Home/Federal/Federal Register/2026-08943

Proposed Rule2026-08943

Designation-Restrict the Operation of Unmanned Aircraft in Close Proximity to a Fixed Site Facility

Primary source

Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.

Published

May 6, 2026

Issuing agencies

Transportation DepartmentFederal Aviation Administration

Abstract

This action would implement section 2209, of the FAA Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016, by establishing a process for operators and proprietors of certain fixed site facilities to request and maintain an unmanned aircraft flight restriction. The proposal also establishes requirements for applicants to demonstrate the unmanned aircraft flight restriction is necessary for: aviation safety, protection of people and property on the ground, national security, or homeland security. Lastly, the proposal identifies the types of operations that are allowed in the unmanned aircraft flight restriction UAFR.

Full Text

<html>
<head>
<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 87 (Wednesday, May 6, 2026)</title>
</head>
<body><pre>
[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 87 (Wednesday, May 6, 2026)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 24650-24704]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-08943]

[[Page 24649]]

Vol. 91

Wednesday,

No. 87

May 6, 2026

Part II

Department of Transportation

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Federal Aviation Administration

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

14 CFR Parts 1, 74, 91, et al.

Designation--Restrict the Operation of Unmanned Aircraft in Close
Proximity to a Fixed Site Facility; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 87 / Wednesday, May 6, 2026 /
Proposed Rules

[[Page 24650]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 1, 74, 91, and 107

[Docket No. FAA-2026-4558; Notice No. 26-03]
RIN 2120-AL33

Designation--Restrict the Operation of Unmanned Aircraft in Close
Proximity to a Fixed Site Facility

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This action would implement section 2209, of the FAA
Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016, by establishing a process
for operators and proprietors of certain fixed site facilities to
request and maintain an unmanned aircraft flight restriction. The
proposal also establishes requirements for applicants to demonstrate
the unmanned aircraft flight restriction is necessary for: aviation
safety, protection of people and property on the ground, national
security, or homeland security. Lastly, the proposal identifies the
types of operations that are allowed in the unmanned aircraft flight
restriction UAFR.

DATES: Send comments on or before July 6, 2026.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2026-4558
using any of the following methods:
<bullet> Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to <a href="https://www.regulations.gov/">https://www.regulations.gov/</a> and follow the online instructions for sending
your comments electronically.
<bullet> Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations; U.S. Department
of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W58-213, West
Building 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
<bullet> Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W58-213 of the West Building 5th Floor at 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
<bullet> Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at (202) 493-2251.
Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
<a href="https://www.regulations.gov/">https://www.regulations.gov/</a> at any time. Follow the online
instructions for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in
Room W58-213 of the West Building 5th Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michelle Ferritto, Office of
Rulemaking, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue
SW, Washington, DC 20591; Phone: (844) 359-6982; Email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#30020200091d65717662705651511e575f46"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="dbe9e9ebe2f68e9a9d899bbdbabaf5bcb4ad">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Executive Summary
A. Background
B. What is a standard unmanned aircraft flight restriction?
C. What is a special unmanned aircraft flight restriction?
D. Who can apply for an unmanned aircraft flight restriction?
E. How do I apply for an unmanned aircraft flight restriction?
F. What happens after the UAFR goes into effect?
G. Summary of the Costs and Benefits
II. Authority for This Rulemaking
III. Background and Statement of the Problem
A. Background
B. Statement of the Problem
IV. Overview of the Proposed Rule
A. Introduction
B. What is an unmanned aircraft flight restriction?
V. Discussion of the Proposed Rule
A. Definitions and Abbreviations (Part 1)
B. General Provisions (Subpart A of Part 74)
C. Minimum Requirements for Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restriction
(Subpart B of Part 74)
D. Sector-Specific Requirements (Subpart C of Part 74)
E. FAA Evaluation, Approvals and Denial (Subparts D and E of
Part 74)
F. Reconsiderations (Subpart E of Part 74)
G. Term, Amendments, Renewal, Modification, and Cancelation of
Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restriction (Subpart F of Part 74)
H. Access to Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restriction (Subpart G of
Part 74)
I. Parts 91 and 107--Conforming Amendments
VI. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Summary of the Regulatory Impact Analysis
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
F. International Compatibility
G. Environmental Analysis
VII. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
B. Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination With
Indian Tribal Governments
C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
D. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation
VIII. Privacy
IX. Additional Information
A. Comments Invited
B. Confidential Business Information or Classified Information
C. Electronic Access and Filing
D. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document

AC--Advisory Circular
AGL--above ground level
ATC--Air Traffic Control
DOT--U.S. Department of Transportation
FAA--Federal Aviation Administration
FAARA--FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
FESSA--FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016
LAANC--Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability
NAS--National Airspace System
NPRM--Notice of proposed rulemaking
SSM--Security Sensitive Material
TSA--Transportation Security Administration
UA--unmanned aircraft
UAFR--unmanned aircraft flight restriction
UAS--unmanned aircraft system(s)

I. Executive Summary

A. Background

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) \1\ are fundamentally changing
aviation, and, as a part of its congressional mandate,\2\ FAA is
working to integrate them into the airspace of the United States.\3\
The relatively low cost of highly capable UAS technology has triggered
hundreds of thousands of new operators to enter the aviation community,
some of whom have aviation knowledge and experience and many others who
do not. The proliferation of these operations presents significant
opportunities for innovation and growth and represents a driving force
in the aviation sector. As the scale and scope of UAS activities has
grown, some stakeholders have become concerned about the safety and
security implications of unmanned aircraft (UA) flying in close
proximity to certain types of facilities.
These concerns led Congress to enact section 2209 of the FAA
Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016 (FESSA), directing FAA to
create a system under which operators or proprietors of certain fixed
site facilities could request FAA to restrict unmanned aircraft
operations in close proximity to those facilities. Congress identified
the following for the process to apply to: critical infrastructure such
as energy production, transmission, and distribution facilities and
equipment; oil refineries, and chemical facilities; amusement parks;
and ``other locations that warrant such a restriction.'' \4\ In the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 (FAARA), Congress amended section 2209 to
include railroad facilities, and in the FAA Reauthorization Act of
2024, Congress again amended section 2209 to include State prisons.
Congress said

[[Page 24651]]

FAA may consider the following factors when considering a request for
an unmanned aircraft flight restriction (UAFR): aviation safety;
protection of people and property on the ground; national security; and
homeland security. FAA proposes a new part 74 to implement this mandate
and properly balance FAA's other statutory mandates.
Consistent with Executive Order 14305, Restoring American Airspace
Sovereignty, FAA is proposing to limit facilities eligible for an UAFR
to those that are fixed site facilities and meet the definition of
critical infrastructure in 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e).\5\ Critical
Infrastructure is defined as ``systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating effect
on security, national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination of those matters.'' \6\ Additionally, FAA
would consider whether an applicant could demonstrate that a UAFR is
necessary for aviation safety, protection of people and property on the
ground, national security, or homeland security. FAA proposes to limit
UAFR eligibility to balance the safety and security concerns Congress
identified in section 2209 with the national policy objectives of
ensuring the public right of transit, preserving airspace efficiency,
and integrating UAS into the NAS.

B. What is a standard unmanned aircraft flight restriction?

A UAFR under this proposal would be airspace with clearly defined
horizontal and vertical limits within which unmanned aircraft would be
restricted from operating unless the operation fell within a few narrow
exceptions (as described in section V.H. of this preamble). The UAFR
would not independently create a physical boundary or authorize
operators or proprietors of the fixed site facility to establish a geo-
fence or other electromagnetic boundary to prevent unauthorized access.
However, if an operator or proprietor does possess independent
authority to operate such equipment, this regulation does not prevent
them from operating that equipment in accordance with applicable law
and regulation. The functions of the UAFR would be to create a legal
designation informing users not to access the airspace and allow
regulators and law enforcement to enforce the restriction. The primary
benefit of the UAFR designation is that compliant operators would avoid
the designated airspace. Another benefit is that the designation would
help fixed site facilities and law enforcement distinguish between
lawful and unlawful operations in the vicinity of the facility and
focus their resources accordingly.
Anyone conducting unauthorized operations in the UAFR could face a
civil or criminal enforcement action. Civil enforcement of violations
by FAA would be similar to enforcement conducted for 14 CFR part 91 or
part 107 operations. Subpart C of 14 CFR part 13 specifies the
penalties FAA may impose in response to a regulatory violation. Those
sanctions may, among other things, include a civil penalty or
certificate action. FAA has also issued generally applicable guidance
on sanctions that may be imposed for regulatory violations, which can
be found in FAA Order 2150.3C.
Finally, the proposed rule and established UAFR do not provide
relief from federal criminal laws to authorize the facility operator or
proprietor to use equipment or technology designed to detect, take
control of, destroy, or otherwise interfere with an unmanned aircraft.
However, if an entity is authorized by law to use UAS detection and
mitigation systems this proposed rule does not affect the existing
federal laws and regulations that apply.\7\

C. What is a special unmanned aircraft flight restriction?

A Special Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restriction (Special UAFR) under
this proposal would be an airspace designation with defined horizontal
and vertical limits that significantly restricts unmanned aircraft
operations at locations where a credible safety or security threat has
been identified. As with standard UAFRs, a Special UAFR would not
create a physical barrier or authorize operators or facility
proprietors to use detection or mitigation technologies to interfere
with unmanned aircraft. Entities with separate statutory authority to
use such systems would remain subject to existing federal laws and
regulations. The Special UAFR framework is designed solely to establish
a legal airspace designation that restricts UAS operations. This
informs operators of prohibited activity and enables regulators and law
enforcement to enforce the restriction.
The purpose of a Special UAFR is to minimize UAS overflight of
sensitive federal sites and certain eligible fixed-site facilities
whose security or operational integrity could be compromised by routine
UAS activity. By clearly delineating protected airspace, the Special
UAFR would help ensure compliant operators avoid these locations and
would support security agencies and facility operators in
distinguishing lawful operations from unauthorized or potentially
unsafe UAS activity. This differentiation allows federal agencies,
military departments, and law enforcement to focus resources on
genuinely suspicious or unlawful flights.
Under proposed Sec. 74.6, facilities owned or operated by federal
security or intelligence agencies or the Department of War, as well as
designated fixed site facilities endorsed by federal security or
intelligence agencies, the Department of War, or at the discretion of
the Administrator may be eligible for a Special UAFR when supported by
a security assessment demonstrating credible risks. This framework
parallels the process used today for Special Security Instructions
(SSIs) under 14 CFR 99.7 but would create a longer-term, five-year
designation to address persistent threats. The FAA also proposes to
integrate appropriate existing 99.7 SSIs into the Special UAFR
framework, providing a uniform, transparent, and enduring mechanism for
managing airspace security at sensitive sites.
Unauthorized operations within a Special UAFR could result in civil
or criminal enforcement actions, similar to violations of 14 CFR parts
91 and 107. Penalties under 14 CFR part 13 may include civil fines or
certificate actions, and FAA Order 2150.3C provides additional sanction
guidance. When a Special UAFR is issued for national security or
homeland security purposes, the affected airspace may be designated as
national defense airspace under 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3), which may carry
criminal penalties under 49 U.S.C. 46307.
Finally, Special UAFRs remain subject to notice and comment, except
in limited cases where the FAA determines that good-cause exists to
forgo notice and comment. This approach balances the need to protect
critical federal and national-security sites with the FAA's
responsibility to maintain safe and efficient access to the National
Airspace System.

D. Who can apply for an unmanned aircraft flight restriction?

Congress directed FAA to establish a process for operators or
proprietors of fixed site facilities to apply for a UAFR. FAA
interprets ``fixed site facilities'' to mean permanent, non-mobile
facilities. Accordingly, under this proposed rule, only owners or
proprietors of those types of facilities, individually or collectively,
would be eligible to apply for a UAFR.

[[Page 24652]]

Congress identified critical infrastructure, such as energy
facilities and equipment; oil refineries and chemical facilities;
amusement parks; railroad facilities; and State prisons. The Critical
Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001 defines ``critical
infrastructure'' as ``systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of
such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security,
national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters'' (Critical Infrastructure Protection Act
of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)).
As initially designated in Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD
21), the National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure
Security and Resilience (NSM-22) identified 16 critical infrastructure
sectors: chemical; commercial facilities; communications; critical
manufacturing; dams; defense industrial base; emergency services;
energy; financial services; food and agriculture; government services
and facilities; healthcare and public health; information technology;
nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; transportation systems; and
water and wastewater. FAA, in coordination with the Sector Risk
Management Agencies (SRMAs) evaluated facility types within the 16
sectors to determine if they could potentially warrant a UAFR (i.e., is
the facility vulnerable to unmanned aircraft; what would be the effect
of an unmanned aircraft incident; and how that affect would impact
aviation safety, protection of persons and property on the ground,
national security, or homeland security). Within these sectors, FAA
proposes the facilities must meet certain eligibility criteria related
to their operations to be eligible to request a UAFR. These criteria,
which are described in section V.D. of this preamble, are designed to
distinguish those facilities that present safety or security
vulnerabilities associated with unmanned aircraft flights over or near
them.
Facilities that meet these criteria must also demonstrate that
there is an important need to justify the remedy of restricting
airspace. Consistent with the statutory language in section 2209, FAA
would then weigh the criticality of the facility with FAA's other
statutory mandates. Consistent with E.O. 14305, Section 5 (b), the FAA
has coordinated foundational sector-specific criteria and risk analysis
with SRMAs. The FAA will incorporate further SRMA coordination, as
appropriate, as part of the FAA's national security and homeland
security assessments of UAFRs. The Administrator, consistent with 49
U.S.C. 40103 and section 2209, retains final authority to determine
whether to approve, deny, or cancel a Standard or Special UAFR.
FAA requests comments on its determination to limit UAFRs to those
fixed site facilities within the sixteen sectors discussed above.
Please provide any relevant data or technical analysis that does not
identify an individual facility that could assist FAA in evaluating
comments on the sixteen sectors such as:
<bullet> If you identify additional facility types within other
industry sectors, please describe the minimum criteria FAA should apply
to the sector and the basis for those criteria, which are described in
section V.C. of this preamble.
<bullet> Explanation of the facility types' specific
vulnerabilities to unmanned aircraft, what could happen if these
vulnerabilities were exploited, and how the UAFR would provide relief.
FAA will assess these vulnerabilities in relation to aviation safety,
protection of persons and property on the ground, national security, or
homeland security.
<bullet> The total number of facilities that fall within the
identified sector under the proposed minimum criteria.

E. How do I apply for an unmanned aircraft flight restriction?

To initiate the application process, the applicant \8\ would submit
information demonstrating that its facility meets the eligibility
criteria and that there is a safety or security need for the UAFR.
Applicants would submit information describing existing unmanned
aircraft activity over the facility, the nature of the facility's
assets, the vulnerabilities of these assets to unmanned aircraft, and
potential consequences or effects if an unmanned aircraft exploited a
vulnerability (intentionally or unintentionally). The applicant would
also need to describe how the requested UAFR would be integrated into a
facility's security plans to supplement existing security measures.
When considering the request, FAA would consider whether the applicant
had already taken reasonable self-help steps, such as restricting
ground-based access or other action, to protect vulnerable assets.
FAA would also assess any effect the UAFR would have on the
environment and the surrounding community. If, after the assessment,
FAA determines that the fixed site facility meets the criteria for
establishing a UAFR, FAA would publish the proposal in the Federal
Register for notice and comment. The comment period would be open for a
minimum of 30 days. At the end of the comment period, FAA would assess
the comments and make a final determination. If granted, FAA would
publish a document in the Federal Register and post the UAFR on the
agency's website. If denied, FAA would withdraw the NPRM and the
applicant would have an opportunity to correct any deficiencies or to
submit a petition for reconsideration.
If the applicant did not meet the requirements for the initial
assessment, FAA would deny the request and the applicant would have one
additional opportunity to correct any deficiencies and re-submit the
materials for FAA review. This does not foreclose an applicant
reapplying at a future date. Details on how to submit this information
are described in section V.F. of this preamble and in the draft
Advisory Circular, Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restrictions,<SUP>9</SUP>
included in the docket.
This rulemaking, if adopted, sets forth the regulatory framework
for applicants to request and FAA to establish a UAFR. This proposal
provides notice that flight restrictions may be requested by an
applicant in the vicinity of the types of critical infrastructure
listed in this NPRM and that specific notice of a requested UAFR would
be published for public comment in accordance with the procedures set
forth in this proposal.

F. What happens after the UAFR goes into effect?

Once the UAFR goes into effect, unmanned aircraft would be
restricted from operating within the boundaries of the UAFR.
Under proposed Sec. 74.250, the FAA would allow only certain UAS
operations to access UAFR airspace over fixed site facilities. Allowed
operations include those conducted under Parts 91, 107, 108, 135, and
137, which have met rigorous FAA safety requirements and Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) security threat assessments where
applicable. Operators must broadcast Remote ID in accordance with 14
CFR part 89 and transit the UAFR in the shortest practicable time as
well as provide notification to the fixed site facility in accordance
with Sec. 74.255. This approach balances the security of sensitive
sites with the public's right to navigate the national airspace system
by restricting access to operators who have met a higher bar for safety
and security.
Proposed Sec. 74.251 establishes stricter access controls for
Special UAFRs, which protect highly sensitive facilities. Operations
within Special UAFRs require both permission from the

[[Page 24653]]

government agency responsible for the site (``using agency'') and
approval from the FAA Administrator. The using agency itself may
operate within its own Special UAFR without FAA approval.
FAA considers restricting airspace to be a remedy to be applied
only when necessary and must balance its other statutory mandates
against closing UAS access to the NAS. FAA recognizes the need to
promote national security but may need to allow some types of safe and
secure operations through UAFRs to support American economic growth.
FAA seeks public comment on the following:
<bullet> What additional types of unmanned aircraft operations
should FAA allow through a UAFR?
<bullet> What would the justification be for allowing those types
of operations?
<bullet> What would be the economic impact to commercial UAS
operators if they are not allowed to transit UAFRs?
<bullet> What information should an unmanned aircraft operator need
to provide to establish their credibility and demonstrate that they are
not a security threat?
<bullet> Are there additional requirements, either technological or
procedural, that must be in place for these operators to be able to
operate in the UAFR? (e.g., remote ID, coordination with site,
coordination with law enforcement?).

G. Summary of the Costs and Benefits

The proposed rule may reduce the risk of various negative
consequences that could result from UAS flying near critical
infrastructure. Potential avoided consequences include fatalities,
injuries, and property damage that could result from explosions and
other incidents, and economic losses from disruption or loss of
operations. The benefits would depend on the ultimate scope of UAFRs in
terms of covering facilities that represent the unmanned aircraft risk
as well as the effectiveness of a UAFR in reducing the risk. Based on a
scenario of over 9,000 eligible fixed site facilities obtaining UAFRs,
annualized costs would be between $21 million and $31 million,
reflecting a range in unit compliance costs to applicants and including
government review costs.

