Notice2026-04179
Termination of the Designation of Yemen for Temporary Protected Status
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
March 3, 2026
Effective
May 4, 2026
Issuing agencies
Homeland Security DepartmentU.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Abstract
Through this notice, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announces that the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) is terminating the designation of Yemen for Temporary Protected Status (TPS). The designation of Yemen is set to expire on March 3, 2026. After reviewing country conditions and consulting with appropriate U.S. Government agencies, the Secretary determined that Yemen no longer continues to meet the conditions for designation for Temporary Protected Status. The Secretary, therefore, is terminating the Temporary Protected Status designation of Yemen as required by statute. This termination is effective May 4, 2026. After May 4, 2026, nationals of Yemen (and aliens having no nationality who last habitually resided in Yemen) who have been granted Temporary Protected Status under Yemen's designation will no longer have Temporary Protected Status.
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 41 (Tuesday, March 3, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 41 (Tuesday, March 3, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 10402-10408]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-04179]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
[CIS No. 2849-26; DHS Docket No. USCIS-2015-0005]
RIN 1615-ZB76
Termination of the Designation of Yemen for Temporary Protected
Status
AGENCY: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Department
of Homeland Security (DHS).
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: Through this notice, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
announces that the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) is
terminating the designation of Yemen for Temporary Protected Status
(TPS). The designation of Yemen is set to expire on March 3, 2026.
After reviewing country conditions and consulting with appropriate U.S.
Government agencies, the Secretary determined that Yemen no longer
continues to meet the conditions for designation for Temporary
Protected Status. The Secretary, therefore, is terminating the
Temporary Protected Status designation of Yemen as required by statute.
This termination is effective May 4, 2026. After May 4, 2026, nationals
of Yemen (and aliens having no nationality who last habitually resided
in Yemen) who have been granted Temporary Protected Status under
Yemen's designation will no longer have Temporary Protected Status.
DATES: The designation of Yemen for Temporary Protected Status is
terminated, effective at 11:59 p.m., local time, on May 4, 2026.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Office of Policy and Strategy, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security,
(240) 721-3000.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
List of Abbreviations
CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
DHS--U.S. Department of Homeland Security
EAD--Employment Authorization Document
FR--Federal Register
FRN--Federal Register Notice
Government--U.S. Government
INA--Immigration and Nationality Act
Secretary--Secretary of Homeland Security
TPS--Temporary Protected Status
USCIS--U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
U.S.C.--United States Code
What Is Temporary Protected Status (TPS)?
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes the Secretary
of Homeland Security (Secretary), after consultation with appropriate
agencies of the U.S. Government, to designate a foreign state (or part
thereof) for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) if the Secretary
determines that certain country conditions exist. See INA sec.
244(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1). In order to designate a country for
Temporary Protected Status in her discretion, the Secretary must
determine one or more of the following: (1) there is an ongoing armed
conflict within the country that would pose a serious threat to the
personal safety of the country's nationals if they were returned; (2)
there has been an environmental disaster resulting in a substantial,
but temporary, disruption of the living conditions in the area
affected, the country is temporarily unable to handle adequately the
return of its nationals, and the country has officially requested
Temporary Protected Status designation; or (3) there exist
extraordinary and temporary conditions in the country that prevent
nationals from returning safely and permitting the country's nationals
to remain temporarily in the United States would not be contrary to the
national interest of the United States. See INA sec. 244(b)(1), 8
U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1). A country (or part there of) may be designated for
Temporary Protected Status based on one or more of the statutory bases.
If the Secretary designates a country, she may, in her discretion,
grant Temporary Protected Status to eligible nationals of that foreign
state (or aliens having no nationality who last habitually resided in
the designated foreign state). See INA sec. 244(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.
1254a(a)(1)(A).
At least 60 days before the expiration of a foreign state's
Temporary Protected Status designation or extension, the Secretary--
after consultation with appropriate U.S. Government agencies--must
review the conditions in the foreign state designated for Temporary
Protected Status and determine whether the conditions for the Temporary
Protected Status designation continue to be met. See INA sec.
244(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(A). If the Secretary determines that
the conditions in the foreign state continue to meet the specific
statutory criteria for the Temporary Protected Status designation,
Temporary Protected Status will be extended for an additional period of
6 months or, in the Secretary's discretion, 12 or 18 months. See INA
sec. 244(b)(3)(A), (C), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(A), (C). If the Secretary
determines that the foreign state no longer meets the conditions for
the Temporary Protected Status designation, the Secretary must
terminate the designation. See INA sec. 244(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C.
1254a(b)(3)(B). There is no judicial review of ``any determination of
the [Secretary] with respect to the designation, or termination or
extension of a designation of a foreign state'' for Temporary Protected
Status. INA sec. 244(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(5)(A).
Temporary Protected Status is a temporary immigration benefit
granted to eligible nationals of a country designated for Temporary
Protected Status under the INA, or to eligible aliens without
nationality who last habitually resided in the designated country.
During the designation period, Temporary Protected Status beneficiaries
are eligible to remain in the United States and may not be removed, so
long as they continue to meet the requirements of Temporary Protected
Status. In addition, Temporary Protected Status beneficiaries are
authorized to work and obtain an Employment Authorization Document
(EAD), if requested. Temporary Protected Status beneficiaries may also
apply for and be granted travel authorization as a matter of
discretion. The granting of Temporary Protected Status does not result
in or lead to lawful permanent resident status or any other immigration
status.
To qualify for Temporary Protected Status, beneficiaries must meet
the eligibility requirements at INA section 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C.
1254a(c)(2), in accordance with the implementing regulations at 8 CFR
parts 244 and 1244. When the Secretary terminates a country's
designation, beneficiaries return to the same immigration status or
category that they maintained before Temporary Protected Status, if any
(unless that status or category has since expired or been terminated),
or any other lawfully obtained immigration status or category they
received while registered for Temporary Protected Status, as long as it
is still valid on the date Temporary Protected Status terminates.
Designation of Yemen for Temporary Protected Status
Yemen was initially designated for Temporary Protected Status on
September 3, 2015, based on a determination that there was an ongoing
armed conflict and that, due to that conflict, requiring nationals of
Yemen to return would pose a serious threat to
[[Page 10403]]
their personal safety.\1\ Following the initial designation, DHS
extended or extended and newly designated (referred to as a
redesignation) Yemen for Temporary Protected Status in 2017,\2\
2018,\3\ 2020,\4\ 2021,\5\ 2023,\6\ and 2024.\7\ On January 4, 2017,
Yemen's designation was extended, and Yemen was newly designated for
Temporary Protected Status for 18 months on the dual bases of ``ongoing
armed conflict,'' INA sec. 244(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1)(A), and
``extraordinary and temporary conditions,'' INA sec. 244(b)(1)(C), 8
U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1)(C). The former Secretaries subsequently extended
Yemen's Temporary Protected Status designation in 2018 and 2020.
