Rule2026-05207
Special Conditions: Airbus Helicopters Model EC175B Helicopters; Search and Rescue (SAR) Modes
Primary source
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Published
March 17, 2026
Effective
March 17, 2026
Issuing agencies
Transportation DepartmentFederal Aviation Administration
Abstract
These special conditions are issued for the Airbus Helicopters (Airbus) Model EC175B helicopter. This helicopter will have a novel or unusual design feature when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category helicopters. This design feature is associated with the installation of an optional search and rescue (SAR) automatic flight control system (AFCS). The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 51 (Tuesday, March 17, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 51 (Tuesday, March 17, 2026)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 12680-12684]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-05207]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 29
[Docket No. FAA-2025-2038; Special Conditions No. 29-060-SC]
Special Conditions: Airbus Helicopters Model EC175B Helicopters;
Search and Rescue (SAR) Modes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Airbus Helicopters
(Airbus) Model EC175B helicopter. This helicopter will have a novel or
unusual design feature when compared to the state of technology
envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category
helicopters. This design feature is associated with the installation of
an optional search and rescue (SAR) automatic flight control system
(AFCS). The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These
special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety
equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.
DATES: This action is effective on Airbus on March 17, 2026. Send
comments on or before May 1, 2026.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by Docket No. FAA-2025-2038 using
any of the following methods:
<bullet> Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a> and
follow the online instructions for sending your comments
electronically.
<bullet> Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
<bullet> Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
<bullet> Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
<bullet> Docket: Background documents or comments received may be
read at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a> at any time. Follow the online instructions
for accessing the docket or go to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
[[Page 12681]]
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gregory Thumann, Performance and
Environment Unit, AIR-621A, Technical Policy Branch, Policy and
Standards Division, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation
Administration, Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower Airport, FAA AIR Office--
Wichita, 1801 S Airport Rd., Wichita, Kansas 67209-2190; telephone and
fax 405-666-1052; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#60271205070f12194e274e3408150d010e0e200601014e070f16"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="a6e1d4c3c1c9d4df88e188f2ced3cbc7c8c8e6c0c7c788c1c9d0">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The substance of these special conditions
has been published in the Federal Register for public comment in
several prior instances with no substantive comments received.
Therefore, the FAA finds, pursuant to Title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations (14 CFR) 11.38(b), that new comments are unlikely, and
notice and comment prior to this publication are unnecessary.
Privacy
Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in
the following paragraph, and other information as described in Sec.
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received without change to
<a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a>, including any personal information you provide.
The FAA will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal
contact received about these special conditions.
Confidential Business Information
Confidential Business Information (CBI) is commercial or financial
information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by
its owner. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552),
CBI is exempt from public disclosure. If your comments responsive to
these special conditions contain commercial or financial information
that is customarily treated as private, that you actually treat as
private, and that is relevant or responsive to these special
conditions, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as
confidential under the FOIA, and the indicated comments will not be
placed in the public docket of these special conditions. Send
submissions containing CBI to the individual listed in the For Further
Information Contact section above. Comments the FAA receive, which are
not specifically designated as CBI, will be placed in the public docket
for these special conditions.
Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested people to take part in this rulemaking
by sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
The FAA will consider all comments received by the closing date for
comments. The FAA may change these special conditions based on the
comments received.
Background
On September 14, 2022, Airbus requested FAA type certificate
validation for the Airbus Model EC175B helicopter, identified by
project Type Certificate No. TC14123SE-R. The Model EC175B helicopter
is a large-passenger Transport Category, 14 CFR part 29, twin-engine
conventional helicopter certificated for Category A operations and also
for instrument flight under the requirements of Appendix B of Part 29.
This model is powered by two Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6C-67E engines
with a dual channel Full Authority Digital Engine Control system, has
five main rotor blades, a maximum gross weight of 17,196 pounds, and a
velocity not exceeding 175 knots. The Model EC175B helicopter features
an integrated modular avionics suite with four 6x8-inch multi-function
displays called Common Integrated Global Avionics for Light
Helicopters. This rotorcraft is capable of carrying 18 passengers and
two crew members. Its initial customer base included offshore oil and
search and rescue operations.
Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Airbus must show that the
Model EC175B helicopter meets the applicable provisions of Part 29, as
amended by Amendments 29-1 through 29-52. The Airbus Model EC175B
certification basis date is March 1, 2009.
If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations (e.g., Part 29) do not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for the Airbus Model EC175B helicopter because of a
novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed
under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.16.
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended
later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or
unusual design feature, these special conditions would also apply to
the other model under 14 CFR 21.101.
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the Airbus Model EC175B helicopter must comply with the
exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise-
certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in
accordance with Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type
certification basis under Sec. 21.17(a)(2).
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The Airbus Model EC175B helicopter will incorporate the following
novel or unusual design feature:
The SAR system is composed of a navigation computer with SAR modes,
an AFCS that provides coupled SAR functions, hoist operator control, a
hover speed reference system, and two radio altimeters. The AFCS
coupled SAR functions include:
(a) Hover hold at selected height above the surface.
(b) Ground speed hold.
(c) Transition down and hover to a waypoint under guidance from the
navigation computer.
(d) SAR pattern, transition down, and hover near a target over
which the helicopter has flown.
(e) Transition up, climb, and capture a cruise height.
(f) Capture and track SAR search patterns generated by the
navigation computer.
(g) Monitor the preselected hover height with an automatic increase
in collective if the aircraft height drops below the safe minimum
height.
These SAR modes are intended to be used over large bodies of water
in areas clear of obstructions. Further, the use of the modes that
transition down from cruise to hover will include operation at
airspeeds below V<INF>MINI</INF>.
The SAR system only entails navigation, flight control, and coupled
AFCS operation of the helicopter. The system does not include the
additional equipment that may be required for over water flight or
external loads to meet other operational requirements.
Discussion
Airbus Model EC175B will include the installation of an optional
SAR AFCS.
The use of dedicated AFCS upper modes, in which a fully coupled
autopilot provides operational SAR profiles, is necessary for SAR
operations
[[Page 12682]]
conducted over water in offshore areas clear of obstructions. The SAR
modes enable the helicopter pilot to fly fully coupled maneuvers,
including predefined search patterns during cruise flight, and to
transition between cruise flight to a stabilized hover, as well as from
hover back to cruise. The SAR AFCS also includes an auxiliary crew
control that allows another crewmember (such as a hoist operator) to
have limited authority to control the helicopter's longitudinal and
lateral position during hover operations.
Flight operations conducted over water at night may have an
extremely limited visual horizon, with little visual reference to the
surface, even when conducted under visual meteorological conditions.
Consequently, the certification requirements for SAR modes must meet
the requirements outlined in Appendix B to Part 29. While Appendix B to
Part 29 prescribes airworthiness criteria for instrument flight, it
does not consider operations below the instrument flight minimum speed
(VMINI), whereas the SAR modes allow for coupled operations at low
speed, all-azimuth flight to zero airspeed (hover).
Since SAR operations have traditionally been a public-use mission,
the use of SAR modes in civil operations requires special airworthiness
standards (special conditions) to ensure a level of safety consistent
with Category A and Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) certification in
accordance with Appendix B to Part 29. In this regard, Part 29 lacks
adequate airworthiness standards for AFCS SAR mode certification,
including flight characteristics, performance, and installed equipment
and systems.
These special conditions contain the additional safety standards
that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of
safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness
standards.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the
Airbus Model EC175B helicopter. Should Airbus apply at a later date for
a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating
the same novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions
would apply to that model as well.
Conclusion
This action affects only a certain novel or unusual design feature
on the Airbus Model EC175B helicopter. It is not a rule of general
applicability.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 29
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
Authority Citation
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40113, 44701, 44702, and 44704.
