Proposed Rule2025-22063
Advanced Methods To Target and Eliminate Robocalls
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Published
December 5, 2025
Issuing agencies
Federal Communications Commission
Abstract
In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes steps to improve the availability and accuracy of caller identification information transmitted to consumers to enable them to better understand who is calling and decide whether to answer calls. Specifically, the Commission proposes to enhance the effectiveness of STIR/SHAKEN by requiring terminating providers to transmit verified caller name or other caller identity information for presentation on a consumer's handset whenever they transmit an indication that a call has received an A-level attestation. It also seeks comment on requiring providers to use Rich Call Data (RCD) to transmit verified caller name on IP networks, whether to permit or require use of other solutions, and an alternative option to require that providers implement RCD in their IP networks for all calls. The Commission further proposes to require voice service providers to implement measures to ensure that consumers know which calls originate from outside of the United States and to prohibit spoofing of United States telephone numbers for calls that originate from outside of the United States. Finally, the Commission seeks comment on whether some of its calling-related rules can be simplified, streamlined, or eliminated, perhaps because they are outdated or have not been enforced for a substantial amount of time.
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 232 (Friday, December 5, 2025)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 56101-56115]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-22063]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 64
[CG Docket Nos. 17-59, 02-278, 25-307; WC Docket No. 17-97; FCC 25-76;
FR ID 319452]
Advanced Methods To Target and Eliminate Robocalls
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission) proposes steps to improve the availability and accuracy of
caller identification information transmitted to consumers to enable
them to better understand who is calling and decide whether to answer
calls. Specifically, the Commission proposes to enhance the
effectiveness of STIR/SHAKEN by
[[Page 56102]]
requiring terminating providers to transmit verified caller name or
other caller identity information for presentation on a consumer's
handset whenever they transmit an indication that a call has received
an A-level attestation. It also seeks comment on requiring providers to
use Rich Call Data (RCD) to transmit verified caller name on IP
networks, whether to permit or require use of other solutions, and an
alternative option to require that providers implement RCD in their IP
networks for all calls. The Commission further proposes to require
voice service providers to implement measures to ensure that consumers
know which calls originate from outside of the United States and to
prohibit spoofing of United States telephone numbers for calls that
originate from outside of the United States. Finally, the Commission
seeks comment on whether some of its calling-related rules can be
simplified, streamlined, or eliminated, perhaps because they are
outdated or have not been enforced for a substantial amount of time.
DATES: Comments are due on or before January 5, 2026 and reply comments
are due on or before February 3, 2026.
ADDRESSES: Pursuant to Sec. 1.49 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR
1.49, parties to this proceeding must file any documents in this
proceeding using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System
(ECFS): You may submit comments, identified by CG Docket No. 17-59, WC
Docket No. 17-97, and CG Docket No. 02-278, by any of the following
methods:
<bullet> Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically
using the internet by accessing the Electronic Comment Filing System
(ECFS): <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs">https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs</a>. See Electronic Filing of Documents in
Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
<bullet> Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and one copy of each filing.
<bullet> Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by
commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be
addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
<bullet> Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for
the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.
by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with
rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of
before entering the building.
<bullet> Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the
U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701.
<bullet> Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail,
Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street
NE, Washington, DC 20554.
<bullet> People with Disabilities: To request materials in
accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print,
electronic files, audio format), send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#4f292c2c7a7f7b0f292c2c61282039"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="23454040161317634540400d444c55">[email protected]</span></a> or
call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information about the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), contact John B. Adams of the
Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-2854 or
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#0e446166604c204f6a6f637d4e686d6d20696178"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="a4eecbcccae68ae5c0c5c9d7e4c2c7c78ac3cbd2">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Ninth
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Seventh Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Public
Notice (NPRM), in CG Docket No. 17-59; WC Docket No. 17-97; CG Docket
Nos. 02-278 and 25-307; FCC 25-76, adopted on October 28, 2025 and
released on October 29, 2025. The full text of this document is
available online at <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-76A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-76A1.pdf</a>.
Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis: The NPRM may contain proposed new
and revised information collection requirements. The Commission, as
part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the
general public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to comment
on the information collection requirements described in this document,
as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13.
In addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of
2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific
comment on how we might further reduce the information collection
burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.
Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act: Consistent with
the Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act, Public Law 118-
9, a summary of this document will be available on <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings">https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings</a>.
Ex Parte Rules: The proceeding the NPRM initiates shall be treated
as a ``permit-but-disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the
Commission's ex parte rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must
file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any
oral presentation within two business days after the presentation
(unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period
applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that
memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons
attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex
parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and
arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted
in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already
reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other
filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such
data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other
filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where
such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the
memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must
be filed consistent with Sec. 1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules. In
proceedings governed by Sec. 1.49(f) of the Commission's rules or for
which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing,
written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte
presentations, and all attachments thereto, must, when feasible, be
filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that
proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml,
.ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should
familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
Synopsis
I. Discussion
1. We propose steps to improve the availability and accuracy of
caller identification information transmitted to consumers to enable
them to better understand who is calling and decide whether to answer
calls. Specifically, we propose to enhance the effectiveness of STIR/
SHAKEN by requiring terminating providers to transmit verified caller
name or other caller identity information for presentation on a
consumer's handset whenever they transmit an indication that a call has
received an A-level attestation. We also seek comment on requiring
providers to use RCD to transmit verified caller name on IP networks,
and on whether to permit or require use of other solutions.
