Modifications to the Regulations Implementing Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as Amended

Issuing agencies

Abstract

The U.S. Department of Labor is revising its implementing regulations for Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (Section 503). The revisions align the regulations with applicable law and recent executive orders, including Executive Order 14173, "Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity," and Executive Order 14219, "Ensuring Lawful Governance and Implementing the President's `Department of Government Efficiency' Deregulatory Initiative."

Full Text

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 161 (Friday, August 21, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 161 (Friday, August 21, 2026)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 54482-54507]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-17115]



[[Page 54481]]

Vol. 91

Friday,

No. 161

August 21, 2026

Part III





 Department of Labor





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 Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs





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41 CFR Parts 60-30 and 60-741





Modifications to the Regulations Implementing Section 503 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as Amended; Interim Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 91 , No. 161 / Friday, August 21, 2026 / 
Rules and Regulations

[[Page 54482]]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs

41 CFR Parts 60-30 and 60-741

[Docket No. OFCCP-2025-0003]
RIN 1250-AA18


Modifications to the Regulations Implementing Section 503 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as Amended

AGENCY: Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Labor.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Labor is revising its implementing 
regulations for Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as 
amended (Section 503). The revisions align the regulations with 
applicable law and recent executive orders, including Executive Order 
14173, ``Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based 
Opportunity,'' and Executive Order 14219, ``Ensuring Lawful Governance 
and Implementing the President's `Department of Government Efficiency' 
Deregulatory Initiative.''

DATES: This rule is effective September 21, 2026, except for amendatory 
instruction 1 (amendment to 41 CFR part 60-30) which is effective on 
December 21, 2026.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth Wolfe, Director, OFCCP, 200 
Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20210. Telephone: 202-693-0101. 
Email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f69990959586a991839f9297989593b692999ad8919980"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="b1ded7d2d2c1eed6c4d8d5d0dfd2d4f1d5dedd9fd6dec7">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Executive Summary

    The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) enforces Section 503, which 
prohibits covered Federal contractors and subcontractors 
(``contractors'') \1\ from discriminating against employees and 
applicants because of their disability status and also requires certain 
contractors to take ``affirmative action'' to employ and advance in 
employment qualified individuals with disabilities. 29 U.S.C. 793. The 
Section 503 implementing regulations include specific affirmative 
action requirements at 41 CFR part 60-741, subpart C.
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    \1\ Hereinafter, the terms ``contractor'' or ``Federal 
contractor'' are used to refer collectively to Federal contractors 
and subcontractors that fall under OFCCP's authority, unless 
otherwise expressly stated. This approach is consistent with OFCCP's 
regulations, which define ``contract'' to include subcontracts and 
``contractor'' to include subcontractors. See 41 CFR 60-741.2.
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    On July 1, 2025, DOL published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM) for the Section 503 implementing regulations. 90 FR 28494 (July 
1, 2025). In the NPRM, DOL proposed removing the implementing 
regulations' cross-references to Executive Order (E.O.) 11246, ``Equal 
Employment Opportunity,'' which was revoked by E.O. 14173, ``Ending 
Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity,'' on 
January 21, 2025. For the reasons described in the background section 
below, DOL also proposed rescinding (1) the regulations at 41 CFR 60-
741.42, which required contractors to ask applicants and employees to 
identify their disability status; (2) the related data collection 
requirements at 41 CFR 60-741.44(k); and (3) the utilization 
requirements at 41 CFR 60-741.45.\2\
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    \2\ Hereinafter, ``utilization requirements'' refers to the 
utilization goal and utilization analyses set forth in 41 CFR 60-
741.45, unless otherwise stated.
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    DOL has carefully reviewed public comments on these proposed 
changes. As set forth in the preamble below, DOL is largely adopting 
its NPRM revisions, with a clarification related to the requirement to 
measure the effectiveness of affirmative action efforts. Additionally, 
the final rule makes several necessary technical corrections to the 
regulations. Specifically, since the publication of the NPRM, the basic 
coverage threshold for Section 503 increased from $15,000 to $20,000 in 
accordance with the inflationary adjustment requirements in 41 U.S.C. 
1908. See Federal Acquisition Regulation: Inflation Adjustment of 
Acquisition-Related Thresholds, 90 FR 41872 (Aug. 27, 2025). Therefore, 
in the final rule, DOL is making technical revisions to the basic 
coverage threshold throughout the Section 503 regulations. The final 
rule also includes additional technical revisions, such as corrections 
to typographical errors in the existing regulations and updates to 
website addresses, as several of the web pages have moved or are no 
longer available at the listed website addresses.

II. Background

A. The Section 503 Implementing Regulations and 2013 Revisions

    The Section 503 regulations' basic nondiscrimination and 
recordkeeping requirements apply to contractors with a government 
contract in excess of $20,000.\3\ Regulations at 41 CFR 60-741.40(b) 
further require contractors with 50 or more employees and a Federal 
contract or subcontract of $50,000 or more to develop and maintain an 
affirmative action program (AAP), where they must implement and 
document their affirmative action efforts on an annual basis.
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    \3\ Effective October 1, 2025, the basic coverage threshold 
under Section 503 increased from $15,000 to $20,000, in accordance 
with the inflationary adjustment requirements in 41 U.S.C. 1908. See 
Federal Acquisition Regulation: Inflation Adjustment of Acquisition-
Related Thresholds, 90 FR 41872 (Aug. 27, 2025).
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    In 2013, DOL made extensive revisions to the regulations 
implementing Section 503, including major changes to the affirmative 
action provisions in 41 CFR part 60-741, subpart C. See 78 FR 58682 
(Sept. 24, 2013). Notably, the 2013 rule revised the regulations to 
include, at 41 CFR 60-741.45, a 7 percent utilization goal for 
individuals with disabilities.\4\ Additionally, in the 2013 rulemaking, 
DOL added a utilization analysis provision at 41 CFR 60-741.45(d), 
which requires contractors to annually evaluate their utilization of 
individuals with disabilities against the 7 percent utilization goal. 
If a contractor's utilization is less than the 7 percent utilization 
goal, the regulations at 41 CFR 60-741.45(e)-(f) require the contractor 
to take steps to determine ``whether and where impediments to equal 
employment opportunity exist'' and to develop and execute ``action-
oriented programs'' designed to correct any identified problem areas.
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    \4\ The 7 percent utilization goal applies to each of the job 
groups in the contractor's workforce. However, if a contractor has a 
total workforce of 100 or fewer employees, the regulations provide 
the option to measure the representation of individuals with 
disabilities in a contractor's entire workforce, rather than in each 
job group. The Section 503 regulations require contractors to 
conduct the utilization analysis using the same job groups 
established for their analyses under E.O. 11246. As discussed in 
more detail below, this requirement is now unworkable due to the 
revocation of E.O. 11246.
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    The 2013 rule also modified the Section 503 regulatory requirement 
for contractors to inquire about an applicant or employee's disability 
status (hereinafter referred to as the ``disability inquiry 
requirement'').\5\ Prior to the 2013 rule, the regulations required 
contractors to inquire about an individual's disability status after 
making an offer of employment to a job applicant, but before the 
applicant began his or her employment. 78 FR 58682, 58690-95 (Sept. 24, 
2013). The 2013 rule expanded the scope of this requirement. 
Specifically, the 2013 rule added the requirement at 41 CFR 60-
741.42(a) that contractors inquire about whether an applicant believes 
that he or she is an individual with a disability at

[[Page 54483]]

the pre-offer stage of the hiring process. The 2013 rule also added the 
requirement at 41 CFR 60-741.42(c) that contractors inquire about 
whether an employee believes he or she is an individual with a 
disability every 5 years and provide a reminder at least once during 
the 5-year period that each employee may ``voluntarily'' update his or 
her disability status. In conjunction with the 2013 rule, DOL created a 
prescribed form (the CC-305 form) for contractors to use when making 
disability inquiries. The most recent version of the CC-305 form 
provides three response options: (1) Yes, I have a disability or have 
had one in the past; (2) No, I do not have a disability and have not 
had one in the past; and (3) I do not want to answer.\6\
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    \5\ The regulations frame these requirements as an ``Invitation 
to self-identify.'' See 41 CFR 60-741.42. However, as discussed in 
section III(A)(2) below, this ``invitation'' amounts to an employer-
initiated disability inquiry that is impermissible under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
    \6\ See Form CC-305, available at <a href="https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewIC?ref_nbr=202306-1250-001&icID=200170">https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewIC?ref_nbr=202306-1250-001&icID=200170</a>.
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    The 2013 rule also created additional data collection requirements 
at 41 CFR 60-741.44(k), which require contractors to document and 
maintain specific computations or comparisons pertaining to applicants 
and hires with disabilities. Additionally, the 2013 rule made several 
changes to conform the regulations with the Americans with Disabilities 
Act Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008. See 78 FR 58682, 58687-58712 (Sept. 
24, 2013) (describing changes necessitated by the ADAAA such as 
revisions to the definition of ``disability'').

B. Need for the Rulemaking

    In the NPRM, DOL proposed rescinding the disability inquiry 
requirement at 41 CFR 60-741.42 and the related data collection 
requirements at 41 CFR 60-741.44(k). DOL also proposed rescinding the 
utilization goal requirements at 41 CFR 60-741.45. Consistent with 
these proposed changes, DOL also proposed removing various cross-
references and language related to these requirements.
    DOL also proposed removing the Section 503 regulations' cross-
references to E.O. 11246, which was revoked by E.O. 14173 on January 
21, 2025. For example, the Section 503 regulations, at 41 CFR 60-
741.65(b), incorporated the E.O. 11246 administrative proceeding 
procedures at 41 CFR part 60-30. With the revocation of E.O. 11246, DOL 
proposed removing these cross-references and adding the administrative 
proceeding provisions directly into the Section 503 regulations. In a 
separate rulemaking, DOL proposed similar changes to the Vietnam Era 
Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act (VEVRAA) regulations. 90 FR 28485 
(July 1, 2025). As the administrative proceeding procedures would be 
incorporated directly into the Section 503 and VEVRAA regulations, the 
41 CFR part 60-30 regulations would be duplicative and unnecessary. 
Therefore, DOL also proposed rescinding 41 CFR part 60-30 using a 
delayed effective date.\7\
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    \7\ As noted above, DOL also proposed correcting typographical 
errors in the regulations. For example, DOL proposed correcting a 
typographical error in 41 CFR 60-741.46(d) (correcting the spelling 
of ``Veterans'''). As noted in the executive summary, the final rule 
is also updating outdated jurisdictional thresholds and other 
information such as outdated web addresses.
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    In the NPRM, DOL identified several reasons for the proposed 
changes. Specifically, DOL provided that while the Section 503 
regulations state that the use of quotas is prohibited, contractors 
may, in practice, be induced to use quotas to meet the utilization 
goal. DOL also detailed concerns that the disability inquiry 
requirement at 41 CFR 60-741.42 and utilization goal requirements at 41 
CFR 60-741.45 were inconsistent with the ADA. See 90 FR 28494 (July 1, 
2025); See also ADA Discussion at Section III(A)(2) below.
    Further, DOL noted that the Section 503 utilization analysis 
requirements are now unworkable, as they are dependent on requirements 
promulgated under E.O. 11246, which was revoked. Specifically, 41 CFR 
60-741.45(d)(2) requires contractors to conduct the utilization 
analysis using the same job groups established for their analyses under 
E.O. 11246. The utilization goal also requires knowledge of disability 
status, which results in impermissible disability inquiries under the 
ADA. In addition, the utilization analysis and disability inquiry 
requirements are not required by the statutory text of Section 503. See 
29 U.S.C. 793 (which refers to ``affirmative action'' generally but 
does not statutorily prescribe specific efforts or methods to achieve 
affirmative action).\8\ By rescinding these burdensome requirements, 
DOL is also fulfilling E.O. 14219's mandate to rescind regulations that 
are not authorized by clear statutory authority. See E.O. 14219, 
``Ensuring Lawful Governance and Implementing the President's 
`Department of Government Efficiency' Deregulatory Initiative,'' 90 FR 
10583 (Feb. 25, 2025).
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    \8\ The 93rd Congress both enacted Section 503 as an affirmative 
action statute and amended VEVRAA to include a similar affirmative 
action requirement. Compare 29 U.S.C. 793, with 38 U.S.C. 4212. A 
conference committee report issued in connection with the VEVRAA 
amendments explains that the 93rd Congress understood affirmative 
action to encompass ``goals and timetables'' under certain 
circumstances. S. Conf. Rep. No. 1240, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1974, 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6336, 6343-44, 1974 WL 11633. To the 
extent commenters argue this legislative history requires 
utilization goals under Section 503, DOL disagrees. DOL must 
interpret the statute based on ``what the statute means,'' not 
``what the legislature meant.'' Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 
497, 523 (2018 (quoting Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers 
Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 397 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)). At their 
own discretion, contractors remain free to conduct utilization 
analyses. In doing so, contractors should ensure they are acting in 
accordance with all applicable laws and regulations, including the 
ADA.
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III. Discussion

A. Public Comments

    On July 1, 2025, DOL published an NPRM in the Federal Register (90 
FR 28494) proposing to revise the Section 503 implementing regulations. 
DOL invited written comments on the NPRM through September 2, 2025. DOL 
received requests from some commenters to extend the comment period. In 
response, DOL extended the comment period through September 17, 2025. 
See 90 FR 42712 (Sept. 4, 2025).
    DOL received 651 comment submissions in response to the NPRM.\9\ 
DOL received some comments in favor of the NPRM and some comments 
against the NPRM. Commenters represented a wide range of stakeholders 
including individuals, employer associations, consultants, law firms, 
governmental entities, education and research centers, political 
organizations, public policy organizations, and various disability and 
disabled veteran organizations. DOL addresses the public comments by 
topic in the sections below.
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    \9\ The ``comments received'' count on <a href="http://regulations.gov">regulations.gov</a> is 
higher, as some commenters counted their comment as more than one 
submission.
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1. Public Comments Addressing the Need for the Rulemaking
    DOL received numerous comments addressing the need for the 
rulemaking. Some commenters questioned the need for the rulemaking, 
asserting that DOL's concerns about the disability inquiry and 
utilization goal requirements were speculative or unsupported by 
evidence. For example, several commenters disagreed with DOL's 
assertion that the utilization goal could, in practice, induce the use 
of quotas. Commenters cited the current regulations' express 
prohibition on quotas found at 41 CFR 60-741.45(h) and past agency 
guidance that highlighted the prohibition against quotas. Commenters 
also stated that contractors were not penalized for failing to meet the 
goal and asserted that even if the goal resulted in a quota, a person 
without a disability would not have standing to challenge the goal.

[[Page 54484]]

Some commenters also believed that the regulations already align with 
the administration's focus on promoting meritocracy.
    DOL disagrees with these comments. As set forth in section 
III(A)(2) below, the current regulatory framework is not supported by 
the statutory text of Section 503, and conflicts with the plain text of 
the ADA's nondiscrimination standards, which are incorporated into the 
Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C. 793(d). OFCCP has an obligation to 
ensure agency action complies with the law independent of whether non-
disabled individuals have standing to challenge the utilization 
requirements. The current requirements also impose significant burdens 
on and create confusion among contractors.
    Further, while some commenters claimed that DOL's concerns over the 
disability inquiry and utilization requirements were speculative or 
unsupported by evidence, DOL's past enforcement of these requirements 
supports the need for the rulemaking. Since implementing the revised 
Section 503 regulations in 2013, DOL received numerous inquiries from 
stakeholders about the permissibility of the disability inquiry in 
light of privacy concerns. While failing to meet the utilization goal 
is not a violation in itself, DOL routinely issued violations if 
contractors failed to conduct the utilization analysis or failed to 
execute ``action-oriented programs'' to address underutilization of 
individuals with disabilities, as set forth in 41 CFR 60-741.45. Since 
fiscal year 2020, DOL issued over 75 violations related to these 
issues. Contractors therefore faced a non-speculative risk of 
enforcement if they did not conduct utilization analyses, which as a 
practical matter required employer-initiated inquiries into applicants' 
and employees' disability status. As explained above, DOL can no longer 
enforce a disability inquiry requirement--or utilization analysis 
requirement that relies on the data yielded from such inquiries--that 
it interprets as conflicting with the ADA.
    DOL also received comments from various stakeholders who agreed 
with the need for the rulemaking. One commenter, who identified himself 
as an individual with a disability, stated that he had deep concerns 
about the way the current regulatory framework has been applied in 
practice. This commenter explained that the disability inquiry 
requirement has not created meaningful progress and believed that the 
disability data contractors obtained through this process was 
unreliable because many employees with non-obvious disabilities, 
including the commenter, often chose not to disclose their disability 
status for various reasons, including stigmatization or the fact that 
they did not trust the process to result in real change. This commenter 
also discussed the ineffectiveness of the utilization goal and stated 
that in practice, companies treat this requirement as a ``box-checking 
exercise.'' This commenter stated that ``the focus is on compliance 
paperwork, not dismantling the systemic barriers that keep people with 
disabilities from being hired, promoted, or retained equitably.''
    In this same vein, another commenter, a lawyer, also believed that 
the disability inquiry requirement lacked utility. He also disagreed 
with the utilization goal. He believed that the goal was poorly 
constructed, as the goal applied uniformly to all job groups, even 
though individuals with disabilities are typically not distributed 
uniformly across job groups. The commenter also expressed concerns 
about the burden imposed by these requirements and the liability 
concerns pertaining to recruitment and hiring managers improperly using 
disability information.
    Another commenter, a 501(c)(3) research and education foundation, 
urged adherence to the plain text of the ADA. This commenter agreed 
that DOL's proposed changes in the NPRM address ongoing conflicts 
between the Rehabilitation Act's goals and the privacy protections 
central to the ADA, and clarify compliance expectations, reduce 
administrative burdens on contractors, and ensure that protections for 
individuals with disabilities remain robust yet consistent with merit-
based employment principles.
2. Inconsistencies With the ADA
    The NPRM expressed DOL's concerns that the disability inquiry 
requirement is inconsistent with the ADA and that the utilization goal, 
as structured, depends on that unlawful disability inquiry framework. 
After considering the comments related to these issues, DOL concludes 
that these concerns are well founded and that the NPRM reflects the 
best interpretation of the governing Section 503 framework.
a. Section 503's Existing Regulatory Structure Requires Disability 
Inquiries That Contravene the Plain Language of the ADA
    The ADA's prohibitions apply directly to Federal contractors 
because as an employer a Federal contractor is a ``covered entity'' as 
defined by 42 U.S.C. 12111(2). With respect to job applicants, the 
ADA's text is clear: ``a covered entity shall not . . . make inquiries 
of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a 
disability.'' 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(2)(A). Yet, under section 60-741.42(a) 
of the Section 503 regulations, a contractor ``shall invite applicants 
to inform the contractor whether the applicant believes that he or she 
is an individual with a disability.'' Although ``shall invite'' frames 
the disability inquiry requirement as an ``invitation'' for applicants 
to ``self-identify'' disability status, this is a requirement imposed 
on the contractor. Describing the applicant's response as ``voluntary'' 
does not alter the legal character of these requirements. The 
inconsistency is plain. DOL's existing regulations require contractors 
to make disability inquiries that the ADA explicitly forbids.
    With respect to employees, the ADA's text is once again clear: a 
``covered entity shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether 
such employee is an individual with a disability . . . unless such . . 
. inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business 
necessity.'' 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A). Yet, the Section 503 regulations 
at 41 CFR 60-741.42(c) require a contractor to invite employees ``to 
voluntarily inform the contractor whether the employee believes that he 
or she is an individual with a disability,'' without any limitation or 
caveat for the invitation to be job-related and consistent with 
business necessity.
    Employers' invitations to applicants and employees to disclose 
disabilities under section 60-741.42(a) and (c) constitute 
``inquiries'' prohibited by 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(2)(A) and 
12112(d)(4)(A). Labeling the disclosures as ``voluntary'' does not 
alter the mandatory nature of the employer's obligation to inquire 
about disability status. The ADA regulates the employer's act of 
asking, not the act of answering. Courts have distinguished between 
information voluntarily disclosed by an employee on their own 
initiative and information elicited by employer questioning--only the 
former falls outside the scope of 42 U.S.C. 12112(d). For example, in 
EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., the court explained that 42 U.S.C. 12112(d) 
``does not apply to or protect information that is voluntarily 
disclosed by an employee unless it is elicited during an authorized 
employment-related medical examination or inquiry,'' and concluded that 
the provision did not apply because there was no evidence that the 
employer ``asked [the employee] a question likely to elicit'' 
disability information. 644 F.3d 1028, 1047-48 (10th Cir. 2011). By