The Special Conditions
[ssquf] Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by
the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part
of the type certification basis for the Airbus Helicopters Model EC175B
helicopter.
In addition to the Part 29 certification requirements for Category
A and helicopter instrument flight (Appendix B to Part 29), the
following additional requirements must be met for certification of the
optional search and rescue (SAR) automatic flight control system
(AFCS):
(a) SAR Flight Modes. The coupled SAR flight modes must provide:
(1) Safe and controlled flight in the three axes at all airspeeds
(lateral position and speed, longitudinal position and speed, and
height and vertical speed) from the previous instrument flight minimum
speed (VMINI) to a hover (within the maximum demonstrated wind
envelope).
(2) Automatic transition to the helicopter instrument flight
(Appendix B to Part 29) envelope as part of the normal SAR mode
sequencing.
(3) A pilot-selectable ``Go-Around'' mode that safely interrupts
any other coupled mode and automatically transitions the helicopter to
the instrument flight (Appendix B to Part 29) envelope.
(4) A means to prevent unintended flight below a safe minimum
height. Pilot-commanded descent below the safe minimum height is
acceptable, provided the alerting requirements in paragraph (b)(8)(i)
of these special conditions alert the pilot of this descent below safe
minimum height.
(b) SAR Mode System Architecture. To support the integrity of the
SAR modes, the following system architecture is required:
(1) Ground mapping radar function that presents real-time
information to the pilots.
(2) A system for limiting the engine power demanded by the AFCS
when any of the automatic piloting modes are engaged so that full
authority digital engine control power limitations, such as torque and
temperature, are not exceeded.
(3) A system providing the aircraft height above the surface and
the final pilot-selected height at a location on the instrument panel
in a position acceptable to the FAA that will make it plainly visible
to and usable by any pilot at their station.
(4) A system providing the aircraft heading and the pilot-selected
heading at a location on the instrument panel in a position acceptable
to the FAA that will make it plainly visible to and usable by any pilot
at their station.
(5) A system providing the aircraft longitudinal and lateral ground
speeds and the pilot-selected longitudinal and lateral ground speeds
when used by the AFCS in the flight envelope where airspeed indications
become unreliable. This information must be presented at a location on
the instrument panel in a position acceptable to the FAA that is
plainly visible to and usable by any pilot at their station.
(6) A system providing wind speed and wind direction when automatic
piloting modes are engaged or while transitioning from one mode to
another.
(7) A system that monitors flight guidance deviations and failures
and contains an alerting function that provides the flight crew with
enough information to take appropriate corrective action.
(8) An alerting system that provides visual or aural alerts, or
both, to the flight crew under any of the following conditions:
(i) When the stored or pilot-selected safe minimum height is
reached.
(ii) When a SAR mode system malfunction occurs.
(iii) When the AFCS changes modes automatically from one SAR mode
to another. For normal transitions between SAR modes, a single visual
or aural alert may suffice. For a SAR mode malfunction or a mode having
a time-critical component, the flight crew alerting system must
activate early enough to allow the flight crew to take timely and
appropriate action. The alerting system means must be designed to alert
the flight crew in order to minimize crew errors that could create an
additional hazard.
(9) The SAR system hoist operator control is considered a flight
control with limited authority and must comply with the following:
(i) The hoist operator control must be designed and located to
provide for convenient operation and to prevent confusion and
inadvertent operation.
(ii) The helicopter must be safely controllable by the hoist
operator control throughout the range of that control.
[[Page 12683]]
(iii) The hoist operator control may not interfere with the safe
operation of the helicopter.
(iv) Pilot and copilot flight controls must be able to smoothly
override the limited control authority of the hoist operator control,
without exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength, and without
the danger of exceeding any other limitation because of the override.
