Modernizing Spectrum Sharing for Satellite Broadband
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Abstract
In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or we) adopts a Report and Order (Order) that revises the spectrum sharing framework for Geostationary Orbit (GSO) and Non- Geostationary Orbit (NGSO) systems that currently relies on NGSO systems complying with Equivalent Power Flux Density (EPFD) limits developed in the late-1990s. The consequence today of applying such EPFD limits in the United States is that operators must overprotect GSO systems, which in turn means that American households and businesses-- most critically in rural and remote areas--do not receive the fastest space-based NGSO satellite broadband American innovation has available. Based on the technical record in this proceeding, the Order replaces the EPFD framework with modern, performance-based GSO protection criteria. The Order extends the Commission's framework for good-faith coordination and allow NGSO and GSO operators to bargain for appropriate interference protections through voluntary, private agreement. The Order further adopts technical backstops to protect GSO systems when coordination has not been reached.
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 92 (Wednesday, May 13, 2026)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 26928-26948]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-09565]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 25
[SB Docket No. 25-157; FCC 26-26; FR ID 345051]
Modernizing Spectrum Sharing for Satellite Broadband
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission or we) adopts a Report and Order (Order) that revises the
spectrum sharing framework for Geostationary Orbit (GSO) and Non-
Geostationary Orbit (NGSO) systems that currently relies on NGSO
systems complying with Equivalent Power Flux Density (EPFD) limits
developed in the late-1990s. The consequence today of applying such
EPFD limits in the United States is that operators must overprotect GSO
systems, which in turn means that American households and businesses--
most critically in rural and remote areas--do not receive the fastest
space-based NGSO satellite broadband American innovation has available.
Based on the technical record in this proceeding, the Order replaces
the EPFD framework with modern, performance-based GSO protection
criteria. The Order extends the Commission's framework for good-faith
coordination and allow NGSO and GSO operators to bargain for
appropriate interference protections through voluntary, private
agreement. The Order further adopts technical backstops to protect GSO
systems when coordination has not been reached.
DATES: These rules are effective July 13, 2026, except for the
amendments to Sec. Sec. 25.146(a)(3) (amendatory instruction 2) and
25.289(a)(2) (amendatory instruction 4), which are indefinitely
delayed. The Commission will publish a document in the Federal Register
announcing the effective date of these rule sections.
The incorporation of reference of certain material listed in this
rule was approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of January
17, 2018.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Clay DeCell, Attorney Advisor,
Satellite Programs and Policy Division, Space Bureau, at
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#47242b263e69232224222b2b0721242469202831"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="2d4e414c540349484e4841416d4b4e4e034a425b">[email protected]</span></a> or at (202) 418-0803.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Order,
FCC 26-26, adopted April 30, 2026, and released May 1, 2026. The
document is available for public inspection online at <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-26A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-26A1.pdf</a>. The document is also
available for inspection and copying during business hours in the FCC
Reference Center, 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554. To request
materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities, send an
email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#2d6b6e6e181d196d4b4e4e034a425b"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="89cfcacabcb9bdc9efeaeaa7eee6ff">[email protected]</span></a> or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs
Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY). ITU Regulations
Article 22, Section II is referenced in the amendatory text of this
document and was previously approved for 25.289.
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), requires
that an agency prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for notice and
comment rulemakings, unless the agency certifies that ``the rule will
not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.'' Accordingly, the Commission has
prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) concerning the
possible impact of the rule and policy changes contained in the Order
on small entities. The FRFA is set forth in Section IV below.
Final Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis
The Order contains modified information collection requirements
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-
13. It will be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
for review under Section 3507(d) of the PRA. OMB, other Federal
agencies, and the general public are invited to comment on the modified
information collection requirements contained in this document.
In the Order, we have assessed the effects of providing NGSO
satellite system applicants an alternative to certifying compliance
with EPFD limits in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands
for operations in the United States, by instead demonstrating that they
will comply with certain GSO satellite network protection criteria. We
find that doing so will serve the public interest and is unlikely to
directly affect businesses with fewer than 25 employees.
Congressional Review Act
The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget,
concurs that this rule is major under the Congressional Review Act, 5
U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of this Report and Order
to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the
Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
Synopsis
I. Introduction
1. As satellite broadband rapidly matures into an integral and
integrated communications technology, the Commission must aggressively
update its rules to ensure Americans reap the abundance of innovation
and investment by the space industry. In the Order, we revise the
decades-old framework for how GSO and NGSO systems share spectrum. Our
legacy rules have significantly limited the ability of operators to
deliver high-speed, low-latency broadband services to consumers. Until
now, NGSO operators' power levels have been restricted by EPFD limits
developed in the late-1990s to protect GSO satellites. Such EPFD limits
were based on theoretical designs for NGSO systems of that era, long
before modern advancements were developed for the NGSO constellations
currently in orbit. The consequence today of applying such EPFD limits
in the United States is that operators must overprotect GSO systems.
The cost of this government-imposed overprotection is that American
households and businesses--most critically in rural and remote areas--
do not receive the fastest space-based broadband American innovation
has available.
[[Page 26929]]
2. The benefits of our changes today may total well over $2
billion, with capacity increases of 100% to 700% possible using the
same number of in-orbit NGSO satellites. Allowing for more intensive
spectrum use brings satellite broadband providers closer to the
milestone of delivering gigabit service from space--a feat unimaginable
only a few years ago. Such capability will bring greater competition to
the broadband marketplace as space-based connectivity reaches speeds
and latency similar to that of terrestrial fiber. And by reducing the
number of satellites required to cover an area with a given capacity,
our new framework will allow for lower unit costs to serve a geographic
area, which in turn can reduce the price of broadband to consumers. In
short, by removing an enormous regulatory constraint on NGSO systems,
the Commission takes another step to unleash the American space
industry to deliver for consumers.
3. Specifically, in the Order, we replace the EPFD framework with
modern, performance-based GSO protection criteria that take account of
the improved spectrum sharing possibilities that modern satellite
technology has brought, including through use of adaptive coding and
modulation (ACM). As the cornerstone of our new sharing regime, we
extend our time-tested framework for good-faith coordination and allow
NGSO and GSO operators to bargain for appropriate interference
protections through voluntary, private agreement. We adopt the
following technical backstops to protect GSO systems when coordination
has not been reached:
<bullet> A long-term protection criterion of 3% time-weighted
average throughput degradation for GSO satellite links using ACM;
<bullet> A short-term protection criterion of 0.1% absolute
increase in link unavailability;
<bullet> A supplemental protection criterion of -10.5 dB
interference-to-noise (I/N) for 80% of the time for GSO satellite links
that do not use ACM, such as point-to-multipoint video transmissions;
and
<bullet> A supplemental protection requirement for NGSO systems to
observe a minimum 3-degree avoidance angle of the GSO arc.
4. Having taken a fresh look at today's satellite technology and
operations, these new rules will promote more efficient and effective
use of the shared spectrum, and support a more competitive market for
satellite broadband and other in-demand services.
II. Background
5. Overview. The American space sector is booming. In the past few
years alone, thousands of broadband-capable satellites have been
launched into low-Earth orbit (LEO), connecting Americans with low-
latency, high-speed services heretofore unavailable in many rural and
underserved areas of the United States. By one estimate, the supply of
high-throughput satellite capacity tripled between 2021 and 2023, with
NGSO satellites accounting for over 90% of the net supply during that
period, and projected to account for 97% of the increase in supply from
2023 to 2028. At the same time, GSO satellite operators have continued
to deploy powerful, new satellites with enhanced capabilities. The
space sector is helping bridge the digital divide.
6. These broadband satellite services rely on shared spectrum. In
the most commonly used frequency bands, between 10.7 GHz and 30 GHz,
NGSO systems share primary fixed-satellite service (FSS) allocations
with GSO networks, and must also operate compatibly with broadcasting-
satellite service (BSS) networks and stations in other services,
including terrestrial services. NGSO FSS systems must comply with power
limits expressed in EPFD to demonstrate that they meet their broader
obligation not to cause unacceptable interference to GSO FSS and BSS
networks. NGSO FSS systems must also meet separate power limits
expressed in power-flux density (PFD) to protect terrestrial services.
Within the 10.7-30 GHz range, EPFD downlink limits apply in the 10.7-
12.7 GHz, 17.3-18.6 GHz, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands in the United States.
Applicants for NGSO FSS space station licenses, and non-U.S.-licensed
satellite operators seeking access to the U.S. market, must certify
that they will comply with the specified EPFD limits.
7. EPFD History. As reviewed in the NPRM, the current EPFD limits
were developed in the late 1990s for the protection of GSO networks
from then-proposed NGSO systems. They were adopted by the international
community at the International Telecommunication Union's (ITU) World
Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) in 2000, and subsequently
incorporated into the Commission's rules. In 2019, the international
community again considered sharing criteria among GSO and NGSO FSS
systems, this time in the higher Q- and V-bands between 37.5 GHz and
51.4 GHz. WRC-19 did not adopt EPFD limits in these bands. Instead,
given the expected use of ACM by GSO networks in these bands, it
required NGSO FSS systems to meet certain long-term and short-term GSO
protection criteria that incorporate a degraded throughput methodology.
8. Current ITU Work. WRC-23 considered a proposal from the Inter-
American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL) co-signed by ten member
states, including the United States, to review the EPFD limits under a
future agenda item for WRC-27. While the proposed agenda item was not
adopted, WRC-23 invited ITU-R to conduct technical studies on the EPFD
limits and to inform WRC-27 of the results of the studies, without any
regulatory consequences. These studies are being carried out in ITU-R
Working Party (WP) 4A.
9. Waivers. On January 9, 2026, the Space Bureau granted SpaceX a
waiver of the EPFD limits in the United States to operate pursuant to
its satellite configuration used during real-world testing of an Nco of
8 and a GSO-arc avoidance angle of 4 degrees. On February 20, 2026, the
Space Bureau granted Amazon a similar waiver for its NGSO system.
10. NPRM. On April 28, 2025, the Commission launched this
proceeding by granting a SpaceX petition for rulemaking to review the
decades-old spectrum sharing regime between GSO and NGSO systems in
downlink frequency bands between 10.7 GHz and 30 GHz that are subject
to EPFD limits, and to amend Sec. Sec. 25.146 and 25.289 of the
Commission's rules. The NPRM sought to develop a substantial technical
record concerning modern and efficient spectrum sharing among NGSO FSS
systems and GSO FSS and BSS networks in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and
19.7-20.2 GHz bands, while ensuring that any rule changes do not affect
the continued protection of other services. In response to the NPRM, 38
comments, 23 reply comments, and numerous ex parte presentations were
filed.
III. Discussion
11. The voluminous record in this proceeding includes rarely
available, real-world testing data assessing the impact of EPFD
exceedances on operational GSO networks, along with technical and
economic analyses and other comments. Based on this record, we conclude
that technological advancements in the past three decades and the
inherent issues in the EPFD limits themselves warrant the establishment
of a new, performance-based spectrum sharing framework between GSO and
NGSO systems in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands.
Leveraging the latest
[[Page 26930]]
satellite technology, the U.S. space industry can make better use of
spectrum resources to substantially expand and improve the broadband
services available in the United States, thereby furthering ``the
policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new
technologies and services to the public.''
12. As described below, we expect the modernized NGSO-GSO sharing
framework to result in substantial benefits for American consumers, by
enabling new NGSO systems to use more satellites to serve the same
area, at potentially higher power, and over a wider portion of the
visible sky. For example, when an NGSO system can employ eight
satellites to provide service simultaneously in a given geographic area
and frequency band, instead of being effectively limited to one
satellite under current EPFD limits, and while continuing to protect
GSO networks as supported by real-world testing, it immediately boosts
capacity, which translates to faster broadband speeds for American
consumers. Increasing the capacity available to any location can
improve quality of service or allow competitors to provide the same
quality of service with a smaller constellation, which could
potentially lower prices to consumers. Expanded, low-latency satellite
broadband at lower cost may also increase competition for broadband
services in new areas, including some urban areas where prior satellite
capacity constraints may have bounded consumers' willingness to switch.
This, in turn, results in greater societal welfare benefits, with one
study estimating welfare to increase by between $10 billion and $100
billion globally if EPFD limits were widely replaced.
13. We replace the outdated and wooden EPFD limitations with a
modern framework that gives NGSO and GSO operators the flexibility to
reach protection criteria through good-faith coordination. It is at
once a fundamental change in regulatory design, but at the same time
consistent with the primacy we place on good-faith coordination across
many other contexts. As the Commission has emphasized, private
coordination among satellite operators, based on real-world operating
parameters, offers the best opportunity for efficient spectrum sharing.
The current EPFD limits do not accommodate such coordination because
they must be met regardless of any agreements between particular NGSO
and GSO satellite operators. Our approach not only encourages good-
faith coordination efforts; it requires them. And the new, performance-
based protection criteria focus on what matters (i.e., delivered
service), allowing innovation in NGSO system designs which respect the
new limits. Whereas EPFD limits categorically restricted an input, the
approach we adopt today gives parties the flexibility to negotiate a
more efficient outcome.
14. As a backstop to good-faith coordination, we adopt GSO
protection criteria that take account of the improved spectrum sharing
possibilities that modern satellite technology has brought, including
through use of ACM. Specifically, we require NGSO satellites
transmitting in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands to
protect co-frequency GSO networks using a long-term protection
criterion of 3% time-weighted average throughput degradation. We adopt
a short-term GSO protection criterion of 0.1% absolute increase in link
unavailability. For GSO satellite links that do not use ACM, we adopt a
long-term protection criterion of -10.5 dB I/N for 80% of the time. As
an additional measure of protection for GSO networks, we require NGSO
systems to observe a minimum 3-degree avoidance angle of the GSO arc.
We decline to establish aggregate limits or other limits on NGSO
systems at this time. These new backstop provisions will ensure that
NGSO broadband services can reap the benefits of significantly more
efficient spectrum sharing while ensuring that NGSO systems continue
not to cause ``unacceptable interference'' to GSO FSS and BSS networks.
15. Below, we outline the public-interest benefits of our decision,
based on the extensive record in this proceeding. We then explain why
the purported costs of modernizing our sharing rules are overstated,
speculative, and, in any case, mitigated by the suite of additional
protections we adopt today. Finally, we resolve assorted issues of
implementation and compliance.