II. Authority for This Rulemaking

FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in title
49, United States Code. Subtitle I, section 106 describes the authority
of FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes the
scope of the Agency's authority.
This rulemaking is promulgated pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(a)(2),
which establishes a public right of transit through the navigable
airspace and section 40103(b)(1) and (2), which direct FAA to issue
regulations: (1) To ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use
of airspace; and (2) to govern the flight of aircraft for purposes of
navigating, protecting and identifying aircraft, and protecting
individuals and property on the ground. In addition, 49 U.S.C.
44701(a)(5) charges FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft by
prescribing regulations FAA finds necessary for safety in air commerce
and national security. This rulemaking is also promulgated pursuant to
49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3), which authorizes the FAA Administrator to
establish areas in the airspace the Administrator decides are necessary
in the interest of national defense while allowing the maximum use of
the navigable airspace by civil aircraft.
This rulemaking also is promulgated under the authority described
in 49 U.S.C. 106(f), which establishes the authority of the
Administrator to promulgate regulations and rules, and 49 U.S.C.
40101(d), which authorizes FAA to consider in the public interest,
among other things, the enhancement of safety and security as the
highest priorities in air commerce, the regulation of civil and
military operations in the interest of safety and efficiency, and
assistance to law enforcement agencies in the enforcement of laws
related to regulation of controlled substances, to the extent
consistent with aviation safety.
Authority for this particular rulemaking is derived from Public Law
114-190, the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (FESSA),
section 2209 \10\ (codified at 49 U.S.C. 44802 note), as amended by
section 369 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 \11\ (Pub. L. 115-
254), as further amended by section 929 of the FAA Reauthorization Act
of 2024 \12\ (Pub. L. 118-63), which mandated the Secretary of
Transportation establish a process to allow applicants to petition the
Administrator of FAA to prohibit or restrict the operation of an
unmanned aircraft in close proximity to a fixed site facility.
The June 6, 2025, Executive Order Restoring American Airspace
Sovereignty directs that a final rule be published as soon as
practicable ``establishing the statutorily required process for
restricting drone flights over fixed site facilities, and interpreting,
to the extent appropriate, critical infrastructure consistent with the
definition of that term in this order.'' This proposed rule is
published by FAA to fulfill that directive.

III. Background and Statement of the Problem

A. Background

The proliferation of UAS continues to create significant
opportunities and challenges. The relatively low cost of highly capable
UAS technology has triggered hundreds of thousands of new operators,
with and without aviation knowledge and experience, to enter the
aviation community. Due to the complexities surrounding the full
integration of UAS into the NAS, FAA continues to engage in a phased,
incremental, and risk-based approach to rulemaking based upon the
statutory authorities delegated to FAA.
In 2012, Congress passed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) (FMRA). Section 333 directed the Secretary to
determine whether UAS operations posing the least amount of public risk
and posing no threat to national security could be safely operated in
the NAS. If UAS met these standards, the Secretary was to establish
requirements for the safe operation of these systems in the NAS.
Given the growth of UAS activity, in January 2015, FAA issued UAS
guidance \13\ to the law enforcement community outlining FAA's
oversight of aviation safety, including UAS operations, as well as how
UAS and model aircraft can be operated legally, and the options
available for legal enforcement actions against unauthorized or unsafe
UAS operators.
On December 16, 2015, the Administrator and Secretary jointly
published an interim final rule in the Federal Register titled,
``Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft''
(Registration Rule).\14\ This interim final rule provided a web-based
aircraft registration process for small unmanned aircraft in 14 CFR
part 48. The Registration Rule imposed marking requirements on small
unmanned aircraft registered under part 48 in which the small unmanned
aircraft must display a unique identifier in a manner that is visible
upon inspection.\15\
On June 28, 2016, FAA and DOT jointly published the final rule for
``Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems''
(2016 Rule) in the Federal Register.\16\ This rule was an important
step towards the integration of civil small UAS operations (for
aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds) into the airspace of the United
States. The 2016 Rule identified the initial operational structure and
restrictions required to allow safe and routine civil operations of
small UAS in the NAS. Prior to the 2016 Rule, FAA

[[Page 24654]]

authorized commercial UAS operations, including but not limited to real
estate photography, precision agriculture, and infrastructure
inspection, under section 333 of FMRA.
Publishing part 107 was the first significant regulatory step to
enable lower risk, less complex UAS operations in the airspace of the
United States. Part 107 opened the airspace of the United States to the
vast majority of routine small UAS operations, allowing flight within
visual line of sight while maintaining flexibility to accommodate
future technological innovations.
On July 15, 2016, Congress enacted section 2209 of FESSA, titled
Applications for Designation, which directed the Secretary of
Transportation to ``establish a process to allow applicants to petition
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to
prohibit or restrict the operation of an unmanned aircraft in close
proximity to a fixed site facility.'' Within section 2209, Congress
directed that an eligible facility must be a fixed site facility and
identified specific categories of eligible industries: critical
infrastructure, such as energy production, transmission, and
distribution facilities and equipment; oil refineries and chemical
facilities; amusement parks; and other locations that warrant such
restrictions.
On October 5, 2018, Congress enacted Public Law 115-254, FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 (FAARA). FAARA amended part A of subtitle
VII of title 49, United States Code by inserting a new chapter 448
titled Unmanned Aircraft Systems, which incorporates additional
authorities and mandates to support the further integration of UAS into
the airspace of the United States. One of those provisions amended
section 2209 of FESSA to add rail facilities as an additional fixed
site facility sector. Another provision, codified at 49 U.S.C. 44809,
allows a person to fly an unmanned aircraft without specific
certification or operating authority from FAA, so long as the operation
meets certain limitations enumerated in the statute, such as compliance
with all airspace and flight restrictions and prohibitions established
under that subtitle, such as special use airspace designations and
temporary flight restrictions.
The new amendments also included several provisions that
specifically address unmanned aircraft operating and certification
requirements, counter-UAS technologies, hazard mitigation, and
enforcement, as well as the need for remote identification of UAS. All
these amendments highlight Congress's support for the safe and secure
integration of unmanned aircraft systems into the NAS while also
protecting aviation safety, people and property on the ground, and
homeland and national security interests.
On January 15, 2021, FAA published the ``Remote Identification of
Unmanned Aircraft'' final rule, building on the feedback and concerns
about safety and security stakeholders provided in connection with the
three February 13, 2019, rulemaking actions.\17\ The rule established
requirements for unmanned aircraft in flight to provide certain
identification, location, and performance information for receipt by
people on the ground and other airspace users. Remote identification
provides airspace awareness to FAA, national security agencies, law
enforcement entities, and other government officials to help
distinguish compliant airspace users from those potentially posing a
safety or security risk. This signal is accessible to the general
public.
On February 5, 2024, FAA released the UAS Detection and Mitigation
Systems Aviation Rulemaking Committee Final Report.\18\ One of the
recommendations included managing airspace in and around critical
infrastructure facilities. More specifically, the UAS Detection and
Mitigation Systems Aviation Rulemaking Committee recommended FAA
develop airspace management procedures for aircraft operating within
restricted areas below 400 feet.\19\
On May 16, 2024, the President signed the FAA Reauthorization Act
of 2024 (Pub. L. 118-63). Title IX--New Entrants and Aerospace
Innovation Subtitle A--Unmanned Aircraft Systems amends title 49,
chapter 448. Section 929 amends section 2209 of the FAA Extension,
Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (49 U.S.C. 44802 note) to add State
prisons to the list of fixed site facilities. Section 929 also directs
FAA to ``temporarily restrict the operation of an unmanned aircraft in
close proximity to a fixed site facility.'' It also removes the ``other
locations that warrant such a restriction'' category from the list of
fixed site facilities.
The implementation of these various rules and regulations related
to the operation and identification of unmanned aircraft is key to
supporting the safe and secure integration of unmanned aircraft systems
into the airspace of the United States. Thus, considering input from
organizations and regulatory agencies, FAA's experience and authority,
and societal concerns, FAA proposes the framework in this rule to
provide a process for owners and proprietors of eligible fixed site
facilities to apply to FAA to restrict unmanned aircraft activity near
fixed site facilities.
This proposed rule addresses the process for fixed site facilities
to request a UAFR. The following sections discuss: (1) the risks
associated with unmanned aircraft operations; (2) the current legal
framework governing unmanned aircraft activity; and (3) FAA's efforts
to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace by
prescribing regulations for the protection of people and property on
the ground, as well as homeland security and national security
interests.

B. Statement of the Problem

1. Overview
UAS are fundamentally changing aviation and, as a part of its
congressional mandate, FAA is working to integrate them into the
airspace of the United States.\20\ In addition to publishing rules to
permit routine operations over people and at night, FAA continues to
work with stakeholders to understand how integration affects aviation
safety and efficiency as well as the safety of people and property on
the ground. At the same time, the scale and scope of UAS activities
continue to grow. As these activities expand, stakeholders are
concerned about safety and security implications of unmanned aircraft
flying close to certain fixed site facilities. These concerns led
Congress to enact section 2209 of FESSA, directing FAA to create a
system under which eligible owners or proprietors of certain facilities
could request a UAFR. This proposed rule implements section 2209,
creating a process to evaluate such requests and determine whether it
is appropriate to restrict specific airspace.
Nonetheless, there is a natural tension between Congress's mandate
in section 2209 to enable unmanned aircraft flight restrictions, and
the direction in 49 U.S.C. 40103 for FAA to regulate the use of the NAS
to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace and
the public right of transit. In addition, FAA must take into account
its statutory mandate to integrate UAS into the NAS. In proposing this
rule, FAA does not read section 2209 in a vacuum; to the contrary, FAA
reads section 2209 together with the other responsibilities Congress
mandated.
2. Examples of Potential Safety and Security Incidents
While no government-wide comprehensive database of unmanned
aircraft related events \21\ currently

[[Page 24655]]

exists,\22\ facility operators or proprietors have reported a number of
such events to the Department of Justice and other security agencies. A
description of some of those incidents follows.
On November 20, 2015, security guards observed a man operating a
UAS near the Phillips 66 oil refinery in Linden, New Jersey. ``When
approached, the man accidentally crashed his UAS into a nearby truck.''
\23\
Another incident reported to security agencies included an apparent
deliberate attempt to attack an electrical substation using an unmanned
aircraft. In July 2020, officials recovered an unmanned aircraft
trailing a thick copper wire near a Pennsylvania electrical substation.
Security partners have opined that the operator modified the unmanned
aircraft ``to disrupt operations by creating a short circuit.'' \24\
Other reports indicated surveillance of critical infrastructure.
For example, in September 2022, CNN reported that ``drones have been
spotted flying over Louisiana chemical facilities and a pipeline over
the past year and a half, prompting a warning on Thursday about the
potential for espionage and terrorism at critical infrastructure
facilities, according to a report obtained by the news agency.'' \25\
In addition, ``on March 8, 2021, a drone was discovered flying near a
Louisiana pipeline. A law enforcement officer located the drone
operator and discovered they had taken pictures.'' Again, on July 29,
2022, observers saw multiple drones flying over a Louisiana chemical
facility at night. The group of drones flew several feet above the
facility before splitting in two directions. In response, a warning was
issued about the potential for espionage and terrorism at critical
infrastructure facilities, stating that unmanned aircraft can be used
to surveil critical infrastructure.\26\
The year 2019 saw the beginning of increased investigation and
prosecution in federal and State courts for drone-delivered
introduction of contraband at State prison facilities. A man pleaded
guilty in 2019 to introducing large amounts of drugs into the Autry
State Prison in the Middle District of Georgia.\27\ In August 2021, the
third of three men convicted in a scheme to introduce contraband into
the Telfair State Prison in the Southern District of Georgia was
sentenced.\28\ In August 2022, State authorities arrested a man on
suspicion of flying a drone carrying contraband over the Yazoo County
Regional Correctional Facility, and the suspect was subsequently
charged in federal court.\29\ In 2023, multiple men were each charged
in separate schemes involving drone-delivered contraband to five State
prisons in Ohio \30\ and six State prisons in California.\31\ Finally,
in April 2024 the Georgia Governor announced the arrest of around 150
people in an alleged ```multi-State' criminal enterprise using drones
to smuggle drugs, guns, cellphones and other contraband in Georgia
prisons.'' \32\ The pace and scope of multi-State, multi-facility, and
multi-actor schemes demonstrate the acute risk posed to State prisons
and the need to better protect these facilities from drone-introduced
contraband.
3. Potential Risk to Safety and Security
Whether innocent or malicious, unmanned aircraft flying over or
near certain types of infrastructure can pose a risk to the safety and
security of both the facility and the surrounding population. An
example of some sector-specific concerns about the potential threat to
public safety and security follows. These examples do not cover every
sector, only examples of the potential risks to sectors.
Commercial Facilities Sector--Amusement parks. Unmanned aircraft
operating too close to high-speed rides and elevated amusements could
strike people or facilities, causing damage to critical safety features
and injuring people. In addition, unmanned aircraft in close proximity
to areas otherwise restricted from public access, such as ride control
systems, could expose amusement parks to cyber-attacks, rendering rides
inoperable or unsafe.
Chemical Sector. Careless or malicious unmanned aircraft operations
could cause physical damage to facilities and interrupt the production
and distribution of critical chemicals that are essential for the
everyday lives of Americans. In addition, unchecked surveillance of
equipment, processes, and protocols in otherwise restricted areas could
allow bad actors to identify vulnerabilities to support destruction of
equipment or of hazardous chemicals. Unmanned aircraft operations in
otherwise restricted areas could also offer malicious actors the
opportunity to use physical or cyber-attack tools that exploit
information technology, operational technology, and industrial control
systems to alter, disrupt, or disable operations. Ultimately, the
potential risk is that assets containing combustible or compressed
substances could sustain damage and result in fires, explosions, or
hazardous release of toxic chemicals threatening the health and safety
of surrounding communities.
Energy Sector Generally. The energy production lifecycle includes
the attainment of energy fuel sources, refinement of fuel, the
generation of energy from refined fuel converted into electricity and
heat, the transmission and distribution of electricity, and with
nuclear energy, the cooling, and storage, and recycle/reuse of
hazardous spent fuel. Unmanned aircraft could be used to surveil
facilities and their associated structures to identify structural and
facility physical and operational security vulnerabilities. Sensitive
information technology and operational technology as well as
supervisory control and data acquisition communication systems could be
vulnerable to cyber-attack initiated by unmanned aircraft. In addition,
unmanned aircraft operating in close proximity to these facilities and
high-voltage transmission and distribution substations could surveil
the facility's security operations and potentially, either
intentionally or unintentionally crash, into critical components,
causing damage to the system, as well as power outages, fires, and
property damage that may have a cascading impact to that Nation's power
grid.
Energy Sector oil refineries and natural gas facilities. Unmanned
aircraft could be used to surveil oil refineries and natural gas
facilities to identify structural and security vulnerabilities.
Refineries have many components, including towers, pipelines, and
valves, that are vulnerable to intrusion by an unmanned aircraft. The
highly flammable materials stored and processed onsite at refineries
creates the potential for fire, explosion, and/or the release of
hazardous materials if an unmanned aircraft were to cause impacts to
certain systems.
Transportation Sector Rail facilities. Rail yards consist of a
series of tracks used for storing, sorting, or loading and unloading
rail vehicles and large cargo containers. While the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) has no reported incidents of unmanned
aircraft causing physical damage to rail cars or infrastructure itself
or injury to personnel, commercially available unmanned aircraft could
access rail yard areas that are otherwise restricted to the public. An
unmanned aircraft also could be used to surveil activity to identify
structural and security vulnerabilities that could be exploited.
Emergency Services Sector State Prisons. Unmanned aircraft pose a
significant challenge for State prisons. Many incidents of unmanned
aircraft being used to infiltrate State prisons to deliver contraband
such as cellphones, drugs, and weapons have been reported. Unmanned
aircraft threaten existing security protocols and perimeter

[[Page 24656]]

control, and they can also be used to conduct surveillance.
4. FAA Capability Gap
Stakeholder concerns about the safety and security risks unmanned
aircraft pose to fixed site facilities are based on incidents, such as
the ones described previously. Many of these incidents are related to
the industry's low barriers to entry: unmanned aircraft operators with
limited aviation knowledge and experience can easily and at relatively
low cost operate unmanned aircraft in the NAS. Existing tools available
to FAA and law enforcement agencies are not sufficient to address the
safety and security problems that flow from these low barriers to entry
and ease of use. While FAA assesses that the majority of unmanned
aircraft operators do not realize the risk their operations could pose
to the safety or security of fixed site facilities, and FAA believes
that most of these operators do not intend to cause harm, FAA has
concluded this rule is necessary, for a number of reasons discussed
herein and, if aware that their operations could cause harm, would
choose to change their behavior.
A primary purpose of this proposed rule is, therefore, to create a
mechanism by which FAA can communicate to operators where their
operations could pose a risk to public safety and security, and to
prohibit the same. FAA anticipates that this mechanism--the UAFR--will
keep responsible and compliant operators from creating a risk to public
safety and the security of the affected fixed site facilities. There
are limitations to the effectiveness of this proposed rule because a
UAFR would not necessarily deter operators who willfully disregard
their responsibilities and obligations for operating in the NAS from
operating in close proximity to the fixed site facilities in question.
Nor would the rule necessarily deter operators with malicious intent.
However, the proposed rule would create new tools that facility
operators and proprietors, FAA, and law enforcement agencies could use
to address public safety and security concerns. For example, when
responding to reports of unmanned aircraft, law enforcement officials
currently can find it challenging to distinguish between compliant
operators and those who mean to do harm. This proposal would create a
tool to assist law enforcement in making that distinction; UAFRs
clearly establish where unmanned aircraft operators should and should
not be operating. This delineation would allow law enforcement
officials to focus their attention on operators of non-compliant
unmanned aircraft and avoid engaging with compliant operators. As a
result, this rule would provide facility operators or proprietors and
law enforcement officials another factor to help them assess risk and
determine how to respond.
Finally, the proposed rule would resolve some of the regulatory
uncertainty regarding airspace access for unmanned aircraft. FAA has
the exclusive authority to regulate aviation safety and the efficient
use of the airspace by aircraft; the public relies on FAA regulations
for direction and clarity. Attempts by State and local governments to
regulate in the fields of aviation safety and the efficient use of the
airspace by aircraft are preempted.\33\ Outside those fields, the
States are generally free to regulate--even by enacting laws that
affect aviation--as long as their laws do not conflict with FAA
regulations, are not aimed at regulating aviation safety or airspace
efficiency, and do not relate to the prices, routes, or services of
commercial air carriers. FAA anticipates this proposed rule would
reduce regulatory confusion in the national airspace for unmanned
aircraft access.

