The Department disagrees with the assertion that the IFR 
constitutes an ultra vires act. The Department is responsible for 
administering its programs in a constitutional manner. When a statutory 
provision is determined to be unconstitutional, the agency must take 
action to cease implementation of that provision. The IFR preserves the 
statutory goal of assisting socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals but removes the unconstitutional method--group-based 
presumptions--used to identify them.

2. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Legal Authority

    The Department determined that the race- and sex-based presumptions 
violate the Constitution, asserting that this conclusion provided 
``good cause'' under the APA to publish the IFR without prior notice 
and comment.
Comments
    The Department received comments challenging the way the IFR was 
promulgated, as well as the underlying legal rationale for eliminating 
the former rule's presumptions of disadvantage.
Good Cause Exception and Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
    Many commenters argued that the Department violated the APA by 
bypassing the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. They contended 
that the Department failed to demonstrate ``good cause'' under 5 U.S.C. 
553(b)(B), arguing that no contingency existed to justify immediate 
implementation without public input. This was particularly true, 
commenters said, due not only to the alleged adverse effects of the IFR 
on thousands of small businesses but also to the variety of 
implementation provisions that could have benefited from public comment 
before going into effect. Several commenters noted that the court cases 
cited by the Department, such as the SFFA decision and the Mid-America 
Milling preliminary injunction, occurred months or even years prior to 
the IFR, thereby negating the claim that notice-and-comment was 
``impracticable.'' Moreover, some comments asserted that SFFA dealt 
with student admissions to universities, a very different subject 
matter area from federally assisted contracting and therefore was not 
on point.
    A few comments asserted that the IFR constitutes a ``major rule'' 
with significant economic impact, requiring a transition period and 
congressional review under the Congressional Review Act (CRA). One 
legal organization argued that the ``good cause'' exception is a narrow 
safety valve intended for acute safety emergencies, not for policy 
shifts driven by litigation risk or executive preference.
    Some commenters also made policy arguments against an immediately 
effective IFR. A letter-writing campaign from over 150 engineers said 
that they, contractors, and public agencies depend on stable and 
clearly communicated Federal requirements to plan and design safe, 
compliant projects. Sudden regulatory changes on this scale, the 
letters said, can cascade through multiple stages of project delivery, 
risking adverse consequences for the projects.
    Many commenters opposing the IFR asked that the Department withdraw 
the IFR, reinstate the pre-October 3, 2025 rule, and issue a notice of 
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) seeking comment on changes in the program 
before imposing the changes.
    Conversely, some commenters supported the immediate effectiveness 
of the rule, agreeing that continuing to enforce race- and sex-based 
presumptions would perpetuate unconstitutional discrimination.
DOT Response
    For the reasons stated in the IFR, the Department maintains that 
``good cause'' existed to issue the IFR without prior notice and 
comment. Agencies are authorized by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B) to publish a 
final rule without first seeking public comment on a proposed rule 
``when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding 
and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that 
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or 
contrary to the public interest.'' DOT notes, moreover, that the IFR 
solicited public comments, and that it has fully evaluated those 
comments in issuing this final rule, and thus the Administrative 
Procedure Act's rulemaking requirements have been satisfied.

3. Constitutional and Statutory Authority

Comments
    Commenters expressed divergent views on the constitutionality of 
the DBE and ACDBE programs and the Department's authority to amend them 
via the IFR.
    Several commenters, including a State attorney general and some 
advocacy organizations, supported the Department's determination that 
the race- and sex-based presumptions are unconstitutional. These 
commenters

[[Page 60888]]

argued that the Supreme Court's decision in SFFA clarified that 
remedying generalized societal discrimination is not a compelling 
interest sufficient to justify racial classifications. They contended 
that the DBE program lacks the ``logical end point'' required by strict 
scrutiny and relies on ``outdated stereotypes'' rather than 
individualized evidence. Supporters emphasized that the Government has 
an obligation to stop enforcing unconstitutional provisions 
immediately.
    As noted above, commenters opposing the IFR argued that it is based 
on a misapplication of case law. They asserted that SFFA addressed 
higher education admissions and did not overrule the long line of 
appellate precedents (e.g., Midwest Fence Corp. v. Dep't of Transp.; 
\7\ Western States Paving Co. v. Wash. State Dep't of Transp.; \8\ 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater \9\) that specifically upheld the 
constitutionality of the DBE program as a remedy for discrimination in 
contracting. Commenters noted that the Mid-America Milling decision 
resulted in the issuance of a preliminary injunction from a single 
district court, applicable only to specific parties, and argued that 
the Department acted prematurely by applying this ruling nationwide 
before a final judgment or appellate review.
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    \7\ 840 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 2016).
    \8\ 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005).
    \9\ 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).
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    Furthermore, numerous commenters argued that the IFR is an ultra 
vires act that violates the separation of powers. They contended that 
the DBE program's presumptions are mandated by statute (e.g., the 
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, 49 U.S.C. 47113) and that the 
Executive Branch lacks authority to repeal legislation through 
regulation or Executive Order without congressional action, and that 
the IFR was arbitrary and capricious for APA purposes because it failed 
to consider reliance interests of affected parties and did not consider 
less burdensome alternatives.
DOT Response
    Regarding the comments on statutory authority and ultra vires acts, 
the Department acknowledges that the presumptions were codified by 
Congress. However, the Executive Branch has an obligation to ensure 
that all laws are implemented in a manner consistent with the 
Constitution. The Department rejects the assertion that Mid-America 
Milling or SFFA is irrelevant; these cases reflect the current 
jurisprudence on equal protection, which prohibits the Government from 
utilizing race- or sex-based classifications unless it is to further a 
compelling governmental interest and it is used in a narrowly tailored 
fashion, which the current presumptions fail to satisfy. The IFR 
preserves the statutory DBE program to the maximum extent possible by 
shifting to an individualized model of disadvantage, thereby saving the 
program from total invalidation while curing its constitutional 
defects.
    Regarding the comments on reliance interests, the Department 
acknowledges that businesses, individuals, and public agencies that 
benefited from the DBE program's presumptions of disadvantage may have 
expected the DBE program to continue in its prior form. However, 
reliance on a program does not justify continuing to operate 
unconstitutional presumptions of disadvantage within the program. The 
final rule allows firms to continue participating in the program by 
demonstrating eligibility through individualized evidence of 
discrimination that caused actual economic harm. This approach 
preserves the constitutional aspects of the DBE program and mitigates 
any effects on reliance interests. To the extent that the immediate 
suspension of goals implicates commenters' reliance interests, any 
effects will be mitigated by firms making required submissions and 
Unified Certification Programs (UCPs) completing the recertification 
process as soon as possible. Immediate suspension of goals is necessary 
to remedy the unconstitutional aspects of the DBE program.

4. Implementation and Transition Period

Comments
    The Department received a significant number of comments expressing 
concern over the immediate effective date of the IFR and the 
operational disruptions caused by the transition to the new 
certification standards.
    A wide range of stakeholders, including trade associations, transit 
agencies, and individual business owners, argued that the immediate 
effective date of the IFR caused severe market disruption. As noted 
above, over 150 comments were submitted by professional engineers, who 
emphasized the importance of regulatory predictability for those 
responsible for safe and efficient infrastructure delivery. They warned 
that immediate implementation of the regulation without clear guidance 
would cause administrative confusion, diverting their attention from 
the core mission of protecting public safety.
    Recipients and industry groups requested urgent clarification 
regarding the status of contracts executed prior to the IFR's effective 
date. Commenters asked whether recipients must stop counting DBE 
participation on active projects toward their overall goals or if they 
must modify existing contracts to remove DBE requirements. Some noted 
confusion regarding whether the IFR requires the termination of DBE 
subcontractors who lose certification during the reevaluation process, 
warning that such actions would lead to litigation and project delays.
    Other commenters pointed out inconsistencies in implementation, 
noting that while some States allowed existing contracts to proceed, 
others issued stop-work orders or paused payments pending Federal 
guidance. An association of general contractors requested a ``safe 
harbor'' for active contracts to prevent administrative bottlenecks and 
protect contractors from liability due to the sudden regulatory change.
DOT Response
    The Department acknowledges the challenges posed by the transition 
period. The Department thanks the professional engineering community 
for highlighting that safe and efficient infrastructure delivery 
depends on regulatory predictability. However, the immediate effective 
date was necessary to bring the program into constitutional compliance.
    In response to the confusion and fears expressed by small 
businesses, prime contractors, and certifying agencies following the 
publication of the IFR, the Department has issued Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQs) guidance available at <a href="https://www.transportation.gov/mission/civil-rights/disadvantaged-business-enterprise/october-2025-interim-final-rule">https://www.transportation.gov/mission/civil-rights/disadvantaged-business-enterprise/october-2025-interim-final-rule</a>. The FAQs clarify how the regulatory changes to 
goal-setting, counting, and termination operate in practice.

