Rule2026-09822
Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
May 15, 2026
Effective
June 15, 2026
Issuing agencies
Federal Communications Commission
Abstract
In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopts measures to strengthen national security and encourage reciprocity in testing and certification. The FCC creates a fast-track priority review process for devices subject to Pre-Approval Guidance (PAG) for applications tested in Trusted Test Labs. Also, updates post-market surveillance and enforcement procedures, and establishes confidential reporting channels for industry participants to raise concerns about violations or national security threats. Lastly, directs development of a consolidated list of prohibited entities to streamline applicant screening and aligns ownership reporting timelines for publicly traded companies with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission requirements.
Full Text
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 94 (Friday, May 15, 2026)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 27843-27849]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-09822]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 2
[ET Docket No. 24-136; FCC 26-28; FR ID 345586]
Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications
Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment
Authorization Program
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission or FCC) adopts measures to strengthen national security and
encourage reciprocity in testing and certification. The FCC creates a
fast-track priority review process for devices subject to Pre-Approval
Guidance (PAG) for applications tested in Trusted Test Labs. Also,
updates post-market surveillance and enforcement procedures, and
establishes confidential reporting channels for industry participants
to raise concerns about violations or national security threats.
Lastly, directs development of a consolidated list of prohibited
entities to streamline applicant screening and aligns ownership
reporting timelines for publicly traded companies with U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission requirements.
DATES: This final rule is effective June 15, 2026, except the
amendments to Sec. Sec. 2.949(b)(5) and (6) and (d) (amendatory
instruction 2), 2.951(a)(10) and (11) and (c) (amendatory instruction
4), and 2.962(d)(9) (amendatory instruction 6) which are delayed. The
Federal Communications Commission will publish a document in the
Federal Register announcing the effective date.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Katherine Nevitt of the Office of
Engineering and Technology, at 301-317-0062 or
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c3a8a2b7aba6b1aaada6edada6b5aab7b783a5a0a0eda4acb5"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="553e34213d30273c3b307b3b30233c2121153336367b323a23">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Second
Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, in ET Docket No. 24-136,
FCC 26-28, adopted on April 30, 2026, and released on May 1, 2026. The
full text of this document is available for public inspection and can
be reviewed at <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-28A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-28A1.pdf</a>.
Alternative formats are available for people with disabilities
(Braille, large print, electronic files, audio format) by sending an
email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#7d1b1e1e484d493d1b1e1e531a120b"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="096f6a6a3c393d496f6a6a276e667f">[email protected]</span></a> or calling the Commission's Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 (voice), (202) 418-0432
(TTY).
Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980,
as amended (RFA) requires that an agency prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis for notice and comment rulemakings, unless the
agency certifies that ``the rule will not, if promulgated, have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.'' Accordingly, the Commission has prepared a Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) concerning the possible impact of the rule
changes contained in the Second Report and Order on small entities. The
FRFA is set forth in Appendix C, <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-targets-device-test-labs-nations-without-reciprocal-agreements-0">https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-targets-device-test-labs-nations-without-reciprocal-agreements-0</a>.
Paperwork Reduction Act. This document contains new or modified
information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13. The Commission, as part of its
continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, will invite the general
public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on any
information collection requirements contained in this document. In
addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002,
Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), the Commission seeks
specific comment on how it might ``further reduce the information
collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25
employees.''
Congressional Review Act. The Commission has determined, and the
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget, concurs, that this this rule is non-
major under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The
Commission will send a copy of the Second Report and Order to Congress
and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
801(a)(1)(A).
Synopsis
In this document, the Commission continues its efforts to
strengthen the integrity and security of the Equipment Authorization
Program. Building on the foundation established in the First EA
Integrity Report and Order, 90 FR 38045 (August 7, 2025), this action
addresses emerging national security risks and supply chain
vulnerabilities by refining the Commission's rules governing
Telecommunications Certification Bodies (TCBs), test laboratories, and
laboratory accreditation bodies.
The Commission adopts measures to strengthen national security and
incentivize domestic testing and certification, including the creation
of a fast-track priority review process for applications tested in
Trusted Test Labs, i.e. test labs in the United States or in the
territories of economies with Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) in
which the FCC participates or trade agreements with conformity
assessment reciprocity provisions to which the United States is a party
(Reciprocal Economies) under the Pre-Approval Guidance (PAG) system.
U.S. actors in the Commission's equipment authorization program,
including U.S. test labs and TCBs, are subject to U.S. laws and can
legally be compelled to respond to FCC inquiries in a timely manner.
Actors based in Reciprocal Economies are similarly bound by the laws of
the reciprocal international agreements. These steps aim to strengthen
the integrity of the Commission's equipment authorization process by
reducing reliance on foreign entities that pose unacceptable risks,
promoting reciprocity, mitigating intellectual property theft, and
ensuring sensitive technologies are evaluated in secure environments.
