Notice2026-02483
United States et al. v. RealPage, Inc.et al.; Response of the United States to Public Comments
Primary source
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Published
February 9, 2026
Issuing agencies
Justice DepartmentAntitrust Division
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 26 (Monday, February 9, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 26 (Monday, February 9, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 5778-5782]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-02483]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States et al. v. RealPage, Inc. et al.; Response of the
United States to Public Comments
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that the Response of the United
States to Public Comment on the Proposed Final Judgment in United
States of America et al. v. RealPage et al., Civil Action No. 24-cv-
00710-WLO-JLW, in regards to Defendant Greystar Management Services,
LLC., has been filed in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, together with the response of the United
States to the comments. Copies of the public comment and the United
States' Response are available for inspection on the Antitrust
Division's website at <a href="http://www.justice.gov/">http://www.justice.gov/</a>atr.
Suzanne Morris,
Deputy Director Civil Enforcement Operations, Antitrust Division.
In the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina
United States of America, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. RealPage,
Inc., et al., Defendants.
No. 1:24-cv-00710-WLO-JLW
Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comments on the Proposed
Final Judgment
Pursuant to the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act (the ``APPA'' or ``Tunney Act''), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h),
the United States submits this response to the five public comments
received regarding the proposed Final Judgment as to Defendant Greystar
Management Services, LLC (Doc. 152-1).\1\
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\1\ The United States has redacted personally identifiable
information from the comments. If the Court requests unredacted
versions, the United States will provide unredacted comments under
seal.
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After careful consideration of the submitted comments, the United
States continues to believe that the proposed Final Judgment will
provide an effective and appropriate remedy for the antitrust
violations alleged in the Complaint.
After this Response has been published in the Federal Register,
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 16(d), the United States will move the Court to
enter the proposed Final Judgment. On December 30, 2025, the Court
approved the United States' request to publish the public comments on
the Antitrust Division's website due to the expense of publishing the
comments in the Federal Register and the accessibility to the public of
the Division's website.\2\ These comments can be accessed at
<a href="http://www.justice.gov/atr">www.justice.gov/atr</a>.
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\2\ Doc. 166.
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I. Procedural History
On August 23, 2024, the United States, along with several states
(``Plaintiffs''), filed a civil antitrust Complaint against RealPage,
Inc. (``RealPage'') (Doc. 1). On January 7, 2025, Plaintiffs amended
their civil Complaint (the ``Complaint'') to add Greystar Management
Services, LLC \3\ (``Greystar'') and five other landlords as Defendants
(Doc. 47) alleging that Greystar's agreements with RealPage and other
landlords to share information and align pricing violate Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The Complaint seeks to enjoin Defendants
from sharing and exploiting competitively sensitive data.
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\3\ The Complaint initially named Greystar Real Estate Partners,
LLC, as the defendant. By agreement, Greystar Management Services,
LLC, was later substituted as the defendant (see Doc. 143).
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On August 8, 2025, the United States filed a proposed Final
Judgment (Doc. 152-1) as to Greystar, which is designed to remedy the
loss of competition alleged in the Complaint due to Greystar's conduct,
and a Stipulation and Proposed Order (Doc. 152), in which Greystar
consented to entry of the proposed Final Judgment after compliance with
the requirements of the Tunney Act.\4\ On August 25, 2025, the United
States filed a Competitive Impact Statement describing the proposed
Final Judgment as to Greystar. (Doc. 155).
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\4\ The Stipulation and Proposed Order, and the proposed Final
Judgment, pertain only to Greystar's conduct. They do not propose to
resolve the anticompetitive conduct alleged in the Complaint against
any other Defendant. Nor do they resolve the claims of any other
Plaintiff besides the United States.
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The United States arranged for the publication of the Complaint,
proposed Final Judgment, and Competitive Impact Statement in the
Federal Register on September 9, 2025, see 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(c); 90 FR
43070 (Sept. 9, 2025), and caused notice regarding the same, together
with directions for the
[[Page 5779]]
submission of written comments relating to the proposed Final Judgment,
to be published in the Washington Post and the Greensboro News and
Record from September 2 to September 8, 2025. The 60-day period for
public comment has now ended. The United States received five comments
in response, which are described below and attached as Exhibit 1
hereto.