[[Page 54485]]

contrast, any disability information, even if ``voluntarily'' disclosed 
under 41 CFR 60-741.42(a) and (c), would be elicited by an employer's 
inquiry that is mandated under the regulation, and thus 42 U.S.C. 
12112(d) applies.
    Likewise, in Cash v. Smith, the court held that 42 U.S.C. 12112(d) 
and its regulations ``do not govern voluntary disclosures initiated by 
the employee.'' 231 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000). Disclosures under 
41 CFR 60-741.42(c) are not initiated by the employee--nor are 
disclosures under 41 CFR 60-741.42(a) and (b) initiated by the 
applicant--because the regulations state that the ``contractor shall 
invite'' employees and applicants, respectively, to ``inform the 
contractor'' of their disability status. An invitation to voluntarily 
disclose disability information may be less coercive than other 
methods, but it remains a form of employer-initiated inquiry. 
Accordingly, this regulation is functionally a mandate that employers 
broadly inquire into disability status, which is unlawful under the 
ADA's plain text.
    Although some commenters contended that the post-offer disability 
inquiry requirement for affirmative action purposes was consistent with 
the ADA's business necessity exception at 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A), DOL 
agrees with other commenters who observed that it is difficult to 
characterize a general invitation to disclose disability status as 
universally ``job-related'' or for reasons of ``business necessity.''
    Further, as one commenter noted, eliminating the disability inquiry 
requirement and utilization goal would neither diminish a contractor's 
statutory obligations under Section 503 nor prevent a contractor from 
complying with those obligations. Contractors complied with Section 
503's statutory requirements for affirmative action prior to the 
addition of the utilization goal in the 2013 rule, and they will be 
able to do so after DOL's rescission of this requirement.
    Apart from mandatory disability inquiries, as commenters noted, 
contractors may still comply with their Section 503 obligations by 
using several measures that do not depend on knowledge of a particular 
applicant's or employee's disability status. For example, contractors 
could conduct skills-based barrier analysis and remediation in which 
the contractor reviews job position descriptions, vacancies, job 
requirements, and physical/mental standards in order to eliminate 
requirements and tasks that are not essential to performing the job 
(e.g., lifting, standing, or driving a car). A contractor could also 
conduct structured outreach and recruitment by partnering with 
disability employment organizations (e.g., vocational rehabilitation 
agencies, centers for independent living, and disability service 
providers) to share vacancies and job fair opportunities. Next, 
contractors can leverage accessibility and usability for hiring systems 
by ensuring that online applications, assessments, and hiring platforms 
are accessible to applicants using screen readers, voice-to-text, and 
other assistive technologies. The measure could focus on equal 
opportunity in the application process. Contractors can also be 
proactive about accommodations for applicants by offering all 
applicants clear and welcoming information about how to request an 
accommodation during any stage of the hiring process. Contractors can 
also provide examples of reasonable accommodations. This would remove 
functional barriers to employment without requiring data collection.
    Further, if a contractor learns of an applicant's or an employee's 
disability without asking--for example, through unsolicited disclosure 
during the interview process or a request for reasonable 
accommodation--then the contractor may take additional affirmative 
action to ``employ or advance in employment'' that individual 
consistent with Section 503.
    Some commenters claimed there was no conflict between the ADA and 
the disability inquiry and utilization requirements. But, as discussed 
above, DOL's authority under Section 503 must be governed by the ADA's 
nondiscrimination standards, which are expressly incorporated into 
Section 503. 29 U.S.C. 793(d). The ADA clearly provides that an 
employer may not, prior to an offer of employment, make any disability-
related inquiries of job applicants, even if that inquiry is related to 
the job. 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(2)(A). The ADA also clearly provides that, 
after an employee starts a job, an employer may make disability-related 
inquiries only if such inquiries are job-related and consistent with 
business necessity. 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A). But, under 41 CFR 60-
741.42, contractors must ask applicants and employees about their 
disability status. In order for a contractor to measure progress 
towards or achievement of a utilization ``goal'' under 41 CFR 60-
741.45, the contractor must know or determine which employees have 
disabilities. These requirements create an unworkable framework under 
the ADA.
    Some commenters argued that the ADA is ineffective in advancing the 
employment of individuals with disabilities. Even if true, this 
argument would not justify interpreting Section 503 to mandate 
disability inquiries that the ADA explicitly prohibits. DOL should not 
be requiring contractors to take actions that contravene the plain 
language of the ADA's statutory text.
    Several commenters pointed to Associated Builders & Contractors v. 
Shiu, 773 F.3d 257 (D.C. Cir. 2014), as an obstacle to removing the 
disability inquiry requirement. That reliance is misplaced. First, Shiu 
upheld the 2013 final rule based on the then-controlling framework set 
forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). At step one of the then-controlling Chevron framework, the 
Shiu court held that the challenger had not demonstrated that DOL's 
interpretation was unambiguously foreclosed by the statutory text of 
Section 503. Id. at 262-64. The Shiu court rejected the challenger's 
Chevron step two argument for the same reason. Id. The Supreme Court 
has since overruled Chevron and clarified that the ``best'' 
interpretation of a statute governs. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 
603 U.S. 369, 391 (2024). Shiu's analysis does not meet this standard 
because the D.C. Circuit explicitly required the plaintiff to ``do more 
than offer . . . even the best[ ] interpretation'' of the statute, 773 
F.3d at 263 (citation omitted), and it did not examine the interaction 
between Section 503 and the ADA's restrictions on employer-initiated 
inquiries into applicants' and employees' disability status.
b. A Harmonious Reading of Section 503 and the ADA Supports DOL's 
Interpretation
    Because Section 503 explicitly incorporates the ADA's standards, 
see 29 U.S.C. 793(d), and because the ADA was enacted against the 
backdrop of Section 503, these two statutes must be read together. A 
commenter who objected to the NPRM stated that when Congress passed the 
ADA, ``it was well aware that Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act 
required federal agencies to develop and implement affirmative action 
plans for individuals with disabilities and Section 503 of the 
Rehabilitation Act mandated that Federal contractors and subcontractors 
take affirmative action to recruit, hire, and promote qualified 
individuals with disabilities.'' The commenter further stated, ``If 
Congress had intended to make it impossible for federal agencies or 
contractors to identify disabled applicants and employees in order to 
implement affirmative action plans,

[[Page 54486]]

they would have done so explicitly.'' To the contrary, the ADA does not 
make express statutory exceptions for contractors covered by Section 
503.
    The district court in Shiu cited congressional committee reports 
that suggested that the ADA's ban on preemployment inquiries would not 
apply to data collected for Section 503 affirmative action purposes. 
See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Shiu, 30 F.Supp.3d 25, 37-38 
(D.D.C. 2014). But legislative history cannot overcome the statute's 
plain meaning because ``legislative history is not the law.'' Epic Sys. 
Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 523 (2018). DOL must interpret the 
statute based on ``what the statute means,'' not ``what the legislature 
meant.'' Id. (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 
U.S. 384, 397 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)). Therefore, legislative 
history cannot change what the ADA commands: a covered entity ``shall 
not'' make preemployment ``inquiries'' as to an applicant's disability 
status, except in only a few situations expressly enumerated in the 
ADA. 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(2)(A)-(B). See Milner v. Dep't of Navy, 562 
U.S. 562, 574 (2011). (``Legislative history, for those who take it 
into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.'').
    The structure of 42 U.S.C. 12112 reinforces this reading and 
forecloses an implied ``affirmative action'' exception. What is allowed 
or not depends on whether the inquiry is made pre-offer, post-offer, or 
after an individual begins employment. Subsections (2) and (4), 
covering pre-offer and post-employment inquiries, both begin with a 
statement of prohibited activities, followed by a set of exceptions. In 
paragraph (4)(B), an exception from the ban on post-employment 
inquiries and examinations is made for ``voluntary medical examinations 
. . . which are part of an employee health program.'' 42 U.S.C. 
12112(d)(4)(B). There is no similar exception for pre-offer inquiries: 
the only exception is for ``inquiries into the ability of an applicant 
to perform job-related functions.'' 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(2)(B). The 
mention of an exception for voluntary examinations in one section, but 
not the other, means Congress knew how to make such an exception, but 
chose not to. DOL therefore declines to read it into the statute by 
implication.
    Regardless of the original objectives revealed through the 
legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act generally, and Section 
503 specifically, and regardless of what interpretation of Section 503 
might have been plausible if the ADA had never been enacted, Congress 
subsequently incorporated the ADA's Title I nondiscrimination standards 
into the Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C. 793(d). Accordingly, the ADA 
defines the permissible contours of employer inquiries into disability 
status under the nondiscrimination framework applicable to Section 503. 
Section 503 cannot be read to authorize or require what the 
incorporated portions of the ADA subsequently and expressly prohibit. 
The ADA's prohibition therefore constrains the scope of permissible 
regulation under Section 503.
    DOL agrees with a commenter who argued that ``since the 
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA both address discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities, the two statutes are in pari materia and 
should be construed'' together--although for the reasons stated above, 
DOL disagrees with the commenter's belief that the disability inquiry 
requirement and the utilization goal are consistent with the ADA. This 
conclusion is reinforced, as another commenter noted, by Congress's 
2008 amendments, which harmonized the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 
See Public Law 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
c. ADA Regulations Do Not Generally Permit Disability Inquiries
    Several commenters challenged DOL's interpretation of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations implementing the 
ADA. After considering those arguments, DOL continues to conclude that 
the NPRM sets forth the best interpretation of Section 503 in light of 
the ADA and its implementing regulations. The ADA establishes a 
comprehensive framework governing employer disability-related inquiries 
at different stages of the employment relationship. 42 U.S.C. 
12112(d)(2)-(4). These provisions prohibit disability-related inquiries 
except in the narrow circumstances specified by the statute. Id. The 
ADA regulations at 29 CFR 1630.13 generally prohibit medical 
examinations or inquiries into disability status at the preemployment 
stage or prior to an offer of employment except in the circumstances 
laid out in 29 CFR 1630.14(b). The ADA regulations at 29 CFR 
1630.14(b)(3) further provide that such medical examinations and 
inquiries ``do not have to be job-related and consistent with business 
necessity.'' However, if certain criteria are used to screen out an 
employee or employees with disabilities as a result of such an 
examination or inquiry, the exclusionary criteria must be job-related 
and consistent with business necessity, and performance of the 
essential job functions cannot be accomplished with reasonable 
accommodation as required in Part 1630 of the ADA regulations. Id. 
After employment begins, such examinations and inquiries are 
permissible only when job-related or consistent with business 
necessity. 29 CFR 1630.14(c).
    Read together, 29 CFR 1630.13 and 1630.14 provide that: (1) except 
in narrow circumstances related to the reasonable accommodation 
process,\10\ an employer may not conduct a medical examination or make 
a disability-related inquiry of a job applicant prior to receipt of a 
job offer; (2) medical examination or inquiry into disability status 
after a conditional job offer is permissible only so long as such 
request for information applies to all entering employees in the same 
job category and may not be used to ``screen out'' individuals with 
disabilities unless the exclusionary criteria is job-related and 
consistent with business necessity, and the essential job functions 
cannot be performed with reasonable accommodation; and (3) once 
employment begins, a medical examination or inquiry into disability 
status is allowed only where it is job-related and consistent with 
business necessity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ ADA contemplates limited pre-offer disability-related 
inquiries when necessary to respond to applicant-initiated requests 
for reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(2)(B), (d)(3); 
29 CFR 1630.14(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Section 503 regulations at 60-741.42(a), however, require 
contractors to ``invite'' applicants to disclose whether they are 
individuals with disabilities at the pre-offer stage, thereby mandating 
an inquiry at a point where 29 CFR 1630.13 and 1630.14 permit none. 
Section 60-741.42(c) likewise requires contractors to ``invite'' 
current employees to disclose disability status on a recurring basis, 
without any requirement that such inquiry be job-related or consistent 
with business necessity. In both instances, the regulation compels 
employer-initiated disability-status inquiries at stages where the ADA 
regulations either categorically prohibit such inquiries or permit them 
only under conditions not incorporated into 41 CFR 60-741.42.
    Given the ADA regulations' careful limitations on disability-
related inquiries--particularly the categorical prohibition at the pre-
offer stage and the business-necessity requirement for inquiries after 
employment begins, DOL agrees with the commenters who urged removal of 
the disability inquiry requirement. Rescission of this requirement 
ensures that the Section 503 regulations do not compel conduct

[[Page 54487]]

that the ADA either prohibits outright or permits only in limited, 
narrowly defined circumstances. These narrowly defined circumstances 
are not incorporated into the Section 503 regulations.
    One commenter asserted ``that the ADA regulations at 29 CFR 
1630.15(e) already provide that employers are not liable for violations 
of the ADA for actions they are required to take by other federal 
statutes or regulations.'' But that provision does not eliminate the 
underlying statutory question. Rather, section 1630.15(e) merely 
provides contractors with a potential defense to liability for a charge 
of discrimination; it does not expand the scope of what the ADA 
substantively permits, nor does it authorize another agency to require 
conduct inconsistent with the ADA's nondiscrimination standards, which 
Section 503 expressly incorporates. See 29 U.S.C. 793(d). This 
liability defense presumes the possibility of tension between statutory 
or regulatory commands and the ADA--it does not resolve that tension or 
supply independent authority for a requirement to violate the ADA.
    Moreover, the existence of such a defense is not a reason to retain 
regulations that place contractors in the position of having to invoke 
it. Agencies should not structure regulatory regimes in a manner that 
requires regulated entities to rely on an interagency conflict defense 
to avoid liability. The better course is to interpret and implement 
Section 503 in harmony with the ADA's statutory limits so that 
contractors are not compelled to choose between compliance with DOL 
regulations and adherence to the ADA's substantive prohibitions. See 29 
U.S.C. 793(e) (requiring DOL to develop procedures that ``avoid[ ] 
duplication of effort and prevent[ ] the imposition of inconsistent or 
conflicting standards'' in the handling of administrative complaints 
under Section 503 and the ADA).
    DOL is not prohibiting contractors from exercising their own legal 
and business judgment about making disability inquiries consistent with 
the ADA and its implementing regulations. Instead, DOL simply no longer 
requires that contractors do so as part of their affirmative action or 
other obligations under Section 503.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ For these same reasons, DOL declines to adopt a commenter's 
recommendation to return to the pre-2013 self-identification 
requirements, which provided that contractors shall, ``after making 
an offer of employment to a job applicant and before the applicant 
begins his or her employment duties, invite the applicant to inform 
the contractor whether the applicant believes that he or she may be 
covered by the act and wishes to benefit under the affirmative 
action program.'' See 61 FR 19336, 19344-45 (May 1, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DOL's rescission of the disability inquiry requirement would not 
cause regulatory confusion, as some commenters suggest, because the 
elimination of this requirement, as contemplated herein, will bring DOL 
in alignment with the EEOC and its treatment of ADA regulations. When 
pursuing a Section 503 discrimination violation, the Secretary of Labor 
is also charged with ensuring that DOL's standards do not conflict with 
the ADA, which is expressly incorporated into Section 503. 29 U.S.C. 
793(d)-(e).
d. EEOC Subregulatory Guidance Is Unpersuasive
    In the NPRM, DOL disagreed with the 2013 rule's reliance on past 
EEOC guidance to support the disability inquiry requirement. 
Specifically, the 2013 rule asserted that EEOC's Title I Technical 
Assistance Manual and an informal discussion letter from EEOC's Office 
of Legal Counsel (OLC) permitted the disclosure of disability 
information for affirmative action purposes.\12\ In response to the 
NPRM, some commenters disagreed with DOL's rescission of the disability 
inquiry requirement and continued to cite the OLC discussion letter. 
Other commenters correctly observed, however, that this is not a formal 
opinion letter, approved by a vote of the Commission. Rather, it 
represents the view of a single EEOC career attorney. As such, it does 
not constitute the EEOC's official position on the matter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See EEOC, ``A Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment 
Provisions (Title I) of the Americans with Disabilities Act,'' (Jan. 
1, 1992), available at <a href="https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/technical-assistance-manual-employment-provisions-title-i-americans-disabilities-act">https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/technical-assistance-manual-employment-provisions-title-i-americans-disabilities-act</a>; 78 FR 58682, 58691 (Sept. 24, 2013) (discussing 
the EEOC technical assistance manual and OLC discussion letter).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The OLC letter is also unpersuasive on its own terms. As one 
commenter who previously served as a senior advisor to the EEOC General 
Counsel explained, the letter does not engage in statutory analysis and 
its conclusion conflicts with the plain text of the ADA, which 
explicitly prohibits all pre-offer employer inquiries into disability 
status and permits post-employment inquiries only where they are job-
related and consistent with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. 
12112(d)(2)(A), (4)(A). Further, though courts are to give ``due 
respect'' to an agency's interpretation of a statute, that commenter 
noted that such interpretations are not entitled to judicial deference. 
Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 400. For the reasons stated above, DOL finds 
the OLC letter neither authoritative nor persuasive.
    As commenters observed, EEOC interpretive guidance provides that 
``inviting individuals to identify themselves as individuals with 
disabilities as required to satisfy the affirmative action requirements 
of section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act is not restricted by'' the 
ADA's prohibition on pre-offer disability inquiries. See Appendix to 
Part 1630, Title 29. Upon consideration, DOL concludes that this 
guidance is inconsistent with the best reading of Section 503 and will 
not defer to it. Specifically, DOL declines to administer Section 503 
in violation of the ADA.
    The ADA's text is unequivocal: a covered employer ``shall not . . . 
make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an 
individual with a disability.'' 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(2)(A). This 
prohibition is categorical and contains no exception for affirmative 
action. Congress enacted the ADA against the backdrop of existing 
affirmative action obligations under Section 503, yet it did not 
include any carveout permitting pre-offer disability inquiries in 
furtherance of those obligations. To the contrary, the ADA must control 
the best reading of Section 503, because the latter incorporates the 
standards of the former. See 29 U.S.C. 793(d). Where Congress includes 
exceptions in some provisions but omits them in others, DOL must 
presume that the omission was intentional.
    Nor does the characterization of such inquiries as ``voluntary 
self-identification'' alter the analysis. The statute regulates the 
employer's conduct--``mak[ing] inquiries''--not the applicant's 
obligation to respond. Even if an applicant may decline to answer, the 
employer has still posed a prohibited question. The ADA does not 
provide an exception for inquiries that an applicant is free to ignore, 
and DOL declines to read one into the statute.
    DOL also disagrees with the premise that such inquiries fall 
outside the scope of section 12112(d)(2)(A) based on their asserted 
purpose. The statutory text does not distinguish between inquiries made 
for discriminatory screening and those made for data collection or 
compliance purposes. Instead, Congress adopted a bright-line rule 
prohibiting pre-offer disability inquiries altogether, while permitting 
more flexibility at later stages of the employment process. See 42 
U.S.C. 12112(d)(3)-(4). Reading a purpose-based limitation into 42 
U.S.C. 12112(d)(2)(A) would be inconsistent with that structure.