A. Benefits of Modernized Sharing Rules
16. Dramatically boosting the capacity of NGSO broadband systems
serves the public interest. Adding more system capacity is the most
impactful way for NGSO operators to address their most acute and
recurring technical challenge: providing 5G-quality data rates to a
growing number of users during periods of peak congestion, without
sacrificing on signal reliability. Enabling that level of performance
makes satellite broadband a more compelling alternative for consumers
in areas with limited competitive options. And it lowers barriers to
entry and potentially stranded investments by reducing the need for new
satellite launches and expensive infrastructure builds.
17. The record unambiguously demonstrates that legacy EPFD
restrictions present perhaps the largest regulatory constraint on NGSO
systems to deliver more capacity to consumers. As discussed below, we
find that modernizing our NGSO-GSO sharing framework to boost NGSO
capacity and reduce the necessary size of NGSO constellations will
bring substantial public-interest benefits. We also note the broader
macroeconomic benefits across America. One study, for example, has
indicated that increases in NGSO system capacity of 74% to 180% could
reduce average costs per unit of capacity of between 43% and 64%. The
study further estimated increases in consumer welfare ranging from 11%,
given a 10% reduction in price and a 25% increase in capacity, to 113%,
assuming a 50% reduction in price and a 250% increase in capacity. And
if revisions to the EPFD regime were adopted globally, they could
result in welfare benefits to all customers ranging from $10 billion to
$100 billion.
1. Boosting Capacity and Speeds
18. The ability of surging NGSO satellite deployments to meet the
needs of Americans on the wrong side of the digital divide is limited
by the design and operational restrictions placed on NGSO systems by
the need to comply with EPFD limits. To meet these limits, NGSO
operators have three primary strategies. First, NGSO operators limit
the number of satellite beams that can serve any given location
simultaneously using the same frequencies (i.e., the number of co-
frequency beams or Nco), limiting spectrum reuse and capacity. Second,
NGSO operators implement wide ``avoidance angles'' of the GSO arc,
which restrict satellites from transmitting when they are within a
certain-degree separation from the transmission path of a GSO
satellite. This technique increases the number of satellites NGSO
operators need to provide full coverage and causes less efficient
rerouting of network paths, which further reduces performance and
increases latency. Third, NGSO operators reduce their power levels even
outside the GSO-arc avoidance angle to ensure off-axis emissions remain
below the EPFD limit, with lower power levels reducing data rates and
leading to less robust connectivity for end users. In total, compliance
with the current EPFD limits directly degrades the efficiency of
spectrum use by NGSO systems.
19. The EPFD limits are coupled with the ITU's software and
methodology for assessing compliance with those limits,
[[Page 26931]]
which can further restrict real-world NGSO operations. For example, the
ITU software considers a relatively sensitive reference antenna pattern
for GSO earth stations, resulting in a greater calculated EPFD into GSO
earth stations and therefore greater restrictions on NGSO operations to
fall below the EPFD limits as calculated with reference to this antenna
pattern. In addition, the ITU software uses a worst-case geometry
selection algorithm when choosing among available NGSO satellites to
transmit to a given location. This assumes that the NGSO operator will
always select the satellite with the worst-case geometry (often, the
satellite closest to the GSO arc), although it is unlikely that an
operator would rely on such an algorithm to conduct actual operations.
Rather, satellite operators rely on a complex, global resource
management system for assigning satellite capacity to their customers.
In total, according to one study, the assumed EPFD of an NGSO system
was substantially below the maximum allowed EPFD in Ka-band at almost
all points when using the ITU methodology, and up to 30 dB below the
limits for short-term interference in the upper portion of the Ka-band
specifically. By restricting EPFD below even the limits themselves,
NGSO capacity, coverage, and service are further reduced. Beyond
stating that EPFD limits rely on conservative or disputed assumptions,
commenters also argue the current ITU process invites ``regulatory
gamesmanship.''
20. In contrast to legacy EPFD regulations, the record demonstrates
substantial potential for enhanced NGSO service offerings under a
modernized NGSO-GSO sharing framework. Analyses for current and planned
Ku-band and Ka-band NGSO systems indicate that modernized sharing rules
could deliver increases in NGSO system capacity of 100% to 700% in a
given area in the United States, because NGSO operators would be able
to increase the number of satellites operating simultaneously in a
given area and a given frequency band from one to as many as eight. At
the same time, a reduction in the GSO-arc avoidance angle would
increase the number of satellites available to serve an earth station
location and thereby increase coverage, potentially reducing the size
and cost of NGSO systems.
a. Real-World Measurement Campaigns
21. This rulemaking has benefitted from rarely available, real-
world measurement campaigns, which assessed the impact of the SpaceX
Starlink NGSO system in different operational configurations on typical
GSO network mass-market terminals. These real-world test results
demonstrate the potential for enhanced NGSO operations, in excess of
current EPFD limits, and the resulting impacts on typical GSO service
links.
22. In one set of testing, SpaceX operated the Starlink system with
GSO-arc avoidance angles resembling typical GSO separation arcs in Ku-
band and Ka-band, e.g., 2, 3, 4 and 6 degrees. The test setup included
a high-precision spectrum analyzer connected to a mass-market GSO
terminal from a major GSO operator. The average de-sense to the GSO
link resulting from eight co-frequency beams with an avoidance angle of
4 degrees from the GSO arc was less than 0.1 dB, which translates to a
degraded throughput of less than approximately 0.7%. In another set of
testing, using a different location and GSO network, SpaceX
demonstrated that, for the Starlink system similarly configured to use
eight co-frequency beams and a 4-degree GSO-arc avoidance angle, the
long-term de-sense of the GSO link was negligible and the increase in
short-term link unavailability was approximately 0.05%. In two other
sets of testing, with different locations and GSO networks, operating
the Starlink system with up to eight co-frequency beams and a 4- or
4.5-degree GSO-arc avoidance angle similarly showed minimal long-term
signal de-sense (and associated degraded throughput) to the GSO links.
And a fifth set of testing provided similar results. Further, the
increase in absolute unavailability in a test using a very small, 35 cm
user terminal was 0.0005%. Notably, SpaceX has conducted measurements
in Jordan with a GSO-arc avoidance angle of 3 degrees and an Nco of 6
for a 60 cm earth station receiving antenna. The average co-polarized
de-sense from this test was approximately 0.17 dB, which corresponds to
an I/N of approximately -13.9 dB.
23. The results of these five extensive, months-long test campaigns
offer direct, real-world evidence that a currently operating NGSO
system could, in comparison with its configuration needed to meet
current EPFD limits, increase by 700% its number of satellites (i.e.,
from 1 satellite to 8 satellites) operating simultaneously co-frequency
in the same area while reducing its GSO-arc avoidance angle by 60%--
from 10 degrees to 4 degrees--with resultant effects on typical GSO
networks of less than 3% degraded throughput and 0.1% absolute increase
in unavailability. While commenters note certain limitations of the
SpaceX real-world testing--that it was only conducted in the Ku-band;
that it does not reflect year-long rain fade effects; and that tested
interference to a GSO earth station located in the center of the GSO
beam, where the desired signal is strongest, would be lower than the
interference to a GSO earth station located at the edge of the GSO
beam, where the desired signal is weakest--no other commenter has
presented alternative interference measurements on the record for
consideration.
b. Simulations
24. Technical studies containing simulations further support the
conclusion that NGSO systems could significantly improve capacity and
coverage with limited effects on GSO networks. In one scenario analyzed
for the Amazon system, for example, the NGSO system could operate at
increased power levels, reduce its GSO-arc avoidance angle from 18
degrees to 3 degrees, and operate at an Nco of 4 (quadrupling its
capacity in any given area), and the largest increase in unavailability
for all ten studied GSO links would be 0.000000073%. The largest
decrease in throughput was 1.27% for a customer terminal, with half of
the ten links studied showing a decrease of 0.00956% or less. In
another scenario analyzed for the Amazon system, the NGSO system could
maintain its lower power level, reduce its GSO-arc avoidance angle to 2
degrees, and operate at an Nco of 8 (octupling the capacity), and the
largest increase in unavailability would be 0.000001756%. At most,
Amazon estimated GSO operators would experience a loss of 2.72% in
throughput, with half of the ten links studied showing a throughput
decrease of 0.175% or less. For SpaceX's Starlink, simulations of
interference from the NGSO system into a 46 cm Ku-band user terminal in
Oregon showed an absolute increase in unavailability of 0.0047%,
assuming an Nco of 15 and a GSO-arc avoidance angle of 18 degrees, and
a 0.0251% increase if the avoidance angle were reduced to 4 degrees.
Another simulation attempted to replicate the results of the SpaceX
real-world testing in Bogota, Colombia and found compliance with a 0.1%
absolute increase in unavailability limit.
25. Simulations on the record assessing the capacity gains of
degraded throughput rely on varying assumptions, which we examine later
from a GSO coexistence perspective. For present purposes, the
simulations presented support the conclusion that the EPFD limits
greatly constrain NGSO capacity. We disagree with suggestions
[[Page 26932]]
that the combined record of rarely available, real-world measurement
data and numerous simulations is an insufficient technical basis on
which to adopt a degraded throughput methodology aligned with the
Commission's NGSO-NGSO sharing framework and the international NGSO-GSO
sharing framework in Q- and V-bands. As the studies show, even a simple
change of Nco from one to two could double the capacity available in a
given area, while meeting GSO protection criteria proposed on the
record.
2. Connecting the Unconnected
26. Satellite connections have long been a lifeline for Americans
in rural and remote areas, where rugged terrain, sparse population, and
economic realities have often kept terrestrial networks out of reach.
Today, satellites are an increasingly powerful tool in the combined
efforts to close the digital divide. The Federal Government has
directed billions in funding for broadband deployment and adoption,
culminating in the $65 billion investment in the 2021 Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law. Yet, in 2024, more than one third of Americans had
only one provider of high-speed broadband or lacked access altogether.
27. This rulemaking has benefitted from the views and experiences
of Americans living and working in rural and underserved areas, and
those who advocate on their behalf, on the impact that modernization of
the NGSO-GSO sharing framework could have for Americans on the wrong
side of the digital divide. These citizens and non-profits note that in
their communities, as in many rural areas, NGSO FSS satellites may
offer the only viable broadband solution, enabling access to telehealth
services, remote learning, digital job training, remote work
opportunities, and emergency communications. These commenters argue
that modernizing the NGSO-GSO sharing framework will enable NGSO
providers to expand capacity, increase speeds, and improve service
reliability, which are ``transformational improvements for the
communities we serve.'' Rural voices on the record uniformly urge us to
update the NGSO-GSO spectrum sharing rules, without delay.
28. NGSO satellite operators are investing heavily as uptake grows,
and the potential for low-latency, gigabit satellite broadband is on
the horizon. High-throughput satellite capacity has been forecast to
grow nine-fold between 2023 and 2028, with NGSO constellations driving
97% of the net increase. And new NGSO satellite capacity is already
being put to significant use--not only offering high-speed, low-latency
broadband in rural areas, but also supporting critical industries, from
aviation and shipping to manufacturing and agriculture, and providing
network resiliency, delivering robust connectivity capable of
supporting life-saving real-time communications. Yet supply constraints
remain. It is imperative that we look at new ways to leverage the
exploding growth of NGSO systems to aid the combined effort to expand
access and competition in broadband and other services in the United
States--starting with the most constraining regulatory requirement on
NGSO broadband systems today.
3. Fostering New Competitive Entry
29. Modernizing the NGSO-GSO sharing regime would also bring
particular benefits for new entrant LEO-satellite systems. With greater
operational flexibility under revised sharing rules, new LEO systems
would need smaller constellations and still have greater capacity to
reach more customers, which would reflect a substantial reduction in
launch costs, satellite costs, and costs of a new LEO constellation.
For example, one analysis indicates that a constellation that would
require 462 LEO satellites under existing EPFD rules to have a certain
coverage could obtain the same coverage with updated rules with only
360 satellites. ICLE argues the EPFD limits impose ``significant market
distortions'' that ``translate directly into higher costs per unit of
capacity delivered to consumers, as operators must deploy more
satellites and infrastructure to achieve the same service levels.''
Lower costs from a revised NGSO-GSO sharing framework would encourage
new entry as well as lower prices for customers. In addition, greater
capacity would make LEO broadband more competitive vis-[agrave]-vis
fixed broadband and bring greater choice to consumers.
4. Maximizing Efficient Spectrum Use
30. In modernizing the spectrum sharing framework between GSO and
NGSO satellite systems, we seek to achieve abundance and reject
technically unnecessary restrictions borne from a zero-sum mindset. We
are guided by the Commission's policy statement on spectrum management
in doing so. This policy, when applied to the current rulemaking,
favors efficiency over absolute protection guarantees. As most
pertinent to this rulemaking, the Commission noted that:
<bullet> The electromagnetic environment is highly variable, and
zero risk of occasional service degradation or interruption cannot be
guaranteed.
<bullet> Services should plan for the spectrum environment in which
they intend to operate, the service they intend to provide, and the
characteristics of spectrally and spatially proximate operations.
Planning should be ongoing and account for changes in spectrum
operating environments.
<bullet> Radio transmitter and receiver system operators and
equipment manufacturers should plan for and design error tolerant
systems, using good engineering practices, to mitigate degradation from
interference.
<bullet> Quantitative analyses of interactions between services
that are fact-and evidence-based, sufficiently robust, transparent, and
reproducible are needed to better inform spectrum management decision-
making.
31. Our decision making in this proceeding squarely aligns with
these principles and is supported by the best-available, real-world
data presented in the record as set forth below. Further, when
considering more intensive use of spectrum for new and innovative
services, we are acutely aware that ``[a] uniform or absolute
expectation of service availability could preclude the introduction of
valuable new services in the RF [radiofrequency] environment and
undermine the efficient use of spectrum resources.'' And we continue to
expect proponents of interference claims ``to supply sufficiently
complete, transparent, and reproducible quantitative analytical models
of the interactions between radio services, with respect to transmitter
and receiver performance characteristics and the RF environment.''
32. Even when considered in their own right, the current EPFD
limits have raised significant concerns as to whether they constitute
an efficient spectrum sharing regime for GSO and NGSO systems in the
10.7-12.7 GHz, 17.3-18.6 GHz, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands. Most starkly,
the differing treatment of Ka-band frequencies--where the EPFD limit in
the upper portion of the band is substantially more restrictive than
the EPFD limit in the lower portion of the band--is widely criticized
in the record as technically unjustified. In addition, the overall
methodology used to derive the current EPFD limits has been called into
question, including the use of methodologies designed to address short-
term interference to develop long-term EPFD limits, overly conservative
modeling of rain attenuation, and the
[[Page 26933]]
inclusion of a large number of unstable links with negative link margin
values in the set of GSO reference links used to derive the EPFD
limits.
