Notice2026-07775
Notice of Request for Exemptive Relief, Pursuant to Section 36(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, From Certain Aspects of Rule 17ad-22(e)(18)(iv) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Request for Comment
Primary source
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Published
April 22, 2026
Issuing agencies
Securities and Exchange Commission
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 77 (Wednesday, April 22, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 77 (Wednesday, April 22, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 21533-21537]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-07775]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-105262; File No. S7-2026-11]
Notice of Request for Exemptive Relief, Pursuant to Section 36(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, From Certain Aspects of Rule
17ad-22(e)(18)(iv) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Request
for Comment
April 17, 2026.
I. Introduction
On December 13, 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
``Commission'') adopted,\1\ among other things, Rule 17ad-
22(e)(18)(iv)(A) (the ``Trade Submission Requirement'') \2\ under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Exchange Act''). Under these
amendments, covered clearing agencies that provide central counterparty
services for U.S. Treasury securities (``U.S. Treasury securities
CCAs'') \3\ must establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written
policies and procedures reasonably designed to establish objective,
risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation which
require that any direct participant of a U.S. Treasury securities CCA
submit for clearance and settlement all of the eligible secondary
market transactions to which such direct participant is a counterparty
and identify and monitor the U.S. Treasury securities CCA's direct
participants' submission of transactions for clearing pursuant to the
Trade Submission Requirement. An ``eligible secondary market
transaction'' is, in turn, defined as (i) a repurchase or reverse
repurchase agreement collateralized by U.S. Treasury securities, in
which one of the counterparties is a direct participant (``repo''); or
(ii) a purchase or sale, between a direct participant and: (A) any
counterparty, if the direct participant of the covered clearing agency
brings together multiple buyers and sellers using a trading facility
(such as a limit order book) and is a counterparty to both the buyer
and seller in two separate transactions; or (B) a registered broker-
dealer, government securities broker, or government securities
dealer.\4\
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\1\ Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies for U.S. Treasury
Securities and Application of the Broker-Dealer Customer Protection
Rule With Respect to U.S. Treasury Securities, Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 99149 (Dec. 13, 2023), 89 FR 2714, 2737 (Jan. 16,
2024) (``Adopting Release'').
\2\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(iv)(A).
\3\ The U.S. Treasury securities CCAs are the Fixed Income
Clearing Corporation (``FICC''), the CME Securities Clearing Corp.
(``CMESC''), and ICE Clear Credit, LLC (``ICC''). For purposes of
this notice, the Commission refers generally to U.S. Treasury
securities CCAs, as the issues raised by SIFMA apply equally to all
U.S. Treasury securities CCAs, unless otherwise noted.
\4\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(a).
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An ``eligible secondary market transaction'' does not include any
repo entered into between a direct participant and an affiliated
counterparty (the ``Inter-Affiliate Exclusion''), provided that the
affiliated counterparty submits for clearance and settlement all other
repos to which the affiliated counterparty is a party (the ``outward-
facing condition'').\5\ An ``affiliated counterparty'' is any
counterparty which meets the following criteria: (i) the counterparty
is either a bank (as defined in 15 U.S.C. 78c(6)), broker (as defined
in 15 U.S.C. 78c(4)), dealer (as defined in 15 U.S.C. 78c(5)), or
futures commission merchant (as defined in 7 U.S.C. 1a(28)), or any
entity regulated as a bank, broker, dealer (together with broker,
``BD''), or futures commission merchant (``FCM'') in its home
jurisdiction (the ``bank/BD/FCM condition''); (ii) the counterparty
holds, directly or indirectly, a majority ownership interest in the
direct participant, or the direct participant, directly or indirectly,
holds a majority ownership interest in the counterparty, or a third
party, directly or indirectly, holds a majority ownership interest in
both the direct participant and the counterparty; and (iii) the
counterparty, direct participant, or third party referenced in
paragraph (ii) of this definition as holding the majority ownership
interest would be required to report its financial statements on a
consolidated basis under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
or International Financial Reporting Standards, and such consolidated
financial statements include the financial results of the majority-
owned party or of both majority-owned parties.\6\
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\5\ Id.
\6\ Id.