5. Business Consequences

Comments
    The Department received starkly contrasting comments regarding the 
economic consequences of the IFR. Although certified DBEs characterized 
the rule as an existential threat that will force widespread business 
closures, other contractors and industry stakeholders viewed it as a 
necessary correction to a market distorted by unconstitutional 
preferences.
    A substantial number of DBE-certified firms reported that the 
immediate

[[Page 60889]]

suspension of goals and the uncertainty of the reevaluation process 
have placed them in immediate financial peril. Many commenters 
described the IFR not merely as a regulatory modification, but as a 
``de facto suspension'' of the program that has frozen their revenue 
streams. Small business owners stated that without the enforcement of 
contract goals, prime contractors immediately ceased soliciting their 
participation or canceled pending agreements, interpreting the IFR as a 
signal that DBE participation is no longer required.
    Specific data points provided by commenters illustrate the severity 
of this ``market freeze.'' One DBE firm reported losing nearly $2 
million in anticipated contracts immediately following the rule's 
publication, representing the entirety of their revenue projection for 
the coming year. A highway products supplier stated it has lost half of 
its revenue since the initial injunctions began and have received 
``zero'' new contracts since the IFR took effect, warning that ``my 
business cannot survive this.'' Another construction equipment firm 
reported that the flow of bid invitations stopped completely within 
days of the rule taking effect, forcing the firm to suspend hiring 
plans and consider workforce reductions to avoid insolvency. Further, a 
construction firm owner reported that she had already let employees go 
because primes were no longer choosing her firm for subcontracts.
    These stakeholders argued that they lack the generational wealth 
and capital reserves of larger, non-disadvantaged competitors. 
Consequently, they contend that the administrative pause and the 
removal of goals will inevitably lead to the collapse of thousands of 
small businesses that operate on thin margins, resulting in layoffs and 
economic damage to the communities they employ. A comment supporting 
the IFR acknowledged that the end of race- and gender-conscious goals 
in California in 1996 resulted in sharp reductions in minority- and 
women-owned business participation in State-funded contracts.
    Some commenters, including non-DBE contractors, engineers, and 
policy organizations, expressed relief at the IFR, arguing that the 
previous system unfairly penalized merit-based businesses and distorted 
market competition. These stakeholders contended that the race- and 
sex-based presumptions operated as a subsidy that displaced more 
qualified and cost-effective firms.
    Supporters of the IFR emphasized several key points regarding 
business survival and market fairness. Business owners who previously 
did not qualify for DBE status stated they had been excluded from 
public work despite paying above-average wages and hiring diverse 
workforces, simply because they did not fit the demographic criteria. 
They viewed the IFR as leveling the playing field so that engineers and 
contractors are chosen based on ``skill set and talent.''
    On the topic of cost efficiency, long-time contractors argued that 
the historic DBE program inflated costs for taxpayers by forcing prime 
contractors to hire DBEs even when they were not the lowest bidder or 
the most qualified. One commenter cited data suggesting bid prices 
dropped by approximately 5.6 percent when similar preferences were 
removed in California for State-funded contracts, arguing that the IFR 
would result in better value for public funds. Finally, several 
commenters argued that the previous system encouraged fraud, citing 
instances of ``pass-through'' entities where spouses or relatives of 
wealthy contractors were listed as owners solely to secure DBE 
certification. These commenters asserted that the IFR would eliminate 
these ``sham'' businesses, thereby restoring integrity to the market.
DOT Response
    The Department acknowledges that the changes it is making regarding 
eligibility for the DBE program may cause temporary losses to firms 
that have participated in the program under the former criteria. The 
IFR's eligibility criteria and PN process provide an avenue for firms 
to remain eligible by providing evidence of discrimination that caused 
actual social and economic disadvantage on an individual basis. We urge 
firms to take advantage of this on-ramp by providing PNs and other 
relevant information to recipients as soon as possible, and for 
recipients to process these submissions in an expedited manner, so that 
all eligible firms can participate in the program in the near future.
    With that said, basing eligibility on race- and sex-based 
presumptions of disadvantage is unconstitutional. The only 
constitutionally permissible way for firm owners to establish 
disadvantage is through individualized evidence of discrimination that 
caused actual economic harm, as required by the Department's rule. If a 
firm owner that has participated in the program via the former 
presumptions cannot make this showing, participation in a program aimed 
at firms owned and controlled by socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals is not possible.
    The Department notes that alternative means for the participation 
of small businesses in DOT-assisted contracts, even those that are not 
eligible DBEs, are available. The Department encourages recipients to 
utilize DBE-neutral strategies, including Small Business Elements (SBE) 
under Sec.  26.39, to foster small business participation both during 
the interim period before the reevaluation process is completed and in 
the future.
    The Department also acknowledges the comments regarding market 
distortion and fraud, noting that the new individualized determination 
process is designed to ensure that only those business owners who have 
truly suffered social and economic disadvantage are certified, thereby 
addressing some of the concerns about program integrity while 
fulfilling the statutory mandate to assist disadvantaged firms.
Section-by-Section Analysis
    The Department received numerous technical comments regarding 
specific regulatory amendments in the IFR. The following summary 
addresses comments organized by the relevant Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) sections.

6. Definitions (Sec. Sec.  23.3 and 26.5)

Comments
    Several commenters raised concerns regarding the revised definition 
of ``socially and economically disadvantaged individual.'' Commenters 
noted that the definition requires a certifier to find an individual 
disadvantaged on a ``case-by-case basis'' but criticized the lack of a 
clear standard for ``social disadvantage'' once the presumptions were 
removed. Some commenters argued that the requirement to compare one's 
status to ``similarly situated non-disadvantaged individuals'' is 
logically flawed, asserting that a disadvantaged individual is, by 
definition, not similarly situated to a non-disadvantaged one. Other 
commenters requested clarification on whether the phrase ``without 
regard to race or sex'' in the definition precludes any mention of race 
or sex in an owner's file, or if it simply prohibits using those 
characteristics as a standalone basis for eligibility.
DOT Response
    The Department amended the definition to reflect the adoption of a 
constitutionally neutral process based on individualized evidence of 
actual social and economic disadvantage. This preamble discusses the 
``similarly

[[Page 60890]]

situated'' and ``without regard to race or sex'' issues below.

7. Reporting and Recordkeeping (Sec. Sec.  26.11 and 23.27)

Comments
    Commenters opposed the elimination of requirements to report the 
race and sex of DBE owners, arguing that without this data, the 
Department cannot monitor the program for discrimination or evaluate 
its effectiveness. Recipients asked for guidance on what data to submit 
in the Uniform Report during the transition, given that goals are 
suspended.
DOT Response
    The Department has determined that collecting race and sex data for 
the purpose of administering presumptions is no longer relevant to the 
program's operation under the new race- and sex-neutral eligibility 
standards. Recipients should continue to report total ACDBE and DBE 
participation once counting resumes. The Department will issue further 
instructions on reporting mechanics going forward.

8. Goal Setting and Counting (Sec. Sec.  26.45, 26.51, 26.55, and Part 
23 Equivalents)

Comments
    Recipients and contractors expressed frustration with the 
prohibition on setting contract goals and counting participation during 
the reevaluation period (Sec. Sec.  26.51(h) and 26.55(i)). Commenters 
stated that this ``pause'' has led prime contractors to drop DBE 
subcontractors from teams.
    Commenters questioned the continued relevance of disparity studies 
given the removal of race- and sex-based presumptions. One commenter 
argued that the IFR fundamentally alters the legal foundation for 
disparity studies, which are designed to measure discrimination against 
specific groups, not generic ``social disadvantage.''
    Consultants and recipients noted that the new requirement in Sec.  
26.45(c)(3) for disparity studies to provide a ``detailed capacity 
analysis'' will increase costs and necessitate new economic modeling 
that many current studies do not include. Some stakeholders asked if 
existing disparity studies are now invalid and if recipients must 
commission new ``capacity analyses'' before resuming the program. 
Others asked for clarification on the requirement for ``detailed 
capacity analysis'' in disparity studies, noting that existing studies 
may not meet this undefined standard.
DOT Response
    The Department understands that the transition to a new 
certification standard can be difficult for participants, but given the 
constitutional imperatives involved, we see no alternative to pausing 
the goal system until only firms that meet the new requirements can 
participate.
    The Department disagrees that the IFR allows consideration of so-
called systemic discrimination. The Department emphasizes that 
recipients must establish eligibility through individualized evidence 
of discrimination that caused actual economic harm. Recipients are not 
eligible if they use goals/disparity studies that are based on 
presumptions regarding race or sex or are otherwise based on 
generalized assertions of systemic discrimination.
    Because the regulation now requires a strictly race- and sex-
neutral approach to goal setting, the sole purpose of disparity studies 
in the DBE and ACDBE programs under this final rule is to ensure that 
recipients' goals properly account for availability and utilization of 
small businesses and the capacity of small, disadvantaged businesses 
relative to non-small businesses or small, non-disadvantaged 
businesses.

9. Consultation Requirements (Sec. Sec.  26.45(g)(1) and 23.43))

Comments
    The IFR amends Sec.  26.45(g)(1) to remove the specific requirement 
to consult with ``minority and women's contractor groups.'' Policy 
centers and advocacy groups criticized this change, arguing that it 
silences the very communities the program is intended to help and 
obscures the reality of discrimination in the marketplace.
DOT Response
    The Department removed specific references to minority and women's 
groups to align the regulations with the DBE-neutral and DBE-conscious 
framework of the IFR. However, recipients must still consult with 
organizations that have information concerning the availability of 
disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged businesses. This includes general 
contractor groups, community organizations, and other individuals and 
groups. Nothing in the rule prohibits recipients from consulting with 
organizations that serve disadvantaged businesses, including those 
serving particular constituencies, provided the overall consultation is 
comprehensive and focuses on obtaining relevant evidence regarding the 
availability of eligible firms. Indeed, the Department encourages such 
broad-based consultation.