The Commission also enhances transparency by requiring disclosure of
the location and number of employees engaged in FCC-recognized testing
and certification, including foreign-based staff, to assess
trustworthiness, impartiality and compliance with Commission rules.
Further, this document directs revisions to post-market
surveillance procedures, strengthens enforcement mechanisms, and
establishes confidential reporting channels for industry participants
to raise concerns about violations or national security threats. To
streamline compliance, the Commission directs the creation of a
consolidated human-readable and, to the extent feasible given limited
resources, machine-readable list of prohibited entities to assist TCBs
in screening applicants efficiently. Additionally, the Commission
grants Garmin's Petition for Reconsideration to align ownership
reporting requirements for publicly traded companies with Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) timelines.
[[Page 27844]]
Through all these actions, the Commission seeks to promote a robust
domestic testing ecosystem, safeguard U.S. communications networks, and
uphold the integrity of the equipment authorization process.
Second EA Integrity Order
In this Second EA Integrity R&O, the Commission focuses on
strengthening the integrity of its equipment authorization program by
addressing national security risks and revising the Commission's
equipment authorization rules to incentivize applicants to use domestic
testing. Specifically, the Commission creates a fast-track priority
review process for equipment that is subject to the PAG system and is
tested in test labs in the U.S. or in the territory of an economy with
which the U.S. has negotiated reciprocal treatment through an MRA or
trade agreement with comparable provisions (Trusted Test Labs). This
will incentivize testing in the U.S. or reciprocal countries, promote
transparency and accountability in the process, and will encourage
reciprocal treatment of U.S.-based testing in foreign countries. The
Commission also amends its rules to require TCBs and test labs to
disclose the location and number of foreign employees engaged in FCC-
recognized testing/certification, to enhance transparency and assess
impartiality as required by Commission rules.
The Commission directs OET to revise post-market surveillance
procedures, including sampling rates, escalation methods, and
transparency when noncompliance is found. The Commission will also take
a more active role in oversight and enforcement, reinforcing penalties
for false certifications and fraudulent test reports. The Commission
establishes a secure portal for industry participants to report
suspected violations or national security concerns and create a
centralized, machine-readable list of prohibited entities to help TCBs
screen applicants efficiently. Finally, the Commission grants a
Petition for Reconsideration filed by Garmin that modifies the
ownership reporting rules for publicly traded companies to align with
SEC timelines.
The Commission clarifies that its current rules allow for many of
these proposals, such as greater disclosure of the locations of foreign
employees and testing locations of test labs and TCBs, a more active
role by the Commission in post-market surveillance, stronger
enforcement, and better data sharing practices.
A. Fast-Track PAG Reviews for Applications Using U.S. Test Labs
The Commission finds it in the public interest to offer a priority
fast-track review of equipment authorization applications subject to
the Pre-Approval Guidance (PAG) process under 47 CFR 2.964 that use
Trusted Test Labs (i.e. labs in the U.S. or Reciprocal Economies) to
test equipment. The Commission believes incentivizing a robust trusted
test lab ecosystem will boost the integrity of the equipment
authorization process overall by expanding testing in trusted
environments, reducing the risk of intellectual property (IP) theft of
innovative technologies, and improve the Commission's ability to
securely adapt to emerging technologies.
The Commission also finds it in the public interest to streamline
requirements for testing and certification by Trusted Test Labs. The
Commission's recent actions to de-recognize test labs based on national
security risk has reduced the supply of testing and has highlighted the
risk in relying on foreign test labs. The Commission finds that
incentivizing domestic testing is a proactive step that will shift the
framework from reactive exclusion to prevention, ultimately serving to
strengthen the Commission's equipment authorization program by
promoting reliance on trustworthy labs that do not present national
security concerns that will be easily subject to FCC enforcement
actions. This expanded domestic testing capacity will strengthen the
overall resilience of the equipment authorization program.
The Commission further finds it in the public interest to allow
Trusted Test Labs to utilize the priority fast-track review process.
The Commission finds that permitting Trusted Test Labs to participate
in the fast-track review process upholds the United States' commitments
in its MRAs and trade agreements and incentivizes additional economies
to pursue similar agreements with the U.S. for reciprocal treatment.
These reciprocal agreements ensure a maximum level of integrity.
The Commission agrees with the overwhelming support from commenters
and finds it in the public interest to incentivize device-makers to use
Trusted Test Labs, or test labs located in the U.S. or in the territory
of an economy with which the U.S. has negotiated reciprocal treatment
through an MRA or trade agreement. The Commission agrees with the
record support that one effective means of doing this is by offering a
priority fast-track process for applications subject to the PAG
process, where equipment is tested by a qualifying entity. In 2024,
3.6% of devices receiving FCC IDs were tested by labs in the U.S., and
12.5% were tested by labs in MRA countries; collectively, over 16% were
tested by Trusted Test Labs. The Commission believes that prioritizing
the participation of Trusted Test Labs in the Commission's equipment
authorization program will help promote the integrity of the
Commission's equipment authorization procedures while simultaneously
helping protect its nation's supply chain against unacceptable risks.