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On April 10, 2026, a trade association submitted a letter to the
Commission requesting exemptive relief in two areas related to the
Trade Submission Requirement. First, the trade association requested
exemptive relief to expand the Inter-Affiliate Exclusion to the Trade
[[Page 21534]]
Submission Requirement.\7\ Specifically, the trade association
requested that the definition of an ``affiliated counterparty'' be
expanded to include all affiliates, except for investment company
entities.\8\ Second, the trade association requested that the outward-
facing condition not include repo transactions between non-U.S.
affiliates and non-U.S. counterparties, to the extent that the direct
participant does not exceed a specific activity level threshold for
those transactions, as discussed further below.\9\ We are publishing
this notice to provide interested persons with an opportunity to
comment on these requests for exemptive relief.
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\7\ See Letter from Robert Toomey, Head of Capital Markets,
Managing Director/Associate General Counsel, Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association (``SIFMA'' or ``trade association''),
dated April 10, 2026, available at <a href="https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/SIFMA-Section-36-Exemptive-Relief-Request-for-Interaffiliate-Transactions.pdf">https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/SIFMA-Section-36-Exemptive-Relief-Request-for-Interaffiliate-Transactions.pdf</a> (``SIFMA Letter'').
\8\ See SIFMA Letter, supra note 7, at 7-8.
\9\ See id. at 8-9.
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II. Discussion and Requested Relief
As noted above, the trade association made certain requests for
exemptive relief from the Inter-Affiliate Exclusion. The trade
association stated that the relief is needed for critical treasury,
liquidity, and collateral management reasons.\10\ The trade association
stated that repo transactions are a critical internal liquidity
management tool for large financial institutions and allow affiliated
entities, including non-U.S. affiliates, to hold U.S. dollars in a safe
and liquid asset.\11\ The trade association further stated that,
although the Inter-Affiliate Exclusion does provide an exemption for
the clearing requirement for certain inter-affiliate repos, the
restrictions on its availability effectively negate its utility, with
these restrictions being that only a limited number of affiliates are
permitted to rely on the Inter-Affiliate Exemption, and that, in order
to use the exemption, an affiliate must centrally clear all outward-
facing repos pursuant to the outward-facing condition.\12\
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\10\ See id. at 3.
\11\ See id.
\12\ See id. at 2.
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The trade association stated that, because of the limitations of
the bank/BD/FCM condition and the outward-facing condition, repo
transactions for treasury, liquidity, and collateral risk management
(``TLC Repo Transactions'') are potentially subject to a clearing
requirement with negative consequences for the financial markets.\13\
According to the trade association, these consequences would include:
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\13\ See id. at 4.
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<bullet> If an affiliate of a direct participant faced an immediate
liquidity or collateral need after a U.S. Treasury securities CCA
closes, the direct participant would not be able to get that liquidity
or collateral to the affiliate via a repo transaction until a covered
clearing agency opened, posing risk to the affiliate and to its
customers and the broader financial market.\14\ The trade association
explained that this problem especially applies to non-U.S. affiliates
operating in time zones outside of the U.S. Treasury securities
CCA.\15\
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\14\ See id. at 5-6. In its letter, SIFMA referred specifically
to FICC, which is currently the only operational U.S. Treasury
securities CCA. SIFMA notes that, while it is possible that CMESC
and ICC will have longer opening hours than FICC, it is not clear if
any of the U.S. Treasury securities CCAs will offer 24/7/365
clearing services. See id. at 6.
\15\ See id. at 6.
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<bullet> Increased affiliate clearing would create exposures to a
covered clearing agency for the affiliates on both sides of the
transaction, unnecessarily grossing up the corporate group's overall
risk exposure to the covered clearing agency.\16\ This could constrain
a direct participant's capacity to clear third-party repo activity
because, when calculating its risk limits, it would need to account for
this inter-affiliate activity (i.e., balance sheet capacity allocated
to centrally cleared affiliate transactions that could be used to clear
third-party repos would instead have to be used to clear affiliate
repos).\17\
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\16\ See id.
\17\ See id.
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<bullet> Increased affiliate clearing would also make affiliate
transactions needlessly more expensive, as both affiliates would need
to post margin to the covered clearing agency, despite the fact that
the group's overall consolidated exposure would be flat.\18\
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\18\ See id.
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<bullet> Increased affiliate clearing would also increase the
systemic importance of a U.S. Treasury securities CCA and augment the
complexities that could arise if operational issues or member defaults
were to occur.\19\
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\19\ See id.
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<bullet> TLC Repo Transactions are an important tool for a firm to
manage its applicable capital and liquidity requirements, as U.S.