II. The Complaint and the Proposed Final Judgment
The Complaint alleges that, by unlawfully sharing its confidential
and competitively sensitive information with RealPage for use in its
and competing landlords' pricing, Greystar violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Under their licensing agreements with
RealPage, Greystar and competing landlords have provided RealPage with
daily, competitively sensitive, nonpublic information for use in
RealPage's revenue management software relating to the landlords'
leasing businesses, including details like how many leases have been
renewed, for what terms, and at what price. The transactional data that
Greystar and other landlords have agreed to provide to RealPage
includes current, forward-looking, granular, and highly competitively
sensitive information. RealPage has used Greystar's competitively
sensitive, nonpublic information to influence rental prices and other
recommendations across rental properties managed by competing
landlords. Greystar's rental prices and related recommendations were
likewise influenced by its competitors' competitively sensitive,
nonpublic information obtained from RealPage. In each relevant market,
RealPage and participating landlords, including Greystar, have
sufficient market power, including market and data penetration, to harm
renters and the competitive process through this unlawful sharing of
confidential and competitively sensitive information. Moreover,
Greystar and other landlords can achieve any procompetitive objective
of revenue management software without sharing this kind of
information.
The Complaint also alleges that Greystar and other landlords, by
adopting and using RealPage's revenue management software, agreed with
RealPage to align their pricing and thereby violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. RealPage has entered into agreements with
Greystar and its competing landlords relating to how to price rental
units, including through the licensing of its revenue management
software--AI Revenue Management (``AIRM''), YieldStar, and Lease Rent
Options (``LRO'')--to landlords, and the provision by landlords of
their competitively sensitive, nonpublic transactional data to RealPage
for training and running its revenue management software. Adoption and
use of RealPage's revenue management software by Greystar and other
landlords has the likely effect of causing competing landlords to
employ the same or very similar strategies, processes, and decisions
relating to their pricing of rental units. Greystar and other landlord
users understand this likely effect, which here dampens the competitive
process that benefits renters.
The proposed Final Judgment imposes several requirements and
restrictions on Greystar that address the United States'
anticompetitive concerns regarding Greystar's conduct alleged in the
Complaint. Specifically:
i. Greystar must not license or use any revenue management product
that uses third-party nonpublic data to recommend or set prices;
ii. Greystar must not license or use any revenue management product
that pools information from Greystar properties that have different
owners;
iii. Greystar must not disclose, solicit, or use competitively
sensitive information from competitors that can be used to set rental
prices or generate pricing;
iv. Greystar must cooperate in this civil antitrust proceeding
(United States et al. v. RealPage et al.);
v. Greystar must adopt a written antitrust compliance policy and
designate a chief antitrust compliance officer who will train Greystar
employees on the policy;
vi. Greystar must allow the United States to inspect its documents
and to interview its employees to ensure compliance with the Final
Judgment;
vii. If Greystar uses a revenue management product, Greystar will
be subject to a monitor unless Greystar obtains a certification that
meets certain requirements, including an affirmation that the product
complies with all required limitations regarding use of competitors'
competitively sensitive data; and
viii. If, in the future, the Court finds that Greystar has violated
the terms of the proposed Final Judgment, Greystar will be subject to a
court-appointed monitor.
Under the terms of the Stipulation and Order, Greystar must abide
by and comply with the provisions of the proposed Final Judgment until
it is entered by the Court or until the time for all appeals of any
Court ruling declining entry of the proposed Final Judgment has
expired.
The United States and Greystar have stipulated that the proposed
Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance with the
APPA. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will terminate this action
with respect to the United States' claims against Greystar, except that
the Court will retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or enforce the
provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish violations
thereof by Greystar.