(10) The reliability of the AFCS must be related to the effects of
its failure. The occurrence of any failure condition that would prevent
continued safe flight and landing must be extremely improbable. For any
failure condition of the AFCS that is not shown to be extremely
improbable:
(i) The helicopter must be safely controllable and capable of
continued safe flight without exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or
strength. Additional unrelated probable failures affecting the control
system must be evaluated.
(ii) The AFCS must be designed so that it cannot create a hazardous
deviation in the flight path or produce hazardous loads on the
helicopter during normal operation or in the event of a malfunction or
failure, assuming corrective action begins within an appropriate period
of time. Where multiple systems are installed, subsequent malfunction
conditions must be evaluated in sequence unless their occurrence is
shown to be improbable.
(11) A functional hazard assessment and a system safety assessment
must address the failure conditions associated with SAR operations:
(i) For SAR catastrophic failure conditions, changes may be
required to the following:
(A) System architecture.
(B) Software and complex electronic hardware design assurance
levels.
(C) High intensity radiated field (HIRF) test levels.
(D) Instructions for continued airworthiness.
(ii) The assessments must consider all the systems required for SAR
operations, including the AFCS, all associated AFCS sensors (for
example, radio altimeter), and primary flight displays. Electrical and
electronic systems with SAR catastrophic failure conditions (for
example, AFCS) must comply with the Sec. 29.1317(a)(4) High Intensity
Radiated Field (HIRF) requirements.
(c) SAR Mode Performance Requirements.
(1) The SAR modes must be demonstrated for the requested flight
envelope, including the following minimum sea state and wind
conditions:
(i) Sea State: Wave height of 2.5 meters (8.2 feet), considering
both short and long swells. This is in addition to the sea state
demonstrated in reference to the airframe's ditching capability.
(ii) Wind: 25 knots headwind; 17 knots for all other azimuths.
(2) The selected hover height and hover velocity must be captured
(including the transition from one captured mode to another captured
mode) accurately and smoothly and not exhibit any significant overshoot
or oscillation.
(3) The minimum use height (MUH) for the SAR modes must be no more
than the maximum loss of height following any single failure or any
combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable, plus an
additional margin of 15 feet above the surface. MUH is the minimum
height at which any SAR AFCS mode may be engaged.
(4) The SAR mode system must be usable up to the maximum certified
gross weight of the aircraft or to the lower of the following weights:
(i) Maximum emergency flotation weight.
(ii) Maximum hover out-of-ground effect (OGE) weight.
(iii) Maximum demonstrated weight.
(d) Flight Characteristics.
(1) The basic aircraft must meet all of the Part 29 airworthiness
criteria for helicopter instrument flight (Appendix B to Part 29).
(2) For SAR mode coupled flight below VMINI, at the maximum
demonstrated winds, the helicopter must be able to maintain any
required flight condition and make a smooth transition from any flight
condition to any other flight condition without requiring exceptional
piloting skill, alertness, or strength, and without exceeding the limit
load factor. This requirement also includes aircraft control through
the hoist operator's control.
(3) For coupled flight below the previously established VMINI, the
following stability requirements replace the stability requirements of
paragraphs IV, V, and VI of Appendix B to Part 29:
(i) Static Longitudinal Stability: The requirements of Appendix B
to Part 29, paragraph IV, are not applicable.
(ii) Static Lateral-Directional Stability: The requirements of
Appendix B to Part 29, paragraph V, are not applicable.
(iii) Dynamic Stability: The requirements of paragraph VI of
Appendix B are replaced with the following two paragraphs:
(A) Any oscillation must be damped, and any aperiodic response must
not double in amplitude in less than 10 seconds. This requirement must
also be met with degraded upper modes of the AFCS. An ``upper mode'' is
a mode that utilizes a fully coupled autopilot to provide an
operational SAR profile.
(B) After any upset, the AFCS must return the aircraft to the last
commanded position within 10 seconds or less.
(4) With any of the upper modes of the AFCS engaged, the pilot must
be able to manually recover the aircraft and transition to the normal
(Appendix B to Part 29) IFR flight profile envelope without exceptional
skill, alertness, or strength.