10. Social and Economic Disadvantage Standards (Sec.  26.67)

    Numerous commenters expressed concern regarding the requirement for 
all firms to submit a PN. Small business owners argued that drafting a 
PN proving systemic barriers and economic harm is burdensome, 
subjective, and requires legal or professional assistance they cannot 
afford. One commenter noted that the compliance costs 
disproportionately impact the very firms the program is meant to help. 
Certifying agencies commented that they lack objective criteria or a 
``rubric'' to evaluate these narratives, fearing that without 
standardized guidance, determinations will be inconsistent across 
States.
``Without Regard to Race or Sex''
Comments
    Stakeholders urgently sought clarification on the IFR's instruction 
that determinations must be made ``without regard to race or sex.'' 
Many commenters, including small businesses, advocacy groups, 
recipients, and trade associations, argued that this phrasing suggests 
owners cannot mention race or sex even as a factual cause of their 
individual disadvantage. An advocacy group argued that this prohibition 
conflicts with the very court decision, Mid-America Milling, the 
Department used to justify the rule. It contended that Mid-America 
Milling struck down the presumption of disadvantage based on group 
membership, but that the court did not rule that race or sex cannot be 
factual causes of disadvantage in individual cases. Moreover, a transit 
authority noted that SFFA, which forms an important basis for the 
Department's rationale for the IFR, explicitly stated that ``how race 
affected [an applicant's] life, be it through discrimination, 
inspiration, or otherwise'' fully complies with the equal protection 
requirements of the Constitution. Many of these commenters recommended 
that the ``without any consideration of race or sex'' language be 
replaced by language saying that individual determinations would be 
made ``without any presumption of disadvantage based on race or sex.''
    Commenters opposing the IFR provision said that it was illogical 
for a PN being able to relate adverse personal experiences related to 
national origin, religion, language, sexual orientation, color, 
political affiliation, and a myriad

[[Page 60891]]

of other possible sources of disadvantage while prohibiting an owner 
from mentioning a personal experience of explicit race or sex 
discrimination. One commenter asserted the rule's restriction on 
mentioning race and sex in PNs acted as a ``gag order'' forcing owners 
to ignore the reality of their experiences.
    Many commenters asserted that binding certifiers to the specific 
nature of the discrimination experienced renders the ``individualized 
review'' impossible and effectively creates a ``presumption of non-
disadvantage.'' Conversely, some commenters supported the strict 
removal of these factors, arguing that any consideration of race or sex 
violates the principle of colorblindness.
    Other comments noted the IFR did not define what constituted 
``race'' for purposes of the rule. A Native American commenter argued 
that American Indians were not a race, but rather a people identified 
by history and tribal identity. Other commenters pointed out that 
Hispanic Americans, while a group that was presumed disadvantaged under 
the pre-October 3 rule, have never been defined as a race. Some 
commenters asked whether the prohibition on considering ``sex'' would 
prevent owners from discussing discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity in their narratives.
DOT Response
    The Department is amending Sec.  26.67(a)(1) to replace the term 
``systemic barriers'' with the term ``social barriers'' This change 
ensures the regulatory text remains consistent with the specific, 
individual experiences required in a PN.
    The Department received comments expressing uncertainty regarding 
the meaning of the phrase ``without regard to race or sex'' in Sec.  
26.67. Several commenters interpreted this language as prohibiting 
applicants from discussing race- and sex-based discrimination in a PN 
or preventing certifiers from considering such experiences as part of 
an individualized determination. That was not the Department's intent. 
The Department intended the IFR to eliminate race- and sex-based 
presumptions of social and economic disadvantage, not to prohibit 
consideration of an applicant's individual experiences. Accordingly, 
the Department is revising the regulatory text to clarify that 
individualized determinations must be made without reliance on race- or 
sex-based presumptions of disadvantage. This clarification does not 
alter the substantive framework established by the IFR. Rather, it 
confirms that eligibility determinations must be based on 
individualized evidence concerning the applicant's own experiences and 
circumstances, including evidence of discrimination, social barriers, 
denied opportunities, or other factors that the applicant contends 
contributed to social and economic disadvantage. This ensures the PN 
establishes disadvantage through ``individualized proof regarding 
specific instances'' as required by Sec.  26.67, rather than relying on 
unconstitutional group-based classifications. This clarification is 
also consistent with DOT Order 2100.9, Ensuring Nondiscrimination and 
Equal Opportunity in Department of Transportation Policies, Programs, 
and Activities (November 10, 2025), which requires that program 
eligibility determinations be based on individualized evidence rather 
than presumptions or classifications based on race or sex. The relevant 
inquiry is thus whether the applicant has established disadvantage 
through individualized evidence of discrimination that caused actual 
economic harm rather than through any presumption arising from 
membership in a particular group.
    In addition, the Department recognizes that the term ``Hispanic'' 
does not denote a ``race.'' Individuals who may fit within the broad 
scope of that term may well encounter acts of discrimination based on 
such factors as language, accent, color, presumed or actual national 
origin, presumed legal status, etc. Such incidents could be cited in an 
owner's PN.
The ``Similarly Situated'' Standard
Comments
    Stakeholders heavily criticized the requirement in Sec.  
26.67(a)(2) that a PN must establish economic disadvantage ``relative 
to similarly situated non-disadvantaged individuals.''
    Several commenters argued that this standard is ``illogical and 
confusing'' because a disadvantaged individual is, by definition, not 
similarly situated to a non-disadvantaged individual. They asserted 
that if two individuals were truly similarly situated, neither would be 
disadvantaged, rendering the comparison impossible. Commenters also 
questioned why business owners must compare themselves to 
``individuals'' rather than comparing their businesses to other 
businesses, calling this a ``fatal flaw'' in the context of commercial 
contracting. Commenters also asserted that owners lack access to the 
confidential financial data of competitors required to prove that a 
peer received more favorable terms, making the standard practically 
impossible to satisfy.
DOT Response
    To address commenter concerns that the ``similarly situated'' 
standard is ``illogical'' or ``impossible'' to meet without access to 
proprietary data, the Department is replacing this term with ``non-
disadvantaged individuals with comparable qualifications.'' This 
refinement clarifies that the evidentiary standard focuses on comparing 
the owner's professional credentials and work history (such as 
comparing two engineers who each hold a bachelor's degree in 
engineering, and certification in the same or similar North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes and similar experience in 
the field), rather than current financial outcomes.
    With the removal of group-based presumptions, the terms 
``disadvantaged'' and ``non-disadvantaged'' are no longer tied to 
specific group membership (racial, ethnic, or sex classifications). Any 
individual could be considered ``non-disadvantaged,'' just as any 
individual could potentially demonstrate ``disadvantage'' through an 
individualized showing.
    The Department disagrees with commenters who characterize the 
``similarly situated'' requirement as ``illogical.'' Rather, in a 
narrative context, the comparison is practical and makes sense. When an 
owner describes how a specific and identifiable attribute, 
characteristic, or personal circumstance negatively affected their 
business experience, the ``non-disadvantaged person with comparable 
qualifications'' is simply a peer who lacks that specific barrier. The 
rule essentially asks the owner to demonstrate: ``Because of 
[Attribute/Characteristic/Reason], I have faced barriers in my 
professional field that a peer with the comparable qualifications--who 
does not have [Attribute/Characteristic/Reason]--did not face.''
    The DBE program evaluates the actual economic harm faced by 
business owners by determining how these disadvantages limit their 
competitiveness within the free enterprise system. Although the 
ultimate impact is on the business, the disadvantage stems from the 
individual owner's experiences with discrimination, bias, or other 
barriers. The PN must, therefore, establish how the individual owner's 
economic trajectory (including their work history and advancement) has 
been hindered relative to a peer with comparable qualifications.

[[Page 60892]]

    This rulemaking does not require owners to obtain confidential, 
private financial data of their competitors to prove that they received 
less favorable outcomes. The rule only requires a narrative of the 
owner's disadvantage, not a financial audit of a competitor. The 
Department ensures that owners can establish economic disadvantage 
through a preponderance of the evidence without seeking the private 
financial data of competitors.
``Economic Disadvantage in Fact'' Provision
Comments
    One policy organization noted that the IFR appears to omit the 
former provision at Sec.  26.67(c)(2), which previously allowed 
recipients to deny certification to an individual whose personal net 
worth (PNW) fell below the regulatory cap but who nonetheless was not 
``economically disadvantaged in fact.'' The commenter argued that 
removing this provision eliminates a critical safeguard that allowed 
certifiers to prevent wealthy individuals from qualifying for the 
program merely by manipulating their assets to meet the technical PNW 
threshold. The commenter recommended reinstating this provision to 
ensure the program serves only those with genuine economic need.
DOT Response
    The Department agrees with commenters who noted that the use of the 
economic disadvantage in fact requirement is important to include as a 
safeguard against the fraudulent use of the program. Requiring that 
firms demonstrate economic disadvantage in fact is consistent with the 
Department's effort to amend the DBE and ACDBE programs to ensure that 
participation in these programs remains limited to individuals that are 
in fact socially and economically disadvantaged. Therefore, the final 
rule amends the regulation to ensure that economic disadvantage in fact 
remains a standalone requirement as part of DBE and ACDBE 
certification.
Specific Group Considerations
    The Department received specific comments regarding the eligibility 
and processing of distinct groups that have historically interacted 
with the DBE and ACDBE programs through unique statutory or regulatory 
provisions, including Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs), Tribes, Native 
Hawaiian Organizations (NHOs), Small Business Administration (SBA) 8(a) 
participants, and Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses 
(SDVOSBs).
Alaska Native Corporations, Indian Tribes, and Native Hawaiian 
Organizations
Comments
    The Department received detailed comments from ANCs, Tribal 
representatives, and advocacy groups arguing that their eligibility for 
the DBE program is derived from specific statutory mandates that are 
legally distinct from the race- and sex-based presumptions addressed in 
the IFR. One commenter noted that ANC eligibility is based on 43 U.S.C. 
1626(e)(4)(C), which provides that ANCs and their subsidiaries are 
``deemed'' to be socially and economically disadvantaged for purposes 
of Federal law.
    Commenters asserted that this eligibility is a ``political 
classification'' based on the government-to-government relationship 
between the United States and sovereign Tribes, recognized in Morton v. 
Mancari,\10\ rather than a racial classification subject to strict 
scrutiny. Consequently, these commenters argued that ANCs, as well as 
Tribally owned concerns and Native Hawaiian Organizations (NHO), should 
be exempt from the requirement to submit PNs. They requested immediate 
guidance confirming that these entities retain their certified status 
without undergoing the individualized narrative process required for 
other firms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

