Notice2026-06023

Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition

Primary source

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Published
March 30, 2026

Issuing agencies

Transportation DepartmentNational Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Abstract

This notice sets forth the reasons for the denial of a defect petition submitted by Costas Lakafossis ("Petitioner") to NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) requesting that the Agency recall all Tesla vehicle models produced from 2013 to the present due to what the Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine (ICE) powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. Having reviewed the information submitted by Petitioner and Tesla, as well as data within its own files, NHTSA has denied the petition because the conditions described therein do not indicate the presence of a safety defect in the subject vehicles.

Full Text

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 60 (Monday, March 30, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 60 (Monday, March 30, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15690-15692]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-06023]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA-2026-0562]


Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Defect petition DP23001 has been denied.

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SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for the denial of a defect 
petition submitted by Costas Lakafossis (``Petitioner'') to NHTSA's 
Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) requesting that the Agency recall 
all Tesla vehicle models produced from 2013 to the present due to what 
the Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal 
misapplication. According to Petitioner, the differences in the 
operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal 
combustion engine (ICE) powered vehicles promote driver pedal 
misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) 
incidents. Having reviewed the information submitted by Petitioner and 
Tesla, as well as data within its own files, NHTSA has denied the 
petition because the conditions described therein do not indicate the 
presence of a safety defect in the subject vehicles.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matthew Martens, Vehicle Defects 
Division--D, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey 
Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20590. Email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#3f525e4b4b575a4811525e4d4b5a514c7f5b504b11585049"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="4a272b3e3e222f3d64272b383e2f24390a2e253e642d253c">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

1.0 Introduction

    Interested persons may petition NHTSA requesting that the Agency 
initiate an investigation to determine whether a motor vehicle or an 
item of replacement equipment does not comply with an applicable motor 
vehicle safety standard or contains a defect that relates to motor 
vehicle safety. 49 U.S.C. 30162(a)(2); 49 CFR part 552. Upon receipt of 
a properly-filed petition, the Agency conducts a technical review of 
the petition. 49 U.S.C. 30162(a)(2); 49 CFR 552.6. The technical review 
may consist solely of a review of information already in the possession 
of the Agency or it may include the collection of information from the 
motor vehicle manufacturer and other sources. After conducting the 
technical review and considering appropriate factors, which may 
include, but are not limited to, the nature of the complaint, 
allocation of Agency resources, Agency priorities, the likelihood of 
uncovering sufficient evidence to establish the existence of a defect 
and the likelihood of success in any necessary enforcement litigation, 
the Agency will grant or deny the petition. See 49 U.S.C. 30162(a)(2); 
49 CFR 552.8.

2.0 Background Information

    The Petition, dated March 21, 2023, requests the recall of all 
Tesla vehicles produced from 2013 to the present because of a 
``missing'' interlock that requires a brake pedal application by the 
driver in order to shift from Drive to Reverse. Attached to the 
Petition is a technical paper authored by Petitioner.\1\
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    \1\ The Petition and supporting paper, ``Self-driving cars and 
SUA accidents: a very clear understanding of the factors that 
increase the likelihood of serious accidents in technologically 
advanced cars,'' are designated ODI ID 11515119 and can be found at 
<a href="https://static.nhtsa.gov/complaints/11515119/11515119-0003.pdf">https://static.nhtsa.gov/complaints/11515119/11515119-0003.pdf</a>.
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    NHTSA's technical review included assessments of the Petition and 
supporting technical paper, Tesla's response to ODI's Information 
Request (IR), and additional data available to NHTSA.

3.0 DP23001 Petition

    The Petition requests a safety recall of all Tesla vehicle models 
produced from 2013 to the present, ``due to a missing critical 
interlock feature and specific Autopilot features that contribute to 
increased likelihood of driver errors in the form of Pedal 
Misapplication.'' According to Petitioner, drivers habituated to 
driving ICE vehicles adapt to ``one-pedal'' driving afforded by the 
subject vehicles' regenerative braking but may mistakenly apply the 
accelerator pedal in emergency situations when they intend to apply the 
brakes, leading to increased unintended acceleration incident rates. 
The Petition further proposes a remedy: the ``add[ition of] a software 
interlock to [relevant vehicles'] control system, requiring the driver 
to press the brake pedal before allowing the car to fully stop and 
reverse gear to engage.''
    In support of his petition, Petitioner describes a collision in 
Greece that he investigated in which the driver

[[Page 15691]]

admitted to parking without the use of the brake pedal, and has 
submitted a technical paper that he authored.
    Petitioner describes the ``mechanism behind'' the alleged pedal 
misapplication or SUA events supposedly caused by the alleged defect as 
follows:
    <bullet> The subject vehicles' regenerative braking capabilities 
permit a driver to decelerate the vehicle by substituting reduced 
accelerator pedal application for a brake pedal application when the 
driver wishes to decelerate with ``one-pedal'' driving.
    <bullet> In certain circumstances, a driver may mistake the vehicle 
deceleration and (accelerator) pedal contact for a brake pedal 
application.
    <bullet> At times, a driver may recognize a need for greater 
deceleration and inadvertently revert to prior muscle memory 
established while driving ICE vehicles without one-pedal driving 
capabilities and press harder on the accelerator pedal, mistaking it 
for the brake pedal, leading to an SUA incident.
    According to the Petitioner, the subject vehicles should, 
therefore, be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional 
removal of the driver's foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of 
the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. Petitioner likens 
these measures to the application of BTSI to automatic transmission-
equipped vehicles, which, Petitioner states, eliminated pedal 
misapplication at vehicle startup and trained drivers to index their 
foot positions.
    The Petition hypothesizes that the application of an interlock 
requiring driver brake application when shifting from Drive to Reverse 
may reduce the pedal misapplication at issue.

