Notice2026-05562

Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change To Remove the Activity Limit From the GSD Rules

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Published
March 23, 2026

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Securities and Exchange Commission

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 55 (Monday, March 23, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 55 (Monday, March 23, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13890-13893]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-05562]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-105046; File No. SR-FICC-2026-003]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation; 
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change To Remove the Activity Limit From 
the GSD Rules

March 18, 2026.

I. Introduction

    On January 29, 2026, the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation 
(``FICC'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(``Commission'') proposed rule change SR-FICC-2026-003, pursuant to 
Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act'') \1\ 
and Rule 19b-4 thereunder.\2\ The Proposed Rule Change would amend the 
Government Securities Division (``GSD'') Rulebook \3\ (i) to remove the 
activity limit currently applied to Sponsoring Members and (ii) to 
modify the application of the existing ``higher of'' calculation 
methodology to apply only to those Sponsored Members and Segregated 
Indirect Participants whose activity level exceeds a specified 
liquidity threshold. The Proposed Rule Change was published for comment 
in the Federal Register on February 4, 2026.\4\ The Commission has 
received no comments on the Proposed Rule Change.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ Each capitalized term not otherwise defined herein has its 
meaning as set forth in the GSD Rulebook (``Rules''), available at 
<a href="https://www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures">https://www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures</a>.
    \4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 104755 (Jan. 30, 
2026). 91 FR 5128 (Feb. 4, 2026) (File No. SR-FICC-2026-003) 
(``Notice of Filing'').
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    For the reasons discussed below, the Commission is approving the 
Proposed Rule Change.

II. Background

    FICC's GSD provides trade comparison, netting, risk management, 
settlement, and central counterparty (``CCP'') services for the U.S. 
Government securities market.\5\ As a CCP, FICC interposes itself as 
the buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer for the financial 
transactions it clears. As such, FICC is exposed to the risk that one 
or more of its members may fail to make a payment or to deliver 
securities.
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    \5\ FICC's Mortgage-Backed Securities Division provides similar 
services for mortgage-backed securities. For purposes of this Order, 
``FICC'' refers to GSD.
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    Market participants who are not members of FICC may access FICC's 
services indirectly through the Sponsored Service or Agent Clearing 
Service.\6\ The Sponsored Service allows members approved as Sponsoring 
Members to sponsor certain firms as ``Sponsored Members.'' \7\ 
Similarly, the Agent Clearing Service allows members approved as Agent 
Clearing Members to submit activities of certain institutional firms, 
``Executing Firm Customers,'' for clearing and settlement. FICC 
establishes and maintains a Sponsoring Member Omnibus Account, to 
record transactions of a Sponsoring Member's Sponsored Members, and an 
Agent Clearing Member Omnibus Account, to record transactions of an 
Agent Clearing Member's Executing Firm Customers.\8\ Sponsoring Members 