33. Compliance with the current EPFD limits results in spectrally
inefficient, overprotection of modern GSO networks that exceeds the
protection GSO operators afford each other. Indeed, the comparison with
GSO-GSO protection is illustrative. As GSO satellites operate from
fixed locations along the 360-degree GSO arc, a primary strategy for
managing potential GSO-GSO interference is through orbital separation.
Internationally, the GSO orbital separation provisions in the ITU Radio
Regulations presume negligible interference beyond orbital separation
of 6 degrees in the Ku-band and 8 degrees in Ka-band. The Commission's
own orbital spacing policy for GSO FSS networks in these bands is based
on two-degree spacing. Yet, as noted in one U.S. study submitted to ITU
WP 4A, maintaining a level of GSO-GSO protection equivalent to the ITU
EPFD limits would require significantly larger orbital separations--
estimated as at least 25 and 46 degrees in the Ku- and Ka-bands,
respectively. Thus, the ITU EPFD limits are 4 to 5 times more
restrictive than equivalent GSO-GSO protections that guard against all
but negligible levels of interference--and 12 to 23 times more
restrictive than the Commission's equivalent separation rules.
34. Analyses on the record further quantify these current
protection levels. According to one study modeling an NGSO system
operating under current EPFD limits, short-term interference to a set
of ten GSO reference links resulted in undetectable increases in
absolute unavailability in both the lower and upper Ka-bands, while the
maximum decrease in throughput in the lower Ka-band was 0.162%. Five of
the other links showed throughput decreases of 0.0011% or less. In the
upper Ka-band (where EPFD limits are significantly more restraining)
the maximum decrease in throughput was 0.0148% with five of the other
links having decreases of 0.000012% or less.
5. Encouraging Good-Faith Coordination
35. Beyond the improvements in technical efficiency of NGSO
operations and attendant lower costs for consumers, a modernized NGSO-
GSO sharing framework can encourage private negotiations where the
current EPFD regime has prevented beneficial bargaining. While ITU
Radio Regulations explicitly permit EPFD limits to be exceeded on the
territory of an administration that so agrees, coordination between any
particular NGSO and GSO operator does not affect the NGSO operator's
obligation to demonstrate adherence to the EPFD limits at the ITU.
Under revised NGSO-GSO sharing rules, private bargaining among GSO and
NGSO operators will have greater relevance. And these benefits will be
added to the significant improvements in NGSO system capacity and
efficiency, with limited impact on GSO operations, and will combine
with the explosive growth of the NGSO satellite industry (which further
increases the benefits of efficiency gains) in comparison with the
relatively stable, or declining, rate of growth of many GSO operations.
36. Other Commission precedent supports a requirement of good-faith
coordination backstopped by performance-based interference metrics in
the NGSO-GSO sharing context. Indeed, when recently considering
protection requirements between NGSO FSS systems, which universally
incorporate ACM, the Commission adopted a long-term protection
criterion of 3% degraded throughput, and a short-term protection
criterion based on the absolute increase in link unavailability (0.4%),
and it declined to create aggregate limits on NGSO interference into
other NGSO systems. Importantly, the Commission explained that
notwithstanding its newly adopted default protection requirements,
coordination among satellite operators in the first instance ``offers
the best opportunity for efficient spectrum sharing.'' Similarly, when
the Commission revised its two-degree orbital spacing rules for GSO
satellites in 2015 it explicitly acknowledged the value of coordination
agreements reached between GSO satellite operators and offered
continued protection of coordinated operations even when they did not
comply with default, two-degree spacing rules. In addition, there is no
conflict between the comprehensive update to the NGSO-GSO sharing
framework undertaken in this rulemaking based on a substantial
technical record and the previous adoption--in the absence of any well-
developed alternative--of ITU EPFD limits, including in the 17.3-17.8
GHz band, which reflected prior domestic alignment with ITU rules
before a compelling reason to depart from those rules was developed.
37. We re-emphasize this fundamental principle--that private
agreements, not heavy-handed regulation, lead to the most efficient
satellite spectrum sharing outcomes--and firmly incorporate it into
NGSO-GSO sharing in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands.
Unlike compliance with EPFD limits, which is assessed by the ITU BR and
effectively replaces any coordination among GSO and NGSO operators in
bands subject to EPFD limits, our default GSO protection criteria and
framework will explicitly recognize and require good-faith
coordination. This is facilitated by the fact that, while we adopt a
default set of GSO reference links below to facilitate technical
showings of compliance with the GSO protection criteria by NGSO
applicants, the particular reference links are taken from particular
satellite networks. We believe interference protections should
ultimately be rooted in real-world interference realities. So when an
NGSO operator completes coordination with a particular GSO network
serving the United States, we will permit the NGSO operator to revise
its technical compatibility showing by omitting the links of the GSO
network with which coordination was completed. By doing so, we avoid
the intractable barriers to coordination under the current regime while
offering a transparent means for agreements between NGSO and GSO
operators to be reflected in the authorized operating parameters of the
NGSO system.
6. Keeping Pace With Technological Advancements
38. Satellite technology has advanced profoundly since EPFD limits
were developed in the 1990s. Analog satellite transponders have been
replaced by digital systems with onboard processors. Large, fixed beams
have given way to smaller, steerable beams using phase array antennas.
Adaptive coding and modulation techniques allow satellite links to be
maintained despite interference (such as adverse weather) by varying
throughput. Operators have incorporated dynamic beam pointing, uplink
and downlink power control, and network protocols that provide greater
resilience to environmental effects and interference. And on the earth
station side, large dishes have given way to very small aperture
terminals that allow for widespread, cost-effective connectivity.
39. These technological developments both allow NGSO systems to
better control and limit interference into GSO networks and strengthen
GSO operations' ability to adapt to changing interference environments.
Fundamentally, they have enabled more intensive, compatible shared use
of the spectrum. Indeed, the availability of ACM with expected GSO
networks in the Q- and V-bands was a significant
[[Page 26934]]
factor that led the international community to decline EPFD limits in
the Q- and V-bands and instead adopt an NGSO-GSO sharing framework
incorporating a long-term GSO protection criterion of 3% degraded
throughput.
7. Promoting U.S. Leadership Globally
40. In launching the NPRM in this proceeding, we concluded it was
appropriate to begin our domestic review of the NGSO-GSO sharing regime
without awaiting the outcome of ongoing deliberations at the ITU.
Experience to date has reinforced that judgment. While individual
member states, including the United States, have continued to
contribute to the ongoing technical studies on the current Article 22
EPFD limits in ITU WP 4A, needless procedural roadblocks and delay
tactics have repeatedly ground international technical discussions to a
halt. Although some stakeholders have suggested deferring domestic
action pending further ITU developments, we believe it is important to
move forward in a timely manner to provide regulatory clarity and
support connectivity for millions of Americans, even as the ITU process
continues toward WRC-27.
41. At the same time, we believe our approach can promote global
collaboration toward spectrum harmonization. We anticipate that the
record developed in this proceeding, including technical analyses and,
over time, real-world implementation outcomes, may serve as a useful
reference point for the ITU's ongoing work. We also hope that the
Commission's policy framework can contribute constructively to
discussions leading up to WRC-27, as the international community
explores approaches to NGSO-GSO sharing that enhance broadband
performance, expand access in rural and remote areas, promote
competition, and ultimately benefit consumers worldwide.
42. As we originally anticipated, this rulemaking has compiled an
exceptional technical record--including real-world measurements and
additional, detailed technical simulations not submitted to
international fora--that enable us to make a forward-looking decision
now in the best interests of Americans. While international
deliberations may--and should--converge on a similar revision to the
EPFD framework in the future, the ITU Radio Regulations explicitly
recognize administrations' rights to exceed EPFD limits on their own
territory in the meantime. And such exceedances are technically
feasible without altering EPFD compliance in neighboring countries with
use of narrow, spot beams and other modern NGSO satellite technologies.
Our action will promote American leadership at a time of increasing
global competition.
B. Modernized Sharing Rules for NGSO-GSO
1. Coordination Default and Degraded Throughput Backstop
43. We consider and ultimately reject countervailing arguments in
favor of retaining the current EPFD limits. One argument is that GSO
operations are uniquely prone to interference. SES, for example,
asserts that the ``EPFD framework is necessary because GSO satellites
operate at fixed orbital positions in a specific orbital arc and cannot
maneuver or switch satellites to mitigate the interference caused by
NGSO systems operating in shared frequency bands.'' However, the EPFD
limits are not the only way to protect GSO networks from unacceptable
interference, as shown by the international adoption of the degraded
throughput methodology to protect GSO networks in Q- and V-bands.
Eutelsat argues that EPFD limits are uniquely suited to protecting GSO
operations, because ``EPFD limits mitigate [the] risks [of dynamic,
time-varying interference caused by NGSO systems] by placing strict
bounds on both peak and aggregate interference levels'' and
``appropriately protect high-value links to support diverse
applications by differentiating EPFD limits according to terminal
characteristics.'' However, the degraded throughput methodology also
limits peak and aggregate interference (or short-term and long-term
interference, in the terminology of a degraded throughput analysis) and
accounts for differing terminal characteristics through a set of GSO
reference links.
44. In addition, while Viasat argues that alternatives to EPFD
limits are a hinderance to innovation by GSO operators, the degraded
throughput methodology will allow continued innovation by protecting
GSO operators from actual, unacceptable interference, as demonstrated
by the NGSO applicant, while also significantly improving the
efficiency of the NGSO system and use of the spectrum overall. Viasat
also argues that calls for reform of the NGSO-GSO sharing framework are
merely ``calls to hobble competition'' as they rest on ``deeply flawed
claims that eliminating the EPFD limits would not expose existing and
future GSO operations to unacceptable levels of interference.'' While
it is unclear what level of interference Viasat would deem
``acceptable,'' especially considering its support of the extremely
restrictive upper Ka-band EPFD limits, the repeated, months-long, real-
world measurements submitted by SpaceX have demonstrated that EPFD
limits can be exceeded without significant impact to currently
operating GSO networks. Viasat further claims that any reforms to the
NGSO-GSO sharing framework ``would frustrate efforts by GSO operators
to introduce innovative service offerings.'' To the extent this means
the future deployment of earth station terminals particularly
susceptible to interference that require the levels of protection
offered by the upper Ka-band EPFD limits, the burdens on NGSO systems
from such unequal spectrum sharing have not been justified. Viasat and
other commenters also argue that the significant recent growth in NGSO
systems is proof that EPFD limits are not unduly constraining. But the
fact of such growth--spurred by technological advances and the inherent
benefits of lower latency and potentially broader coverage derived from
NGSO satellite constellations, especially in LEO--does not negate any
of the benefits of NGSO-GSO sharing reform.
45. SES argues that eliminating EPFD protections would shift the
burden of interference mitigation onto GSO operators and the Commission
in administering a new framework. However, NGSO operators would still
have a unilateral requirement to protect GSO networks under a degraded
throughput framework the Commission is already administering in the
NGSO-NGSO sharing context. SES also raises concerns that, without EPFD
limits in place, NGSO operators may tilt the competitive landscape in
their favor and eventually monopolize shared spectrum bands. Yet as
long as NGSO systems have a one-way requirement to protect GSO
networks, and not claim protection from them, it is impossible for NGSO
systems to monopolize the shared spectrum. SES further argues that
moving away from the EPFD regime would devalue GSO service assets
potentially to the point of stranding those assets, and discourage
future GSO investments and innovation. SES provides no economic
evidence in support of this strong claim, nor does it contend that the
use of the degraded throughput methodology in Q- and V-bands has
foreclosed future GSO use of those bands. We believe that under
appropriate protection criteria in a degraded throughput framework GSO
networks can continue to grow and provide valuable services.
46. Commenters also present technical simulations showing
[[Page 26935]]
exceedances of proposed protection criteria. For example, analyses of
the Amazon system assuming an Nco of 16 and a GSO-arc avoidance angle
as low as 2 degrees indicate exceedances of the proposed threshold
limits at certain locations. An analysis of the Starlink system at a
GSO network earth station in Lima, Peru, assuming an Nco of 8 and a
GSO-arc avoidance angle of 4 degrees, also indicates exceedances of a
0.1% absolute increase in unavailability. Additionally, Eutelsat
presents simulations in which the Starlink system, when using an EPFD-
compliant configuration of an Nco of 1 and a GSO-arc avoidance angle of
18 degrees, would nonetheless exceed the thresholds of 3% degraded
throughput and 0.1% absolute increase in unavailability for the four
analyzed GSO links in Ku-band--thus indicating that the current EPFD
limits may be less protective than the proposed new protection
criteria, a conclusion not suggested by any other commenter and
contrary to the real-world testing summarized above. Ultimately,
compliance with the GSO protection criteria we are adopting must be
demonstrated by the NGSO applicant. If certain NGSO operational
parameters are not currently feasible while meeting those criteria for
the set of GSO reference links, then they will not be permitted. Thus,
simulations showing exceedances for certain NGSO operational parameters
at certain locations do not undermine our conclusion that significant
capacity and service improvements are possible under performance-based
GSO protection criteria, as demonstrated by real-world testing and
technical simulations.
47. Commenters also present simulations showing exceedances of
proposed protection criteria that demonstrate the interplay between
short-term and long-term interference protections. For example, studies
of the Starlink system in Ka-band assuming an Nco of 40 and a GSO-arc
avoidance angle of either 18 degrees or 4 degrees found less than a
0.1% absolute increase in unavailability at non-ACM GSO network user
terminal locations in Oregon (0.016% and 0.03%, respectively), Utah
(0.041% and 0.056%, respectively), Oklahoma (0.071% and 0.098%,
respectively), Alabama (0.030% and 0.032%, respectively), and New
Mexico (0.046% and 0.095%, respectively); and exceedances of the 0.1%
limit in New York (0.104% and 0.171%, respectively). For the Amazon
system, studies assuming an Nco of 16 and a GSO-arc avoidance angle of
either 6 degrees or 2 degrees in Ka-band showed compliance with a 0.1%
absolute increase in unavailability limit for user terminals in Oregon
(0.025% and 0.038%, respectively) and Alabama (0.01% and 0.035%,
respectively); mixed results--compliance with an avoidance angle of 6
degrees and exceedances at 2 degrees--for earth stations in Oklahoma
(0.024% and 0.566%, respectively), New York (0.03% and 0.39%,
respectively), and New Mexico (0.01% and 1.37%, respectively); and
exceedances for an earth station in Utah (0.14% and 1.47%,
respectively). However, in all these cases for both the Starlink and
Amazon systems, the separate long-term limit proposed for non-ACM GSO
links such as these, -10.5 dB I/N for 80% of the time, was exceeded.
