Request for Comments on the Scope and Operation of a Mechanism To Promote Reciprocal Managed Trade With China
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Abstract
USTR invites comments from interested parties to inform the development of negotiations with China aimed at optimizing bilateral trade in non-sensitive products in order to promote reciprocity and balance in the U.S.-China trade relationship. In particular, comment is sought on the types of non-sensitive products that would benefit from favorable tariff modifications by both sides, and considerations around the design of a new government-to-government mechanism--a U.S.-China Board of Trade--to manage bilateral trade optimization on an ongoing basis.
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 108 (Friday, June 5, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 108 (Friday, June 5, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 34269-34272]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-11291]
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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Request for Comments on the Scope and Operation of a Mechanism To
Promote Reciprocal Managed Trade With China
AGENCY: Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR).
ACTION: Request for comments.
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SUMMARY: USTR invites comments from interested parties to inform the
development of negotiations with China aimed at optimizing bilateral
trade in non-sensitive products in order to promote reciprocity and
balance in the U.S.-China trade relationship. In particular, comment is
sought on the types of non-sensitive products that would benefit from
favorable tariff modifications by both sides, and considerations around
the design of a new government-to-government mechanism--a U.S.-China
Board of Trade--to manage bilateral trade optimization on an ongoing
basis.
DATES: To be assured of consideration, please submit written comments
regarding the topics listed in section II, below, to the public docket
by July 10, 2026. Any rebuttals or responses to those comments may be
submitted to a separate public docket by July 27, 2026.
ADDRESSES: Submit written comments through the online USTR portal:
<a href="https://comments.ustr.gov/s/">https://comments.ustr.gov/s/</a>. Follow the instructions for submission in
section III below. For alternatives to online submissions, please
contact Terry McCartin, AUSTR for China, Mongolia, and Taiwan Affairs,
at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#b4e0d1c6c6cdebf9d7f7d5c6c0dddaf4e1e7e0e69af1fbe49af3fbe2"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="0d59687f7f7452406e4e6c7f7964634d585e595f2348425d234a425b">[email protected]</span></a> or 202-395-9487.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Terry McCartin, AUSTR for China,
Mongolia, and Taiwan Affairs, at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#16427364646f495b75557764627f7856434542443853594638515940"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="74201106060d2b3917371506001d1a34212720265a313b245a333b22">[email protected]</span></a> or 202-
395-9487.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
[[Page 34270]]
I. Background
Historic U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations
The trade relationship between the United States and the People's
Republic of China (China or the PRC) has been defined by various modes
and methods of engagement. President Nixon's visit to China in 1972
ended a period of 23 years without official diplomatic ties between the
United States and China. President Nixon embarked on a new relationship
with a country whose single-party government had isolated itself from
much of the world. Our relationship with China was, in many respects,
starting from scratch, and, from the outset, was marked by significant
differences in the two countries' economic and political systems.
Ideological differences, political complexities, and other
obstacles meant that it took seven years after President Nixon's visit
for the United States and China to normalize relations, which occurred
in 1979. Our bilateral relationship has undergone a phased evolution
ever since, requiring special attention and skilled navigation. China
is not like other trading partners: it is a non-market economy and
strategic competitor; our modern history of commerce and diplomatic
engagement is relatively brief; and our economic trajectories are at
once mismatched and yet closely interwoven. But the United States and
China are the two largest economies in the world, and it is possible
for each country to derive benefits from trade with the other in
discrete ways.
Since the 1970s, our bilateral trade relationship has moved through
different phases as circumstances have changed. In 1986, China formally
requested to join the modern, multilateral trading system. China's
accession to the World Trade organization (WTO) was a 15-year process
of intense negotiation. During that time, the United States granted
China most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment on an annual basis subject to
review by Congress under Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974. The U.S.-
China Relations Act of 2000, which ended the yearly Congressional
review of MFN treatment of China, granted China permanent normal trade
relations and paved the way for China's entry into the WTO in 2001. It
also established mechanisms for managing the bilateral relationship,
including a requirement that the U.S. Trade Representative submit
annual reports to Congress regarding China's compliance with its WTO
commitments and the creation of a temporary, China-specific safeguard
to restrict surges of imports from China under Section 421.