and Agent Clearing Members also have the option of segregating 
transactions of Sponsored Members and Executing Firm Customers, as 
``Segregated Indirect Participants,'' in Segregated Indirect 
Participants Accounts.\9\
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    \6\ See GSD Rules 3A and 8, supra note 3.
    \7\ See Notice of Filing, supra note 4, 91 FR at 5129.
    \8\ Id.
    \9\ Id.
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    A key tool that FICC uses to manage its credit exposures to its 
members is the daily collection of the Required Fund Deposit (i.e., 
margin) from each member. A member's margin is designed to mitigate 
potential losses associated with liquidation of the member's portfolio 
in the event of that member's default. FICC's Rules refer to margin in 
two ways, depending on the types of members and accounts involved. 
First, the Required Fund Deposit is the sum of each member's 
proprietary accounts and its indirect participant accounts not 
designated as Segregated Indirect Participants Accounts.\10\ The 
aggregated amount of all GSD members' margin constitutes the Clearing 
Fund, which FICC would be able to access should a defaulted member's 
own margin be insufficient to satisfy losses to FICC caused by the 
liquidation of that member's portfolio. Second, the Segregated Customer 
Margin Requirement is the sum of the member's Sponsoring Member Omnibus 
Accounts and Agent Clearing Member Omnibus Accounts designated as 
Segregated Indirect Participants Accounts.\11\ Similarly, FICC would be 
able to access Segregated Customer Margin in the event of the default 
of the Segregated Indirect Participant for which that margin is held.
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    \10\ See GSD Rule 4 (Clearing Fund and Loss Allocation), supra 
note 3.
    \11\ Id.
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    Both the Required Fund Deposit and Segregated Customer Margin 
Requirement consist of several components, each of which is calculated 
to address specific risks faced by FICC arising out of its members' 
trading activity.\12\ For both, the components include, among others, a 
VaR charge (``VaR Charge'') designed to capture the potential market 
price risk associated with the securities in a member's portfolio.\13\ 
As a further risk mitigation step, FICC may require additional 
financial resources or other adequate assurances (such as limitations 
on activities) from members that may present a higher risk exposure to 
FICC.\14\
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    \12\ See GSD Rules Margin Component Schedule, Sections 2 and 5, 
supra note 3.
    \13\ Id. The components also include, as applicable, Blackout 
Period Exposure Adjustment, Backtesting Charge, Holiday Charge, 
Intraday Supplemental Fund Deposit, Margin Liquidity Adjustment 
Charge, and Portfolio Differential Charge.
    \14\ See Notice of Filing, supra note 4, 91 FR at 5129. See also 
GSD Rule 3A (Sponsoring Members and Sponsored Members) and Margin 
Component Schedule, supra note 3.
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    In particular, to mitigate the market risk associated with the 
Sponsored Service, FICC limits the activity that a Sponsoring Member 
can submit to FICC in certain circumstances. Specifically, a Sponsoring 
Member is not allowed to submit activity into its Sponsoring Member 
Omnibus Account when the sum of the VaR Charges for its Sponsoring 
Member Omnibus Account(s) and its Dealer Accounts (``Aggregate VaR 
Charges'') exceeds its Netting Member Capital.\15\
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    \15\ See Notice of Filing, supra note 4, 91 FR at 5129.
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    In addition, FICC can assess a higher Required Fund Deposit on its