Because both long-term and short-term limits would need to be met at
all locations, the effect of the -10.5 dB I/N long-term limit would
further reduce the expected short-term absolute increases in
unavailability in all cases, even where a 0.1% short-term limit was met
with a wide margin. With ACM networks, analyses for the Amazon Ka-band
system, for example, similarly indicate that the proposed long-term
protection criteria of 3% throughput degradation is the limiting factor
even when a short-term 0.1% absolute increase in unavailability limit
is met.
48. Having concluded that existing EPFD limits are needlessly
prescriptive, outdated, and overprotective of GSO operations, and that
they unreasonably constrain services by innovative new NGSO systems, we
turn to their replacement. For FSS systems using ACM, we conclude--
again--that the performance-based metrics of throughput degradation and
increase in absolute unavailability represent efficient and appropriate
protection criteria. Indeed, when recently establishing protection
criteria for NGSO-NGSO sharing in bands including the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-
18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands, the Commission likewise set long-term
and short-term protection thresholds using these metrics. The
Commission did so because, for ACM satellite systems, the degraded
throughput methodology reflects modern technology, results in efficient
spectrum sharing, and is readily administrable. The same reasoning now
applies to the NGSO-GSO sharing context. Even the ITU, when more
recently establishing protections for GSO networks from NGSO systems in
bands between 37.5 GHz and 51.4 GHz, chose a degraded throughput
methodology, not EPFD limits. In contrast, pursuing merely different
EPFD limits would sacrifice the benefits of performance-based metrics
and needlessly delay reform, as parties proposing the development of
new EPFD limits do not themselves propose definitive limits for
adoption.
49. A degraded throughput methodology does not make enforceability
more difficult than the current EPFD regime. As noted below, under our
modernized framework, NGSO applicants will be required to submit
transparent technical analyses of how they would meet the GSO
protection criteria, which will be subject to public and Commission
review. In contrast, the current ITU compliance assessments have been
noted as ``opaque'' and encouraging ``gamesmanship.'' Nor is the
degraded throughput analysis unduly complex given its benefits, as it
is already used by satellite operators to assess NGSO-GSO interference.
Nor would GSO operators lose the ability to control their service
quality. As we discussed in response to similar concerns in the NGSO-
NGSO sharing context, the interference criteria must be met at all
analyzed locations. Since the worst-case locations will drive NGSO
operators' determinations of appropriate system parameters and any
mitigation measures, the actual degradations in throughput, absolute
increases in unavailability, and I/N levels will be less than the
protection criteria in many circumstances. And studies on the record
confirm these differing impacts. Thus, earth station equipment that is
used for high-availability applications, and that is less sensitive to
sidelobe interference than the most sensitive user terminals to be
protected, will experience real-world effects significantly below the
protection criteria. In a similar vein, Eutelsat raises concerns that
the degraded throughput methodology inappropriately allows a gateway
link to be degraded as much as a user link, although impacts to gateway
links can impact service to numerous customers at once. Again, this is
a theoretical concern that is unlikely, if ever, to occur in reality,
because the NGSO system must be configured to cause no more
interference than the most protective criteria for a GSO link, and
because larger, gateway earth station antennas are inherently less
susceptible to sidelobe interference than smaller user terminals and
therefore will receive less, often substantially less, interference
than the thresholds.
[[Page 26936]]
2. Long-Term Interference Backstop
50. We adopt a 3% time-weighted average degraded throughput
threshold as the long-term interference metric that NGSO systems must
comply with for the protection of GSO networks using ACM in the 10.7-
12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands.
51. Consistent with the Commission's decision making in the NGSO-
NGSO sharing context for modern satellite systems using ACM, we
conclude that adopting this value best furthers our goals of allowing
for competitive new and improved services by NGSO operators while
providing adequate protection of GSO networks. First, this value has
been thoroughly developed, debated, and adopted for the protection of
GSO networks using ACM in the Q- and V-bands internationally, as well
as for the protection of NGSO systems using ACM in bands including the
10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands. Second, the 3% value is
the only degraded throughput value proposed, analyzed, and supported on
the record. Third, the 3% throughput-degradation threshold limits the
interference allowed at any analyzed GSO network earth station
location, not the expected average of interference across all
locations. Since the worst-case scenarios will drive the overall NGSO
system parameters necessary to guarantee protection of the most
sensitive link, actual interference will be less than 3% in many
circumstances. Importantly, GSO satellite operators will be able to
further reduce this level of throughput degradation for given customers
by the use, or continued use, of appropriate earth station equipment
that is less sensitive than the most sensitive links to be protected,
considering geographic and other factors. And, GSO operators may
coordinate directly with NGSO operators regarding accommodation of
particular use cases, and we will require good-faith coordination
efforts by both GSO and NGSO operators in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and
19.7-20.2 GHz bands. Finally, analysis on the record indicates that a
3% degraded throughput threshold is achievable by current and planned
NGSO systems, and could enable significantly greater spectrum use and
cost savings by NGSO systems in comparison to the current EPFD limits.
52. We find that objections expressed in the record with respect to
the well-established 3% degraded throughput limit for ACM systems are
technically unpersuasive. Despite its past support for a 3% threshold
for ACM systems in the NGSO-NGSO context, Viasat argues that such a
threshold would ``leave GSO networks and their end users exposed to
significant interference risks.'' Viasat's supporting study, however,
focuses on the interplay between a roughly 3% degradation in throughput
and the impact on non-performance-affecting static ``reserve
capacity''--a hypothetical concept contemplated in the 1990s that is
ill-defined and does not reflect how actual ACM systems operate. The
study indicates that ACM systems, which are specifically designed to
better handle intermittent interference, will experience substantially
more interference and worse performance than non-ACM systems. We
believe that months of real-world testing are a better indicator of
actual interference impacts than studies relying on the ``reserve
capacity'' concept.
53. Eutelsat expresses concern that, even with a 3% time-weighted
average throughput degradation threshold, throughput losses will exceed
3% at times. Eutelsat argues that if ``a customer experiences a 13.62%
degradation for 1% of a 24-hour period, that means they experience
about 15 minutes a day of massively degraded service,'' which is
``especially problematic for enterprise level or business-to-business
customer links.'' This worst-case analysis, however, which could not be
replicated by one other commenter, assumes that both the GSO and the
NGSO customer would need the full capacity of all the spectrum at issue
on all available satellites for that full 15 minutes at the same times,
and that Eutelsat chooses an earth station antenna that is particularly
susceptible to interference for its enterprise customer. As noted
above, GSO operators can reliably reduce their expected interference
through appropriate earth station antenna choice and network design. We
need not devise general interference limits based on a combination of
unlikely events and worst-case scenarios. Further, as a long-term
protection criterion, the change in time-weighted average throughput
has already been adopted internationally for the protection of GSO
networks using ACM from NGSO systems in the Q- and V-bands. To the
extent that an NGSO system complying with the long-term and short-term
protection criteria still presents a realistic risk of such
interference spikes to a GSO network, that possibility can be discussed
during good-faith coordination between the operators.
3. Short-Term Interference Backstop
54. We adopt a 0.1% absolute increase in link unavailability as the
short-term GSO interference metric. For the reasons discussed below, we
conclude that this 0.1% value, which is more protective than the
alternative 0.4% value proposed on the record and adopted in the NGSO-
NGSO sharing context, will provide adequate protection of GSO networks
while offering substantially improved opportunities for efficient
spectrum sharing with NGSO systems. Indeed, we expect the real-world
short-term impact to be less than this 0.1% value in many instances
given not only varying GSO network antenna performance but also
technical studies indicating that it is the long-term protection
criteria we are adopting that are the limiting factor, since it is the
most restrictive protection criterion that will govern NGSO operational
characteristics.
55. As an initial matter, as in the NGSO-NGSO sharing context, we
considered both a relative measure of increase in link unavailability
and an absolute measure of increase in unavailability. We again
conclude that the use of an absolute increase in link unavailability as
the short-term interference metric provides a more reliable measure of
short-term interference that is not as susceptible to significant
fluctuations as a relative increase metric would be. This is because,
for satellite links with a high baseline availability, the relative
measure of increase can prove incredibly sensitive. For example, if a
GSO link with a baseline availability of 99.99% were reduced to 99.98%,
this would represent an absolute change of only 0.01% but a relative
change of 100%; while the same, relative 100% increase in
unavailability for a GSO link with a baseline availability of 99.5%
would represent a 50-times larger or 0.5% absolute change. Especially
given the lower value of 0.1% increase that we are adopting in the
NGSO-GSO sharing context in comparison with the 0.4% increase permitted
in the NGSO-NGSO sharing context, we conclude that the absolute measure
of unavailability will provide sufficient protection without the
volatility and potential for extremely limiting protection requirements
under a relative increase in unavailability metric.
56. We also find that the 0.1% unavailability increase criterion
will adequately protect GSO networks. Indeed, it may approximate the
maximum short-term interference a GSO satellite operator in Ku-band
would expect from another GSO satellite operating 6.5 degrees away on
the GSO arc, a distance at which no coordination between the GSO
operators would be required under the ITU Radio Regulations because the
interference is
[[Page 26937]]
expected to be negligible. Moreover, like the long-term interference
metric adopted above, this short-term interference metric will limit
the increase in link unavailability at any analyzed location. Since the
worst-case locations will drive NGSO operators' determinations of
appropriate system parameters and any mitigation measures, the actual
increase in unavailability will be less than 0.1% in many
circumstances. And importantly, GSO operators can realistically
increase the availability of their links by choosing earth station
equipment that is less sensitive to interference than the most
sensitive GSO links being protected. In addition, GSO operators may
coordinate directly with NGSO operators regarding any particular use
cases. We also conclude that adopting a 0.1% absolute increase in
unavailability metric will simultaneously support competitive new and
expanded NGSO services because analyses on the record indicate it can
accommodate current and planned NGSO systems.
57. Further, we note that, while the Commission does not guarantee
privately negotiated service levels of GSO operators, we believe that
concerns on the record about maintaining high availability GSO links
are overstated. First, the 0.1% limit is inherently protective. Even
the most sensitive GSO reference link, which typically represents a
small, mass-market user terminal rather than an enterprise-level
customer demanding high availability, could maintain a link
availability near 99.9% in the presence of an operational NGSO system.
Second, actual enterprise-level customers or others negotiating for
high availability services will experience significantly less--perhaps
exponentially less--reduction in unavailability than 0.1%. This is
because the operating parameters of the NGSO system will be driven by
the need to protect the most vulnerable GSO link, and because the
inherent design of GSO links predicated on maintaining high
availability renders them less susceptible to interference from NGSO
systems, for example by use of earth station antennas with higher main-
beam gain and lower sidelobes. Third, as we explained in the NGSO-NGSO
context, we expect that any cumulative, real-world effects of two or
more NGSO systems will likely be less than a simple multiplication of
the 0.1% limit by the number of NGSO interferers--even for the most
sensitive GSO link--because doing so fails to account for mitigation
techniques or other spectrum-sharing measures that may be applied by
the NGSO systems to reduce interference to each other, and accordingly
reduce their overall aggregate impact to GSO networks. Accordingly, our
adoption of a 0.1% limit on absolute increase in unavailability
considers the real-world implications of the limit in order to achieve
an efficient and reasonable balance between expanded NGSO services and
continued, competitive GSO services, rather than imposing arbitrary
constraints on NGSO systems to guarantee a theoretical level of GSO
service premised on simple, worst-case interference assumptions. We
also consider the interplay of the 0.1% limit with our long-term
protection criteria. As indicated in simulations, even NGSO system
configurations that result in a 0.01% short-term impact to non-ACM GSO
links, or a 0.03% impact to ACM GSO links, could exceed the applicable
long-term limits of -10.5 dB for 80% of the time or 3% time-weighted
average degraded throughput, and therefore the short-term impact would
be reduced even further to comply with the long-term criteria. In this
way, our choice of long-term GSO protection criteria, especially a
limit of -10.5 dB for 80% of the time for GSO networks not using ACM,
further addresses concerns raised about short-term impacts to GSO
networks, and in particular to non-ACM networks.
4. Interference Backstop for GSOs Without ACM
58. As we move towards performance-based protection metrics for
NGSO-GSO spectrum sharing in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2
GHz bands, we recognize that there are continuing GSO satellite
operations that do not employ ACM because of the nature of the service
they are providing--for example, video transmissions to geographically
diverse areas of the country that cannot adapt to changing interference
environments in particular areas--and for which a degraded throughput
limit would be inappropriate. These GSO satellite services are more
prominent in Ku-band, especially BSS, but also exist in Ka-band as
well. For the protection of non-ACM GSO satellite links we adopt a
protection threshold of -10.5 dB I/N for 80% of the time.
59. With an I/N threshold of -10.5 dB, the level of interference
that a Ku-band GSO satellite would experience from an NGSO system is
approximately equivalent to that of two GSO Ku-band satellites that are
separated by approximately 6.5 degrees. As noted above, under the ITU
coordination procedures, Ku-band GSO satellite networks that are
separated by more than 6 degrees are not required to coordinate with
each other because of the presumed negligible interference effects. In
addition, a -10.5 dB I/N limit for 80% of the time was assumed to be
protective of FSS and BSS networks in the portions of the Ka-band
(24.65-25.25 GHz and 27-27.5 GHz) during international studies with
International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT) systems prior to WRC-19.
And, the -10.5 dB I/N limit has been validated through real-world
testing.
60. The long-term limit of -10.5 dB I/N for 80% of time will work
in tandem with the 0.1% absolute increase in unavailability short-term
limit to protect non-ACM GSO operations. While some commenters argue
that a short-term metric alone is the most relevant for assessing
interference to non-ACM links, we believe that including an additional,
long-term interference metric will provide additional protection to GSO
video distribution links without being overly constraining on NGSO
operators, as it is supported by the largest NGSO operator in Ku-band,
where non-ACM links are more prevalent.
