Notice2026-18597
Craig Cohen, DPM; Decision and Order
Primary source
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Published
September 11, 2026
Issuing agencies
Justice DepartmentDrug Enforcement Administration
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 175 (Friday, September 11, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 175 (Friday, September 11, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57922-57923]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-18597]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Craig Cohen, DPM; Decision and Order
On March 23, 2026, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Craig Cohen, DPM, of
Dublin, Ohio (Registrant). Request for Final Agency Action (RFAA),
Exhibit (RFAAX) 1, at 1, 3. The OSC proposed the revocation of
Registrant's Certificate of Registration No. AC1462302, alleging that
Registrant is ``currently without authority to prescribe, administer,
dispense, or otherwise handle controlled substances in the State of
Ohio, the state in which [he is] registered with DEA.'' Id. at 2
(citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).
The OSC notified Registrant of his right to file a written request
for hearing, and that if he failed to file such a request, he would be
deemed to have waived his right to a hearing and be in default. Id. at
2 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not request a hearing,
and the Agency finds him to be in default. RFAA, at 2.\1\ ``A default,
unless excused, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the
registrant's/applicant's right to a hearing and an admission of the
factual allegations of the [OSC].'' 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
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\1\ Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated May
26, 2026, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on Registrant was
adequate. The included declaration from a DEA Diversion Investigator
(DI) indicates that from February 9, 2026, through February 17,
2026, the DI made multiple attempts to contact Registrant by phone
through various phone numbers associated with Registrant's DEA
registration and law enforcement records, but none of these attempts
were successful. RFAAX 2, at 2. On March 12, 2026, the DI attempted
to serve Registrant in person at Registrant's registered address,
but the location was closed at the time. Id. On March 25, 2026, the
DI again traveled to Registrant's registered address to attempt
service and spoke to two receptionists, who informed the DI that
Registrant was no longer practicing at the registered address
location, had retired approximately one year earlier, and had
stopped his mail forwarding address. Id. at 2-3. On the same day,
the DI emailed Registrant at Registrant's registered email address
and received a delivery receipt for the email. Id. at 1-2; see RFAAX
4. Here, the Agency finds that Registrant was successfully served
the OSC by email and that the DI's efforts to serve Registrant by
other means were `` `reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise [Registrant] of the pendency of the
action.' '' Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006) (quoting
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950)). Therefore, due process notice requirements have been
satisfied. See Mohammed S. Aljanaby, M.D., 82 FR 34552, 34552 (2017)
(finding that service by email satisfies due process where the email
is not returned as undeliverable and other methods have been
unsuccessful); Emilio Luna, M.D., 77 FR 4829, 4830 (2012) (same).
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Further, ``[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be
in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action
with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In
such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order
pursuant to [21 CFR] 1316.67.'' Id. at 1301.43(f)(1). Here, the
Government has requested final agency action based on Registrant's
default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c), (f), and 1301.46. RFAA, at 3;
see also 21 CFR 1316.67.
Findings of Fact
The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the
factual allegations in the OSC are deemed admitted. According to the
OSC, on April 1, 2025, Registrant's Ohio medical license expired by its
own terms. RFAAX 1, at 1. According to Ohio online records, of which
the Agency takes official notice,\2\ Registrant's Ohio medical license
is expired. eLicense Ohio Professional Licensure License Look-Up,
<a href="https://elicense.ohio">https://elicense.ohio</a>./oh_verifylicense (last visited date of signature
of this Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds that Registrant is not
licensed to practice medicine in Ohio, the state in which he is
registered with DEA.\3\
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\2\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ``may take
official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--even in the
final decision.'' United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979).
\3\ Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ``[w]hen an agency decision
rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the
evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to
an opportunity to show the contrary.'' The material fact here is
that Registrant, as of the date of this Order, is not licensed to
practice medicine in Ohio. Accordingly, Registrant may dispute the
Agency's finding by filing a properly supported motion for
reconsideration of findings of fact within fifteen calendar days of
the date of this Order. Any such motion and response shall be filed
and served by email to the other party and to the DEA Office of the
Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, at
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#294d4c4807484d4d4607485d5d465b474c505a694d4c48074e465f"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="dbbfbebaf5babfbfb4f5baafafb4a9b5bea2a89bbfbebaf5bcb4ad">[email protected]</span></a>.