4.0 ODI's IR and Tesla's Assessment

    On May 13, 2023, ODI sent an IR to Tesla requesting relevant field 
incident reporting, information about its regenerative braking options, 
copies of internal assessments of one-pedal driving, pedal 
misapplication mitigation strategies, and its assessment of the alleged 
defect as proposed by the Petition. In its response, Tesla maintained 
that the relevant vehicles appropriately responded to driver inputs 
and, therefore, that there were not any SUA events responsive to ODI's 
inquiries. In support of this conclusion, Tesla explained the operation 
of the subject vehicles' regenerative braking systems, the creep/hold 
functions, and the formerly called ``Pedal Misapplication Mitigation 
(PMM)'' strategy, now referred to as ``Obstacle-Aware Acceleration 
(OAA),'' \2\ and Tesla's overall assessment of the Petition.
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    \2\ According to the Tesla Owner's Manual, Obstacle-Aware 
Acceleration is designed to reduce the impact of a collision by 
reducing motor torque and in some cases applying the brakes, if 
Model 3 detects an object in its driving path. The touchscreen 
displays a visual warning and sounds a chime when the brakes are 
automatically applied. For example, Model 3, while parked in front 
of a closed garage door with Drive engaged, detects that you have 
pressed hard on the accelerator pedal. Although Model 3 still 
accelerates and hits the garage door, the reduced torque may result 
in less damage.
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5.0 ODI Analysis

    ODI's analysis included assessments of the Petition and supporting 
technical paper, Tesla's response to ODI's Information Request (IR), 
and additional data available to NHTSA.

5.1 Scoping and Assumptions

    Based on the Petition's emphasis on the human-machine interface 
with regenerative braking systems and conditions existing at the 
transition between Drive and Reverse at the end of a drive cycle, ODI 
restricted its analysis to manually-driven circumstances and the 
performance of regenerative braking in subject vehicles shifting from 
Drive to Reverse.

5.2 Regenerative Braking and One-Pedal Driving Across the Industry

    As is relevant here, regenerative braking is the primary vehicle-
based differentiator between ICE models and the subject Battery 
Electric Vehicle (BEV) models. Regenerative braking converts excess 
kinetic energy from a moving BEV into electric current, which recharges 
its battery and slows the vehicle. Depending on the particular vehicle 
model and user settings, regenerative braking may be set strongly 
enough to enable ``one-pedal'' driving where the driver primarily uses 
the accelerator during the drive cycle and may decelerate the vehicle 
with a reduced level of accelerator application (instead of a brake 
application). One-pedal driving furnishes substantially higher levels 
of deceleration than coasting deceleration in ICE-powered vehicles.\3\
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    \3\ Vigil, C., Kaayal, O., and Szepelak, A., ``Quantifying the 
Deceleration of Various Electric Vehicles Utilizing Regenerative 
Braking,'' SAE Technical Paper 2023-01-0623, 2023, <a href="https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0623">https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0623</a>.
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    One-pedal driving capability is not limited to the subject 
vehicles. ODI conducted a review of the usage of one-pedal driving 
across the light vehicle industry. The ability to use regenerative 
braking through the accelerator pedal exists across 21 light vehicle 
manufacturers and 64 models, from 2008 through 2023 (the date of the 
petition), with several models capable of generating deceleration rates 
comparable to those of the subject vehicle and capable of bringing the 
vehicle to a complete stop without the application of the brake pedal.

5.3 Evaluation of Pedal Misapplication-Involved Collisions

    ODI used vehicle data that Tesla submitted in response to ODI's 
information requests pertinent to DP23001 and additional Tesla pedal 
misapplication incidents falling outside the particular scenario 
posited by the Petitioner. Through this search, ODI was able to 
identify only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of 
the alleged defect. Moreover, corresponding vehicle data demonstrated 
that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by 
their drivers. Additionally, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest 
that Petitioner's proposed interlock \4\ would have prevented either 
the particular collisions furnished in Tesla's IR response or in pedal 
misapplication collisions more generally known to the Agency.
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    \4\ It is also worth noting that the vehicle manufacturer 
determines the remedy for any safety defect; NHTSA does not 
prescribe a specific remedy. See 49 U.S.C. 30120(a).
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6.0 Conclusion

    Having reviewed all relevant and available information, ODI has not 
found evidence of a safety defect in Tesla vehicles as described in the 
Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator 
pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle 
manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in 
this respect. ODI has not identified evidence that would support 
opening a defect investigation into pedal misapplication on the subject 
vehicles based on an analysis of vehicle behavior or incidents known to 
the agency. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with 
all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review 
any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.


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(Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d) and 49 CFR part 552; delegations of 
authority at 49 CFR 1.95(a).) \5\
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    \5\ The authority to determine whether to approve or deny defect 
petitions under 49 U.S.C. 30162(d) and 49 CFR part 552 has been 
further delegated to the Associate Administrator for Enforcement.

Eileen Sullivan,
Associate Administrator, Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2026-06023 Filed 3-27-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P


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Indexed from Federal Register on March 30, 2026.

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