Additionally, we seek comment on an alternative option to require that
[[Page 56103]]
providers implement RCD in their IP networks for all calls. Finally, we
propose to require voice service providers to implement measures to
ensure that consumers know which calls originate from outside of the
United States and to prohibit spoofing of United States telephone
numbers for calls that originate from outside of the United States.
A. Need for Improved Caller Identity Information
2. We believe that our proposals will empower consumers by giving
them the information they need when deciding whether to answer a call.
STIR/SHAKEN has served the Commission's goals of making spoofing more
difficult, improving providers' call blocking and spam labeling
decisions, and increasing the overall level of trust consumers have
that a particular call originated from the telephone number being
presented. However, consumers often cannot be sure who is calling
unless a number is stored in their contact list or otherwise
recognized. STIR/SHAKEN information does not provide consumers with
robust information about who is calling, and an A-level attestation
indicator alone does not give consumers enough information to decide
whether a call is worth answering. In the absence of accurate caller
name, and possibly other caller identity information, consumers might
mistakenly believe that a checkmark or other indication that a call
received an A-level attestation is an assurance that a call is not a
scam or otherwise unlawful.
3. We believe that providing consumers with a verified caller name
or other caller identity information would empower a more informed
decision about whether to answer the call. We further believe that when
a consumer's handset presents this additional information, it will
reduce their confusion about the meaning of a green checkmark or other
indicator that a call has received an A-level attestation, which will
further increase trust and better enable consumers to avoid spoofed,
scam, and other unlawful calls. Finally, we believe that transmitting
verified caller identity information to the terminating provider will
give providers additional information to use in their analytics,
potentially making the analytics more accurate and thus addressing
concerns about calls being labeled inaccurately.
4. Consumer surveys strongly support the goal of our proposals and
suggest that legitimate callers, especially business callers, can
benefit as well. One consumer survey indicated that 90% of consumers
are uncomfortable answering unidentified calls and that 78% of
consumers have missed an important call in the last month because they
did not answer an unidentified call. Another survey revealed that 92%
of consumers assume unidentified calls are fraudulent and that 56% of
consumers sometimes risk answering an unidentified call because they
fear it is a call they cannot afford to miss. It also asserted that
employees who make calls on behalf of businesses believe that ensuring
that consumers know who is calling is the most effective way to improve
answer rates. As many as 88% of enterprise calls are not answered,
which can reduce efficiency, increase costs of doing business, and
reduce customer service. Notably, a different survey indicates that
consumers are more likely to answer calls as more trusted caller
identity information is presented to them. According to that survey,
73% will answer a call if the name of the caller is presented, 76% will
answer if the caller's name and logo are presented, and 78% will answer
if the reason for the call also is presented.
B. Defining Caller Identity Information
5. We propose to define ``caller identity information'' as having
the same meaning given the term ``caller identification information''
in our rules, but excluding the originating telephone number or portion
thereof and billing number information.
6. Terms like ``Caller ID'' and ``Caller ID with Name''
historically have been used to refer to functionalities that enabled a
terminating provider to present to consumers, respectively, the
originating telephone number or the originating telephone number and
the associated caller name from a CNAM database. The Truth in Caller ID
Act and our implementing rules define ``caller identification
information'' to include both the originating telephone number and
``other information regarding the origination of the call,'' which our
rules define to include certain enumerated items and ``[o]ther
information regarding the source or apparent source of a telephone
call'' and refer to any service or device used to provide caller
identification information to a consumer as a ``caller identification
service.''
7. In the context of the TRACED Act and the STIR/SHAKEN framework,
however, ``caller ID authentication'' often is used to refer more
narrowly to the originating telephone number alone. To be clear and to
avoid duplication of rules that already require authentication of
originating phone numbers using the STIR/SHAKEN framework, we use the
term ``caller identity information'' throughout this document to refer
to the caller's name, location, and ``other information regarding the
source or apparent source of a telephone call,'' which generally means
information other than the originating telephone number and billing
information, and have proposed to define that term similarly in our
rules. We seek comment on this analysis.
C. Transmitting Caller Identity Information to Consumers
1. Requiring Transmission of Caller Identity Information to Consumers
When A-Level Attestations Are Indicated
8. We propose to require terminating providers to transmit to
consumer handsets verified caller identity information whenever they
transmit to the handset an indication that a call received an A-level
attestation. To be clear, we do not propose to require terminating
providers to transmit to consumer's handsets whether a call has
received an A-level attestation or to transmit any new caller
identification information. Instead, we propose a requirement that
would apply only when a terminating provider chooses to transmit to the
handset an indication that a call received an A-level attestation and
seek comment on this proposal.
9. We believe that presenting an A-level attestation indicator on a
handset with only the originating number provides little benefit to
consumers because they might not understand the meaning of the
indicator, mistakenly taking it to indicate that the call is not a scam
or otherwise is lawful. Are marketplace solutions, on their own,
sufficient to drive widespread presentation of verified caller
identification information?
10. We believe that verified caller identity information helps
legitimate callers, especially business callers, as well as consumers.
If consumers have trustworthy caller identity information, they can
make better informed decisions about whether to answer a call, which is
likely to lead to higher answer rates and engagement. Information from
the industry appears to support this belief. TransUnion states that
customers are up to 105% more likely to answer a branded call.
Similarly, a TNS survey found that 76% of Americans would prefer to
engage with businesses that use branded calling and that 81% of
consumers would answer a branded call if they recently had engaged with
that brand. Is our belief correct?