Treasury securities are a low-risk asset with deep liquidity that can
be moved across the organization quickly as needed.\20\ Imposing a
clearing requirement on inter-affiliate transactions could lead to
serious delays and cost increases for organizations for business-as-
usual transactions used to comply with applicable regulations, which
could increase systemic liquidity risk during market stress.\21\
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\20\ See id. at 4.
\21\ See id. at 5. Specifically, SIFMA stated that repos for
treasury, liquidity, or collateral management assist firms in
complying with the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio, which
requires firms to maintain consolidated access to high-quality
liquid assets, such as U.S. Treasury securities, to meet stress-
period outflows. See id. SIFMA also stated that banks use such repos
to transfer liquidity to affiliates without facing the restrictions
of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation W, which places
quantitative limits on the extensions of credit a bank may make to
its affiliates but also exempts an extension of credit (including
repos) from those limits to the extent they are secured by U.S.
Treasury securities. See id.
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<bullet> Given that TLC Repo Transactions are a crucial way to move
liquidity across an organization quickly, TLC Repo Transactions may be
relied upon heavily in an insolvency or resolution, and the clearing
requirement could lead to serious delays when liquidity is needed
most.\22\
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\22\ See id.
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<bullet> The trade association stated that repos are also an
essential method for non-U.S. affiliates to hold and manage U.S. dollar
assets, because such non-U.S. affiliates do not generally have direct
access to Federal Reserve master accounts, making U.S. Treasury
securities an important way to hold U.S. dollar assets.\23\ In
addition, a non-U.S. affiliate that holds U.S. dollars may prefer not
to deposit the dollars with another affiliate, since credit exposure
regulations in other jurisdictions may treat such a deposit as an
unsecured exposure to the affiliate and a repo transaction may receive
more favorable treatment under the applicable credit exposure
regulations because the transaction is securities.\24\ A clearing
requirement could make holding Treasuries more expensive for non-U.S.
affiliates, impeding their ability to hold these essential assets.\25\
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\23\ See id.
\24\ See id.
\25\ See id. SIFMA further explained that repo transactions on
other U.S. dollar-denominated assets may also be constrained by
applicable capital and liquidity regulations (e.g., less favorable
treatment of U.S. agency mortgage-backed securities under the Basel
III Liquidity Coverage Ratio in foreign jurisdictions). See id.
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In addition, the trade association stated that the outward-facing
condition provides no flexibility to firms, imposing a blanket clearing
requirement regardless of the actual level of risk.\26\ The trade
association further stated that, currently, a direct participant would
be required to clear all repos with an affiliate that is not a bank,
BD, or FCM (together, ``Limited Covered Affiliates''), and with respect
to affiliates that are banks, BDs, or FCMs, a firm is faced
[[Page 21535]]
with one of two options to comply with the Outward-Facing Condition:
clear all Repo Transactions between the bank, BD, or FCM affiliate and
the Direct Participant (i.e., not take advantage of the Inter-Affiliate
Exemption), or clear all the Limited Covered Affiliate's Outward-Facing
Repo Transactions (which, as explained in more detail below, may not be
feasible for non-U.S. affiliates that trade with non-U.S.
counterparties).\27\
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\26\ See id. at 7.
\27\ See id. at 4.
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The trade association requested exemptive relief in two areas.
First, the trade association asked that the Commission provide
exemptive relief to make the Inter-Affiliate Exemption available to all
affiliates, except ``investment company'' affiliates.\28\ This request
would expand the list of permitted affiliates with whom direct
participants of a U.S. Treasury securities CCA could transact and rely
upon the Inter-Affiliate Exclusion beyond the current set (i.e., banks,
broker-dealers, futures commission merchants, and their foreign
equivalents) to include any entity that is not an investment company
(as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15
U.S.C. 80a-3)), regardless of whether such investment company is
registered or required to be registered under that act.\29\ The trade
association identified other potential types of entities that would
then be encompassed within the rule as swap dealers, the top-tier bank
holding company, and intermediate holding company affiliates, and
stated that many of these affiliates, particularly the holding company
entities, do not have external activity (i.e., they are not customer-
facing entities).\30\
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\28\ See id. at 7-8. SIFMA stated this limitation would ensure
that neither any registered investment company nor any private fund
(i.e., an issuer that meets the definition of ``investment company''
under section 3(a)(1) of that Act, but relies on one of the
exemptions from registration thereunder) may rely on this proposed
exemptive relief to enter into uncleared repo transactions with an
affiliated direct participant. See id. at 8.
\29\ See id. at 7-8.