[[Page 54488]]

    Recent Supreme Court precedent reinforces the need to adhere to the 
statute's best reading. In Loper Bright, the Court emphasized that `` 
`statutes . . . have a single, best meaning' '' that is `` `fixed at 
the time of enactment.' '' 603 U.S. at 400 (quoting Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. 
United States, 585 U.S. 274, 284 (2018)). Applying that principle here, 
DOL concludes that the best reading of Section 503 in light of 42 
U.S.C. 12112(d)(2)(A) is that employers may not make disability-related 
inquiries of job applicants prior to an offer of employment, regardless 
of the employer's intent or the framing of the question.
    Accordingly, DOL does not adopt or defer to EEOC enforcement 
guidance to the extent it suggests that pre-offer disability inquiries 
are permissible when made for affirmative action purposes under Section 
503. To the extent there is tension between the ADA's prohibition and 
regulatory approaches that rely on applicant self-identification, that 
tension must be resolved in a manner consistent with the statutory text 
enacted by Congress.
    The same conclusion applies to other EEOC statements and guidance 
that suggest disability inquiries are permitted for affirmative action 
purposes, including EEOC's 1995 Title I Technical Assistance Manual and 
its July 27, 2000, Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries 
and Medical Examinations of Employees under the ADA. Like other 
subregulatory guidance predating Loper Bright--these are unpersuasive 
to the extent they are read to authorize mandatory pre-offer disability 
inquiries.
    Ultimately, many commenters pointed to no text in the ADA 
supporting their position and instead relied on subregulatory EEOC 
guidance. The suggestion that DOL may interpret only Section 503 while 
disregarding the ADA prohibitions is unpersuasive. As discussed above, 
DOL has an obligation to administer Section 503 consistent with other 
applicable federal statutes. Section 503 does not operate in isolation, 
and DOL must interpret and implement it in tandem with the ADA. As 
other commenters observed, due to the overlapping subject matter of the 
ADA and Section 503, the two statutes should be read together. When 
reading these statutes together, DOL adopts the best reading of the 
text and will not defer to contrary subregulatory guidance.
e. Potential Utility of Disability Data Does Not Override ADA's Privacy 
Protection
    Many commenters argued that soliciting disability data through 
disability inquiries is useful to contractors in advancing affirmative 
action. DOL acknowledges those views but concludes that Congress has 
already made a policy determination in enacting the ADA to protect 
individual privacy by limiting employer-initiated disability inquiries. 
Other commenters emphasized that the ADA serves, in part, to shield 
applicants and employees from potentially invasive questioning and from 
the risk that disability information will influence employment 
decisions. One commenter, drawing on experience as an OFCCP 
practitioner, noted that individuals with observable disabilities often 
feel they have no meaningful choice but to disclose their disability 
status, while individuals with non-obvious disabilities report 
disclosing only out of concern that failure to do so might be perceived 
as dishonesty.
    Although contractors are required to keep disability disclosures 
confidential and not use them in employment decisions, confidentiality 
requirements do not eliminate the practical pressures or risk of 
distress that individuals may experience when presented with an 
employer-initiated request to disclose disability status. Because DOL 
does not believe that the collection of disability information is 
necessary for contractors to satisfy their statutory affirmative action 
obligations under Section 503, it concludes that the privacy interests 
reflected in the ADA outweigh the asserted utility of collecting 
disability data.
    Commenters also asserted that the disability data assists 
contractors with reviewing their job qualifications and employment 
practices for Section 503 compliance. For example, one commenter 
asserted that disability data helps contractors conduct barrier 
analyses where they can ``assess whether there are potential compliance 
gaps or barriers to equal employment opportunity.'' But contractors 
can--and should--review their practices, job qualifications, and 
advancement opportunities as part of their ongoing equal employment 
opportunity compliance functions regardless of whether disability-
status data has been collected. Such reviews need not depend on 
knowledge of which individuals have disabilities. Contractors remain 
free to analyze potential barriers by job category and to ensure 
accessibility and compliance with equal employment opportunity 
requirements without asking employees or applicants to disclose their 
disability status.
f. The ADA's Statutory Construction Provisions Do Not Permit Disability 
Inquiries
    Some commenters cited ADA provisions at 42 U.S.C. 12201(a) and (b), 
which govern statutory construction, to argue that DOL's disability 
inquiry requirement can override or is otherwise exempt from the ADA's 
limitation on employer inquiries of applicants' and employees' 
disabilities status. DOL disagrees.
    Several commenters characterized section 12201(a) as generally 
providing that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act should be construed 
with reference to each other and argued that, as a result, DOL may not 
rescind the Section 503 regulations' requirement that contractors 
inquire into applicants' disability status under 41 CFR 60-741.42. 
Several commenters asserted: ``Reading the ADA and Rehabilitation Act 
together makes clear that the ADA's pre-offer inquiry bar is a term of 
art that does not apply to Section 503 self-identification forms, which 
are kept separate from an applicant or employee's personnel file.'' The 
commenters did not identify any term that they contend is a ``term of 
art'' because there are none. Section 12112(d)(2)(A)'s pre-offer 
inquiry bar is not a term of art, but a statutory prohibition, entitled 
``Prohibited examination or inquiry,'' that governs inquiries to job 
applicants no matter the form in which they are made. Consistent with 
ordinary meaning principles, statutory terms are interpreted according 
to their plain and ordinary meaning unless Congress indicates 
otherwise. Nothing in the ADA suggests that ``inquiries'' or any other 
relevant term carries a specialized meaning that would exclude 
employer-initiated requests for information about disability status.
    Some commenters also argued that section 12201(a) ``preserves'' or 
effectively ``locks in'' Section 503 regulations, but they did not 
explain how the statutory text supports this conclusion. Section 
12201(a) provides that ``nothing in this chapter shall be construed to 
apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations 
issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.'' The provision ``in 
this chapter'' at issue is section 12112(d)(2)(A)'s pre-offer inquiry 
bar. That provision is part of the ADA's

[[Page 54489]]

antidiscrimination and privacy framework. It protects job applicants by 
prohibiting employers from asking about disability status and thereby 
reduces the risk that such information will be used improperly in 
employment decisions.
    The proper comparison under section 12201(a), therefore, is whether 
construing section 12112(d)(2)(A) to prohibit preemployment employer-
initiated disability inquiries results in either a ``lesser standard'' 
of protection against discrimination or in a lesser degree of privacy 
protection than the standards applied under the Rehabilitation Act or 
its regulations. It does not. The ADA's limitation on disability-
related inquiries is itself a substantive protection for individuals. A 
regulatory requirement that contractors inquire into applicants' 
disability status does not provide greater or equal protection in these 
respects.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ It is not even clear that the regulation's requirement that 
contractors inquire into their applicants and employees' disability 
status is a standard at all, let alone a standard of protection for 
individuals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The commenters' reliance on Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631-32 
(1998), does not support a different conclusion. In Bragdon, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the ADA's definition of ``disability'' 
consistently with the Rehabilitation Act to ensure that individuals 
receive the ADA's protection against discrimination. The Court's 
reference to ``protection'' concerned the scope of the ADA's 
antidiscrimination provisions. It did not suggest that regulatory 
mechanisms developed under the Rehabilitation Act must be incorporated 
into the ADA or may override the ADA's express statutory limitations.
    The commenters read section 12201(a) to invert its function. The 
provision requires ``constru[ing] the ADA to grant at least as much 
protection as provided by the regulations implementing the 
Rehabilitation Act.'' Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 632. It does not, as 
commenters suggested, require the ADA to yield where its statutory 
provisions provide greater protection than a Rehabilitation Act 
regulation. Here, the ADA's limitation on employer-initiated disability 
inquiries provides a higher level of privacy and a greater degree of 
antidiscrimination protection. Construing section 12112(d)(2)(A) to 
prohibit employer-initiated inquiries therefore complies with, rather 
than violates, section 12201(a).
    Several commenters also asserted that the disability inquiry 
requirements are preserved by 42 U.S.C. 12201(b), which provides that 
nothing in the ADA ``shall be construed to invalidate or limit the 
remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law . . . that provides 
greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with 
disabilities than are afforded by this chapter.'' The Department has 
considered this argument and does not find it persuasive.
    First, section 12201(b) is a rule of statutory construction that 
preserves the ``remedies, rights, and procedures'' provided in other 
``Federal laws.'' It does not extend to every regulatory mechanism that 
an agency may adopt to implement those laws. Section 503 requires 
covered contractors to take affirmative action to employ and advance in 
employment qualified individuals with disabilities. 29 U.S.C. 793. That 
said, it does not mandate any particular method for achieving those 
objectives, such as employer-initiated inquiries into disability status 
and utilization goals that depend on such inquiries. The disability 
inquiry requirements are therefore regulatory choices, not statutory 
commands. This distinction is reinforced by Congress's drafting: in 
section 12201(a), Congress expressly provided that the ``no lesser 
standard'' provision applies with respect to ``regulations,'' but it 
did not include such language in section 12201(b). Accordingly, section 
12201(b) preserves the continued validity of Section 503 itself, not 
specific regulatory approaches that go beyond the statute's text.
    Second, section 12201(b) does not authorize regulatory requirements 
that conflict with the ADA's express prohibitions. As explained above, 
the ADA establishes clear limitations on disability-related inquiries 
by employers, including a categorical ban against pre-offer inquiries 
and strict conditions on inquiries of employees. A savings clause such 
as section 12201(b) does not create exceptions to these limitations or 
permit agencies to mandate conduct that the ADA explicitly forbids. 
Rather, it merely ensures that the ADA is not interpreted to displace 
other Federal statutes that protect individuals with disabilities. It 
does not operate as an independent grant of authority to impose 
requirements inconsistent with the ADA's substantive protections.
    Third, the Department is not persuaded that the disability inquiry 
requirement constitutes ``greater or equal protection'' within the 
meaning of section 12201(b). The ADA's limitations on employer-
initiated disability-related inquiries are themselves substantive 
protections designed to safeguard individual privacy and reduce the 
risk of discrimination. A requirement that compels employers to solicit 
disability information diminishes, rather than enhances, those 
protections. While commenters contended that the collection of 
disability data may support broader affirmative action objectives, 
section 12201(b) calls for a comparison of the legal protections for 
the ``rights of individuals.'' Section 12201(b) does not call for an 
abstract assessment of policy benefits. Ultimately, the ADA's express 
limits on employer-initiated disability inquiries reflect a deliberate 
policy choice by Congress. DOL is obliged to give effect to that 
judgment, not to second-guess it by substituting DOL's own 
determination of what types of employer-initiated disability inquiries 
should be permitted. DOL therefore does not conclude that the 
disability inquiry requirement provides greater or equal protection 
than the ADA's restrictions.
    Finally, as previously discussed in more detail, contractors may 
still comply with Section 503's affirmative action obligations using 
measures that do not depend on knowledge of a particular applicant's or 
employee's disability status.
g. Other ADA-Related Comments
    Although many commenters urged DOL to maintain the existing 
disability inquiry requirement, several commenters proposed alternative 
frameworks for this requirement. Some commenters suggested that DOL 
impose the requirement only for the post-offer period, or convert the 
requirement into a voluntary option. As explained above, DOL is not 
prohibiting contractors from voluntarily exercising their own legal and 
business judgment about making disability status inquiries at the post-
offer stage, if they believe such inquiries comply with the ADA and its 
implementing regulations. DOL is, however, no longer requiring that 
contractors conduct such inquiries as part of their affirmative action 
obligations under Section 503. The same is true for pre-employment 
inquiries: if a contractor believes there is a lawful basis under the 
ADA and its regulations to collect disability information, then DOL is 
not forbidding that practice--DOL is simply no longer going to require 
it. At their own discretion and without being prompted by an employer, 
employees and applicants are still permitted to disclose their 
disability status at any point in the hiring or employment process 
(e.g., when requesting a reasonable accommodation).
    One commenter stated that any conflict with the ADA could be 
resolved

[[Page 54490]]

by requiring contractors to conduct confidential, anonymous, or 
aggregated collection of disability self-identification data after a 
job offer. DOL does not find this to be a workable solution. The 
commenter's suggestion continues to require the contractor to make a 
disability-related inquiry. The text of the ADA does not provide an 
exception for anonymous or aggregated inquiries. Additionally, true 
anonymity would often be difficult to ensure in practice, particularly 
in small applicant pools or in narrowly defined job categories. Even if 
anonymity could be maintained, the utility of the data would be 
limited, as using aggregated or anonymous data would constrain 
meaningful analysis and could introduce issues such as duplication or 
data inaccuracy.
    Other commenters urged DOL and the EEOC to adopt joint regulations 
clarifying the circumstances in which pre-employment disability 
inquiries are permitted. Since DOL is removing the disability inquiry 
requirement, DOL does not believe that joint regulations are necessary 
or appropriate. By rescinding the disability inquiry requirement, DOL 
eliminates any asserted tension and does not consider it proper to 
initiate joint rulemaking on a requirement it is no longer imposing on 
contractors.
    Some commenters requested DOL maintain the CC-305 form, which 
contractors were previously required to use when requesting the 
disability information.\14\ DOL declines to retain this form, as the 
final rule rescinds the disability inquiry requirement. Other 
commenters asserted that the CC-305 form does not constitute a 
prohibited inquiry under the ADA because it is voluntary, includes an 
``I do not want to answer'' option, and imposes no penalty for non-
disclosure. DOL disagrees. A truly voluntary disclosure occurs when an 
applicant or employee volunteers his or her disability self-
identification without being asked. When an employer hands the employee 
a form, that is clearly a request for information. The existence of a 
``I do not want to answer'' option on an employer-provided form does 
not change the fact that the employer has made an inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ One commenter suggested that DOL retain the form but modify 
the language by eliminating the existing responses and allowing the 
user to mark a box which says ``I am voluntarily reporting that I 
have a disability or have had one in the past. I acknowledge that my 
employer or prospective employer has not inquired about whether I 
have a disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (29 U.S.C. 12112(d)), that I have been told that I need not 
disclose that I have a disability, and that I am doing so of my own 
free will.'' DOL declines to make this change, as this approach does 
not address the ADA concerns detailed above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter argued that other DOL requirements go beyond the text 
of the ADA, citing medical examinations that may be authorized under 
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act or the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act requirements. This objection is misplaced. The cited 
authorities govern employees, not applicants, and thus operate only in 
the employment context or in the post-offer stage. The ADA draws a 
clear distinction between stages of employment: although it 
categorically prohibits disability-related inquiries at the pre-offer 
stage, it permits medical examinations and certain inquiries after an 
offer of employment, subject to certain conditions, as well as during 
employment when they are job-related and consistent with business 
necessity or part of an employee health program. The medical 
examinations referenced by the commenter fall within those permissible 
contexts. Accordingly, the commenter's examples do not present a 
conflict with the ADA's restrictions and do not undermine DOL's 
position.
3. Impact of the Proposed Changes
    Several commenters believed that the proposed changes would weaken 
employment discrimination protections for individuals with 
disabilities. Some commenters were also concerned that the NPRM, if 
finalized, would decrease employment and economic opportunities or undo 
recent advancements for the disability community, including disabled 
veterans. Commenters also expressed concern that the proposed changes 
would signal that hiring individuals with disabilities is not a 
priority or discourage other countries from working towards disability 
inclusion. Several commenters also asserted that there were several 
benefits to the voluntary self-identification and data collection 
requirements, citing their belief that these requirements increased 
awareness of the ADA definitions, destigmatized disabilities, 
encouraged inclusive work environments, and signaled that employers 
were open to hiring, advancing or reasonably accommodating workers with 
disabilities. Some commenters believed that DOL's past enforcement of 
the regulations was effective and consistent with the administration's 
focus on expanding labor force participation. Commenters were also 
concerned that the proposed changes would conceal discrimination in 
workplaces and reduce accountability and transparency for contractors.
    DOL reviewed these concerns and believes they are unfounded and 
unpersuasive. The rescinded provisions are limited to specific 
affirmative action requirements that conflict with the clear statutory 
text of the ADA and weaken the ADA's privacy protections by forcing 
contractors to inquire about disability status. The regulations' non-
discrimination provisions remain intact, where contractors are still 
prohibited from discriminating against any employee or applicant for 
employment because of their physical or mental disability. Contractors 
are still subject to other provisions in the regulations such as the 
recordkeeping requirements, various requirements in Subpart C (e.g., 
outreach requirements), and other provisions such as the complaint 
procedures set forth in Subpart D. With the remaining provisions, DOL 
continues to preserve the agency's Section 503 program, while ensuring 
that qualified individuals with disabilities can fully participate in 
the workforce.
    Ultimately, the above commenters argued that the disability inquiry 
requirement and utilization goal produce beneficial policy outcomes. 
Even assuming these claimed effects were accurate, they would not alter 
DOL's conclusion. Agencies may not retain the unlawful disability 
inquiry requirement and related analyses based on perceived policy 
benefits. As explained above, the ADA expressly limits disability-
related inquiries by employers. DOL regulations that require 
contractors to solicit disability status from applicants or employees 
plainly violate those statutory restrictions. Where a regulation 
conflicts with the plain text of a statute, the agency lacks authority 
to maintain the regulation regardless of any asserted policy benefit. 
DOL cannot preserve the disability inquiry and utilization provisions 
based on commenters' policy preferences when those provisions are 
inconsistent with the ADA's statutory requirements.
    DOL also received several comments on the NPRM's potential impact 
on reasonable accommodation procedures. Commenters believed that the 
proposed changes would take away the right to request reasonable 
accommodations, reduce the number of qualified individuals with 
disabilities who request reasonable accommodations, or make it more 
difficult for qualified individuals with a disability to request and 
receive reasonable accommodations. Some commenters believed that the 
disability inquiry requirement should be retained because employers 
need disability information to make reasonable accommodations.