IV. Overview of the Proposed Rule

A. Introduction

The purpose of this rule is to comply with the direction in section
2209 of FESSA to create a process for restricting unmanned aircraft in
close proximity to certain fixed site facilities. Congress stated FAA
may consider the following entities as eligible for UAFR: critical
infrastructure such as energy facilities and equipment; oil refineries
and chemical facilities; amusement parks; railroad facilities; and
State prisons. Congress identified the following factors for FAA to
consider when reviewing an application for a UAFR: aviation safety,
protection of people and property on the ground, national security, or
homeland security.
FAA proposes to create a process under which certain facilities can
request a UAFR to address public safety and security concerns
associated with unmanned aircraft flying in close proximity to the
facility. This proposal takes into account Congress's mandate to
establish this process while at the same time balancing FAA's statutory
mandates to regulate the use of the NAS to ensure the safety of
aircraft and the efficient use of airspace, ensure the public right of
transit, and integrate unmanned aircraft into the NAS. In addition,
because the rule proposes to restrict unmanned aircraft operations in
certain airspace, the proposal also incorporates environmental review
and public notice processes similar to those FAA routinely implements
for other changes to airspace within the NAS. Finally, restricting
airspace is an extraordinary remedy that must be balanced against the
public right of transit under 49 U.S.C. 40103 and not unduly affect the
efficiency of the NAS. Accordingly, this proposal establishes a process
for granting UAFRs only in those limited circumstances in which there
is a clearly articulated need that justifies the remedy of restricting
airspace, and where narrower measures cannot adequately address a
clearly documented security risk.
FAA seeks to balance the public's right of transit through the NAS
and a need to secure critical infrastructure fixed sites from UAS
threats. In order to ensure preservation of the navigable airspace for
aviation to the greatest extent possible, the proposal puts the burden
on applicants to provide data and documentation establishing that the
restriction is necessary for safety or security. FAA would evaluate
that information and determine whether the applicant demonstrated a
sufficient need to justify the remedy of restricting airspace.

B. What is an unmanned aircraft flight restriction?

FAA proposes two distinct types of unmanned aircraft flight
restrictions designed to manage and protect sensitive airspace around
fixed site facilities: Standard UAFRs and Special UAFRs. Both serve as
legal airspace designations that restrict unmanned aircraft operations,
but they differ in scope, application, and the nature of the threats
they address.
Both UAFRs designate a volume of airspace within which unmanned
aircraft operations are generally prohibited except for narrowly
defined exceptions (see section V.H. of this preamble). The lateral
boundaries of a UAFR must lie entirely within the applicant's property
lines and are capped by an altitude ceiling of 400 feet above ground
level (AGL). In certain cases, the vertical limit may extend above 400
feet to accommodate structures exceeding 300 feet AGL.
Both UAFRs also have two options for the activation duration period
continuous or part-time. A continuous UAFR is active year-round without
interruption. A part-time UAFR would be active for up to 290
consecutive days per year, providing flexibility for applicants with
seasonal or non-year-round operational needs. For example, if flight
restrictions apply only for six months annually, a UAFR would be

[[Page 24657]]

active 24/7 during this six-month period.
Once activated, a UAFR communicates a legal restriction on unmanned
aircraft via a publicly accessible website, directing operators to
avoid the restricted airspace. While the UAFR serves as a ``virtual no
trespassing sign,'' it does not physically prevent unauthorized access.
Violations of Standard UAFRs may lead to civil enforcement actions,
while violations of Special UAFRs may lead to civil or criminal
enforcement actions consistent with FAA's authority under 14 CFR parts
91, 107, 13, and FAA Order 2150.3C, as well as potential criminal
penalties under 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3) and 46307 for national security-
related UAFRs.
The UAFR does not authorize the use of detection or mitigation
technologies to interfere with unmanned aircraft; such activities
remain subject to existing federal laws, including Title 18 and Title
49 U.S.C. The UAFR alone does not create a physical or electromagnetic
boundary to prevent unauthorized access. However, facilities with
independent authority to operate such systems may continue to do so
lawfully, and manufacturers may leverage the publicly available UAFR
database. Additionally, the rule requires the deployment of Remote
Identification (Remote ID) receivers as described in 14 CFR part 89 to
monitor UAS activity.
The proposed UAFRs are distinct from other FAA flight restrictions
which tend to address temporary or emergency scenarios. As directed by
section 929 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, UAFRs primarily
reflect risk profiles correlated with permanent or semi-permanent
facility characteristics. Temporary, short-term restrictions remain the
purview of existing SSIs under 14 CFR part 99.
Special UAFRs represent a more stringent airspace designation
applied at locations where credible safety or security threats exist,
particularly at sensitive federal sites and eligible fixed-site
facilities that require enhanced protection of their security or
operational integrity.
Like standard UAFRs, Special UAFRs define specific horizontal and
vertical limits within which unmanned aircraft operations are
effectively prohibited, but they do not create physical or
electromagnetic barriers. Facility operators with separate statutory
authority to deploy counter-UAS technologies may continue existing
practices; however, this proposed rule does not grant or expand such
authorities.
The primary objective of a Special UAFR is to minimize UAS
overflight at critical sites by clearly delineating restricted
airspace, thereby assisting compliant operators in avoiding these areas
and enabling federal, military, and law enforcement agencies to focus
enforcement resources on genuinely suspicious or unauthorized flights.
Under proposed Sec. 74.6, Special UAFRs would be available to
federal security agencies, military departments, and designated fixed-
site facilities supported by verified security assessments
demonstrating credible threats. This framework parallels the well-
established security-related Temporary Flight Restrictions under 14 CFR
99.7, but Special UAFRs establish longer-term (five-year) designations
for ongoing protection.
Unauthorized operations within Special UAFRs may incur civil or
criminal penalties similar to those described for standard UAFRs, with
enforcement authority stemming from 14 CFR parts 91, 107, 13, FAA Order
2150.3C, and relevant national security statutes.
Special UAFRs remain subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking
unless good cause exists to forgo notice and comment thereby balancing
protection of critical national-security sites with the FAA's mandate
for safe and efficient NAS access.

V. Discussion of the Proposed Rule

In response to Congress's mandate in section 2209 of FESSA, as
amended, FAA proposes to establish a new part 74, in title 14 of the
Code of Federal Regulations. This new part would establish a process
under which operators and proprietors of certain fixed site facilities
may request a UAFR. This proposal describes the types of facilities
that could apply for the UAFR, the information the applicant would be
required to submit, and how FAA would consider the request. It also
describes the terms and conditions that would apply once a UAFR goes
into effect. A description of each section of the rule follows.

A. Definitions and Abbreviations (Part 1)

FAA proposes to add a definition of unmanned aircraft flight
restriction (UAFR) to 14 CFR 1.1: Unmanned aircraft flight restriction
(UAFR) means airspace designated under this part within which the
operation of unmanned aircraft is subject to restriction. Though a UAFR
is a new airspace designation that primarily impacts unmanned aircraft
operators, FAA proposes to include this definition in part 1 because
all aviators, manned and unmanned, benefit from understanding the
requirements for unmanned aircraft operating near a fixed site
facility. FAA also proposes to add the abbreviation UAFR to the list of
abbreviations and symbols in 14 CFR 1.2.

B. General Provisions (Subpart A of Part 74)

1. Definitions (Sec. 74.1)
FAA proposes to add a new part 74, Designation of Unmanned Aircraft
Flight Restrictions, to title 14, chapter I, subchapter E, Airspace.
Many of the terms frequently used in proposed part 74 are not currently
used in other FAA regulations. In addition, FAA anticipates many fixed
site facility operators will not have interacted with FAA or have
experience managing aviation operations prior to applying for a UAFR.
Defining these terms would assist fixed site facility personnel, and
unmanned aircraft operators seeking permission to operate within a
UAFR, by ensuring consistent terminology is used during the application
and maintenance of a UAFR. In Sec. 74.1, FAA proposes the following
definitions:
Applicant. FAA proposes to define applicant as a person requesting
a UAFR under new part 74. Consistent with the statutory mandate in
section 2209, the applicant would have to be an operator or proprietor
of the fixed site facility.
Continuous unmanned aircraft flight restriction. FAA proposes to
define continuous unmanned aircraft flight restriction to mean a UAFR
that is active year-round, and 24 hours per day. This definition
distinguishes between the two types of UAFRs: continuous and part-time.
A part-time UAFR (described below), may be active for 290 or fewer
consecutive days per year.\34\
Critical Infrastructure. FAA proposes to define critical
infrastructure as having the meaning given in 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e), and
includes systems and assets in all of the designated critical
infrastructure sectors identified in National Security Memorandum 22 of
April 30, 2024 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience) (NSM-
22).
Designated representative. FAA proposes to define designated
representative to be an individual who serves as the authorized agent
of the operator or proprietor. This person would serve as the primary
point of contact for communications with FAA about a UAFR during the
application process and, if the request is granted, while the UAFR is
active. An operator or proprietor could serve as the designated
representative, or the

[[Page 24658]]

operator or proprietor could identify someone else.
Designated unmanned aircraft flight restrictions. FAA proposes to
define designated unmanned aircraft flight restrictions to mean the
UAFRs designated in FAA Order JO 7400.12 (incorporated by reference,
see Sec. 74.30).
Fixed site facility. FAA proposes to define fixed site facility to
mean a permanent structure, building, or asset with defined geographic
boundaries. A mobile, virtual, temporary, or impermanent facility would
not constitute a fixed site facility.
Operator or proprietor. FAA proposes to define operator or
proprietor to mean any person who operates or has an ownership interest
in the fixed site facility, or who has a legal right or title to the
property within the boundaries of a requested UAFR, or within the
boundaries of a UAFR after it is issued, including those arising from
an easement, right of way, or leasehold. In accordance with this
proposed definition, the property below a UAFR could have more than one
operator or proprietor, and those operators and proprietors could have
different types of legal rights or interests in the property. As
discussed in section V.C. of this preamble, FAA expects all operators
and proprietors to come to consensus on what property and assets, if
any, may need a UAFR prior to submitting an application.
Part-time unmanned aircraft flight restriction. FAA proposes to
define a part time unmanned aircraft flight restriction as an unmanned
aircraft flight restriction active 24-hours per day for no more than
290 consecutive days. Under part 74, a part-time airspace restriction
is active 24 hours a day, but for no more than 290 consecutive days
(approximately 9 months) annually. For example, an outdoor amusement
park that is closed during the winter months (December, January, and
February) might not require a UAFR to be active during the months the
park is closed as the potential impacts to the amusement park's
operations, guests, and infrastructure from an errant unmanned aircraft
is minimal. A part-time UAFR could be inactive during the off-season;
however, during the season when the UAFR is active, it would be in
effect 24 hours a day. Applying a part-time airspace restriction allows
FAA to balance public access to airspace with the need for seasonal
airspace restrictions.
Security perimeter. FAA proposes to define security perimeter to
mean a boundary that restricts or limits access to a specific location.
A security perimeter may be tangible, such as a gate or fence, or
intangible, such as surveillance cameras or patrolled perimeters. It
may also be a natural feature that cannot be easily traversed. The key
characteristic of a security perimeter is that it is designed to
restrict or deter access to a facility or a portion of a facility. A
security perimeter could include procedures, systems, or physical
boundaries used to monitor, secure, and prevent unauthorized access to
a facility and its assets that the operator or proprietor is trying to
protect.
Site manager. FAA proposes to define site manager to mean the
individual who serves as the operator or proprietor's authorized
representative for the purpose of receiving notification of allowed
operations under subpart G (Access to Unmanned Aircraft Flight
Restriction) of proposed part 74. This site manager could be the
designated representative, operator or proprietor, or any other person.
This person would also be the single point of contact for communication
with FAA in the event that coordination with FAA is necessary.
Unmanned aircraft flight restriction. FAA proposes to define
unmanned aircraft flight restriction to mean an unmanned aircraft
flight restriction that includes both standard unmanned aircraft flight
restrictions as described in Sec. 74.5 and special unmanned aircraft
flight restrictions described in Sec. 74.6 as specified in part 74.
FAA has included this proposed definition to delineate that the process
for UAFRs established under Sec. Sec. 74.5 and 74.6 are both
considered when the term unmanned aircraft flight restriction is used.
Only when Sec. Sec. 74.5 or 74.6 are specified is there a difference
in the unmanned aircraft flight restriction access or notification
requirements.
2. Standard Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restriction Designation (Sec.
74.5)
A flight restriction is a tool FAA uses to restrict aircraft
operations within designated volumes of airspace. In the context of
both manned and unmanned aircraft, FAA can use a flight restriction to
separate non-participating aircraft from hazardous activities. FAA can
also use flight restrictions to restrict aircraft from operating in
airspace for national security or homeland security purposes. These
restrictions can be permanent or temporary, and they can apply to both
manned and unmanned aircraft or just one or the other.
This proposed rule would establish a new type of flight
restriction--the Standard UAFR. A Standard UAFR would be a volume of
airspace with specific horizontal and vertical limits in which FAA
would restrict unauthorized unmanned aircraft operations. The Standard
UAFRs' text would show where unmanned aircraft are not authorized to
operate (unless they qualify for access as explained in section V.H. of
this preamble) and identify whether the restrictions are continuous or
part-time. A continuous UAFR is active year-round. A part-time UAFR is
active for a period of 290 or fewer consecutive days per year. FAA
would publish a legal description of the UAFR in the Federal Register.
Approved Standard UAFRs also would be included in FAA Order JO
7400.12 and depicted on a publicly accessible FAA website. New part 74
would describe how and under what circumstances the operator or
proprietor of a fixed site facility (or a designated representative
acting on their behalf) could request a UAFR.
3. Special Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restriction Designation (Sec.
74.6)
FAA established the general framework for a UAFR in Sec. 74.5.
Under Sec. 74.5, a UAFR allows UAS operations through the airspace
designation that are established, known, and conspicuous so long as the
operator is operating in accordance with Sec. 74.250.
FAA proposes to provide an alternative UAFR for sites with a
credible safety or security threat that would strictly limit UAS
operations and minimize UAS overflight. Proposed Sec. 74.6(a) would
establish the process for federal intelligence and security agencies
(such as DHS, DOD, DOE, and DOJ) and certain fixed site facilities to
be designated as a Special UAFR. These sites have vulnerabilities that
would be exacerbated by having routine UAS overflight due to national
security or specific identified risks to safety.
Under proposed Sec. 74.6, eligible facilities would be limited to
facilities that are under the ownership of or sponsored by Federal
security agencies and military departments.
Federal security agencies and military departments possess the
operational authority, intelligence resources, and mission
responsibility necessary to identify credible threats and assess
vulnerabilities associated with sensitive Federal activities. Allowing
these agencies to directly request Special UAFRs ensures that the FAA
receives requests supported by verified security assessments.
Proposed paragraph (a) would allow FAA, Federal security and
intelligence agencies, and military departments to directly petition
FAA for a Special UAFR for facilities or operations under their
ownership, operational control, or

[[Page 24659]]

have a special interest in. This proposal mirrors the current 99.7
process used for special security instructions (SSIs) but aims to
establish a more enduring solution to address the long-term security
needs of these critical locations. Unlike 99.7s, which are intended to
be a short-term security measure, Special UAFRs will provide a stable
framework for flight restrictions with a term of five years, offering
sustained protection against the evolving unmanned aircraft threats.
As part of the proposed framework under Sec. 74.6, FAA plans to
integrate all current eligible 99.7 SSIs that align with the intent of
this section into Special UAFR designations. By bringing these existing
restrictions into the Special UAFR framework, FAA seeks to provide a
more permanent, structured, and transparent approach for establishing
these airspace designations. This approach also seeks to eliminate
inconsistencies that may arise from the temporary nature of 99.7 SSIs,
offering a cohesive and uniform standard for managing airspace security
at sensitive sites.
FAA also recognizes that certain non-Federal facilities or critical
infrastructure as described in subpart C may support national or
homeland security, even when those facilities are not directly owned or
operated by the Federal Government. These facilities may include
infrastructure supporting defense production, intelligence operations,
continuity of government functions, or other activities where
disruption could create significant national security risks.
Proposed paragraph (a) allows eligible sites as described in
subpart C to be eligible for a Special UAFR if sponsored by FAA, or a
federal intelligence or security agency such as (DHS, DOD, DOE, and
DOJ). During the application evaluation, FAA and the appropriate
federal security agency would evaluate whether the proposed UAFR would
be designated as a Special UAFR. The federal security agency would
provide FAA with a justification in a form and manner as determined by
the Administrator.
FAA recognizes that Special UAFRs are more restrictive than the
standard UAFR, this is by design. Limiting eligibility to entities with
demonstrated national security or homeland security risks helps ensure
that such restrictions are requested only when necessary to address
credible security risks and that requests are supported by agencies
capable of evaluating the broader implications of restricting access to
navigable airspace. FAA believes limiting eligibility to the categories
described above ensures that Special UAFRs are justified by a
demonstrated credible safety or security threat. For example, state
prisons are highly vulnerable to contraband delivery by UAS, with
significant consequences to the safety of both guards and prisoners. In
such cases, the FAA Administrator may determine that a Special UAFR is
the appropriate airspace designation for that site.
This proposal aligns with Executive Order 14305, ``Restoring
Airspace Sovereignty,'' which underscores the United States' policy to
maintain control over national airspace and to protect public spaces,
critical infrastructure, mass gatherings, and sensitive government and
government-sponsored installations from threats posed by the careless
or unlawful use of UAS.
The Special UAFR would remain subject to notice and comment
procedures under this rule unless good cause exists to forgo notice and
comment. Providing notice and comment for such restrictions allows FAA
to evaluate the broader impacts of the restriction on the NAS and the
public to provide meaningful input for consideration.
However, FAA recognizes that notice and comment on the proposed
special UAFR could increase the risk of revealing threat assessments,
security vulnerabilities, or operational timing considerations and thus
FAA may limit the type of information provided in the NPRM in the
interest of national or homeland security. Nevertheless, FAA
anticipates that the most helpful comments for these types of
restrictions will be on the size and scope of the restrictions and any
considerations that FAA may be unaware of. In addition, FAA anticipates
that only a limited number of facilities will be issued Special UAFRs,
reducing any significant impacts to accessing navigable airspace.
This procedural distinction reflects FAA's effort to balance
national security and national defense considerations with its
statutory responsibility under 49 U.S.C. 40103 to preserve safe and
efficient access to navigable airspace. FAA seeks to ensure that
regulatory procedures remain proportionate to the anticipated
operational impact of the restriction by limiting the good cause
exception. FAA invites public to comment on the overall proposed
framework for Special UAFRs, including the integration and inclusion of
existing 99.7 SSIs.
The UAFR and Special UAFR share the same foundational
characteristics. Under proposed paragraph Sec. 74.6 (b), the airspace
designation would have (1) a horizontal limit defined by a lateral
boundary as described in Sec. 74.58, (2) a vertical limit defined by
an altitude ceiling Sec. 74.60, and (3) a continuous or part-time
activation period as described in Sec. 74.62.
4. Applicability (Sec. 74.10)
Proposed Sec. 74.10 describes to whom the requirements in new part
74 would apply. Specifically, this section states that part 74 would
apply to anyone requesting or managing a UAFR. It includes provisions
applicable to anyone who operates unmanned aircraft in the United
States. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Part 74 constrains the
exercise of federal counter-UAS authorities under 6 U.S.C. 124n, 10
U.S.C. 130i, 10 U.S.C. 6227, or 50 U.S.C. 3515a including the
deployment or operation of unmanned aircraft systems for counter-UAS
detection or mitigation purposes.
5. Requesting a Standard or Special Unmanned Aircraft Flight
Restriction (Sec. 74.15)
Proposed Sec. 74.15 establishes the application requirements for a
UAFR. An operator or proprietor would have to successfully complete the
steps outlined in paragraphs (a) through (d) to comply with the
application requirements.
The first step is described in paragraph (a). To initiate the
application process, FAA proposes to require the applicant to establish
that the facility meets the criteria in Sec. 74.54. The applicant
would submit documentation showing that the facility is a fixed site
facility and that it falls within one of the types of facilities
described in subpart C of part 74. FAA would not consider any requests
from operators or proprietors if their facilities failed to meet the
minimum criteria. Only those applicants that demonstrate eligibility
under Sec. 74.54 would be able to initiate the application process.
Those requirements are described in detail in section V.D of this
preamble.
If the operator or proprietor can show that the facility meets the
criteria in Sec. 74.54, they would be able to move on to the second
step. As described in paragraph (b), the applicant would next be
required to demonstrate a safety or security need for the UAFR. During
this step, the applicant would describe the problems unmanned aircraft
pose to the facility and how the UAFR would help address those
problems. For example, proposed Sec. 74.66 would require the applicant
to submit information describing existing unmanned aircraft traffic in
close proximity to the facility, the facility's specific
vulnerabilities to unmanned aircraft, what could happen