As the National Security Division (NSD) of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) has previously advised us in this proceeding, allowing foreign
adversaries to infiltrate the equipment authorization program creates a
risk that they could exploit it on a broad scale--potentially
misappropriating sensitive intellectual property and business
intelligence from U.S. companies to advance their own national
interests.
The Commission agrees with the Cetecom comment supporting domestic
testing to ensure sensitive technologies are evaluated in secure,
controlled environments and to reduce the risk of IP theft and foreign
surveillance. The Commission also agrees with the many comments
supporting testing in allied and MRA countries. The Commission finds
that these risks, particularly IP theft, are especially heightened for
the types of technologies appearing in the PAG list. Test labs have
privileged and early access to confidential information about new
products given their role in the supply chain, and the risk of IP theft
and foreign surveillance is especially pronounced for new technologies
on the PAG list.
The Commission also notes the commitments made by the United States
in it's a MRAs and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Certain MRAs to which
the U.S. is a Party include a mutual commitment to accept test reports
of recognized conformity assessment bodies of the other Party on terms
no less favorable than those accorded to test reports produced by
conformity assessment bodies of the importing Party. Similarly, many
U.S. FTAs and Agreements on Reciprocal Trade (ARTs) include a mutual
commitment to accord to conformity assessment bodies located in the
territory of the other Party treatment no less favorable than the Party
accords to conformity assessment bodies located in its own territory.
The Commission finds that it is appropriate and in the public interest
to allow test labs located in the territory of economies with which the
[[Page 27845]]
U.S. has negotiated such reciprocal treatment through an MRA or trade
agreement to participate in the fast-track PAG process.
While all FCC grants for certification of RF equipment are
processed through TCBs, certain equipment authorization approvals
related to new and evolving technologies require direct oversight by
the Commission through the PAG process. For products that contain new
and evolving technologies covered by the PAG process, it is
particularly important that those responsible for testing them be
subject to U.S. law so that they may be compelled to respond in a
timely manner to FCC requests. The Commission has previously raised
concerns that foreign actors in the Commission's equipment
authorization program have been able to evade U.S. law when products
they are responsible for have harmed American consumers. U.S. actors in
the Commission's equipment authorization program, including U.S. test
labs and TCBs, are subject to U.S. laws and can legally be compelled to
respond to FCC inquiries in a timely manner. Actors based in Reciprocal
Economies are similarly bound by the laws of the reciprocal
international agreements. In contrast, foreign actors from non-
Reciprocal Economies have abused the protections of the Hague Service
Convention to evade accountability for repeated violations in the
Commission's equipment authorization program.
The PAG process and associated PAG list address the compliance
requirements for these technologies and must be followed by all TCBs
before finalizing the equipment authorization approval for any devices
identified in the PAG List. Currently, the Commission's rules require
TCBs to comply with the following for PAG list equipment: (1) perform
an initial review of the application and determine the issues that
require guidance from the Commission; (2) complete the review of the
application in accordance with the Commission's guidance; (3) provide
any test samples of the equipment requested by the Commission; (4)
electronically submit the application and all exhibits to the
Commission along with a request to grant the application; and (5)
supply any additional information or equipment testing required by the
Commission to comply with its rules.
The Commission revises Sec. 2.964 of its rules to prioritize
approval for PAG list equipment authorization applications, where the
equipment is tested in the U.S. or in the territory of an economy with
which the U.S. has negotiated reciprocal treatment through an MRA or
trade agreement (Trusted Test Labs). First, the Commission directs OET
to create a fast-track PAG list option for TCBs utilizing Trusted Test
Labs in its PAG list approval process. The Commission also directs OET
to update the PAG list to provide a separate streamlined list of
categories for which pre-approval guidance is required for applications
that use domestic testing provided by Trusted Test Labs. This
streamlined list will aid in the removal of associated lag time with
the PAG review and approval process. Finally, the Commission directs
OET to publish, and update as necessary, a list of economies with which
the United States has an MRA or comparable trade agreement. The
Commission believes these actions will create the appropriate incentive
to utilize Trusted Test Labs that creates a faster pipeline in getting
newer equipment to the market. The Commission also believes Trusted
Test Labs do not carry the same national security and trustworthiness
risk that certain foreign test labs do, and the Commission therefore
places enhanced trust in their ability to receive and handle sensitive
and proprietary equipment authorization information as reflected in a
shorter period for Commission staff to review their test results. to
receive and handle sensitive and proprietary equipment authorization
information as reflected in a shorter period for Commission staff to
review their test results.