DOT Response
    In order to maintain consistency with the SBA's treatment of Indian 
Tribes and NHOs legally recognized under Federal and State law, 
representatives of these firms are exempt from the reevaluation and 
narrative requirements. However, these firms and their representatives 
must comply with all other certification requirements (e.g., business 
size, control, PNW) under Sec.  26.63(c)(1). This is equally applicable 
to the ACDBE program, which follows the certification standards of 
Sec.  26.63(c). See Sec.  23.31(a). ANCs will continue to follow the 
Sec.  26.63(c)(2) process for certification, which reflects their 
recognition as disadvantaged under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act.
    The Department emphasizes that the process for Tribally owned 
concerns, NHO-owned, and ANC-owned firms is based on the fact that 
these businesses are owned by sovereign entities and not by 
individuals. Individuals who are Native American, Native Hawaiian, or 
Alaska Native and who are seeking ACDBE or DBE certification on behalf 
of their individually owned (not Tribally owned) business are required 
to submit a PN and must demonstrate both social and economic 
disadvantage.
SBA 8(a) Program Participants
Comments
    Several commenters urged the Department to grant automatic 
reciprocity or a waiver of the PN requirement for firms currently 
certified under SBA's 8(a) Business Development Program (8(a)). 
Commenters noted that following the Ultima Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't 
of Agric.\11\ decision, the SBA already required SBA 8(a) participants 
to submit individual social disadvantage narratives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ 683 F. Supp. 3d 745 (E.D. Tenn. 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These commenters argued that requiring these same firms to undergo 
a duplicative review by DOT recipients wastes administrative resources 
and imposes unnecessary burdens on small businesses that have already 
proven their disadvantage to a Federal agency. A commenter specifically 
recommended that the Department amend Sec.  26.111 to extend DBE 
certification to SBA 8(a) firms automatically for the duration of their 
program term. Conversely, some commenters noted that the SBA's post-
Ultima process allows owners to cite race as a contributing factor to 
their disadvantage and sought clarification on whether DOT would accept 
SBA-approved narratives given the IFR's ``without regard to race or 
sex'' language.
DOT Response
    The Department declines to adopt automatic reciprocity for SBA 8(a) 
certified firms. Although the SBA 8(a) program and the DBE program 
share similar goals, they operate under different statutory authorities 
and regulatory standards.
    The Department's IFR requires a PN to establish social and economic 
disadvantage based on ``individualized proof regarding specific 
instances of economic hardship, social barriers, and denied 
opportunities.'' Sec.  26.67(a)(1). Because the SBA's evidentiary 
standards and certification procedures have diverged from the 
Department's requirements under the IFR, UCPs must evaluate whether a 
firm meets the specific standards of the DBE program. But the 
Department acknowledges that financial documentation or other evidence 
prepared for SBA certification may still be relevant; owners are 
encouraged to use such existing documentation to support their DBE or 
ACDBE reevaluation, provided it addresses the specific criteria in 
Sec.  26.67.

[[Page 60893]]

Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses
Comments
    Multiple commenters advocated for the inclusion of SDVOSBs in the 
DBE program or suggested replacing the race-based presumptions with 
preferences for veterans. Commenters argued that veterans face 
significant employment and business barriers due to their service and 
disability, which constitutes a race-neutral form of social 
disadvantage. One commenter noted that they faced ``secondary'' 
disadvantage status behind race-based groups and that the elimination 
of those presumptions creates an opportunity to prioritize veterans.
DOT Response
    The statutory definition of ``socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals'' authorized by Congress for the DBE program 
does not automatically include veterans as a presumptive group. The IFR 
eliminates unconstitutional race- and sex-based presumptions and 
requires all applicants to establish social and economic disadvantage 
through individualized evidence. However, the Department emphasizes 
that under the new case-by-case standard in Sec.  26.67, any 
individual--including a veteran--may qualify as socially and 
economically disadvantaged if the individual can demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he or she has faced chronic and 
substantial social disadvantage that has impeded business success. A 
service-connected disability could be part of the factual basis for 
such a claim of disadvantage, provided the owner meets the PNW cap and 
other eligibility criteria.

11. Privacy and Confidentiality of Information (Sec. Sec.  26.109(a) 
and (b), 26.68(e))

    The Department received comments regarding the protection of 
sensitive personal and financial information required under the new 
individualized certification standards, as well as conflicting comments 
advocating for the public disclosure of such information to ensure 
program integrity.
Comments
    Several commenters expressed concern that the IFR's PN and PNW 
statement requirements significantly increase the volume of sensitive 
data held by UCPs, raising the risk of unauthorized disclosure. A trade 
association representing public transportation agencies noted that the 
influx of personally identifiable information (PII) creates potential 
disclosure risks under various State and Federal open records laws. 
This association urged the Department to clarify that UCPs must 
continue to safeguard PII in accordance with applicable laws to prevent 
the exposure of owners' private financial and personal histories.
    Other commenters echoed this concern, with one accounting firm 
requesting explicit assurance from the Department that information 
submitted for reevaluation would be used solely for assessment purposes 
and treated as confidential. Another commenter described the 
requirement to divulge personal histories of discrimination as an 
``invasion of privacy.'' Similarly, a supplier argued that requiring 
business owners to describe personal experiences of bias in writing 
raises serious privacy concerns and risks ``re-traumatizing'' 
individuals who must relive harmful experiences to justify their 
eligibility. This commenter warned that without clear confidentiality 
standards, the process might discourage qualified owners from 
participating.
    Conversely, the Department received comments advocating for the 
public disclosure of certification documents to deter fraud. A public 
policy organization argued that the current lack of public transparency 
in the certification process allows for potential abuse. This commenter 
recommended that the Department amend the rule to require UCPs to post 
approved PNs and PNW documents publicly on their websites with 
sensitive identifiers redacted. They asserted that such transparency 
would allow competing contractors to review and challenge questionable 
certifications, thereby ensuring that only genuinely disadvantaged 
businesses receive DBE status. Another commenter supported this view, 
stating that the ability of other contractors to challenge a firm's 
status is the clearest way to keep the process honest, and objected to 
shielding this data from public review.
DOT Response
    The Department acknowledges the privacy concerns raised by 
stakeholders regarding the submission of PNs and financial 
documentation. The IFR, while changing DBE eligibility standards, does 
not alter the Department's longstanding commitment to protecting PII. 
The Department reaffirms that UCPs are required to protect the 
confidentiality of personal and financial information permitted by 
Federal, State, and local law, consistent with the existing provisions 
of Sec. Sec.  26.83(g) and 26.109(a)(2). Specifically, Sec.  
26.109(a)(2) provides that notwithstanding any provision of State or 
Federal law (e.g., Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 522), 
certifiers must not release any information that may reasonably be 
construed as confidential business information without the submitter's 
written consent. This includes applications for certification and 
supporting information submitted in a PN as confidential information 
protected by this provision. To assist UCPs in maintaining compliance 
with Federal confidentiality standards, the Department may draft 
specific guidance regarding ensuring privacy of narrative information 
in the future.
    Regarding the requests to mandate public posting of owner 
narratives and financial statements, the Department declines to adopt 
this recommendation. In addition to the part 26 provisions cited above, 
the Privacy Act and the FOIA generally protect personal financial 
information and personnel-like files from mandatory public disclosure 
to prevent unwarranted invasions of personal privacy. Publishing 
redacted PNW statements and PNs of discrimination would likely deter 
legitimate participation in the program due to privacy concerns, as 
noted by other commenters. The Department relies on the expertise of 
UCP certifiers and established oversight mechanisms, rather than public 
crowdsourcing, to verify eligibility, prevent fraud, and ensure program 
integrity.

12. The Reevaluation Process (Sec. Sec.  26.111 and 23.81)

Comments
    Commenters raised significant practical concerns regarding the 
reevaluation process. Stakeholders expressed deep concern regarding the 
requirement in Sec.  26.111(c) for UCPs to complete reevaluations ``as 
quickly as practicable'' without a defined deadline. Commenters argued 
that this creates an indefinite period of uncertainty where firms that 
meet the revised eligibility requirements are technically certified but 
practically ineligible for goal credit, since the recipients' programs 
would not yet be allowed to operate or utilize DBE goals. Some objected 
to the provision stating that the decertification procedures of Sec.  
26.87 do not apply. They argued this strips firms of due process 
rights, such as notice and administrative hearing, before losing a 
property interest in their certification.
    Commenters noted confusion regarding firms certified in multiple 
States. The FAQ guidance suggesting firms must go through the 
reevaluation process in their Jurisdiction of Original

[[Page 60894]]