61. We will require the -10.5 dB I/N for 80% of time limit to be
met for non-ACM links in both Ku-band and Ka-band. While the record
indicates the remaining non-ACM GSO networks are generally concentrated
in Ku-band, non-ACM GSO networks are also deployed and providing video
service to customers using Ka-band and at least for these networks, the
choice of not using ACM is a result of the video distribution type of
service being provided, not due to the use of older or less advanced
earth station equipment alone. Noting that the only specific proposal
on the record for the long-term protection of non-ACM GSO links is the
-10.5 dB I/N limit, we will, as with our short-term limit and long-term
ACM limit described above, apply this equally to GSO operations in the
Ku-band and Ka-band.
5. GSO-Arc Avoidance Angle
62. Above, based on an exceptional technical record, we adopted
protection criteria for modern GSO networks that will enable
substantial improvements in spectrum use by NGSO systems, resulting in
higher capacity and lower costs, using performance-based metrics that
accommodate the gold standard of efficient satellite spectrum
management--coordination. Nonetheless, we recognize that moving towards
a modernized, degraded-throughput based spectrum sharing framework is a
significant shift from the EPFD protections that GSO operators had been
accustomed to receiving in the
[[Page 26938]]
10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands in the United States.
63. Therefore, in addition to the specific protection criteria
described above, we will require NGSO systems in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-
18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands to observe a 3-degree GSO-arc avoidance
angle with respect to any operational co-frequency GSO satellite
serving the United States. This angle, which was one of the angles used
during the SpaceX real-world testing campaign, approximately reflects
the widest main-beam width of GSO satellite earth station antennas
currently listed and protected under ITU EPFD limits. Since NGSO
operations near the GSO arc typically represent the greatest
interfering scenario for a GSO network earth station, observing this 3-
degree GSO-arc avoidance angle will provide an additional layer of
assurance that NGSO satellite transmissions will not fall within the
main beam of the receiving victim earth station and therefore the
resulting increase in interference will be minimal. At the same time,
it will facilitate NGSO deployment.
64. In the NGSO-NGSO sharing context, the Commission adopted
protection criteria for NGSO systems authorized through an earlier
processing round and required later-round applicants to demonstrate
compliance with those limits if coordination agreements with the
earlier-round operators had not yet been reached. While those technical
demonstrations were pending before the Commission, however, NGSO
operators are permitted to begin operating on a non-interference basis.
In this instance, a minimum GSO-arc avoidance angle will achieve a
similar balance of encouraging immediate services to the public and
providing protection of other operators. Thus, we will allow NGSO
satellite applicants to submit technical demonstrations of compliance
with the GSO protection criteria, and begin operating on an
unprotected, non-interference basis even if those technical
demonstrations remain pending and not yet acted on by the Commission,
provided they operate consistent both with the operational parameters
reflected in the technical demonstrations and the 3-degree GSO-arc
avoidance angle.
65. We note that the minimum 3-degree GSO-arc avoidance angle
represents an additional layer of protection for GSO networks that may
restrict NGSO systems more than is strictly necessary. Although an
avoidance angle may not sufficiently protect GSO networks on its own,
because it does not account for other key variables such as transmit
power and the number of co-frequency satellites transmitting to the
same location at the same time, it should provide an added level of
assurance to GSO network operators should NGSO systems need to begin
operating while their technical demonstrations of compliance with the
protection criteria remain pending. With greater experience
implementing the new NGSO-GSO sharing framework, we may re-visit this
requirement.
6. GSO Reference Links
66. To accompany the protection criteria above, we adopt a set of
GSO reference links reflecting typical and widespread GSO operations in
the United States, contained in Appendix B to the Order. Reference
links are used by an NGSO operator to demonstrate that it will comply
with the long-term and short-term interference metrics. Reference links
provide transparency and regulatory certainty for both GSO and NGSO
operators as to the types of operations that will be protected to the
threshold levels.
67. As an initial matter, the GSO reference links we adopt include
328 links provided in the record and drawn from both ITU data and the
Commission's licensing databases and filtered according to a filtering
methodology. After review, we find these links are reasonably
representative of a variety of widespread GSO operations and
appropriate as an initial set of links to be tested against. While some
commenters urge the Commission to seek further comment on development
of GSO reference links, the Commission specifically did so in the NPRM,
and those parties criticizing the GSO reference links provided on the
record, without offering a set of links of their own, do not provide an
alternative for consideration at this time.
68. In addition to the 328 links, Amazon performed an analysis of
3,944 Ka-band GSO links taken from the Commission's licensing database
and selected four of the most sensitive links among these, which Amazon
states are protectively representative of 97.6% of the links studied.
Using a smaller set of the most sensitive links--which drive the
interference analysis in any event--could well be a simpler and more
efficient means of demonstrating compliance with the protection
criteria. However, for our initial set of GSO reference links, we
include a broader collection of links that may provide GSO operators
greater confidence in the results of the compatibility demonstrations.
69. In adopting these reference links, we recognize the diversity
of operating parameters that may inform the protection of small earth
station terminals, such as those used in Earth Stations in Motion
(ESIMs). And we recognize that GSO networks, and NGSO systems, will
continue to evolve. Accordingly, we delegate authority to the Space
Bureau to revisit the baseline set of links we identify today, and to
remove, revise, or add appropriate GSO links in the future, after
seeking comment. We direct the Bureau to initiate such a focused
proceeding within 15 days after release of the Order, and to adopt a
decision within 60 days after close of that comment period. We note
that operating NGSO systems may be required to adjust their operations
to protect any new GSO reference links added in the future.
7. Aggregate Interference Limits
70. As we look towards more efficient spectrum sharing between GSO
and NGSO systems, we find no technical basis in the record--or
compelling justification--to create and adopt aggregate limits on
interference from NGSO systems into GSO networks. Indeed, as we noted
when recently declining to create aggregate limits on NGSO interference
into other NGSO systems, a host of unresolved questions remain,
including: as to the need for any aggregate limits given the ongoing
and, at times, uncertain deployment of newly authorized NGSO
constellations; the derivation of any proposed aggregate limits that
avoids simplistic, worst-case assumptions and accounts for mitigation
techniques or other spectrum-sharing measures that may be applied by
the NGSO systems and reduce their overall aggregate impact; and the
implementation of any aggregate limits among operational NGSO systems,
an issue that remains unresolved internationally more than 25 years
after aggregate EPFD limits were adopted.
71. Limiting new entry while we wait and see which NGSO FSS systems
will deploy, out of a fear of future aggregate interference that may
never arise, would artificially and unreasonably inhibit competition
contrary to the public interest. More fundamentally, as we move towards
performance-based metrics based on real-world data and realistic
interference concerns, any aggregate limits would run the stark risk of
piling worst-case assumptions on top of one another to the detriment of
efficiency and real-world costs. Parties advocating aggregate limits
have not submitted aggregate interference studies or modeling or
otherwise shown that any such limits--and none are proposed
[[Page 26939]]
on the record--would be justified. Nonetheless, should a demonstrated
need arise in the future, we may revisit the question of aggregate
limits. And, of course, operators are free to discuss and agree upon
ways to account for any aggregate interference effects during their
good-faith coordination discussions.
C. Other Technical and Procedural Considerations
1. Terrestrial Operations
72. Modernizing the NGSO-GSO spectrum sharing framework can be
accomplished without affecting the required protection levels of
terrestrial operations. Within the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2
GHz bands subject to EPFD limits, NGSO systems must also adhere to PFD
limits in the 10.7-11.7 GHz, 12.2-12.7 GHz, and 17.7-18.3 GHz band
segments developed for the protection of co-primary fixed services. The
EPFD limits and PFD limits address different geometries of the NGSO
system's operation--the former addresses interference from NGSO
operations near the GSO arc, whereas the latter addresses NGSO
operations near the horizon. In addition, NGSO systems must meet PFD
limits to protect terrestrial services in the 18.6-19.7 GHz portion of
the Ka-band where EPFD limits do not apply.
73. We recognize that several terrestrial commenters propose a
comprehensive re-evaluation of the protection afforded by current PFD
limits--critiquing the assumptions about both fixed-service (FS) and
FSS deployments underlying current limits, including FS deployments
considered and the scale of NGSO satellite deployments; noting that,
unlike Ka-band PFD limits, Ku-band PFD limits do not scale based on
constellation size; seeking new demonstrations that NGSO systems
complying with PFD limits will continue to protect terrestrial services
from the risk of aggregate interference; and otherwise suggesting that
the PFD limits adopted at WRC-2000 are outdated. Such comprehensive
studies re-evaluating the Ku-band and Ka-band PFD limits may be
warranted. However, the parties calling for such studies have neither
begun them, provided necessary characteristics for them, or otherwise
provided any technical basis for the conclusion that the current,
required protection levels of terrestrial services are in fact
inadequate, or that single-entry PFD limits should be newly evaluated
based on potential aggregate interference. Accordingly, there is
insufficient support in the record to indefinitely delay updating the
NGSO-GSO sharing framework in bands overlapping terrestrial allocations
and in which PFD limits will continue to apply, especially where the
substantial technical record indicates that eliminating the EPFD limits
will not result in unacceptable interference to GSO networks as
described above.
74. We also note that expanding more efficient and intensive
spectrum use in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands is
consistent with other Commission priorities, including in the Upper C-
band, where the Commission has sought comment on repurposing at least
100 megahertz in the 3.98-4.2 GHz band from FSS use to next-generation
wireless services and relocating some GSO FSS operations to other
available FSS spectrum. Regarding the potential relocation of some
high-availability services from C-band to Ku-band, in which rain fade
plays a larger role in link design, we note that the combination of
adaptive power control, appropriate earth station selection and link
design, and our modest 0.1% absolute increase in unavailability metric
will mean GSO satellite operators will face significantly lower than
even a 0.1% change in unavailability at earth stations designed to
support high availability links. For the protection of video
distribution links specifically, we have adopted a limit of -10.5 dB I/
N not to be exceeded 80% of the time, which will provide an extra layer
of protection for these links in addition to the short-term absolute
change in unavailability criterion. Further, at least 20 megahertz of
C-band spectrum are proposed to remain for satellite services requiring
C-band transmission characteristics under even the broadest repurposing
of the band for which comment was sought in the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking. Accordingly, we reject arguments that revising the NGSO-GSO
sharing framework will jeopardize any portion of an Upper C-band
transition.
2. Radio Astronomy
75. Modernizing the NGSO-GSO sharing framework will also not affect
ongoing obligations of NGSO licensees to successfully coordinate with
radio astronomy service (RAS) sites. Indeed, the record details the
close coordination and data sharing between RAS and NGSO satellite
systems pursuant to Footnote US131 of the Table of Frequency
Allocations. Given this successful record of coordination to date, we
continue to expect that the obligation on NGSO licensees operating in
the 10.7-11.7 GHz band to complete coordination with RAS prior to
commencing operation will ensure the continued protection of RAS sites.
Furthermore, requirement of coordination for any related fixed
infrastructure (e.g., gateways) within the National Radio Quiet Zone
(NRQZ) pursuant to Sec. 1.924 accommodates coordination requirements
for the federal facilities within the NRQZ. As NGSO licensees have
different operating parameters, the general coordination requirement
provides flexibility to adapt to specific scenarios. Accordingly, there
is no basis in the record to adopt additional, specific technical
requirements regarding the operational means NGSO systems may employ to
protect RAS sites as agreed in coordination, or to require new studies
or aggregate interference analyses at this time, or to simply convert
existing single-entry PFD limits to aggregate limits, as some RAS
commenters have suggested. It should be noted that for the specific
case of NGSO's providing Supplemental Coverage from Space, the FCC
Report and Order did note that SCS licenses would be considered on a
case-by-case basis and encouraged applicants to conduct outreach and
work with appropriate federal agency contacts (NSF for radio astronomy)
in advance of submission of license applications to the Commission,
including conducting Monte Carlo analyses of potential impacts to radio
astronomy systems using their specific configurations, as appropriate.
Should any difficulties arise in the future during coordination
discussions among NGSO operators and RAS site operators the Commission
may assist in finding a solution agreeable to all parties involved.
3. Cross-Border Considerations
76. The ITU Radio Regulations provide that EPFD limits may be
exceeded on the territory of any country whose administration has
authorized such operation, and doing so in the United States, to the
benefit of American consumers, is fully consistent with our
international and cross-border obligations. From a practical
standpoint, modern NGSO systems are capable of keeping the energy from
their downlink beams from spilling over into the territory of adjacent
countries by using narrow beams with sharp roll-off while continuously
monitoring and controlling the amount of power and location of the
beams on the ground. The customer terminals associated with these
systems also employ narrow beams with suppressed sidelobes that
continuously track NGSO satellites at specific elevations, resulting in
minimal exposure outside the main beam of the antenna. Thus, modern
NGSO satellite systems have the technical capability to
[[Page 26940]]
exceed the EPFD limits within the territory of the United States while
respecting the EPFD limits on the territory of adjacent countries that
have not authorized exceedances of the limits. We will continue to
require such international compliance from NGSO satellite systems
notified by the United States, without requiring any additional
measures or specific cross-border agreements to implement the updated
NGSO-GSO sharing framework in the United States.
4. Implementation and Technical Demonstrations of Compatibility
77. In implementing the modernized NGSO-GSO sharing framework, the
Commission's recently adopted degraded throughput framework in the
NGSO-NGSO sharing context provides a ready example that we may draw
from. Specifically, in 2024, the Commission adopted spectrum sharing
requirements for NGSO FSS systems authorized in a later processing
round to protect NGSO FSS systems authorized in an earlier processing
round. As we are adopting here, the Commission adopted a long-term
protection criteria of 3% time-weighted average throughput degradation
and short-term protection criterion based on the absolute increase in
link unavailability. In the NGSO-NGSO sharing context, prior to
commencing operations, an NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient
must either certify that it has completed a coordination agreement with
any operational NGSO FSS system licensed or granted U.S. market access
in an earlier processing round, or submit for Commission approval a
compatibility showing which demonstrates by use of a degraded
throughput methodology that it will not cause harmful interference to
any such system with which coordination has not been completed. Such
compatibility showings must contain a demonstration that the later-
round system will cause no more than 3% time-weighted average degraded
throughput of the link to the earlier-round system, for links with a
baseline link availability of 99.0% or higher at a C/N threshold of 0
dB; and a demonstration that the later-round system will cause no more
than 0.4% absolute change in link availability to the earlier-round
system using a C/N threshold value of 0 dB, for links with a baseline
link availability of 99.0% link availability or higher. While a
compatibility showing remains pending before the Commission, the
submitting NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient may commence
operations on an unprotected, non-interference basis with respect to
the operations of the system that is the subject of the showing.