III. Standard of Judicial Review
The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed
consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be
subject to a 60-day comment period, after which the Court shall
determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment ``is in the
public interest.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In making that determination,
the Court, in accordance with the Tunney Act as amended in 2004, is
required to consider:
(A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination
of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification,
duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies
actually considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and any other
competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment
that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether the
consent judgment is in the public interest; and
(B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the
relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and individuals
alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint
including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived
from a determination of the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In considering these statutory
factors, the Court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one, as the
government is entitled to ``broad discretion to settle with the
defendant within the reaches of the public interest.'' United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v.
U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2014)
(explaining that the ``court's inquiry is limited'' in Tunney Act
settlements); United States v. InBev N.V./S.A., No. 08-1965 (JR), 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that a
court's review of a consent judgment is limited and only inquires
``into whether the government's determination that the
[[Page 5780]]
proposed remedies will cure the antitrust violations alleged in the
complaint was reasonable, and whether the mechanism to enforce the
final judgment are clear and manageable''); United States v. Keyspan
Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see SEC v.
Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2012) (``We
are bound in such matters to give deference to an executive agency's
assessment of the public interest.'').
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
has held, under the APPA, a court considers, among other things, the
relationship between the remedy secured and the specific allegations in
the government's complaint, whether the proposed Final Judgment is
sufficiently clear, whether its enforcement mechanisms are sufficient,
and whether it may positively harm third parties. See Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1458-62; United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 631
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1458, 1461-62). With
respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by the proposed Final
Judgment, a court may ``not make de novo determination of facts and
issues.'' United States v. W. Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1577 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (quotation marks omitted); see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460-
62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001);
United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2000);
InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3. Instead, ``[t]he balancing
of competing social and political interests affected by a proposed
antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first instance, to the
discretion of the Attorney General.'' W. Elec. Co., 993 F.2d at 1577
(quotation marks omitted). ``The court should bear in mind the
flexibility of the public interest inquiry: the court's function is not
to determine whether the resulting array of rights and liabilities is
one that will best serve society, but only to confirm that the
resulting settlement is within the reaches of the public interest.''
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460 (quotation marks omitted); see also United
States v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 19-2232 (TJK), 2020 WL 1873555, at
*7 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 2020). More demanding requirements would ``have
enormous practical consequences for the government's ability to
negotiate future settlements,'' contrary to congressional intent.
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1456. ``The Tunney Act was not intended to create
a disincentive to the use of the consent decree.'' Id.\5\
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\5\ See also United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 464 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding that the court's ``ultimate authority under the
[APPA] is limited to approving or disapproving the consent
decree''); United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D.
Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way, the court is constrained to
``look at the overall picture not hypercritically, nor with a
microscope, but with an artist's reducing glass'').
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The United States' predictions about the efficacy of the remedy are
to be afforded deference by the Court. See, e.g., Microsoft, 56 F.3d at
1461 (recognizing courts should give ``due respect to the Justice
Department's . . . view of the nature of its case''); United States v.
Iron Mountain, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 146, 152-53 (D.D.C. 2016) (``In
evaluating objections to settlement agreements under the Tunney Act, a
court must be mindful that [t]he government need not prove that the
settlements will perfectly remedy the alleged antitrust harms[;] it
need only provide a factual basis for concluding that the settlements
are reasonably adequate remedies for the alleged harms.'') (internal
citations omitted); United States v. Republic Servs., Inc., 723 F.
Supp. 2d 157, 160 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting ``the deferential review to
which the government's proposed remedy is accorded''); United States v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (``A
district court must accord due respect to the government's prediction
as to the effect of proposed remedies, its perception of the market
structure, and its view of the nature of the case''). In determining
whether a proposed settlement is in the public interest, a district
court ``is not permitted to reject the proposed remedies merely because
the court believes other remedies are preferable.'' United States v.
Morgan Stanley, 881 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting
United States v. Abitibi-Consol. Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165 (D.D.C.