[[Page 24660]]

if these vulnerabilities were exploited, and how the UAFR would provide
relief. In addition, proposed Sec. 74.64 would require the applicant
to submit the facility's existing plan for addressing those
vulnerabilities and the potential consequences if an unmanned aircraft
were to exploit them. FAA would then coordinate with SRMAs on the
security assessment provided by the applicable SRMA to assess
eligibility. These requirements are described in more detail in section
V.C. of this preamble.
As discussed earlier in the preamble, FAA must balance the mandate
to ensure public right of transit and the efficiency of the NAS with
the mandate to create a process for UAFRs in section 2209. Reading
these authorities together, FAA has determined that, prior to issuing a
UAFR, the applicant must demonstrate that unmanned aircraft pose a risk
or hazard and that a UAFR would add to existing security measures in
place at the facility. The information in paragraph (b) would help
establish whether that need exists.
FAA is responsible for complying with applicable environmental
laws. To fulfill that responsibility, FAA would consider and document
the potential environmental effects of each requested UAFR.
Accordingly, FAA proposes to require the applicant to submit
information about sensitive land uses in the vicinity of the requested
UAFR. These requirements are described in more detail in section V.C.11
of this preamble.
After the applicant submits the items required in proposed
paragraphs (a), (b), and (c), FAA would evaluate whether the package
meets the requirements of subparts B and C of part 74. As a part of
that review, FAA will assess whether the facility meets all of the
eligibility criteria, and the applicant has demonstrated a sufficient
need to justify the requested airspace restriction. This evaluation is
discussed in more detail in section V.E. of this preamble. If FAA
determines that the applicant meets the requirements and has presented
a sufficient need, FAA would publish an NPRM regarding the proposal and
accept comments for a period of at least 30 days. At this point, FAA
would conduct its final review and decide whether to grant the
requested UAFR. If granted, FAA would publish a final rule in the
Federal Register.
6. Obligation To Update (Sec. 74.20)
Proposed Sec. 74.20 outlines a fixed site facility operator or
proprietor's obligation to provide FAA accurate and current data during
the application process and after a UAFR is granted. Paragraph (a)
would require the operator or proprietor to ensure that the information
submitted during the application process (see proposed Sec. 74.15) is
accurate and up to date. It also would require the operator or
proprietor who has been granted a UAFR to report any changes to the
information submitted during the application process. Paragraph (a)
would require the operator or proprietor to submit this information
within 5 business days of becoming aware of the change. FAA would
provide instructions on how to report these changes in the proposed
Advisory Circular (AC), Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restrictions.
Paragraph (b) would provide one exception. Generally, proposed
Sec. 74.66 requires the applicant to submit information on existing
unmanned aircraft traffic patterns in close proximity to the facility.
FAA recognizes that it would be burdensome for an operator or
proprietor to continually update this information within 5 business
days, especially after a requested UAFR is active. Accordingly, FAA
proposes to require yearly reports once a UAFR is active. The applicant
would not be obligated to update historical unmanned aircraft activity
after they submit the request for a UAFR; however, FAA may request
supplemental information at any time during the application process
(see proposed Sec. 74.100(b)), including updated information about
unmanned aircraft traffic patterns.
Proposed paragraph (c) would require the operator or proprietor to
provide FAA with an ongoing update of the most current information for
the unmanned aircraft flight restriction. To support that review, the
Administrator may require the operator or proprietor to provide
information in paragraph (b) of this section on a more frequent basis.
Proposed paragraph (d) would require the operator or proprietor of
a facility covered by a UAFR to promptly notify FAA of any material
change in circumstances that affect the continuing need for the
restriction. For example, FAA would expect the operator or proprietor
to notify FAA if the facility would be shutting down or having a
temporary lapse in service. FAA would use this information to determine
whether to modify or cancel the restriction in accordance with proposed
Sec. 74.215, Modification and Cancelation.
Proposed paragraph (e) would identify the consequences if an
operator or proprietor does not comply with this section. They include
denying the application under proposed Sec. 74.100, Denial, or
modifying or canceling the UAFR under proposed Sec. 74.215,
Modification and Cancelation. FAA's UAFR analysis and decisions are
based on FAA's obligation to ensure that the totality of data and
circumstances warrant the remedy of restricting airspace. Even after it
grants a UAFR, FAA has continuing obligations to ensure the public
right of access as well as the safety and efficiency of the NAS.
Accordingly, FAA must have current information to discharge these
responsibilities. A critical part of this duty is assessing whether any
changes to the information on which FAA based its decision would affect
FAA's evaluation under subparts D and E of part 74.
7. Incorporation by Reference (Sec. 74.30)
FAA proposes to publish all newly designated, renewed, modified,
and canceled UAFRs in the Federal Register.
Under proposed Sec. 74.100 FAA would provide notice and seek
comment on the proposed UAFR for applicants who have been conditionally
approved. FAA would direct submission of comments to FAA for a minimum
of 30 days.
FAA would compile the designated UAFRs annually in FAA Order JO
7400.12, which FAA would incorporate by reference into proposed Sec.
74.30. FAA would then publish periodic designation updates in the
Federal Register. At the end of the year, FAA would update FAA Order JO
7400.12 with any new, amended, or cancelled UAFRs. FAA would then
incorporate the new version of the Order by reference. This process is
similar to the existing, established processes FAA uses to establish
and maintain a legal description of other airspace designations.\35\
This NPRM proposes to incorporate by reference the final version of
FAA Order JO 7400.12, currently available in draft form. During the
comment period of this NPRM, FAA Order JO 7400.12, the draft of FAA
Order JO 7400.12 is available in the docket for this rulemaking which
is available by visiting <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a>.

C. Minimum Requirements for Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restriction
(Subpart B of Part 74)

FAA proposes to require applicants to submit specific information
to FAA in connection with a UAFR request. This section discusses the
information applicants would be required to submit to request a UAFR.
FAA needs this information so it can fulfill its statutory
responsibilities under section 2209, but also to uphold its
responsibilities with respect to the public right of access and the
safety and efficiency of the NAS.

[[Page 24661]]

The information described in this section would help FAA in
consultation with the SRMAs to understand whether there is a safety or
security need for a UAFR that justifies the remedy of restricting
airspace.
1. General (Sec. 74.50)
Proposed Sec. 74.50 would require applicants to provide the
information described in subpart B of part 74 in a form and manner
acceptable to the Administrator. FAA is developing a web-based portal
(the UAFR Module) through which applicants can submit all required
information. FAA recognizes that some applicants may have confidential
business information, including security-related materials. Therefore,
FAA developed a system where applicants can provide security-related
materials with the appropriate security protections. The draft Advisory
Circular, Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restrictions, available in the
docket for public review and comment, provides detailed instructions on
how to submit information, including confidential business information
and sensitive, classified, or proprietary information.
2. Applicant and Facility Information (Sec. 74.52)
Proposed Sec. 74.52 would require applicants to provide
information identifying both the appropriate points of contact and the
location of the facility for which the applicant seeks a UAFR.
Proposed paragraph (a) would require the applicant to provide the
name and contact information for the key people associated with the
requested UAFR, including any operators or proprietors, as defined in
proposed Sec. 74.1. For example, the applicant would provide
information pertaining to the operator or proprietor of the facility
and anyone with a claimed legal right or interest in the property
within the requested boundaries. Paragraph (a) would also require the
applicant to provide the name and contact information for a designated
representative and a site manager (also as defined in proposed Sec.
74.1).
Prior to requesting a UAFR, the applicant must coordinate with all
other operators, proprietors, or other people with a claimed legal
interest in the property. This coordination could include, but is not
limited to, lessees, easement holders, or other third-parties with a
property interest. FAA would expect the applicant to resolve any
concerns or disputes among those with a property interest prior to
requesting a UAFR. FAA will not intervene in a private property dispute
over how the property should or should not be used. FAA would not
process an application until all such disputes are resolved and those
with a property interest come to consensus on whether and to what
extent there should be a UAFR.
Proposed Sec. 74.52(b) would require the applicant to submit to
FAA information about the facility, including address, contact
information, and a legal description of the property. This information
would include not only the physical location and mailing address for
the fixed site facility, but also a description of the facility;
property boundaries; easements, leaseholds, or other claimed legal
rights or interest in the property and the height of the tallest
structure above ground level located within the lateral boundary of the
requested UAFR.
Section 2209 provides that operators or proprietors may apply for
designation individually or collectively.\36\ If more than one person
has a legal right or title to the property within the proposed UAFR,
including a legal right or title arising from an easement or right of
way, those persons must apply collectively for a UAFR. FAA interprets
``collectively request'' to mean a request by more than one operator or
proprietor for a particular fixed site facility where more than one
operator has an interest or exercises control. Any issues arising from
lack of coordination between the UAFR applicant and other property
owners are beyond FAA's discretion to resolve.
On the other hand, proposed Sec. 74.52(b) would also clarify that
each UAFR application applies to only one fixed site facility even if
the operator or proprietor owns multiple eligible sites.
3. Eligible Facilities (Sec. 74.54)
Proposed Sec. 74.54 sets forth the eligibility requirements for
requesting a standard UAFR. First, an applicant would be eligible to
apply for a UAFR if the site can demonstrate they are a fixed site
facility. A fixed site facility is defined as a permanent structure,
building, or asset with defined geographic boundaries.\37\ A mobile,
virtual, temporary, or impermanent facility does not constitute a fixed
site facility.
Second, the applicant would need to demonstrate the fixed site
facility is critical infrastructure. In 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e), critical
infrastructure is defined as, ``systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact
on security, national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination of those matters.'' \38\ NSM-22 identifies
16 critical infrastructure sectors.\39\
FAA engaged with security subject matter experts from each SRMA to
develop minimum eligibility criteria for each sector. Executive Order
14305 directed FAA to develop a process for restricting drone flights
over fixed site facilities, and to interpret, to the extent
appropriate, critical infrastructure consistent with the definition in
42 U.S.C. 5195c(e).\40\
Third, FAA proposes to have an applicant be required to have
protective security measures in place that are commensurate with the
site's criticality to national security, homeland security, aviation
safety, and protection of persons and property on the ground. As high-
risk sites, FAA expects them to have layered security measures to
protect against a multitude of threats, including threats from unmanned
aircraft. Sec. 74.56 outlines what requirements FAA proposes.
Lastly, FAA proposes to have the site demonstrate the facility has
one or more critical assets or components of facility operations that
are vulnerable to UAS threats. The applicant would provide an
explanation of what portions of the site are exposed to this risk and
how an unmanned aircraft poses a unique challenge a UAFR can mitigate.
FAA and SRMAs recognize that each of the sectors cover a variety of
different assets and facility types which could lead to millions of
eligible facilities for flight restrictions in the NAS. As such FAA
worked with SRMAs to develop eligibility criteria.
The commentary on what specific vulnerabilities each sector, sub-
sector, and specific facility has is limited due to the classification
level of the information that highlights the most at-risk parts of a
facility and its criticality to national and homeland security. The
following criteria were developed to ensure sensitive information
protocols were maintained while also giving the public some insight
into the methodology on which sites are likely to be considered for a
UAFR.
FAA, in coordination with the SRMAs as applicable, considered the
following characteristics when developing eligibility criteria:
<bullet> Whether the facility meets the definition of 42 U.S.C.
5195c(e).
<bullet> Whether the facility is a fixed site with a defined
perimeter.
<bullet> Whether the facility is openly accessible by other means,
including by foot and vehicles.
<bullet> Whether the facility has visible external sensitive
operations vulnerable to surveillance.

[[Page 24662]]

<bullet> Whether the facility has security measures in place.
<bullet> Whether an unmanned aircraft poses a particular or unusual
risk to people or property at the facility.
<bullet> The criticality of the facility, including the consequence
of disruption or the collection of non-public information from or about
the facility, which if disclosed could impact national or homeland
security.
These characteristics informed the development of the eligibility
criteria generally and for the sector and subsectors. Furthermore, the
criteria establish which fixed site facilities would be eligible to
request a UAFR under part 74.
4. Protective Security (Sec. 74.56)
FAA proposes under Sec. 74.56 the outline of protective security
that satisfies the eligibility requirements under Sec. 74.54. As high-
risk sites, FAA expects facilities to have layered security measures to
protect against a multitude of threats, including threats from unmanned
aircraft. Therefore, sites would be required to show they meet all of
the following security requirements:
(1) Access to the facility, certain areas, or key components must
be restricted
(2) The facility must have designated security personnel
(3) The facility must have security monitoring
(4) Must include the capability, either directly or through a
contracted service, to receive broadcast Remote Identification messages
from unmanned aircraft operating within or in close proximity to the
requested unmanned aircraft flight restriction.
UAS are typically difficult to visibly or audibly detect, even at
low altitude, without a technical detection capability to assist
security personnel. At minimum, FAA believes requiring a fixed site to
have a Remote Identification sensing capability is necessary for the
site to establish awareness of the airspace around the facility and be
able to detect allowed operations outlined in Sec. 74.250. This
requirement is limited to passive RF equipment that can receive the Wi-
Fi or Bluetooth signals associated with requirements of 14 CFR part 89.
FAA encourages fixed sites to explore more advanced detection options
as their security and legal authority permit. There are several
solutions on the market to sense a Remote ID broadcast from a drone,
including through fixed infrastructure such as antennae and third-party
subscription services from companies that install and provide security
monitoring.
In addition, FAA also recognizes the potential value of remote
identification data for law enforcement purposes and as a potential
tool to meet mandatory reporting requirements under Sec. 74.20
Obligation to Update. However, FAA is unsure if voluntary retention of
data is sufficient for those purposes or if FAA should include a record
keeping requirement for the remote identification data. Therefore, FAA
is seeking comment on whether FAA should include a retention
requirement for this data. If FAA does include a record retention
requirement, what is the appropriate duration that entities should be
required to retain the records to meet the suggested use of this data.
In addition, FAA seeks comment on any associated costs that retaining
this information may entail.
FAA seeks public comments on the sufficiency of all requirements
under protective security, particularly for Remote ID sensing
capabilities, whether additional standards may be required for RID
sensing technology, or any additional minimum requirements that might
be necessary to adequately delineate between compliant and non-
compliant UAS in a UAFR. FAA seeks comment on whether more stringent
Remote ID broadcast requirements should be imposed on UAS operating
within a UAFR beyond the standard broadcast requirements outlined in 14
CFR part 89. Particularly, FAA is interested in empirical data on the
efficacy of current Remote ID broadcast messages such as the distances
the broadcasts are picked up, any degradation in the ability to receive
the broadcasts and why, and any other pertinent information FAA should
consider when requiring Remote ID to be the main methodology for making
UAS conspicuous to FSFs. Are there any new or additional Remote ID
requirements the FAA should consider to ensure Remote ID can adequately
perform the intended function of apprising FSFs of allowed operations?
Additionally, FAA seeks comments on the economic impact such
requirements would have in terms of cost to the fixed-site operator and
market supply of RID sensing technology.
5. Lateral Boundary (Sec. 74.58)
Proposed Sec. 74.58(a) would require the applicant to identify the
lateral boundaries for the requested UAFR. Paragraph (b) would require
that the requested UAFR boundary not exceed the operator or
proprietor's property boundary. The purpose of these limitations is to
make sure that the requested UAFR is limited to property over which the
applicant has a legal right or interest. For example, in the case of an
application with a single operator or proprietor, the applicant would
have legal control of the facility and all property below the requested
UAFR. In applying Sec. 74.58(b), FAA intends to draw the smallest
practicable polygon consistent with the facility's documented
protection needs and will, where feasible, preserve low-risk flight
corridors between adjacent facilities to support commercial UAS routes
and other NAS users.
In the case where the requested UAFR would extend over a fixed site
facility and encompass additional property within the legal control of
a third-party other than the operator or proprietor of the facility,
the third-party would be considered an operator or proprietor for
purposes of proposed part 74 and must be included in the application.
Proposed paragraph (b) would also require that the lateral
boundaries not overlap in whole or in part with a permanent airspace
restriction. Examples of permanent restrictions include, but are not
limited to, special use airspace designations under 14 CFR part 73 such
as prohibited or restricted areas; UAFR designations under proposed
part 74; or any other established special flight rule, restriction, or
regulation in title 14 CFR limiting the operation of aircraft. FAA
would not consider a UAFR at locations where a permanent restriction
already exists because it would cause a conflict with existing airspace
restriction. Moreover, if a restriction is already in place, a UAFR
would be unnecessary and redundant.
FAA anticipates that applicants will tailor the lateral boundary of
their requested UAFRs to the specific needs of each particular
facility. Some facilities may warrant a UAFR to cover the facility from
property line to property line. Others may warrant a UAFR over only
specific portions of the property. In either case, FAA will evaluate,
in accordance with proposed Sec. 74.100, whether the applicant
demonstrates a need that justifies the restriction. FAA would work with
an applicant to reduce the footprint of the UAFR, if FAA determines
that the lateral boundaries, as requested, do not justify an airspace
restriction, but a smaller footprint would justify the restriction. The
draft advisory circular contains graphical representations of potential
UAFR boundaries.
Finally, the lateral boundary may consist of one contiguous
geographic area or multiple non-contiguous geographic areas that fall
within the fixed site facility's property boundaries. During the
development of this