[[Page 54491]]

Commenters also discussed the benefits of reasonable accommodations for 
qualified individuals with disabilities and asserted that most 
accommodations are not costly for employers.
    In response, DOL notes that the NPRM did not propose, and the final 
rule does not make, changes to the reasonable accommodation 
requirements.\15\ As provided in 41 CFR 60-741.21(a)(6), a contractor 
must make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability 
unless it can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of its business. At their own discretion and 
without being prompted by an employer, employees and applicants are 
also still permitted to voluntarily provide information about their 
disability status for reasonable accommodation purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ The proposed revisions to the guidance in Appendix A on a 
contractor's duty to provide reasonable accommodations were limited 
to those related to the invitation to self-identify as an individual 
with a disability, which DOL proposed rescinding in the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter also stated that the NPRM ``eliminates the 
requirement for contractors to conduct self-audits of their hiring, 
promotion, and compensation practices to evaluate inclusion of 
individuals with disabilities. This means contractors will no longer 
need to examine whether their practices are producing discriminatory 
outcomes or take steps to address shortfalls.'' For clarification, DOL 
relied on the now-rescinded E.O. 11246 to require contractors to 
conduct in-depth analyses of their employment practices including 
hiring, pay, and compensation. The Section 503 regulations never 
included this requirement. Rather, the Section 503 regulations require 
contractors to use their utilization analyses to determine ``whether 
and where impediments to equal employment opportunity exist'' and ``to 
develop and execute action-oriented programs'' designed to correct any 
identified problem areas. See 41 CFR 60-741.45(e) and (f). While the 
final rule rescinds these requirements, contractors can continue to 
assess their workplace policies through other means such as barrier 
analyses of recruitment, hiring, retention, and promotion practices. 
The NPRM and the final rule also continue to include the equal 
employment opportunity clause at 41 CFR 60-741.5, which requires 
contractors to take affirmative action to employ and advance in 
employment individuals with disabilities, and to treat qualified 
individuals without discrimination on the basis of their physical or 
mental disability in all employment practices.
    In the NPRM and the final rule, contractors meeting the AAP 
thresholds are still required to design and implement an audit and 
reporting system, which differs from the requirements referenced by the 
commenter. See 41 CFR 60-741.44(h) (focusing on the effectiveness of 
the AAP). While contractors are no longer required to collect the 
disability self-identification data, they can continue to meet these 
obligations through other measures such as reviewing their actions 
taken in response to reasonable accommodation requests or auditing 
their workplace accessibility. Employees and applicants also have the 
right to file complaints of disability discrimination pursuant to the 
regulations. See 41 CFR 60-741 at Subpart D. In this way, contractors 
can continue to assess what remedial measures may be necessary in their 
workplaces.
    A few commenters believed that the proposed changes would hinder 
DOL's or researchers' ability to analyze workforce data on the 
employment of individuals with disabilities. However, these commenters 
misunderstand the use and purpose of the data collection requirements. 
Applicants and employees submitted the CC-305 form to the contractor, 
not DOL. The prescribed CC-305 form indicated that contractors were 
soliciting disability information for the purpose of measuring their 
progress towards the 7 percent utilization goal.\16\ Although DOL may 
have seen contractor-specific information when assessing a contractor's 
compliance with the utilization requirements during a compliance 
review, it did not collect this data for all contractors and did not 
use or share this data for statistical or research purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ See Form CC-305, available at <a href="https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewIC?ref_nbr=202306-1250-001&icID=200170">https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewIC?ref_nbr=202306-1250-001&icID=200170</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, commenters expressed concern that the proposed changes 
could impact the enforcement or interpretation of other laws or 
policies such as VEVRAA or Schedule A hiring in federal agencies. DOL 
notes that this final rule pertains to the Section 503 regulations 
only. The revisions to Section 503's implementing regulations do not 
extend to other programs such as VEVRAA, which relates to protected 
veterans, or the Federal Government's Schedule A hiring program, which 
are outside the scope of this final rule.
    That said, DOL intends to clarify its view on one issue raised by a 
few commenters who suggested that the Section 503 disability inquiry 
requirement is comparable to the self-identification requirements in 
the VEVRAA regulations. For example, one such commenter asserted that 
``VEVRAA depends on the same foundational ideas that [41 CFR 60-741] is 
built on. Challenging the authority to self-identify disabilities 
[under Section 503] seems like it necessarily brings into question the 
legality of the disabled veterans category [under VEVRAA].'' DOL 
disagrees for several reasons.
    First, under the VEVRAA regulations, 41 CFR 60-300.42(a) requires 
contractors to invite applicants during the pre-offer stage to disclose 
protected veteran status, but not the particular category thereof.\17\ 
Under VEVRAA, ``protected veteran'' includes a veteran who may be 
classified as a ``disabled veteran'' under 41 CFR 60-300.2(i). See 41 
CFR 60-300.2(q).\18\ However, the invitation to disclose protected 
veteran status under 41 CFR 60-300.42(a) is distinguishable from the 
Section 503 invitation to disclose disability status. The primary 
purpose of the protected veteran inquiry is to assess whether an 
individual is a protected veteran, not whether an individual has a 
disability. The protected veteran inquiry is therefore not a proxy for 
a disability inquiry. As OFCCP explained in the 2013 preamble to the 
VEVRAA regulations, ``the proposed pre-offer inquiry does not ask about 
disability status specifically; rather, it only asks that the applicant 
identify whether he or she is a protected veteran generally.'' 78 FR 
58627 (Sept. 24, 2013). This is also consistent with the recommended 
text for extending the pre-offer invitation in Appendix B to Part 60-
300, which asks simply whether the applicant ``identif[ies] as one or 
more of the classifications of protected veteran status . . .'' but 
does not invite the individual to list those categories. Since one 
cannot directly infer that an applicant is disabled from their 
protected veteran status, it is not an ``inquiry'' under the ADA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ 41 CFR 60-300.42(a) (``[t]he contractor shall invite 
applicants to inform the contractor whether the applicant believes 
that he or she is a protected veteran who may be covered by 
[VEVRAA].'').
    \18\ A ``protected veteran'' means ``a veteran who is protected 
under the non-discrimination and affirmative action provisions of 
[VEVRAA]; specifically, a veteran who may be classified as a 
`disabled veteran,' `recently separated veteran,' `active duty 
wartime or campaign badge veteran,' or an `Armed Forces service 
medal veteran,' as defined by this section.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, although the invitation that occurs at the post-offer stage 
does

[[Page 54492]]

specify the particular categories of ``protected veteran'' to which the 
applicant may belong, the scope of the ``disabled veteran'' category is 
materially different from--and broader in relevant respect than--the 
ADA-based definition of ``disability'' covered by the Section 503 
disability inquiry. The Section 503 disability inquiry requirement is 
based on whether the applicant believes that he or she is an individual 
with a ``disability'' as defined in 41 CFR 60-741.2(g)(1)(i) or (ii). 
This definition tracks the first two prongs of the ADA definition of 
``disability'': ``(i) A physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual; [or] (ii) a record of such an impairment[.]'' This 
definition is closely aligned with the ADA definition and therefore 
offers a clear illustration of a pure disability inquiry.
    In contrast, under VEVRAA, ``disabled veteran'' is defined more 
broadly as: (1) A veteran of the U.S. military, ground, naval or air 
service who is entitled to compensation (or who but for the receipt of 
military retired pay would be entitled to compensation) under laws 
administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs; or (2) a person who 
was discharged or released from active duty because of a service-
connected disability. 41 CFR 60-300.2(i). This category is not 
coextensive with the category of individuals who meet the ADA's 
definition of disability. It may include, for instance, individuals 
with service-connected conditions that do not ``substantially limit'' a 
major life activity--and thus would not satisfy the ADA definition--but 
nonetheless render individuals unfit for the specific military duties 
of their office, grade, rank, or rating. See 10 U.S.C. 1201, 1203. The 
reverse is also true. Someone disabled under the ADA would not be a 
``disabled veteran'' if, for instance, the disability lacked any 
service connection. See 38 U.S.C. 1110. ``Disabled veterans'' under 
VEVRAA must satisfy different conditions than those who have a 
disability under the ADA and Section 503. The individuals who qualify 
as ``disabled veterans'' under VEVRAA meet fundamentally different 
definitions than those who are not veterans but have a disability under 
the ADA and Section 503. The inquiries are, therefore, not comparable 
as the commenters suggest.
4. Due Process Rights and Reliance Interests
    Some commenters asserted that ``Individuals with disabilities have 
historic reliance on voluntary self identification and the 7% 
utilization goal, so phasing it out without a hearing is a due process 
violation,'' citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). These 
commenters are wrong.
    Perry held that a public employee could have a constitutionally 
protected property interest in continued employment where there was an 
implied tenure system creating a legitimate claim of entitlement. That 
holding is inapplicable here. The individuals that commenters are 
referencing are not government employees but applicants and employees 
of private contractors. Neither the disability inquiry requirement nor 
the utilization goal creates any individual entitlement, property 
interest, or other constitutionally protected interest. Importantly, 
these provisions regulate contractor compliance obligations and do not 
confer enforceable rights on applicants or employees. Accordingly, the 
Due Process Clause does not require a hearing before DOL revises or 
rescinds these regulatory provisions. See Bd. of Regents of State 
Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
    Commenters also cited Encino Motorcars LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 
211, 212 (2016), for the proposition that agencies must ``be cognizant 
that longstanding policies may have engendered serious reliance 
interests that must be taken into account'' and FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009), which states that ``[i]t would be 
arbitrary or capricious to ignore such matters.'' These cases concern 
the Administrative Procedure Act's requirement that agencies consider 
serious reliance interests when changing policy, not constitutional due 
process hearing requirements.
    DOL also disagrees that there is a reliance interest in the 
disability inquiry and utilization goal regulations. Individuals do not 
have a legitimate reliance interest in being asked whether they have a 
disability by a prospective or current employer. The commenters did not 
explain what individuals with disabilities have done in reliance upon 
the expectation that they would be asked whether they have a 
disability. If an individual wishes to disclose that information, 
nothing in this rule prevents him or her from voluntarily doing so 
without being asked, such as in the course of requesting a reasonable 
accommodation.
    Nor is there any legitimate reliance interest in the utilization 
goal. The utilization goal does not guarantee employment, advancement, 
accommodation, or any other benefit to any individual with a 
disability. It does not create any entitlement or preference for any 
particular applicant or employee. Rather, the utilization goal 
functions as a management tool used by contractors to evaluate their 
overall affirmative action efforts. Because it does not confer any 
individual right or benefit, commenters have not identified any 
concrete reliance interest. And as explained above, commenters have not 
explained what employees have done in reliance on the expectation that 
contractors would use the utilization goal to evaluate their 
affirmative action efforts.
5. Alternatives To Rescinding the Utilization Goal and Related Analyses
    In lieu of rescinding the utilization goal, commenters suggested 
that DOL modify the regulations at 41 CFR 60-741.5 to further clarify 
the prohibition against quotas or to institute an annual certification 
requirement for contractors to certify that they are not using quotas. 
Commenters also suggested various alternatives to rescinding the 
utilization goal such as increasing or decreasing the goal; adopting a 
flexible, non-binding goal; adopting diagnostic reference points in 
lieu of a goal; increasing the employee threshold required to trigger 
the goal; instituting a hiring benchmark; or moving the utilization 
provisions to the regulations' Appendices, which provide guidelines 
contractors can choose to implement to promote equal employment 
opportunity for individuals with disabilities.
    DOL considered these alternatives and declines to retain the 
utilization goal and related analyses in any form. First, given the 
rescission of the disability inquiry requirement, DOL views commenters' 
alternatives for assessing utilization as unworkable and therefore 
declines to adopt them in the final rule. Further, modifying the goal, 
requiring a certification, or adding new regulatory language 
prohibiting quotas would be ineffective. Prior to this rescission, the 
regulations already included express language prohibiting the use of 
quotas and the agency issued guidance highlighting this 
prohibition.\19\ Despite these guardrails, several commenters agreed 
that the utilization requirements were in practice pressuring 
contractors to meet quotas. DOL also notes that neither the

[[Page 54493]]

utilization goal nor the related analyses are required by Section 503. 
See 29 U.S.C. 793. By rescinding these burdensome requirements, DOL is 
fulfilling the mandate of E.O. 14219 to rescind or modify regulations 
that are not authorized by clear statutory authority. See E.O. 14219, 
``Ensuring Lawful Governance and Implementing the President's 
`Department of Government Efficiency' Deregulatory Initiative,'' 90 FR 
10583 (Feb. 25, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ 41 CFR 60-741.45 Utilization goals, ``The utilization goal 
is not a rigid and inflexible quota which must be met, nor is it to 
be considered either a ceiling or a floor for the employment of 
particular groups. Quotas are expressly forbidden;'' and 41 CFR 60-
741.45(h), ``The utilization goal established in paragraph (a) of 
this section shall not be used as a quota or ceiling that limits or 
restricts the employment of individuals with disabilities.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters disagreed with DOL's position that the Section 503 
utilization analysis is unworkable because it is dependent on the E.O. 
11246 job groupings. See 41 CFR 60-741.45(d)(2) (requiring the Section 
503 utilization analysis to use the same job groupings as the 
contractor's E.O. 11246 analyses). For example, some commenters stated 
that contractors could continue to use E.O. 11246 job groups for their 
analysis. Given the rescission of the utilization goal in the final 
rule, DOL declines to adopt this recommendation. Further, with the 
revocation of the E.O. 11246 authority, requiring contractors to 
continue to use the E.O. 11246 job groupings for their Section 503 
analyses may cause confusion.
    In lieu of E.O. 11246 job groups, some commenters suggested that 
contractors could use EEO-1 job categories, total workforce, or their 
own groupings for the utilization analysis. Other commenters suggested 
that DOL add the 41 CFR 60-2.12 definition of job group from the E.O. 
11246 regulations to the Section 503 regulations. One commenter 
suggested replacing the utilization goal and analysis with other types 
of analyses and reporting. These include barrier analyses of 
recruitment, hiring, retention, and promotion practices; data on 
average response times and resolution outcomes for reasonable 
accommodation requests; and reports on qualitative measures of 
inclusion, such as accessibility of digital systems, participation in 
leadership pipelines, and engagement in workplace culture. The 
commenter also recommended that contractors be required to integrate 
accessibility into procurement and supply chain reviews and to embed 
accessibility and disability inclusion into training, design, and 
operational practices. Another commenter suggested requiring a barrier 
analysis to assess application accessibility, screening practices, 
workplace culture, and career pathways when contractors fail to meet 
the 7 percent utilization goal.
    DOL declines to adopt these recommendations. Imposing new 
requirements or job groupings for conducting Section 503 analyses would 
be contrary to E.O. 14219, which directs Federal agencies to implement 
deregulatory measures and reduce undue burden on businesses. See E.O. 
14219, ``Ensuring Lawful Governance and Implementing the President's 
`Department of Government Efficiency' Deregulatory Initiative,'' 90 FR 
10583 (Feb. 25, 2025).\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ DOL further notes that EEOC has issued a proposed rule to 
rescind the EEO-1 data reporting requirement at 29 CFR 1602.7. See 
91 FR 46332 (July 23, 2026).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also expressed concern as to how they could measure 
progress without the utilization analysis and the regulations' data 
collection requirements. For example, some commenters expressed concern 
as to how contractors could identify potential discrimination issues in 
their workforce or measure the effectiveness of their outreach efforts, 
as required by 41 CFR 60-741.44(f)(3), without these analyses. 
Similarly, commenters asserted that rescinding the analyses would 
hinder contractors' ability to prepare and maintain other required 
sections of the AAP. A commenter requested that contractors be 
permitted to continue to conduct the analyses and to be afforded 
flexibility in how they do so. Another commenter also recommended that 
contractors be permitted to conduct periodic analyses to assess whether 
they are reaching qualified applicants.
    In response, DOL notes that contractors can continue to meet the 
objectives of Section 503 without DOL mandating the specific type of 
analyses. This final rule is removing the disability inquiry 
requirement and is rescinding the related data collection and analyses 
set forth at 41 CFR 60-741.44(k) and 41 CFR 60-741.45, respectively. If 
contractors, at their own discretion, continue to take these actions, 
they should ensure that in doing so, they are acting in accordance with 
all applicable laws and regulations, including the ADA. Removing the 
rigid requirement to complete the utilization and data collection 
analyses affords contractors the flexibility to conduct analyses that 
are appropriate for their workforce, rather than imposing a one-size-
fits-all requirement.
    Further, while the final rule no longer requires contractors to 
collect disability data or to compute the metrics previously required 
under 41 CFR 60-741.44(k), they can continue to measure the 
effectiveness of their outreach efforts through other measures that are 
appropriate for their workforce. DOL does acknowledge that many 
contractors primarily relied on the quantitative data to assess the 
effectiveness of their outreach and other affirmative action 
requirements. The 2013 rule also required contractors to consider the 
quantitative data, among other criteria. See 78 FR 58682, 58699 (Sept. 
24, 2013). Given this final rule's rescission of the disability inquiry 
requirement, DOL does agree that more clarification on this issue is 
necessary. To address confusion regarding contractors' obligations, DOL 
is adding clarifying language to 41 CFR 60-741.44 providing that 
contractors are no longer required to consider quantitative data on the 
numbers of individuals with disabilities who were referrals, 
applicants, or hires when assessing the effectiveness of their outreach 
efforts and affirmative action program pursuant to 41 CFR 60-
741.44(f)(3) and 41 CFR 60-741.44(h)(1).\21\ See Ne. Maryland Waste 
Disposal Auth. v. E.P.A., 358 F.3d 936, 951 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(``Agencies, are free--indeed, they are encouraged--to modify proposed 
rules as a result of the comments they receive.''). In meeting these 
requirements, contractors may review other factors such as the 
accessibility of their outreach and hiring materials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ The clarifying language is now included at 41 CFR 60-
741.44(l) and reads as follows: ``Contractors are not required to 
consider quantitative data on the numbers of individuals with 
disabilities who were referrals, applicants, or hires when assessing 
the effectiveness of their outreach efforts and affirmative action 
program pursuant to 41 CFR 60-741.44(f)(3) and 41 CFR 60-
741.44(h)(1).''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Congressional Intent
    DOL received several comments regarding the congressional intent 
underlying Section 503. For example, some commenters noted that Section 
503 requires contractors to engage in affirmative action for 
individuals with disabilities. These commenters asserted that DOL's 
proposal to rescind the affirmative action requirements described above 
(e.g., the disability inquiry requirement and utilization goal and 
analyses) conflicts with the congressional intent underlying Section 
503. More generally, commenters asserted that Section 503 was meant to 
strengthen protections for individuals with disabilities, and thus they 
believed that DOL's proposal to rescind these affirmative action 
requirements conflicted with the intent or purpose of Section 503.
    DOL disagrees with these comments. Section 503 requires contractors 
to ``take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment 
qualified individuals with disabilities.'' 29 U.S.C. 793(a). As 
detailed in section III(A) above, while the disability inquiry and 
utilization goal requirements conflict