Creating a fast-track PAG option for TCBs using Trusted Test Labs
will also assist with accelerating the expansion of testing capacity in
the United States and Reciprocal Economies. This is all the more
important, given that in the last several months, the Commission has
ceased to recognize 21 labs. Even as the Commission protects the
integrity of the equipment authorization process by not recognizing
untrustworthy labs, the Commission believes it is in the public
interest to facilitate more testing in the United States and Reciprocal
Economies, which will increase trust in the process trust in the
process. The Commission also agrees with the Heritage Foundation that
supporting greater domestic testing capacity will boost the resilience
of the equipment authorization program by ensuring the U.S. has
reliable, secure testing capacity at home.
The Commission envisions that this fast-track option will create
two distinct lines for the PAG approval process: one for Trusted Test
Labs that will receive a shorter, faster queue and one for all other
test labs. In addition, there will be two distinct PAG list tracks, the
general PAG list and the Trusted Test Lab streamlined PAG list with
fewer equipment categories. The Commission directs OET to release a
public notice determining the specific equipment categories to be
removed on the Trusted Test Lab PAG list that will enable this fast-
track approval process.
Unsurprisingly, the current queue for such vigorous PAG list review
and approval can take several months. In 2025, the OET Laboratory
Division reviewed and processed 1,202 PAG list items. The Commission
directs the OET Lab Division to make publicly available data metrics
for the timelines associated with PAG list review and approval. The
Commission believes this transparency will serve the public interest in
several ways. First, the metrics for PAG processing will provide data
to improve administrative processes, which allow interactions with the
Commission to be more accessible and efficient. Second, these metrics
will provide a measure of the time-savings the fast-track PAG
processing option provides in the PAG approval process. The Commission
anticipates that the time-savings will translate to faster marketing of
new types of equipment and cost savings for bringing such innovations
to market, benefiting the American public.
B. Greater Disclosure of Number and Location of Test Lab and TCB
Employees
The Commission also amends its rules to provide that test labs and
TCBs must disclose the number and location of all employees that are
engaged in FCC-recognized testing and/or certification at designation
and renewal.
Background. The Commission's rules require recognition of test labs
based on the ISO 17025 standard, and recognition of TCBs based on the
ISO 17065 standard. Both standards assess whether test labs and TCBs
operate in a competent, consistent and impartial manner. In practice,
our rules operate to require reviews of the underlying requirements of
recognition at least every two years for test labs and TCBs. The
Commission does not require either TCBs or test labs to disclose the
location of their employees.
In the First EA Integrity FNPRM (90 FR 31945; July 16, 2025), the
Commission sought comment on the potential for this current structure
to raise questions as to the integrity of the Commission's equipment
authorization program or the impartiality of TCBs or test labs. The
Commission sought comment on what additional information the Commission
should require regarding the relationship between the individuals who
each performed a defined role in the review and approval process, as
well as any
[[Page 27846]]
additional safeguards that the Commission should consider to further
ensure the impartiality of the Commission's TCBs and test labs.
Further, the Commission sought comment on whether it should restrict
the relationships between TCBs and test labs to prevent TCBs from
reviewing authorization applications for which the equipment was tested
by a test lab owned by, or under the direction or control of the same
entities that own, direct, or control the TCB.
Discussion. The Commission adopts its proposal and clarifies that,
in reviewing for adherence to the ISO/IEC 17065 and ISO/IEC 17025
impartiality frameworks, the Commission will consider where employees
are based and where they carry out their testing and certification
activities. The Commission will therefore require test labs and TCBS to
report the number and location information of all employees engaged in
FCC-recognized testing and/or certification, including those based
outside the U.S. The Commission believes such information, to the
extent relevant to the test lab or TCB's participation in the
Commission's equipment authorization program, is required to determine
compliance with the Commission's rules. Test labs are already required
to provide information about the location of their test sites. The
rules also require test labs to provide ``[o]ther information as
requested by the Commission[.]'' The Commission amends its rules to
require submission of information on the location of employees. The
rules already prohibit TCBs from outsourcing review and certification
decision activities, and place limits on how TCBs may use external
(outsourced) resources. TCBs are required to maintain appropriate
oversight of outsourced resources, and include periodic audits and
other activities required by ISO/IEC 17065. More disclosure of the
locations of employees and testing locations will allow the Commission
to consider how test labs and TCBs intend to comply with the
Commission's rules regarding oversight. The Commission therefore amends
Sec. 2.960 to require TCBs to provide location information for
employees engaged in certification.