\30\ See id. at 7.
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The trade association explained that, by allowing additional types
of affiliated counterparties to be able to use the Inter-Affiliate
Exclusion, affiliates of direct participants of U.S. Treasury
securities CCAs would be able to conduct uncleared repo transactions
with their direct participant, which is essential to allowing
affiliates to effectively manage liquidity and collateral needs without
unnecessary costs and delays.\31\ In addition, the trade association
further explained that by allowing the use of additional types of
affiliated counterparties, the outward-facing condition would still
apply, unless another form of relief were available, meaning that a
firm would still not be able to use ``back-to-back'' repo transactions
to transfer risk to a direct participant.\32\
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\31\ See id. at 8.
\32\ See id.
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Second, the trade association requested that the Commission provide
exemptive relief for non-U.S. affiliates, by exempting from the
outward-facing condition to the Inter-Affiliate Exclusion repo
transactions between non-U.S. affiliates and non-U.S. counterparties,
including between two non-U.S. affiliates, to the extent that the
direct participant is able to meet the following condition: the
quotient of the following is less than 10 percent: (i) numerator
transactions: uncleared repo transactions between all non-U.S.
affiliates of the direct participant and their non-U.S. external
counterparties,\33\ divided by (ii) denominator transactions: the sum
of (x) all cleared eligible secondary market transactions that are repo
transactions of all of a firm's direct participants,\34\ and (y) the
numerator transactions.\35\ Regarding the denominator transactions, the
trade association stated that including both all cleared eligible
secondary market transactions that are repo transactions of a firm's
direct participants and the numerator transactions would therefore
encompass repo transactions that are subject to the clearing
requirement, along with most of the repo transactions benefiting from
the proposed threshold.
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\33\ See id. at 8-9. SIFMA clarified that uncleared repo between
two non-U.S. affiliates should be excluded from the numerator
because they do not represent market-facing activity. See id. at 9.
\34\ See id. at 9. SIFMA explained that this portion of the
calculation refers to all of a firm's direct participants because
this proposed condition should not be measured on a direct
participant-by-direct participant basis, but rather across the
entire organization. See id. at 10. In addition, SIFMA explained
that cleared eligible secondary market transactions that are repo
transactions of a firm's direct participant include those repo
transactions that are subject to the clearing requirement but
exclude those that are not (e.g., repo transactions between a direct
participant and natural persons or central banks). See id.
\35\ See id. at 9. SIFMA stated that this calculation should be
performed as an average of outstanding daily open notional balances
over each of the last three quarters, with more weight given to more
recent quarters. See id. at 10. SIFMA stated that this methodology
would ensure that short-term fluctuations in a firm's repo
transaction activity do not unduly affect whether the relief is
available, providing more predictability and stability. See id.
Additionally, SIFMA clarified that uncleared repos between two non-
U.S. affiliates also should be excluded from the denominator for the
same reason they should be excluded from the numerator. See id. at
10, n. 25.
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The trade association stated that the outward-facing condition
would require that two non-U.S. affiliates of a direct participant
clear a repo transaction between themselves if either affiliate wished
to enter into an uncleared repo transaction with a direct participant,
which would impose costs and burdens for this activity, who often use
repo transactions to conduct treasury, liquidity, and collateral
management activities.\36\
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\36\ See id. at 9. SIFMA also stated that non-U.S. affiliates of
direct participants engage in repos with non-U.S. counterparties who
do not themselves engage in Repo Transactions at a level that makes
onboarding them to clear through a U.S. Treasury securities CCA
feasible. See id. at 6 (noting, as a example, FICC's operating hours
and the relatively small list of approved jurisdictions for FICC's
sponsored member service).
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Specifically, the trade association stated that it would be unduly
burdensome to effectively require non-U.S. affiliates to become direct
or indirect participants of a U.S. Treasury securities CCA to use the
Inter-Affiliate Exclusion, especially because repo transactions between
non-U.S. affiliates are likely to be rather small in comparison to a
firm's overall activity in eligible secondary market transactions that
are repo transactions.\37\ The trade association also stated that, if a
non-U.S. affiliate needed funding when U.S. Treasury securities CCAs
are closed, which is particularly likely for non-U.S. affiliates who
operate in different time zones worldwide, the non-U.S. affiliate would
effectively be unable to obtain such funding through a repo transaction
with another non-U.S. affiliate, causing unnecessary liquidity issues
that could potentially have destabilizing ripple effects.\38\
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\37\ See id. at 9.