11. While we believe that an indication that a call received an A-
level attestation provides little benefit to
[[Page 56104]]
consumers taken alone, we also believe that combining it with verified
caller identity information would benefit consumers significantly. We
seek comment on this belief. Does verified caller identity information,
such as caller name or logos, provide significant benefit to consumers?
Does providing an indication that a call received an A-level
attestation at the same time increase this benefit?
12. Does indicating that a call received an A-level attestation
without additional caller identity information create opportunities for
fraud? Are there situations where it would significantly benefit
consumers to receive an A-level attestation indicator without any other
verified caller identity information? Would adopting our proposal cause
providers to stop transmitting A-level attestation indicators to
consumer handsets? If so, would that enhance or undermine the goals of
STIR/SHAKEN? What actions, if any, should we take to address any such
outcomes?
13. Minimum Caller Identity Information. Current call branding
solutions generally include caller name and the option for branding,
such as logos. We propose to adopt a minimum requirement for what
caller identity information must be provided; specifically, a verified
name, whether personal or business. We believe that this is the most
reasonable minimum requirement because some callers, such as individual
callers, will not have a brand logo or other information to provide for
a call. We seek comment on this proposal. Is there other information
that would be appropriate to require? If we do not set a minimum
requirement, is there information that we should specify does not meet
the required standard?
14. Are there situations in which we should not require terminating
voice service providers to transmit caller name or other caller
identity information to consumer handsets? For example, what
requirements should apply to callers who have a legitimate need for
privacy, such as domestic violence shelters? What about callers who
simply wish to maintain privacy? For example, what about callers who
place calls using *67 or a handset that has a privacy setting to hide
caller identify information? Does the Truth in Caller ID Act or any
other provision of law require us to ensure that callers may prevent
transmission of identifying information to the called party? We also
seek comment on existing industry practices regarding privacy. For
example, the ATIS RCD standard states that the terminating voice
service provider is not to transmit RCD to the called party's handset
if the caller requested privacy.
15. Handset Capabilities. Consumers can use a variety of handsets
to receive calls, including traditional wireline phones, wireline
phones for IP networks, and mobile phones. Consumers also might use
assistive devices, services, mobile applications, or technologies when
receiving calls. We seek comment on the capabilities of the various
types of handsets to present caller identity information to consumers.
16. Modern mobile phones can present images, such as logos, as well
as text on the screen. In addition, we believe that most modern mobile
phone operating systems currently support the presentation of verified
caller identity information, including verified logos, on their
screens. We seek comment on this belief. Does the ability to present
verified caller identity information on the screen vary depending upon
the manufacturer of the mobile phone or the operating system? If so,
how can we address this issue and ensure that consumers receive this
valuable information? Are there steps we can take to ensure consumers
consistently understand the information presented regardless of the
device and/or operating system they are using? Are there similar
options for IP or traditional wireline service that would allow the
full range of verified caller identity information to be presented? If
not, are most IP or traditional wireline phones capable of, at a
minimum, presenting verified caller name? Would the transition of
traditional wireline service to IP-based networks enhance consumer
access to verified caller identity information?
17. We seek comment on the impact of our proposal on people with
disabilities who use assistive devices and technologies, such as
braille readers, TTYs, and assistive technologies integrated into
handsets. For example, do mobile phones vary depending upon the
manufacturer or operating system in how they present caller
identification information when the consumer uses assistive
technologies built into the phone? How would our proposal affect users
of third-party assistive devices, generally? When text or other graphic
communication is transmitted via assistive devices (e.g., TTY text-
based communications) and is converted into digital audio packets for
transmission over IP networks, will that affect the transmission of
caller identification information associated with the call? If so, how
and what steps should we take to mitigate any loss of caller
information?
18. Telecommunications Relay Services (TRS). We seek comment on how
our proposals affect the use of TRS. When a provider of TRS (of any
type) connects a call from a TRS user to the called party, is the
caller identification information, including the level of attestation,
for the caller transmitted to the called party or is caller
identification information, including the level of attestation, for the
TRS center transmitted to the called party? Why? Does the result depend
upon the capabilities of the TRS provider, the voice service providers
in the call path, or something else? In the context of caller
identification information and caller ID authentication, is connecting
to the TRS provider treated as part of initiating the call or as a
separate segment of the call path following call initiation? Do voice
service providers who perform attestation assign different attestation
levels depending upon whether the originating number or other caller
identification information is for the caller or for the TRS center? If
so, why? How does the likelihood that a called party will answer a call
differ when the caller identification information, including the level
of attestation, is for the TRS center versus for the caller? If caller
identification information for the TRS center, rather than for the
caller, is transmitted to the called party, what steps should we take
to ensure that caller identification information for the caller is
transmitted to the called party? Does connecting to a TRS center affect
the terminating provider's ability to perform authentication functions?
If so, how?
19. We also seek comment on the implications of these proposals for
different types of relay services. For example, when a user of TTY-
based TRS or Speech-to-Speech Relay Service (STS) calls 711 to connect
to the relay service, is the caller identification information,
including attestation level, for the relay center or for the caller?