Beginning in 2021, the former Secretary extended the designation and
newly designated Yemen in 2021, 2023, and 2024 on the dual bases of
ongoing armed conflict and extraordinary and temporary conditions.
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\1\ Designation of the Republic of Yemen for Temporary Protected
Status, 80 FR 53319 (Sept. 3, 2015).
\2\ Extension and Redesignation of Yemen for Temporary Protected
Status, 82 FR 859 (Jan. 4, 2017).
\3\ Extension of the Designation of Yemen for Temporary
Protected Status, 83 FR 40307 (Aug. 14, 2018).
\4\ Extension of the Designation of Yemen for Temporary
Protected Status, 88 FR 12313 (Mar. 2, 2020).
\5\ Extension and Redesignation of Yemen for Temporary Protected
Status, 86 FR 36295 (July 9, 2021).
\6\ Extension and Redesignation of Yemen for Temporary Protected
Status, 88 FR 94 (Jan. 3, 2023).
\7\ Extension and Redesignation of Yemen for Temporary Protected
Status, 89 FR 56765 (July 10, 2024).
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Secretary's Authority To Terminate the Designation of Yemen for
Temporary Protected Status
At least 60 days before the expiration of a foreign state's
Temporary Protected Status designation or extension, the Secretary--
after consultation with appropriate U.S. Government agencies--must
review the conditions in the foreign state designated for Temporary
Protected Status to determine whether the country continues to meet the
conditions for the designation. See INA sec. 244(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C.
1254a(b)(3)(A). If the Secretary determines that foreign state no
longer meets the conditions for the Temporary Protected Status
designation, the Secretary must terminate the designation. See INA sec.
244(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(B). The termination may not take
effect earlier than 60 days after the date the Federal Register notice
of termination is published, or if later, the expiration of the most
recent previous extension of the country designation. See id. The
Secretary may determine the appropriate effective date of the
termination and expiration of any Temporary Protected Status-related
documentation, such as EADs, issued or renewed after the effective date
of termination. See id.; see also INA sec. 244(d)(3), 8 U.S.C.
1254a(d)(3) (providing the Secretary the discretionary ``option'' to
allow for a certain ``orderly transition'' period if she determines it
to be ``appropriate'').
Reasons for the Secretary's Termination of the Temporary Protected
Status Designation for Yemen
Consistent with INA section 244(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(A),
after consulting with appropriate U.S. Government agencies, the
Secretary reviewed country conditions in Yemen and considered whether
Yemen continues to meet the conditions for the designation under INA
section 244(b)(1)(A) or (C), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1)(A) or (C). This
review included examining under INA section 244(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.
1254a(b)(1)(A), whether requiring the return of Yemeni nationals (and
aliens having no nationality who last resided in Yemen) poses a serious
threat to their personal safety due to an armed conflict. The Secretary
also examined under INA section 244(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1)(C),
whether extraordinary and temporary conditions in Yemen that prevent
Yemeni nationals from returning in safety exist, and if permitting
Yemeni nationals to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary
to the national interest of the United States.
Following the Department's review, the Secretary has determined the
situation in Yemen no longer meets the criteria for an ongoing armed
conflict that poses a serious threat to the personal safety of
returning Yemeni nationals. Although there may be sporadic instances of
truncated armed conflict in Yemen, improvements demonstrate that this
conflict does not appear to pose a threat to the safety of returning
Yemeni nationals.
Yemen, a country of approximately 39 million people,\8\ entered a
prolonged and still unresolved violent conflict in 2014, when the
Houthi movement--also known as Ansar Allah--and forces allied with
them, attempted to remove Yemen's then-sitting President, Abdu Rabbu
Hadi.\9\ The Houthi forces launched a successful attack on Sana'a,
Yemen's capital, capturing it and eventually forcing Yemeni government
leaders into exile in Saudi Arabia. A violent territorial expansion
across much of the country's north followed,\10\ which prompted a
Saudi-led coalition to intervene into what quickly became a protracted
regional proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.\11\
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\8\ World Health Organization, ``Yemen Data'' <a href="https://data.who.int/countries/887">https://data.who.int/countries/887</a> (accessed Dec. 10, 2025).
\9\ Christopher Blanchard, Congressional Research Service,
``Yemen: Conflict, Red Sea Attacks, and U.S. Policy'' (July 22,
2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/
IF12581#:~:text=Yemen%20is%20a%20conflict%2Dafflicted,and%20other%20a
nti%2DHouthi%20forces.
\10\ Ben Watson, The Atlantic, ``The War in Yemen and the Making
of a Chaos State'' (Feb. 3, 2018), <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/the-war-in-yemen-and-the-making-of-a-chaos-state/551987/">https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/the-war-in-yemen-and-the-making-of-a-chaos-state/551987/</a>.
\11\ Associated Press, ``Saudi Arabia praises `positive results'
after Yemen's Houthi rebels visit kingdom for peace talks'' (Sept.
30, 2023), <a href="https://apnews.com/article/saudi-arabia-yemen-war-peace-talks-d2a9ad9efe1ab0b4f5d51597098f46a2">https://apnews.com/article/saudi-arabia-yemen-war-peace-talks-d2a9ad9efe1ab0b4f5d51597098f46a2</a>.
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In January 2017, with the death toll officially reaching over
10,000, the conflict was considered by some in the international
community to be a civil war.\12\ In November 2019, the head of the
internationally-recognized government of Yemen, President Hadi, allied
with a southern separatist group,\13\ forming the Southern Transitional
Council and challenging the Houthis' de facto authority.\14\ The
primary domestic sides to the conflict are the Houthis on one side, and
the Southern Transitional Council and the internationally-recognized
government and coalition (led by Saudi Arabia, and including the United
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt, Sudan, and Morocco),\15\ on the
other.\16\ Each side is
[[Page 10404]]
supported by multiple domestic and international actors.\17\ The
internationally recognized Yemeni government, as well as the Houthis,
face significant political, military, and economic challenges,
generally resulting in a stalemate.\18\
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\12\ See British Broadcasting Corporation, ``Yemen conflict: At
least 10,000 killed, says UN'' (Jan. 17, 2017), <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38646066">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38646066</a>; see also Washington Post, ``The
deadly war in Yemen rages on. So why does the death toll stand
still?'' (Aug. 3, 2018), <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-deadly-war-in-yemen-rages-on-so-why-does-the-death-toll-stand-still-/2018/08/02/e6d9ebca-9022-11e8-ae59-01880eac5f1d_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-deadly-war-in-yemen-rages-on-so-why-does-the-death-toll-stand-still-/2018/08/02/e6d9ebca-9022-11e8-ae59-01880eac5f1d_story.html</a>; see
also Florence Gaub, European Union Institute for Security Studies,
``Civil wars: a very short introduction'' (Oct. 2013), <a href="https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/pbei/weu/0029419/f_0029419_23869.pdf">https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/pbei/weu/0029419/f_0029419_23869.pdf</a>.
