Safety Advisory 2026-01; Restricted Speed

Issuing agencies

Abstract

FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2026-01 to remind railroads and their employees of the importance of compliance with Federal regulations and railroad operating rules governing restricted speed. This Safety Advisory contains a summary of seven recent train accidents involving failure to operate at restricted speed and makes recommendations to railroads to ensure employee compliance with restricted speed requirements, with particular emphasis on operations in positive train control (PTC) Restricted Mode.

Full Text

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 170 (Thursday, September 3, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 170 (Thursday, September 3, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 56709-56711]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-17996]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Safety Advisory 2026-01; Restricted Speed

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2026-01 to remind railroads and 
their employees of the importance of compliance with Federal 
regulations and railroad operating rules governing restricted speed. 
This Safety Advisory contains a summary of seven recent train accidents 
involving failure to operate at restricted speed and makes 
recommendations to railroads to ensure employee compliance with 
restricted speed requirements, with particular emphasis on operations 
in positive train control (PTC) Restricted Mode.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christian Holt, Staff Director, 
Operating Practices Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New 
Jersey Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20590, (610) 858-3312, 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#91f2f9e3f8e2e5f8f0ffbff9fefde5d1f5fee5bff6fee7"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="91f2f9e3f8e2e5f8f0ffbff9fefde5d1f5fee5bff6fee7">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    While the overall safety of railroad operations has improved in 
recent years, a series of accidents has highlighted the need for 
railroads to review, to reemphasize, and to adhere to Federal 
regulations and railroad operating rules and procedures governing the 
requirements of restricted speed, including in PTC territory. FRA has 
reviewed operational testing data which suggests a concerning trend in 
PTC-governed territory. When restricted speed is in effect, there 
appears to be a lack of robust, representative testing to ensure 
compliance with the requirement that train crews be prepared to stop 
within one-half their range of vision. FRA is concerned that a 
significant safety gap has emerged due to a misunderstanding of the 
role of PTC in restricted speed compliance.
    For purposes of this Safety Advisory, ``restricted speed'' is 
defined as ``a speed that will permit a train or other equipment to 
stop within one-half the range of vision of the person operating the 
train or other equipment, but not exceeding 20 miles per hour, unless 
further restricted by the operating rules of the railroad.'' \1\ Though 
terminology varies slightly by railroad, consistent with FRA's 
definition, railroad restricted speed rules generally require trains to 
operate at a speed that permits stopping within one-half the range of 
vision, short of a train, engine, railroad car, roadway workers or 
equipment fouling the track; an improperly lined switch; or other 
obstruction. In other words, restricted speed is not a fixed numerical 
value; it is a dynamic requirement that must be constantly evaluated 
and adjusted as conditions change. These definitions place the 
responsibility for determining an appropriate speed squarely on the 
operating crew.
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    \1\ 49 CFR 214.7. See also Sec.  236.812.
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    FRA's recent accident investigations and field observations 
indicate that, in some cases, train crews are relying on PTC-enforced 
speed limits in Restricted Mode to meet the requirements of the 
applicable restricted speed rules. In doing so, crews may fail to 
account fully for visibility limitations, train length and tonnage, 
braking characteristics, grade, curvature, and other conditions that 
materially affect the ability to stop within one-half the range of 
vision. FRA emphasizes that the requirement to be able to stop within 
one-half the range of vision is the controlling element of restricted 
speed and takes precedence over any maximum authorized speed.

Recent Incidents

    The following is a list of seven recent collisions, including the 
date, speed and outcome, that appear to involve a failure to comply 
with restricted speed operating rules or related signal indications. 
Information regarding these incidents is based on FRA's preliminary 
investigations and findings to date.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Speed at time of
             Date                collision (mph)          Outcome
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5/18/26.......................                13  6 freight cars
                                                   derailed.
1/30/26.......................                27  Moving train (lead
                                                   locomotive and 2 non-
                                                   hazmat cars) collided
                                                   with standing train
                                                   (2 freight cars).
12/19/25......................                17  Derailment of
                                                   passenger equipment
                                                   resulting in
                                                   passenger and crew
                                                   injuries.
12/23/24......................                30  4 locomotives and 4
                                                   freight cars
                                                   derailed.
12/6/24.......................                20  Moving train derailed
                                                   6 freight cars;
                                                   standing train
                                                   derailed 12 cars.

[[Page 56710]]

 
3/2/24........................                13  3-train collision;
                                                   moving train struck
                                                   standing train
                                                   derailing 3 cars;
                                                   those cars fouled an
                                                   adjacent track and
                                                   were struck by a
                                                   third train,
                                                   derailing 3
                                                   locomotives and 6
                                                   freight cars.
2/22/24.......................                12  Freight train collided
                                                   with helper train, no
                                                   derailment.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Discussion