Why? Does the result depend on the capabilities of the relay center,
the voice service providers in the call path, or something else? Does
the attestation level assigned by a voice service provider differ
depending on whether the caller identification information is for the
relay center or for the caller? Why and how? Providers of Video Relay
Service (VRS) and IP Relay assign their users telephone numbers. Before
connecting a call placed by a VRS or IP Relay user, the TRS provider
must first query the TRS Numbering database to determine whether the
call is point-to-point or requires a communications assistant. Calls
requiring a
[[Page 56105]]
communications assistant are first routed to the TRS center and then to
the terminating provider, perhaps via intermediate providers. How does
the involvement of the TRS center affect transmission of caller
identification information, including attestation level, over the
entire call path? For these different types of relay services, how does
the likelihood that a called party will answer a call differ when the
caller identification information, including level of attestation, is
for the TRS center versus for the caller? Do the differences between
caller identify information and attestation level, if any, when the
caller identification information is for the caller or for the TRS
center affect the likelihood that a called party will answer? How and
how much? Some providers of IP Captioned Telephone Services (IP CTS)
utilize call forwarding capabilities to provide captions and allow IP
CTS users to share their mobile phone number, rather than the telephone
number assigned for purposes of connecting to IP CTS. How do the
characteristics and transmission paths of these calls affect the end-
to-end transmission of caller identification information, including
assignment and transmission of an attestation level? What steps should
we take to ensure the end-to-end transmission of caller identity
information for calls that involve these types of relay services?
20. Are there changes or refinements we should make to our
proposals to ensure that users of assistive devices, services, and
technologies, including TRS, receive all of the benefits associated
with being better able to identify callers? If so, are those changes or
refinements different depending on whether the user of assistive
devices, services, or technologies is making or receiving a call?
2. Requiring Originating Providers To Verify That Transmitted Caller
Identity Information Is Accurate
21. We propose to require originating providers that transmit
caller identity information to employ reasonable measures to verify the
accuracy of the information transmitted. We believe that caller
identity information is valuable to consumers only if it is accurate.
Inaccurate information has the potential to cause significant harm if
it leads a consumer to trust a caller making unlawful calls, and can
further erode trust in the telephone network. We seek comment on this
proposal.
22. What measures should be viewed as ``reasonable''? Should our
codified rules prescribe specific measures or specific standards or
criteria for assessing reasonableness? As part of a verification
requirement, should we mandate collection and verification of specific
information? If so, what specific information should be collected, and
how should it be verified? Should we allow providers flexibility in how
they verify caller identity information or in what information must be
verified? If so, are there minimum standards or guidelines we should
adopt? How can we ensure that all providers are taking necessary steps
to ensure the accuracy of caller identity information? Do we need to
adopt specific requirements when the originating provider is a reseller
or when the caller utilizes a branded calling solution provided by a
third-party vendor? Are there other requirements we could adopt that do
not involve the collection and verification of specific information but
still would ensure that caller identity information is accurate? For
example, should we permit voice service providers contractually to
require customers to provide only accurate information and names,
logos, etc. that they legally are entitled to use? Are there practical,
operational, or business considerations that limit the ability of an
originating provider to verify the accuracy of caller identity
information? Should we define what constitutes ``accurate''
information? If so, how should we define it?
23. If we adopt particular requirements, should we address
differences among types or classes of callers, such as government, non-
profit, business, and individual callers, or differentiate among
callers based on call volume? Would originating providers be able to
accurately determine the type or class of caller in all instances? For
business callers, what steps should an originating provider take to
ensure that business name, company logo, or other information is
accurate? What steps should we take to ensure business callers are
authorized to use a business name, brand name, or logo? Is it necessary
to take different approaches depending on the type or size of the
business? What about franchisees or individual business locations of a
large, perhaps regional or national, business? For individual callers,
should we require verification of the caller name against government
issued identification prior to transmission of the name for this
purpose? Are there alternative approaches to verifying the caller name
for individual callers? If we were to differentiate among callers based
on call volume, what threshold should be used to differentiate, for
example, between high-volume and low-volume callers?
24. Are there situations in which an individual caller might have a
valid reason to transmit something other than a legal name, such as a
nickname? How can we address these situations? How should we handle
multi-line accounts, including family plans, where the caller name for
each individual line might be different from the subscriber's name and
where verification of each name might be more difficult? If names of
individuals on a family plan can be presented on called parties
handsets, should we establish safeguards regarding the transmission and
presentation of the names of minors? For example, should there be a
broad exception for all consumers under the age of 18? Would a generic
label be more appropriate for non-business calls placed by an
individual caller? If so, how would a caller select this option for
their personal calls? How would our proposal affect a person calling a
crisis hotline, such as 988 for suicide prevention or the National
Domestic Violence Hotline?
25. Should other entities share responsibility for ensuring caller
identity information is accurate? For example, if a terminating
provider becomes aware that an originating provider is transmitting
inaccurate information, should it cease delivery of the originating
provider's traffic or take other steps? Are there other enforcement
requirements we should consider to similarly ensure accurate caller
identity information?
26. There appear to be some industry standards and best practices
that could inform our deliberations. For example, the ATIS RCD standard
contains provisions related to the vetting of RCD information, and CTIA
has created best practices for its branded calling solution. We seek
comment on these documents and any other related industry practices,
including their sufficiency, propriety, and enforceability, and on
whether they mitigate the need for us to adopt requirements.
27. Should we consider measures beyond requiring that originating
providers take reasonable steps to ensure caller identity information
is accurate? Citing other sources, Numeracle states that ``93.4% of
robocall traffic from the most prolific robocall signers now carry A-
level attestations'' and ``48 percent of illegal calls are A-
attested.'' Are these numbers accurate and, if so, do they buttress the
view that A-level attestations mislead consumers and that we should
adopt more stringent requirements for verifying caller identity
information? For example, should we consider establishing a ``trusted
framework'' whereby the Commission or another
[[Page 56106]]
entity defines who can assert caller identity is verified and when? If
we were to adopt such an approach, how can we ensure that any such
entity and process are competitively neutral? We believe that
revisiting our know-your-customer requirements will be an important
part of this effort, and we plan to do so in a separate proceeding.