\13\ Middle East Institute, ``The Riyadh Agreement: Yemen's new
cabinet and what remains to be done'' (Feb. 1, 2021), <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/riyadh-agreement-yemens-new-cabinet-and-what-remains-be-done">https://www.mei.edu/publications/riyadh-agreement-yemens-new-cabinet-and-what-remains-be-done</a>.
\14\ Council on Foreign Relations, ``Conflict in Yemen and the
Red Sea'' (last updated Mar 26, 2025), <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen</a>.
\15\ Daniel L. Byman, Brookings Institution, ``Saudi Arabia And
the United Arab Emirates Have a Disastrous Yemen Strategy'' (July
17, 2018), <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/17/saudi-arabia-and-the-united-arab-emirates-have-a-disastrous-yemen-strategy">https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/17/saudi-arabia-and-the-united-arab-emirates-have-a-disastrous-yemen-strategy</a>.
\16\ Council on Foreign Relations, ``Yemen's Tragedy: War,
Stalemate, and Suffering'' (May 1, 2023), <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis#chapter-title-0-3">https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis#chapter-title-0-3</a>.
\17\ Council on Foreign Relations, ``Conflict in Yemen and the
Red Sea'' (last updated Mar. 26, 2025), <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen</a>.
\18\ Joshua Yaphe, National Interest, ``Who's Winning Yemen's
War? No One'' (Oct. 7, 2025), <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/whos-winning-yemens-war-no-one">https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/whos-winning-yemens-war-no-one</a>.
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The conflict in Yemen since 2014 directly affected the physical
security of the civilian population throughout the country.\19\ Tactics
by the Houthi forces, the international coalition, and domestic and
international terrorist organizations operating inside of Yemen
previously put civilians at risk of harm.
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\19\ Human Rights Watch, ``2024 World Report: Yemen'' (Jan. 11,
2024), <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/yemen">https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/yemen</a>.
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Notable improvements with respect to the armed conflict in Yemen
have been observed since April 2022. The United Nations brokered a two-
month nationwide truce between the warring parties in Yemen, which was
extended twice, each time by two months, expiring in October 2022.
During the truce's implementation, there was a significant reduction in
violence across the country, with the cessation of Saudi-led coalition
airstrikes and major ground offensives by both sides, as well as the
establishment of some humanitarian measures.\20\ Although sporadic
events continue to occur along the frontlines, the peace resulting from
the April 2022 truce remains in effect.\21\
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\20\ UN News, ``Yemen truce renewed for another two months''
(Aug. 2, 2022), <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1123832">https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1123832</a>.
\21\ Security Council Report, ``April 2025 Monthly Forecast:
Yemen'' (Mar. 31, 2025, <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-04/yemen-77.php">https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-04/yemen-77.php</a>.
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In January 2025, the Houthis' release of ``conflict-related
detainees'' indicated notable progress towards reviving
negotiations.\22\ In May 2025, a U.N. Special Envoy engaged Yemeni
leadership to revive peace talks, focusing on a ceasefire, economic
stabilization, and an inclusive political process.<SUP>23 24</SUP>
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\22\ Al Jazeera, ``Yemen's Houthi rebels release 153 prisoners
of war'' (Jan. 25, 2025), <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/25/yemens-houthi-rebels-release-153-prisoners-of-war">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/25/yemens-houthi-rebels-release-153-prisoners-of-war</a>.
\23\ Security Council Report, ``April 2025 Monthly Forecast:
Yemen'' (Mar. 31, 2025), <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-04/yemen-77.php">https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-04/yemen-77.php</a>.
\24\ United Nations, ``9915th Meeting of the United Nations
Security Council'' (May 14, 2025), <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/S/PV.9915">https://docs.un.org/en/S/PV.9915</a>.
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Early September 2025 saw skirmishes along the country's southern
front lines, resulting in casualties on both sides.\25\ Also in early
September 2025, fighting occurred east of the city of Taiz, with the
Yemeni army defending against the Houthi attackers and forcing the
Houthis to retreat.\26\ Nonetheless, during a briefing to the United
Nations Security Council on September 15, 2025, the Special Envoy for
Yemen noted that ``relative calm and stability'' continue to hold on
the frontlines between rival groups in Yemen.\27\
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\25\ The Security Council, ``Yemen: October 2025 Monthly
Forecast'' (Sept. 30, 2025), <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-10/yemen-83.php">https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-10/yemen-83.php</a>.
\26\ Yemen Monitor, ``Yemeni Army Thwarts Houthi Attack East of
Taiz, Inflicting Casualties and Losses'' (Sept. 6, 2025), <a href="https://www.yemenmonitor.com/en/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/149300">https://www.yemenmonitor.com/en/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/149300</a>.
\27\ Security Council Report, ``October 2025 Monthly Forecast:
Yemen'' (Sept. 30, 2025), <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-10/yemen-83.php">https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-10/yemen-83.php</a>.
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Diplomatic efforts continue, including in October 2025, following
the announcement of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, when the
U.N. Special Envoy to Yemen noted that the ceasefire presents an
opportunity to ``reinforce regional stability, renew momentum toward
peace in Yemen and create conditions that support sustained de-
escalation and advance an inclusive political process.'' \28\ In
November 2025, the Special Envoy met with various regional stakeholders
and discussed UN efforts to promote discussions aimed at achieving a
comprehensive political solution that addresses regional concerns and
secures lasting peace and stability in Yemen through ``strengthen[ing]
regional consensus'' and ``ensuring a unified international approach in
support of the UN's mediation efforts.'' \29\ Also, in November 2025,
the Special Envoy met with the Houthis' Chief Negotiator, focusing on
the need for an environment to advance the political process.\30\
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\28\ Security Council Report, ``November 2025 Monthly Forecast:
Yemen'' (Nov. 2, 2025), <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-11/yemen-84.php">https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-11/yemen-84.php</a>.