78. We believe that carrying over this implementation framework
from the NGSO-NGSO context, where it was rigorously debated, will
facilitate technical showings in the NGSO-GSO sharing context as well
because NGSO operators will be familiar with its application. This
implementation framework also includes adopting the same C/N threshold
for ACM links and the specific C/(N+I) threshold from the GSO reference
link database for non-ACM links, assumptions about additional sources
of interference, rain-fade model flexibility using the rainfall rates
from the GSO reference link database, ability to use information
received through any coordination discussions, a set of parameters and
assumptions to facilitate the compatibility analysis, and flexibility
for NGSO operators in adopting mitigation techniques to ensure
compliance with the protection thresholds. As part of this framework,
NGSO applicants and operators would be required to submit a
compatibility demonstration which shows that their results and proposed
operational configuration (including key parameters such as Nco, GSO-
arc avoidance angle, and power levels) will meet the protection
criteria for all of the approved GSO reference links. Further, NGSO
operators will be required to share relevant technical information,
including the compatibility demonstration, as needed by the GSO
operators in assessing interference or for performing their own
technical analysis that can aid in the coordination. Thus, through
coordination, GSO operators would be able to receive the most up-to-
date and technically precise details of NGSO system operations for use
in their own assessments, without involving Commission resources or
incentives towards protracted disputes. The Commission, however, would
be available if assistance is needed in coordination or to resolve
real-world interference concerns.
79. We note that the latest developments in modeling NGSO and GSO
systems may be used in the compatibility analyses. We also note that we
will also consider arguments by NGSO satellite applicants and operators
that, because of successful coordination with one or more GSO network
operators, certain of the GSO reference links included in the set of
standard reference links may no longer need to be demonstrated as
protected because equivalent links are not used by any remaining GSO
operators serving the United States with whom coordination has not yet
been reached.
5. Transition to New Rules
80. An immediate transition to the modernized NGSO-GSO sharing
framework will offer immediate benefits without jeopardizing legacy
services. Today, as discussed above, NGSO services are unreasonably
constrained by EPFD limits based on decades-old proposed systems,
assumptions, and methodologies, which results in protection levels for
GSO networks significantly higher than the protection they expect from
other co-primary GSO networks. Updating this framework to a set of
protection criteria based on degraded throughput for ACM networks,
absolute increase in unavailability, and an I/N limit for non-ACM
networks, will adequately protect ongoing GSO operations while
uncapping significant new NGSO capacity. Further delaying the
transition to a modernized sharing framework, including for up to 18
years or through grandfathering provisions, would sacrifice the
immediate economic and other benefits of the new framework. As
supported by real-world testing, the new rules can be implemented
without introducing unacceptable interference to GSO networks.
Retaining the existing EPFD limits, even temporarily, would have a
concrete and substantial impact on NGSO deployment and the ability of
NGSO operators to deliver innovative new services to customers within
the United States.
81. We will apply all rule changes adopted in the Order to current
NGSO licensees and market access grantees, pending applicants and
petitioners, as well as future applicants and petitioners. With respect
to pending applications, applicants do not gain any vested right merely
by filing an application, and the simple act of filing an application
is not considered a ``transaction already completed'' for purposes of
this analysis. Applying our new rules and procedures to pending space
station applications will not impair the rights any applicant had at
the time it filed its application. Nor will doing so increase an
applicant's liability for past conduct. Similarly, with respect to
current licensees and market access grantees, none of the actions we
take here increase liability for past conduct, impair rights a party
possessed when he acted, or impose new duties with respect to
transactions already completed. Rather, all of these actions take
effect in the future, after the rules become effective. Accordingly,
applying these rule changes to existing licenses and grants of market
access will not
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upset any grantee's reasonable expectations.
6. Additional Frequency Bands and Other Issues
82. While the record provides ample basis to revise the NGSO-GSO
sharing framework in the 10.7-12.7 GHz, 17.3-18.6 GHz, and 19.7-20.2
GHz bands of focus in this rulemaking, it does not provide a basis for
action in other bands. Indeed, no NGSO system proponent advocates
changes in additional frequency bands at this time, and commenters
addressing other bands either request that we explicitly decline any
changes in C-band, or raise issues in other bands that are beyond the
scope of this rulemaking. Accordingly, we limit our actions to those
areas of demonstrated need regarding NGSO operations in the 10.7-12.7
GHz, 17.3-18.6 GHz, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands in the United States.
7. Alternative Sharing Frameworks and Sunsetting
83. While we are modernizing the NGSO-GSO sharing framework based
on the best available data today, we recognize that future revisions
may be warranted to further refine this framework and maximize the
benefits to American consumers. While some commenters propose to sunset
the GSO protection criteria requirements and move towards a framework
of coordination only between GSO and NGSO systems, or coordination with
a ``safe harbor'' GSO-arc avoidance angle requirement, we believe that
encouraging coordination under the new protection criteria that we are
adopting will offer immediate benefits and provide a new record of
experience on which we could re-consider GSO-NGSO sharing in the
future. Accordingly, we decline to adopt any alternative NGSO-GSO
sharing frameworks at this time.
D. Costs and Benefits
84. We have carefully reviewed the record in this proceeding,
including all studies submitted therein. We conclude that the benefits
of the changes we adopt today exceed the costs. Our evaluation of costs
and benefits are contained in Section V below.
IV. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
85. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as
amended (RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was
incorporated in the NPRM. The Federal Communications Commission
(Commission) sought written public comment on the proposals in the
Further NPRM, including comment on the IRFA. No comments were filed
addressing the IRFA. This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA)
conforms to the RFA.
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Rules
86. The NPRM in this proceeding launched a much needed review of
the long-standing spectrum sharing regime between GSO and NGSO
satellite systems operating in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2
GHz bands. The decades-old spectrum sharing regime constitutes the
primary restrictive regulatory requirement on NGSO satellite systems
currently deploying at breakneck speed. Innovation in the satellite
industry has witnessed new NGSO satellite operators launching thousands
of satellites in the short span of a few years, and these operators are
beginning to offer high-speed, low-latency broadband services. The NPRM
sought to develop a substantial technical record concerning modern and
efficient spectrum sharing among NGSO FSS (Fixed Satellite Service)
systems, GSO FSS, and BSS (Broadcast Satellite Service) networks in the
10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands, while ensuring that any
rule changes continue to safeguard and maintain the protection of co-
frequency terrestrial services.
87. In response to the record developed from the NPRM, the Order
replaces the outdated framework of EPFD limits on NGSO systems with
modern protection criteria that take account of the improved spectrum
sharing possibilities that modern satellite technology has brought,
including through use of adaptive coding and modulation. Specifically,
the Order requires NGSO satellites transmitting in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-
18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands to protect co-frequency GSO networks
using a long-term protection criteria of 3% time-weighted average
throughput degradation as a long-term interference protection
criterion. The Order adopts a short-term GSO protection criterion of
0.1% absolute increase in link unavailability. For GSO satellite links
that do not use ACM, such as point-to-multipoint video transmissions,
we adopt a protection criterion of -10.5 dB interference-to-noise (I/N)
for 80% of the time. As an additional measure of protection for GSO
networks, we require NGSO systems to observe a minimum 3-degree
avoidance angle of the GSO arc. We decline to establish aggregate
limits or other limits on NGSO systems at this time. Having taken a
fresh look at today's satellite technology and operations, these new
spectrum sharing rules will promote more efficient and effective use of
the shared spectrum, and support a more competitive market for
satellite broadband and other in-demand services while uncapping the
potential of satellite constellations that were unthinkable when the
current regime was developed, to the ultimate benefit of American
consumers.
B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response
to the IRFA
88. There were no comments filed that specifically addressed the
proposed rules and policies presented in the IRFA.
C. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration
89. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended
the RFA, the Commission is required to respond to any comments the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA)
filed in this proceeding, and provide a detailed statement of any
change made to the proposed rules as a result those comments. The Chief
Counsel did not file any comments in response to the proposed rules or
policies in this proceeding.
D. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which
the Rules Will Apply
90. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and where
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be
affected by the adopted rules. The RFA generally defines the term
``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business
Act. A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) is independently
owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and
(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA. The SBA
establishes small business size standards that agencies are required to
use when promulgating regulations relating to small businesses;
agencies may establish alternative size standards for use in such
programs, but must consult and obtain approval from SBA before doing
so.
91. Our actions, over time, may affect small entities that are not
easily categorized at present. We therefore describe three broad groups
of small entities that could be directly affected
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by our actions. In general, a small business is an independent business
having fewer than 500 employees. These types of small businesses
represent 99.9% of all businesses in the United States, which
translates to 34.75 million businesses. Next, ``small organizations''
are not-for-profit enterprises that are independently owned and
operated and are not dominant in their field. While we do not have data
regarding the number of non-profits that meet that criteria, over 99
percent of nonprofits have fewer than 500 employees. Finally, ``small
governmental jurisdictions'' are defined as cities, counties, towns,
townships, villages, school districts, or special districts with
populations of less than fifty thousand. Based on the 2022 U.S. Census
of Governments data, we estimate that at least 48,724 out of 90,835
local government jurisdictions have a population of less than 50,000.
92. The rules adopted in the Order will apply to small entities in
the industries identified in the chart below by their six-digit North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes and corresponding
SBA size standard. Based on currently available U.S. Census data
regarding the estimated number of small firms in each identified
industry, we conclude that the adopted rules may impact a substantial
number of small entities. Where available, we also provide additional
information regarding the number of potentially affected entities in
the identified industries below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulated industry (footnotes specify potentially SBA size
affected entities within a regulated industry where NAICS standard Total Total small % Small
applicable) code (million) firms firms firms
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Satellite Telecommunications............................ 517410 $44 332 195 58.73
All Other Telecommunications............................ 517810 40 1,673 1,007 60.19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Description of Economic Impact and Projected Reporting,
Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements for Small Entities
93. The RFA directs agencies to describe the economic impact of
adopted rules on small entities, as well as projected reporting,
recordkeeping and other compliance requirements, including an estimate
of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the
requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record.
94. The Order defines specific metrics for long-term interference
and short-term interference that must be used in compatibility analyses
demonstrating that a NGSO FSS system operating in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-
18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands in the United States will adequately
protect co-frequency GSO networks. The Order adopts a long-term
interference metric for GSO networks using ACM of 3% degraded
throughput threshold and a 0.1% absolute increase in link
unavailability as the short-term interference metric, along with a
protection criterion for GSO networks not using ACM of -10.5 dB
interference-to-noise (I/N) for 80% of the time and a 3-degree minimum
GSO-arc avoidance angle, based on the technical record developed in
this proceeding. The Commission concludes that establishing a
protection metrics consistent with the technical evidence in the record
provides the benefit of a clear standard for new NGSO operators, and a
benchmark that parties can use to negotiate any alternative protections
mutually agreed to in coordination.
95. The adopted protection criteria will impact information NGSO
system applicants are required to report to the Commission, and small
NGSO system applicants may incur compliance costs as a result of the
Order. Specifically, NGSO system applicants may need to hire
professionals or expend staff time on familiarization and
implementation of the rules adopted in the Order. However, because of
the costs involved in developing and deploying an NGSO satellite
constellation in these bands, the Commission anticipates that few, if
any, NGSO operators affected by this rulemaking would qualify under the
SBA definition of ``small entity,'' and therefore small entities are
not likely to have to hire professionals, or incur any compliance costs
as a result of the Order.
F. Discussion of Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic
Impact on Small Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered
96. The RFA requires an agency to provide, ``a description of the
steps the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic impact
on small entities . . . including a statement of the factual, policy,
and legal reasons for selecting the alternative adopted in the final
rule and why each one of the other significant alternatives to the rule
considered by the agency which affect the impact on small entities was
rejected.''
97. The Order amends rules that are applicable to space station
operators requesting a license or grant of U.S. market access from the
Commission. Specifically, the Order adopts changes to the spectrum
sharing requirements among GSO and NGSO satellite systems operating in
the United States in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands,
and specifies details of the technical demonstration that NGSO space
station applicants in these bands must submit to show that they will
not cause harmful interference to co-frequency GSO space station
licensees and market access grantees. The technical demonstration of
compatibility is based on a degraded throughput methodology, assessing
absolute increase in link unavailability, and an I/N limit.
98. The Commission specifically considered, and declined, to adopt:
a short-term interference criterion of 0.4% absolute increase in
unavailability, an alternative of coordination or compliance with a
GSO-arc avoidance angle only, or a sunset provision, because such
proposals would provide less protection to GSO networks while not being
shown to be technically necessary for the expansion of NGSO systems.
The Commission also considered, but declined, to create new aggregate
interference limits as none were proposed on the record.
G. Report to Congress
99. The Commission will send a copy of the Order, including this
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, in a report to Congress pursuant
to the Congressional Review Act. In addition, the Commission will send
a copy of the Order, including this Final Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for the SBA Office of Advocacy and will
publish a copy of the Order, and this Final Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (or summaries thereof) in the Federal Register.
V. Regulatory Impact Analysis
A. Executive Summary
1. Summary
100. In the Order, the Commission modernizes the spectrum sharing
regime between GSO and NGSO satellite systems operating in the 10.7-
12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands.
[[Page 26943]]
The Order replaces EPFD limits on NGSO systems with performance-based
GSO protection criteria. It also requires good-faith coordination
efforts by both GSO and NGSO operators in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and
19.7-20.2 GHz bands. We adopt the following technical backstops to
protect GSO systems when coordination has not been reached:
<bullet> A long-term protection criterion of 3% time-weighted
average throughput degradation for GSO satellite links using adaptive
coding and modulation (ACM);
<bullet> A short-term protection criterion of 0.1% absolute
increase in link unavailability;
<bullet> A supplemental protection criterion of -10.5 dB
interference-to-noise (I/N) for 80% of the time for GSO satellite links
that do not use ACM, such as point-to-multipoint video transmissions;
and
<bullet> A supplemental protection requirement for NGSO systems to
observe a minimum 3-degree avoidance angle of the GSO arc.