The Commission further clarifies that knowing where a TCB's or test
lab's employees are located and where they carry out their testing
activities is necessary to assess a test lab or TCB's impartiality. As
explained by FDD, certain foreign laws, including national security
laws, may coerce corporate cooperation with state intelligence
objectives such that they cannot credibly demonstrate operational
independence from a foreign government. While a foreign government's
ability to coerce an FCC-recognized test lab's cooperation is strongest
when that test lab is either an arm of the government or owned by the
government, the foreign government can also exercise influence when it
has jurisdiction over the employees and testing. For these reasons, the
Commission clarifies that disclosure of this information is required to
ensure the integrity of the Commission's equipment authorization
program. The Commission therefore updates its rules accordingly.
To eliminate any privacy concerns, the Commission notes that it
will not require the personal address of employees or their personally
identifiable information, unless required as part of an investigation
into the truthfulness of such disclosures. Instead, the Commission
requires the business address where the employee conducts testing or
reviews certification applications for a TCB. The record shows broad
support for the adoption of this requirement, and the Commission
believes this measured approach balances U.S. national security
concerns and unnecessary granularity.
The Commission disagrees with LGAI Technological Center that the
increase in regulatory burden implementing this requirement does not
provide sufficient regulatory benefit. To the contrary, as the
Commission has previously noted, ``[i]t is obvious and unarguable that
no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the
Nation.'' The TCBs are charged with ensuring that all equipment
authorization approvals it issues are not affected by the improper
influence of a foreign government, which promotes U.S. national
security while test labs have access to sensitive and innovative
equipment prior to its availability in the commercial marketplace. The
Commission similarly disagrees with the contention of China's State
Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) that requiring country
locations of TCB and test lab employees is inconsistent with the TBT
Agreement. The referenced provisions in the TBT Agreement do not apply
to requirements for conformity assessment bodies to receive
accreditation.
C. Post-Market Surveillance
Under current Commission rules, a TCB must perform appropriate
post-market surveillance activities in accordance with ISO/IEC 17065.
While the standard provides a general framework for surveillance, OET
provides greater specificity on post-market surveillance procedures for
TCBs. The post-market surveillance procedures are published in an OET
document known as ``KDB 610077,'' which provides specific benchmarks
such as the number and types of samples that a TCB must test and
includes sample templates and checklists to help TCBs streamline their
surveillance reporting.
The Commission agrees with comments supporting the Commission
taking a more active role in managing the post-market surveillance
program. An effective surveillance program allows the public to trust
that their FCC-certified electronics in the real world are consistent
with those submitted for certification testing in the lab. The
Commission's current post-market surveillance procedures were last
published in April 2022. The Commission believes these surveillance
procedures require revisions to consider the rapidly evolving national
security threat landscape and the new risks to the Commission's
equipment authorization program explained over the last four years in
the Commission's EA Security and the EA Integrity proceedings. The
Commission agrees with comments seeking further clarification of post-
market surveillance procedures and directs OET to release a public
notice developing revised procedures.
The Commission directs OET to include in the revised surveillance
procedures questions about the sampling rate, such as whether TCBs are
required to sample five percent of their certification grants in the
same calendar year. Such questions are a valid concern, as TCBs often
cannot predict how many certification grants they will issue by year-
end and are left uncertain in December if they will meet their sampling
quotas for the year. The Commission directs OET to include in the
surveillance procedures methods for TCBs to elevate concerns, such as
when grantees are uncooperative in providing required samples for
surveillance testing or when they believe other TCBs have deficient
surveillance procedures. The Commission also directs OET to provide
greater transparency when surveillance discovers noncompliance by
making significant instances of noncompliance public. Such transparency
would be consistent with the surveillance practices of other agencies
that rely on ISO/IEC 17025-accredited test labs, such as the Consumer
Product Safety Commission.
D. Stronger Enforcement
The Commission sought comment on reasonable practices TCBs could
[[Page 27847]]
implement to better identify equipment that may be noncompliant with
Commission rules, despite authorization, and also sought comment on
additional safeguards that it should consider to further ensure the
impartiality of TCBs and test labs.
The Commission agrees with commenters supporting stronger
enforcement of existing rules. The Commission notes that stronger
enforcement of the equipment authorization regime is exactly what the
Commission intended when it created the TCB system. Back in 1998, the
Commission recognized that ``the integrity of the TCB program must be
based on the Commission's ability to enforce its rules effectively.''
The Commission anticipated that the TCB program would reduce Commission
resources devoted to processing applications and stated the
Commission's intent to ``redirect resources toward enforcement of the
rules.''