\29\ Security Council Report, ``December 2025 Monthly Forecast:
Yemen'' (Nov. 30, 2025), <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-12/yemen-85.php">https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-12/yemen-85.php</a>.
\30\ Id.
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In December 2025, the Southern Transitional Council, who remains in
alliance with the Yemeni government in opposition to the Houthis, took
over two of the eight provinces in Yemen. This territorial expansion
does not appear to have been accompanied by violence.\31\ As outlined,
areas in Yemen remain under control of the recognized government and
its allies. As such, DHS has accordingly concluded that the conflict in
Yemen does not appear to pose a threat to the safety of returning
Yemeni nationals.
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\31\ Reuters, ``Yemen's power shift: Will southern separatist
push shake fragile peace?'' (Dec. 9, 2025), <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/how-yemens-southern-power-shift-heightens-risk-turbulent-region-2025-12-09/">https://www.reuters.com/world/how-yemens-southern-power-shift-heightens-risk-turbulent-region-2025-12-09/</a>; see also Ismaeel Naar, New York Times, ``Yemeni
Separatists Set Sights on Houthi-Controlled Capital'' (Dec. 10,
2025), <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/10/world/middleeast/yemen-separatists.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/10/world/middleeast/yemen-separatists.html</a>.
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Of additional significance when evaluating the conditions in Yemen
and the ability of Yemeni nationals to safety return to Yemen, a number
of Yemeni nationals have requested advance parole documents for travel
back to Yemen. This bears directly on the question of whether nationals
may safely travel there. From 2018 through 2025, there were 142
applications for travel to Yemen.\32\ Additionally, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is currently removing aliens to
Yemen.\33\
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\32\ DHS Office of Performance and Quality, estimate as of Sept.
12, 2025.
\33\ DHS Office of Homeland Security Statistics, Analysis of ICE
Enforcement and Removal Operations, estimate as of September 30,
2025.
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Based on the Department's review, the Secretary has further
determined that while Yemen still experiences extraordinary and
temporary conditions, the termination of Yemen's Temporary Protected
Status designation is required because it is contrary to the national
interest to permit Yemeni nationals (or nationals having no nationality
who last habitually resided in Yemen) to remain temporarily in the
United States. By statute, the Secretary is prohibited from designating
a country for Temporary Protected Status or extending a Temporary
Protected Status designation on the basis of extraordinary and
temporary conditions if she finds that ``permitting the aliens to
remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national
interest of the United States.'' \34\
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\34\ See INA 244(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1)(C).
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The most historically populous regions of Yemen in the north are
currently ruled by the de facto Houthi government, which has been
designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. Department
of State.\35\ As millions fled Houthi-controlled areas,\36\
[[Page 10405]]
internal displacement introduced a host of problems to relatively more
stable regions in Yemen.\37\ For example, internal displacement doubled
the water demand in areas with large internally displaced persons
camps.\38\ The crucial challenge facing people living outside of
Houthi-controlled areas is the ``complete collapse of government
institutions,'' which exacerbates all the other challenges Yemenis
face.\39\
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\35\ Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation of Ansarallah,
90 FR 11352 (Mar. 5, 2025); see also U.S. Department of State,
``Press Statement: Designation of Ansarallah as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization,'' (Mar. 4, 2025), <a href="https://www.state.gov/designation-of-ansarallah-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization">https://www.state.gov/designation-of-ansarallah-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization</a>.
\36\ Maggie Michael & Amr AlFiky, Reuters, ``Special Report: How
the Houthis rule in Yemen: Prisons, a personality cult, and pilfered
food aid'' (Oct. 15, 2025), <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigations/how-houthis-rule-yemen-prisons-personality-cult-pilfered-food-aid-2025-10-15/">https://www.reuters.com/investigations/how-houthis-rule-yemen-prisons-personality-cult-pilfered-food-aid-2025-10-15/</a>.
\37\ Ayman Omar, The Carnegie Endowment, ``Struggling Over Every
Drop: Yemen's Crisis of Aridity and Political Collapse'' (Apr. 29,
2025), <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2025/04/struggling-over-every-drop-yemens-crisis-of-aridity-and-political-collapse?lang=en">https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2025/04/struggling-over-every-drop-yemens-crisis-of-aridity-and-political-collapse?lang=en</a>.
\38\ Id.
\39\ Id.
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Despite certain negative conditions in Yemen, the United Nations
Development Programme, in partnership with the World Bank and others,
is implementing agricultural and water infrastructure projects to
improve food security, expand irrigated land, and create employment
opportunities.\40\ The Norwegian Refugee Council has enhanced access to
clean water and sanitation for over 52,000 people through well
rehabilitation and sanitation services.\41\
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\40\ United Nations Development Programme, ``Combatting the
effects of climate change to build food security in Yemen'' (Sept.
29, 2024), <a href="https://www.undp.org/arab-states/stories/combatting-effects-climate-change-build-food-security-yemen">https://www.undp.org/arab-states/stories/combatting-effects-climate-change-build-food-security-yemen</a>.
\41\ Norwegian Refugee Council, ``Yemen: Water situation worsens
amid scant rains'' (July 25, 2025), <a href="https://www.nrc.no/news/2025/july/yemen-water-situation-worsens-amid-scant-rains">https://www.nrc.no/news/2025/july/yemen-water-situation-worsens-amid-scant-rains</a>.
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The United Nations Development Programme partnered with the World
Bank, Social Fund for Development, and the Global Agriculture and Food
Security Program to implement the Food Security Response and Resilience
Project to construct rainwater harvesting reservoirs, prevent land
erosion, and preserve agricultural lands, all while creating employment
opportunities for local communities and facilitating their access to
water for irrigation and livestock, offering a holistic approach to
tackling food insecurity.\42\ Notably, there were improvements in
humanitarian conditions in one-third of the geographic districts of
Yemen due to sustained assistance and reduced conflict.\43\ These
changes include the ``open[ing] of roads and improve[ment of]
commercial access along frontlines, while decreasing displacement.''
\44\
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\42\ United Nations Development Programme, ``Combatting the
effects of climate change to build food security in Yemen'' (Sept.
29, 2024), <a href="https://www.undp.org/arab-states/stories/combatting-effects-climate-change-build-food-security-yemen">https://www.undp.org/arab-states/stories/combatting-effects-climate-change-build-food-security-yemen</a>.
\43\ Humanitarian Action, ``Global Humanitarian Overview 2025:
Yemen'' (Dec. 4, 2025), <a href="https://humanitarianaction.info/document/global-humanitarian-overview-2025/article/yemen-2">https://humanitarianaction.info/document/global-humanitarian-overview-2025/article/yemen-2</a>.
\44\ Id.