[[Page 24663]]

proposal, FAA developed graphics to help the applicant visualize these
scenarios. The graphics are in the draft AC, Unmanned Aircraft Flight
Restrictions, Appendix B, which is in the docket for this rulemaking.
The FAA solicits comments on whether the property line of a
facility applying for a UAFR should be the maximum perimeter of a UAFR
in all cases or whether there are certain circumstances FAA should
expand the lateral boundaries beyond the property line.
<bullet> If FAA does allow the expansion beyond the property line,
what circumstances should FAA consider? Additionally, how will the
expanded lateral boundaries help aid in security of a site?
<bullet> Conversely, if FAA does not allow UAFRs to extend beyond
the property line, how might that heighten the risk to some kinds of
facilities?
<bullet> Should expanded lateral boundaries be considered for all
facility types or just specific types of facilities?
<bullet> Similarly, FAA seeks comment on if the lateral boundaries
should be reduced to less than the property line and what scenarios
would be applicable to having less than the property line for a UAFR?
<bullet> Are there certain facilities that only need a small
section of the property restricted?
6. Altitude Ceiling (Sec. 74.60)
Proposed Sec. 74.60(a) would require the applicant to identify the
altitude ceiling for the requested UAFR. Under proposed paragraph (b),
the altitude ceiling could not overlap in whole or in part with a
permanent airspace restriction. As discussed in the preceding section,
permanent restrictions include, but are not limited to, special use
airspace designations under 14 CFR part 73; UAFR designations under
proposed part 74; or any other established special flight rule,
restriction, or regulation in title 14 CFR limiting the operation of
aircraft. FAA would not consider a UAFR at locations where a permanent
restriction already exists because it would cause a conflict with the
existing airspace restriction. Moreover, if a restriction is already in
place, a UAFR would be unnecessary and redundant.
Proposed paragraph (b) also would limit the UAFR to 400 feet above
ground level (AGL). This limit is consistent with existing Sec.
107.51, which prohibits small unmanned aircraft flying under part 107
from operating above 400 feet AGL, with limited exceptions. It is also
consistent with 49 U.S.C. 44809(a)(6), which limits recreational
unmanned aircraft to 400 feet AGL in Class G airspace. Since most small
unmanned aircraft are not permitted to operate above 400 feet AGL in
most circumstances, it would be unnecessary to issue a UAFR with a
ceiling above 400 feet AGL. Nonetheless, FAA recognizes that some
unmanned aircraft operations are authorized above 400 feet AGL.
Operations that do not fall under part 107 or 49 U.S.C. 44809 are
subject to the operating requirements in part 91. Specifically, section
91.119 requires operations above a certain minimum safe altitude
(typically 500 or 1000 feet AGL). Many unmanned aircraft operators seek
an exemption from that provision to allow operations below that minimum
safe altitude. If granted, the exemption would include conditions and
limitations for those operations. Regardless, the part 91 operator
would remain subject to the UAFR, including the altitude ceiling.
The relevant difference between part 91 operators and the other
operators is that under certain conditions, the part 91 unmanned
aircraft could fly over the UAFR when the other operators could not.
For example, if a UAFR ceiling is set at 400 feet AGL, part 107 and
section 44809 operators could fly around the UAFR, but not over it.
This is because part 107 and section 44809 prohibit operations above
400 feet AGL. Part 91 operators would not necessarily be limited to 400
feet AGL. If the terms and conditions of their waiver allow them to fly
over 400 feet AGL, in theory, they could fly over the UAFR.
FAA considered whether applicants could request UAFR ceilings that
exceeded 400 feet AGL to restrict part 91 operations but ultimately
determined that the appropriate ceiling should be 400 feet AGL.
Currently, manned aircraft, including helicopters and small fixed wing
aircraft, routinely operate at altitudes as low as 500 feet (see 14 CFR
91.119). At that altitude, manned aircraft could pose equal to if not
greater risk, to fixed site facilities as unmanned aircraft flying at
the same altitude. For example, a manned aircraft could cause
significantly more damage on impact than a small unmanned aircraft. FAA
ultimately concluded that it could not justify proposing to limit part
91 unmanned aircraft from airspace where part 91 manned aircraft could
continue to operate.
Proposed paragraph (c) would permit UAFR to exceed 400 feet AGL
under certain limited circumstances. FAA proposes that if the tallest
component of the fixed site facility located within the lateral
boundary of the UAFR exceeds 300 feet AGL, the UAFR could extend
vertically from the surface to the height of the facility's tallest
component plus 100 feet, rounded up to the next 50-foot increment,
across the entire UAFR. For example, if the fixed site facility has a
smokestack that is 310 feet above ground level, FAA would add 100 feet
to the altitude to arrive at 410 feet. FAA would then round up to the
nearest 50-foot increment. Under these circumstances, the UAFR could
extend to 450 feet above ground level. The UAFR ceiling would remain at
450 feet AGL, extending to all lateral boundaries.
FAA would not create a ``stair-step'' ceiling on the UAFR in which
the UAFR would extend up or down depending on the height of structures.
A uniform ceiling creates a simple and easy-to-understand restriction
to minimize confusion and maximize compliance for unmanned aircraft
operators. The draft Advisory Circular, Unmanned Aircraft Flight
Restriction, provides graphics depicting other examples and the
appropriate UAFR ceilings using this criterion.
7. Activation Duration of Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restriction (Sec.
74.62)
FAA proposes two types of UAFRs: continuous or part-time. A
continuous UAFR would be active 24 hours per day, year-round. A part-
time UAFR would be active for a period of 290 or fewer consecutive days
per year. In either case, the UAFR would be active 24 hours per day.
FAA proposes that UAFRs would always be in effect on a 24-hour basis to
make the restrictions easy to understand and to eliminate opportunities
for confusion. Similarly, FAA proposes that a part-time unmanned
aircraft flight restriction would be in effect during consecutive days
to make the restrictions simple and straightforward. FAA would not
grant a UAFR for single days or for multiple consecutive groupings of
days within a year.
An applicant would request a continuous or part-time UAFR depending
upon the following criteria. To request a continuously active UAFR, the
applicant would have to demonstrate the facility met the eligibility
criteria in proposed Sec. 74.54 more than 290 days in the previous
calendar year or, if a site is newly operational, provide data to
sufficiently demonstrate how the facility would be eligible if in
operation for 290 days. If the facility met those criteria, the
applicant could request a continuous UAFR. If the applicant cannot meet
these criteria, it may nonetheless be eligible for a part-time
restriction. A part-time UAFR would be active 24 hours per day;
however, it would be in effect on a seasonal basis for 290 or

[[Page 24664]]

fewer consecutive days, as appropriate for the facility in question.
8. Unmanned Aircraft System Security and Incident Response Plans (Sec.
74.64)
FAA does not believe that the remedy of a flight restriction should
be a facility's first line of defense to address risks or
vulnerabilities associated with unmanned aircraft. FAA expects that
operators or proprietors of facilities will take reasonable steps to
address unmanned aircraft prior to requesting a UAFR.
Proposed Sec. 74.64 would require applicants to provide, in form
and manner acceptable to the Administrator, the following information
related to a facility's security plans, including UAS incident response
plans. FAA envisions that this information would include, but not be
limited to, graphical representations and descriptions of the existing
fixed site facility's security perimeter (as defined in Sec. 74.1),
FAA would expect the facility to have some means to restrict ground
access to sensitive or vulnerable assets, such as a security perimeter.
FAA would consider this information when evaluating the application
under proposed Sec. 74.100. This information allows FAA to evaluate
whether the fixed site facility has taken actions to minimize its
vulnerabilities from an unmanned aircraft. FAA is unlikely to approve a
UAFR if the applicant cannot show that it has taken some steps to
restrict public access to the facility. However, FAA recognizes that
there are situations that may require special consideration regarding
how much of the facility is restricted from the public.
9. Demonstration of Need (Sec. 74.66)
As discussed in section IV.C.2 of this preamble, to balance
Congress's direction in section 2209 with FAA's other statutory
obligations to ensure right of public transit, safety, efficiency, and
unmanned aircraft integration in the NAS, only those applicants with a
sufficient safety or security need may obtain a UAFR. Accordingly, FAA
proposes to require all UAFR applicants to submit information
demonstrating a safety or security need that justifies the remedy of an
airspace restriction. To help FAA evaluate need, proposed Sec. 74.66
would require applicants to describe: (1) existing unmanned aircraft
traffic in close proximity to the fixed site facility; (2) the
facility's specific vulnerabilities to unmanned aircraft traffic; (3)
what would happen if an unmanned aircraft were to exploit a
vulnerability; and (4) how a UAFR would be integrated into a facility's
security plans to supplement existing security measures. No one of
these factors would be dispositive. Furthermore, FAA may choose to deny
a requested UAFR under 49 U.S.C. 40103 and section 2209 of FESSA even
if an applicant meets the minimum criteria outlined in subparts B and
C,. The Administrator may make this decision if it is determined that
the restriction is unnecessary to address the documented risk or would
unduly impair the efficient use of the NAS and the public's right of
transit. FAA would evaluate them together with other information the
applicant submits to determine whether unmanned aircraft activity
presents a problem that a UAFR could address. A discussion of the
information FAA proposes to request in Sec. 74.66 follows.
Existing unmanned aircraft traffic patterns. Paragraph (a) would
require applicants to submit information describing unmanned aircraft
operations in close proximity to the facility during the previous 24
months, if available. Ideally, the applicant would be able to describe
the type of operation, identify whether the operator is known to the
applicant, and provide the total number of operations the applicant
assesses are not associated with the facility itself.
Establishing a baseline for existing traffic would not only help
FAA understand current operations over the facility, but it also would
create a reference point for evaluating the effectiveness of the UAFR
once it is active. FAA would use this information to understand
existing threats and hazards and to evaluate the likelihood that a
safety or security incident could occur. Whether a facility has heavy
or light unmanned aircraft traffic would not be used to determine
whether a fixed facility has vulnerabilities to UAS; rather, it is a
factor FAA would consider in the balance for ensuring use of airspace.
For example, FAA understands that some facilities might experience very
light unmanned aircraft traffic; however, its unique vulnerabilities
may lead FAA to conclude that a UAFR is warranted. Similarly, a
facility may report significant unmanned aircraft traffic, but without
demonstrating a vulnerability to those operations, FAA may conclude
that the applicant has not demonstrated a need.
Vulnerability. Section 74.66(b) would require the applicant to
describe how the facility is vulnerable to unmanned aircraft operating
in close proximity to the fixed site facility. This explanation would
identify the security weaknesses or gaps that an unmanned aircraft
could exploit, either intentionally or unintentionally, to the
detriment of the facility's operation or mission. FAA considers a
vulnerability to be something in a fixed site facility's
infrastructure, software systems, operations, or procedures that an
unmanned aircraft could exploit or inadvertently interfere with in a
way that could harm the facility, impede the facility's mission, or
present a hazard to people or property.
FAA would expect the facility to address as many vulnerabilities as
possible through a UAS security response plan or other measures the
facility could reasonably take, short of restricting airspace. FAA
would evaluate those vulnerabilities that could not be addressed
through safety or security measures within the control of the facility
as a part of the process for determining whether a UAFR would be
appropriate and effective to address the identified vulnerabilities.
Consequence. In addition to identifying potential vulnerabilities
to an unmanned aircraft operating over a fixed site facility, the
applicant must describe the potential undesirable outcomes if an
unmanned aircraft exploits a vulnerability. Accordingly, proposed Sec.
74.66(c) would require the applicant to describe the consequences of an
exploitation of the vulnerabilities identified in proposed Sec.
74.66(b), including impact on: (1) the facility's operation or mission;
and (2) aviation safety, the protection of persons and property on the
ground, national security, or homeland security.
To evaluate whether a UAFR would be appropriate, FAA must
understand not only what the vulnerabilities are, but what injury or
hazard those vulnerabilities could cause. To establish their need for a
UAFR, applicants would provide information showing how an incident
could affect the fixed site facility's assets, operations, mission, or
personnel. The applicant would address impacts on aviation safety,
including those impacts on authorized unmanned aircraft activities and
the local population, as well as any impact to national security or
homeland security. For example, if the applicant is concerned about an
operator losing control of an unmanned aircraft over the facility and
it crashing into a structure, the applicant should describe what harm
that incident could cause. The consequences might include physical
damage leading to a power outage, injury to people in or near the
facility, or the release of hazardous materials into the surrounding
community. If the applicant is concerned about an unmanned aircraft
causing radio frequency interference or disrupting critical
communications systems, then

[[Page 24665]]

the applicant should describe what effect that interference or
disruption would have on the facility's ability to fulfill its mission.
FAA would evaluate the likelihood and severity of those consequences,
in coordination with other agencies, as a part of its assessment as to
whether the applicant can show a safety or security need to justify the
UAFR.
Effect. Finally, the applicant must show how the requested UAFR
would be integrated into a facility's security plans to supplement
existing security measures.
FAA would expect the applicant to provide a description of how the
facility would identify and respond to UAFR incursions, how employees
would be trained, and how incursions would be reported. For example,
would the facility have a way to monitor for UAS activity, report
incursions, post signage communicating the airspace restriction, engage
local law enforcement? With this information, FAA would evaluate the
facility's readiness to incorporate a UAFR into their security plans.
FAA expects that in meeting the requirements of Sec. 74.66, the
applicant may consult with and obtain information, analysis, technical
data, and other information, as authorized and appropriate, from their
respective SRMA outlined in NSM-22.
10. Externalities (Sec. 74.68)
In addition to evaluating the effect a UAFR would have on the
applicant's facility, FAA would also evaluate what effect, if any, the
UAFR would have on adjacent landowners and airspace users. Proposed
Sec. 74.68 would require the applicant to describe in a form and
manner acceptable to the Administrator: (1) the costs, disruptions, or
other negative effects to users of the airspace, including known
traffic circumnavigating the facility; and (2) any efforts the operator
or proprietor of the fixed site facility has taken or would take to
reduce or limit those costs, disruptions, or other negative effects.
For example, if a facility knows that a hospital uses unmanned
aircraft to transport high value and time sensitive cargo, such as
organs or blood for transplants, and they regularly fly over the
facility since it is the shortest route to the hospital, what would be
the cost and impact to the hospital if they had to fly around the UAFR?
Another example may be a neighboring facility or landowner that
regularly uses an unmanned aircraft as part of their operations; in
that case, how would the fixed site facility's UAFR impact the other
entity's operations and mission? To the extent a facility identifies
externalities the UAFR would impose on other stakeholders, proposed
Sec. 74.68 would also require the applicant to describe any efforts
that the applicant has taken or could take to minimize those costs or
disruptions. For example, the facility could request a smaller lateral
boundary for the UAFR so it encompasses critical facilities but does
not impact known unmanned aircraft traffic. The fixed site facility
owner could work with neighbors who use unmanned aircraft to establish
policies and procedures that would support both their operations and
missions. FAA would encourage applicants to understand the impact their
requested UAFR would have on others and work with them to identify
mutually acceptable mitigations or accommodations before initiating a
UAFR request.
FAA would consider the externalities, as well as proposed
solutions, when evaluating whether a UAFR is an appropriate remedy for
a particular case. It is important for FAA to make sure that, in
granting a UAFR to address one risk, it does not create a different
concern for other stakeholders. Accordingly, understanding the effect
the UAFR would have on others is an important element for FAA to
consider when balancing section 2209 with Congress's mandate to ensure
public right of access and the safety and security of the NAS.
11. Environmental Impact (Sec. 74.70)
FAA is responsible for complying with the procedures and policies
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and other
applicable environmental laws, regulations, and Executive orders prior
to designating a UAFR. One such responsibility is to consider and
document the potential environmental effects associated with UAFRs.
Though FAA anticipates the vast majority of proposed UAFRs will not
cause adverse environmental effects, FAA must nonetheless fulfill its
obligations under applicable law.
<bullet> To enable FAA to evaluate site-specific information about
requested UAFRs, FAA proposes to require applicants to provide certain
information about sensitive land uses. Specifically, the applicant
would be required to identify and describe the following land uses and
resource types within, adjacent, or proximate to the proposed UAFR:
<bullet> Historic or cultural resources protected under the
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, 54 U.S.C.
300101 et seq.;
<bullet> Presence of Tribal land of Federally-Recognized Tribes or
areas to which Federally-Recognized Tribes have ancestral ties or
religious and cultural affiliations;
<bullet> Properties protected under section 4(f) of the Department
of Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. 303(c));
<bullet> Recreational or park land purchased with section 6(f) Land
and Water Conservation Funds (54 U.S.C. 200305(f));
<bullet> Any Federal or State listed endangered, threatened, or
candidate species or designated critical habitat, including species
protected by individual statute;
<bullet> Any seasonal nesting sites, rookeries, or flyways for
migratory or other listed, threatened or endangered avian species
protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. 703 et seq.)
or other relevant and applicable State and Federal protections;
<bullet> Wilderness Areas;
<bullet> Wild and Scenic Rivers (those that are known for
recreation or vistas) (16 U.S.C. 1271 et seq.) and
<bullet> Noise sensitive areas and land uses.
Depending on FAA's analysis of the information the applicant
provides, FAA proposes the applicant could be required to do the
following:
<bullet> Prepare a site-specific analysis of circumstances or
actions that could result in environmental impacts;
<bullet> Provide information to support FAA's development of an
Environmental Assessment or its equivalent; or
<bullet> Assume financial responsibility for preparation of
documentation required by NEPA by an FAA-selected and -managed
consultant contractor.
Applicants also would be required to provide other site-specific
information FAA may need to complete its evaluation.

