Notice2026-18604
Joseph John Stubbers III, D.O.; Decision and Order
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
September 11, 2026
Issuing agencies
Justice DepartmentDrug Enforcement Administration
Full Text
<html>
<head>
<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 175 (Friday, September 11, 2026)</title>
</head>
<body><pre>
[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 175 (Friday, September 11, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57928-57929]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-18604]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Joseph John Stubbers III, D.O.; Decision and Order
On February 27, 2026, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Joseph John Stubbers
III, D.O., of Fairfield, Ohio (Registrant). Request for Final Agency
Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 1, at 1, 3. The OSC proposed the
revocation of Registrant's Certificate of Registration No. BS2473798,
alleging that Registrant is ``currently without authority to prescribe,
administer, dispense, or otherwise handle controlled substances in the
State of Ohio, the state in which [he is] registered with DEA.'' Id. at
2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ According to Agency records, Registrant's registration
expired on February 28, 2026. The fact that a registrant allows his
registration to expire during the pendency of an OSC does not impact
the Agency's jurisdiction or prerogative under the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) to adjudicate the OSC to finality. Jeffrey D.
Olsen, M.D., 84 FR 68474, 68476-79 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The OSC notified Registrant of his right to file a written request
for hearing, and that if he failed to file such a request, he would be
deemed to have waived his right to a hearing and be in default. Id. at
2 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not request a hearing,
and the Agency finds him to be in default. RFAA, at 2.\2\ ``A default,
unless excused, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the
registrant's/applicant's right to a hearing and an admission of the
factual allegations of the [OSC].'' 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated
April 21, 2026, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on
Registrant was adequate. The included declaration from a DEA
Diversion Investigator (DI) indicates that on February 27, 2026, the
DI mailed a copy of the OSC to Registrant's registered address/
mailing address provided to DEA. RFAAX 2, at 1. On the same date,
the DI emailed a copy of the OSC to Registrant's registered email
address. Id.; see also id., Attachment A. Further, on the same date,
the DI traveled with other DEA personnel to Registrant's residence
(a different address associated with Registrant). RFAAX 2, at 2.
There was no answer at the front door, after which the DI called the
phone number associated with Registrant's registration. Id. Over the
phone, Registrant told the DI he was not home and to leave a copy of
the OSC at his residence. Id. Registrant also provided an alternate
email address and was informed of the DI's email and mail service of
the OSC, as well as the OSC's meaning and effect, which Registrant
acknowledged. Id. Later, on the same date, the DI emailed a copy of
the OSC to the alternate email address provided by Registrant. Id.;
see also id., Attachment B. On April 3, 2026, the copy of the OSC
that the DI had sent by mail was returned as not deliverable. RFAAX
2, at 2; see also id., Attachment C. Here, the Agency finds that
Registrant was successfully served the OSC by email and that the
DI's efforts to serve Registrant by other means were `` `reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [Registrant] of
the pendency of the action.' '' Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226
(2006) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). Therefore, due process notice requirements
have been satisfied. See Mohammed S. Aljanaby, M.D., 82 FR 34552,
34552 (2017) (finding that service by email satisfies due process
where the email is not returned as undeliverable and other methods
have been unsuccessful). Emilio Luna, M.D., 77 FR 4829, 4830 (2012)
(same).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, ``[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be
in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action
with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In
such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order
pursuant to [21 CFR] 1316.67.'' Id. 1301.43(f)(1). Here, the Government
has requested final agency action based on Registrant's
[[Page 57929]]
default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c), (f), and 1301.46. RFAA, at 1;
see also 21 CFR 1316.67.
Findings of Fact
The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the
factual allegations in the OSC are deemed admitted. According to the
OSC, effective April 26, 2023, the State Medical Board of Ohio
permanently revoked Registrant's Ohio doctor of osteopathic medicine
license. RFAAX 1, at 1-2. According to Ohio online records, of which
the Agency takes official notice, Registrant's Ohio osteopathic medical
license status remains revoked.\3\ eLicense Ohio Professional Licensure
License Look-up, <a href="https://elicense.ohio">https://elicense.ohio</a>./oh_verifylicense (last visited
date of signature of this Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds that
Registrant is currently not licensed to practice osteopathic medicine
in Ohio, the state in which he is registered with DEA.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ``may take
official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--even in the
final decision.'' United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979).