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The European Commission announced $93.5 million USD in humanitarian
funding for 2025 to support people in need in Yemen,\45\ was targeted
toward food and health services--including those focusing on
malnutrition and epidemics--as well as water provision, sanitation and
hygiene and education, among other support measures.\46\ The United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated a
reduction in the number of people with health needs between 2023 and
2024; from approximately 20.3 million in 2023 to approximately 17.8
million in 2024.\47\
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\45\ Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and
Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), ``EU announces [euro]80 million
humanitarian aid package for Yemen, European Commission'' (May 21,
2025), <a href="https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-announces-eu80-million-humanitarian-aid-package-yemen-2025-05-21_en">https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-announces-eu80-million-humanitarian-aid-package-yemen-2025-05-21_en</a>.
\46\ Id.
\47\ UK Government, ``Country policy and information note:
humanitarian situation, Yemen, March 2025 (accessible version)''
(Mar. 31, 2025), <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/yemen-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-humanitarian-situation-yemen-march-2025-accessible-version">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/yemen-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-humanitarian-situation-yemen-march-2025-accessible-version</a>.
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Satellite imagery and machine learning analysis showed a
significant expansion in cropland between 2018 and 2022.\48\ Urban to
rural migration has also emerged as households seek stability and
improved living conditions; and this shift is seen as likely
contributing to higher employment in agriculture.\49\
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\48\ World Bank Group, ``Yemen Economic Monitor: Persistent
Fragility amid Rising Risks (English)'' (May 29, 2025), <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099822505292530706/pdf/IDU-7009880b-d070-472d-9bf2-5cc72a3fc75d.pdf">https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099822505292530706/pdf/IDU-7009880b-d070-472d-9bf2-5cc72a3fc75d.pdf</a>.
\49\ Id.
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The primary healthcare system of Yemen is being slowly and
meaningfully rebuilt.\50\ For example, between December 2024 and March
2025, 150 facilities across Yemen received operational support from the
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development.\51\ Critical supplies, such
as disinfectants, soap, thermometers, and stationery were restocked,
resulting in safer, cleaner, and more functional spaces.\52\
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\50\ See, e.g., United Nations Yemen, ``United Nations
Children's Fund Yemen: Health, Hope, and a Hard Road Ahead--Inside
Yemen's Community Clinics,'' (Aug. 18, 2025), <a href="https://yemen.un.org/en/299987-unicef-yemen-health-hope-and-hard-road-ahead-inside-yemen">https://yemen.un.org/en/299987-unicef-yemen-health-hope-and-hard-road-ahead-inside-yemen</a>'s-community-clinics.
\51\ Id.
\52\ Id.
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The European Union and International Finance Corporation, a member
of the World Bank Group that focuses on private sector development in
developing countries, formed a partnership in 2025 in Yemen to
establish a Trust Fund to advance private sector development over the
next five years.\53\ The partnership's overarching goal is to
contribute to Yemen's economic resilience and recovery by fostering
local development and job creation.\54\
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\53\ Delegation of the European Union to Yemen, ``EU-IFC Trust
Fund--Enhancing Private Sector Growth in Yemen, European External
Action Service'' (Aug. 1, 2025), <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/yemen/eu-ifc-trust-fund-enhancing-private-sector-growth-yemen_en?s=211">https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/yemen/eu-ifc-trust-fund-enhancing-private-sector-growth-yemen_en?s=211</a>.
\54\ Id.
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In totality, although there have been some improvements, country
conditions indicate that extraordinary and temporary conditions
continue to challenge Yemeni nationals' ability to safely return home.
DHS acknowledges that there may appear to be some tension between
its determination under INA section 244(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.
1254a(b)(1)(A) that requiring the return of Yemeni nationals (and
aliens having no nationality who last resided in Yemen) does not pose a
serious threat to their personal safety due to an armed conflict; and
its separate determination under INA section 244(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C.
1254a(b)(1)(C), that extraordinary and temporary conditions in Yemen
that prevent Yemeni nationals from returning in safety may remain. DHS
notes, however, that these are two separate statutory bases, each
requiring its own determination based on separate facts. Accordingly,
DHS does not believe there is inconsistency in finding that armed
conflict does not prevent Yemenis from safely returning, while also
finding that extraordinary and temporary conditions may continue to
exist. DHS further notes that under the second prong of INA section
244(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1)(C), the Secretary must consider
whether permitting Yemeni nationals to remain temporarily in the United
States is contrary to the national interest of the United States.
Accordingly, even assuming that such extraordinary and temporary
conditions remain, the Secretary has determined that permitting Yemeni
nationals to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the
U.S. national interest.
``National interest'' is an expansive standard that may encompass
an array of broad considerations, including foreign policy, public
safety (e.g., potential nexus to criminal gang membership), national
security,
[[Page 10406]]
migration factors (e.g., pull factors), immigration policy (e.g.,
enforcement prerogatives), and economic considerations (e.g., adverse
effects on U.S. workers, impact on U.S. communities).\55\ Determining
whether permitting a class of aliens to remain temporarily in the
United States is contrary to the U.S. national interest therefore calls
upon the Secretary's expertise and discretionary judgment, informed by
her consultation with appropriate U.S. Government agencies. If the
Secretary determines that it is contrary to the national interest of
the United States to designate or extend Temporary Protected Status,
the statute compels the Secretary to terminate the designation, even if
extraordinary and temporary conditions exist.
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\55\ See, e.g., Poursina v. USCIS, 936 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.
2019) (observing, in an analogous INA context, ``that the `national
interest' standard invokes broader economic and national-security
considerations, and such determinations are firmly committed to the
discretion of the Executive Branch--not to federal courts'' (citing
Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 684-86 (2018)); Flores v. Garland, 72
F.4th 85, 89-90 (5th Cir. 2023) (same); Brasil v. Sec'y, Dep't of
Homeland Sec., 28 F.4th 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2022) (same); cf.
Matter of D-J-, 23 I&N Dec. 572, 579-81 (A.G. 2003) (recognizing
that taking measures to stem and eliminate possible incentives for
potential large-scale migration from a given country is ``sound
immigration policy'' and an ``important national security
interest''); Matter of Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. 884, 890-91 (AAO 2016)
(taking into account impact on U.S. workers in ``national interest''
assessments).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 4, 2025, President Trump issued Proclamation 10949,
``Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United
States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public
Safety Threats'' to suspend or limit the entry into the United States
of foreign nationals from certain countries whose screening, identity-
management or information-sharing practices the U.S. Government has
determined as deficient, and whose nationals may pose risk to national
security or public safety.\56\
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\56\ 90 FR 24497 (June 4, 2025).