Commenters have urged the Commission to hold manufacturers
accountable for inaccuracies in their equipment authorization
applications. The Commission clarifies that current Commission rules
already hold applicants, including manufacturers, liable for the types
of misconduct referenced in these commenters. Section 2.911(d) of the
Commission's rules require applicants to provide ``a written and signed
certification . . . that all statements it makes in its request for
equipment authorization are true and correct to the best of its
knowledge and belief.'' Submitting false information in an equipment
authorization violates the Commission's rules requiring truthful and
accurate statements to the Commission. When an applicant submits
written materials, a violation may occur even absent an intent to
deceive; a factually inaccurate statement in an equipment authorization
application may violate Sec. 1.17(a)(2) of the Commission's rules if
it is provided without a reasonable basis. The Commission takes very
seriously the duty of candor that all applicants, including
manufacturers, owe when they apply for equipment authorizations. In
2024, the Commission proposed the statutory maximum civil penalties
against a Chinese doorbell camera manufacturer for submitting false
certifications under Sec. 2.911(d) in its equipment authorization
application. The Commission further notes that violations of the
Communications Act or the Commission's also can result in seizure of
equipment through in rem forfeiture actions, as well as criminal
sanctions, including imprisonment. The Commission will not hesitate to
refer violations to federal law enforcement partners when warranted by
the facts, especially when violations implicate national security
equities.
The Commission also received comments that the Commission should
hold test labs accountable for deficient test results. The Commission
agrees that such behavior may violate the impartiality provisions of
IEC/ISO 17025, a requirement for FCC test lab recognition. The
Commission clarifies that its rules provide that test labs that submit
false test results may also be in violation of the requirement in Sec.
1.17 of the Commission's rules requiring truthful and accurate
statements. The Commission further clarify that a TCB that willfully or
repeatedly submits fraudulent or unreliable test results may likewise
be in violation of the impartiality provisions of IEC/ISO 17065, and by
extension, the requirements for FCC recognition of TCBs.
E. Confidential Reporting Channels
The Commission sought comment on any other measures the Commission
might take to strengthen the integrity of the post-market surveillance
process.
The Commission agrees with these comments and directs OET to create
a confidential channel for professionals, industry participants, and
other key stakeholders in the Commission's equipment authorization
program to report suspected violations and national security concerns.
The Commission agrees with the DOJ NSD comment that market dynamics and
commercial relationships may dissuade participants from reporting
concerns. Industry participants may be especially deterred from
reporting publicly if their concerns involve a nation-state actor with
the capability to retaliate.
F. Consolidated List of ``Prohibited Entities''
Current Commission rules incorporate numerous sources in the
definition of ``prohibited entity.'' Moreover, current Commission rules
incorporate numerous sources in this definition, including the FCC
Covered List and other lists promulgated by the Departments of
Commerce, Homeland Security, and Treasury, as well as multiple statutes
naming entities. In response to the EA Integrity FNPRM, three TCBs
commented on the difficulties they have faced and proposed that the
Commission provide more data tools to help TCBs review for prohibited
entities.
The Commission agrees with these commenters. The Commission finds
that organizing and sharing more information with TCBs will help them
screen prohibited entities more efficiently. Creating a consolidated
list will promote the integrity of the Commission's equipment
authorization program. The Commission also finds such a list would
streamline and alleviate unnecessary administrative compliance burden
on the Commission's TCBs, all of whom are based in the United States or
allied MRA nations. The Commission's TCBs are valuable partners in its
shared mission of ensuring the safety and security of Americans'
electronic devices--and its national security. The Commission directs
OET to create a single consolidated list of prohibited entities under
Sec. 2.902 of its rules and to share it with TCBs in human and, to the
extent feasible given limited resources, machine-readable format. The
Commission also directs OET to update that list on a timely basis.
Order on Reconsideration
Garmin International, Inc. submitted a Petition for Reconsideration
on September 8, 2025, requesting that the Commission reconsider the
ownership reporting requirement adopted in the Commission's First EA
Integrity R&O and codified in Sec. Sec. 2.949(d)(9), 2.951(c), and
2.962(d). The requirement in question requires TCBs and test labs to
report ownership changes of five percent or more equity in the entity
no later than 30 days after the relevant change takes effect. Garmin
maintains that the new requirement creates unnecessary challenges for
U.S. publicly traded companies and is in conflict with the timeline for
the ownership reporting requirements of the SEC's Exchange Act Rule
13d-1. Garmin petitioned the Commission to either modify the relevant
sections and align the deadlines with the SEC reporting requirements or
to exempt U.S. equipment authorization entities from the reporting
requirement entirely. Garmin reiterated their argument in comments
submitted in response to public notice of its petition. Likewise,
comments of the Consumer Technology Association (CTA) echoed Garmin's
concerns and recommended that the Commission either adopt Garmin's
recommendations or provide an exemption to equipment authorization
entities based in countries in an MRA with the United States.
The Commission grants Garmin's Petition and amends Sec. Sec.
2.949(d)(9), 2.951(c), and 2.962(d) of its rules as applied to U.S.
publicly traded companies so that the 30-day notice deadlines set forth
in these rules are
[[Page 27848]]
triggered by actual knowledge regarding a new or former five percent
owner, rather than triggered by when the ownership change takes effect.