D. Sector-Specific Requirements (Subpart C of Part 74)

1. Chemical Sector (Sec. 74.81)
Overview. This sector is responsible for producing, using, and
transporting chemicals essential for the economy and national
defense.\41\ The chemical sector includes facilities that use,
manufacture, store, transport, possess, or deliver potentially
dangerous chemicals. Chemicals touch every critical infrastructure
sector and impact the lives of Americans every day. The chemical sector
is generally made up of four components: agricultural chemicals, basic
chemicals, specialty chemicals, and consumer chemicals.
The four components of the chemical sector play unique and critical
roles supporting various aspects of daily life

[[Page 24666]]

and industrial operations. Diversity within the sector allows it to
address a wide range of needs, from agricultural productivity and
industrial manufacturing to consumer safety and national security. By
maintaining robust production and supply chains for each component, the
chemical sector ensures the continued availability and reliability of
the chemicals that are essential to society.
Most chemical manufacturing, transportation, storage, and
warehousing facilities are privately owned and operated. Because of
potential health and safety hazards, chemicals must be carefully
managed from manufacturing to end use. Chemical facilities include
those related to research, pharmaceuticals, and petrochemicals, among
others. With facilities, suppliers, and end users located around the
globe, chemical sector operations are vulnerable to a variety of
disruptions stemming from a UAS incident. Local or regional disruptions
to critical suppliers can cause cascading supply chain disruptions
across geographic regions and in multiple industries.
The chemical sector affects most industries, with nearly all
sectors requiring chemical products or services for their operations.
Therefore, an incident at a chemical facility can cut across multiple
sectors increasing the impact in both range and scope. Many of these
operations are vital to national security. As a result, the chemical
sector has significant impacts on national security, the economy,
public health and safety, food and agriculture.
Criteria. FAA worked with SRMA's to create risk-based parameters
for chemical facilities eligible to request a UAFR. Relying on previous
analysis of chemicals and threshold quantities, FAA in collaboration
with the SRMA, developed eligibility criteria based on a facility
using, manufacturing, storing, transporting, possessing, or
distributing one or more hazardous-release chemicals at or above the
minimum concentration percentages and screening threshold quantities
that are referenced in the sections of Appendix A. Hazardous release,
in this instance, addresses the release of toxic, explosive, and
flammable chemicals that could cause a hazard.
FAA proposes that a fixed site facility within the chemical
industry may apply for a UAFR designation if the facility uses,
manufactures, stores, transports, possesses or distributes one or more
hazardous-release chemicals at or above the minimum concentration
percentages and screening threshold quantities. To determine the
required minimum concentration and percentages FAA proposes to adopt
sections of appendix A from 6 CFR part 27 into a new appendix to 14 CFR
part 74. The appendix will have a selection of the chemicals that were
included in 6 CFR part 27 and other technical edits to those chemicals
as recommended by the SRMAs.
2. Commercial Facilities Sector (Sec. 74.82)
Overview. The Commercial Facilities Sector includes various sites
that draw large crowds for shopping, conducting business,
entertainment, or lodging.\42\ This sector is integral to the U.S.
economy, contributing significantly to the U.S. gross domestic product
and supporting millions of jobs across the country. The assets in this
sector are extremely diverse and play a vital role in the overall well-
being of people in the nation, which makes their protection and
resilience a matter of national priority. Given the wide variety of
facilities and events within this sector, the Commercial Facilities
stakeholders encounter an inherent tension in balancing security
priorities with the need to provide open access, ensure public
confidence, and encourage economic vitality.
Due to their high public visibility and large foot traffic, these
facilities prioritize safety and security measures to protect against
natural disasters, cyberattacks, terrorism, and public health
emergencies. Any impact on the sector's ability to operate normally
will directly affect the nation's economy as well as the public's
health and safety.\43\ The commercial facilities sector has eight
subsectors that range from entertainment and media to real estate and
sports leagues.
Eligibility criteria for this sector focuses on facilities in the
Outdoor Events and Public Assembly Subsectors, with facilities in those
subsectors representing the highest risk of significant public safety
and economic impacts in the event of a UAS incident. Within Outdoor
Events and Public Assembly Subsectors, as well as in the Sports League
Subsector, certain high-risk fairs, parades, exhibitions, sporting
events, marathons, and events at arenas, stadiums, convention centers,
etc. may be eligible to request temporary flight restrictions from FAA.
As these facilities host events that are often temporary in nature
(e.g., have a start and end time), a temporary flight restriction is
more appropriate than a permanent or part-time UAFR. Certain major
sporting events also fall under a standing flight restriction for one
hour before and one hour after qualifying events.\44\ However, there
are also many facilities in the Outdoor Events and Public Assembly
Subsectors that host large crowds on a non-temporary basis; for
example, amusement parks, theme parks, and zoos. Careless or malicious
use of UAS around commercial facilities could result in significant
harm to people, property, and business operations. The cascading
effects of a UA incident occurring at a facility serving this large of
a community would extend beyond the target facility and negatively
affect supply chains, tourism, and the nation's economy.
Criteria. FAA worked in consultation with the SRMAs to develop the
criteria for eligible sites. While FAA is not seeking to limit
eligibility to only amusement parks, this facility type offered raw
publicly available data. The SRMA's reviewed the annual attendance
levels reported in the 2023 Theme Index report from AECOM; this report
lists the top 20 amusement and theme parks in North America based on
attendance.\45\ The lowest annual attendance of the top 20 parks is 2.5
million. A threshold of 2.5 million may potentially allow facilities
that host short-term events, such as state fairs, to request a UAFR.
The UAFR is meant to be more permanent in nature. Therefore, FAA also
proposes that the facility is open to the public at least 120 days a
year.
FAA proposes that a fixed site facility within the commercial
facilities sector may apply for a UAFR designation if the facility
meets the following eligibility requirements. The facility would be
required to have a minimum annual attendance of 2.5 million in the
previous year, be open to the public for at least 120 days a year, be
primarily outdoors and not enclosed, have ticketing or entry controls
procedures in place and is not a stadium or venue where the events may
be covered by temporary flight restrictions.
3. Communications Sector (Sec. 74.83)
Overview. The communications sector makes it possible to
communicate in rapid time anywhere around the world by providing the
products and services that support the efficient operation of today's
global information-based society. This sector is responsible for
delivering voice, data, video, and internet services to support
national security and the economy.\46\ Many of these products and
services are foundational or necessary for the operations and services
provided by all of the other 15 critical infrastructure sectors.
Communications networks involve both physical infrastructure
(buildings, switches, routers, towers, antennas, servers, generators,
conduits, etc.) and

[[Page 24667]]

cyber infrastructure (routing and switching software, operational
support systems, user applications, etc.), which presents a holistic
challenge to protect the combined physical-cyber infrastructure. The
communications sector includes components from broadcasting systems to
wireless telecommunication. The communications sector is vitally
important to the health of the U.S. economy and the preservation of
public safety and national security, as communications infrastructure
underlies the operations of all businesses, commerce, medicine, public
safety organizations, and government organizations.
Criteria. Eligible facility types in this sector would be limited
to broadcast, communications-related data centers, satellite, and
wireless. The cable component of this sector primarily supports the
distribution of television and internet services, which are considered
less critical compared to large scale telecommunications and
broadcasting which are essential for emergency communications, public
safety, and national security.
Cellular towers, broadcast antennas and satellite uplinks are
vulnerable to UAS. Other types of communications facilities such as
data centers that contain internet exchange points and colocation
facilities. An incident at one of these sites could disrupt phones,
internet, or emergency communications and cause outages that could
result in emergency response delays, economic disruption, impacts to
critical government operations, and loss of human life. Any potential
gating criteria in this sector will be limited to eligible facilities
for which a disruption would have a regional or national impact on the
nation's communications capabilities.
FAA proposes that operators or proprietors within the
communications sector may apply for a UAFR if they are a facility type
listed below and meet the associated criteria:
<bullet> Broadcast network facilities with antennas or transmitters
that are essential for the transmission of public safety information
and emergency alerts.
<bullet> Cellular towers, base stations, or nodes of which
disruption could result in debilitating impact to regional or national,
public health, financial systems, or national security.
<bullet> Satellite uplink and downlink stations of which disruption
could result in debilitating impact to regional or national, public
health, financial systems, or national security.
<bullet> Facilities underpinning interconnected services where
disruption could result in regional or national-level debilitating
impact to multiple downstream sectors (e.g., financial systems,
healthcare, energy grid supervisory control and data acquisition
systems, national security systems, network operations centers).
<bullet> Data Centers/internet Exchange Points and colocation
facilities that contain peak traffic throughput of at least 1 terabit
per second.
4. Critical Manufacturing Sector (Sec. 74.84)
Overview. The critical manufacturing sector is crucial to the
economic prosperity and continuity of the United States. This sector
processes raw materials and produces highly specialized parts and
equipment essential to primary operations in several U.S. industries--
particularly transportation, defense, electricity, and major
construction.\47\ Central to the sector's operations is the global
transport of raw materials and finished products along large supply
chains. According to IndustrySelect's database, there are over 400,000
U.S. manufacturers.\48\ From these manufacturers, there are
approximately 70,000 facilities within the critical manufacturing
sector across the four key functional areas: (1) primary metals
manufacturing; (2) machinery manufacturing; (3) electrical equipment,
appliance, and component manufacturing; and (4) transportation
equipment manufacturing.
Criteria. The critical manufacturing sector is complex, and the
criticality of certain facilities may fluctuate based on various
factors such as economic winds, national public health, and supply
chain changes. For instance, a facility may be the sole source provider
of a certain product, and if there is a supply chain shortage for any
reason, then that facility may become increasingly critical.
Additionally, many facilities may be eligible for a UAFR under criteria
for other sectors as there is significant overlap with the Defense
Industrial Base, Transportation Systems Sector, and Chemical Sector,
among others.
FAA proposes the following minimum eligibility criteria for an
operator or proprietor: (1) the facility must be within any of the
Critical Manufacturing Sector's four key functional areas aligned to
the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS): Primary
Metal Manufacturing; Machinery Manufacturing; Electrical Equipment,
Appliance, and Component Manufacturing; and Transportation Equipment
Manufacturing and (2) has one or more critical components of facility
operations occurring in an exposed area without enclosed walls or
roofs.
FAA seeks public comment on:
1. Are there additional criteria that would be beneficial for
discerning eligible critical manufacturing facilities that have
regional or national level consequences if disrupted by unmanned
aircraft?
2. Are there specific facilities that were omitted or facilities
that should be removed from the current criteria?
When providing a response, please identify the sector and question
to which the response is provided to distinguish from the other sectors
that have similar questions.
5. Dams Sector (Sec. 74.85)
Overview. The dams sector is a vital and beneficial part of the
nation's infrastructure. Water retention and control services provided
by the dams sector support multiple critical infrastructure sectors,
industries, and regions. Dams sector assets contribute to hydroelectric
power generation, water storage and supply, nuclear plant cooling
water, movement of valuable goods on inland waterways, protection from
catastrophic flooding, extreme weather mitigation, and contributions to
local economies. The dams sector assets include dam projects,
navigation locks, and levees.\49\
Dam projects comprise water impoundment or control structures,
reservoirs, spillways, outlet works, powerhouses, canals or aqueducts,
and in some cases, navigation locks. They provide electricity
generation, water storage and supply, sediment and flood control, and/
or recreation. The National Inventory of Dams database documents more
than 92,000 dams in the United States.\50\ Dam failures and associated
inundation areas can result in high fatality rates (i.e., the number of
fatalities divided by the number of people exposed to the flooding),
especially when flooding overwhelms an unsuspecting group of people. As
of July 2025, the National Inventory of Dams classifies 16,845 dams in
the United States as High-Hazard Potential, meaning that their failure
could result in loss of life.\51\
Locks. Locks make inland waterways viable transportation corridors
by allowing commercial and recreational traffic to move safely between
river pools. The U.S. waterway system includes 12,000 miles of inland
and intracoastal waterways and 13,000 miles of inland channels and
harbors, made navigable by over 250 locks.\52\ Inoperable navigation
locks could delay

[[Page 24668]]

valuable domestic cargo shipments that move commerce from 28 states,
along the inland marine highways, to the rest of the nation and
world.\53\
Criteria
Dams. FAA proposes the following minimum eligibility criteria for
an operator or proprietor of a Dam to apply for a UAFR. The dam project
must be assigned in the National Inventory of Dams database as high- or
significant-hazard potential classification and meet one of the
following minimum thresholds:
<bullet> Hydroelectric dams with a combined nameplate capacity of
350 megawatts or more of power and have produced 1,850,000 megawatt
hours or greater during the previous calendar year, or
<bullet> Facilities with a drinking water supply function that
constitutes the main source of water to a population exceeding 500,000,
or
<bullet> Facilities with annual total water deliveries (including
municipal, industrial, and/or agricultural purposes) exceeding $100
million or 800,000 acre-feet.
Locks. FAA proposes that the operator or proprietor of a fixed site
facility may apply for a UAFR designation if the lock has a navigation
function associated with annual traffic exceeding 25,000 kilotons.
6. Defense Industrial Base Sector (Sec. 74.86)
Overview. The Defense Industrial Base Sector (DIB) enables research
and development, as well as design, production, delivery, and
maintenance of military weapons systems, subsystems, and components or
parts, to meet U.S. military requirements. The Defense Industrial Base
partnership consists of Department of Defense components, more than
100,000 defense industrial base companies and their subcontractors who
perform under contract to the Department of Defense, companies
providing incidental materials and services to the Department of
Defense, and government-owned/contractor-operated and government-owned/
government-operated facilities.\54\ Defense industrial base companies
include domestic and foreign entities, with production assets located
in many countries. The sector provides products and services that are
essential to mobilize, deploy, and sustain military operations.
Criteria. The DIB sector is unique because it is contractual based.
The stakeholders in this sector are either contractors or
subcontractors for the Department of Defense. As such, to apply for a
UAFR within this sector, the operator or proprietor must demonstrate
they are a Department of Defense contractor or subcontractor located in
the United States.
The contractor or subcontractor would also be required to
demonstrate their scope of work specifically pertains to the
development, production, or support of mission critical functions such
as aircraft assembly; missile defense; munitions and energetics;
nuclear modernization, including nuclear command, control, and
communications; shipbuilding; space launch vehicles and payload
construction and launch sites; and unmanned systems and counter
unmanned systems.
7. Emergency Services Sector (Sec. 74.87)
Overview. The emergency services sector represents the nation's
first line of defense in the prevention and mitigation of risk from
both intentional and unintentional manmade incidents and natural
disasters.\55\ Emergency services sector functions support each of the
other 15 critical infrastructure sectors and assist a range of
organizations and communities in maintaining public safety, security,
and confidence in the government by performing lifesaving operations,
protecting property and the environment, assisting communities impacted
by disasters, and aiding in recovery from emergencies. Five distinct
subsectors comprise the emergency services sector including: emergency
management, emergency medical services, fire and rescue services, law
enforcement, and public works. For the purposes of this rule, state
prisons are included in the Emergency Services Sector.
The primary unmanned aircraft-related risks to facilities in the
Emergency Services Sector are at correctional facilities. While other
sector functions and roles are subject to disruptions from UAS, those
incidents are typically not necessarily connected to a fixed site
facility.
Correctional facilities routinely face challenges with the delivery
of dangerous contraband into correctional institutions using UAS. In
some cases, this contraband includes drugs and cell phones; in other
cases, more serious contraband, such as weapons and tools to facilitate
escape, has been introduced via UAS delivery.\56\ Additionally, there
are examples where UAS have been used to conduct surveillance prior to
delivering contraband to prison inmates.
Between 2013 and 2016, the Georgia Department of Corrections
reported a total of three drone sightings. In 2018, Georgia Department
of Corrections reported 300 drone sightings.\57\ The South Carolina
Department of Corrections reported 193 drone incidents in 2019, which
rose to 262 drone incidents in 2022.\58\ As criminal drone operators
use sophisticated techniques to evade detection, reported drone
incidents likely represent only a fraction of the actual drone
incursions into prisons.
On June 4, 2024, FAA met with the American Correctional Association
(ACA) and the Correctional Leadership Association (CLA) to discuss the
threat posed by unmanned aircraft to State prisons.\59\ Both
organizations provided FAA with the Countering the Emerging Drone
Threat to Correctional Security Report by RAND.\60\ ACA and CLA
directed FAA to the endnotes and references in the report which include
countless news articles and data documenting the threat unmanned
aircraft pose to prisons.
These drone sightings and incursions into prison facilities are not
benign. Inmates connected to individuals on the outside are using
unmanned aircraft to deliver drugs, weapons, escape tools, cellphones,
and other contraband to prison yards.\61\ Thus far, activity is
reported to have involved the delivery of drugs, cell phones, and
weapons; however, there have also been reports of attempts to attack,
escape from, and surveil the facilities.\62\
Criteria. FAA proposes emergency services sector facilities seeking
a UAFR meet the following minimum qualifications for their specified
subsector: if it is an (1) institution under State jurisdiction where
the primary purpose of the facility is for the confinement of
individuals convicted of a felony or (2) it is a correctional facility
federal, local, tribal, territorial, or private and able to house 500
or more inmates.
FAA seeks public comment on the following:
1. Are there additional facility types in this sector that should
be considered?
a. What are the UAS concerns, threats, and/or vulnerabilities to
these additional facilities?
b. Would these be national level or regional level consequences if
affected?
c. What gating criteria would be appropriate to ensure only
facilities that have regional or national level impacts are considered?
When providing a response, please identify the sector and question
to which the response is provided to distinguish from the other sectors
that have similar questions.

[[Page 24669]]

8. Energy Sector (Sec. 74.88)
Overview. The secure and reliable delivery of energy is crucial for
national security, economic prosperity, public health, and public
safety. The ability to access electricity, natural gas, and petroleum
products on demand relies on the uninterrupted operation of the energy
infrastructure and supply chains that support energy delivery. All
other critical infrastructure sectors depend on energy for their own
secure and reliable operation.
Energy systems are highly complex, with many intra-dependencies
within the sector. The sheer quantity and geographic distribution of
energy infrastructure makes it challenging to harden all assets against
physical security threats, including UAS.
However, certain facilities are critical to regional energy supply
due to their size and function. Within the electricity sector, large
power plants and large transmission substations play critical roles in
electricity generation and delivery to end customers. Within the oil
sector, large oil refineries are critical for regional supplies of
transportation and heating fuels, and within the natural gas sector,
large natural gas processing plants are critical for regional supply of
pipeline grade natural gas.\63\
Criteria. FAA proposes that energy sector facilities seeking a UAFR
meet the following minimum qualifications for their specified
subsector:
Electricity Facility. The operator or proprietor of a fixed site
facility within the electricity industry may apply for a UAFR if it
meets one of the following criteria: (1) the facility is a power-
generation facility with a combined nameplate capacity of 500 megawatts
or greater of power; (2) the facility is an electrical substation with
a capacity of 500 kilovolts or greater of power; or (3) the facility is
an electrical substation with a capacity of 345 kilovolts or greater of
power in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas.
Oil Refinery. The operator or proprietor of a fixed site facility
within the oil refinery industry may apply for a UAFR if: (1) it is a
facility where crude oil is converted into petroleum product; and (2)
it has the capacity to produce 100,000 barrels per day or more of a
petroleum product.
Natural Gas. The operator or proprietor of a fixed site facility
within the natural gas processing industry may apply for a UAFR if: (1)
it is a facility where natural gas is processed into dry natural gas
(also known as pipeline quality or consumer grade gas); and (2) it has
a processing capacity of at least 500 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/
d) of natural gas.
9. Financial Services Sector (Sec. 74.89)
Overview. The Financial Services Sector is highly diverse. Each
financial institution has unique security and resilience needs,
resources, and plans depending on the functions it performs and its
approach to risk management. Effectively reducing the sector's physical
and cybersecurity risk requires a shared understanding of the critical
services the sector provides, the specific security and resilience
risks it faces, and the collaboration mechanisms used among the
sector's security and resilience stakeholders including financial
services sector companies; sector trade associations; federal
government agencies; financial regulators; State, local, Tribal, and
territorial governments; and other government and private sector
partners in the United States and around the world.
The financial services sector includes thousands of depository
institutions, providers of investment products, insurance companies,
other credit and financing organizations, and the providers of the
critical financial market utilities and services that support these
functions. Financial institutions vary widely in size and presence,
ranging from some of the world's largest global companies with hundreds
of thousands of employees and trillions of dollars in assets, to
community banks and credit unions with a small number of employees
serving individual communities.\64\
The financial sector faces growing risks from UAS due to their
increasing accessibility, technological capabilities, and potential use
in malicious activities. UAS pose a unique and evolving threat to
financial institutions, particularly those with critical physical
infrastructure, high concentrations of personnel, or sensitive data
centers.
Criteria. FAA proposes that financial services facilities seeking a
UAFR meet the following minimum qualifications for their specified
subsector:
Corporate Headquarters and Regional Operations Centers. The
operator or proprietor of a corporate headquarters or regional
operations centers may apply for a UAFR if the facility houses C-suite
or high-value personnel or is in urban centers or high-visibility
areas.
Cash Vaults, Currency Processing, and ATM Support Facilities. The
operator or proprietor of cash vaults, currency processing, and ATM
support facilities may apply for a UAFR if that facility has high-
volume cash throughput or services multiple branches.
Trading Floors and Financial Exchanges. The operator or proprietor
of trading floors and financial exchanges may apply for a UAFR if it is
a high-value site for securities and commodities trading and market
infrastructure with real-time trading, media presence, or systemic
importance.
Third-Party Service Provider Facilities. The operator or proprietor
of third-party service provider facilities may apply for a UAFR if the
facility supports transaction processing, custody, authentication, or
cloud services.
FAA is requesting comment on the following:
1. Are these financial sector facility types appropriate for a
UAFR? Please describe why they should be added and the unique risk UAS
pose to them.
a. Are there any types of facilities that should be removed from
consideration for UAFR?
When providing a response, please identify the sector and question
to which the response is provided to distinguish from the other sectors
that have similar questions.
10. Food and Agriculture Sector (Sec. 74.90)
The food and agriculture sector is responsible for the growth,
processing, and delivery of food and agricultural products. The food
and agriculture sector is almost entirely under private ownership and
is composed of farms; manufacturers; processors; storage and
warehousing facilities; restaurants, retail establishments, and more.
Agriculture, food, and related industries represent 5.6% of U.S. gross
domestic product (GDP) and 10.4% of U.S. employment.\65\ The food and
agriculture sector has critical dependencies with many other critical
infrastructure sectors, such as water, transportation, energy,
chemicals, and information technology.
The U.S. food and agriculture sector is composed of approximately
1.9 million farms, over 700,000 restaurants, and more than 220,000
registered facilities in food manufacturing, processing, and
storage.\66\ FAA, in consultation with the SRMAs, could not identify a
facility in this sector that was not already captured by another sector
or would rise to the level of national level debilitating impact.
Criteria. FAA has not developed criteria for this sector. As such,
FAA seeks comments on the following questions to inform the development
of the criteria for the food and agricultural sector:

[[Page 24670]]

1. What types of facilities within this sector should be considered
for a UAFR? Specifically, those that could have debilitating regional
or national-level consequences.
2. What characteristics should be considered in the development of
gating criteria for those facilities?
3. Should the population served or regional or national economic
impact be considered in the development of gating criteria, and if so,
what are appropriate thresholds?
When providing a response, please identify the sector and question
to which the response is provided to distinguish from the other sectors
that have similar questions.
11. Government Services and Facilities Sector (Sec. 74.91)
Overview. The government services and facilities sector includes a
wide variety of buildings, located in the United States, that are owned
or leased by federal, State, local, and Tribal governments. Many
government facilities are open to the public for government business
activities and services, while others contain highly sensitive
information, materials, processes, and equipment and are closed to the
public. These facilities include general-use and special-use office
buildings, courthouses, national laboratories, and structures that may
house critical systems and assets. In addition to physical structures,
the sector includes cyber elements that contribute to the protection of
sector assets for the delivery of mission-oriented services necessary
to conduct security- and national security-sensitive operations and
supporting services necessary for ensuring the National Essential
Functions.\67\
The education services and facilities subsector covers pre-
kindergarten through 12th grade schools, institutions of higher
education, and business and trade schools. The subsector includes
facilities owned by both government and private sector entities.
UAS possess an ever-growing set of capabilities that have the
potential for high-risk disruption to the GSFS--its people, customers,
facilities (including their assets and systems) and services the sector
provides. The range of potential UAS payloads, with various numbers,
sizes and types, could cause harm to the facility personnel and
customers, facilities, assets and systems resulting in incapacitation
and debilitation of critical mission-oriented services necessary for
National Essential Functions. Furthermore, the use of UAS near high
risk, high-security government entities by adversaries could also
result in security disruption, breach, surveillance, espionage,
intellectual property theft, and sabotage.
Criteria. Eligible facilities in the government services and
facilities sector would be limited to high-risk high-security
government facilities with a national or homeland security role and
critical mission-oriented services necessary for National Essential
Functions as determined by a comprehensive risk assessment considering
symbolism, facility size, mission criticality, facility population, and
threats to tenant agency. Therefore, FAA proposes that Government
Services and Facilities seeking a UAFR meet the following minimum
qualifications for their specified subsector:
(1) A high-risk, high-security government facility with a national
or homeland security role and critical mission-oriented services along
with a security level determination resulting from a comprehensive risk
assessment, along with documented related risk management measures in
place.
12. Healthcare and Public Health Sector (Sec. 74.92)
Overview. The healthcare and public health sector encompasses the
essential services and assets needed to protect public health and
ensure the delivery of healthcare services. Key components include
hospitals, outpatient clinics, public health agencies, laboratories,
pharmaceutical manufacturers, health insurers, and others. These are
distributed across the United States and its territories, with
approximately 85% of the healthcare and public health sector's critical
infrastructure owned and operated by the private sector. The healthcare
and public health sector is also responsible for vast, complex public-
private information technology systems required for supporting care
delivery and the rapid and secure transmission and storage of large
amounts of data.\68\
Drones pose a threat to facilities in this sector because they
could collide or interfere with helicopters transporting patients,
medical professionals, biologics, and urgent medical equipment and
supplies. Drones could also interfere with power supplies and
communication systems leading to operational disruptions and potential
harm to patients.
Criteria. FAA proposes that operators or proprietors within the
healthcare and public health sector may apply for a UAFR if the
facility is a Level I trauma center with helipad(s) or pediatric level
I trauma center with helipad(s).
13. Information Technology Sector (Sec. 74.93)
Overview. The information technology sector provides products and
services crucial to efficiently operating today's global information-
based society. It supports the operations and services of other
critical infrastructure sectors and comprises small, medium, and large
multinational companies.\69\
The information technology sector has a profound impact on the
economy and national security. It enables the operation of other
critical infrastructure sectors, supports economic growth through
innovation and productivity improvements, and is integral to national
defense and emergency response capabilities. Disruptions in the
information technology sector can lead to cascading effects across
multiple sectors, as was seen in the 2024 Crowdstrike update
disruption, highlighting the need for robust security and resilience
measures.\70\ Information technology products and services are central
to the nation's critical infrastructure, with businesses, governments,
academia, and private citizens increasingly dependent on information
technology Sector functions.\71\
The information technology sector is a cornerstone of the U.S.
economy with the U.S. computer systems and design related services
industry adding $489.2 billion and data processing, internet
publishing, and other information services adding $469.4 billion in
value to the U.S. economy in 2023.\72\ Information technology
infrastructure enhances the safety, resilience, and continuity of all
16 critical infrastructure sectors. Unlike many critical infrastructure
sectors, consisting of finite and easily identifiable physical assets,
the information technology sector is function-based, encompassing
physical assets and virtual systems and networks that enable key
capabilities and services in the public and private sectors. These
functions are required to maintain or reconstitute networks (e.g., the
internet, local networks, and wide area networks) and their associated
services. These critical information technology Sector functions are
provided through a combination of information technology hardware,
software, networks, and services.
Information technology sector functions encompass the complete set
of processes involved in creating information technology products and
services, including research & development, manufacturing,
distribution, upgrades, and maintenance. These functions support

[[Page 24671]]

the sector's ability to provide various industries with high-assurance
information technology products and services.
Criteria. FAA proposes that operators or proprietors within the
information technology sector may apply for a UAFR if they are a
facility type listed below and meet the associated criteria:
<bullet> Data center hosting cross-sectoral data or platform
dependencies where a loss, degradation, or compromise of such services
could have a debilitating impact on national security, defense, or
continuity of critical government operations.
<bullet> Data center underpinning interconnected services where
disruption could result in regional or national-level debilitating
impact to multiple downstream sectors.
<bullet> Internet exchange point and collocated data centers that
contain peak traffic throughput of at least 1 terabit per second
(Tbps).\73\
<bullet> Exposed long-haul fiber-optic cables at data centers where
a loss, degradation, or compromise of such networking infrastructure
could have an debilitating impact on national security, defense, or
continuity of critical government operations.
14. Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector (Sec. 74.94)
Overview. The nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector is
critical to U.S. clean power generation, as well as medical and
industrial applications and academic research.\74\ This sector includes
the nation's fleet of commercial nuclear power plants, non-power
reactors used for research, training, and radioisotope production, and
nuclear and radioactive materials used in medical, industrial, and
academic settings.\75\ There are 95 nuclear reactors at 54 commercial
nuclear power plant sites in 28 states powering one in five homes and
businesses across the U.S. As the nation's largest source of clean
electricity, nuclear power accounts for more than half of all carbon-
free electricity generated.
A significant incident or failure at a major nuclear facility could
lead to high economic, national defense, environmental, and safety
impacts. There are also public safety implications that would result in
a large national security interest in nuclear sector facilities.
Several nuclear facilities are located within 50 miles of high-density
population centers. Most of the larger plants and facilities were
initially built in remote areas; however, during decades of operation,
development has increased population density near formerly remote
plants. Generally, any facility within 25-50 miles of a major urban
area may be considered a heightened national security risk due to the
potential for mass casualties, disruption of critical services, and
public panic in the event of an incident.
The presence of radioactive material poses an inherent risk to
public safety and the environment--a breach or release of nuclear
material could result in mass evacuations, widespread contamination,
and long-term health impacts.
Criteria. The proposed criteria for the nuclear sector is intended
for critical functions in the energy lifecycle, such as storage,
conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, isotope production, and waste
management.
FAA proposes that operators or proprietors within the nuclear
sector may apply for a UAFR if the facility meets one or more of the
following criteria:
<bullet> Nuclear power plants that are currently operating and
generating electricity.
<bullet> Facilities that convert, enrich, fabricate, or reprocess
nuclear material for nuclear reactor fuel.
<bullet> Former nuclear power plant sites with spent nuclear fuel,
off-site spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste
independent spent fuel storage installations, consolidated interim
storage facilities, or monitored retrievable storage installations.
<bullet> Isotope Production Facilities where a disruption from a
UAS incident could halt isotope supply for medical diagnostics/
treatment.
<bullet> Nuclear research and test reactors.
15. Transportation Systems Sector (Sec. 74.95)
Overview. The nation's transportation system quickly, safely, and
securely moves people and goods through aviation, roads, rail,
maritime, pipelines, and transit systems.\76\ The transportation
systems sector consists of six key subsectors, or modes:
The aviation subsector includes aircraft, air traffic control
systems, and about 19,700 airports, heliports, and landing strips.
Approximately 500 provide commercial aviation services at civil and
joint-use military airports, heliports, and sea plane bases. In
addition, the aviation subsector includes commercial and recreational
aircraft and a wide variety of support services, such as aircraft
repair stations, fueling facilities, navigation aids, and flight
schools.
In the aviation subsector, airports and commercial spaceports are
susceptible to UAS operations due to the high impact of drone incidents
near these sites. For instance, the implications of the 2018 Gatwick
drone incident led to over 1,000 flight cancellations and impacting
over 140,000 passengers, significant financial losses for the airport
and airlines. U.S. officials told a Senate committee on July 22, 2025
that there have been more than 3,000 drone events near American
airports since 2021, including 11 aircraft this year that reported
taking evasive action to avoid collisions.\77\
FAA has an existing framework regulating UAS operations near
aviation subsector infrastructure. Currently, UA are restricted from
flying near an airport without prior authorization from an Air Traffic
Controller.\78\ FAA also has regulations in place for launch and
reentry at commercial spaceports. FAA has frequently used TFRs to
segregate hazardous launch, reentry, and amateur rocket operations from
all other NAS users.\79\ FAA will continue to leverage its existing
framework to manage airspace near these sites.
The mass transit and passenger rail subsector include terminals,
operational systems, and supporting infrastructure for passenger
services by transit buses, trolleybuses, monorail, heavy rail, light
rail, passenger rail, and vanpool/rideshare. In 2024, the U.S. public
transportation sector delivered 7.7 billion passenger trips, while
Amtrak, the national passenger rail service, recorded a record 32.8
million customer trips.\80\
The freight rail subsector consists of six major carriers, hundreds
of smaller railroads, over 138,000 miles of active railroad, over 1.33
million freight cars, and approximately 20,000 locomotives. An
estimated 12,000 trains operate daily. The Department of Defense has
designated 30,000 miles of track and structure as critical to
mobilization and resupply of U.S. forces.
During meetings with FAA, the Association of American Railroads
(AAR) requested FAA consider allowing UAFRs over approximately 140,000
miles of track to include right-of-way property extending laterally
fifty feet from the tracks. FAA does not believe that issuing UAFRs
over potentially 140,000 miles of track is consistent with Congress's
direction under section 2209 or FAA's statutory mandate to ensure
public right of access and the safety and efficiency of the NAS.
Moreover, FAA is concerned that airspace restriction on this scale
would be inconsistent with its obligation to integrate unmanned
aircraft into the airspace.
In this subsector, there are also rail secure areas that are
susceptible to UAS threat. A rail secure area is defined in

[[Page 24672]]

49 CFR 1500.3 as ``a secure location(s) identified by a rail hazardous
materials shipper or rail hazardous materials receiver where security-
related pre-transportation or transportation functions are performed or
rail cars containing the categories and quantities of rail security-
sensitive materials are prepared, loaded, stored, and/or unloaded.''
Rail security sensitive materials (RSSM) are defined in 49 CFR 1580.3
and cover three categories of hazardous materials that, in certain
quantities, present serious security risks: material poisonous by
inhalation, certain explosive materials, and certain high-level
radioactive materials.
The highway and motor carrier subsector encompasses more than 4
million miles of roadway, more than 600,000 bridges, and more than 350
tunnels. Vehicles include trucks, including those carrying hazardous
materials; other commercial vehicles, including commercial motorcoaches
and school buses; vehicle and driver licensing systems; traffic
management systems; and cyber systems used for operational management.
The maritime transportation system (MTS) subsector is an integrated
network that consists of 25,000 miles of coastal and inland waters and
rivers serving 361 ports and supports $5.4 trillion dollars of economic
activity each year and accounts for the employment of more than 30
million Americans. The maritime transportation of cargo is critical to
U.S. national interests and provides an economical, environmentally
friendly, and efficient mode of freight transport. The MTS connects
America's consumers, producers, manufacturers, and farmers to domestic
and global markets.
The pipeline systems subsector consists of more than 3 million
miles of pipelines spanning the country and carrying nearly all the
nation's natural gas and about 65 percent of hazardous liquids, as well
as various chemicals. Above-ground assets, such as compressor stations
and pumping stations, are also included in this subsector.
Criteria. The transportation sector is inherently mobile with many
of its critical assets spanning large geographical regions. Many of the
assets within each of the modes of transportation are mobile and do not
qualify as fixed sites.
FAA proposes that operators or proprietors within the
Transportation sector may apply for a UAFR if the facility meets one of
the following criteria:
For Surface Transportation:
<bullet> Rail facilities required by law to have a rail secure area
as defined in 49 CFR 1500.3.
<bullet> Intermodal passenger transportation hubs that serve three
or more of the following: ferries, commuter rail, heavy rail transit,
Amtrak, intracity buses, and intercity buses.
<bullet> Pipeline pump stations that are immediately upstream of
mountain ranges. (i.e., hydraulically critical).
<bullet> Pipeline compressor stations that are just upstream of
electric power generating plants or major metropolitan areas.
<bullet> Electric substations providing power to pipeline pumping
and compressor stations.
<bullet> Electric substations providing power to railroad catenary
systems.
<bullet> Pipeline control stations/rooms that are sole source
supply to cities, airports, and national defense infrastructure.
<bullet> Highway bridges or tunnels that serve 50,000 or more
vehicles daily and have a structure length of at least a half mile.
For Maritime Transportation:
<bullet> To be eligible to request an unmanned aircraft flight
restriction in the maritime subsector, the facility must be regulated
by the Maritime Transportation Security Act and currently have an
active Facility Security Plan (FSP) or be covered by a Commandant
approved Alternate Security Plan (ASP).
16. Water and Wastewater Systems Sector (Sec. 74.96)
Overview. The water and wastewater sector is composed of drinking
water and wastewater infrastructure of varying sizes and ownership
types.\81\ The sector has its own unique risks including threats,
vulnerabilities, and consequences that drive sector security and
resilience activities. With the support of the Department of Homeland
Security, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the lead SRMA
for this sector, overseeing the safety and security of the drinking
water and wastewater systems of the United States. Below is a breakdown
of the types of facilities that service this sector.
Drinking Water Systems. There are approximately 153,000 public
water systems (PWSs) in the United States. These water systems are
categorized according to the number of people they serve, source of
water, and whether the same customers are served year-round or on an
occasional basis. Public water systems provide water for human
consumption through pipes or other constructed conveyances to at least
15 service connections or serve an average of at least 25 people for at
least 60 days a year. Public water systems are divided into three
categories: (1) Community Water System--a public water system that
serves people year-round in their residences; (2) Non-transient non-
community water system--a public water system that is not a community
water system but still regularly serves at least 25 of the same people
more than six (6) months of the year (e.g., schools, factories, office
buildings, and hospitals that have their own water systems); and (3)
Transient Non-Community Water System (TNCWS)--a public water system
that serves transient consumers. Transient consumers represent
individuals who have the opportunity to consume water from a water
system but who do not fit the definition of a residential or regular
consumer. Examples include gas stations or campgrounds where people do
not remain for long periods of time. There are more than 51,000
community water systems, more than 18,000 non-transient non-community
water system, and approximately 84,000 transient non-community water
systems in the United States.\82\
There are relatively few very large drinking water systems as
compared to the number of smaller utilities. There are approximately
410 community water systems (CWS) that service more than 100,000
people; approximately 3,746 CWS service between 10,001 and 100,000
people; approximately 4,871 CWS that service populations between 3,301
and 10,000; and approximately 42,624 CWS that service fewer than 3,301
people.\83\
Wastewater Systems. There are more than 16,500 publicly owned
treatment works in the United States that collectively provide
wastewater service and treatment to more than 227 million people and
are generally designed to treat domestic sewage. However, publicly
owned treatment works also receive wastewater from industrial (non-
domestic) users; these industrial users discharge effluent into a
collection system for subsequent treatment at a publicly owned
treatment works and are subject to the national pretreatment program.
Many states are authorized to administer this program, which ensures
that effluent is compatible with the utility's treatment capabilities
or, if not, that the effluent is pretreated before being discharged to
the collection system. Major and minor dischargers are defined
according to a formula that considers the type of industry, flow rate,
types of pollutants, and other factors.
Approximately 79 percent of utilities treat less than one (1)
million gallons per day and provide wastewater treatment to less than
23 million people

[[Page 24673]]

or approximately 10 percent of the population served by publicly owned
treatment works. Utilities that treat more than one million gallons per
day provide wastewater treatment to the other 90 percent of the
population served or approximately 205 million people.
As with drinking water, there are relatively few very large
wastewater utilities as compared to the number of smaller utilities.
There are approximately 382 publicly owned treatment works that service
more than 100,000 people; approximately 2,288 publicly owned treatment
works service between 10,001 and 100,000 people; approximately 2,598
publicly owned treatment works that service populations between 3,301
and 10,000; and approximately 11,050 publicly owned treatment works
that service fewer than 3,301 people.\84\
Criteria. FAA has not developed criteria for this sector. As such,
FAA seeks comments on the following questions to inform the development
of the criteria for the water and wastewater systems sector:
1. What types of drinking water and wastewater systems should be
considered in development of gating criteria?
2. What are the characteristics of drinking water and wastewater
systems that should be considered in development of gating criteria?
3. Should population served by a drinking water or wastewater
system be considered in development of gating criteria, and if so, what
are appropriate population thresholds?
4. Should critical customers served by a drinking water or
wastewater system be considered in development of gating criteria?
5. Should a history of unauthorized drone flight over a drinking
water or wastewater system be considered in development of gating
criteria?
When providing a response, please identify the sector and question
to which the response is provided to distinguish from the other sectors
that have similar questions.