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This proclamation identified Yemen as one of the twelve countries
identified for full suspension of entry (immigrant and nonimmigrants)
noting that ``Yemen lacks a competent or cooperative central authority
for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have
appropriate screening and vetting measures.'' \57\ This vulnerability
has been a longstanding issue for Yemen. The U.S. Embassy in Sana'a
closed and suspended services in February 2015 due to conflicts and
high levels of insecurity within Yemen, further hindering the ability
to locally confirm the validity of these identity documents.\58\ The
U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs also alerts that
competing authorities, including areas of Houthi control, are issuing
passports, leading to several European countries refusing to accept
them since 2020.\59\
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\57\ 90 FR 24501.
\58\ U.S. Mission to Yemen, ``U.S.-Yemen Relations,'' <a href="https://ye.usembassy.gov/u-s-yemen-relations/">https://ye.usembassy.gov/u-s-yemen-relations/</a>.
\59\ U.S. Department of State, ``Yemen: Reciprocity Schedule,''
<a href="https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/Visa-Reciprocity-and-Civil-Documents-by-Country.html">https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/Visa-Reciprocity-and-Civil-Documents-by-Country.html</a>.
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The President made his determination to suspend entry of Yemeni
nationals after the President consulted with the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, appropriate Assistants to the President, the
Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.\60\ The President also considered foreign policy,
national security, and counterterrorism goals, as well as Yemen's
screening and vetting capabilities, information sharing policies, and
country-specific risk factors--including whether Yemen has a
significant terrorist presence within its territory, its visa-overstay
rate, and its cooperation with accepting back its removable
nationals.\61\
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\60\ See 90 FR 24498-99.
\61\ See id.
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The President's 2025 proclamation further supported the suspension
of Yemeni entrants because the government of Yemen ``does not have
physical control over its own territory'' and, since January 20, 2025,
``has been the site of active United States military operations.'' \62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Id.
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In January 2025, President Trump issued an order to ``set in motion
a process by which Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis, shall be
considered for designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.'' \63\
In that order, President Trump noted the Houthis ``have fired at U.S.
Navy warships dozens of times since 2023, endangering American men and
women in uniform. Since seizing most Yemeni population centers by force
from the legitimate Yemeni government in 2014-2015, the Houthis have
launched numerous attacks on civilian infrastructure, including
multiple attacks on civilian airports in Saudi Arabia, the deadly
January 2022 attacks on the United Arab Emirates, and more than 300
projectiles fired at Israel since October 2023. The Houthis have also
attacked commercial vessels transiting Bab al-Mandeb more than 100
times, killing at least four civilian sailors and forcing some Red Sea
maritime commercial traffic to reroute, which has contributed to global
inflation.'' \64\ President Trump accordingly concluded that ``the
Houthis' activities threaten the security of American civilians and
personnel in the Middle East, the safety of our closest regional
partners and the stability of global maritime trade.'' \65\ Following
the President's direction, the Department of State formally designated
Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in March 2025.\66\
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\63\ Designation of Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization, 90 FR 8639 (Jan. 31, 2025) (originally published Jan.
22, 2025).
\64\ Id.
\65\ Id.
\66\ Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation of Ansarallah,
90 FR 11352 (Mar. 5, 2025).
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Further raising concerns for the national interest of the United
States with respect to Yemen, as noted previously, since 2015, Yemen's
capital Sana'a and northern and western region have been controlled by
Ansar Allah.\67\ They continue to hold areas encompassing 70% of
Yemen's population, including de-facto control over the country's
northern and western regions, while the internationally-recognized
government maintains control of the southern and eastern regions.\68\
President Trump noted that the Houthis are supported by Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Quds Force (IRGC-QF),\69\ another Foreign
[[Page 10407]]
Terrorist Organization,\70\ which arms and trains terrorist
organizations around the world.\71\
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\67\ To be determined a Foreign Terrorist Organization, an
organization must: (1) be foreign; (2) engage in terrorist activity,
as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22
U.S.C. 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to engage
in terrorist activity or terrorism; and (3) involve activity or
terrorism that threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the
national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the
economic interests) of the United States.
\68\ The White House, ``Fact Sheet: President Donald J Trump Re-
designates the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization'' (Jan.
22, 2025), <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-re-designates-the-houthis-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-re-designates-the-houthis-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization/</a>; U.S. Department of State,
``Designation of Ansarallah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization''
(Mar. 4, 2025), <a href="https://www.state.gov/designation-of-ansarallah-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization/">https://www.state.gov/designation-of-ansarallah-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization/</a>; BBC, ``Who are the Houthis and
why is the U.S. targeting them?'' (Mar. 25, 2025), <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911</a>; Nabeel A. Khoury, Arab
Center Washington DC, ``Yemen's Houthi Movement Reconsidered'' (June
12, 2025), <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemens-houthi-movement-reconsidered/">https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemens-houthi-movement-reconsidered/</a>; U.S. Department of State, ``Yemen 2024 Human Rights
Report'' (July 31, 2025), <a href="https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2025/07/624521YEMEN-2024-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf">https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2025/07/624521YEMEN-2024-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf</a>.
\69\ The White House, ``Designation of Ansar Allah as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization'' (Jan. 22, 2025), <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/designation-of-ansar-allah-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/designation-of-ansar-allah-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization/</a>.
\70\ In the Matter of the Designation of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (and Other Aliases) as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization, 84 FR 15278 (Apr. 15, 2019).
\71\ U.S. Department of State, ``Fact Sheet: Designation of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps'' (Apr. 8, 2019), <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/designation-of-the-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps/">https://2017-2021.state.gov/designation-of-the-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps/</a>.
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Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a Yemen-based Al-Qaeda
affiliate designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2009,
continues to pose growing threat in the region.\72\ According to a
United Nations Security Council report, AQAP is experiencing a
resurgence, leveraging Yemen's ongoing instability to reorganize rank,
strengthen internal structure, and enhance its operational
capabilities.\73\ In 2024, they carried out over 40 attacks targeting
the internationally recognized Government of Yemen.\74\ The United
Nations report also indicates an emerging opportunistic relationship
between AQAP and the Houthis, who ceased hostilities against each other
in late 2022.\75\ Reporting indicates collaboration between the two
groups, to include weapons exchanges, joint training efforts, and
prisoner swaps.<SUP>76 77</SUP> In June 2025, AQAP leaders called for
the assassination of President Trump, Vice President J.D. Vance and
Elon Musk, among others.\78\
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\72\ Congressional Research Service, ``Al Qaeda: Background,
Current Status, and U.S. Policy'' (May 6, 2024), <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11854">https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11854</a>.