[[Page 13891]]

Sponsoring Members. FICC currently determines the intraday VaR Charge 
on Sponsoring Member Omnibus Accounts by using a ``higher of'' VaR 
Charge calculation methodology, meaning that FICC applies as the 
intraday VaR Charge the higher of the VaR calculation as of the 
beginning of the day and intraday.\16\
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    \16\ Id. at 5130. FICC calculates VaR Charge twice daily based 
on each Member's noon position and end-of-day position, collecting 
the former intraday (i.e., intraday VaR Charge) and the latter at 
start-of-day the next business day (i.e., SOD VaR Charge). With the 
application of the ``higher of'' methodology, FICC would compare the 
VaR Charge calculated based on the noon slice against the VaR Charge 
calculated based on the prior business day's end-of-day positions 
and apply the higher of the two amounts as the intraday VaR Charge. 
Id. at n.21.
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III. Description of the Proposed Rule Change

    FICC is proposing to amend the Rules to remove the activity limit 
currently applied to Sponsoring Members and to modify the application 
of the ``higher of'' calculation methodology currently applied for the 
intraday VaR Charge to Sponsoring Member Omnibus Accounts.\17\
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    \17\ FICC is also proposing to add two new definitions and 
conforming changes. FICC proposes to add to Rule 1 definitions for 
terms ``Affiliated Family'' and ``Daily Liquidity Need.'' See Notice 
of Filing, supra note 4, 91 FR at 5130.
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    First, the Proposed Rule Change would remove the restriction on 
activity submission from Sponsoring Members currently applied to 
Sponsoring Members whose Aggregate VaR Charges exceed their Netting 
Member Capital. FICC states that it is proposing to delete this 
restriction on activity submission from GSD Rule 3A, and, in lieu 
thereof, modify the application of the ``higher of'' calculation 
methodology so that it would apply to only those Sponsored Members and 
Segregated Indirect Participants whose activity level exceeds a 
specified liquidity threshold.\18\ FICC also states that the proposed 
removal of activity limit would also facilitate access to FICC's 
clearance and settlement services in accordance with the requirements 
of Rule 17ad-22(e)(18)(iv)(C) under the Act.\19\
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    \18\ Id. at 5129.
    \19\ Id. at 5130 (citing 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(18)(iv)(C)).
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    Second, FICC is proposing to expand the application of the ``higher 
of'' calculation methodology currently applied to Sponsoring Member 
Omnibus Accounts for the intraday VaR Charge to also apply to 
Segregated Indirect Participants Accounts.\20\ FICC states that since 
both of these account types are used exclusively to record transactions 
submitted to FICC on behalf of indirect participants, they should be 
monitored and risk managed in a similar manner.\21\
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    \20\ FICC states that it would not apply the ``higher of'' 
calculation methodology to Agent Clearing Member Omnibus Accounts 
that are not designated as segregated because margin requirements 
for these accounts are calculated on a net basis across all 
Executing Firm Customers whose transactions are recorded within the 
same account, unlike Sponsored Members and Segregated Indirect 
Participants whose margin requirements are calculated on a gross 
basis. See Notice of Filing, supra note 4, 91 FR at 5130 n.22.
    \21\ See Notice of Filing, supra note 4, 91 FR at 5130.
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    In addition, to monitor and mitigate risk exposures from Sponsored 
Members and Segregated Indirect Participants, FICC is proposing to 
apply the ``higher of'' calculation methodology only when the aggregate 
liquidity needs of a particular Sponsored Member/Segregated Indirect 
Participant across all accounts exceed FICC's daily liquidity need.\22\ 
To determine when to apply the ``higher of'' calculation methodology, 
FICC would compare the total liquidity needs arising from the Sponsored 
Member's/Segregated Indirect Participant's activities across all 
accounts of its Sponsoring Members/Agent Clearing Members against 
FICC's daily liquidity need. If the indirect participant's liquidity 
needs exceed FICC's daily liquidity need on any Business Day, FICC 
would then apply the ``higher of'' the VaR Charge calculation as the 
intraday VaR Charge to the Sponsored Member/Segregated Indirect 
Participant for the following 25 Business Days.\23\ FICC states that 
this proposed change would help monitor and mitigate risk exposures 
from Sponsored Members and Segregated Indirect Participants whose 
activity level exceeds the specified liquidity threshold of FICC's 
daily liquidity need.\24\
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    \22\ Id.
    \23\ Id.
    \24\ Id.
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    FICC conducted an impact study for the period from April 1, 2024 to 
October 31, 2025 (``Impact Study'').\25\ Overall, the Impact Study 
shows that if modifications to the application of the ``higher of'' 
calculation methodology had been in place, of the Sponsored Members 
included in the study, 95.5% of the Sponsored Members would have had a 
reduction in their VaR Charges, each having, on average, a daily 
reduction in their VaR Charges of approximately $20.2 million (or 
approximately 32% of the average daily VaR Charge that would otherwise 
be assessed on the Sponsored Member). The Impact Study also shows that 
4.5% of the Sponsored Members included would not have been impacted 
because they were either already subject to the ``higher of'' 
calculation methodology and remain so under the proposed modification, 
or they were already being assessed the VaR Charge calculated intraday 
as the intraday VaR Charge and would remain so under the proposed 
modification.
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    \25\ As part of the Proposed Rule Change, FICC filed, as Exhibit 
3, the Impact Study. Pursuant to 17 CFR 240.24b-2, FICC requested 
confidential treatment of Exhibit 3.
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IV. Discussion and Commission Findings

    Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Act \26\ directs the Commission to 
approve a proposed rule change of a self-regulatory organization if it 
finds that such proposed rule change is consistent with the 
requirements of the Act and rules and regulations thereunder applicable 
to such organization. After careful review of the Proposed Rule Change, 
the Commission finds that the Proposed Rule Change is consistent with 
the requirements of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder 
applicable to FICC. In particular, the Commission finds that the 
Proposed Rule Change is consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act 
\27\ and Rule 17ad-22(e)(4), (e)(6)(i), and (e)(19) thereunder.\28\
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    \26\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C).
    \27\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
    \28\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(4), (e)(6)(i), and (e)(19).
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A. Consistency With Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act

    Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act requires that the rules of a 
clearing agency be designed to, among other things, promote the prompt 
and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions, and 
assure the safeguarding of securities and funds which are in the 
custody or control of the clearing agency or for which it is 
responsible.\29\ The Commission believes that the Proposed Rule Change 
is consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act for the reasons 
stated below.
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    \29\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
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    As discussed in Part II, FICC determines and monitors the 
appropriate margin to collect from members to mitigate potential losses 
from liquidation of a member's portfolio in the event of that member's 
default. As discussed in Part III, the Proposed Rule Change would 
remove the activity limit on Sponsored Members with VaR Charges that 
exceed their capital, and it would revise FICC's rules such that FICC 
would assess a higher margin on Sponsored Members and Segregated 
Indirect Participants whose activity

[[Page 13892]]

level exceeds FICC's daily liquidity need and thus pose a higher risk 
to FICC. The Proposed Rule Change should continue to allow FICC to 
assess the margin required to cover risks arising from the activity of 
Sponsored Members and Segregated Indirect Participants, thus helping to 
better mitigate potential losses arising out of a member default that 
would exceed FICC's prefunded resources and result in a disruption of 
FICC's operation of its critical clearance and settlement services. 
Because the modifications to margin calculation methodology would 
generally provide a more accurate assessment of margin sufficient to 
manage potential losses arising out of a member default, the Commission 
finds that the Proposed Rule Change should support FICC's ability to 
provide prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities 
transactions, consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act.\30\
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    \30\ Id.
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    Additionally, the Proposed Rule Change should help limit non-
defaulting members' exposure to mutualized losses since FICC would 
access the mutualized Clearing Fund should a defaulted member's own 
margin be insufficient to satisfy losses to FICC caused by the 
liquidation of that member's portfolio. By allowing FICC to assess 
additional margin on Sponsored Members and Segregated Indirect 
Participants whose activity poses a higher risk to FICC and helping to 
limit the exposure of FICC's non-defaulting members to mutualized 
losses, the Proposed Rule Change should help FICC assure the 
safeguarding of securities and funds which are in its custody or 
control, consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act.\31\
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    \31\ Id.
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B. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)(i) requires that FICC establish, implement, 
maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to effectively identify, measure, monitor, and manage its 
credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, 
clearing, and settlement processes.\32\
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    \32\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(4).
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    The Proposed Rule Change would modify the application of the 
``higher of'' calculation methodology so that Sponsored Members and 
Segregated Indirect Participants that present a higher risk exposure to 
FICC have a higher margin assessment. This modification should help 
FICC calculate and collect sufficient margin that more accurately 
covers the risk exposure from activities that members submit to FICC on 
behalf of indirect participants. By enabling FICC to calculate and 
collect sufficient margin to manage and mitigate FICC's credit exposure 
to its members, the Proposed Rule Change is reasonably designed to 
enable FICC to effectively identify, measure, monitor, and manage its 
credit exposure to participants, consistent with Rule 17ad-
22(e)(4).\33\
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    \33\ Id.
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C. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(i)