Certification (JOC) and then reapply for certification was described as 
burdensome and contrary to the streamlining goals of the 2024 final 
rule. Comments suggested that once a firm was recertified in its JOC, 
all that the firm must do is notify other UCPs of that action to be 
recertified there. A frequent request from commenters in many 
categories was for the Department to provide standardized templates and 
checklists for the PN and the PNW statement. Commenters were concerned 
that without a DOT template, 53 different UCPs will develop 53 
different standards, leading to chaos for interstate firms and 
inconsistent determinations.
    State agencies and UCPs commented that they lack the staffing and 
resources to process thousands of PNs and PNW statements 
simultaneously. One recipient projected that while larger agencies 
might complete reviews in 60-90 days, smaller UCP members could require 
6-12 months, creating a fragmented ``mosaic'' of compliance where 
eligibility depends on geography rather than merit. One commenter noted 
that without a deadline, some jurisdictions might delay reevaluation 
indefinitely, effectively ending the program in those areas. Similarly, 
a trade association expressed the concern that absent a deadline for 
the submission of PNs, current DBE firms that do not submit PNs could 
hold up the restart of the program for those who have already submitted 
their documentation. Commenters suggested that the Department should 
have allowed for a phased implementation or a ``grace period'' where 
existing certifications remained valid while the new standards were 
applied to applicants.
DOT Response
    The Department agrees with commenters that an open-ended 
reevaluation process is untenable and that a definitive deadline is 
essential to prevent administrative paralysis and achieve programmatic 
finality. To monitor actively the timely completion of these 
reevaluations, to ensure uniformity of practice, and to reactivate the 
goal setting process, the Department is codifying specific deadlines 
and reporting requirements under 49 CFR 26.111(c), as well as 
establishing a clear close-out mechanism for non-responsive firms under 
Sec.  26.111(d).
    UCPs must complete their reevaluations no later than December 24, 
2026. The Department believes that December 24, 2026 is sufficient time 
for UCPs to complete the reevaluation process, which has been in place 
since October 3, 2025. A one-time three-month extension may be granted 
by the Department for special circumstances, and only if requested in 
advance of the reevaluation deadline. To apply for this extension, the 
UCP must email the Department's Office of Small and Disadvantaged 
Business Utilization (OSDBU) at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#4206000730272734232e3723362b2d2c3102262d366c252d34"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="cc888e89bea9a9baada0b9adb8a5a3a2bf8ca8a3b8e2aba3ba">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.
    After completing a reevaluation, each UCP must promptly email OSDBU 
at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f2b6b0b780979784939e8793869b9d9c81b2969d86dc959d84"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="7632343304131300171a0317021f1918053612190258111900">[email&#160;protected]</span></a> and provide the following data:

    1. Firms Maintaining Certification: The UCP must identify the 
total number of DBEs that remain certified following the 
reevaluation. In addition, the notice must include a declaration 
that the UCP serves as the JOC for all retained DBEs;
    2. Firms Removed for Ineligibility: The UCP must state the total 
number of firms disqualified and removed from the program because 
the owner failed to meet the required disadvantage criteria; and
    3. Non-Responsive Firms: The UCP must report the total number of 
DBE firms that were not processed during the reevaluation due to the 
owner's failure to respond to the notice requiring the submission of 
a PN with a PNW statement.

    The Department reserves the right to review the UCP's reevaluation 
process, including auditing any underlying documentation associated 
with a reported firm, at its discretion.
    Finally, under the newly added Sec.  26.111(d), UCPs will issue a 
final written notice of nonresponse to any DBE that fails to submit its 
documentation by March 24, 2027. These firms will be granted a final 
90-day grace period to comply. If they fail to submit the required 
documentation within this 90-day window, they will be automatically 
disqualified. By codifying a 90-day grace period, paragraph (d) 
resolves the administrative paralysis identified by commenters and 
achieves three essential goals: due process, administrative finality, 
and program resumption. First, it ensures due process by providing 
under-resourced small businesses with a definitive, clearly 
communicated window to submit their complex documentation, protecting 
vulnerable firms from sudden, unexpected removal. Second, it guarantees 
administrative finality by giving UCPs a uniform mechanism to remove 
non-responsive firms automatically without enduring protracted 
administrative proceedings. Third, it provides timelines to ensure that 
the DBE and ACDBE programs fully resume in compliance with the revised 
certification standards.
    The reevaluation process does not involve a full-scale 
recertification of current DBE firms. Under the rule, certified firms 
must establish their owners' social and economic disadvantage through 
the PN process. If an owner makes this showing successfully, it will be 
retained in the certifier's program and in its directory without 
change. If a firm cannot do so successfully, it will be disqualified 
under the revised program.
    Such a removal is not a decertification. A decertification involves 
a finding that one of the elements of eligibility (e.g., business size, 
ownership, control) that a firm demonstrated to obtain certification in 
the first place was incorrect or overtaken by events, or that the firm 
failed to cooperate with the certification process (e.g., failed to 
submit a timely annual Declaration of Eligibility). A disqualification 
under Sec.  26.111 is different. It reflects that a firm failed to 
demonstrate that it met a new requirement established by this rule, the 
same requirement that first-time applicant now must meet. Consequently, 
the burden of proof and administrative due process provisions 
associated with decertifications (Sec. Sec.  26.61 and 26.87) do not 
apply.
    The Department understands that the terminology in Sec.  26.111 
created unintended ambiguity regarding the burden of proof applicable 
to reevaluations and enforcement-based removals. In order to cure the 
confusion regarding the burden of proof, the Department will amend 
Sec. Sec.  26.111(a)(4) and 23.81(a)(4) by replacing the term 
``decertified'' with ``disqualified'' and the term ``recertified'' with 
``reevaluated'' thereby further clarifying that Sec.  26.87 procedures 
do not apply.
    The Department also adds language to Sec. Sec.  26.111(d) and 
23.81(d) to clarify that UCPs must follow due process protections 
outlined in Sec.  26.86(a) for disqualification decisions. Any 
resulting disqualification letter must specifically detail the reasons 
for the decision and include verbatim appeal instructions exactly as 
they appear on the Department's web page.
    The Department agrees with the commenters that requiring firms to 
``reapply'' in other States after reevaluation by their JOC would be 
unnecessarily burdensome and contrary to the streamlining goals of the 
interstate certification process. Once the JOC reevaluates a firm under 
the updated standards, other States should automatically accept that 
decision upon simple notification, such as a letter or a screenshot 
showing the firm's status in the JOC's updated DBE directory. The 
receiving UCP must use this documentation to record and track whether 
the out-of-State firm has been retained by its JOC. To prevent 
bureaucratic gridlock, no further

[[Page 60895]]

requirements may be imposed by UCPs. If a firm does not seek to 
reaffirm its interstate certification in another State within one year 
of the date it was reevaluated by its JOC, the firm must follow the 
regular Sec.  26.85 interstate certification procedure as if it were 
seeking interstate certification for the first time in that State.
    Consistent with the objective of minimizing bureaucratic delays, 
the Department notes that during the reevaluation process, UCPs are not 
permitted to refuse Uniform Certification Applications (UCA) from firms 
seeking certification as a DBE or ACDBE, or pause applications that 
were already in process. Nothing contained in the IFR or the final rule 
provides UCP certifiers with the authority to deny the acceptance of 
UCAs during the reevaluation process. Small businesses that were not 
certified previously who meet the new disadvantaged criteria should not 
be locked out of a program designed to assist them. Any pause or 
refusal in processing UCAs prevents new competition and limits the 
newly reconstituted pool of DBEs that prime contractors need to meet 
future goals. The Department intends to keep the regulatory intent of 
the program alive, and therefore, new applications should be 
entertained by the UCP.
    Certifiers are expected to process applications using the new 
individualized criteria. New firms will be subject to the same 
requirements as those presently in the program. They must submit a PN 
and a current PNW statement. They must also complete the revised UCA 
and submit all other required program documentation. The Department 
maintains that a ``grace period'' allowing continued use of the race- 
and sex-based presumptions would be legally indefensible given the 
Department's determination that those presumptions are 
unconstitutional. We agree that consistency among UCPs with respect to 
firms certified in multiple States is vital, but it does not believe 
that exact templates are appropriate for the PN, as the requirement 
mandates an individualized presentation of unique facts and 
circumstances that may not fit a rigid ``fill-in-the-blank'' format. 
However, the Department will consider issuing guidance materials to 
assist owners and UCPs in understanding the evidentiary standards 
required. UCPs are strongly encouraged to use these Department-issued 
resources to ensure a uniform standard of review and uniformity of 
practice.

13. Regulatory Impact Analysis and Paperwork Reduction Act

Comments
    The Department received detailed comments regarding the economic 
analysis underlying the IFR, specifically challenging the estimated 
costs, the calculation of paperwork burdens, and the consideration of 
regulatory alternatives.
    Several commenters challenged the Department's determination that 
the IFR is not a ``major rule'' under the CRA. These commenters 
asserted that the rule would result in an annual effect on the economy 
of $100 million or more. One trade association argued that the 
Department's own Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) estimates compliance 
costs at approximately $91.9 million, and when combined with the 
unquantified costs of market disruption, delayed projects, and lost 
business opportunities, the total impact clearly exceeds the $100 
million threshold.
    Commenters also criticized the Department's cost-benefit analysis 
as ``circular and arbitrary,'' arguing that the Department failed to 
quantify the benefits of the rule or explain why quantification was 
impossible. They contended that asserting ``constitutional compliance'' 
as a benefit that automatically outweighs nearly $100 million in direct 
costs lacks evidentiary support and violates the principles of sound 
regulatory analysis under Executive Order 12866.
    Commenters specifically attacked the methodology used to estimate 
the information collection burden under the PRA. One commenter noted 
that the Department's estimate of 820,000 burden hours was based on 
``the average of three stakeholder responses,'' arguing that a sample 
size of three is statistically invalid for a population of over 40,000 
firms. Small business owners stated that the Department underestimated 
the time required to compile a PN and supporting documentation, with 
some estimating it would take significantly longer than the 
Department's projection, forcing them to hire outside consultants. 
State agencies (UCPs) also commented that the IFR failed to account for 
the administrative cost to States for hiring additional staff or 
contractors to process the sudden influx of reevaluation submissions.
DOT Response
    Several commenters challenged the cost-benefit analysis underlying 
the IFR, asserting that the Department failed to quantify benefits or 
justify compliance costs. The Department has reviewed these comments 
and affirms that the IFR's economic analysis was sound at the time of 
publication and remains valid. The cost estimates are based on the best 
available data, including Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) wage rate 
information and estimates derived from stakeholder input consistent 
with standard Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) methodology as outlined in 
Section H.
    The compliance costs identified in the IFR's approximately $95 
million \12\ in one-time transitional costs--reflect the burden of 
transitioning from the prior presumption-based system to an 
individualized determination system. Those costs are accrued upon the 
IFR's effective date and are attributable to the IFR, not this final 
rule. This final rule imposes no additional compliance obligations and 
therefore has no independent economic impact that would qualify it as a 
major rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ The aggregate economic impact of this rulemaking--
encompassing both the interim final rule and this final rule--
consists of approximately $95 million in one-time transitional 
costs, primarily reflecting certification narrative burdens on DBE/
ACDBE firms ($91.9 million) and UCP reevaluation costs ($3.4 
million), plus recurring annualized costs of approximately $1.8 
million associated with ongoing reporting and program 
administration. These quantified costs are more than offset by the 
unquantifiable benefits of constitutional compliance, including 
elimination of ongoing litigation risk, restoration of equal 
protection principles in federally assisted contracting, and 
improved program integrity through individualized determinations of 
disadvantage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the PRA burden estimates, the Department relied on the 
best available data, given the need for immediate action. The 
reevaluation process is a one-time event for existing firms, not a 
recurring annual cost at this magnitude. The Department acknowledges 
that some firms may choose to hire consultants to assist with the PN 
but emphasizes that the PN is a statement of the owner's own 
experiences, not a technical or legally complex document to be written 
by consultants or legal experts. The Department also points out that 
some DBE applicants already retain consultants to assist with their 
applications, further reducing any marginal cost of consultants to 
comply with this rule. The Department will monitor the actual burden 
during the implementation phase and adjust future Information 
Collection Requests (ICR) as necessary.