\73\ South 24, ``UN Report: AQAP Reorganizing in Yemen While
Maintaining ``Opportunistic'' Ties with Houthis'' (Jun. 8, 2025),
<a href="https://outh24.net/news/newse.php?nid=4823">https://outh24.net/news/newse.php?nid=4823</a>; UN Security Council,
``Thirty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions
Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024)
concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and
entities'' (July 24, 2025), <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/482">https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/482</a>.
\74\ Justice4Yemen Pact, ``Evidence of Houthi/al-Qaida
Cooperation in Yemen'' (Mar. 2025), <a href="https://justice4yemenpact.org/articles/the-evolving-relationship-between-the-houthis-and-aqap-conflict-cooperation-and-strategic-interests/">https://justice4yemenpact.org/articles/the-evolving-relationship-between-the-houthis-and-aqap-conflict-cooperation-and-strategic-interests/</a>.
\75\ UN Security Council, ``Thirty-sixth report of the
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and
associated individuals and entities'' (July 24, 2025), <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/482">https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/482</a>.
\76\ Justice4Yemen Pact, ``Evidence of Houthi/al-Qaida
Cooperation in Yemen (Mar. 2025), <a href="https://justice4yemenpact.org/articles/the-evolving-relationship-between-the-houthis-and-aqap-conflict-cooperation-and-strategic-interests/">https://justice4yemenpact.org/articles/the-evolving-relationship-between-the-houthis-and-aqap-conflict-cooperation-and-strategic-interests/</a>.
\77\ UN Security Council, ``Thirty-sixth report of the
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and
associated individuals and entities'' (July 24, 2025), <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/482">https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/482</a>.
\78\ Al Jazeera, ``Yemen's al-Qaeda leader threatens Trump, Musk
over Israel's war on Gaza'' (June 7, 2025), <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/7/yemens-al-qaeda-leader-threatens-trump-musk-over-israels-war-on-gaza">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/7/yemens-al-qaeda-leader-threatens-trump-musk-over-israels-war-on-gaza</a>.
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Additionally, DHS records indicate some of the Yemeni nationals who
have applied for or been granted Temporary Protected Status have been
under administrative investigation for risk to national security or
public safety, or for attempting to obtain immigration benefits through
fraud or misrepresentation. DHS accordingly took account of those cases
in making the decision to terminate TPS, as fraud and egregious public
safety violations are contrary to the national interest.
Contributing further to the national interest concerns of the
United States with respect to Yemeni nationals in the United States are
instances of Yemeni nationals overstaying their nonimmigrant visas.
There was a large spike in Yemeni visa overstay rates in 2018,
coinciding with the initial designation of Temporary Protected Status
for Yemen in early January 2017.\79\ Yemen's visa overstay rates have
subsequently consistently remained very high compared to the global
average from Fiscal Year 2018 to 2024. There were approximately 600
overstays among nonimmigrant visa holders with an ``Admit Until'' date
that fell in Fiscal Year 2023, 670 overstays with a date that fell in
Fiscal Year 2024, and 230 overstays among visa holders with a date that
fell in Fiscal Year 2025.\80\ Due to the former Secretary's decision to
extend and newly designate Yemen for Temporary Protected Status, many
of these visa overstays who arrived after the initial designation
became newly eligible to apply for Temporary Protected Status.
According to the Fiscal Year 2024 Department of Homeland Security
Entry/Exit Overstay Report, Yemen had a Non-Visa Waiver Program
Countries Business or Pleasure Visitors (B-1/B-2) visa overstay rate of
17.1% and a Student and Exchange Visitors (F, M, J) visa overstay rate
of 25.7%.\81\ These rates exceed by a large margin the global average
of overstay rates of 2.3% for B-1/B-2 visas and 3.23% for F, M, J
visas--over six times higher for business or pleasure visitors and
nearly seven times higher for student and exchange visitors.\82\
Elevated overstay rates present potential risks to U.S. national
security and public safety, as individuals who overstay their visas may
be harder to locate and monitor, increasing vulnerabilities within
immigration enforcement systems.
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\79\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``Fiscal Year 2018
Entry/Exit Overstay Report'' (Apr. 17, 2019), <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0417_fy18-entry-and-exit-overstay-report.pdf">https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0417_fy18-entry-and-exit-overstay-report.pdf</a>.
\80\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), ``Fiscal Year
2018 Entry/Exit Overstay Report'' (Apr. 17, 2019), <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0417_fy18-entry-and-exit-overstay-report.pdf">https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0417_fy18-entry-and-exit-overstay-report.pdf</a>; see also CBP, ``Fiscal Year 2019 Entry/
Exit Overstay Report'' (May 13, 2020), <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_0513_fy19-entry-and-exit-overstay-report.pdf">https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_0513_fy19-entry-and-exit-overstay-report.pdf</a>; CBP, ``Fiscal Year 2020 Entry/Exit Overstay Report''
(Dec. 1, 2021), <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/CBP%20-%20FY%202020%20Entry%20Exit%20Overstay%20Report_0.pdf">https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/CBP%20-%20FY%202020%20Entry%20Exit%20Overstay%20Report_0.pdf</a>; CBP,
``Fiscal Year 2022 Entry/Exit Overstay Report'' (July 7, 2023),
<a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/23_0707_FY22_FY23_CBP_Integrated_Entry_Exit_Overstay_Report.pdf">https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/23_0707_FY22_FY23_CBP_Integrated_Entry_Exit_Overstay_Report.pdf</a>;
CBP, ``Entry/Exit Overstay Report: Fiscal Year 2023 Report to
Congress,'' (Aug. 5, 2024), <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-10/24_1011_CBP-Entry-Exit-Overstay-Report-FY23-Data.pdf">https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-10/24_1011_CBP-Entry-Exit-Overstay-Report-FY23-Data.pdf</a>; CBP,
``Entry/Exit Overstay Report: Fiscal Year 2024 Report to Congress''
(July 16, 2025), <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-09/25_0912_cbp_entry-exit-overstay-report-fiscal-year-2024.pdf">https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-09/25_0912_cbp_entry-exit-overstay-report-fiscal-year-2024.pdf</a>. FY2025
data are as of October 3, 2025. Aliens who overstayed multiple times
are counted more than once.
\81\ CBP, Entry/Exit Overstay Report, Department of Homeland
Security (July 16, 2025), <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-08/250826cbpentry-exit-overstay-report-fiscal-year-2024.pdf">https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-08/250826cbpentry-exit-overstay-report-fiscal-year-2024.pdf</a>.
\82\ Id.