2008)). The ultimate question is whether ``the remedies [obtained by
the Final Judgment are] so inconsonant with the allegations charged as
to fall outside of the `reaches of the public interest.' '' Microsoft,
56 F.3d at 1461 (quoting W. Elec. Co., 900 F.2d at 309).
Moreover, the Court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing
the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has
alleged in its complaint, and does not authorize the Court to
``construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree
against that case.'' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459; see also U.S. Airways,
38 F. Supp. 3d at 75 (noting that the court must simply determine
whether there is a factual foundation for the government's decisions
such that its conclusions regarding the proposed settlements are
reasonable); United States v. Keyspan Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 633 637-38
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (``The Court's function is not to determine whether the
proposed [d]ecree results in the balance of rights and liabilities that
is the one that will best serve society, but only to ensure that the
resulting settlement is `within the reaches of the public interest.' ''
(quoting United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 235,
238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)); InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (``the
`public interest' is not to be measured by comparing the violations
alleged in the complaint against those the court believes could have,
or even should have, been alleged''). Because the ``court's authority
to review the decree depends entirely on the government's exercising
its prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first place,''
it follows that ``the court is only authorized to review the decree
itself,'' and not to ``effectively redraft the complaint'' to inquire
into other matters that the United States did not pursue. Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1459-60. See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)
(quoting U.S. Const. art. II, Sec. 3) (recognizing that the decision
about which claims to bring ``has long been regarded as the special
province of the Executive Branch.'').
In its 2004 amendments to the APPA, Congress made clear its intent
to preserve the practical benefits of using consent judgments proposed
by the United States in antitrust enforcement, Public Law 108-237 Sec.
221, and added the unambiguous instruction that ``[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to
intervene.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2); see also U.S. Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d
at 76 (indicating that a court is not required to hold an evidentiary
hearing or to permit intervenors as part of its review under the Tunney
Act). This language explicitly wrote into the statute what Congress
intended when it first enacted the Tunney Act in 1974. As Senator
Tunney explained: ``[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or
to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect of
vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through the
consent decree process.'' 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement of
Sen. Tunney). ``A court can make its public interest determination
based on the competitive impact statement and response to public
comments alone.'' U.S. Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (citing Enova
Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d at 17).
[[Page 5781]]
IV. Summary of Public Comments and the United States' Repsonse
The United States received five public comments from three
commenters in response to the proposed Final Judgment. These comments
were submitted by private individuals, whom the United States will
refer to by each individual's initials: AB (``AB Comment''), DMP (``DMP
Comment'' and ``DMP Supplemental Comment''), and JP (``JP Comment'' and
``JP Supplemental Comment'').\6\
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\6\ The JP Supplemental Comment also includes comments about the
proposed Final Judgment between the United States and RealPage, Inc.
See Doc. 159-1. The United States will address JP's comments about
its proposed Final Judgment with RealPage in the United States'
response to the public comments on the RealPage Final Judgment.
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a. The AB Comment
AB comments that Greystar and other private equity groups were able
to raise prices between 2018 and 2024 by 26% in Denver, Colorado, due
to what she characterizes as price-fixing achieved through RealPage.\7\
AB does not believe that preventing Greystar from using certain
software is enough; rather, she suggests that Greystar should divest
the majority of its properties in the United States and pay restitution
to Americans.\8\ AB adds that price fixing through RealPage should be
outlawed.\9\
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\7\ AB Comment.
\8\ AB Comment.
\9\ AB Comment.
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As the Complaint explains, the claims the United States asserted
against Greystar arise from Greystar's sharing of nonpublic data with
RealPage and its use of RealPage revenue management software that uses
shared nonpublic data from Greystar and its competitors. The alleged
violations relating to Greystar, i.e., its use of its competitors'
nonpublic data and its alignment of pricing through the use of
RealPage's software, are properly remedied through the proposed Final
Judgment, which prohibits Greystar's use of nonpublic data and of
software that would align Greystar's pricing with competitors.
As to AB's comments related to price-fixing, the United States did
not allege in the Complaint that Greystar engaged in price-fixing, and
thus price-fixing is outside the scope of Tunney Act review.
b. The DMP Comments
DMP is a former employee of Mid-America Apartment Communities, Inc.