14. Alternatives Considered

    Numerous commenters suggested that the Department should have 
considered less disruptive alternatives to the immediate elimination of 
presumptions.

[[Page 60896]]

Comments
    Many stakeholders recommended that the Department transition the 
DBE program to a race-neutral Small Business Enterprise (SBE) model, 
similar to the existing SBE element in Sec.  26.39, which would 
eliminate the need for complex social disadvantage narratives while 
still aiding small firms. One commenter proposed transitioning to a 
``microbusiness'' participation requirement defined by employee count 
and gross receipts. Several commenters argued the Department should 
have allowed existing certifications to remain valid until their 
natural expiration date, applying the new standards only to applicants 
to avoid market shock.
DOT Response
    The Department considered these alternatives but determined that 
they would not fulfill the statutory and constitutional mandates. The 
statutes authorizing the DBE and ACDBE programs (e.g., the 
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act) specifically require the 
Department to assist ``socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals.'' Although the Department encourages SBE participation, 
converting the entire program to a generic SBE model would ignore the 
statutory requirement to address social disadvantage, which persists 
independently of business size. The IFR preserves the statutory focus 
on social disadvantage but requires individualized proof rather than 
group presumptions. The Department rejected the option to 
``grandfather'' existing certifications because doing so would allow 
the Government to continue utilizing race- and sex-based presumptions 
that it has determined are unconstitutional. The Department cannot 
knowingly perpetuate a constitutional violation for the sake of 
administrative convenience. Immediate reevaluation was necessary to 
cure the constitutional defect.

15. Airport Concession DBE (ACDBE) Specific Issues (Part 23)

Comments
    ACDBE stakeholders, including airports, trade associations, and law 
firms representing concessionaires, raised concerns about the long-term 
nature of concession leases. They noted that unlike construction 
contracts, concession agreements often span many years, and abrupt 
disqualifications could place concessionaires in breach of contract 
regarding ACDBE participation requirements.
DOT Response
    The Department recognizes the unique structure of airport 
concessions. Like part 26, existing concession agreements are not 
required to be modified by the IFR. However, participation by ACDBEs 
that are disqualified cannot be counted toward future ACDBE goals. The 
Department advises airport sponsors to work with concessionaires to 
navigate the reevaluation period without penalizing firms for 
regulatory changes outside their control, provided the concessionaire 
acts in good faith.
    Separately, the Department is making a technical correction to 
change the heading of Sec.  23.35 back to ``Personal net worth,'' which 
was retitled in error.
Conclusion
    After careful consideration of the public comments received in 
response to the IFR, the Department affirms that the immediate removal 
of race- and sex-based presumptions from the DBE and ACDBE programs is 
necessary to ensure these programs comply with the equal protection 
guarantee of the Constitution. The Department acknowledges the 
significant concerns raised by stakeholders regarding the 
administrative burden of the reevaluation process, the temporary 
suspension of contract goals, and the potential for market disruption 
affecting small businesses. However, the Department concludes that 
these transitional challenges do not outweigh the Government's 
overriding obligation to eliminate unconstitutional racial and sex 
classifications. The regulatory amendments implemented by the IFR, as 
modified in this issuance, remain in effect with the minor 
modifications described above.

IV. Regulatory Analyses and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866, 13563, and DOT Policies and Procedures

    This final rule is a significant regulatory action under Executive 
Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, as supplemented by 
Executive Order 13563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review. 
Accordingly, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has reviewed it 
under that Executive Order.
    This final rule confirms the regulatory amendments implemented in 
the IFR with only minor modifications, such as clarifying IFR concepts 
like ``similarly situated,'' ``economically disadvantaged in fact,'' 
and deadlines for the reevaluation process. This rule is needed because 
the Department's prior DBE regulations, which presumed social and 
economic disadvantage based on race and sex, were determined to be 
unconstitutional, necessitating regulatory action to replace 
presumption-based eligibility with an individualized determination 
process.
    The Department analyzed the IFR in a regulatory impact analysis. 
The Department's economic analysis for the IFR, available in the 
rulemaking docket (DOT-OST-2025-0897), analyzed the costs and benefits 
of transitioning from race- and sex-based presumptions to an 
individualized determination system. That analysis remains the 
operative economic assessment for the IFR. The Department received 
comments questioning specific methodological choices, including the 
sample size for burden hour estimates and the comparison with SBA 8(a) 
program burden calculations. After review, the Department concludes 
that its methodology is appropriate. The policy rationale articulated 
in the IFR--that constitutional compliance benefits outweigh 
transitional compliance costs--applies with equal force to this final 
rule, which merely confirms the IFR with clarifying amendments.
    The IFR came into force immediately upon publication in 2025. Since 
then, recipients have already begun the reevaluation process and some 
firms have already submitted personal narratives for this purpose. 
Since the IFR is in effect, the appropriate baseline for the costs and 
benefits of this final rule is today's conditions, after the IFR has 
taken effect, rather than before it did. Since this final rule is no 
more than a clarification and response to comments of the IFR and 
therefore has no new economic impacts beyond those of the IFR, it has 
negligible economic impact on its own.

B. Executive Order 14192 (``Unleashing Prosperity Through 
Deregulation'')

    The IFR and this final rule cumulatively will be considered one 
Executive Order 14192 deregulatory action because the unquantified 
benefits associated with constitutional compliance, elimination of 
ongoing litigation risk, restoration of equal protection principles in 
federally assisted contracting, and improved program integrity through 
individualized determinations of disadvantage outweigh the quantified 
costs.

C. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601, et 
seq.) requires agencies to evaluate the potential effects of their 
proposed and final rules on small businesses, small organizations,

[[Page 60897]]

and small governmental jurisdictions. Whenever an agency is required by 
5 U.S.C. 553, or any other law, to publish general notice of proposed 
rulemaking for any proposed rule, the agency must conduct and publish 
for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis. Because the 
Department is not required to publish a proposed rulemaking for this 
action, an analysis under the RFA is not required.

D. Executive Order 13132 (``Federalism'')

    This final rule has been analyzed in accordance with the principles 
and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132, Federalism, and the 
rule satisfies the requirements of the Executive Order. This final rule 
does not impose any requirement that: (1) has substantial direct 
effects on the States, the relationship between the national government 
and the States, or the distribution of power and responsibilities among 
the various levels of government, (2) imposes substantial direct 
compliance costs on State and local governments, or (3) preempts State 
law.

E. Executive Order 13175 (``Consultation and Coordination With Indian 
Tribal Governments'')

    This rulemaking has been analyzed in accordance with the principles 
and criteria contained in Executive Order 13175, Consultation and 
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments. Because this rulemaking 
does not significantly or uniquely affect the communities of the Indian 
Tribal governments or impose substantial direct compliance costs on 
them, the funding and consultation requirements of Executive Order 
13175 do not apply.

F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) 
requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, 
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a 
Federal mandate likely to result in expenditures by State, local, or 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of more 
than $100 million annually (adjusted annually for inflation with the 
base year of 1995). This rulemaking would not result in annual State 
expenditures exceeding the minimum threshold. The Department has 
determined that the requirements of the Title II of the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 therefore do not apply to this rulemaking.

G. National Environmental Policy Act

    The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this 
action pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 
(42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq.) and has determined that it is categorically 
excluded pursuant to DOT Order 5610.1D available at <a href="https://www.transportation.gov/mission/dots-procedures-considering-environmental-impacts">https://www.transportation.gov/mission/dots-procedures-considering-environmental-impacts</a>.
    Categorical exclusions are actions identified in an agency's NEPA 
implementing procedures that do not normally have a significant impact 
on the environment and therefore do not require either an environmental 
assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). The purpose of 
this rulemaking is to amend the Department's DBE and ACDBE regulations. 
Section 9(f) of DOT Order 5610.1D states that a DOT Operating 
Administration can use the categorical exclusions developed by another 
Operating Administration. This action is covered by the categorical 
exclusion listed in FTA implementing procedures, ``[p]lanning and 
administrative activities that do not involve or lead directly to 
construction, such as: . . . promulgation of rules, regulations, 
directives . . .'' 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). In analyzing the applicability 
of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether 
extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the 
preparation of an EA or EIS. The Department does not anticipate any 
environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances 
present in connection with this rulemaking.

H. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The PRA of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-13, 49 U.S.C. 3501, 3507) requires 
Federal agencies to obtain approval from OMB before undertaking a new 
collection of information imposed on ten or more persons, or continuing 
a collection previously approved by OMB that is set to expire.
    This rule contains one additional modification to an information 
collection requirement that was previously approved beyond the 
information collections identified in the IFR, which is the MAP-21 DBE 
data collection described below. The modifications to this collection 
are burden reductions compared to the MAP-21 previously approved DBE 
data collection and are parallel to the changes identified in the IFR 
for ACDBEs identified as ``ACDBE Annual Report of percentages of ACDBEs 
in various categories.'' The MAP-21 data collection does not impose any 
additional reporting burdens beyond those that existed prior to the 
IFR.
    To ensure that the methodology for calculating cost burdens is 
consistent with the most recent information collections for the DBE and 
ACDBE programs, the Department is adjusting the cost burden information 
for the burdens identified in the IFR. The time burdens remain 
unchanged from the IFR. The Department is also modifying the time and 
cost estimate under another existing information collection, the Moving 
Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) data collection for 
DBEs, given that it is a parallel requirement to the information 
collection entitled ``ACDBE Annual Report of percentages of ACDBEs in 
various categories.'' The revised methodology for adjusting the costs 
for the updated cost estimates in this final rule appears below, along 
with an updated chart and itemized list of collection instruments 
modified by the IFR and final rule.
    The Department's cost estimates utilize NAICS codes for Business 
and Financial Operations Occupations (NAICS 13-0000) for firm owner 
burden calculations and Compliance Officer categories for recipient 
burden calculations. These occupational categories were selected 
because they most closely approximate the personnel who would undertake 
the compliance activities required by this rule--specifically, 
preparing personal narratives (firm owners) and reviewing certification 
applications (agency compliance staff). The BLS wage data and the 1.62 
multiplier for fully loaded compensation rates are consistent with 
standard DOT practice for regulatory cost estimation based off of the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employer Costs for Employee Compensation 
News Release.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employer Costs for Employee 
Compensation News Release (March 20, 2026), available at <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.htm">https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.htm</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A recipient's employee's wage rate is based on BLS' estimate of a 
Transit Agency Compliance Officer at $31.31/hour.\14\ The wage rate is 
multiplied by 1.62 to get a fully loaded wage rate (i.e., compensation 
rate) of $50.72 to account for the cost of employer-provided benefits. 
The 1.62 loaded wage multiplier reflects the ratio of total 
compensation to wages and salaries for private industry workers, as 
reported in the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employer Costs for Employee 
Compensation

[[Page 60898]]

(ECEC) survey. According to the most recent ECEC data, wages and 
salaries account for approximately 61.6 percent of total compensation, 
implying that total compensation is roughly 1.62 times the base wage. 
This multiplier accounts for employer-paid benefits including paid 
leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings 
contributions, and legally required benefits such as Social Security, 
Medicare, and unemployment insurance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See Urban Transit Systems--May 2024 OEWS Industry-Specific 
Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates available at <a href="https://www.bls.gov/oes/home.htm">https://www.bls.gov/oes/home.htm</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The airport employee wage rate taken from BLS' estimate of a 
Compliance Officer in Air Transportation at $41.95/hour.\15\ The wage 
rate is multiplied by 1.62 to get a fully loaded wage rate 
(compensation rate) of $67.95 to account for the cost of employer-
provided benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ See Support Activities for Air Transportation--May 2024 
OEWS Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates 
available at <a href="https://www.bls.gov/oes/home.htm">https://www.bls.gov/oes/home.htm</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For socially and economically disadvantaged business owners (SEDO), 
this analysis uses a wage rate without additional benefits, as a SEDO 
would pay the benefits to themself.

    Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2024, 13-0000 Business and
 Financial Operations Occupations (Major Group), Hourly Wage, 50 Percent
                           Median, $38.90 \16\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              Estimated cost
         Requirement             burden ($              Timing
                                 million)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Certification narratives                31.9  One-time.
 (firms).
UCP reevaluations...........            4.15  One-time.
Interstate certification....            0.16  One-time.
Bidders' list reporting.....            1.62  Annual.
ACDBE annual report.........            0.70  Annual.
MAP-21 data report..........            0.70  Annual.
Setting overall goals.......            0.60  Every three years.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Reapplication for DBE/ACDBE Certification Based on Individualized 
Showing of Social Disadvantage (Certification Narratives)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ See Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2024, 13-0000 
Business and Financial Operations Occupations (Major Group), Hourly 
Wage, 50 percent Median, $38.90, available at <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ocwage.pdf">https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ocwage.pdf</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Respondents: Firms seeking to maintain their DBE/ACDBE 
certification.
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 41,000.
    Frequency: One time per respondent.
    Total Annual Burden Hours: 820,000 (one-time burden).
    Total Annual Cost Burden: $31.898,000 (one-time burden).
ii. UCP Reevaluation of Applications for DBE/ACDBE Certification Based 
on Individualized Showing of Social Disadvantage
    Respondents: UCPs.
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 53.
    Frequency: One-time reevaluation of 41,000 applicant firms.
    Total Annual Burden Hours: 82,000 (one-time burden).
    Total Annual Cost Burden: $4,149,040 (one-time cost).
iii. Maintaining and Updating Bidders' Lists
    Respondents: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA), and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) funding 
recipients.
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 1,639.
    Frequency: 3 times per year.
    Total Annual Burden Hours: 29,502.
    Total Annual Cost Burden: $1,619,156.
iv. ACDBE Annual Report of Percentages of ACDBEs in Various Categories
    Respondents: State Departments of Transportation, District of 
Columbia, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico.
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 53.
    Frequency: Once per year.
    Total Annual Burden Hours: 13,780.
    Total Annual Cost Burden: $698,921.
v. Reporting Percentages of DBEs in Various Categories (MAP-21 Data 
Report)
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 53.
    Frequency: Once per year.
    Total Annual Burden Hours: 13,780.
    Total Annual Cost Burden: $698,921.
vi. Setting Overall Goals for DBE Participation in DOT-Assisted 
Contracts
    Respondents: DOT funding recipients.
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 1,639.
    Frequency: Once every three years.
    Total Annual Burden Hours: 10,927.
    Total Annual Cost Burden: $599,987.
vii. Providing Evidence of Certification to an Additional State When a 
Firm Certified in Its Home State Applies to Another State for 
Certification (Interstate Certification)
    Respondents: DBE/ACDBE firms applying for interstate certification.
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 4,100.
    Frequency: Once.
    Total Annual Burden Hours: 4,100.
    Total Annual Cost Burden: $159,490 (one-time cost).
    Given that the modifications to the existing collection instruments 
as identified in the IFR cover modifications to existing information 
collections covered by OMB Control No. 2105-0585 and No. 2105-0586, the 
Department's information collection request submitted in conjunction 
with this final rule will cover the collection instruments from both 
information collections.

I. Congressional Review Act

    The Department will submit a report containing this rule and other 
required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of 
Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States. This 
rule is not a ``major rule'' as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Parts 23 and 26

    Administrative practice and procedure, Airports, Civil rights, 
Government contracts, Grant programs--transportation, Mass 
transportation, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Transportation.


[[Page 60899]]


    Issued at Washington, DC.
Sean P. Duffy,
Secretary of Transportation.

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Department of 
Transportation amends 49 CFR parts 23 and 26 as follows:

PART 23--PARTICIPATION OF DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN 
AIRPORT CONCESSIONS

0
1. The authority for part 23 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 47107 and 47113; 42 U.S.C. 2000d; 49 
U.S.C. 322; E.O. 12138, 44 FR 29637, 3 CFR, 1979 Comp., p. 393.


0
2. Amend Sec.  23.3 by revising the definition of ``Socially and 
economically disadvantaged individual'' to read as follows:


Sec.  23.3   What do the terms used in this part mean?

* * * * *
    Socially and economically disadvantaged individual means any 
individual who is a citizen (or lawfully admitted permanent resident) 
of the United States and who a certifier finds to be socially and 
economically disadvantaged on a case-by-case basis. A determination 
that an individual is socially and economically disadvantaged must not 
be based in whole or in part on a presumption based on race or sex. For 
that reason, all owners may qualify as socially and economically 
disadvantaged only if they meet the relevant criteria described in 
Sec.  26.67 of this subtitle.
* * * * *

0
3. Amend Sec.  23.35 by revising the section heading to read as 
follows:


Sec.  23.35  Personal net worth.

0
4. Amend Sec.  23.81 by:
0
a. Adding a heading to paragraph (a);
0
b. Revising paragraph (a)(4);
0
c. Adding a heading to paragraph (b);
0
d. Revising paragraph (c); and
0
e. Adding paragraph (d).
    The additions and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  23.81   ACDBE reevaluation process.