\38\ See id.
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The trade association stated that 10 percent was an appropriate
threshold because it represents a relatively small amount of uncleared
repo transactions in comparison to a firm's overall activity in cleared
eligible secondary market transactions, but that it would still be
useful to non-U.S. affiliates.\39\ The trade association further stated
that, as a practical matter, firms will almost certainly have to target
a figure well below any regulatorily determined threshold to avoid
inadvertently exceeding the threshold, such that making the threshold
below 10 percent would make the requested relief of little practical
use to firms, as the actual figure to which firms would need to manage
would be too small to use in a meaningful way.\40\
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\39\ See id. at 9.
\40\ See id. at 10.
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Finally, the trade association also stated that if a firm finds
that it has materially exceeded the 10 percent threshold, it should be
required to
[[Page 21536]]
report this fact to the Commission.\41\ The trade association further
stated that if a firm reports multiple instances of exceeding the 10
percent threshold, the Commission may consider imposing a limited
clearing requirement to address the issue, subject to a sufficient
timeline for implementation,\42\ and in any event, repos between two
non-U.S. affiliates should not be subject to a clearing
requirement.\43\
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\41\ See id. at 11.
\42\ See id. The trade association stated that such a clearing
requirement should only be imposed to the extent needed to ensure
the firm does not continue to exceed the 10% thresholds and should
not be a blanket restriction on relying on the 10% non-U.S.
affiliate relief. See id.
\43\ See id.
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III. Request for Comment
We request and encourage any interested person to submit comments
on the requested relief, including whether the Commission should grant
exemptive relief. In particular, we solicit comments on the following
questions:
1. Is the requested expansion of the types of affiliates that could
qualify for the Inter-Affiliate Exclusion appropriate? Please explain.
2. Is the 10 percent threshold appropriate? Please explain why or
why not, and if possible, provide data to demonstrate why it is or is
not. Would another threshold be appropriate and why?
3. Are the calculations for the numerator and denominator
appropriate? Please explain. Alternatively, should the numerator and
denominator include repo transactions between two non-U.S. affiliates?
Please explain.
4. Should the numerator transactions and denominator transactions
be calculated as an average of outstanding daily open notional balances
over each of the last three quarters with more weight given to more
recent quarters? Please explain why or why not. Would another method or
period of time be appropriate for the calculation and why?
5. Should the denominator transactions be measured across a direct
participant's entire organization, as opposed to on a direct
participant-by-direct participant basis? Please explain why or why not,
and whether such an approach would also be appropriate for the
numerator transaction.
6. Would the requested relief impact how market participants
structure their repo transactions or access central clearing (e.g.,
through an affiliated direct participant or by joining a U.S. Treasury
securities CCA directly)? If so, please describe the impact and how
this impact would occur.
7. Would the requested relief impact competition between different
types of firms or based on the firm's organizational structure or size?
If so, please describe the impact on competition and how this impact
would occur.
8. Would the requested relief have any impact on existing U.S.
reporting requirements (e.g., FINRA's TRACE reporting or the
requirements with respect to certain non-centrally cleared bilateral
repo reporting established by the Office of Financial Research within
the U.S. Department of the Treasury \44\)? Please explain.
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\44\ See 12 CFR part 1610.
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9. Would the requested relief have any impact on liquidity and/or
overall resiliency of the U.S. Treasury markets? If so, please describe
the impact on liquidity and overall resiliency and how the impact would
occur.
10. Would the requested relief have any impact on foreign
participation in U.S. Treasury markets? If so, please describe the
impact on foreign participation and how the impact would occur.
11. Would the requested relief impact contagion risk \45\ for U.S.
Treasury securities CCAs, or systemic risk more broadly?
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\45\ See Adopting Release, supra note 1, 89 FR at 2717, 2741-42.
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12. Would the requested relief impact any of the benefits that the
Commission identified as arising from the Trade Submission Requirement,
such as decreasing counterparty credit risk, decreasing the risk of a
disorderly member default, increasing multilateral netting? \46\
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\46\ See id. at 2717-18.
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13. Would the requested relief impact a U.S. Treasury securities
CCA's ability to risk manage the transactions of its direct
participants? If so, please describe the impact on a U.S Treasury
securities CCA's risk management.
14. As an alternative to the requested relief, should the
Commission issue an exemption for a direct participant's inter-
affiliate transactions that are for treasury, liquidity, or collateral
risk management purposes? If so, how should the Commission define such
purposes, and what evidence could a direct participant use to
demonstrate why such transactions are for treasury, liquidity, or
collateral risk management purposes?