Since China's WTO accession, the phases of U.S.-China engagement
have been defined by a recognition of the unique and evolving
challenges posed by the continuing lack of fairness, reciprocity, and
balance in the bilateral trade relationship. In the first five years
following China's accession to the WTO in 2001, the United States
failed to aggressively enforce China's trade commitments, choosing
instead to advocate for domestic liberalization efforts and reforms in
China. During this period, China revised or repealed many laws,
regulations, and other measures required under the terms of its WTO
accession, while maintaining problematic acts, policies, and practices
that harmed U.S. workers and businesses. When it became clear that
China was not coming into conformity with its WTO commitments and China
was not transitioning toward a market economy, as it had agreed to
under the terms of its accession to the WTO, the United States took a
new dual-track approach. In 2006, USTR released the first-ever Top-to-
Bottom Review (TBR) of the U.S.-China trade relationship. As
recommended by the TBR, the United States brought numerous disputes at
the WTO against China, while also pursuing high-level dialogues aimed
at securing China's compliance with its WTO obligations and encouraging
China to pursue market-oriented reforms.
By 2016, a decade and a half after China's entry into the WTO, it
was clear that the dual-track approach had failed. U.S. government
enforcement efforts largely were not backed up by the political will of
previous U.S. presidents or the most senior U.S. policy makers. WTO
litigation and high-level dialogues had proven incapable of securing
significant changes in China's approach to its economy and trade.
Without such changes, China's approach to its economy and trade was a
major factor in the United States' loss of 3.7 million jobs to the
post-accession ``China Shock'' of the early 2000s.
The United States tried another, new approach in 2018 when
President Trump initiated an investigation under Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301) into China's acts, policies, and
practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and
innovation. After using this established statutory mechanism to first
document and then address China's unfair and burdensome practices
through additional tariffs, President Trump entered into negotiations
with China. After balking at a more-ambitious effort to optimize trade
relations, China ultimately agreed to the Economic and Trade Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the People's Republic of China (Phase One Agreement) in
January 2020. This historic agreement required structural reforms and
other changes to China's economic and trade regime in the areas of
intellectual property, forced technology transfer, agriculture,
financial services, and currency and foreign exchange. The agreement
also included a commitment by China to make substantial purchases of
U.S. goods and services over a set timeline, along with a robust
dispute resolution mechanism to ensure implementation and enforcement.
However, concerns have arisen regarding China's implementation of
several of these commitments, and the Biden Administration failed to
enforce the agreement.
In September 2024, USTR concluded a four-year review of the Section
301 investigation that led to the Phase One Agreement, maintaining
existing Section 301 tariffs and increasing tariffs on certain
strategic sectors through 2026. Should USTR initiate a second,
statutorily mandated four-year review later this year, interested
stakeholders will have an additional opportunity to assess the impact
and application of the Section 301 tariff actions on U.S.-China trade.
Recent Developments in U.S. China Economic and Trade Relations;
Managing U.S.-China Trade
In 2025, President Trump imposed global as well as China-specific
tariffs on economic and national security grounds. Following these
actions and subsequent U.S.-China negotiations in Geneva, London,
Stockholm, Madrid, and Kuala Lumpur--culminating in a trade and
economic deal between the United States and China agreed by Presidents
Trump and Xi in Busan--the U.S.-China trade relationship entered a new
phase. This new phase, appropriately, requires a new approach: managed
trade. In further talks in Paris, Seoul, and then as part of President
Trump's May 2026 visit to Beijing, the United States and China
developed a new mechanism to manage the bilateral trade relationship.
Announced as part of a package of outcomes from President Trump's
visit, the U.S.-China Board of Trade will be a government-to-government
channel for discussions on how to optimize the trade of non-sensitive
products.