[[Page 54494]]

with the guardrails included in the ADA statute, the regulations 
continue to provide for other actions contractors can take to employ 
and advance in employment qualified individuals with disabilities.
7. Cross-References to E.O. 11246 and 41 CFR 60-3
    In the NPRM, DOL proposed removing the Section 503 regulations' 
cross-references to E.O. 11246, which was revoked by E.O. 14173 on 
January 21, 2025.
    A commenter stated that removing the E.O. 11246 cross-references 
would result in disability-related complaints being siloed or 
deprioritized, particularly in cases where disability interacts with 
other protected bases under federal law (e.g., race or gender). Another 
commenter acknowledged that E.O. 11246 was now revoked but urged DOL to 
retain the cross-references to the revoked E.O. 11246 authority. In 
support of this position, the commenter asserted that E.O. 11246 helped 
prevent employment discrimination and noted that E.O. 11246 was in 
effect for decades. Another commenter suggested that E.O. 14173 could 
not impact Section 503 because Section 503 is statutory and remains in 
effect.
    As a point of clarification, neither the NPRM nor this final rule 
propose changes to Section 503 found at 29 U.S.C. 793. Rather, the NPRM 
correctly noted that the implementing regulations for this statute 
expressly cross-reference E.O. 11246, which was revoked by E.O. 14173. 
Commenters' concerns about removing the E.O. 11246 cross-references are 
unfounded, as the proposed change is technical in nature. Rather than 
cross-referencing to the E.O. 11246 regulation's administrative 
proceeding procedures, DOL is merely moving the applicable procedures 
directly into the Section 503 regulatory text. This technical change 
will remove the outdated E.O. 11246 references, thereby ensuring 
greater clarity for stakeholders.
    Separately, the E.O. 11246 regulations at 41 CFR part 60-3 
previously incorporated the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection 
Procedures (UGESP), 29 CFR part 1607. UGESP is not applicable to 
Section 503. Section 60-741.21(a)(7)(iii) explained this fact by citing 
to the E.O. 11246 regulations at 41 CFR part 60-3. Now that E.O. 11246 
has been revoked, UGESP continues to be inapplicable to Section 503, 
but the reference to 41 CFR part 60-3 in 41 CFR 60-741.21(a)(7)(iii) is 
outdated. As a result, this final rule revises 41 CFR 60-
741.21(a)(7)(iii) to remove the cross-reference to 41 CFR part 60-3 and 
retain the reference to UGESP. This action does not impact other 
agencies' interpretation and application of UGESP, or the existence of 
UGESP more broadly.
8. Administrative Proceeding Procedures
    DOL received numerous comments on its proposal to relocate the 
administrative proceeding procedures formerly contained in the E.O. 
11246 regulations into the Section 503 implementing regulations. 
Several commenters supported this proposal, stating that conforming the 
regulatory structure in this manner is reasonable and appropriate 
following the revocation of E.O. 11246. These commenters noted that 
consolidating the applicable procedures within the Section 503 
regulations would improve regulatory clarity and transparency regarding 
the procedures governing enforcement of Section 503. Other commenters 
recommended that DOL modify or eliminate the administrative proceeding 
procedures because of recent case law challenging the use of 
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) by federal agencies. See, e.g., Space 
Exploration Tech. Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 151 F.4th 761 
(5th Cir. 2025) (challenging the structure of the NLRB, including its 
ALJs); ABM Indus. Groups, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 756 F.Supp.3d 468 
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2024) (holding that Plaintiff is likely to succeed 
on its claim that the assigned DOL ALJ is unconstitutionally protected 
by two layers of good-cause removal restrictions), vacated, No. 4:24-
CV-03353, 2024 WL 6076919. Relying on this case law, some of these 
commenters asserted that DOL can no longer use the ALJ structure 
included in the current procedures. Commenters also cited SEC v. 
Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024), in which the Supreme Court held that the 
Seventh Amendment requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
pursue civil penalties in federal court where the defendant is entitled 
to a jury trial. Some commenters further cited lower court decisions 
applying Jarkesy outside the SEC context, including Sun Valley 
Orchards, LLC v. DOL, 148 F.4th 121 (3d Cir. 2025), cert. granted, 2026 
WL 1127242 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2026) (No. 25-966) (applying Jarkesy to hold 
that DOL could not seek certain monetary remedies through 
administrative proceedings). However, the application of Jarkesy 
outside the SEC context remains unsettled and continues to be addressed 
by the courts. Compare Sun Valley with Axalta Coating Systems LLC v. 
FAA, 144 F.4th 467 (3d Cir. 2025) (holding that Jarkesy did not bar 
administrative adjudication of civil penalties for violations of hazmat 
regulations). DOL sought Supreme Court review of Sun Valley, and the 
Court granted a writ of certiorari. 2026 WL 1127242 (U.S. Apr. 27, 
2026) (No. 25-966).
    In any event, these developments do not affect DOL's decision here. 
This final rule does not expand DOL's remedial authority, create new 
causes of action, or establish new enforcement mechanisms. It merely 
relocates the existing procedural provisions after the revocation of 
E.O. 11246. To the extent future judicial decisions clarify the 
constitutional status of DOL's ALJs, clarify the application of Jarkesy 
to DOL enforcement actions, or otherwise require changes to DOL's 
administrative enforcement structure or available remedies, then the 
impact of potential future judicial decisions on such issues may be 
addressed in a separate rulemaking. DOL reaffirms its position that 
moving the administrative proceeding procedures directly into the 
Section 503 regulations is necessary due to the revocation of E.O. 
11246. This change will also provide clarity about the current 
administrative proceeding procedures applicable to Section 503.
9. Burden and Cost
    In the NPRM, DOL noted that rescinding the disability inquiry, 
utilization, and related data collection requirements would reduce the 
regulatory burden for contractors. While some commenters agreed that 
the NPRM revisions would reduce undue burden, others disagreed. These 
other commenters noted that changing the current requirements would 
require contractors to update their HR systems and processes, creating 
additional work. They also expressed concern that shifting requirements 
could cause confusion and increase the risk of noncompliance. Other 
commenters argued that the current requirements do not impose an undue 
burden, emphasizing that the burden is minimal because contractors 
already collect similar information on protected veterans. They further 
asserted that any burdens are minor compared to the potential costs to 
individuals with disabilities such as weakened discrimination 
protections.
    DOL acknowledges that contractors might incur costs updating HR 
systems to remove disability inquiries and updating related analyses. 
But even after accounting for these potential costs, DOL estimates that 
these changes will lead to significant overall savings. See Paperwork 
Reduction Act discussion at section IV(C) below.

[[Page 54495]]

    DOL also disagrees with the comments regarding the potential costs 
to individuals with disabilities. As noted above, the discrimination 
protections remain intact, and the proposed changes to the affirmative 
action provisions are intended to align the regulations with the ADA's 
guardrails and protections for individuals with disabilities. DOL is 
implementing changes that will better ensure that contractors are 
meeting their Section 503 obligations, while also complying with their 
other civil rights obligations.
    With respect to commenters' concerns about the proposed changes 
causing confusion, DOL will continue to provide stakeholders with 
updated guidance as necessary on the Section 503 program. In this way, 
contractors will continue to receive notice of the changes and can stay 
informed about their obligations under Section 503.
10. Other Comments
    Some commenters expressed general support or opposition to the NPRM 
without addressing specific issues discussed in the NPRM. Some 
commenters raised issues unrelated to DOL's authority under Section 
503, such as contract bidding opportunities for individuals with 
disabilities. Other commenters suggested modifications unrelated to 
topics covered in the NPRM, such as adding a religious exemption into 
the Section 503 regulations or adding fines and penalties to the 
regulations. Some commenters suggested subregulatory changes to DOL's 
enforcement procedures or requested subregulatory guidance on the 
Section 503 program. These issues fall outside the scope of this 
rulemaking, and therefore DOL does not address them in this final rule. 
To the extent that DOL determines that additional regulatory changes 
may be necessary, then those changes may be pursued in a separate 
rulemaking. DOL may also continue to update its subregulatory materials 
as necessary to ensure they align with current agency procedures and 
requirements.
    A commenter supporting the proposed rule urged the President to 
utilize his authority at 29 U.S.C. 793(c) to temporarily provide relief 
from the affirmative action requirements under Section 503 until DOL 
finalized a new rule. While DOL declined to implement this 
recommendation, DOL notes that no contractors were cited for a 
violation related to the disability inquiry and utilization 
requirements during the rulemaking period.
    Some commenters encouraged DOL to delay the final rule until 
further study and input from stakeholders or until the future state of 
OFCCP is determined. Another commenter recommended DOL wait until the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) issues a pending report on the 
Section 503 program and stakeholders have an opportunity to assess the 
impact. DOL respectfully declines these recommendations. As set forth 
in detail above, issuing the final rule is necessary to align the 
Section 503 requirements with applicable law and recent executive 
orders, and significantly reduces the regulatory burden on contractors. 
Through the rulemaking process, DOL has provided stakeholders with 
sufficient notice of the changes and an opportunity to comment.

B. Jurisdictional Thresholds

    Effective October 1, 2025, the basic coverage threshold for Section 
503 increased from $15,000 to $20,000, in accordance with the 
inflationary adjustment requirements in 41 U.S.C. 1908. See Federal 
Acquisition Regulation: Inflation Adjustment of Acquisition-Related 
Thresholds, 90 FR 41872 (Aug. 27, 2025). Therefore, DOL is updating 
references to the basic coverage thresholds noted throughout the 
Section 503 regulations. This technical revision will ensure that the 
regulations accurately reflect the basic coverage threshold, thereby 
promoting greater clarity for contractors about their obligations 
pursuant to Section 503. DOL finds good cause to make these changes 
without prior notice and comment pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B). 
Specifically, DOL finds that notice and comment are unnecessary because 
the inflationary adjustments are minor and technical amendments that 
were previously subject to notice and comment through the Federal 
Acquisition Regulatory (FAR) Council's rulemaking process and are now 
binding on the Section 503 regulations.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ See Federal Acquisition Regulation: Inflation Adjustment of 
Acquisition-Related Thresholds, 90 FR 41872 (Aug. 27, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Other Technical Revisions

    The final rule also includes additional technical changes such as 
corrections to typographical errors and updates to several website 
addresses that have changed or are no longer available. DOL finds good 
cause to make these corrections under the ``good cause'' exemption of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B). Specifically, DOL 
finds that notice and comment are unnecessary because these changes are 
technical in nature and do not substantively amend the regulations.

IV. Procedural Issues and Regulatory Review

A. Review Under Executive Order 12866

    Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review,'' 58 FR 
51735 (Oct. 4, 1993), requires agencies, to the extent permitted by 
law, to (1) propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that its benefits justify its costs (recognizing that 
some benefits and costs are difficult to quantify); (2) tailor 
regulations to impose the least burden on society, consistent with 
obtaining regulatory objectives, taking into account, among other 
things, and to the extent practicable, the costs of cumulative 
regulations; (3) select, in choosing among alternative regulatory 
approaches, those approaches that maximize net benefits; (4) to the 
extent feasible, specify performance objectives, rather than specifying 
the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities must 
adopt; and (5) identify and assess available alternatives to direct 
regulation, including providing economic incentives to encourage the 
desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing 
information upon which choices can be made by the public.
    Section 6(a) of E.O. 12866 also requires agencies to submit 
``significant regulatory actions'' to the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review. In accordance with E.O. 12866, 
DOL has determined that this final rule does not constitute a 
``significant regulatory action.'' See E.O. 12866 sec. 3(f)(1). 
Accordingly, this final rule was not submitted to OIRA for review under 
E.O. 12866.
1. Costs of the Final Rule
    Rescinding the disability inquiry and utilization requirements 
impacts the time burden and costs related to Section 503 compliance. 
With the removal of the rescinded requirements, DOL estimates the 
following:
a. System Updates Related to Recordkeeping Changes
    DOL estimates that covered entities will take an average of 10 
hours to remove the CC-305 form and data collection information from 
their recordkeeping/Human Resource Information Systems. This will 
result in a total of 299,040 burden hours.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ As Human Resources Information Systems (HRIS) are typically 
maintained by the parent company rather than individual 
establishment, DOL calculated the burden hours for this estimate by 
the total number of parent companies subject to the Section 503 
requirements. Based on EEO-1 data, DOL estimates that 29,904 
contractors will need to undergo HRIS updates (29,904 x 10 hours = 
299,040 burden hours).

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[[Page 54496]]

b. Recordkeeping Burden
    With the rescinded provisions, covered entities will no longer have 
recordkeeping costs related to the disability inquiry requirement and 
utilization analyses. The regulations at 41 CFR 60-741.44(f)(4) still 
require a contractor to document all outreach activities it undertakes 
for individuals with disabilities and retain these documents for a 
period of 3 years. DOL estimates that it will take each covered entity 
10 minutes to maintain the outreach and recruitment documentation. 
Therefore, the recurring burden for this provision is 19,995 hours 
(119,971 covered entities x 10 minutes/60 = 19,995 hours).
    Section 60-741.44(h)(1)(vi) requires contractors to document the 
actions taken to meet the audit and reporting system requirements 
outlined in Section 60-741.44(h). DOL estimates that it will take 
covered entities 10 minutes to document compliance with this provision. 
Documentation may include, as an example, the standard operating 
procedure of the system including roles and responsibilities, and audit 
and reporting timeframes and lifecycles. The annual recordkeeping 
burden of this provision is 19,995 hours (119,971 covered entities x 10 
minutes/60 = 19,995 hours).
c. Third-Party Disclosure Burden
    With the rescinded provisions, affected parties (covered entities 
and applicants/employees) no longer have a third-party disclosure 
burden related to administering and completing the CC-305 form. The 
remaining third-party disclosure burden is related to 41 CFR 60-
741.44(f)(1)(ii), which requires a contractor to ``send written 
notification of company policy related to its affirmative action 
efforts to all subcontractors, including subcontracting vendors and 
suppliers, requesting appropriate action on their part.'' DOL estimates 
that contractors will take 15 minutes to prepare the notification and 
send it to subcontractors, vendors, and suppliers, and an additional 15 
minutes to update email address changes in the company's email system. 
Likewise, DOL estimates the burden for any information technology 
assistance needed to send the written communication as 15 minutes. 
Accordingly, the annual third-party disclosure burden is 89,978 hours 
(119,971 contractor establishments \24\ x 45 minutes/60 = 89,978 
hours).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Based on EEO-1 data, the covered entities consist of 
approximately 119,971 contractor establishments covered by the 
Section 503 regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the above, the monetized burden is as follows:
    <bullet> First-year monetized recordkeeping burden: (299,040 hours 
x $78.05 \25\) + ([19,995 hours +19,995 hours] x $86.35 \26\) = 
$23,340,072 + $3,453,137 = $26,793,209.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Because these costs relate to the system changes, the 
calculation is based on the average wage rate for a Computer Systems 
Analyst plus 45 percent of wages for fringe benefits. $53.83 x 1.45 
= $78.05. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment 
Statistics, Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2024, <a href="https://data.bls.gov/oes/#/industry/000000">https://data.bls.gov/oes/#/industry/000000</a>.
    \26\ See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment 
Statistics, Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2024, <a href="https://data.bls.gov/oes/#/industry/000000">https://data.bls.gov/oes/#/industry/000000</a>. $55.15 per hour for Management 
Analysts and $77.15 per hour for Human Resources Managers. The 
calculation uses an 80/20 split between Management Analysts and 
Human Resources Managers, which equals $59.55 plus 45 percent of 
wages for fringe benefits. $59.55 x 1.45 = $86.35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    <bullet> Monetized recordkeeping burden for each subsequent year: 
([19,995 hours +19,995 hours] x $86.35 \27\) = $3,453,137.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    <bullet> Monetized annual third-party disclosure burden is 
$7,769,600 (89,978 hours x $86.35 \28\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Together, these costs amount to $26,793,209 in first-year 
recordkeeping burden costs, $7,769,600 in first-year third-party 
disclosure burden costs, and $11,222,737 in recurring annual costs 
(recordkeeping and third-party disclosure burden costs) for subsequent 
years. With a total of $34,562,809 in first year costs and $11,222,737 
in recurring costs in subsequent years, and using a 7 percent discount 
rate, the annualized cost is $14,328,439.
    DOL estimates that affected parties incurred an estimated 
$105,173,444 in costs under the previous requirements ($104,698,359 in 
annualized monetized time burden and $475,085 in operating costs 
related to the CC-305 form).\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ See Burden and cost estimates in the April 2026 supporting 
statement for OMB #1250-0005, available at <a href="https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewDocument?ref_nbr=202604-1250-002">https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewDocument?ref_nbr=202604-1250-002</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Rule Familiarization Costs
    DOL expects that Human Resources Managers or Management Analysts at 
each covered entity will spend time becoming familiar with the 
provisions in the final rule. DOL estimates that it will take one hour 
on average for a Human Resources Manager or Management Analyst to read 
the final rule or the compliance assistance materials provided by DOL.
    DOL estimates an average hourly wage rate of $99.11 based on a 60/
40 split between Human Resources Managers ($77.15) and Management 
Analysts ($55.15), resulting in an average hourly wage of $68.35. DOL 
applies a 45 percent rate for fringe benefits and overhead costs, 
leading to a total hourly wage rate of $99.11 (= $68.35 x 1.45).\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Occupational 
Employment and Wage Statistics, May 2024 National Occupational 
Employment and Wage Estimates, available at <a href="https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm">https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm</a> (reporting mean hourly wage of $77.15 for Human 
Resources Managers (SOC 11-3121) and $55.15 for Management Analysts 
(SOC 13-1111)). The blended rate applies a 60/40 weighting to these 
occupations, yielding a weighted average hourly wage of $68.35. BLS, 
Employer Costs for Employee Compensation, December 2024, available 
at <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.toc.htm">https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.toc.htm</a> (fringe benefits 
and overhead costs equal 45 percent of wages). Loaded blended rate: 
$68.35 x 1.45 = $99.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consequently, the estimated burden for rule familiarization is 
119,971 hours (= 119,971 covered entities based on 2022 EEO-1 data x 
1.0 hours). The total estimated cost is $11,890,326 (= 119,971 hours x 
$99.11/hour) in the first year. Over the 10-year analysis period, the 
annualized rule familiarization costs are estimated at:
    <bullet> $1.4 million at a discount rate of 3 percent.
    <bullet> $1.6 million at a discount rate of 7 percent.
    DOL does not anticipate significant adjustment costs beyond rule 
familiarization.
    This rule is considered a deregulatory action under Executive Order 
14192. Using a perpetual time horizon and 7 percent discount rate, DOL 
estimates that the annualized cost savings resulting from this final 
rule amount to $80,047,091 in 2024 dollars.

B. Review Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires 
preparation of an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) and a 
final regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) for any rule that by law 
must be proposed for public comment, unless the agency certifies that 
the rule, if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact 
on a substantial number of small entities.
    DOL reviewed this final rule under the provisions of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act. The Department has determined that a Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis is not required because this rule is not expected 
to have a ``significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities''

[[Page 54497]]

within the meaning of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Act directs 
agencies, where such impacts exist, to consider steps ``to minimize the 
significant economic impact on small entities consistent with the 
stated objectives of applicable statutes,'' 5 U.S.C. 604(a)(6), 
reflecting Congress's concern with regulatory compliance burdens 
imposed on small entities. Cf. Mid-Tex Elec. Coop. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 
327, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (explaining that ``the costs of compliance 
with uniform regulations to small businesses were the focus of 
congressional concern''). ``Congress envisioned that the relevant 
`economic impact' was the impact of compliance with the proposed rule 
on regulated small entities.'' Id. at 348.
    This final rule has no compliance impacts on small entities and 
would instead eliminate burdensome regulations. Small entities, 
including small Federal contractors and subcontractors, within the 
scope of the rescinded requirements may experience economic effects 
from this rule. However, those effects are expected to be beneficial 
due to burdens and barriers to participation being eliminated. Because 
the rule does not impose compliance obligations or associated costs of 
the type that the RFA is designed to address and that agencies must 
take steps to ``minimize,'' DOL has concluded that the final rule would 
not have a ``significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities'' and that the preparation of an FRFA is not warranted. 
DOL will transmit this certification and supporting statement of 
factual basis to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration for review under 5 U.S.C. 605(b).