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Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 ``upon a
finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license or
registration suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State
authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . .
. dispensing of controlled substances.'' With respect to a
practitioner, DEA has also long held that the possession of authority
to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which
a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental
condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner's registration.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (``The Attorney General
can register a physician to dispense controlled substances `if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under
the laws of the State in which he practices.' . . . The very definition
of a `practitioner' eligible to prescribe includes physicians
`licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or
the jurisdiction in which he practices' to dispense controlled
substances. Sec. 802(21).''). The Agency has applied these principles
consistently. See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71371 (2011),
pet. for rev. denied, 481 F. App'x 826 (4th Cir. 2012); Ashley
Vermillion, N.P., 91 FR 35270 (2026); Walter Walters, M.D., 91 FR 1816
(2026); Nicholas J. Nardacci, M.D., 81 FR 47409 (2016).\4\
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\4\ This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA). First, Congress defined the term
``practitioner'' to mean ``a physician . . . or other person
licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by . . . the
jurisdiction in which he practices . . . , to distribute, dispense,
. . . [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of
professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration, Congress
directed that ``[t]he Attorney General shall register practitioners
. . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.'' 21
U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress has clearly mandated that a
practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a
practitioner under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation
of a practitioner's registration is the appropriate sanction
whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the state in which he practices. See,
e.g., Elias Garcia Garcia, P.A., 90 FR 31242 (2025); Jason Weakley,
R.N., A.P.R.N., 90 FR 10085 (2025); Khursheed Haider, M.D., 90 FR
21950 (2025).
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According to Ohio statute, ``[n]o person shall knowingly obtain,
possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance
analog,'' except ``pursuant to a prescription issued by a licensed
health professional authorized to prescribe drugs if the prescription
was issued for a legitimate medical purpose.'' Ohio Rev. Code Sec.
2925.11(A), (B)(1)(d) (2025). Further, a ```[l]icensed health
professional authorized to prescribe drugs' or `prescriber' means an
individual who is authorized by law to prescribe drugs or dangerous
drugs or drug therapy related devices in the course of the individual's
professional practice.'' Id. Sec. 4729.01(I). Ohio statute further
defines an authorized prescriber as ``[a] physician authorized under
Chapter 4731. of the Revised Code to practice medicine and surgery,
osteopathic medicine and surgery, or podiatric medicine and surgery.''
Id. Sec. 4729.01(I)(5). Additionally, Ohio law permits only ``[a]
licensed health professional authorized to prescribe drugs, if acting
in the course of professional practice, in accordance with the laws
regulating the professional's practice'' to prescribe or administer
schedule II, III, IV, and V controlled substances to patients. Id.
Sec. 3719.06(A)(1)(a)-(b).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant
lacks authority to practice medicine in Ohio. As discussed above, an
individual must be a licensed health professional authorized to
prescribe drugs in order to handle controlled substances in Ohio. Thus,
because Registrant is not a licensed health professional authorized to
prescribe drugs in Ohio and, therefore, is not authorized to handle
controlled substances in Ohio, Registrant is not eligible to maintain a
DEA registration. Accordingly, the Agency will order that Registrant's
DEA registration be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No.
AC1462302 issued to Craig Cohen, DPM. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR
0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I
hereby deny any pending applications of Craig Cohen, DPM, to renew or
modify this registration, as well as any other pending application of
Craig Cohen, DPM, for additional registration in Ohio. This Order is
effective October 13, 2026.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
September 2, 2026, by DEA Administrator Terrance C. Cole. That document
with the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document
of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect
of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2026-18597 Filed 9-10-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on September 11, 2026.
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