(e) One-Engine Inoperative (OEI) Performance Information.
(1) The following performance information must be provided in the
Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement (RFMS):
(i) OEI performance information and emergency procedures, providing
the maximum weight that will provide a minimum clearance of 15 feet
above the surface, following failure of the critical engine in a hover.
The maximum weight must be presented as a function of the hover height
for the temperature and pressure altitude range requested for
certification. The effects of wind must be reflected in the hover
performance information.
(ii) Hover OGE performance with the critical engine inoperative for
OEI continuous and time-limited power ratings for those weights,
altitudes, and temperatures for which certification is requested.
Note: These OEI performance requirements do not replace
performance requirements that may be needed to comply with the
airworthiness or operational standards (14 CFR 29.865 or 14 CFR part
133) for external loads or human external cargo.
(2) [Reserved]
(f) RFMS.
(1) Limitations necessary for the safe operation of the SAR system
to include:
(i) Minimum crew requirements. No fewer than two pilots, except for
approved external load operations, which will also require a hoist
operator.
(ii) Maximum SAR weight as determined by the lower of the SAR mode
performance requirement of paragraph (c)(4) of these special conditions
or the aircraft performance information provided by paragraph (e) of
these special conditions.
(iii) Maximum demonstrated sea state conditions for ditching
compliance.
(iv) Engagement criteria for each of the SAR modes to include MUH
(as determined in subparagraph (c)(3)) of these special conditions.
(v) Normal and emergency procedures for operation of the SAR system
[[Page 12684]]
(including operation of the hoist operator control), with AFCS failure
modes, AFCS degraded modes, and engine failures.
(2) Performance information:
(i) OEI performance and height-loss.
(ii) Hover OGE performance information, utilizing OEI continuous
and time-limited power ratings.
(iii) The maximum wind envelope demonstrated in the flight test.
(iv) Information and advisory information concerning operations in
a heavy salt spray environment, including any airframe or power effects
as a result of salt encrustation.
(g) Flight Demonstration.
(1) Before approval of the SAR system, an acceptable flight
demonstration of all the coupled SAR modes is required.
(2) The AFCS must provide fail-safe operations during coupled
maneuvers. The demonstration of fail-safe operations must include a
pilot workload assessment associated with manually flying the aircraft
to an altitude greater than 200 feet above the surface and an airspeed
of at least the best rate of climb airspeed (Vy).
(3) For any failure condition of the SAR system not shown to be
extremely improbable, the pilot must be able to make a smooth
transition from one flight mode to another without exceptional piloting
skill, alertness, or strength.
(4) Failure conditions that are not shown to be extremely
improbable must be demonstrated by analysis, ground testing, or flight
testing. For failures demonstrated in flight, the following normal
pilot recovery times are acceptable:
(i) Transition modes (Cruise-to-Hover/Hover-to-Cruise) and hover
modes: Normal pilot recognition plus 1 second.
(ii) Cruise modes: Normal pilot recognition plus 3 seconds.
(5) All AFCS malfunctions must include evaluation of the low-speed
and high-power flight conditions typical of SAR operations.
Additionally, AFCS hard-over, slow-over, and oscillatory malfunctions,
particularly in yaw, require evaluation. AFCS malfunction testing must
include a single or a combination of failures (such as erroneous data
from and loss of the radio altimeter, attitude, heading, and altitude
sensors) that are not shown to be extremely improbable.
(6) The flight demonstration must include the following
environmental conditions:
(i) Swell into wind.
(ii) Swell and wind from different directions.
(iii) Cross swell.
(iv) Swell of different lengths (short and long swell).
(7) The flight demonstration must also evaluate OEI procedures from
hover while hoisting an external load.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 6, 2026.
Jorge R. Castillo,
Manager, Technical Policy Branch, Policy and Standards Division,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2026-05207 Filed 3-16-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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