Notice2026-17592
Thomas Earley, D.D.S.; Decision and Order
Primary source
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Published
August 28, 2026
Issuing agencies
Justice DepartmentDrug Enforcement Administration
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 166 (Friday, August 28, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 166 (Friday, August 28, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 55624-55625]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-17592]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Thomas Earley, D.D.S.; Decision and Order
On April 7, 2026, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Thomas Earley,
D.D.S., of Englewood, Ohio (Registrant). Request for Final Agency
Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 2, at 1, 3. The OSC proposed the
revocation of Registrant's Certificate of Registration No. AE2384636,
alleging that Registrant is ``currently without authority to prescribe,
administer, dispense, or otherwise handle controlled substances in the
State of Ohio, the state in which [he is] registered with DEA.'' Id. at
2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).
The OSC notified Registrant of his right to file a written request
for hearing, and that if he failed to file such a request, he would be
deemed to have waived his right to a hearing and be in default. Id. at
2 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not request a hearing,
and the Agency finds him to be in default. RFAA, at 3.\1\ ``A default,
unless excused, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the
registrant's/applicant's right to a hearing and an admission of the
factual allegations of the [OSC].'' 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
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\1\ Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated June
8, 2026, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on Registrant was
adequate. The included declaration from a DEA Diversion Investigator
(DI) indicates that on April 13, 2026, the DI unsuccessfully
attempted to serve Registrant at his registered location. RFAAX 5,
at 2. The same day, the DI emailed Registrant a copy of the OSC to
three different email addresses linked to Registrant. Id. There is
no evidence indicating that the emails were undeliverable. The DI
additionally mailed a copy of the OSC to Registrant's potential home
address and registered address. Id. Here, the Agency finds that
Registrant was successfully served the OSC by email and that the
DI's efforts to serve Registrant by other means were `reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [Registrant] of
the pendency of the action.' Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226
(2006) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 314 (1950)); see also Mohammed S. Aljanaby, M.D., 82 FR
34552, 34552 (2017) (finding that service by email satisfies due
process where the email is not returned as undeliverable and other
methods have been unsuccessful).
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Further, ``[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be
in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action
with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In
such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order
pursuant to [21 CFR] 1316.67.'' Id. 1301.43(f)(1). Here, the Government
has requested final agency action based on Registrant's default
pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(1), (f)(1), and 1301.46. RFAA, at 1; see
also 21 CFR 1316.67.
Findings of Fact
The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the
factual allegations in the OSC are deemed admitted. 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
According to the OSC, Registrant's dental license expired on December
31, 2025. RFAAX 2, at 1. According to Ohio online records, of which the
Agency takes official notice, Registrant's Ohio dental license status
remains expired.\2\ eLicense Ohio Professional Licensure License
Lookup, <a href="https://elicense.ohio">https://elicense.ohio</a>./oh_verifylicense (last visited date of
signature of this Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds that Registrant
is not licensed to practice dentistry in Ohio, the state in which he is
registered with DEA.\3\
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\2\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ``may take
official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--even in the
final decision.'' United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979).
\3\ Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ``[w]hen an agency decision
rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the
evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to
an opportunity to show the contrary.'' The material fact here is
that Registrant, as of the date of this Order, is not licensed to
practice dentistry in Ohio. Accordingly, Registrant may dispute the
Agency's finding by filing a properly supported motion for
reconsideration of findings of fact within fifteen calendar days of
the date of this Order. Any such motion and response shall be filed
and served by email to the other party and to the Office of the
Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, at
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e1858480cf8085858ecf8095958e938f849892a1858480cf868e97"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="fb9f9e9ad59a9f9f94d59a8f8f9489959e8288bb9f9e9ad59c948d">[email protected]</span></a>.
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Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 ``upon a
finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license or
registration suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State
authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . .
. dispensing of controlled substances.''
With respect to a practitioner, DEA has also long held that the
possession of authority to dispense controlled substances under the
laws of the state in which a practitioner engages in professional
practice is a fundamental condition for obtaining and maintaining a
practitioner's registration. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270
(2006) (``The Attorney General can register a physician to dispense
controlled substances `if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . .
controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he
practices. ' . . . The very definition of a `practitioner' eligible to
prescribe includes physicians `licensed, registered, or otherwise
permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he
practices' to dispense controlled substances. 802(21).'').\4\ The
Agency has applied these principles consistently. See, e.g., Lawrence
Rudolph, D.M.D., 89 FR 79310 (2024); Henry-Norbert O. Ndekwe, M.D., 90
FR 15990 (2025); Benson Sergiles, P.A., 90 FR 32016 (2025).
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\4\ This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA). First, Congress defined the term
``practitioner'' to mean ``a physician . . . or other person
licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by . . . the
jurisdiction in which he practices . . . , to distribute, dispense,
. . . [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of
professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration, Congress
directed that ``[t]he Attorney General shall register practitioners
. . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.'' 21
U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress has clearly mandated that a
practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a
practitioner under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation
of a practitioner's registration is the appropriate sanction
whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the state in which he practices. See,
e.g., Elias Garcia Garcia, P.A., 90 FR 31242 (2025); Jason Weakley,
R.N., A.P.R.N., 90 FR 10085 (2025); Khursheed Haider, M.D., 90 FR
21950 (2025).
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According to Ohio statute, ``[n]o person shall knowingly obtain,
possess, or use a controlled substance or a
[[Page 55625]]
controlled substance analog,'' except pursuant to a ``prescription
issued by a licensed health professional authorized to prescribe drugs
if the prescription was issued for a legitimate medical purpose.'' Ohio
Rev. Code Sec. 2925.11(A), (B)(1)(d) (2025). Further, a ```[l]icensed
health professional authorized to prescribe drugs' or `prescriber'
means an individual who is authorized by law to prescribe drugs or
dangerous drugs or drug therapy related devices in the course of the
individual's professional practice.'' Id. Sec. 4729.01(I). The Ohio
statute further defines an authorized prescriber as ``[a] dentist
licensed under Chapter 4715. of the Revised Code.'' Id. Sec.
4729.01(I)(1). Additionally, Ohio law permits ``[a] licensed health
professional authorized to prescribe drugs, if acting in the course of
professional practice, in accordance with the laws regulating the
professional's practice'' to prescribe or administer schedule II, III,
IV, and V controlled substances to patients. Id. Sec.
3719.06(A)(1)(a)-(b).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant
lacks a license to practice dentistry in Ohio. As discussed above, an
individual must be a licensed health professional authorized to
prescribe drugs, which includes a dentist, in order to handle
controlled substances in Ohio. Thus, because Registrant lacks a license
to practice dentistry in Ohio and, therefore, is not authorized to
handle controlled substances in Ohio, Registrant is not eligible to
maintain a DEA registration in Ohio. Accordingly, the Agency will order
that Registrant's DEA registration be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No.
AE2384636 issued to Thomas Earley, D.D.S. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR
0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I
hereby deny any pending applications of Thomas Earley, D.D.S., to renew
or modify this registration, as well as any other pending application
of Thomas Earley, D.D.S., for additional registration in Ohio. This
Order is effective September 28, 2026.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
August 23, 2026, by DEA Administrator Terrance C. Cole. That document
with the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document
of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect
of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2026-17592 Filed 8-27-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
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