3. Securely Transmitting Caller Identity Information
28. We seek comment on any requirements we should adopt to ensure
that caller identity information is securely transmitted from the
originating provider to the terminating provider, including whether to
require the use of RCD to do so. We believe that if caller identity
information is changed or tampered with in transit, then the
verification efforts of the originating provider will not ultimately
benefit consumers or callers. We seek comment on this belief. Is secure
transmission necessary to ensure that caller identity information is
not altered by bad actors and can be trusted by consumers? Are there
other ways to ensure that the data transmitted is not modified or
tampered with? Are there other legal requirements or benefits to
ensuring the caller identity information is securely transmitted
throughout the entire call path?
29. Rich Call Data. We seek comment on whether to require providers
to use RCD whenever they transmit caller identity information. With
RCD, caller identity information is placed into a PASSporT Identity
token with a digital signature, just as with the originating number
under STIR/SHAKEN. When the provider digitally signs the encrypted
PASSporT(s) carrying both SHAKEN and RCD information, it is asserting
to the truth of the information carried in the PASSport(s), including
the call attestation level, calling number, and any caller identity
information. The terminating provider then decrypts and verifies the
digital signature and electronically validates the information. RCD
thus takes advantage of the end-to-end trust provided under the STIR/
SHAKEN framework. RCD requires the inclusion of a caller name, but
allows for additional information, such as a link to a logo and/or a
website with information about the caller, and a form of virtual
business card referred to as a ``jCard.''
30. We believe that RCD provides a means to securely transmit
caller identity information. Is our belief correct? Are there features
of caller identity information transmission that suggest we should
depart from the RCD standards? If so, how might we address them? Are
there any steps we can take to make the RCD standards more secure?
Alternatively, is the security of RCD generally unnecessary in this
context? If so, why, and how much security is actually necessary?
31. If we were to require use of RCD, should we require the use of
only one or up to all three RCD standards? Why or why not? Should we
require that providers implement the ATIS standard to ensure that
providers comply with vetting requirements? Are there other aspects
unique to the ATIS standard that would justify its adoption? Are there
omissions that would counsel against its adoption or do those omissions
give providers helpful implementation flexibility? We seek comment with
respect to any unique features and additional omissions in the IETF
standards as well and their relevance to whether we should mandate
their adoption. We also seek comment on whether we should specify that
the current version of any RCD standard we require must be used. If we
do specify a standard, how should we balance the evolution of standards
and provide implementation timelines for updated standards looking
forward?
32. We also seek comment on whether the standards are sufficiently
developed and available to require their implementation. We note that
the two recently published IETF standards have been in draft form for
several years, and the first version of the ATIS RCD standard was
adopted in 2021. To what extent have providers and vendors implemented
the earlier versions of these standards, and do the recently-finalized
standards require additional time to implement based on any incremental
changes? Since our understanding is that some providers already use RCD
as part of their branded calling solutions, we believe that the RCD
standards, including the revised standards, can be implemented in a
reasonable amount of time. We seek comment on this belief. We also seek
comment on whether any additional features or functions of the
standards need to be developed to ensure that they achieve their
purpose. If not, what work must be completed prior to implementation?
How can we ensure that this work is completed in a timely manner?
33. We also seek comment on the benefits and drawbacks of RCD
generally. Does RCD provide particular benefits that make it superior
to other caller identity information solutions? Are there any
particular weaknesses we should be aware of? For example, does it
present particular challenges for some providers, such as smaller
providers? If we do not require use of the RCD standards, should we
adopt rules that set minimum requirements based on the RCD standards?
If so, what minimum requirements should we set? Should any minimum
requirements vary by provider type? How would the costs associated with
this option impact its implementation?
34. Alternative Caller Identity Solutions. We seek comment on
options other than RCD for transmitting caller identity information or
basing our minimum requirements on the current versions of the RCD
standards. Our understanding is that there are caller identity
solutions currently in the market, usually referred to as call branding
or branded calling, that allow for transmission of caller identity
information but that do not use the RCD standards or only use them
partially along with other standards or proprietary elements. We seek
comment on these solutions. Do they ensure that caller identity
information is secure and cannot be modified? If so, how? Would that
remain true for alternatives if implemented at a larger scale? Do they
have any particular strengths or weaknesses as compared to RCD? Would
allowing providers to use other solutions enable more providers to
transmit caller identity information to consumers and therefore benefit
more consumers or provide inconsistent service?
35. If we allow providers to use solutions other than RCD or that
do not rely on the RCD standards, how can we ensure that caller
identity information is securely transmitted so that consumers can rely
upon it? Are there specific existing alternative solutions that offer
secure transmission that we should authorize or require providers to
use? If so, which solutions offer appropriate security?
36. If we allow providers to use more than one solution to fulfill
their obligations, we believe that they should be interoperable so that
caller identity information is not lost. How can we ensure that
approved solutions are interoperable? To what extent are current
alternatives interoperable? Are there requirements we could adopt to
ensure that caller identity information is always passed on to the
point of termination regardless of which solution a provider uses?
Should we require intermediate providers to transmit caller identity
information for calls that transit their networks for any IP-based
caller identity solutions providers may use? What should we do if an
intermediate provider is not able to comply with such
[[Page 56107]]
a requirement because of technical limitations?