Specifically, the Commission amends its rules to define the appropriate
trigger as actual knowledge of the new five percent owner, such as the
filing of the appropriate Schedule 13D and/or 13G by the acquirer as
required by the SEC. The Commission believes this change will allow
publicly traded companies, if they otherwise lack actual knowledge, to
rely on public information that they can be reasonably expected to
obtain without additional cost burdens, while avoiding substantial
delays in the transmission of foreign ownership information to the
Commission.
Benefits and Costs
Benefits. The adopted rules will enhance the integrity and security
of the equipment authorization program, yielding cost saving and other
benefits that outweigh the associated compliance costs. By
incentivizing domestic testing through a fast-track PAG process, the
Commission strengthens supply chain resilience and reduces reliance on
foreign entities that pose national security risks. This approach
mitigates threats such as intellectual property theft and foreign
surveillance, thus ensuring that sensitive technologies are evaluated
in secure environments. These benefits extend beyond national security;
they also promote consumer confidence in FCC-certified devices and
foster a robust U.S. testing ecosystem. In addition to these
potentially substantial, but difficult to quantify benefits from
enhancing national security and fostering a robust U.S. testing
environment, a fast track review process could also potentially save
time for certifications made by U.S. laboratories and TCBs, decreasing
labor costs and decreasing the time that it takes to bring new products
to market.
Although the benefits of enhanced national security and the
strengthening of the equipment authorization process can be
substantial, the Commission does not attempt to quantify them here. The
Commission finds that the cost savings to applicants already eligible
for the fast track PAG process alone, outweigh the costs associated
with the adopted rules. In 2025, OET reviewed approximately 3,369 PAG
applications, including 579 submitted through U.S.-based test labs and
TCBs. Assuming the fast-track PAG process affects 10% of domestic PAG
applications and reduces time spent by technical staff in filing the
application and responding to Commission inquiries by 32 hours per
expedited PAG applications, the Commission estimates that the adopted
rule will result in approximately $218,000 in annual cost savings to
applicants using U.S.-based test labs and an additional $552,000 in
annual cost savings to applicants using Trusted Test Labs outside the
United States. This estimate is highly conservative, as it does not
account for the substantial benefits of reducing the time that it takes
to bring products to market. This estimate is also likely too low
because it assumes the volume of domestic PAG applications remains
unchanged following the adoption of this rule. If applicants increase
PAG submissions through Trusted Test Labs as a result of the expedited
process for domestic applications, the benefits would exceed the
Commission's current estimate.
The Commission finds that adopting the rules to revise post-market
surveillance procedures, strengthen enforcement mechanisms, establish
confidential reporting channels, and create a machine-readable list of
prohibited entities will provide greater regulatory clarify, deter
violations, and prevent equipment posing unacceptable risks from
entering U.S. markets. In addition, granting Garmin's Petition for
Reconsideration aligns the Commission's ownership reporting
requirements with SEC timelines and minimize burdens on publicly traded
companies.
The costs imposed by these rules--such as reporting employee
locations and implementing enhanced post-market surveillance--are
modest and primarily administrative. These measures are essential to
assess impartiality and compliance with Commission rules, and they
align with existing ISO standards that TCBs and test labs already
follow. The Commission finds that the cost of complying with the
updated post-market surveillance guidance under OET directives is
negligible because TCBs already incur these compliance costs whenever
updates are issued. The Commission does not provide a separate estimate
of the cost for applicants to shift applications from non-U.S. based
test labs and TCBs to U.S.-based facilities because such decisions are
entirely voluntary and would only occur when applicants determine that
the benefits of doing so outweigh the associated costs. The Commission
finds that the fast-track PAG process will yield annual benefits of
approximately $770,000, which exceeds the estimated annual reporting
cost of approximately $16,000, not to mention additional unquantified
benefits such as enhanced national security and a strengthened
equipment authorization process.
Ordering Clauses
It is ordered, pursuant to the authority found in sections 1, 4(i),
229, 301, 302, 303, 309, 312, 403, and 503 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 229, 301, 302a, 303, 309, 312,
403, and 503, section 105 of the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. 1004; the Secure and Trusted Communications
Networks Act of 2019, 47 U.S.C. 1601 1609; and the Secure Equipment Act
of 2021, Public Law 117 55, 135 Stat. 423, 47 U.S.C. 1601 note, that
this Second Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration is hereby
adopted.
It is ordered that the amendments of part 2 of the Commission's
rules are adopted, effective 30 days after the date of publication in
the Federal Register, with the exception of sections that contain new
or modified information collection requirements that require review by
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction
Act. The Commission directs the Office of Engineering and Technology to
establish and announce the effective date of these sections in a
document published in the Federal Register after completion of OMB
review.