    (a) Reevaluation. * * *
    (4) Issue a written decision to each firm reevaluated pursuant to 
paragraph (a)(3) of this section, stating either that it has been 
retained as an ACDBE or has been disqualified from the ACDBE program. 
For disqualified firms, the decision must follow the requirements of 
Sec.  26.86(a) of this subtitle.
    (b) Relationship to 49 CFR 26.87. * * *
    (c) Deadline for completion. Each UCP must complete the 
reevaluation process required under this section no later than December 
24, 2026.
    (1) Extension. A UCP may request a one-time extension of up to 90 
days to complete the reevaluation process. The Office of Small and 
Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) may grant this extension if 
it determines that good cause exists. UCPs must request extensions in 
advance of the reevaluation deadline.
    (2) Notice of completion. Following the completion of the 
reevaluation process, each UCP must promptly email the Department's 
OSDBU at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6d292f281f08081b0c01180c190402031e2d090219430a021b"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="195d5b5c6b7c7c6f78756c786d7076776a597d766d377e766f">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>. Within three business days of 
emailing OSDBU, the UCP must send a copy of the email to all recipients 
of DOT funding (certifying and non-certifying agencies) within its 
jurisdiction. The email must provide the following data:
    (i) Total ACDBEs that remain certified. The number of ACDBEs that 
remained certified following the reevaluation, including a 
certification that the UCP is the Jurisdiction of Original 
Certification (JOC) that certified the ACDBEs;
    (ii) Total ACDBEs disqualified. The number of ACDBEs disqualified 
because an owner failed to meet the requirements of Sec.  26.67 of this 
subtitle; and
    (iii) ACDBEs not processed due to nonresponse. The number of ACDBEs 
that the UCP did not reevaluate because the owner failed to respond to 
the notice requiring the submission of Personal Narratives (PNs) and 
PNW statements.
    (3) Right of review. The Department reserves the right to review 
the UCP's reevaluation process and the underlying documentation for any 
firm reported under paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
    (d) Nonresponsive firms. Any ACDBE that fails to submit its owner's 
PN and PNW statement by the date the UCP completes its reevaluation 
process, as reported to the Department under paragraph (c)(2) of this 
section, must be issued a written notice of nonresponse by the UCP. The 
ACDBE has until March 24, 2027 to submit the PN and PNW statement to 
the UCP. If the UCP is granted an extension under paragraph (c)(1) of 
this section, the ACDBE must submit the owner's PN and PNW statement 
within 90 days of the UCP's extended deadline. Any firm that fails to 
submit the required documentation by the applicable deadline provided 
in this paragraph (d) will be automatically disqualified by the UCP 
without further administrative proceedings. The UCP need only issue a 
NOD, under Sec.  26.68(a) of this subtitle, informing the firm that it 
has been disqualified for failure to meet the requirements of Sec.  
26.67 of this subtitle.

PART 26--PARTICIPATION BY DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES IN 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

0
5. The authority for part 26 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 23 U.S.C. 304 and 324; 42 U.S.C. 2000d, et seq.; 49 
U.S.C. 47113, 47123; Sec. 1101(b), Pub. L. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312, 
1324 (23 U.S.C. 101 note); Sec. 150, Pub. L. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3215 
(23 U.S.C. 101 note); Pub. L. 117-58, 135 Stat. 429 (23 U.S.C. 101 
note).


0
6. Amend Sec.  26.5 by revising the definition of ``Socially and 
economically disadvantaged individual'' to read as follows:


Sec.  26.5  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Socially and economically disadvantaged individual means any 
individual who is a citizen (or lawfully admitted permanent resident) 
of the United States and who a certifier finds to be socially and 
economically disadvantaged on a case-by-case basis. A determination 
that an individual is socially and economically disadvantaged must not 
be based in whole or in part on a presumption based on race or sex. For 
that reason, all owners may qualify as socially and economically 
disadvantaged only if they meet the relevant criteria described in 
Sec.  26.67.
* * * * *

0
7. Amend Sec.  26.63 by revising paragraph (c)(1) to read as follows:


Sec.  26.63   General certification rules.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) Indian Tribes and NHOs. A firm that is owned by an Indian Tribe 
or Native Hawaiian organization (NHO), rather than by Indians or Native 
Hawaiians as individuals, is eligible if the firm and its 
representatives meet all other certification requirements in this part 
(e.g., Size, Control, PNW). The officials that control these firms are 
not required to submit a Sec.  26.67 personal narrative or participate 
in the Sec.  26.111 mandatory reevaluation process.
* * * * *

0
8. Revise Sec.  26.67 to read as follows:


Sec.  26.67  Social and economic disadvantage.

    (a) Non-presumptive disadvantage. Except as stated in Sec.  
26.63(c), all applicable owner(s) must demonstrate

[[Page 60900]]

social and economic disadvantage (SED) affirmatively based on their own 
experiences and circumstances within American society, and without any 
presumptions based on race or sex.
    (1) To satisfy the SED requirement and ensure all determinations of 
disadvantage are not based in whole or in part on a presumption of 
disadvantage based on race or sex, an owner must provide the certifier 
with a Personal Narrative (PN) that establishes the existence of 
disadvantage by a preponderance of the evidence based on individualized 
proof regarding specific instances of economic hardship, social 
barriers, or denied opportunities that impeded the owner's progress or 
success in education, employment, or business, including obtaining 
financing on terms available to non-disadvantaged individuals with 
comparable qualifications.
    (2) The PN must identify at least one objective basis for the 
owner's disadvantaged status. The basis may be any identifiable status 
or condition. The PN must describe this objective distinguishing 
feature (ODF) in sufficient detail to justify the owner's conclusion 
that it prompted economic hardship, social barriers, or denied 
opportunities that the owner experienced.
    (3) The PN must state how and to what extent the impediments caused 
the owner economic harm, including a full description of the type and 
magnitude.
    (4) The owner must attach to the PN a current PNW statement and any 
other financial information he considers relevant. If a certifier has a 
reasonable basis to believe that an owner who submits a PNW statement 
that is below the current PNW cap is not economically disadvantaged, 
the certifier may determine that the individual is not economically 
disadvantaged in fact under paragraph (b) of this section.
    (b) Economically disadvantaged in fact. The certifier may conclude 
that a reasonable person would not consider the owner economically 
disadvantaged in fact (EDIF) compared to non-disadvantaged individuals 
with comparable qualifications.
    (1) Evidence to consider. There are no limitations or exclusions. 
The certifier may consider individual's assets, income, access to 
credit and capital. (e.g., disproportionately expensive homes; premium 
luxury personal property; high-value stocks or retirement funds; 
unearned assets; substantial trust holdings). This includes avoiding 
the free use of, or ready access to, the benefits of such wealth. The 
certifier need only demonstrate ``ballpark'' values based on available 
evidence.
    Example 1 to paragraph (b)(1): An owner of an engineering firm has, 
or enjoys the benefits of, excessively high income of $X; an exorbitant 
home worth approximately $Y; substantial interests in outside 
businesses Q, R, and S; four rental properties of aggregate value $Z; 
holds a high-value retirement account worth approximately $V.
    (2) [Reserved]

0
9. Amend Sec.  26.111 by:
0
a. Adding a heading to paragraph (a);
0
b. Revising paragraph (a)(4);
0
c. Adding a heading to paragraph (b);
0
d. Revising paragraph (c); and
0
e. Adding paragraph (d).
    The additions and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  26.111   The DBE reevaluation process

    (a) Reevaluation. * * *
    (4) Issue a written decision to each firm reevaluated pursuant to 
paragraph (a)(3) of this section, stating either that it has been 
retained as a DBE or has been disqualified from the DBE program. For 
disqualified firms, the decision must follow the requirements of Sec.  
26.86(a).
    (b) Relationship to Sec.  26.87. * * *
    (c) Deadline for completion. Each UCP must complete the 
reevaluation process required under this section no later than December 
24, 2026.
    (1) Extension. A UCP may request a one-time extension of up to 90 
days to complete the reevaluation process. The Office of Small and 
Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) may grant this extension if 
it determines that good cause exists. UCPs must request extensions in 
advance of the reevaluation deadline.
    (2) Notice of completion. Following the completion of the 
reevaluation process, each UCP must promptly email the Department's 
OSDBU at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#5014121522353526313c253124393f3e2310343f247e373f26"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="8dc9cfc8ffe8e8fbece1f8ecf9e4e2e3fecde9e2f9a3eae2fb">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>. The email must clearly state that 
the reevaluation process is complete for all UCP members, not just a 
subset of certifiers. Within three business days of emailing OSDBU, the 
UCP must send a copy of the email to all recipients of DOT funding 
(certifying and non-certifying agencies) within its jurisdiction. The 
email must provide the following data:
    (i) Total DBEs that remain certified. The number of DBEs that 
remained certified following the reevaluation, including a 
certification that the UCP is the Jurisdiction of Original 
Certification (JOC) that certified the DBEs;
    (ii) Total DBEs disqualified. The number of DBEs disqualified 
because an owner failed to meet the requirements of Sec.  26.67; and
    (iii) DBEs not processed due to nonresponse. The number of DBEs 
that the UCP did not reevaluate because the owner failed to respond to 
the notice requiring the submission of Personal Narratives (PNs) and 
Personal Net Worth (PNW) statements.
    (3) Right of review. The Department reserves the right to review 
the UCP's reevaluation process and the underlying documentation for any 
firm reported under paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
    (d) Non-responsive firms. Any DBE that fails to submit its owner's 
PN and PNW statement by the date the UCP completes its reevaluation 
process, as reported to the Department under paragraph (c)(2) of this 
section, must be issued a written notice of nonresponse by the UCP. The 
DBE has until March 24, 2027 to submit the PN and PNW statement to the 
UCP. If the UCP is granted an extension under paragraph (c)(1) of this 
section, the DBE must submit the PN and PNW statement within 90 days of 
the UCP's extended deadline. Any firm that fails to submit the required 
documentation by the applicable deadline provided in this paragraph (d) 
will be automatically disqualified by the UCP without further 
administrative proceedings. The UCP need only issue a NOD, under Sec.  
26.86(a), informing the firm that it has been disqualified for failure 
to meet the requirements of Sec.  26.67.

[FR Doc. 2026-19688 Filed 9-24-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-9X-P


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Indexed from Federal Register on September 25, 2026.

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