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(i) requires that, among other things, that FICC 
establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to cover its credit exposures to its 
participants by establishing a risk-based margin system that, at a 
minimum, considers, and produces margin levels commensurate with, the 
risks and particular attributes of each relevant product, portfolio, 
and market.\34\
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    \34\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(6)(i).
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    By assessing higher margin on indirect participants with higher 
risk exposures to FICC, the modification to the application of the 
``higher of'' calculation methodology would help ensure that margin 
levels are commensurate with the risk exposure presented by the 
activities of indirect participants submitted to FICC by Sponsoring 
Members and Agent Clearing Members. Therefore, the Proposed Rule Change 
should allow FICC to more accurately address the risks presented by 
members and indirect participants, thus producing margin levels 
commensurate with the risks and particular attributes of each as with 
each relevant product, portfolio, and market, and overall better cover 
FICC's credit exposures to its participants, consistent with the 
requirements of Rule 17ad-22(e)(6)(i).\35\
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    \35\ Id.
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D. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(19)

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(19) requires FICC to identify, monitor, and manage 
the material risks to FICC arising from arrangements in which firms 
that are indirect participants in FICC rely on the services provided by 
direct participants to access FICC's clearance and settlement 
facilities.\36\
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    \36\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(19).
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    As discussed in Part III, FICC is removing the activity limit 
currently applicable to Sponsoring Members, which restricts their 
activity when their Aggregate VaR Charges exceed their Netting Member 
Capital. However, FICC would continue to have additional tools 
available to monitor its Sponsoring Members' exposures to Sponsored 
Member activity. For example, FICC performs intraday monitoring and 
collects Intraday Supplemental Fund Deposits and/or Intraday Mark-to-
Market Charges as appropriate on its indirect participant accounts and 
would be able to collect additional margin should a particular 
portfolio present that risk.\37\ FICC would still be able to monitor 
its Sponsoring Members' Excess Capital Ratio, which compares (a) the 
amount of a Netting Member's VaR Charge, other than the VaR Charges 
calculated for such Netting Member's Segregated Indirect Participants 
Accounts, against (b) the amount of Netting Member Capital that the 
Netting Member maintains, and, if that ECR is greater than 1.0, FICC 
assesses the Excess Capital Premium.\38\ FICC therefore would continue 
to have the ability to monitor and manage the potential exposures 
arising from Sponsored Member Activity.
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    \37\ See, e.g., Margin Component Schedule, GSD Rules (Section 
2(b) for Required Fund Deposit calculations and Section 3(b) for 
Segregated Indirect Customer Margin Requirements), supra note 3. See 
also id. (Section 2(c) identifying the inclusion of the Intraday 
Supplemental Fund Deposit for Sponsored GC CIL Omnibus Account 
Required Fund Deposits).
    \38\ See id. (Section 2(b) regarding Required Fund Deposit 
Calculations and Section 5 defining Excess Capital Ratio and Excess 
Capital Premium).
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    In addition, FICC is modifying the application of the ``higher of'' 
calculation methodology which would also include Segregated Indirect 
Participants. In doing so, the Proposed Rule Change should enable FICC 
to more accurately address the risk that the activities of all types of 
indirect participants present to FICC. This change should further 
mitigate risk exposure from indirect participant transactions for both 
Sponsored Members and Segregated Indirect Participants by ensuring that 
the margin collected is sufficient to cover the risk from these 
indirect participant arrangements accessing FICC's services.
    For these reasons, the Proposed Rule Change should continue to 
allow FICC to identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to FICC 
arising from the activities of Sponsored Members and Segregated 
Indirect Participants, consistent with the requirements of Rule 17ad-
22(e)(19).\39\
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    \39\ Id.
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V. Conclusion

    On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission finds that the 
Proposed Rule Change is consistent with the requirements of the Act, 
and in

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particular, with the requirements of Section 17A of the Act \40\ and 
the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
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    \40\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1.
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    It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act 
\41\ that proposed rule change SR-FICC-2026-003, be, and hereby is, 
approved.\42\
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    \41\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
    \42\ In approving the Proposed Rule Change, the Commission 
considered its impact on efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation. 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\43\
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    \43\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2026-05562 Filed 3-20-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


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Indexed from Federal Register on March 23, 2026.

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