\4\ Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ``[w]hen an agency decision
rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the
evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to
an opportunity to show the contrary.'' The material fact here is
that Registrant, as of the date of this Order, is not licensed to
practice osteopathic medicine in Ohio. Accordingly, Registrant may
dispute the Agency's finding by filing a properly supported motion
for reconsideration of findings of fact within fifteen calendar days
of the date of this Order. Any such motion and response shall be
filed and served by email to the other party and to the Office of
the Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, at
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#66020307480702020948071212091408031f152602030748010910"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d3b7b6b2fdb2b7b7bcfdb2a7a7bca1bdb6aaa093b7b6b2fdb4bca5">[email protected]</span></a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 ``upon a
finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license or
registration suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State
authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . .
. dispensing of controlled substances.'' With respect to a
practitioner, DEA has also long held that the possession of authority
to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which
a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental
condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner's registration.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (``The Attorney General
can register a physician to dispense controlled substances `if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under
the laws of the State in which he practices.' . . . The very definition
of a `practitioner' eligible to prescribe includes physicians
`licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or
the jurisdiction in which he practices' to dispense controlled
substances. 802(21).'').\5\ The Agency has applied these principles
consistently. See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71371, 71372
(2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 F. App'x 826 (4th Cir. 2012);
Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR 27616, 27617 (1978).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act. First, Congress defined the term
``practitioner'' to mean ``a physician . . . or other person
licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by . . . the
jurisdiction in which he practices . . . , to distribute, dispense,
. . . [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of
professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration, Congress
directed that ``[t]he Attorney General shall register practitioners
. . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.'' 21
U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress has clearly mandated that a
practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a
practitioner under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation
of a practitioner's registration is the appropriate sanction
whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the state in which he practices. See,
e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR at 71371-72; Sheran Arden Yeates,
M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR
51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11919, 11920 (1988);
Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR at 27617.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Ohio statute, ``[n]o person shall knowingly obtain,
possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance
analog,'' except pursuant to a ``prescription issued by a licensed
health professional authorized to prescribe drugs if the prescription
was issued for a legitimate medical purpose.'' Ohio Rev. Code Sec.
2925.11(A), (B)(1)(d) (2025). Further, a `` `[l]icensed health
professional authorized to prescribe drugs' or `prescriber' means an
individual who is authorized by law to prescribe drugs or dangerous
drugs or drug therapy related devices in the course of the individual's
professional practice.'' Id. Sec. 4729.01(I). Ohio statute further
defines an authorized prescriber as ``[a] physician authorized under
Chapter 4731. of the [Ohio] Revised Code to practice medicine and
surgery, osteopathic medicine and surgery, or podiatric medicine and
surgery.'' Id. Sec. 4729.01(I)(5). Additionally, Ohio law permits
``[a] licensed health professional authorized to prescribe drugs, if
acting in the course of professional practice, in accordance with the
laws regulating the professional's practice'' to prescribe or
administer schedule II, III, IV, and V controlled substances to
patients. Id. Sec. 3719.06(A)(1)(a)-(b).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant
currently lacks a license to practice osteopathic medicine in Ohio. As
discussed above, an individual must be a licensed health professional
authorized to prescribe drugs in order to handle controlled substances
in Ohio. Thus, because Registrant is not a licensed health professional
authorized to prescribe drugs in Ohio, and, therefore, is not
authorized to handle controlled substances in Ohio, Registrant is not
eligible to maintain a DEA registration. Accordingly, the Agency will
order that Registrant's DEA registration be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No.
BS2473798 issued to Joseph John Stubbers III, D.O. Further, pursuant to
28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1),
I hereby deny any pending applications of Joseph John Stubbers III,
D.O., to renew or modify this registration, as well as any other
pending application of Joseph John Stubbers III, D.O., for additional
registration in Ohio. This Order is effective October 13, 2026.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
September 2, 2026, by DEA Administrator Terrance C. Cole. That document
with the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document
of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect
of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2026-18604 Filed 9-10-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>Indexed from Federal Register on September 11, 2026.
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.