It is ordered that the petition for reconsideration of Garmin
International, Inc., submitted September 8, 2025, in this docket is
granted to the extent discussed herein.
It is ordered that the Commission's Office of the Secretary, SHALL
SEND a copy of this Second Report and Order and Order on
Reconsideration, including the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analyses,
to the Chief Counsel for the Small Business Administration (SBA) Office
of Advocacy.
It is ordered that the Office of the Managing Director, Performance
Program Management, SHALL SEND a copy of the Second Report and Order in
a report to be sent to Congress and the Government Accountability
Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 2
Administrative practice and procedures, Communications equipment,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Telecommunications.
[[Page 27849]]
Federal Communications Commission.
Aleta Bowers,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Office of the Secretary.
Final Rules
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 2 as follows:
PART 2--FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AND RADIO TREATY MATTERS; GENERAL
RULES AND REGULATIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 2 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 302a, 303, and 336, unless otherwise
noted.
0
2. Delayed indefinitely, further amend Sec. 2.949 by adding paragraphs
(b)(5) and (6) and (d) to read as follows:
Sec. 2.949 Recognition of laboratory accreditation bodies.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(5) Certification to the Commission that the laboratory
accreditation body is not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
direction of a prohibited entity pursuant to Sec. 2.902.
(6) Documentation to the Commission identifying any entity that has
equity or voting interests of 5% or greater in the laboratory
accreditation body.
* * * * *
(d) Each recognized laboratory accreditation body must provide to
the Commission, in accordance with Sec. 2.950 and no later than 30
days after any relevant change to the required information takes
effect, or in the case of U.S. publicly traded companies, after having
actual knowledge of any relevant change:
(1) Certification to the Commission that the laboratory
accreditation body is not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
direction of a prohibited entity pursuant to Sec. 2.902.
(2) Documentation to the Commission identifying any entity that has
equity or voting interests of 5% or greater in the laboratory
accreditation body.
* * * * *
0
3. Amend Sec. 2.951 by adding and reserving paragraphs (a)(10) and
(11) and adding paragraph (a)(12) to read as follows:
Sec. 2.951 Recognition of measurement facilities.
(a) * * *
(12) The number and location of all employees or agents that are
engaged in FCC-recognized testing and/or certification, including those
based outside the United States.
* * * * *
0
4. Delayed indefinitely, further amend Sec. 2.951 by adding paragraphs
(a)(10) and (11) and (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 2.951 Recognition of measurement facilities.
(a) * * *
(10) Certification to the Commission that the laboratory is not
owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited
entity pursuant to Sec. 2.902.
(11) Documentation to the Commission identifying any entity that
has equity or voting interests of 5% or greater in the laboratory.
* * * * *
(c) Each recognized laboratory must provide to the Commission, in
accordance with Sec. 2.950 and no later than 30 days after any
relevant change to the required information takes effect, or in the
case of U.S. publicly traded companies, after having actual knowledge
of any relevant change:
(1) Certification to the Commission that the laboratory is not
owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited
entity pursuant to Sec. 2.902.
(2) Documentation to the Commission identifying any entity that has
equity or voting interests of 5% or greater in the laboratory.
* * * * *
0
5. Amend Sec. 2.960 by adding paragraph (a)(8) to read as follows:
Sec. 2.960 Recognition of Telecommunication Certification Bodies
(TCBs).
(a) * * *
(8) Demonstrates impartiality and compliance with Commission rules
by disclosing the number and location of all employees or agents that
are engaged in FCC-recognized testing and/or certification, including
those based outside the United States.
* * * * *
0
6. Delayed indefinitely, further amend Sec. 2.962 by adding paragraph
(d)(9) to read as follows:
Sec. 2.962 Requirements for Telecommunication Certification Bodies.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(9) Provide to the Commission, in accordance with Sec. 2.950 and
no later than 30 days after any relevant change to the required
information takes effect, or in the case of U.S. publicly traded
companies, after having actual knowledge of any relevant change:
(i) Certification to the Commission that the TCB is not owned by,
controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity
pursuant to Sec. 2.902; and
(ii) Documentation to the Commission identifying any entity that
has equity or voting interests of 5% or greater in the TCB.
* * * * *
0
7. Amend Sec. 2.964 by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
Sec. 2.964 Pre-approval guidance procedure for Telecommunication
Certification Bodies.
(a) The Commission will publish a ``Pre-approval Guidance (PAG)
List'' identifying the categories of equipment or types of testing for
which Telecommunication Certification Bodies (TCBs) must request
guidance from the Commission before approving equipment on the list.
The PAG list will prioritize for approval equipment tested in Trusted
Test Labs, i.e., test labs located in the United States or those test
labs located in the territory of an economy with which the United
States has negotiated reciprocal treatment through a trade agreement.
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2026-09822 Filed 5-14-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
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