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The high level of unlawful presence by Yemeni nationals is likely
in part driven by Temporary Protected Status designations--particularly
repeated new designations. Studies have found immigration
regularization or legalization programs (of which Temporary Protected
Status is one example, particularly in cases where a country's
designation is both extended and newly designated on a regular cadence)
can act as a pull factor attracting migration, especially when combined
with other factors, such as broader policies, generosity of the
program, and perceptions of leniency in enforcement at the destination
country.\83\ The expectation of repeated new Temporary Protected Status
designations, and employment authorization offered by Temporary
Protected Status, likely contributed to newly arriving Yemenis
nationals' decision to remain in the United States unlawfully.
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\83\ See, e.g., Paul Elguezabal & Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso,
International Network for Economic Research, ``Are Immigration
Regularization Programs a Pull Factor? Evidence for OECD
Countries,'' (2024), <a href="https://infer-research.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/WP2024.14.pdf">https://infer-research.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/WP2024.14.pdf</a>.
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The Department has accordingly considered the national interest
factors and determined that continuing to permit Yemeni nationals (and
aliens having no nationality who last habitually resided in Yemen) to
reside in the United States under Temporary Protected Status is
contrary to the U.S. national interest; therefore, termination of the
Yemen Temporary Protected Status designation is required.
[[Page 10408]]
DHS estimates that as of December 8, 2025 there were approximately
2,810 beneficiaries under the designation of Yemen for Temporary
Protected Status, and 425 total pending applications <SUP>84 85</SUP>
for the designation of Yemen for Temporary Protected Status.\86\
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\84\ DHS, Office of Performance and Quality, estimate as of
December 8, 2025.
\85\ The DHS Office of Homeland Security Statistics estimates
that an additional approximately 1000 nationals of Yemen who entered
the United States since July 2, 2024, could become newly eligible
for Temporary Protected Status if Yemen is newly designated.
Estimate as of October 21, 2025.
\86\ The DHS Office of Homeland Security Statistics estimates
that an additional approximately 1000 nationals of Yemen who entered
the United States since July 2, 2024, could become newly eligible
for Temporary Protected Status if Yemen is newly designated.
Estimate as of October 21, 2025.
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Effective Date of Termination of the Designation
The Temporary Protected Status statute provides that the
termination of a country's Temporary Protected Status designation may
not be effective earlier than 60 days after the notice is published in
the Federal Register or, if later, the expiration of the most-recent
previous extension. See INA sec. 244(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(B).
The Temporary Protected Status statute authorizes the Secretary, at
her discretionary option as she deems appropriate, to allow for an
extended ``orderly transition'' period with respect to the termination
and the expiration of any Temporary Protected Status-related
documentation, such as Employment Authorization Documents. The
Secretary has determined, in her discretion, that a 60-day transition
period is sufficient and warranted here given the Secretary's finding
that continuing to permit the Yemeni nationals to remain temporarily in
the United States is contrary to the U.S. national interest. See INA
sec. 244(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(d)(3). Accordingly, the termination of
the Yemen Temporary Protected Status designation will be effective 60
days from this notice's publication date.\87\
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\87\ See 8 CFR 244.19 (``Upon the termination of designation of
a foreign state, those nationals afforded temporary Protected Status
shall, upon the sixtieth (60th) day after the date notice of
termination is published in the Federal Register, or on the last day
of the most recent extension of designation by the [Secretary of
Homeland Security], automatically and without further notice or
right of appeal, lose Temporary Protected Status in the United
States. Such termination of a foreign state's designation is not
subject to appeal.'').
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DHS recognizes that Yemen Temporary Protected Status beneficiaries
continue to be authorized to work during the 60-day transition
period.\88\ Accordingly, through this Federal Register notice, DHS
automatically extends the validity of certain Employment Authorization
Documents previously issued under the Temporary Protected Status
designation of Yemen through May 4, 2026. Therefore, as proof of
continued employment authorization through May 4, 2026, Temporary
Protected Status beneficiaries can show their Employment Authorization
Documents that have the notation A-12 or C-19 under Category and a
``Card Expires'' date of March 3, 2023, September 3, 2024, and March 3,
2026.
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\88\ See INA 244(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(a)(1)(B); see also 8
CFR 244.13(b).
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The Secretary has considered putative reliance interests in the
Yemen Temporary Protected Status designation, especially when
considering whether to allow for an additional transition period akin
to that allowed under certain previous Temporary Protected Status
terminations. Temporary Protected Status, as the name itself makes
clear, is an inherently temporary status. Temporary Protected Status
designations are time-limited and must be periodically reviewed, and
Temporary Protected Status notices clearly notify aliens of the
designations' expiration dates, and whether to allow for an orderly
transition period is left to the Secretary's unfettered discretion. See
INA sec. 244(b)(3), (d)(3); 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3), (d)(3). The statute
inherently contemplates advance notice of a termination by requiring
timely publication of the Secretary's determination and delaying the
effective date of the termination by at least 60 days after publication
of a Federal Register notice of the termination or, if later, the
existing expiration date. See INA sec. 244(b)(3)(A)-(B), (d)(3); 8
U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(A)-(B), (d)(3).
Notice of the Termination of the Temporary Protected Status Designation
of Yemen
By the authority vested in me as Secretary under INA section
244(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3), I have reviewed, in consultation with
the appropriate U.S. Government agencies, whether Yemen is experiencing
ongoing armed conflict that poses a serious threat to the personal
safety of Yemeni nationals; whether extraordinary and temporary
conditions in Yemen that prevent Yemeni nationals from returning in
safety continue to exist; and whether permitting the nationals of Yemen
(and aliens having no nationality who last habitually resided in Yemen)
to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national
interest of the United States. Based on my review, I have determined
that Yemen no longer continues to meet the conditions for Temporary
Protected Status under INA section 244(b)(1)(A) or (C), 8 U.S.C.
1254a(b)(1)(A) or (C).
Accordingly, I order as follows:
(1) Pursuant to INA section 244(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(B),
and considering INA section 244(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(d)(3), the
designation of Yemen for Temporary Protected Status is terminated
effective at 11:59 p.m., local time, on May 4, 2026.
(2) Information concerning the termination of Temporary Protected
Status for nationals of Yemen (and aliens having no nationality who
last habitually resided in Yemen) will be available at local USCIS
office upon publication of this notice and through the USCIS Contact
Center at 1-800-375-5283. This information will be published on the
USCIS website at <a href="http://www.uscis.gov">www.uscis.gov</a>.
Kristi Noem,
Secretary of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2026-04179 Filed 3-2-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-97-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on March 3, 2026.
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