15. Should the Commission include a self-reporting mechanism to the
Commission in the event that a particular direct participant materially
exceeds the 10 percent threshold, or any other threshold the Commission
may condition the relief upon? If the Commission were to include such a
mechanism, please describe how that mechanism would work. Should the
Commission consider providing such a mechanism with reporting to
another entity, such as the covered clearing agency or agencies of
which that entity is a direct participant, its regulator, or some other
entity?
16. Additionally, what should be considered ``material'' when
determining whether a firm has materially exceeded the 10 percent
threshold, or any other threshold the Commission may condition the
relief upon?
17. If self-reporting should be made to the covered clearing
agency, how would this reporting mechanism differ, if at all, from Rule
17ad-22(e)(18)(iv)(B), which requires a covered clearing agency to
identify and monitor its direct participants' submission of
transactions for clearing as required by Rule 17ad-22(e)(18)(iv)(A),
including how the covered clearing agency would address a failure to
submit transactions in accordance with Rule 17ad-22(e)(18)(iv)(A)?
Would some sort of self-reporting mechanism be burdensome to administer
at one or more U.S. Treasury securities CCAs?
18. Should the Commission include a limited clearing requirement,
subject to a sufficient timeline for implementation, for firms who
report multiple instances of exceeding the 10 percent threshold, or any
other threshold the Commission may condition the relief upon? If so,
what should the limited clearing requirement be? What form would such a
limited clearing requirement take? Should such limited clearing
requirement necessarily exclude repos between two non-U.S. affiliates?
What would be a sufficient timeline for implementation?
19. If the Commission were to grant the requested relief, should we
modify any of the conditions in the request for exemptive relief?
Should the Commission condition the requested relief on any additional
requirements? If so, please describe what those conditions should be
and why.
20. How does the relief requested interact, if at all, with the
relief requested by the Institute for International Bankers (``IIB'')?
\47\ Are
[[Page 21537]]
there any competitive concerns that could arise if the Commission
granted the relief, as noticed, in these two contexts? If so, should
the Commission modify the exemptive relief for either or both requests?
In what ways should either or both requests for exemptive relief be
modified? As an example, to address competitive concerns, should the
Commission impose a percentage threshold relief as a condition to the
relief sought by IIB? If so, should that percentage threshold and the
method of calculation be the same or would it need to be different?
Also, should the Commission include a limited clearing requirement,
subject to a sufficient timeline for implementation, for firms who
report multiple instances of exceeding that threshold? Please explain.
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\47\ See Notice of Request for Exemptive Relief, Pursuant to
section 36(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, from Certain
Aspects of Rule 17ad-22(e)(18)(iv) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Request for Comment, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
104944 (Mar. 6, 2026), 91 FR 12030 (Mar. 11, 2026) (``IIB
request'').
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21. Please describe how the requested relief would or would not
protect investors and the public interest, consistent with sections 17A
and 36 of the Exchange Act.
22. Please describe how the requested relief would or would not
help to facilitate the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of
securities transactions as well as the safeguarding of securities and
funds, consistent with section 17A of the Exchange Act.
Comments should be received on or before May 29, 2026. Comments may
be submitted by any of the following methods:
Electronic Comments
<bullet> Use the Commission's internet comment form (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/exchange-act-exemptive-notices-orders">https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/exchange-act-exemptive-notices-orders</a>)
or
<bullet> Send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#5220273e377f313d3f3f373c2621122137317c353d24"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="bdcfc8d1d890ded2d0d0d8d3c9cefdced8de93dad2cb">[email protected]</span></a>. Please include
File Number S7-2026-11 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
<bullet> Send paper comments to Secretary, Vanessa A. Countryman,
Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number S7-2026-11. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/exchange-act-exemptive-notices-orders">https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/exchange-act-exemptive-notices-orders</a>). Do not include
personal identifiable information in submissions; you should submit
only information that you wish to make available publicly. We may
redact in part or withhold entirely from publications submitted
material that is obscene or subject to copyright protection.
For further information, you may contact Elizabeth Fitzgerald,
Assistant Director, at (202) 551-6036, or Heather Percival, Senior
Special Counsel, at (202) 551-3498, in the Division of Trading and
Markets; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549.
By the Commission.
Dated: April 17, 2026.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2026-07775 Filed 4-21-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on April 22, 2026.
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.