    Preliminary investigations indicate that collisions occurring while 
movements should have been governed by restricted speed frequently 
result from an interplay of factors rather than a single causal 
mistake. Those factors often include an excessive reliance on PTC 
enforcement, failure to reduce speed commensurate with reduced 
visibility, train-handling characteristics, engineer and conductor 
distraction, and an overreliance on operational testing of PTC in 
Restricted Mode to encompass all operating conditions.
    FRA reiterates that restricted speed is principally a visual and 
physical requirement, not merely a numeric speed cap. Operating crews 
must maintain a vigilant lookout, continuously determine their actual 
range of vision, and account for train-handling factors, such as train 
length and tonnage, braking capability (including the relative roles 
and limitations of dynamic and automatic air brakes), track grade, and 
curvature, when selecting an appropriate speed. The controlling 
obligation under restricted speed rules is the ability to stop the 
movement physically within one-half the distance that the crew can see 
the track to be clear. Thus, if only 20 car lengths ahead of clear 
track is visible because of curvature, weather, or darkness, the train 
must be prepared to stop within 10 car lengths; maximum speed 
authorized by timetable, rule, or system enforcement is subordinate to 
that stopping distance requirement. As visibility decreases, the 
maximum safe speed that permits stopping within one-half the range of 
vision declines rapidly.
    PTC is a safety overlay that, among other things, enforces 
specified speed limits, preventing certain classes of human-performance 
errors. Nevertheless, FRA is concerned about the safety implications of 
overreliance on PTC, particularly when PTC is used in Restricted Mode. 
In many system configurations, PTC's use in Restricted Mode enforces 
the upper limit of restricted speed; however, the crew remains 
responsible for ensuring the train can be stopped within one half their 
range of vision.
    Given the high level of responsibility associated with restricted 
speed operations, non-compliance with restricted speed requirements can 
have significant certification consequences and may result in 
revocation or suspension of locomotive engineer or conductor 
certification under FRA's regulations. Restricted speed violations are 
among the most serious operational infractions in the railroad industry 
because of their strong association with rear-end collisions, 
sideswipes, injuries, and yard accidents.

Recommended Railroad Action

    Considering the above discussion, FRA recommends that railroads:
    (1) Review with operating employees the circumstances of the seven 
collisions identified in this Safety Advisory, and any similar 
incidents on their own properties, with emphasis on the signal 
indications or other authorities in effect, visibility conditions, 
track geometry, and train-handling practices, and on how compliance 
with restricted speed and related rules appears to have broken down.
    (2) Assess the effectiveness of training and rules instruction 
related to restricted speed, including initial and recurrent training 
in certification programs, with emphasis on the requirement, under 
applicable operating rules and Federal regulations, to adjust speed 
continuously so that the train can be stopped within one-half the range 
of vision, rather than relying on maximum authorized or system-enforced 
speeds as the primary element of the rule. FRA recommends that 
railroads ensure that training includes scenario-based discussion of 
how visibility, locomotive orientation, train length and tonnage, 
grade, curvature, and environmental conditions affect stopping distance 
under restricted speed requirements.
    (3) Reinforce through rules, training, and supervisory oversight 
that PTC, including during its use in Restricted Mode, is an overlay 
and does not negate or diminish the crew's responsibility to adjust 
speed based on visibility, obstructed views, and train-handling 
characteristics to comply with the visual requirements of restricted 
speed. FRA recommends that railroads ensure employees understand that 
PTC in use during Restricted Mode does not detect misaligned switches 
or standing equipment, or provide any visual safeguard, and that 
tonnage, braking characteristics (dynamic and air), and environmental 
factors (such as wet leaves, frost, ice, and contaminated rail) must 
dictate speed adjustments when operating under restricted speed rules, 
even when PTC permits a higher speed.
    (4) Evaluate quarterly and 6-month reviews of operational testing 
data as required by 49 CFR 217.9, and, as appropriate, increase the 
level of operational testing concerning the operation of trains on main 
tracks, sidings, and yard or terminal tracks at restricted speed, 
including in PTC territory, and when operating in PTC during Restricted 
Mode. FRA recommends that a representative number of operational tests 
be conducted on trains following other trains into occupied blocks or 
sidings, particularly in high-density corridors, and that such tests, 
where practicable, include review of locomotive event recorder and 
onboard video data to verify compliance with restricted speed 
requirements.
    (5) Reinforce that all crew members in the controlling locomotive 
share responsibility for maintaining situational awareness during 
restricted speed operations and that unnecessary distractions must be 
eliminated during such operations. FRA recommends that railroads 
emphasize, in training and supervision, the importance of active 
communication among crew members regarding signal indications, track 
conditions, and the location of other trains and equipment, and that 
any uncertainty regarding conditions ahead should result in a reduction 
of speed or a stop until the situation is clearly understood.
    FRA encourages the railroad industry to take actions consistent 
with the preceding recommendations, and to take all actions that help 
ensure the safety of the Nation's railroad employees and the public. 
Nothing in this Safety Advisory alters any existing regulatory 
requirements, operating rules, or obligations under Federal law. FRA 
may modify this Safety Advisory 2026-01, issue additional safety 
advisories, or take other appropriate actions it deems necessary to 
ensure the highest level of

[[Page 56711]]

safety on the Nation's railroads, including pursuing enforcement or 
other corrective measures under its rail safety authority.

    Issued under authority delegated in 49 CFR 1.89.
John Karl Alexy,
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2026-17996 Filed 9-2-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P


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