C. Review Under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

    The purpose of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 
3501 et seq., includes minimizing the paperwork burden on affected 
entities. The PRA requires certain actions before an agency can adopt 
or revise a collection of information, including publishing for public 
comment a summary of the collection of information and a brief 
description of the need for and proposed use of the information.
    As part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork and respondent 
burden, DOL conducts a preclearance consultation program to provide the 
public and Federal agencies with an opportunity to comment on proposed 
and continuing collections of information in accordance with the PRA. 
See 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A). This activity helps to ensure that the 
public understands DOL's collection instructions, respondents can 
provide the requested data in the desired format, reporting burden 
(time and financial resources) is minimized, collection instruments are 
clearly understood, and DOL can properly assess the impact of 
collection requirements on respondents.
    A Federal agency may not conduct or sponsor a collection of 
information unless it is approved by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) under the PRA and it displays a currently valid OMB 
control number. The public is also not required to respond to a 
collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB 
control number. In addition, notwithstanding any other provisions of 
law, no person will be subject to penalty for failing to comply with a 
collection of information if the collection of information does not 
display a currently valid OMB control number. 44 U.S.C. 3512.
    This rulemaking affects DOL's information collection, ``U.S. 
Department of Labor Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs 
Recordkeeping Requirements--29 U.S.C. 793 Section 503 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, As Amended,'' which is currently approved 
under OMB Control Number 1250-0005. This information collection covers 
various Section 503 requirements and includes the CC-305 form, which 
contractors use to ask applicants and employees if they have a 
disability or have had one in the past. On August 25, 2025, DOL 
published a 60-day notice in the Federal Register proposing changes to 
the information collection to align the information collection with the 
proposed changes in the NPRM. 90 FR 41415. Specifically, DOL proposed 
removing the requirements related to the disability inquiry requirement 
from the information collection, including removing the prescribed CC-
305 form. The agency received 24 comments during the 60-day period from 
a variety of stakeholders including individuals, employer associations, 
law firms, consultants, and advocacy groups. The comments on the 
proposed changes to the information collection are described below.
1. Information Collection Comments on Disability Inquiries
    Many of the comments received in response to the information 
collection request were similar to the NPRM public comments. For 
example, several commenters disagreed with the proposed information 
collection changes, asserting that the disability inquiry requirement 
and related CC-305 form helped DOL and contractors assess compliance 
with the Section 503 affirmative action obligations, better identify 
potential discrimination, and develop best practices for disability 
inclusion. A commenter stated that ``removing Section 503 data-
collection framework would eliminate the only mechanism that allows 
both contractors and OFCCP to measure whether affirmative action is 
meaningful'' and that without the data, DOL enforcement would rely on 
individual complaints and case-by-case investigations, which they view 
as slower, less efficient, and less effective at identifying systemic 
discrimination.
    Similar to the NPRM comments, commenters urged the agency to 
maintain the CC-305 form because, if eliminated, contractors would need 
to develop their own form to collect information they believe necessary 
to comply with Section 503. Likewise, a commenter stated that they 
expect many contractors will continue soliciting employees' disability 
status as part of their Section 503 compliance programs, even if not 
expressly required by DOL's regulations. A commenter expressed concern 
that rescinding the CC-305 form would detract from employers' ability 
to obtain disability information for lawful purposes, such as the 
ability to evaluate the effectiveness of outreach and recruiting 
efforts.
    One commenter asserted that rescinding the CC-305 form would make 
it less likely for individuals to disclose their disabilities and seek 
reasonable accommodation in the workplace, increasing the possibility 
of discrimination and decreasing productivity. This commenter also 
believed the CC-305 form was useful because it includes a comprehensive 
list of disabilities that helps qualified workers determine if a 
condition they have constitutes a disability. The commenter further 
noted that this determination can empower workers who may not realize 
they are protected by the ADA and Section 503, leading some workers 
with disabilities to seek accommodations that support their success in 
the workplace, thereby increasing productivity.
    Commenters further supported the continued use of the CC-305 form 
because they believe it streamlines the process for contractors and 
promotes uniformity among contractors and across contractors' multiple 
locations, specifically multi-state employers. In particular, one 
commenter stated that discontinuing the CC-305 form is burdensome for 
multi-state employers. The commenter argued it is less

[[Page 54498]]

burdensome for multi-state employers to use one common form or set of 
approved words that is acceptable across all 50 states and U.S. 
territories rather than having to implement multiple, different 
versions of a disability self-identification form.
    Commenters offered additional support for maintaining the CC-305 
form, citing their belief that it reinforces the government's 
leadership role in modeling inclusive employment practices and provides 
the government data on federal hiring of individuals with disabilities. 
Another commenter similarly expressed concern that the proposed 
information collection changes would reduce transparency, 
accountability, and the ability to measure whether accessibility and 
inclusion commitments are truly being met.
    Several commenters suggested edits to the CC-305 form, including 
simplifying the introductory language and revising the form to allow 
contractors to include information on how applicants can request a 
reasonable accommodation at any point during the selection process. 
Some commenters suggested the agency adopt a shorter form, with one 
recommending the agency adopt a form that is mobile-friendly while 
maintaining the language stating the form is voluntary and 
confidential. This commenter also suggested that contractors be 
permitted to hyperlink to the definition of disability and list of 
medical conditions in order to shorten the form.
    A commenter requested that DOL retain the CC-305 form as an 
optional form, and that DOL provide contractors with flexibility to 
modify the contents or the format in a way that is consistent with 
their own corporate culture. The commenter likened this approach to the 
VEVRAA model in which DOL identifies the core elements that a 
disability inquiry must contain but leaves the development and 
execution of the form itself to the contractor. Further, the commenter 
requested that contractors be permitted to require applicants and 
employees to complete the form, provided it includes an `opt out' or `I 
do not want to answer' option. The commenter asserted that because 
respondents can select `I do not want to answer,' the form remains 
voluntary.
    Some commenters also discussed agency guidance related to the CC-
305 form. For example, a commenter requested that DOL restore to the 
agency's website a prior FAQ related to the electronic implementation 
of Form CC-305. Another commenter suggested that DOL provide additional 
resources to encourage higher response rates. Finally, an employer 
association expressed that it would be premature to eliminate the CC-
305 form before any new final regulations implementing Section 503 are 
promulgated.
    In response to the commenter's concern that it would be premature 
to eliminate the CC-305 form before the Section 503 final rule is 
promulgated, DOL notes that the proposed changes to the information 
collection will not take effect until the effective date of the final 
rule.
    Further, for the reasons described above, DOL declines to retain 
the CC-305 form in any manner since the final rule eliminates the 
requirement that contractors ask applicants and employees about their 
disability status. As detailed in the ADA discussion at section 
III(A)(2) above, DOL believes that Congress made a policy determination 
to protect privacy with the enactment of the ADA. DOL chooses to 
enforce Section 503 consistent with the privacy protections of the ADA. 
DOL enforced, and contractors were able to comply with Section 503's 
statutory requirements prior to the CC-305 form, and DOL will continue 
to enforce, and contractors will continue to be able to comply with 
Section 503's statutory requirements after the discontinuation of this 
form. If a contractor, in exercising its own legal and business 
judgment, believes there is a legal basis on which it is permitted to 
collect certain information under the ADA and its implementing 
regulations, then this final rule does not prohibit the contractor from 
doing so. However, given DOL's view that this inquiry process 
contravenes the ADA, it would not be appropriate for DOL to provide a 
form for contractors to make potentially unlawful inquiries as to the 
disability status of applicants and employees.
    With respect to the other concerns raised by commenters, DOL notes 
that the nondiscrimination provisions in the Section 503 regulations 
remain intact. Contractors are still prohibited from discriminating 
against any employee or applicant for employment because of their 
physical or mental disability. As explained above, DOL did not propose, 
and the final rule does not make, changes to provisions related to 
reasonable accommodation. Additionally, employees and applicants are 
still permitted to voluntarily provide information about their 
disability status for reasonable accommodation purposes. Appendix B to 
Part 60-741 continues to provide guidance to contractors on best 
practices on reasonable accommodation procedures, including 
dissemination of reasonable accommodation procedures to employees. DOL 
may continue to update its subregulatory materials, as necessary, for 
alignment with current agency procedures and requirements, including 
the agency website.
2. Burden Estimates for the Information Collection
    DOL received several comments discussing the burden for the 
information collection. For example, one commenter argued the agency 
may be overestimating the burden related to implementing the CC-305 
form, as the commenter believes the ongoing costs for administering the 
form are minimal. Other commenters similarly noted that electronic 
submission of the disability data minimizes employer burden. Several 
other commenters expressed concern that eliminating the CC-305 form 
would impose additional costs, noting the change would require 
modifications to contractors' electronic systems.
    In response, DOL notes that the information collection burden 
estimate accounted for contractor costs related to discontinuation of 
the CC-305 form.\31\ The information collection estimates are based on 
average costs and cost savings for all contractors. DOL acknowledges 
that individual costs and costs savings may vary depending on the 
various resources and policies of contractors. However, DOL estimates 
that removing the disability inquiry and utilization requirements will 
result in a net decrease in burden. As noted above, the annualized cost 
savings associated with this burden decrease, when discounting at a 7% 
percent discount rate, is approximately $80 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The information collection request accounted for 299,040 
burden hours related to updating systems to remove the CC-305 form 
and utilization information. DOL continues to use this estimate in 
this final rule. See cost analysis in Section IV(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The information collection requirements associated with this final 
rule are summarized as follows:
    Agency: Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs.
    Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
    Title of Collection: U.S. Department of Labor Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance Programs Recordkeeping Requirements--29 U.S.C. 793 
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, As Amended.
    OMB Control Number: 1250-0005.
    Affected Public: Business or other for profit.
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 119,971 Contractor Establishments.
    Frequency: On occasion.
    Number of Responses: 119,971.

[[Page 54499]]

    Estimated Average Time per Response: 1.91 hours per Contractor 
Establishment.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 229,648 total burden hours.
    Total Estimated Annual Other Cost Burden: $0 (operating and 
maintenance costs).
    Forms: None.

D. Review Under Executive Order 13132

    Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism,'' 64 FR 43255 (Aug. 10, 1999), 
imposes certain requirements on Federal agencies formulating and 
implementing policies or regulations that preempt State law or that 
have federalism implications. Executive Order 13132 requires agencies 
to examine the constitutional and statutory authority supporting any 
action that would limit the policymaking discretion of the States and 
to carefully assess the necessity for such actions. The E.O. also 
requires agencies to have an accountable process to ensure meaningful 
and timely input by State and local officials in the development of 
regulatory policies that have federalism implications.
    DOL has examined this final rule and has determined that it would 
not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

E. Review Under Executive Order 12988

    With respect to the review of existing regulations and the 
promulgation of new regulations, section 3(a) of E.O. 12988, ``Civil 
Justice Reform,'' imposes on Federal agencies the general duty to 
adhere to the following requirements: (1) eliminate drafting errors and 
ambiguity, (2) write regulations to minimize litigation, (3) provide a 
clear legal standard for affected conduct rather than a general 
standard, and (4) promote simplification and burden reduction. 61 FR 
4729 (Feb. 7, 1996). Regarding the review required by section 3(a), 
section 3(b) of E.O. 12988 specifically requires that Executive 
agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: 
(1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect, if any, (2) clearly 
specifies any effect on existing Federal law or regulation, (3) 
provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct while promoting 
simplification and burden reduction, (4) specifies the retroactive 
effect, if any, (5) adequately defines key terms, and (6) addresses 
other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship 
under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.
    Section 3(c) of E.O. 12988 requires Executive agencies to review 
regulations in light of applicable standards in section 3(a) and 
section 3(b) to determine whether they are met or it is unreasonable to 
meet one or more of them. DOL has completed the required review and 
determined that, to the extent permitted by law, this final rule meets 
the relevant standards of E.O. 12988.

F. Review Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) 
requires each Federal agency to assess the effects of Federal 
regulatory actions on State, local, and Tribal governments and the 
private sector. Sec. 201, Public Law 104-4 (codified at 2 U.S.C. 1531). 
For a regulatory action likely to result in a rule that may cause the 
expenditure by State, local, and Tribal governments, in the aggregate, 
or by the private sector of $100 million or more in any one year 
(adjusted annually for inflation), section 202 of UMRA requires a 
Federal agency to publish a written statement that estimates the 
resulting costs, benefits, and other effects on the national economy. 2 
U.S.C. 1532(a) and (b). The UMRA also requires a Federal agency to 
develop an effective process to permit timely input by elected officers 
of State, local, and Tribal governments on a significant 
``intergovernmental mandate,'' and requires an agency plan for giving 
notice and opportunity for timely input to potentially affected small 
governments before establishing any requirements that might 
significantly or uniquely affect them.
    DOL examined this final rule according to UMRA and its statement of 
policy and determined that the final rule does not contain a Federal 
intergovernmental mandate, nor is it expected to require expenditures 
of $100 million or more in any one year by State, local, and Tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector. As a result, 
the analytical requirements of UMRA do not apply.

G. Review Under the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 
1999

    Section 654 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations 
Act, 1999 (Pub. L. 105-277) requires Federal agencies to issue a Family 
Policymaking Assessment for any rule that may affect family well-being. 
This final rule would not have any impact on the autonomy or integrity 
of the family as an institution. Accordingly, DOL has concluded that it 
is not necessary to prepare a Family Policymaking Assessment. A 
commenter disagreed with this assessment, asserting that promoting 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities directly affects 
family well-being. As explained in section III(A)(3) above, the 
regulations' non-discrimination provisions remain intact and 
contractors are still prohibited from discriminating against any 
employee or applicant for employment because of their physical or 
mental disability. Therefore, DOL maintains that it is not necessary to 
prepare a Family Policymaking Assessment.

H. Review Under Executive Order 12630

    Pursuant to E.O. 12630, ``Governmental Actions and Interference 
with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights,'' 53 FR 8859 (Mar. 18, 
1988), DOL has determined that this final rule would not result in any 
takings that might require compensation under the Fifth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution.

I. Review Under the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 
2001

    Section 515 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations 
Act, 2001 (44 U.S.C. 3516, note) provides for Federal agencies to 
review most disseminations of information to the public under 
information quality guidelines established by each agency pursuant to 
general guidelines issued by OMB. OMB's guidelines were published at 67 
FR 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002). DOL has reviewed this final rule under the OMB 
guidelines and has concluded that it is consistent with applicable 
policies in those guidelines.

J. Review Under Executive Order 13175

    DOL has examined this final rule and determined that it does not 
have tribal implications under E.O. 13175 that would require a tribal 
summary impact statement. It does not ``have substantial direct effects 
on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal 
Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.''

K. Review Under Additional Executive Orders and Presidential Memoranda

    As detailed above, DOL has examined this rule and has determined 
that it is consistent with the policies and directives outlined in E.O. 
14173, ``Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based 
Opportunity;'' E.O. 14219, ``Ensuring Lawful Governance and 
Implementing the President's `Department of Government

[[Page 54500]]

Efficiency' Deregulatory Initiative;'' E.O. 14275, ``Restoring Common 
Sense to Federal Procurement;'' E.O. 14267, ``Reducing Anti-Competitive 
Regulatory Barriers;'' Presidential Memorandum, ``Directing the Repeal 
of Unlawful Regulations;'' \32\ and E.O. 14192, ``Unleashing Prosperity 
through Deregulation.'' This final rule is considered a deregulatory 
action under E.O. 14192. As described in section IV(C) above, using a 
perpetual time horizon to allow for cost comparisons under that order, 
DOL estimates that the annualized cost savings amount to $80 million in 
2024 dollars, using a 7 percent discount rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ Presidential Memorandum on Directing the Repeal of Unlawful 
Regulations, 2025 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 466 (Apr. 9, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

List of Subjects

41 CFR Part 60-30

    Administrative practice and procedure, Civil rights, Equal 
employment opportunity, Government contracts, Government procurement, 
Government property management, Individuals with disabilities, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Veterans.

41 CFR Part 60-741

    Administrative practice and procedure, Civil rights, Employment, 
Equal employment opportunity, Government contracts, Government 
procurement, Individuals with disabilities, Investigations, Labor, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Veterans.

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, and under the authority 
of 29 U.S.C. 793, as amended, 38 U.S.C. 4212, as amended, and E.O. 
14173, DOL amends chapter 60 in title 41 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations as set forth below:

PART 60-30 [REMOVED AND RESERVED]

0
1. Effective December 21, 2026, under the authority of 29 U.S.C. 793, 
as amended, 38 U.S.C. 4212, as amended, and E.O. 14173, remove and 
reserve 41 CFR Part 60-30.

PART 60-741--AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND NONDISCRIMINATION OBLIGATIONS 
OF FEDERAL CONTRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS REGARDING INDIVIDUALS 
WITH DISABILITIES

0
2. The authority citation for part 60-741 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 29 U.S.C. 705 and 793; E.O. 11758 (3 CFR, 1971-1975 
Comp., p. 841).


0
3. Amend Sec.  60-741.1 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  60-741.1  Purpose, applicability, and construction.

* * * * *
    (b) Applicability. This part applies to all Government contracts 
and subcontracts in excess of $20,000 for the purchase, sale or use of 
personal property or nonpersonal services (including construction): 
Provided, That subpart C of this part applies only as described in 
Sec.  60-741.40(a). Compliance by the contractor with the provisions of 
this part will not necessarily determine its compliance with other 
statutes, and compliance with other statutes will not necessarily 
determine its compliance with this part: Provided, That compliance 
shall also satisfy the employment provisions of the Department of 
Labor's regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 (see 29 CFR 32.2(b)) when the contractor is also subject to 
those requirements.
* * * * *

0
4. Amend Sec.  60-741.2 by revising paragraphs (d), (p), and (aa) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  60-741.2  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (d) Contractor means, unless otherwise indicated, a prime 
contractor or subcontractor holding a contract in excess of $20,000.
* * * * *
    (p) Prime contractor means any person holding a contract in excess 
of $20,000, and, for the purposes of subpart D of this part, ``General 
Enforcement and Complaint Procedures,'' includes any person who has 
held a contract subject to the act.
* * * * *
    (aa) Subcontractor means any person holding a subcontract in excess 
of $20,000 and, for the purposes of subpart D of this part, ``General 
Enforcement and Complaint Procedures,'' any person who has held a 
subcontract subject to the act.
* * * * *

0
5. Amend Sec.  60-741.4 by revising paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  60-741.4  Coverage and waivers.

    (a) * * *
    (1) Contracts and subcontracts in excess of $20,000. Contracts and 
subcontracts in excess of $20,000 are covered by this part. No 
contracting agency or contractor shall procure supplies or services in 
less than usual quantities to avoid the applicability of the equal 
opportunity clause.
    (2) Contracts and subcontracts for indefinite quantities. With 
respect to indefinite delivery-type contracts and subcontracts 
(including, but not limited to, open end contracts, requirement-type 
contracts, Federal Supply Schedule contracts, ``call-type'' contracts, 
and purchase notice agreements), the equal opportunity clause shall be 
included unless the contracting agency has reason to believe that the 
amount to be ordered in any year under such contract will not be in 
excess of $20,000. The applicability of the equal opportunity clause 
shall be determined at the time of award for the first year and 
annually thereafter for succeeding years, if any. Notwithstanding the 
above, the equal opportunity clause shall be applied to such contract 
whenever the amount of a single order exceeds $20,000. Once the equal 
opportunity clause is determined to be applicable, the contract shall 
continue to be subject to such clause for its duration, regardless of 
the amounts ordered, or reasonably expected to be ordered in any year.
* * * * *

0
6. Amend Sec.  60-741.5 by revising paragraph (a)(6) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  60-741.5   Equal opportunity clause.

    (a) * * *
    (6) The contractor will include the provisions of this clause in 
every subcontract or purchase order in excess of $20,000, unless 
exempted by the rules, regulations, or orders of the Secretary issued 
pursuant to section 503 of the act, as amended, so that such provisions 
will be binding upon each subcontractor or vendor. The contractor will 
take such action with respect to any subcontract or purchase order as 
the Director, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs may direct 
to enforce such provisions, including action for noncompliance.
* * * * *

0
7. Amend Sec.  60-741.21 by revising paragraph (a)(7)(iii) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  60-741.21  Prohibitions.