The U.S.-China Board of Trade is a positive way to manage the
realities of
[[Page 34271]]
the U.S.-China economic relationship and the imperative to defend
American workers and industries from negative aspects of trading with
China. The American and Chinese economies function very differently and
have fundamentally different objectives and guiding principles. The
U.S.-China Board of Trade will function as an ``adapter'' mechanism to
promote reciprocity, durability, and balance in the U.S.-China trade
relationship. As long as China maintains its non-market policies and
practices and refuses to provide reciprocal treatment to U.S. exports--
such as disregard for intellectual property rights, subsidies and other
industrial policies creating systemic overcapacity and overproduction
in industrial sectors, diverse and deeply entrenched market access
barriers, and lack of regulatory transparency--the United States likely
will continue to rely on tariffs and other tools to manage trade with
China. However, through the U.S.-China Board of Trade, the United
States and China will consider tariff modifications on imports of an
equal value of non-sensitive goods from each side, while monitoring and
evaluating outcomes over time.
Specifically, under this approach, each side would identify non-
sensitive products and come to agreement to modify certain non-MFN
tariffs imposed by the other side. The United States envisions that
additional tariffs imposed through certain U.S. authorities could be
favorably modified as a result of the negotiations, provided that any
modifications would not conflict with U.S. law or economic or national
security interests, and that any conditions related to tariff
modifications are satisfied. Meanwhile, China would be expected to
modify tariffs that it has imposed on the United States.
If such an arrangement can be negotiated successfully, the United
States can monitor and evaluate certain U.S.-China trade flows based on
a fixed amount of trade.
Summary
The past fifty years make clear that prior U.S. approaches to its
economic and trade relationship with China have not resulted in a more
fair, reciprocal, or balanced relationship, nor has that relationship
been stable, durable, or mutually prosperous. Both new and long-
standing U.S. tariffs have worked effectively to bring bilateral trade
closer to balance. The U.S. trade deficit in goods with China fell by
approximately 32% year-over-year to $202 billion in 2025, the lowest it
has been since 2004. In March 2026, the U.S. goods trade deficit with
China was down 46% year-over-year. In this period of economic
adjustment, the United States will maintain trade ties with China and
seek to identify and promote balanced trade in non-sensitive goods by
considering the modification of certain non-MFN tariffs. The United
States expects that this approach will bring economic benefits to U.S.
farmers, ranchers, fishermen, small businesses, manufacturers, and
workers, along with their communities, as well as for those who produce
non-sensitive goods in China.
To inform this new phase of engagement, USTR seeks public comment
on effective ways to manage bilateral trade with China, including
through the type of approach discussed above.
II. Topics on Which USTR Seeks Information
To inform its consideration of a managed trade mechanism for
balance and reciprocity with China, USTR invites comments from
interested parties on any or all of the following topics:
A. Product Eligibility for Potential Tariff Modification
Where applicable, products should be identified at the HS 8-digit
level.
1. What types of Chinese products, or Chinese products in
particular sectors, should be considered non-sensitive in that they
give rise to few, if any, issues related to economic and national
security and supply chain resilience risks?
2. What products of China, currently subject to additional U.S.
tariffs, should the United States import at lower tariff rates, such as
MFN (Column 1) rates? Please provide the average annual value of U.S.
imports of those products from China in 2022-2024.
3. Which, if any, U.S. consumers would benefit from this tariff
modification?
4. Which, if any, U.S. consumers would be harmed from this tariff
modification?
5. Which, if any, U.S. workers or producers would benefit from this
tariff reduction modification?
6. Which, if any, U.S. workers or producers would be harmed from
this tariff modification?
7. For a product identified in response to question 2 above, has
the tariff on that product resulted in a tariff inversion whereby the
tariff is higher on a given manufacturing input than on the downstream
finished product? (Please specify the average differential between the
tariff on the component at issue and the tariff on the relevant
downstream product.)
8. What is China's share of U.S. imports of each product identified
in response to question 2? Please identify the product(s) and the
market share.