101. This economically significant regulatory action is submitted
to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for
interagency review. The regulatory impact analysis (RIA) presents an
assessment of the regulatory compliance costs and benefits associated
with this action and is consistent with Executive Order 12866.
Comparing the performance-based GSO protection criteria with other
alternative policy options, Commission Staff concludes that the
adoption of these proposed rules will result in significant benefits
that outweigh the associated costs. This rule is considered a
deregulatory action under Executive Order 14192.
2. Table of Benefits and Costs
102. Summary of Benefits and Costs. Based on Staff analysis, the
net present value of benefits--after netting out costs of doing
business and compliance--over five years would be $1.6 billion to $19.9
billion using a 3% annual discount rate or $1.4 billion to $17.1
billion using a 7% annual discount rate. Given these net benefit
estimates, Staff finds that the overall benefits of the regulatory
action outweigh the total costs.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Method 1 Method 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Present value (3% Present value (7% Present value (3% Present value
Year discount) discount) discount) (7% discount)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
bound bound bound bound bound bound bound bound
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefits ($ Billion)......... 2026 $0.5 $0.6 $0.5 $0.6 $0.2 $0.3 $0.2 $0.3
2027 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.5 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3
2028 2.6 3.2 2.3 2.8 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4
2029 4.3 5.5 3.7 4.7 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4
2030 7.0 9.0 5.7 7.4 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 15.7 19.9 13.5 17.1 1.6 2.2 1.4 1.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantifiable Costs ($ 2026 112 112 107 107 112 112 107 107
Thousands)..................
2027 13 13 12 12 13 13 12 12
2028 13 13 11 11 13 13 11 11
2029 12 12 11 11 12 12 11 11
2030 12 12 10 10 12 12 10 10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 162 162 152 152 162 162 152 152
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative Costs............ Costs from negotiating agreements induced by new spectrum sharing framework.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net Gain ($ Billions)........ Total 15.7 19.9 13.5 17.1 1.6 2.2 1.4 1.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Need for Regulatory Action
103. Wireless telecommunications devices function by transmitting
signals over the electromagnetic spectrum, a finite public resource
managed by the FCC. To promote efficient use of the spectrum and to
minimize harmful interference, the FCC allocates spectrum into various
bands. It designates some bands for exclusive, licensed use, while
requiring shared use of other bands based on technical and other rules
to mitigate harmful interference. In the most commonly used frequency
bands used by satellite operators, between 10.7 GHz and 30 GHz, NGSO
systems share primary fixed-satellite service (FSS) allocations with
GSO networks, and they must also operate compatibly or coordinate with
other federal and non-federal users of these bands.
104. NGSO FSS systems must comply with, among other rules, power
limits expressed in EPFD to demonstrate that they do not cause
unacceptable interference to GSO FSS and Broadcasting Satellite Service
(BSS) networks. As NGSO operators supply data to a growing number of
users, however, the record has shown that EPFD restrictions present a
significant and growing regulatory constraint on NGSO systems seeking
to meet consumer capacity needs, particularly during periods of peak
congestion. Technological advances in the past three decades and the
inherent issues in the EPFD limits warrant the establishment of a new,
performance-based spectrum sharing framework between GSO and NGSO
systems in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands. By
adopting the rules in the Order, the Commission would enable the U.S.
space industry to make better use of spectrum resources. Specifically,
the rules would enable NGSO systems to use more satellites to serve the
same area, at potentially higher power, and over a wider portion of the
visible sky while continuing to protect GSO networks as supported by
real-world testing. This would immediately boost capacity, translating
to faster broadband speeds for American consumers.
C. Background on NGSO-GSO Sharing
105. Broadband satellite services rely on shared spectrum. In the
most commonly used frequency bands, between 10.7 GHz and 30 GHz, NGSO
systems share primary fixed-satellite service (FSS) allocations with
GSO networks and must also operate compatibly with BSS networks and
stations in other services, including terrestrial services. NGSO FSS
systems must comply with power limits expressed in EPFD to demonstrate
that they meet their broader obligation not to cause unacceptable
interference to GSO FSS and BSS networks. NGSO FSS systems must also
meet separate power
[[Page 26944]]
limits expressed in power-flux density (PFD) to protect terrestrial
services. Applicants for NGSO FSS space station licenses, and non-U.S.-
licensed satellite operators seeking access to the U.S. market, must
certify that they will comply with the specified EPFD limits.
106. The current EPFD limits for the protection of GSO networks
were developed in the late 1990s, adopted internationally in 2000, and
subsequently incorporated into the Commission's rules in 2000 and 2017.
In 2019, the international community required NGSO FSS systems
operating in the higher Q- and V-bands between 37.5 GHz and 51.4 GHz to
meet certain long-term and short-term GSO protection criteria that
incorporate a degraded throughput methodology. The World
Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) 2019 (WRC-19) did not adopt EPFD
limits in these bands. WRC-23 considered, but ultimately did not adopt,
a proposal to review the EPFD limits under a future agenda item for
WRC-27. Instead, ITU-R Working Party 4A is studying EPFD limits and
will report findings at WRC-27.
107. On April 28, 2025, the Commission, in response to a petition
for rulemaking by SpaceX, released an NPRM that proposed to revise the
spectrum sharing regime between GSO and NGSO systems in downlink
frequency bands between 10.7 GHz and 30 GHz that are subject to EPFD
limits, and to amend Sec. Sec. 25.146 and 25.289 of the Commission's
rules. The NPRM sought to develop a substantial technical record
concerning modern and efficient spectrum sharing among NGSO FSS systems
and GSO FSS and BSS networks in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2
GHz bands that could increase efficient use of the spectrum while
protecting other services.
D. Regulatory Action
108. The Order establishes a new, performance-based spectrum
sharing framework between GSO and NGSO systems in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-
18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands. The new GSO protection framework would
require good-faith coordination between GSO and NGSO operators. Where
good-faith coordination fails, the rule would require NGSO satellites
transmitting in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6, and 19.7-20.2 GHz bands to
protect co-frequency GSO networks using a long-term protection criteria
of 3% time-weighted average throughput degradation. The Order adopts a
short-term GSO protection criterion of 0.1% absolute increase in link
unavailability. For GSO satellite links that do not use ACM, the Order
would adopt a protection criterion of -10.5 dB interference-to-noise
(I/N) for 80% of the time. As an additional measure of protection for
GSO networks, the Order would require NGSO systems to observe a minimum
3-degree avoidance angle of the GSO arc. To accompany these protection
criteria, the Order adopts a realistic set of GSO reference links
reflecting typical and widespread GSO operations in the United States.
These GSO reference links are based on the set of 328 links provided in
the record and drawn from both ITU data and the Commission's licensing
databases.
E. Benefits
109. By modernizing the spectrum sharing framework between GSO and
NGSO satellite systems, the rules adopted in the Order should deliver
substantial economic benefits to American households, satellite
competitors, and other stakeholders. As discussed in detail in the
Order, these rules should increase capacity and broadband speeds,
foster new competitive entry, and promote U.S. leadership globally.
They should also strengthen the ability of NGSOs to serve as a lifeline
to Americans in rural and remote areas. The record of this proceeding
reflects broad support for modernizing satellite spectrum sharing.
Commenters point out that, with greater operational flexibility under
revised sharing rules, new NGSO systems would need smaller
constellations and still have greater capacity to reach more customers,
which would reflect a substantial reduction in launch costs, satellite
costs, and costs of a new low-Earth orbit (LEO) constellation. Those
lower costs should encourage new entry as well as lower prices for
customers. The revised rules are also anticipated to support innovation
through the availability of higher-throughput, lower-latency
connectivity in rural and underserved areas. Accordingly, Staff is
unpersuaded by arguments that the benefits of revising the EFPD limits
are uncertain, speculative and overstated.
110. Certain commenters submitted studies concerning the benefits,
with one providing quantitative estimates. An analysis by Harold
Furchtgott-Roth suggests that the effects of moving away from the
outdated EPFD rules would increase NGSO system capacity by 74% to 180%,
which could reduce average costs per unit of capacity by 43% to 64%.
The study further estimated that this would increase annual global
consumer welfare by $1.62 billion to $16.2 billion, translating to a
net present value increase in global welfare ranging from $10 billion
to $100 billion. A second study submitted by the Phoenix Center posited
that a rising relative willingness to pay for NGSO broadband--even
without growth in the overall satellite market--implies that today's
spectrum sharing- rules are too restrictive and should shift toward
greater accommodation of NGSO systems. The intuition of the model
presented in the study is that, as NGSO demand has grown far faster
than demand for GSO services, an efficient regime must evolve to
reflect this higher marginal valuation of NGSO connectivity. While the
study did not provide quantitative estimates of benefits, Staff
believes that the results of this study align with the steps we are
taking today.
111. While Staff generally agrees with the conclusion of the Harold
Furchtgott-Roth study, we find that the report does not adequately
justify the assumptions underlying the consumer surplus calculations.
For example, the report assumes price reductions ranging from 10% to
50% without providing a supporting rationale and provides no estimate
of price elasticity of demand or passthrough rate, despite these
assumptions being crucial in calculating consumer surplus. Furthermore,
even setting aside methodological concerns with the consumer surplus
calculations, it would still be necessary to appropriately scale any
global consumer surplus estimates to derive a corresponding estimate of
the change in domestic consumer surplus. If we assumed that U.S.
consumers account for only one-quarter of the global benefits, the
estimated annual benefits are reduced to approximately $405 million to
$4.05 billion. If we conservatively take the lower bound estimate of
$405 million, the corresponding net present value of benefits accruing
over the next five years is $1.9 billion when using a discount rate of
3% and $1.7 billion when using a discount rate of 7%. Under these
revised assumptions, the overall increase in benefits to U.S. consumers
nevertheless remains substantial.
112. Commission Staff conducted a separate internal assessment of
benefits. Staff based its analysis on the potential relationship
between the increase in supply of satellite capacity discussed in the
Order and the projected overall growth in the size of satellite data
services market. Based on support in the record, Staff assumed an
increase in capacity in the foreseeable future of between 500% and
700%. Staff related these assumed increases in capacity to industry
analyst projections of the market value of U.S. satellite data services
as well as the supply of satellite
[[Page 26945]]
capacity using two alternative methodologies. First, we assume that the
supply of NGSO high throughput satellite (HTS) capacity is 500-700%
greater than it would be in 2030 absent the rule changes and infer that
market value will expand proportionally based on the preexisting
relationship between satellite market value and capacity. Second, we
assume that the industry analyst's projected growth of HTS satellite
capacity from 2025 to 2030 is correct, but that some fraction of that
capacity growth is due to the 500% to 700% increase in HTS NGSO
capacity due to the Order and that the fraction of market value growth
due to the Order is also the same. For both methods, Staff then assumes
that NGSO operators will earn 58% in profits on the gain in market
value, and we use this as our estimate of gains in producer surplus.
Staff did not attempt to estimate consumer surplus so that our estimate
of benefits, which consists of gains in producer surplus, is
conservative. We describe the two methods in detail below.
113. According to January 2025 analyst estimates for the years
2024-2034, the value of U.S. satellite data services will grow from
$3.40 billion to $19.53 billion at a CAGR of 19.1%. Based on a separate
April 2024 report estimating NGSO and GSO HTS capacity in 2023 and
2028, NGSO and GSO capacity will grow between 2023 and 2028 at a
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 59.1% and 22.2%, respectively,
leading to a total HTS CAGR of 56.1%.
114. Method 1: First, Staff assumes that analyst projections do not
anticipate the capacity increase that Staff attributes to the revised
spectrum sharing rules, such that 2030 capacity would be 500-700% more
than the initial projections. Staff then calculates the new CAGR of
capacity implied by the new 2030 level of capacity and then use the new
CAGR to estimate the increase in the value of U.S. data services for
the years 2025-2030. The markets value gains are then converted to
gains in producer surplus by multiplying by the profit margin of 58%.
Staff treats the net present value (NPV) increase in producer surplus
as a public benefit. Total HTS throughput CAGR is 124.2% to 137.5%,
which is significantly larger than the original CAGR of 56.1% for every
year from 2026 to 2030, resulting in $15.7 to $19.9 billion in NPV at a
3% discount rate or $13.5 billion to $17.1 billion NPV at a 7% discount
rate.
115. Method 2: Second, Staff assumes that the industry analysts
anticipate some sort of regulatory change to achieve the projected
supply increase. In this scenario, Staff assumes that the Order is part
of these anticipated regulatory changes, so that a fraction of the
increase in capacity supply from 2025 to 2030 is attributable to the
Order. Staff assumes that the Order will lead to an increase in NGSO
HTS capacity of either 500% or 700% from 2025 to 2030. Based on the
2025 capacity of 60,009 Gbps, this is 300,045 Gbps or 420,063 Gbps,
respectively. By comparison, a projection based on analyst reports
indicates that total HTS capacity will increase by 560,846 Gbps from
2025 to 2030 (using a CAGR of 56.1%). This implies that either 300,045
Gbps/560,846 Gbps = 53.5% or 420,063/560,846 Gbps = 74.9% of growth is
due to the Order. Staff then assumes the Order is responsible for the
same fraction (either 53.5% or 74.9%) of the increase in satellite
markets value each year between 2025 and 2030 and calculate the PV gain
associated with that fraction of the increase in market value. After
multiplying by the profit margin of 58%, this leads to a producer
surplus gain in present value that is attributed to the Order ranging
from $1.6 billion to $2.2 billion in benefits using a 3% discount rate,
or $1.4 to $1.8 billion using a 7% discount rate.
116. Combining the results of the two approaches, Staff finds
benefits ranging from $1.6 billion to $19.9 billion using a 3% discount
rate and ranging from $1.4 billion to $17.1 billion using a 7% discount
rate.
F. Costs
117. Staff accepts the findings of the Order that the rules adopted
therein, including the long-term and short-term criteria for GSO
satellite links using ACM, protection criteria for those that do not
use ACM, and the minimum avoidance angle of the GSO arc will continue
to provide sufficient protection to GSO operations from substantial
interference, and therefore Staff concludes that they will not result
in harm or substantial costs to GSO providers. Staff is therefore
unpersuaded by arguments raised in a Brattle Group report submitted by
Viasat, alleging that abandoning the long-standing EPFD framework would
impose unacceptable interference costs on GSO operators, since, as the
Order concludes, the performance-based GSO protection criteria that the
Order adopts are sufficient to protect incumbent GSO operations and
other incumbent users. Staff also is unpersuaded by Brattle's arguments
that the new framework would undermine the property rights and market-
driven approach of the EPFD framework. In contrast, the new framework
would improve these aspects as it makes the use of coordination
explicit and allows for mutually beneficial outcomes above and beyond
those that would be required by our backstop performance criteria.