37. Alternative Options. We seek comment on other approaches we
could take to enable consumers to make more informed choices when their
phones ring. First, we explore the option of requiring providers to
implement RCD in their IP networks for all calls. Second, we seek
comment on requiring caller identity verification as a condition of an
originating provider giving an A-level attestation. Finally, we seek
comment on any other steps we could take to improve the availability
and validity of caller identity information for consumers and restore
trust in the network.
38. Requiring Implementation of RCD. Should we require all voice
service providers to implement RCD in their IP networks for all calls?
What benefits or harms would consumers and providers experience? How
can the Commission balance them? Currently, Commission rules require
voice service providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN in their IP networks,
but there is no corresponding requirement to implement RCD. Would a
requirement for all providers to implement RCD in their IP networks be
appropriate at this time, and if not, when would such a requirement be
appropriate?
39. Should we require providers to implement the existing RCD
standards? Since there are three RCD standards, should we require
implementation of just one, all three, or some combination of two of
the standards? Why? How would requiring implementation of one or two of
the RCD standards affect providers that choose also to implement the
third? If we were to adopt requirements that differ from those
contained in the RCD standards, such as for verification of caller
identity information or regarding the ability of callers to maintain
their privacy by preventing caller identity information from being
transmitted with their calls, how would that affect the choice of which
RCD standard or standards to require? Would our choice of any
particular standard or standards create a significant or different
burden on smaller providers?
40. What measure or measures should we adopt to determine whether a
provider has implemented RCD? Would any potential measure be different
for resellers, originating facilities-based providers, intermediate
providers, or terminating providers? If so, why? For example, would an
intermediate provider properly be considered to have implemented RCD if
it transmits to subsequent providers in the call path the RCD
information it receives from the provider immediately before it in the
call path?
41. If we do adopt an implementation mandate, how quickly can
providers implement RCD throughout their IP networks? Does this answer
depend upon which RCD standard or standards we require providers to
implement? Are there any types of providers, such as smaller or rural
providers, for which RCD implementation would be especially burdensome?
If so, should we adopt a mandate that is more limited in scope with the
intention of expanding it to all providers in the future?
Alternatively, should we adopt an exemption for certain categories of
providers or establish a longer implementation timeframe for those
providers? Is there any standards work left to be done to ensure that
RCD is implementable across all IP networks? Does interoperability
testing need to be completed? If so, how can we ensure that this work
is completed as quickly and efficiently as possible while ensuring that
key steps are not skipped? If standards work or testing still is
needed, are there rules short of a mandate that we could adopt to
expedite this work?
42 Considering that STIR/SHAKEN and RCD work only on IP networks,
we seek comment on any steps we should take, consistent with requiring
RCD, to address the non-IP gap as the Commission continues to drive
towards an all-IP environment. Are there requirements we could adopt
that would address the fact that RCD does not work on non-IP networks?
For example, are there other existing solutions that work on non-IP
networks that we could require? Are these solutions interoperable with
RCD or can they be made interoperable? We previously proposed to
require the implementation of non-IP caller ID authentication
solutions. We received limited comment on the use of RCD and
alternatives on non-IP networks and now seek additional, focused
comment. If we do require any or all of these solutions, are there
rules we could adopt consistent with requiring RCD that would build on
those solutions for caller identity information beyond the originating
number? Are there methods by which RCD could work with non-IP
authentication frameworks, either as currently envisioned or with minor
adjustments? If not, are there equivalent options that would work with
non-IP authentication frameworks? If there are equivalent options, how
can we ensure that they can be used where appropriate? Would allowing
providers the flexibility to use options other than RCD enable or
encourage more providers to transmit verified caller identity
information? Do any non-RCD solutions prevent caller identity
information from reaching the terminating provider when a call transits
from IP to non-IP networks? If so, are there ways we could address that
problem? What is the cost to implement non-RCD solutions on non-IP
networks?
43. Requiring Caller Identity Information Verification as a
Condition of A-Level Attestation. Because we propose in this document
to require originating providers to employ reasonable measures to
verify the accuracy of caller identity information before transmitting
it, we also take the opportunity to ask whether, alternatively, the
Commission should explore making this verification requirement a
condition of A-level attestation. Under current STIR/SHAKEN standards,
an authenticating provider may give an A-level attestation when it has
a direct authenticated relationship with the customer and can identify
the customer, and when it has established that its customer has a
verified association with the telephone number used for the call. The
authenticating provider's customer may be a caller or another provider.
The STIR/SHAKEN standards do not require the provider to verify any
caller identity information the caller provides.
44. We seek comment on whether requiring caller identity
verification as a condition of A-level attestation could yield greater
benefits than our proposal to require originating providers to simply
verify the accuracy of caller identity information. If so, how? Would
such an approach effectively deter A-level attestations for calls that
are spoofed? Should we consider such a requirement in conjunction with
requiring the transmission of verified caller identity information as
we propose above? If so, are there any changes we should make to that
proposal? Could such an approach create greater or different burdens
for originating providers compared to our proposal to require
originating providers to verify the accuracy of caller identity
information prior to transmission? What modifications could help reduce
these burdens and this possibility? Is such an approach aligned with
the overall goal of STIR/SHAKEN, or are there reasons to separate the
caller's identity from an indicator that the number is less likely to
be spoofed? If the latter, what steps could we take to ensure
consistency with the goals of STIR/SHAKEN? Are there other issues we
should consider?