(``MAAC''), a real estate investment trust. DMP's comment states that
the proposed Final Judgment should (1) prohibit manual input of
competitor pricing or concessions into revenue management systems; (2)
bar contemporaneous market survey exchanges for pricing; (3) require
certifications on data usage in revenue management software; (4)
require a monitor be appointed whenever a large landlord uses a
commercial revenue management tool like RealPage's software; and (5)
prevent landlords like Greystar from retaliating against staff or
tenants who raise antitrust or compliance concerns.\10\
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\10\ DMP Comment at 15-16.
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The proposed Final Judgment already includes most of these
suggested remedies. While the proposed Final Judgment does not prohibit
manual input of data into revenue management software, it bars Greystar
from using revenue management software that uses any competitor data in
either the runtime operation or model training, regardless of whether
the data was inputted manually, through a data feed, or any other
way.\11\
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\11\ Greystar Proposed Final Judgment Sec. IV.A (Doc. 152-1).
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The DMP Comment also suggests that ``market surveys in which rival
property managers swap current pricing and occupancy information''
should be explicitly prohibited. The proposed Final Judgment also
includes this remedy. Section V.A of the proposed Final Judgment
prohibits Greystar from disclosing, soliciting, or using nonpublic data
from any competing property manager or property owner in setting rental
prices or generating pricing recommendations.\12\ The restriction
applies to nonpublic data obtained through market surveys.\13\
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\12\ Greystar Proposed Final Judgment Sec. V.A (Doc. 152-1).
\13\ Greystar Proposed Final Judgment Sec. V.A (Doc. 152-1).
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The DMP Comment suggests requiring both software vendors and
landlords to certify that relevant software does not use ``pricing
algorithms or models . . . trained on non-public data from other
landlords without each landlord's independent input or consent.'' \14\
The proposed Final Judgment requires Greystar to obtain certifications
from its revenue management vendors that the software complies with the
agreed upon terms, including not using nonpublic data from competing
properties.\15\
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\14\ DMP Comment at 8.
\15\ Greystar Proposed Final Judgment Sec. IV.E (Doc. 152-1).
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The DMP Comment also suggests that a monitor should be implemented
``unless and until the vendor provides verifiable certifications of
completely siloed data and client demonstrates a compliance program
that actively tracks and audits any deviations from recommended
pricing.'' \16\ While the proposed Final Judgement requires that a
monitor be appointed only in certain circumstances, it contains
alternative mechanisms to ensure compliance, including: (1) an
antitrust compliance program and training; \17\ (2) certifications from
revenue management software vendors; \18\ (3) certifications from
Greystar's General Counsel regarding compliance with sections of the
proposed Final Judgment; \19\ and (4) attestations under penalty of
perjury from employees engaged in or overseeing Greystar's revenue or
property management of multifamily rental properties that they have
complied with the prohibitions regarding the use of competitors'
nonpublic data.\20\ Additionally, the proposed Final Judgment provides
the United States with inspection capabilities to ensure compliance
with the consent decree.\21\ Finally, the proposed Final Judgment
requires that a monitor be appointed if Greystar violates any provision
in the proposed Final Judgment.\22\
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\16\ DMP Comment at 8.
\17\ Greystar Proposed Final Judgment Sec. VI.A-B (Doc. 152-1).
\18\ Greystar Proposed Final Judgment Sec. IV.E (Doc. 152-1).
\19\ Greystar Proposed Final Judgment Sec. VI.C (Doc. 152-1).
\20\ Greystar Proposed Final Judgment Sec. VI.C (Doc. 152-1).
\21\ Greystar Proposed Final Judgment Sec. IX (Doc. 152-1).
\22\ Greystar Proposed Final Judgment Sec. VIII.B.2 (Doc. 152-
1).