Rather than reduce innovation and investment through greater regulatory
uncertainty and interference risk, as Brattle claims, the new rules
will continue to protect existing spectrum users, while encouraging
investment through more efficient spectrum use. Staff also finds
Brattle concerns about international coordination unfounded because it
is legally feasible for an administration to exceed the ITU EFPD limits
and technologically feasible for service providers to operate both
under and above those limits in adjacent countries.
118. Staff identifies two categories of costs: (1) increases in
expenditures needed to serve a larger pool of customers, and (2) costs
of complying with the revised rules. The analysis in the benefits
section accounts for the category 1 costs--i.e., the costs to serve
additional customers by multiplying estimated market value gains by an
estimated profit margin. This amounts to subtracting incremental costs
of serving new customers from incremental revenue. With respect to
category 2, we recognize three kinds of potential costs of complying
with the revised rules: familiarization costs, certification costs, and
negotiation costs. Familiarization costs result from work that
regulatees wishing to take advantage of the revised rules need to
perform to familiarize themselves with the rule revisions.
Certification costs are the labor costs that any NGSO operator wishing
to take advantage of the new rules must incur in order to certify that
it is using a degraded throughput methodology to avoid unacceptable
interference. In the alternative, NGSO operators wishing to take
advantage of the new rules may certify that they have a coordination
agreement with any operational co-frequency GSO satellite network.
Negotiation costs are costs that NGSO and GSO operators would need to
incur to reach a coordination agreement. As there is a lack of
information to estimate how frequent or long such negotiations would
be, Staff is unable to quantity the costs of such negotiations.
However, Staff concludes due to the relatively low number of
negotiating partners in the industry coupled with the backstop option
of a compatibility showing that associated costs would be relatively
small compared to the volume of proposed benefits.
119. Staff estimates familiarization and certification costs by
using needed
[[Page 26946]]
labor hours worked by engineers and attorneys to make sure that NGSO
operators understand and comply with the new rules. Staff estimates
that telecommunications aerospace engineers are compensated at a rate
of $100.26/hour and telecommunications attorneys are compensated at
$140.73/hour. Staff estimates that 26 NGSO constellations may be
impacted by our rules, and conservatively assume that 26 NGSO
regulatees will require familiarization and certification work. For
familiarization, Staff assumes reading and understanding the order will
take 6 engineer hours of work and 2 lawyer hours of work for each
constellation, implying $23,000 of costs for NGSO operators. Because
these rules replace existing rules, future entrants into NGSO FSS
operators would not be expected to incur additional familiarization
costs because they would need to familiarize themselves with only one
set of rules prior to entry. For certification, we conservatively
assume that each of the 26 NGSO constellations would wish to submit a
Sec. 25.146 compatibility showing and therefore incur the
certification cost. Additionally, because the Sec. 25.146
compatibility showing is different from what new applicants would need
to submit to the ITU to certify compliance with EPFD limits outside the
United States, we assume that new applicants would likewise incur the
certification cost. In these cases, Staff estimates that 26 operators
incur a one-time certification cost and that in future years, 4 new
operators would incur the certification cost. For each operator, we
assume that certification comprises of 24 hours of engineering work and
8 hours of legal work. Therefore, Staff estimates then that the first
year will result in $92,000 in certification costs, and then every
subsequent year will result in $14,000 in certification costs. Adding
the one-time familiarization costs to the first year certification
costs, we have $115,000 of costs in the first year of the new rules,
followed by the $14,000 of annual certification costs. Staff then finds
that total costs, including familiarization and certification, from
2026 to 2030, sum to $162,000 using a 3% discount rate, and $152,000
using a 7% discount rate, respectively.
G. Alternate Policies
1. Alternative A--No Action
120. Under this alternative, the Commission would decline to revise
the current sharing framework based on EPFD and PFD limits. The
differing treatment of Ka-band frequencies in the current rules--where
the EPFD limit in the upper portion of the band is substantially more
restrictive than the EPFD limit in the lower portion of the band--was
widely criticized in the record as technically unjustified. In
addition, the overall methodology used to derive the current EPFD
limits has been called into question, including the use of
methodologies designed to address short-term interference to develop
long-term EPFD limits, overly conservative modeling of rain
attenuation, and the inclusion of a large number of unstable links with
negative link margin values in the set of GSO reference links used to
derive the EPFD limits. For these reasons, as well as others identified
in the record, Staff finds that the current limits were overly and
unnecessarily restrictive.
121. Modern management practices allow more satellites to serve the
same area, at potentially higher power, and over a wider portion of the
visible sky. Failure to adopt newer standards would leave satellite
spectrum underutilized relative to its potential economic and
technological value. Without further action, the Commission would forgo
an opportunity to promote more efficient use of spectrum, stimulate
innovation, and bridge the digital divide.
2. Alternative B--Adopt Modern Performance-Based GSO Protection Rules
as Bright-Line Rules To Replace Existing EPFD
122. Under this alternative, the Commission would replace the
current sharing framework based on EPFD limits with performance-based
GSO network protection requirements. These performance-based
requirements would include: (1) a long-term protection criterion of 3%
time-weighted average throughput degradation for GSO satellite links
using ACM; (2) a short-term protection criterion of 0.1% absolute
increase in link unavailability for GSO satellite links; (3) a
protection criterion of -10.5 dB interference-to-noise (I/N) for 80% of
the time for GSO satellite links that do not use ACM; and (4) an NGSO
minimum 3-degree avoidance angle of the GSO arc. Given the overly
conservative nature of the current sharing framework, these more modern
and permissive requirements are an improvement over Alternative A, as
they would result in an increase in satellite capacity, while
protecting incumbent GSO providers. As discussed below, however, this
alternative is inferior to the rules adopted, because it does not
permit parties to negotiate a mutually beneficial coordination
agreement that may be superior to what would exist from the mere
application of the modern performance-based requirements described
above.
3. Alternative C (Adopted Rules)--Introduce A Coordination-Based
Framework With a Backstop of Modern Performance-Based GSO Protection
Rules as a Default Protection Regime Should the Parties Be Unable To
Agree
123. The Commission has emphasized that private coordination among
satellite operators, based on real-world operating parameters, offers
the best opportunity for efficient spectrum sharing. The current EPFD
limits do not accommodate such coordination because they must be met
regardless of any agreements between particular NGSO and GSO satellite
operators. Commission precedent also supports a requirement of good-
faith coordination backstopped by performance-based interference
metrics.
124. If the parties cannot agree on a coordination plan, then the
performance-based GSO network protection requirements set forth in
Alternative B would apply as a default protection requirement.
Alternative C is superior to Alternative B, because it enables parties
to negotiate a mutually beneficial coordination agreement if such an
agreement is superior to what would result from the application of the
performance-based GSO network protection requirements. Given this, the
parties must be at least as well off under Alternative C compared to
Alternative B.
H. Justification Determination
1. Benefits Exceed Costs
125. Staff finds that the changes adopted in the Order will
generate large broad-based benefits to the public that exceed the
relatively low compliance costs. Moving away from restrictive and
outdated requirements will enable new uses and capabilities for NGSO
satellites. Staff estimates large benefits in the form of increases in
producer surplus from expanded economic activities in satellite
telecommunications services. These activities will take the form of
increased satellite deployment, expanded service and new innovations in
technology that will spur economic activity and help close the digital
divide. Staff estimates net benefits--after netting out compliance
costs--ranging from $1.6 billion to $19.9 billion using a 3% discount
rate and $1.4 billion to $17.1 billion using a 7% discount rate.
2. Highest Net-Benefit Alternative
126. Based on the record and economic analysis, Staff finds that
[[Page 26947]]
Alternative C--the coordination framework with default performance-
based, bright-line rules offers the greatest net benefit among the
three alternatives considered. This combination of encouraging
coordination among parties buttressed by backstop protection
requirements should the parties be unable to agree, generates the most
protection of GSO satellite operations without hindering mutually
beneficial coordination between GSO and NGSO satellite operators.
3. Small Entity Impacts
127. The rules adopted by the Commission in the Order will benefit
many small entities by giving them greater access to satellite-based
communication services, while imposing few direct compliance costs on
small entities. The RFA, generally defines the term ``small entity'' as
having the same meaning as under the Small Business Act. In addition,
the term ``small business'' has the same meaning as the term ``small
business concern'' under the ``Small Business Act.'' A ``small business
concern'' is one which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is
not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any
additional criteria established by the SBA. We divide small entities
into two industries--identified in the chart below--that could be
directly affected by our actions, satellite telecommunications and
other telecommunications.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulated industry (footnotes specify potentially SBA size
affected entities within a regulated industry where NAICS standard Total Total small % Small
applicable) Code (million) firms firms firms
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Satellite Telecommunications............................ 517410 $44 332 195 58.73
All Other Telecommunications............................ 517810 40 1,673 1,007 60.19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
128. The adopted modern sharing rules replace an outdated,
spectrally inefficient sharing framework, and will promote more
efficient use of spectrum, stimulate innovation, and bridge the digital
divide. Small entities that use or provide input for these services
will benefit. Out of the existing small satellite telecommunications
providers, few if any are satellite operators, given the high fixed
costs of deploying and operating satellites, and thus subject to the
rules. We conclude that little to no compliance costs will be imposed
on small entities. Additionally, the Commission considered alternative
proposals and weighed their benefits against their potential costs to
small businesses and other entities. On balance, the adopted rules will
result in significant economic benefits for small entities.
4. Impacts on Disadvantaged Populations
129. The new adopted sharing framework should help disadvantaged
populations, such as the extremely rural, who lack current access to
telecommunications services. More utilization of spectrum stimulated by
the new rules is likely to result in expanded coverage by satellites
telecommunications services. Coverage might then extend to areas that
were economically unprofitable, such as areas with very low population
densities. Other disadvantaged groups are likely to face the same
benefits as the general population as the benefits are likely broad-
based. As for costs, we expect them to entirely take the form
compliance costs for satellite service providers and not the general
public. As a result, disadvantaged populations are unlikely to incur
disproportionate costs.
VI. Ordering Clauses
130. It is ordered, pursuant to Sections 4(i), 7(a), 303, 308(b),
and 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
154(i), 157(a), 303, 308(b), 316, that the Order is adopted, the
policies, rules, and requirements discussed herein are adopted, and
part 25 of the Commission's rules is amended as set forth in the final
rules.
131. It is further ordered that the Order shall be effective 60
days after publication in the Federal Register, except that Sec. Sec.
25.146(a)(3) and 25.289(a)(2), which may contain new or modified
information collection requirements, will not become effective until
the Office of Management and Budget completes review of any information
collection requirements that the Space Bureau determines is required
under the Paperwork Reduction Act. The Commission directs the Space
Bureau to announce the effective date for Sec. Sec. 25.146(a)(3) and
25.289(a)(2) by publication of a document in the Federal Register.
132. It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of
Secretary shall send a copy of the Order, including the FRFA, to the
Chief Counsel for the Small Business Administration (SBA) Office of
Advocacy.
133. It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of the
Managing Director, Performance Program Management, shall send a copy of
the Order in a report to be sent to Congress and the Government
Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5
U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
List of Subjects
47 CFR Part 25
Administrative practice and procedure, Incorporation by reference,
Satellites.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.
Final Rules
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 25 as follows:
PART 25--SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 301, 302, 303, 307, 309, 310, 319,
332, 605, and 721, unless otherwise noted.
0
2. Delayed indefinitely, amend Sec. 25.146 by adding paragraph (a)(3)
to read as follows:
Sec. 25.146 Licensing and operating provisions for NGSO FSS space
stations.
(a) * * *
(3) For operation in the United States in the 10.7-12.7, 17.3-18.6,
or 19.7-20.2 GHz bands, an NGSO FSS applicant may, as an alternative to
certifying that it will comply with equivalent power-flux density
limits in these bands, apply the following procedure: Prior to
commencing operations, an NGSO FSS applicant must either certify that
it has completed a coordination agreement with any operational co-
frequency GSO satellite network, or submit for Commission approval a
compatibility showing which demonstrates by use of a degraded
throughput methodology
[[Page 26948]]
that it will not cause unacceptable interference to any such system
with which coordination has not been completed.
(i) Compatibility showings must contain the following elements:
(A) A demonstration that the NGSO system will cause no more than 3%
time-weighted average degraded throughput of any GSO reference link
that uses adaptive coding and modulation;
(B) A demonstration that the NGSO system will cause no more than
0.1% absolute change in link availability to any GSO reference link;
(C) A demonstration that the NGSO system will cause no more than -
10.5 dB I/N for 80% of time for any GSO reference link that does not
use adaptive coding and modulation; and
(D) A certification that the NGSO system will use a minimum GSO-arc
avoidance angle of 3 degrees with respect to any operational co-
frequency GSO space station serving the United States.
(ii) While a compatibility showing remains pending before the
Commission, the submitting NGSO licensee or market access recipient may
commence operations on an unprotected, non-interference basis with
respect to the operations of any co-frequency GSO network with which
coordination has not been completed.
* * * * *
0
3. Revise Sec. 25.289 to read as follows:
Sec. 25.289 Protection of GSO networks by NGSO systems.
(a) Unacceptable interference. Unless otherwise provided in this
chapter, an NGSO system licensee must not cause unacceptable
interference to, or claim protection from, a GSO FSS or GSO BSS
network.
(1) An NGSO FSS licensee operating in compliance with the
applicable equivalent power flux-density limits in Article 22, Section
II of the ITU Radio Regulations (incorporated by reference, Sec.
25.108) will be considered as having fulfilled this obligation with
respect to any GSO network.
(2) [Reserved]
(b) Coordination. GSO and NGSO satellite operators must coordinate
in good faith the use of commonly authorized frequencies in the 10.7-
12.7, 17.3-18.6, or 19.7-20.2 GHz bands in the United States.
0
4. Delayed indefinitely, further amend Sec. 25.289 by adding paragraph
(a)(2) to read as follows:
Sec. 25.289 Protection of GSO networks by NGSO systems.
(a) * * *
(2) An NGSO FSS licensee authorized pursuant to Sec. 25.146(a)(3)
will be considered as having fulfilled this obligation with respect to
any GSO network.
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2026-09565 Filed 5-12-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
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</html>This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.