45. We also seek comment on how providers can verify caller
identity information in scenarios where the
[[Page 56108]]
authenticating provider does not have a direct relationship with the
end-user caller. For example, how should the Commission address the
``knowledge gap'' that arises when an authenticating provider's
customer is a reseller rather than the calling party? Would requiring
providers to delegate certificates enable providers who have the
relationship with callers to send verified caller identity information
to authenticating providers. Instead of or in addition to doing so,
should we remove the exemption for providers who lack control of the
network infrastructure necessary to implement STIR/SHAKEN so that the
reseller that has the relationship with the caller has an obligation to
authenticate calls using STIR/SHAKEN? How would eliminating this
exemption work in practice, and would it provide a practical means for
all providers to include verified caller identity information with
their attestations? Are there other ways to allow providers to assign
A-level attestations and include verified caller identity information
in indirect customer scenarios while maintaining the integrity of the
STIR/SHAKEN framework? Are the answers to these questions different in
other scenarios where the authenticating provider does not have a
direct relationship with the end-user caller, such as when a user
obtains a toll-free number from a Responsible Organization or obtains
voice service from a voice service provider that obtains numbering
resources from another voice service provider rather than from the
Numbering Administrator?
46. Additionally, we seek comment on the potential short- and long-
term impacts of conditioning A-level attestations on verification of
end-user caller identity. In the short term, could this effectively
eliminate A-level attestations in many scenarios, thereby reducing the
usefulness of STIR/SHAKEN for analytics and consumer trust? Over the
longer term, what processes, standards, or technical solutions would be
necessary for providers to develop reliable caller identity
verification practices? Should we require their adoption, and what
timelines would be reasonable for development and implementation? To
date, we have not raised the possibility of deviating from the
standards' requirements for providers to sign a call with an A-level
attestation. We seek comment on whether imposing requirements that go
beyond current STIR/SHAKEN standards would conflict with the standards
or pose other challenges. As the Commission continues to evaluate the
effectiveness of the technologies used for call authentication
frameworks, how should we balance the goals of improving caller
identity assurance with the existing functionality of the STIR/SHAKEN
framework?
47. Other Options. Are there other approaches we could take to
ensure that consumers receive accurate and actionable information when
calls are delivered? If so, what might these approaches be? Are any
providers already taking these steps? Should we adopt any of these
proposals in conjunction with one of the options discussed previously,
or do they supplant our other options? How difficult would adopting
these other options be for callers and providers? What benefits would
they provide? Would the approach be implementable across the network or
would some providers be technically unable to do so?
D. Calls Originating From Outside of the United States
48. Identifying Foreign-Originated Calls. We propose to require
providers to identify calls that originate from outside of the United
States to transmit that information over the entire call path, and to
transmit to consumer handsets an indicator that the call originated
from outside of the United States whenever they know or have a
reasonable basis to know that a call originated from outside of the
United States. Specifically, we propose to require gateway providers to
mark calls that originate from outside of the United States,
intermediate providers to transmit that information to downstream
providers, and the terminating voice service provider to transmit to
consumers' handsets an indicator that a call originated outside of the
United States when they know or have reason to know that a call
originated from outside of the United States, such as when a call has
been marked as having originated outside of the United States by an
gateway provider. We seek comment on this proposal. We also seek
comment on what steps gateway providers, non-gateway intermediate
providers, and terminating voice service providers would need to take
to implement this proposal, if adopted. Should we establish a
definition of ``foreign-originated'' for these purposes and, if so,
what should be that definition?
49. We believe that transmitting such information through the
entire call path and the presentation of an associated indication on
the called party's handset would give both providers and consumers
information to protect against scam robocalls originating outside of
the United States. We seek comment on that belief.
50. We seek comment on the ability of gateway providers to
determine the country of origin for a call and for providers across the
call path to include the country of origin in caller identity
information when transmitting a call. For example, are gateway
providers able to identify a call's country of origin? Why or why not?
Can gateway providers include the country of origin when transmitting a
call? How can we ensure the country of origin information is
transmitted securely across the entire call path? For instance, should
we require a gateway provider authenticating foreign originated calls
using STIR/SHAKEN to encrypt information that a call originated
overseas in the PASSporT? Should we require a specific means for
achieving this? Is it possible for providers to insert this information
in the OrigID, and, if so, should we require that providers use a
specific OrigID to indicate a call is foreign originated? Can providers
user a unique OrigID for each country? Would this use of an OrigID
conflict with the STIR/SHAKEN standards or impose any implementation
obstacles?
51. Would we also need to require intermediate providers to pass
the OrigID intact downstream and for the terminating provider to accept
it before transmitting an indication that the call was foreign
originated to the called party? Should we require use of non-IP
solutions to ensure transmission over non-IP networks? Do terminating
providers have a means of transmitting the OrigID or another indicator
that the call originated outside the United States for presentation on
handsets? Does the ability of terminating voice service providers to
transmit to consumer handsets an indicator that a call received an A-
level attestation demonstrate that they could readily transmit an
indicator that a call originated from outside of the United States? Do
handsets typically have a means of presenting an indication that a call
was foreign originated based on any such indicator? What difference
would the handset's manufacturer or operating system make in being able
to present the country of origin when the phone rings compared to being
able to present an indicator that the call originated from outside of
the United States? Should we, and is it technically feasible to,
require gateway providers to label or modify the number sent for
presentation on the called party's handset for foreign-originated
domestic
[[Page 56109]]
calls carrying U.S. NANP numbers as some countries already do?