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DMP also includes allegations regarding MAAC's conduct. The
Complaint does not name MAAC as a defendant or involve MAAC's conduct,
and this proposed Final Judgment resolves only the United States'
claims against Greystar. Therefore, DMP's comments about MAAC are
outside the scope of the Tunney Act review.
c. The JP Comments
JP describes himself as a resident of a Greystar property in
Atlanta, Georgia. JP alleges that Greystar ``systematically perpetrates
document forgeries, housing discrimination, denial of due process,
environmental and health hazards, financial exploitation, and evidence
suppression.'' \23\ Additionally, JP's supplemental comment expresses a
concern that the proposed Final Judgment does not address the ``public
authority fraud where government-owned properties are operated for
private profit using these algorithms.'' \24\ JP expresses concern that
the ``prohibition on algorithmic pricing
[[Page 5782]]
coordination'' did not include financial penalties, a victim
compensation fund, or an admission of wrongdoing.
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\23\ JP Comment at 4.
\24\ JP Supplemental Comment at 2-3.
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Many of JP's concerns are not relevant to the alleged claims in the
Complaint. The Tunney Act applies only to final judgments or decrees in
civil proceedings brought by the United States under the antitrust
laws. See 15 U.S.C. 16(b). JP's allegations regarding forgeries,
discrimination, denial of due process, environmental and health
hazards, financial exploitation, evidence suppression, wrongful
eviction actions, and public authority fraud are not relevant to the
allegations in the Complaint against Greystar or the proposed Final
Judgment and are thus outside the scope of the Tunney Act review.
Restitution is not one of the remedies sought by the United States,
and hence it is outside the scope of the Tunney Act review.
JP also comments that the Greystar settlement does not include
admission of wrongdoing. The Tunney Act, however, does not require a
settlement to include an admission of wrongdoing as a prerequisite to
judicial approval. See United States v. Morgan Stanley, 881 F. Supp. 2d
563, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). On the contrary, the statute specifically
excepts consent judgments from being prima facie evidence or having a
collateral estoppel effect in another action or proceeding. See 15
U.S.C. 16(a)(``A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter
rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of
the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a
defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against
such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party
against such defendant under said laws as to all matters respecting
which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the
parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent
judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken.'')
Congress has designed the remedial provisions of the antitrust laws to
encourage consent judgments, which allow the government to obtain
relief without the ``time, expense and inevitable risk of litigation.''
United States v. Armour and Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971). See also
United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 553 F. Supp. 621, 623
(D.D.C. 1982) (``Congress apparently enacted this proviso in order to
encourage defendants to settle promptly government-initiated antitrust
claims and thereby to save the government the time and expense of
further litigation.''). To insist on more is to impose substantial
resource costs on government antitrust enforcement, to risk the
possibility of litigation resulting in no relief, and to establish a
precedent that could impede enforcement of the antitrust laws in the
future.
* * * * *
To the extent that commenters wish to raise the possibility of
additional unlawful conduct not addressed by the Complaint brought in
this matter, members of the public are encouraged to submit information
about any antitrust violation, including potentially unlawful exchanges
of information between competitors, to the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division's Citizen Complaint Center (<a href="https://www.justice.gov/atr/webform/pcsf-citizen-complaint">https://www.justice.gov/atr/webform/pcsf-citizen-complaint</a>).
V. Conclusion
After careful consideration of the public comments, the United
States continues to believe that the proposed Final Judgment provides
an effective and appropriate remedy for the antitrust violations
alleged in the Complaint and is therefore in the public interest. The
United States will move this Court to enter the proposed Final Judgment
after the comments and this response are published in a manner approved
by the Court, as required by 15 U.S.C. 16(d).
Dated: February 4, 2026.
Respectfully submitted,
By:--------------------------------------------------------------------
Henry C. Su,
David A. Geiger,
Danielle Hauck,
John J. Hogan,
Kris A. Perez Hicks,
Attorneys, United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division,
450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 7100, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone:
(202) 307-620, Email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#a8c0cdc6dad186dbdde8dddbccc7c286cfc7de"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d7bfb2b9a5aef9a4a297a2a4b3b8bdf9b0b8a1">[email protected]</span></a>.
[FR Doc. 2026-02483 Filed 2-6-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on February 9, 2026.
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