    (a) * * *
    (7) * * *
    (iii) The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures do 
not apply to the Rehabilitation Act and are similarly inapplicable to 
this part.
* * * * *

0
8. Amend Sec.  60-741.23 by revising paragraph (a) and removing and 
reserving paragraph (c) to read as follows:

[[Page 54501]]

Sec.  60-741.23  Medical Examinations and Inquiries.

    (a) Prohibited medical examinations or inquiries. Except as stated 
in paragraph (b) of this section, it is unlawful for the contractor to 
require a medical examination of an applicant or employee or to make 
inquiries as to whether an applicant or employee is an individual with 
a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability.
* * * * *

0
9. Amend Sec.  60-741.24 by revising paragraph (b)(3) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  60-741.24  Drugs and alcohol.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) Any information regarding the medical condition or history of 
any employee or applicant obtained from a test to determine the illegal 
use of drugs, except information regarding the illegal use of drugs, is 
subject to the requirements of Sec.  60-741.23(b)(5).

0
10. Revise Sec.  60-741.41 to read as follows:


Sec.  60-741.41  Availability of affirmative action program.

    The full affirmative action program shall be available to any 
employee or applicant for employment for inspection upon request. The 
location and hours during which the program may be obtained shall be 
posted at each establishment.


Sec.  60-741.42  [Removed and Reserved]

0
11. Remove and reserve Sec.  60-741.42.

0
12. Amend Sec.  60-741.44 by:
0
a. Revising paragraphs (f)(2)(i)(D) and (E), and (f)(3);
0
b. Removing and reserving paragraph (k); and
0
c. Adding paragraph (l).
    The revisions and addition read as follows:


Sec.  60-741.44  Required contents of affirmative action programs.

* * * * *
    (f) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (i) * * *
    (D) Entities funded by the Department of Labor that provide 
recruitment or training services for individuals with disabilities, 
such as the services currently provided through the Employer Assistance 
and Resource Network (EARN) (<a href="https://askearn.org">https://askearn.org</a>);
    (E) Local Employment Network (EN) organizations (other than the 
contractor, if the contractor is an EN) listed in the Social Security 
Administration's Ticket to Work Employment Network Directory (<a href="https://yourtickettowork.ssa.gov">https://yourtickettowork.ssa.gov</a>);
* * * * *
    (3) Assessment of external outreach and recruitment efforts. The 
contractor shall, on an annual basis, review the outreach and 
recruitment efforts it has taken over the previous twelve months to 
evaluate their effectiveness in identifying and recruiting qualified 
individuals with disabilities. The contractor shall document each 
evaluation, including at a minimum the criteria it used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of each effort and the contractor's conclusion as to 
whether each effort was effective. The contractor's conclusion as to 
the effectiveness of its outreach efforts must be reasonable as 
determined by OFCCP in light of these regulations. If the contractor 
concludes the totality of its efforts were not effective in identifying 
and recruiting qualified individuals with disabilities, it shall 
identify and implement alternative efforts listed in paragraphs (f)(1) 
or (f)(2) of this section in order to fulfill its obligations.
* * * * *
    (l) Contractors are not required to consider quantitative data on 
the numbers of individuals with disabilities who were referrals, 
applicants, or hires when assessing the effectiveness of their outreach 
efforts and affirmative action program pursuant to 41 CFR 60-
741.44(f)(3) and 41 CFR 60-741.44(h)(1).


Sec.  60-741.45   [Removed and Reserved]

0
13. Remove and reserve Sec.  60-741.45.

0
14. Amend Sec.  60-741.46 by removing and reserving paragraph (a)(2) 
and revising paragraph (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  60-741.46  Voluntary affirmative action programs for employees 
with disabilities.

* * * * *
    (d) These voluntary training and development programs should not 
result in discrimination against other groups and do not relieve a 
contractor from liability for discrimination under this act or the 
Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act.

0
15. Amend Sec.  60-741.61 by revising paragraph (f)(1) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  60-741.61  Complaint procedures.

* * * * *
    (f) * * *
    (1) If the complaint investigation finds no violation of the act or 
this part, or if the Director decides not to refer the matter to the 
Solicitor of Labor for enforcement proceedings against the contractor 
pursuant to Sec.  60-741.65(a)(1), the complainant and contractor shall 
be so notified. The Director, on his or her own initiative, may 
reconsider his or her determination or the determination of any of his 
or her designated officers who have authority to issue Notifications of 
Results of Investigation.
* * * * *

0
16. Revise Sec.  60-741.65 to read as follows:


Sec.  60-741.65  Enforcement proceedings.

    (a) General. (1) If a compliance evaluation, complaint 
investigation, or other review by OFCCP finds a violation of the act or 
this part, and the violation has not been corrected in accordance with 
the conciliation procedures in this part, or OFCCP determines that 
referral for consideration of formal enforcement (rather than 
settlement) is appropriate, OFCCP may refer the matter to the Solicitor 
of Labor with a recommendation for the institution of enforcement 
proceedings to enjoin the violations, to seek appropriate relief, and 
to impose appropriate sanctions, or any combination of these outcomes. 
OFCCP may seek back pay and other make whole relief for aggrieved 
individuals identified during a complaint investigation or compliance 
review. Such individuals need not have filed a complaint as a 
prerequisite to OFCCP seeking such relief on their behalf. Interest on 
back pay shall be calculated from the date of the loss and compounded 
quarterly at the percentage rate established by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) for the underpayment of taxes.
    (2) In addition to the administrative proceedings set forth in this 
section, the Director may, within the limitations of applicable law, 
seek appropriate judicial action to enforce the contractual provisions 
set forth in Sec.  60-741.5, including appropriate injunctive relief.
    (b) Hearing practice and procedure. (1) In administrative 
enforcement proceedings the contractor shall be provided an opportunity 
for a formal hearing. All hearings conducted under the act and this 
part shall be governed by the regulations at 41 CFR 60-741.65(c) to 
(mm) and the Rules of Evidence set out in the Rules of Practice and 
Procedure for Administrative Hearings Before the Office of 
Administrative Law Judges contained in 29 CFR part 18, subpart B: 
Provided, That a final administrative order shall be issued within one 
year from the date of the issuance of the recommended findings, 
conclusions, and decision of the Administrative Law Judge, or the 
submission of any exceptions and responses to exceptions to such 
decision (if any) whichever is later.
    (2) Complaints may be filed by the Solicitor, the Associate 
Solicitor for Civil Rights and Labor-Management, Regional Solicitors, 
and Associate Regional Solicitors.

[[Page 54502]]

    (3) [Reserved]
    (c) Applicability of rules of practice for administrative 
proceedings. The regulations at 41 CFR 60-741.65(c) to (mm) provide the 
rules of practice for all administrative proceedings that relate to the 
enforcement of Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 
503), as amended, including but not limited to proceedings instituted 
against contractors or subcontractors covered by 41 CFR part 60-741. In 
the absence of a specific provision, procedures shall be in accordance 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
    (d) Waiver, modification. Upon notice to all parties, the 
Administrative Law Judge may, with respect to matters pending before 
him modify or waive any rule herein upon a determination that no party 
will be prejudiced and that the ends of justice will be served thereby.
    (e) Computation of time. In computing any period of time under 
these rules or in an order issued hereunder, the time begins with the 
day following the act, event, or default, and includes the last day of 
the period, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday observed 
by the Federal Government in which event it includes the next business 
day.
    (f) Form, filing, service of pleadings and papers. (1) Form. The 
original of all pleadings and papers in a proceeding conducted under 
the 41 CFR 60-741.65 regulations shall be filed with the Administrative 
Law Judge assigned to the case or with the Chief Administrative Law 
Judge if the case has not been assigned. Every pleading and paper filed 
in the proceeding shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the 
agency instituting the proceeding, the title of the action, the case 
file number assigned by the Administrative Law Judge, and a designation 
of the pleading or paper (e.g., complaint, motion to dismiss, etc.). 
The pleading or papers shall be signed and shall contain the address 
and telephone number of the person representing the party or the person 
on whose behalf the pleading or paper was filed. Unless otherwise 
ordered for good cause by the Administrative Law Judge regarding 
specific papers and pleadings in a specific case, all such papers and 
pleadings are public documents.
    (2) Service. Service upon any party shall be made by the party 
filing the pleading or document in accordance with 29 CFR part 26. When 
a party is represented by an attorney, the service shall be upon the 
attorney.
    (3) Proof of service. A certificate of the person serving the 
pleading or other document, setting forth the manner of service, shall 
be proof of the service.
    (g) Prehearing procedures: Administrative complaint. (1) Filing. 
The Solicitor of Labor, Associate Solicitor for Labor Relations and 
Civil Rights Regional Solicitors and Regional Attorney upon referral 
from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, are authorized 
to institute enforcement proceedings by filing a complaint and serving 
the complaint upon the contractor which shall be designated as the 
defendant. The Department of Labor, OFCCP, shall be designated as the 
plaintiff.
    (2) Contents. The complaint shall contain a concise jurisdictional 
statement, and a clear and concise statement sufficient to put the 
defendant on notice of the acts or practices it is alleged to have 
committed in violation of the order, the regulations, or its 
contractual obligations. The complaint shall also contain a prayer 
regarding the relief being sought, a statement of whatever sanctions 
the Government will seek to impose and the name and address of the 
attorney who will represent the Government.
    (3) Amendment. The complaint may be amended once as a matter of 
course before an answer is filed, and the defendant may amend its 
answer once as a matter of course not later than 10 days after the 
filing of the original answer. Other amendments of the complaint or of 
the answer to the complaint shall be made only by leave of the 
Administrative Law Judge or by written consent of the adverse party; 
and leave shall be freely given where justice so requires. An amended 
complaint shall be answered within 14 days of its service, or within 
the time for filing an answer to the original complaint, whichever 
period is longer. An amended answer shall be responded to within 14 
days of its service.
    (h) Prehearing procedures: Answer. (1) Filing and service. Within 
20 days after the service of the complaint, the defendant shall file an 
answer with the Chief Administrative Law Judge if the case has not been 
assigned to an Administrative Law Judge. The answer shall be signed by 
the defendant or its attorney and served on the Government in 
accordance with Sec.  60-741.65(f)(2).
    (2) Contents; failure to file. The answer shall:
    (i) Contain a statement of the facts which constitute the grounds 
of defense, and shall specifically admit, explain, or deny, each of the 
allegations of the complaint unless the defendant is without knowledge, 
in which case the answer shall so state; or
    (ii) State that the defendant admits all the allegations of the 
complaint. The answer may contain a waiver of hearing; and if not, a 
separate paragraph in the answer shall request a hearing. The answer 
shall contain the name and address of the defendant, or of the attorney 
representing the defendant. Failure to file an answer or to plead 
specifically to any allegation of the complaint shall constitute an 
admission of such allegation.
    (3) Procedure, upon admission of facts. The admission, in the 
answer or by failure to file an answer, of all the material allegations 
of fact contained in the complaint shall constitute a waiver of 
hearing. Upon such admission, the Administrative Law Judge, without 
further hearing, may prepare his decision in which he shall adopt as 
his proposed findings of fact the material facts alleged in the 
complaint. The parties shall be given an opportunity to file exceptions 
to his decision and to file briefs in support of the exceptions.
    (i) Prehearing procedures: Notice of prehearing conference. The 
Administrative Law Judge shall respond to defendant's request for a 
hearing within 15 days and shall serve a notice of prehearing 
conference on the parties. The notice shall contain the time and place 
of the conference.
    (j) Prehearing procedures: Motions; disposition of motions. (1) 
Motions. Motions shall state the relief sought, the authority relied 
upon and the facts alleged, and shall be filed with the Administrative 
Law Judge. If made before or after the hearing itself, the motions 
shall be in writing. If made at the hearing, motions may be stated 
orally; but the Administrative Law Judge may require that they be 
reduced to writing and filed and served on all parties in the same 
manner as a formal motion. Unless otherwise ordered by the 
Administrative Law Judge, written motions shall be accompanied by a 
supporting memorandum. Within 10 days after a written motion is served, 
or such other time period as may be fixed, any party may file a 
response to a motion.
    (2) Disposition of motions. The Administrative Law Judge may not 
grant a written motion prior to expiration of the time for filing 
responses thereto, except upon consent of the parties or following a 
hearing, but may overrule or deny such motion without awaiting 
response: Provided, That prehearing conferences, hearings, and 
decisions need not be delayed pending disposition of motions.
    (k) Prehearing procedures: Interrogatories and admissions as to 
facts and documents. (1) Interrogatories.

[[Page 54503]]

Not later than 25 days prior to the date of the hearing, except for 
good cause shown, or not later than 14 days prior to such earlier date 
as the Administrative Law Judge may order, any party may serve upon an 
opposing party written interrogatories. Each interrogatory shall be 
answered separately and fully in writing under oath, unless objected 
to. Answers are to be signed by the person making them and objections 
by the attorney or by whoever is representing the party. Answers and 
objections shall be filed and served within 25 days of service of the 
interrogatory.
    (2) Admissions. Not later than 14 days prior to the date of the 
hearing, except for good cause shown, or not later than 14 days prior 
to such earlier date as the Administrative Law Judge may order, any 
party may serve upon an opposing party a written request for the 
admission of the genuineness and authenticity of any relevant documents 
described in and exhibited with the request, or for the admission of 
the truth of any relevant matters of fact stated in the request. Each 
of the matters as to which an admission is requested shall be deemed 
admitted, unless within 25 days after service, the party to whom the 
request is directed serves upon the requesting party a sworn statement 
either:
    (i) Denying specifically the matter as to which an admission is 
requested; or
    (ii) Setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully 
either admit or deny such matters.
    (3) Objections or failures to respond. The party submitting the 
interrogatory or request may move for an order with respect to any 
objection or other failure to respond.
    (l) Prehearing procedures: Production of documents and things and 
entry upon land for inspection and other purposes. (1) After 
commencement of the action, any party may serve on any other party a 
request to produce and/or permit the party, or someone acting on his 
behalf, to inspect and copy any unprivileged documents, phonorecords, 
and other compilations, including computer tapes and printouts which 
contain or may lead to relevant information and which are in the 
possession, custody, or control of the party upon whom the request is 
served. If necessary, translation of data compilations shall be done by 
the party furnishing the information.
    (2) After commencement of the action, any party may serve on any 
other party a request to permit entry upon designated property which 
may be relevant to the issues in the proceeding and, which is in the 
possession or control of the party upon whom the request is served for 
the purpose of inspection, measuring, surveying or photographing, 
testing, or sampling the property or any designated object or area.
    (3) Each request shall set forth with reasonable particularity the 
items to be inspected and shall specify a reasonable time and place for 
making the inspection and performing the related acts.
    (4) The party upon whom the request is served shall respond within 
25 days after the service of the request. The response shall state, 
with respect to each item, that inspection and related activities will 
be permitted as requested, unless there are objections, in which case 
the reasons for each objection shall be stated. The party submitting 
the request may move for an order with respect to any objection or to 
other failure to respond.
    (m) Prehearing procedures: Depositions upon oral examination. (1) 
Depositions; notice of examination. After commencement of the action, 
any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, 
having personal or expert knowledge of the matters in issue, by 
deposition upon oral examination. A party desiring to take a deposition 
shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the 
proceeding, and may use an administrative subpoena. The notice shall 
state the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and 
address of each person to be examined, if known, and, if the name is 
not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the 
particular class or group to which he belongs. The notice shall also 
set forth the categories of documents the witness is to bring with him 
to the deposition, if any. A copy of the notice shall be furnished to 
the person to be examined unless his name is unknown.
    (2) Production of witnesses; obligation of parties; objections. It 
shall be the obligation of each party to produce for examination any 
person, along with such documents as may be requested, at the time and 
place, and on the date, set forth in the notice, if that party has 
control over such person. Each party shall be deemed to have control 
over its officers, agents, employees, and members. Unless the parties 
agree otherwise, depositions shall be held within the county in which 
the witness resides or works. The party or prospective witness may file 
with the Administrative Law Judge an objection within 5 days after 
notice of production of such witness is served, stating with 
particularity the reasons why the party cannot or ought not to produce 
a requested witness. The party serving the notice may move for an order 
with respect to such objection or failure to produce a witness. All 
errors or irregularities in compliance with the provisions of this 
section shall be deemed waived unless a motion to suppress the 
deposition or some part thereof is made with reasonable promptness 
after such defect is or, with due diligence, might have been 
ascertained.
    (3) Before whom taken; scope of examination; failure to answer. 
Depositions may be taken before any officer authorized to administer 
oaths by the laws of the United States or of the place where the 
deposition is held. At the time and place specified in the notice, each 
party shall be permitted to examine and cross-examine the witness under 
oath upon any matter which is relevant to the subject matter of the 
proceeding, or which is reasonably calculated to lead to the production 
of relevant and otherwise admissible evidence. All objections to 
questions, except as to the form thereof, and all objections to 
evidence are reserved until the hearing. A refusal or failure on the 
part of any person under the control of a party to answer a question 
shall operate to create a presumption that the answer, if given, would 
be unfavorable to the controlling party, unless the question is 
subsequently ruled improper by the Administrative Law Judge or the 
Administrative Law Judge rules that there was valid justification for 
the witness' failure or refusal to answer the question: Provided, That 
the examining party shall note on the record during the deposition the 
question which the deponent has failed, or refused to answer, and state 
his intention to invoke the presumption if no answer is forthcoming.
    (4) Subscription; certification; filing. The testimony shall be 
reduced to typewriting, either by the officer taking the deposition or 
under his direction, and shall be submitted to the witness for 
examination and signing. If the deposition is not signed by the witness 
because he is ill, dead, cannot be found, or refuses to sign it, such 
fact shall be noted in the certificate of the officer and the 
deposition may then be used as fully as though signed. The officer 
shall immediately deliver the original copy of the transcript, together 
with his certificate, in person or by mail to the Administrative Law 
Judge. Copies of the transcript and certificate shall be furnished to 
all persons desiring them, upon payment of reasonable charges, unless 
distribution is restricted by order