9. Which, if any, products of the United States, currently subject
to additional Chinese tariffs, should U.S. exporters be able to sell to
the Chinese market at China's MFN rates? Please provide the average
annual value of U.S. exports of those products to China in 2022-2024.
10. Is any product identified in response to question 9 above (a)
an ``agricultural product,'' defined as products covered by and listed
in Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture; (b) an industrial
product the export of which to China has declined significantly in
recent years; or (c) a product subject to multiple Chinese tariff
actions or exceptionally high Chinese tariffs?
11. Are there products that China still purchases, or would likely
purchase, from the United States notwithstanding China's additional
tariffs above the MFN rate? Put differently, are there U.S. products
currently subject to China's tariffs above the applicable MFN rates
whose exports to China have not been significantly affected by China's
tariffs, or for which China appears to be reliant on U.S. exports?
B. Establishment of a U.S.-China Board of Trade
1. How frequently should the U.S.-China Board of Trade convene in
order to effectively monitor the balance of trade flows (in terms of
dollar value and timing) and to ensure the effectiveness of the list of
products identified as non-sensitive for the purpose of the tariff
modification arrangement discussed above?
2. How should the U.S.-China Board of Trade assess when, and
whether, to modify the composition or scope of the identified non-
sensitive products?
3. What mechanism should be established to ensure the effective
sharing of trade data between the two sides to allow for optimal
functioning of the U.S.-China Board of Trade?
Nothing in this notice shall be construed to impair or otherwise
affect requirements and processes stipulated under applicable U.S.
laws.
III. Submission Instructions
You must submit written comments in response to this notice using
the appropriate docket on the portal at <a href="https://comments.ustr.gov/s/">https://comments.ustr.gov/s/</a>.
To make a submission, use docket number USTR-2026-0430 entitled
``Request for
[[Page 34272]]
Comments on the Scope and Operation of a Mechanism to Promote
Reciprocal Managed Trade with China.'' To make a rebuttal or a
response, use docket number USTR-2026-0431 entitled ``Rebuttal/Response
to Comments on the Scope and Operation of a Mechanism to Promote
Reciprocal Managed Trade with China.'' You do not need to establish an
account to submit comments. The first screen allows you to enter
identification and contact information. Third-party organizations such
as law firms, trade associations, or customs brokers should identify
the full legal name of the organization they represent and identify the
primary point of contact for the submission. Fields with a gray
Business Confidential Information (BCI) notation are for BCI
information that will not be made publicly available. Fields with a
green (Public) notation will be viewable by the public. After entering
the identification and contact information, you can complete the
remainder of the comment, or any portion of it, by clicking `Next.'
You may upload documents at the end of the form and indicate
whether USTR should treat the documents as business confidential or
public information. Any page containing BCI must be clearly marked
`BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL' on the top of that page and the submission
should clearly indicate, via brackets, highlighting, or other means,
the specific information that is BCI. If you request business
confidential treatment, you must certify in writing that the
information would not customarily be released to the public. Parties
uploading attachments containing BCI also must submit a public version
of their comments. If these procedures are not sufficient to protect
BCI or otherwise protect business interests, please contact Terry
McCartin, AUSTR for China, Mongolia, and Taiwan Affairs, at
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#fbaf9e898982a4b698b89a898f9295bbaea8afa9d5beb4abd5bcb4ad"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="3e6a5b4c4c4761735d7d5f4c4a57507e6b6d6a6c107b716e10797168">[email protected]</span></a> or 202-395-9487 to discuss whether
alternative arrangements are possible.
USTR will post attachments uploaded to the docket for public
inspection, except for properly designated BCI. You can view
submissions on USTR's electronic portal at <a href="https://comments.ustr.gov/s/">https://comments.ustr.gov/s/</a>.
Bryan R. Switzer,
Deputy United States Trade Representative, Office of the United States
Trade Representative.
[FR Doc. 2026-11291 Filed 6-4-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3390-F4-P
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