E. FAA Evaluation, Approvals and Denial (Subparts D and E of Part 74)

1. Evaluation (Sec. 74.100)
After the applicant submits the information described in proposed
subpart B of part 74, FAA would review and evaluate the UAFR request.
During this review, FAA would determine whether the applicant
demonstrated a safety or security need that justifies the remedy of
restricting airspace. If FAA concludes that the applicant satisfied
this burden, FAA would then provide public notice of the requested UAFR
and accept public comments. A discussion of those processes follows.
FAA's evaluation of an applicant's UAFR request takes into account
the totality of the circumstances, balancing the facility's safety and
security needs with the public right of transit and the statutory
mandate to integrate unmanned aircraft into the NAS. Taking these
factors into account, FAA proposes to require that the applicant
demonstrate that the totality of the circumstances presents a need that
justifies the airspace restriction. Importantly, FAA would not consider
individual factors in isolation; rather, FAA would consider them in the
broader context of the airspace and any impact to people and property
on the ground, homeland security and national security needs.
FAA does not enter into airspace restrictions lightly. To strike
the right balance between the public right of access, safety, security,
and the mandate to integrate, FAA proposes to require the applicant to
bear the burden of showing that the UAFR is an appropriate remedy. FAA
will consider recommendations provided by SRMAs on the requested UAFR
as part of its evaluation of UAFR applications.
The applicant must demonstrate that unmanned aircraft present real
risks, vulnerabilities, or potential consequences to safety or security
when in close proximity to the facility and that the applicant has
taken proactive measures to address those problems before applying for
a UAFR. The applicant must also describe how the requested UAFR would
be integrated into a facility's security plans to supplement existing
security measures. FAA would expect the applicant to provide a
description of how the facility would identify and respond to UAFR
incursions, how employees would be trained, and how incursions would be
reported. With this information, FAA would evaluate the facility's
readiness to incorporate a UAFR into their security plans.
In section 2209, Congress directed that FAA may consider aviation
safety, protection of people and property on the ground, national
security, or homeland security when determining whether to grant or
deny a UAFR. Accordingly, FAA would consider these four factors as a
part of its analysis, together with the information the applicant
submits in subpart B of proposed part 74. When considering these four
factors, FAA may rely on both the information the applicant submits as
well as other independent information available to FAA.
Proposed paragraph (b) would require the applicant to provide other
information relevant to the UAFR FAA may identify as necessary for
evaluating the UAFR request.
Proposed paragraph (c) provides that, after concluding review, FAA
would either deny or conditionally approve the requested UAFR. If
during the evaluation process FAA determines the applicant has not met
the burden of showing there is a demonstrated need to justify the
flight restriction, FAA would deny the request.
Proposed paragraph (f) outlines the denial process; if FAA denies
the request, it would provide an explanation for the denial and the
applicant could petition FAA for reconsideration under proposed Sec.
74.160 (see section V.F. of this preamble). Alternatively, the
applicant could initiate a new request and start the process from the
beginning.
If FAA determines that, based upon the totality of circumstances,
to include the security assessment from the associated SRMA, the UAFR
is justified, FAA would issue a conditional approval. Following the
conditional approval FAA would publish the proposal in the Federal
Register for notice and comment. The comment period would last at least
30 days. Publishing in the Federal Register provides broad public
visibility, conforms to established administrative practice, and
creates a clear, durable record for notice and comment rulemaking. For
these reasons FAA proposes the Federal Register as the primary vehicle
for formal notice and comment on UAFRs.
Once the comment period has closed, FAA would review and make a
final determination within 90 days from when owner/operator submits
their application. FAA would review the complete application materials
to make a final determination whether to approve or deny the requested
UAFR. FAA's review would be based upon the totality of circumstances
and information available to FAA. To reach a final determination, FAA
may consider the following: (1) information the applicant submitted to
FAA at any point in the process; (2) any changes or updates the
applicant submitted to FAA; (3) any public comments received; and (4)
any other information the Administrator deems relevant.
FAA would have already considered the need for and impacts of the
requested UAFR during the conditional approval stage. FAA would not
revisit that decision de novo during the final

[[Page 24674]]

application stage. As a part of the final application review, FAA would
consider: any new issues or unforeseen consequences raised in the
comments; new or updated information the applicant submitted after
conditional approval; and anything else relevant to the analysis.
If FAA approves of the UAFR designation airspace request and FAA
would publish the UAFR in the Federal Register as a Final Rule. Then,
the UAFR would become effective on the date specified in the published
document.
If FAA denies the requested UAFR, it would withdraw the NPRM and
would provide the applicant with the basis for the denial. The
applicant would have 30 days to either correct any deficiencies or
petition for reconsideration under Sec. 74.160. If the applicant does
not submit a revised application addressing the identified deficiencies
within 30 days, the applicant would no longer have an opportunity to
correct any deficiencies. If FAA denies the application again after a
resubmission, the applicant would have 30 days from the date of that
denial to petition for reconsideration under Sec. 74.160.
FAA also considered an alternative approach whereby FAA would
publish the proposal on FAA's website for notice and comment as opposed
to in the Federal Register. The comment period would last at least 30
days. If FAA determines the submitted application is complete and a
UAFR is justified, FAA would approve the application and publish a
final rule document in the Federal Register.
This process would likely reduce interagency redundancies and
provide a streamlined application process. The challenge with this
approach is that the public is familiar with the Federal Register
notice and comment process and FAA would need to ensure that users of
the airspace receive sufficient notice of each proposed airspace
designation and have a meaningful opportunity to provide comment on the
proposed airspace designation.
FAA seeks comment on the benefits and drawbacks of each of the
approaches. FAA also seeks comment on what procedures the agency should
use if FAA adopts the website-based approach to ensure the public and
interested parties have notice and a meaningful opportunity to comment.
FAA invites comment on all aspects of the primary proposal and the
alternative approach. Commenters should address the following
questions:
1. What are the practical benefits and drawbacks of a website-
first, conditional approval process versus immediate Federal Register
publication? Would a website posting materially improve processing
speed or reduce interagency duplication, and if so, how?
2. What procedures or safeguards would be necessary to ensure that
a website posting provides notice and an opportunity to comment that
are equivalent to the Federal Register? Examples include but are not
limited to automated email notifications to registered stakeholders,
use of the <a href="http://regulations.gov">regulations.gov</a> API, targeted outreach to affected
operators, or parallel postings to other federal notice systems.
3. Is a minimum 30 day comment period adequate for meaningful
review and response? Can the comment period be shorter or longer? If
so, what period would be appropriate and why?
4. Please provide any other data, evidence, or examples of best
practices FAA should consider regarding website-based notice, email or
subscription notification, <a href="http://regulations.gov">regulations.gov</a> integration, or hybrid
notice approaches.
FAA anticipates that FAA will be required to issue a significant
number of letters demonstrating delay due to both resources and the
application numbers under either proposal. FAA has considered
variations to the proposed process to streamline the application. FAA
seeks comment on the viability of these variations and on any other
measures FAA could take to streamline the application process.
1. FAA considered requiring an applicant to seek a security
assessment from the applicable SRMA prior to petitioning FAA. Are there
any practical benefits or drawbacks of this variation? Would this
requirement materially improve processing speed or reduce interagency
duplication, and if so, how?
2. FAA considered staggering the effective dates or alternatively
staggering the application windows for the various sectors. Are there
any practical benefits or drawbacks of this variation? Would this
change materially improve processing speed or better allow FAA to
utilize agency resources, and if so, how?
3. If FAA does adopt variation two, how should FAA determine the
order of the sectors effective dates or application windows? What
factors should FAA consider? Should FAA focus on the sectors with the
largest volume or the greatest security risk? Is there an alternative
metric that FAA should consider?

F. Reconsiderations (Subpart E of Part 74)

1. Petitions To Reconsider Denial (Sec. 74.160)
FAA proposes to allow applicants an opportunity to appeal FAA's
decision to deny a UAFR application by submitting a petition for
reconsideration. Proposed Sec. 74.160 would permit an applicant to
seek reconsideration of a denial issued during FAA review process in
proposed subpart D of part 74.
The applicant would have 30 days from the date of the denial to
file a petition demonstrating that FAA denied the application in error.
If the applicant takes the opportunity to correct any deficiencies in
accordance with proposed Sec. 74.100, and FAA affirms its denial, the
30 days would begin to run after FAA affirms the denial. To demonstrate
error, the applicant would have to present a material fact not
previously presented to FAA during the application process, show that
FAA made a material error of fact, or show that FAA incorrectly
interpreted applicable law, regulation, or precedent.
FAA would consider timely filed petitions. If FAA determines that
it issued the denial in error, it would rescind the denial and permit
the applicant to continue with the UAFR application process. If FAA
determines that it did not issue the denial in error, the denial would
become final.

G. Term, Amendments, Renewal, Modification, and Cancelation of Unmanned
Aircraft Flight Restriction (Subpart F of Part 74)

1. Term (Sec. 74.200)
FAA proposes to make UAFRs granted under proposed part 74 effective
for a maximum of five years from the date they go into effect. The UAFR
would expire at the end of the term unless the operator or proprietor
seeks a renewal under proposed Sec. 74.210.
FAA proposes a limit of five years to balance the operator or
proprietor's interest in safety and security with the practical reality
that the UAS operational environment is dynamic. As FAA continues to
implement policies and regulations to safely integrate UAS into the
NAS, FAA will have to review, validate, and adapt UAFRs to determine
whether the UAFR is still warranted. Moreover, though the need to
secure fixed site facilities may remain constant, technologies for
surveilling and protecting facilities will continue to evolve,
including those related to remote identification, detection, and
geofencing. FAA anticipates that advancements in unmanned aircraft

[[Page 24675]]

systems traffic management (UTM), beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS)
operations, unmanned aircraft remote identification (Remote ID) as well
as the growth of new remote and autonomous operations such as urban air
mobility (UAM) and advanced air mobility (AAM), will affect stakeholder
use of the airspace as well as safety and security cases for those
operations.
Finally, as unmanned aircraft operators become more cognizant of
the need to avoid fixed site facilities, UAFR requirements may change
or may not be required at all. Accordingly, FAA must retain the
flexibility to adjust to changing needs of the airspace and stakeholder
communities. Five-year UAFR term limits afford FAA that flexibility.
2. Amendments (Sec. 74.205)
Under proposed Sec. 74.205, an operator or proprietor may request
to amend a UAFR. For substantive amendments that would increase the
altitude ceiling, lateral boundary, or activation duration of a UAFR,
FAA would publish a new NPRM seeking public comment and a final rule.
For all other requests, FAA proposes to require operators or
proprietors to provide updates in accordance with the operator or
proprietor's continuing obligation to update in accordance with
proposed Sec. 74.20. FAA anticipates that other changes, such as
administrative updates or requests to decrease the airspace volume or
decrease the active period of the UAFR would have minimal or no
operational impact on unmanned aircraft operations.
FAA anticipates that operators or proprietors would be able to
submit requests for amendments electronically via the UAFR Module. The
draft Advisory Circular, Designation of Unmanned Aircraft Flight
Restrictions, would provide guidance on how to submit this information.
3. Renewal (Sec. 74.210)
Proposed Sec. 74.210 would permit operators or proprietors to
request renewal of a UAFR. FAA would require operators or proprietors
to submit the request no later than 120 days before the UAFR expires.
The 120-day lead time would give FAA time to process the request before
the UAFR expires. If the operator or proprietor requests a renewal less
than 120 days before expiration, FAA would not be able to guarantee
that it will have sufficient time to complete a review before the UAFR
expires. If the UAFR expires before FAA can issue a renewal, the
operator or proprietor of the fixed site facility may have to apply for
a new UAFR under proposed part 74. FAA will publish guidance for
submitting a renewal package as provided in the draft Advisory
Circular, Designation of Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restrictions.
FAA proposes a UAFR term limit of five years from the effective
date. FAA proposes subsequent renewal periods would also run for five
years. The five-year term would be to ensure periodic review of the
UAFR for the reasons explained in section V.F.1 of this preamble.
4. Modification and Cancelation (Sec. 74.215)
Proposed Sec. 74.215 describes how either the operator or
proprietor may request FAA to cancel an active UAFR or FAA itself can
cancel an active UAFR.
Proposed paragraph (a) would provide that the operator or
proprietor could ask FAA to cancel the UAFR for any reason and at any
time. FAA proposes to provide information on how to request cancelation
in the draft Advisory Circular, Designation of Unmanned Aircraft Flight
Restrictions. Paragraph (a) would also put an affirmative obligation on
the operator or proprietor to request cancelation if the fixed site
facility no longer meets the eligibility criteria in proposed Sec.
74.54 and subpart C of part 74. For example, to be eligible for a UAFR,
proposed Sec. 74.88 requires facilities within the energy sector to
have certain minimum outputs, depending on the type of facility. If the
facility's output no longer met the minimum threshold, the operator or
proprietor would have to cancel the UAFR.
Proposed paragraph (b) provides that any UAFR is subject to FAA's
ongoing review. If FAA determines the basis for its approval of a UAFR
no longer meets the requirements of proposed part 74, FAA may cancel or
amend the UAFR. In other words, over time the facts and circumstances
that justified the remedy of restricting airspace could change. FAA
reserves the right to reconsider the UAFR in light of those
circumstances and potentially adjust or terminate the UAFR, if
appropriate. For example, proposed Sec. 74.58(b)(2) prohibits a UAFR
from overlapping with a permanent airspace restriction. If FAA
establishes a permanent airspace restriction that overlaps with an
active UAFR, FAA would modify or terminate the UAFR to reflect the new
condition. Other examples could include a facility that no longer meets
the eligibility criteria discussed in section V.C. of this preamble or
a facility where the security asset vulnerabilities no longer exist due
to external changes.
FAA would provide the operator or proprietor with notice explaining
why it intends to cancel the UAFR. The operator or proprietor would
have 30 days to demonstrate why FAA should not cancel the UAFR. If the
operator or proprietor does not respond, FAA would cancel the UAFR. If
the operator or proprietor does respond, FAA would consider the
response and make a decision on whether to cancel the UAFR.

H. Access to Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restriction (Subpart G of Part
74)

FAA recognizes there may be circumstances under which there is a
need to allow limited access to airspace that is otherwise restricted.
Accordingly, under existing regulations, FAA accommodates certain
operations when there is an important need for access. Consistent with
this historical approach to airspace access, FAA proposes to establish
a process under which unmanned aircraft systems operators could access
a UAFR under certain circumstances. This approach is consistent with
Congress's mandate. In section 2209(a), Congress directed the agency to
create a process to ``prohibit or restrict'' (emphasis added) unmanned
aircraft in close proximity to fixed site facilities. By using the word
``restrict,'' Congress recognized that some unmanned aircraft might be
able to access the designated airspace under certain circumstances.
Moreover, in paragraph (d), Congress was explicit about its intent,
stating that FAA has clear authority to authorize operations within
airspace designated for a UAFR. FAA would exercise that authority under
proposed Sec. Sec. 74.250 and 74.255.
1. Allowed Operations (Sec. 74.250)
In accordance with E.O. 14307 Unleashing American Drone Dominance
and consistent with FAA's statutory responsibilities under 49 U.S.C.
40103(a)(2), FAA must balance public right of transit in the NAS with
national security risk to sensitive fixed sites.\85\ As such, proposed
Sec. 74.250 would establish the terms under which certain unmanned
aircraft system operators could access UAFR airspace, under Sec. 74.5,
that is otherwise restricted to unmanned aircraft operations. FAA's
intent is to allow established, known, and conspicuous operators to
enter and transit UAFRs.
Proposed paragraph (a) outlines the requirements for an allowed
operator to enter the UAFR.
In Sec. 74.250 (a)(1), allowed operators would be required to
broadcast remote ID in accordance with 14 CFR part 89, unless otherwise
authorized by the

[[Page 24676]]

Administrator, to transit a UAFR. This requirement is intended to
balance the need to secure the airspace with the efficiency of the NAS.
The requirement supports a facility's ability to identify UAS
operations and contact law enforcement, if necessary, without imposing
undue barriers to lawful UAS operations by enabling operators to be
readily identifiable.
FAA has historically relied on aircraft conspicuity to enhance
safety and security while preserving NAS access. For example, in the
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Performance
Requirements to Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service final rule,
FAA emphasized that increased identification and situational awareness
would improve the safety and efficiency of the airspace system without
unduly restricting compliant operators.\86\ Consistent with this
approach, FAA proposes to require UAS broadcast Remote ID. The intent
of this requirement is to require that the UAS be conspicuous so that
the fixed site facility operator or proprietor would be able to
identify allowed operators through remote identification. This
requirement, in conjunction with the requirement for UAFR fixed sites
to have a remote ID sensing capability in proposed Sec. 74.56, and
notification procedures in proposed Sec. 74.255 requiring allowed
operators to submit their remote ID serial number to the fixed site,
would lead to enhanced UAS visibility and identification in the UAFR.
Paragraph (a)(2) proposes that operations within a UAFR must
transit a UAFR in the shortest amount of time practicable. FAA
considered imposing operational restrictions for operations within a
UAFR, such as prohibitions on hovering or landing, but ultimately
believed that a performance-based time objective was a more flexible
method to meet the intent of balancing the safety and security of a
UAFR with the rights of the public to navigable airspace. FAA's intent
with using the word practicable is to strike this balance without
hindering those operators' ability to maneuver for safety of flight
such as pausing for air traffic deconfliction purposes. FAA understands
that some UAS operations, such as business applications of the fixed
site facility (e.g., infrastructure inspection), law enforcement or
national security investigations, or first amendment activity, may
require non-transitory operations within a UAFR. FAA is interested in
the public's feedback on whether the language in (a)(2) is broad enough
to enable both legitimate transitory and non-transitory operations
within a UAFR, with the appropriate notification to the fixed site
facility, while still preserving the integrity of the airspace
restriction. Ultimately, the requirement in (a)(2) is rooted in the
overarching need to maintain security within the UAFR, an area where
authorization to operate does not automatically confer permission for
all types of operations. In such sensitive environments, specific
behaviors such as hovering, orbiting, landing, or loitering, may
present security challenges that are distinct from conventional
aviation safety issues. These types of behaviors, when conducted over
sensitive sites, draw heightened concern from security personnel.
Consequently, FAA believes a performance-based operational limitation
is necessary to safeguard the integrity and security of the airspace,
and seeks comment on the reasonability of the current proposed
limitation, specific categories of operations that limitations should
or should not apply to, and any additional language FAA should consider
to balance the integrity of a UAFR with the public's right to navigable
airspace.
Proposed paragraph (a)(3) would limit unmanned aircraft operations
within a UAFR to the types of operations described in paragraphs (b)
through (f).
Propos

[…truncated; see source link]

View on FederalRegister.gov →Plain-text source

Indexed from Federal Register on May 6, 2026.

This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.