[[Page 54504]]

of the Administrative Law Judge for good cause shown.
    (5) Rulings on admissibility; use of deposition. Subject to the 
provisions of this section, objection may be made at the hearing to 
receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any reason 
which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were 
then present and testifying. Any part or all of a deposition, so far as 
admissible in the discretion of the Administrative Law Judge, may be 
used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of 
the deposition or who had reasonable notice, in accordance with the 
following provisions:
    (i) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of 
contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness.
    (ii) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of 
taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent, or 
was designated to testify on behalf of a public or private corporation, 
partnership, association, or governmental agency which is a party may 
be used by the adverse party for any purpose.
    (iii) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be 
used by any party for any purpose if the administrative law judge 
finds:
    (A) That the witness is dead; or
    (B) That the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, 
illness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or
    (C) That the party offering the deposition has been unable to 
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or
    (D) Upon application and notice, that such exceptional 
circumstances exist as to make it desirable to allow the deposition to 
be used.
    (iv) If only part of a deposition is introduced in evidence by a 
party, any party may introduce any other parts by way of rebuttal and 
otherwise.
    (6) Stipulations. If the parties so stipulate in writing, 
depositions may be taken before any person at any time or place, upon 
any notice and in any manner, and when so taken may be used like other 
depositions.
    (n) Prehearing procedures: Prehearing conferences. (1) Upon his own 
motion or the motion of the parties, the Administrative Law Judge may 
direct the parties or their counsel to meet with him for a conference 
to consider:
    (i) Simplification of the issues;
    (ii) Necessity or desirability of amendments to pleadings for 
purposes of clarification, simplification, or limitation;
    (iii) Stipulations, admissions of fact and of contents and 
authenticity of documents;
    (iv) Limitation of number of witnesses;
    (v) Scheduling dates for the exchange of witness lists and of 
proposed exhibits;
    (vi) Such other matters as may tend to expedite the disposition of 
the proceedings.
    (2) The record shall show the matters disposed of by order and by 
agreement in such pretrial conferences. The subsequent course of the 
proceeding shall be controlled by such action.
    (o) Prehearing procedures: Consent findings and order. (1) General. 
At any time after the issuance of a complaint and prior to or during 
the reception of evidence in any proceeding, the parties may jointly 
move to defer the receipt of any evidence for a reasonable time to 
permit negotiation of an agreement containing consent findings and an 
order disposing of the whole or any part of the proceeding. The 
allowance of such deferment and the duration thereof shall be in the 
discretion of the Administrative Law Judge after consideration of the 
nature of the proceeding, the requirements of the public interest, the 
representations of the parties, and the probability of an agreement 
being reached which will result in a just disposition of the issues 
involved.
    (2) Content. Any agreement containing consent findings and an order 
disposing of a proceeding shall also provide:
    (i) That the order shall have the same force and effect as an order 
made after full hearing;
    (ii) That the entire record on which any order may be based shall 
consist solely of the complaint and the agreement;
    (iii) That any further procedural steps are waived; and
    (iv) That any right to challenge or contest the validity of the 
findings and order entered into in accordance with the agreement is 
waived.
    (3) Submission. On or before the expiration of the time granted for 
negotiations, the parties or their counsel may:
    (i) Submit the proposed agreement to the Administrative Law Judge 
for his consideration;
    (ii) Inform the Administrative Law Judge that agreement cannot be 
reached.
    (4) Disposition. In the event an agreement containing consent 
findings and an order is submitted within the time allowed, the 
Administrative Law Judge, within 30 days, shall accept such agreement 
by issuing his decision based upon the agreed findings, and his 
decision shall constitute the final Administrative order.
    (p) Hearings and Related Matters: Designation of Administrative Law 
Judges. Hearings shall be held before an Administrative Law Judge of 
the Department of Labor who shall be designated by the Chief 
Administrative Law Judge of the Department of Labor. After commencement 
of the proceeding but prior to the designation of an Administrative Law 
Judge, pleadings and papers shall be filed with the Chief 
Administrative Law Judge.
    (q) Hearings and Related Matters: Authority and responsibilities of 
Administrative Law Judges. The Administrative Law Judge shall propose 
findings and conclusions to the Secretary on the basis of the record. 
In order to do so, he shall have the duty to conduct a fair hearing, to 
take all necessary action to avoid delay, and to maintain order. He 
shall have all powers necessary to those ends, including, but not 
limited to, the power to:
    (1) Hold conferences to settle, simplify, or fix the issues in a 
proceeding, or to consider other matters that may aid in the 
expeditious disposition of the proceeding by consent of the parties or 
upon his own motion;
    (2) Require parties to state their position with respect to the 
various issues in the proceeding;
    (3) Require parties to produce for examination those relevant 
witnesses and documents under their control; and require parties to 
answer interrogatories and requests for admissions in full;
    (4) Administer oaths;
    (5) Rule on motions, and other procedural items or matters pending 
before him;
    (6) Regulate the course of the hearing and conduct of participants 
therein;
    (7) Examine and cross-examine witnesses, and introduce into the 
record documentary or other evidence;
    (8) Receive, rule on, exclude, or limit evidence and limit lines of 
questioning or testimony which are irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly 
repetitious;
    (9) Fix time limits for submission of written documents in matters 
before him and extend any time limits established by this part upon a 
determination that no party will be prejudiced and that the ends of 
justice will be served thereby;
    (10) Impose appropriate sanctions against any party or person 
failing to obey an order under these rules which may include:
    (i) Refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose 
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting it

[[Page 54505]]

from introducing designated matters in evidence;
    (ii) Excluding all testimony of an unresponsive or evasive witness, 
or determining that the answer of such witness, if given, would be 
unfavorable to the party having control over him; and
    (iii) Expelling any party or person from further participation in 
the hearing;
    (11) Take official notice of any material fact not appearing in 
evidence in the record, which is among the traditional matters of 
judicial notice;
    (12) Recommend whether the respondent is in current violation of 
the order, regulations, or its contractual obligations, as well as the 
nature of the relief necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the 
rights secured by the order;
    (13) Issue subpoenas; and
    (14) Take any action authorized by these rules.
    (r) Hearings and Related Matters: Appearances. (1) Representation. 
The parties or other persons or organizations participating pursuant to 
41 CFR 60-741.65 have the right to be represented by counsel.
    (2) Failure to appear. In the event that a party appears at the 
hearing and no party appears for the opposing side, the party who is 
present shall have an election to present his evidence in whole or such 
portion thereof sufficient to make a prima facie case before the 
Administrative Law Judge. Failure to appear at the hearing shall not be 
deemed to be a waiver of the right to be served with a copy of the 
Administrative Law Judge's recommended decision and to file exceptions 
to it.
    (s) Hearings and Related Matters: Appearance of witnesses. (1) A 
party wishing to procure the appearance at the hearing of any person 
having personal or expert knowledge of the matters in issue shall serve 
on the prospective witness a notice, which may be accomplished by an 
administrative subpoena, setting forth the time, date, and place at 
which he is to appear for the purpose of giving testimony. The notice 
shall also set forth the categories of documents the witness is to 
bring with him to the hearing, if any. A copy of the notice shall be 
filed with the Administrative Law Judge and additional copies shall be 
served upon the opposing parties.
    (2) It shall be the obligation of each party to produce for 
examination any person, along with such documents as may be requested, 
at the time and place, and on the date, set forth in the notice, if 
that party has control over such person. Each party shall be deemed to 
have control over its officers, agents, employees, and members. Due 
regard shall be given to the convenience of witnesses in scheduling 
their testimony so that they will be detained no longer than reasonably 
necessary.
    (3) The party or prospective witness may file an objection within 5 
days after notice of production of such witness is served stating with 
particularity the reasons why the party cannot produce a requested 
witness. The party serving the notice may move for an order with 
respect to such objection or failure to produce a witness.
    (t) Hearings and Related Matters: Rules of evidence. In any 
hearing, decision, or administrative review conducted pursuant to this 
part, all evidentiary matters shall be governed by Office of 
Administrative Law Judges' Rules of evidence at 29 CFR part 18, subpart 
B.
    (u) Hearings and Related Matters: Objections; exceptions; offer of 
proof. (1) Objections. If a party objects to the admission or rejection 
of any evidence or to the limitation of the scope of any examination or 
cross-examination or the failure to limit such scope, he shall state 
briefly the grounds for such objection. Rulings on all objections shall 
appear in the record. Only objections made on the record may be relied 
upon subsequently in the proceedings.
    (2) Exceptions. Formal exception to an adverse ruling is not 
required. Rulings by the Administrative Law Judge shall not be appealed 
prior to the transfer of the case to the Secretary, but shall be 
considered by the Secretary upon filing exceptions to the 
Administrative Law Judge's recommendations and conclusions.
    (3) Offer of proof. An offer of proof made in connection with an 
objection taken to any ruling excluding proffered oral testimony shall 
consist of a statement of the substance of the evidence which counsel 
contends would be adduced by such testimony; and, if the excluded 
evidence consists of evidence in written form or consists of reference 
to documents, a copy of such evidence shall be marked for 
identification and shall accompany the record as the offer of proof.
    (v) Hearings and Related Matters: Ex parte communications. The 
Administrative Law Judge shall not consult any person, or party, on any 
fact in issue unless upon notice and opportunity for all parties to 
participate. No employee or agent of the Federal Government engaged in 
the investigation and prosecution of this case shall participate or 
advise in the rendering of the recommended or final decision in the 
case, except as witness or counsel in the proceeding.
    (w) Hearings and Related Matters: Oral argument. Any party shall be 
entitled upon request to a reasonable period between the close of 
evidence and termination of the hearing for oral argument. Oral 
arguments shall be included in the official transcript of the hearing.
    (x) Hearings and Related Matters: Official transcript. The official 
transcripts of testimony taken, together with any exhibits, briefs, or 
memorandums of law, shall be filed with the Administrative Law Judge. 
Transcripts of testimony may be obtained from the official reporter by 
the parties and the public as provided in section 11(a) of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (86 Stat. 770). Upon notice to all parties, the 
Administrative Law Judge may authorize such corrections to the 
transcript as are necessary to reflect accurately the testimony.
    (y) Hearings and Related Matters: Summary judgment. (1) For the 
Government. At any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action, or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the respondent, the Government may move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment upon all claims or any 
part.
    (2) For defendant. The defendant may, at any time after 
commencement of the action, move with or without supporting affidavits 
for summary judgment in its favor as to all claims or any part.
    (3) Other parties. Any other party to a formal proceeding under 
this part may support or oppose motions for summary judgment made by 
the Government or respondent, in accordance with this section, but may 
not move for a summary judgment in his own behalf.
    (4) Statement of uncontested facts. All motions for summary 
judgment shall be accompanied by a ``Statement of Uncontested Facts'' 
in which the moving party sets forth all alleged uncontested material 
facts which shall provide the basis for its motion. At least 5 days 
prior to the time fixed for hearing on the motion, any party contending 
that any material fact regarding the matter covered by the motion is in 
dispute, shall file a ``Statement of Disputed Facts.'' Failure to file 
a ``Statement of Disputed Facts'' shall be deemed as an admission to 
the ``Statement of Uncontested Facts.''
    (5) Motion and proceedings. The motion shall be served upon all 
parties at least 15 days before the time fixed for the hearing on the 
motion. The adverse

[[Page 54506]]

party or parties may serve opposing affidavits prior to the day of 
hearing. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
complaint and answer, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. Summary judgment rendered for or against the 
Government or the respondent shall constitute the findings and 
recommendations on the issues involved. Hearings on motions made under 
this section shall be scheduled by the Administrative Law Judge.
    (6) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this 
section judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the 
relief asked and a final hearing is necessary, the Administrative Law 
Judge at the hearing of the motion, by examining the notice and answer 
and the evidence before him and by interrogating counsel, shall, if 
practicable, ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. He shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts 
that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to 
which relief is not in controversy, and directing such further 
proceedings as are just. At the hearing on the merits, the facts so 
specified shall be deemed established, and the final hearing shall be 
conducted accordingly.
    (z) Hearings and Related Matters: Participation by interested 
persons. (1) To the extent that proceedings hereunder involve 
employment of persons covered by a collective bargaining agreement, and 
compliance may necessitate a revision of such agreement, any labor 
organization which is a signatory to the agreement shall have the right 
to participate as a party.
    (2) Other persons or organizations shall have the right to 
participate as parties if the final Administrative order could 
adversely affect them or the class they represent, and such 
participation may contribute materially to the proper disposition of 
the proceedings.
    (3) Any person or organization wishing to participate as a party 
under this section shall file with the Administrative Law Judge and 
serve on all parties a petition within 25 days after the commencement 
of the action or at such other time as ordered by the Administrative 
Law Judge, so long as it does not disrupt the proceeding. Such petition 
shall concisely state:
    (i) Petitioner's interest in the proceedings;
    (ii) Who will appear for petitioner;
    (iii) The issues on which petitioner wishes to participate; and
    (iv) Whether petitioner intends to present witnesses.
    (4) The Administrative Law Judge shall determine whether each 
petitioner has the requisite interest in the proceedings and shall 
permit or deny participation accordingly. Where petitions to 
participate as parties are made by individuals or groups with common 
interest, the Administrative Law Judge may request all such petitioners 
to designate a single representative to represent all such petitioners: 
Provided, That the representative of a labor organization qualifying to 
participate under paragraph (z)(1) of the section must be permitted to 
participate in the proceedings. The Administrative Law Judge shall give 
each petitioner written notice of the decision on his petition; and if 
the petition is denied, he shall briefly state the grounds for denial 
and shall then treat the petition as a request for participation as 
amicus curiae. The Administrative Law Judge shall give written notice 
to each party of each petition granted.
    (5) Any other interested person or organization wishing to 
participate as amicus curiae shall file a petition before the 
commencement of the final hearing with the Administrative Law Judge. 
Such petition shall concisely state:
    (i) The petitioner's interest in the hearing;
    (ii) Who will represent the petitioner; and
    (iii) The issues on which petitioner intends to present argument. 
The Administrative Law Judge may grant the petition if he finds that 
the petitioner has a legitimate interest in the proceedings, and that 
such participation may contribute materially to the proper disposition 
of the issues. An amicus curiae is not a party but may participate as 
provided in this section.
    (6) An amicus curiae may present a brief oral statement at the 
hearing at the point in the proceeding specified by the Administrative 
Law Judge. He may submit a written statement of position to the 
Administrative Law Judge prior to the beginning of a hearing and shall 
serve a copy on each party. He may also submit a brief or written 
statement at such time as the parties submit briefs and exceptions, and 
he shall serve a copy on each party.
    (aa) Post-Hearing Procedures: Proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Within 20 days after receipt of the transcript of 
the testimony, each party and amicus may file a brief. Such briefs 
shall be served simultaneously on all parties and amici, and a 
certificate of service shall be furnished to the Administrative Law 
Judge. Requests for additional time in which to file a brief shall be 
made in writing, and copies shall be served simultaneously on the other 
parties. Requests for extensions shall be received not later than 3 
days before the date such briefs are due. No reply brief may be filed 
except by special permission of the Administrative Law Judge.
    (bb) Post-Hearing Procedures: Record for recommended decision. The 
transcript of testimony, exhibits, and all papers, documents, and 
requests filed in the proceedings, including briefs, but excepting the 
correspondence section of the docket, shall constitute the record for 
decision.
    (cc) Post-Hearing Procedures: Recommended decision. Within a 
reasonable time after the filing of briefs, the Administrative Law 
Judge shall recommend findings, conclusions, and a decision. These 
recommendations shall be certified, together with the record for 
recommended decision, to the Administrative Review Board, United States 
Department of Labor, for a final Administrative order. The recommended 
findings, conclusions, and decision shall be served on all parties and 
amici to the proceeding.
    (dd) Post-Hearing Procedures: Exceptions to recommended decisions. 
Within 14 days after receipt of the recommended findings, conclusions, 
and decision, any party may submit exceptions to said recommendation. 
These exceptions may be responded to by other parties within 14 days of 
their receipt by said parties. All exceptions and responses shall be 
filed with the Administrative Review Board, United States Department of 
Labor. Service of such briefs or exceptions and responses shall be made 
simultaneously on all parties to the proceeding. Requests to the 
Administrative Review Board, United States Department of Labor, for 
additional time in which to file exceptions and responses shall be in 
writing and copies shall be served simultaneously on other parties. 
Requests for extensions must be received no later than 3 days before 
the exceptions are due.
    (ee) Post-Hearing Procedures: Record. After expiration of the time 
for filing briefs and exceptions, the Administrative Review Board, 
United States Department of Labor, shall make a decision, which shall 
be the Administrative order, on the basis of the record. The record 
shall consist of the record for recommended decision, the rulings and 
recommended decision of the Administrative Law Judge and the

[[Page 54507]]

exceptions and briefs filed subsequent to the Administrative Law 
Judge's decision.
    (ff) Post-Hearing Procedures: Administrative Order. After 
expiration of the time for filing, the Administrative Review Board, 
United States Department of Labor, shall make a decision which shall be 
served on all parties. If the Administrative Review Board, United 
States Department of Labor, concludes that the defendant has violated 
Section 503, the equal opportunity clause, or the regulations, an 
Administrative Order shall be issued enjoining the violations, and 
requiring the contractor to provide whatever remedies are appropriate, 
and imposing whatever sanctions are appropriate, or any of the above. 
In any event, failure to comply with the Administrative Order shall 
result in the immediate cancellation, termination, and suspension of 
the respondent's contracts and/or debarment of the respondent from 
further contracts.
    (gg) Expedited Hearing Procedures: Expedited hearings--when 
appropriate. Expedited Hearings may be used, inter alia, when a 
contractor or subcontractor has violated a conciliation agreement; has 
not adopted and implemented an acceptable affirmative action program; 
has refused to give access to or to supply records or other information 
as required by the equal opportunity clause; or has refused to allow an 
on-site compliance review to be conducted.
    (hh) Expedited Hearing Procedures: Administrative complaint and 
answer. (1) Expedited hearings shall be commenced by filing an 
administrative complaint in accordance with 41 CFR 60-741.65(g). The 
complaint shall state that the hearing is subject to these expedited 
hearing procedures.
    (2) The answer shall be filed in accordance with 41 CFR 60-
741.65(h)(1) and (2).
    (3) Failure to request a hearing within the 20 days provided by 41 
CFR 60-741.65(h)(1) shall constitute a waiver of hearing, and all the 
material allegations of fact contained in the complaint shall be deemed 
to be admitted. If a hearing is not requested or is waived, within 25 
days of the complaint's filing, the Administrative Law Judge shall 
adopt as findings of fact the material facts alleged in the complaint, 
and shall order the appropriate sanctions and/or penalties sought in 
the complaint. The Administrative Law Judge's findings and order shall 
constitute a final Administrative order, unless the Office of the 
Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, files exceptions to the findings 
and order within 10 days of receipt thereof. If the Office of the 
Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, files exceptions, the matter shall 
proceed in accordance with 41 CFR 60-741.65(ll).
    (4) If a request for a hearing is received within 20 days as 
provided by 41 CFR 60-741.65(h)(1), the hearing shall be convened 
within 45 days of receipt of the request and shall be completed within 
15 days thereafter, unless more hearing time is required.
    (ii) Discovery. (1) Any party may serve requests for admissions in 
accordance with 41 CFR 60-741.65(k)(2) and (3).
    (2) Witness lists and hearing exhibits will be exchanged at least 
10 days in advance of the hearing.
    (3) For good cause shown, and upon motion made in accordance with 
41 CFR 60-741.65(j), the Administrative Law Judge may allow the taking 
of depositions. Other discovery will not be permitted.
    (jj) Conduct of hearing. (1) At the hearing, the Government shall 
be given an opportunity to demonstrate the basis for the request for 
sanctions and/or remedies, and the contractor shall be given an 
opportunity to show that the violation complained of did not occur and/
or that good cause or good faith efforts excuse the alleged violations. 
Both parties shall be allowed to present evidence and argument and to 
cross-examine witnesses.
    (2) The hearing shall be informal in nature, and the Administrative 
Law Judge shall not be bound by formal rules of evidence.
    (kk) Recommended decision after hearing. Within 15 days after the 
hearing is concluded, the Administrative Law Judge shall recommend 
findings, conclusions, and a decision. The Administrative Law Judge may 
permit the parties to file written post-hearing briefs within this time 
period, but the Administrative Law Judge's recommendations shall not be 
delayed pending receipt of such briefs. These recommendations shall be 
certified, together with the record, to the Administrative Review 
Board, United States Department of Labor, for a final Administrative 
order. The recommended decision shall be served on all parties and 
amici to the proceeding.
    (ll) Exceptions to recommendations. Within 10 days after receipt of 
the recommended findings, conclusions and decision, any party may 
submit exceptions to said recommendations. Exceptions may be responded 
to by other parties within 7 days after receipt by said parties of the 
exceptions. All exceptions and responses shall be filed with the 
Administrative Review Board, United States Department of Labor. Briefs 
or exceptions and responses shall be served simultaneously on all 
parties to the proceeding.
    (mm) Final Administrative Order. After expi

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