52. We seek comment on the impact, if any, on the ability of voice
service providers to implement our proposals for calls that originate
from outside of the United States but that legitimately spoof a North
American Numbering Plan (NANP) number, such as when a domestic business
has offshored call center operations and chooses to present a domestic
NANP number as the originating number or for consumers to call back.
Are there any different or unique factors we should consider for calls
that originate outside of the United States but legitimately spoof a
NANP number, especially a domestic NANP number?
53. Similarly, we seek comment on whether we should exempt from our
proposals calls that originate on devices subscribed to United States
mobile and/or VoIP service and that are roaming outside the United
States. For example, United States VoIP consumers may seek to use
nomadic capabilities of their service to place calls using their United
States telephone number while traveling abroad. Do service providers
have the means to distinguish United States mobile and/or VoIP service
roaming calls from other calls that originate outside the United
States?
54. We further propose to require voice service providers that use
reasonable analytics to block calls to include whether a call
originated from outside of the United States as a factor in their
analytics. We seek comment on this proposal. We seek comment on what
steps providers would need to take to include this information in their
analytics and whether this requirement would further protect consumers
against scam robocalls originating outside of the United States. Do
those steps differ depending upon whether providers who use analytics
know only that the call originated from outside of the United States
versus the specific country from which a call originated? Can current
or potential Artificial Intelligence capabilities play a role in these
analytics or in verifying caller identity information?
55. Are there countries from which a greater volume of scam or
otherwise potentially unlawful calls originate or countries that
otherwise pose a greater risk to consumers? If so, which countries and
why? What volume of scam or otherwise potentially unlawful calls
originates from each country? How does that compare to the total volume
of calls that originate from each country? Based on annual data, what
is the total number of calls that originate from outside of the United
States? Of those calls, what percentage are scam calls, spam calls, use
an autodialer, and/or use an artificial or prerecorded voice? For each
of these types or categories of calls, what methodology was used to
identify and categorize the calls?
56. How should foreign-origin indicators appear on consumer devices
without confusing consumers? What, if anything, are providers already
doing to protect consumers from scams or otherwise potentially unlawful
calls that originate from outside of the United States or from specific
countries? What challenges do providers face when dealing with
detecting, blocking, or labeling such calls? Are there other actions
that the Commission could take to address these calls?
57. Using Phone Number Requirements to Identify Foreign-Originated
Calls. We seek comment on whether we should establish numbering
requirements that would help enable consumers to identify foreign-
originated calls. For instance, should we designate a specific area
code for foreign-originated calls? What challenges would arise from
moving existing foreign users of United States NANP numbers to a newly-
designated area code? Would designating an area code for foreign-
originated calls provide a clear and useful signal to terminating end-
users that the call originated from outside of the United States and
not from the domestic marketplace? How should numbering resources in
such area codes be assigned? Are any special considerations necessary
for routing calls to and from such numbers? How should calls among such
numbers and other United States NANP numbers be categorized for
intercarrier compensation purposes (e.g., should all such calls be
treated as interstate interexchange calls)? Are there any technical or
administrative barriers to doing so?
58. If we establish a designated area code for foreign-originated
calls, we seek comment on whether we should require that gateway
providers block any foreign-originated calls carrying United States
NANP numbers for presentation on the called party's handset that are
not from that area code. We believe that marketplace developments and
the continued evolution of similar rules in other countries may provide
real-world evidence of the effectiveness and administrability of such a
requirement in the United States. For example, in 2024, the UK's Ofcom
released revised guidance stating that calls from outside of the UK
carrying a UK ``presentation'' number (i.e., the number to be presented
to the called party) will be blocked except where the call is made by a
UK customer who has the right to use the number. Under OfCom's
guidance, the gateway provider is responsible for compliance with the
guidance. OfCom also notes that one way foreign-originating providers
can demonstrate to UK gateway providers that a call is being made by a
UK customer is by providing the gateway provider with evidence of
direct or indirect number assignment. We seek comment on OfCom's
approach and any similar approaches adopted in other countries to block
foreign-originated calls that terminate within the domestic
marketplace. Should exceptions to blocking be made for certain traffic,
such as mobile roaming traffic, that carries different presentation
numbers? Should we instead require gateway providers to use heightened
due diligence or mitigation techniques on calls from area codes other
than the one designated for foreign-originated calls?
59. Identifying the Source of Unlawful Foreign-Originated Calls. We
seek comment on how to better identify the source of unlawful calls
that originate from outside of the United States. In this context, the
source of an unlawful call includes the country from which the call
originated, the originating voice service provider, and the maker of
the call.
60. To what extent can providers, including United States gateway
providers and foreign intermediate providers, identify the originating
caller or provider of a foreign-originated call? Does existing routing
technology, which is often designed to reduce costs and avoid
congestion, prevent providers from identifying the source of a call?
Could traceback efforts be streamlined if calls originating from
outside of the United States involved fewer voice service providers in
the call path before the call reaches the United States? How can the
number of voice service providers in the call path outside of the
United States be reduced? What factors contribute to how many voice
service providers are in the call path outside of the United States?
What can we do to mitigate or eliminate those factors? Are there
international agreements or memoranda of understanding that might
provide mechanisms for reducing the number of voice service providers
in the call path before a call reaches the United States or that we
should otherwise be mindful of as we consider our proposals?
61. What other tools could we use to help identify the sources of
foreign-originated calls? For instance, could we implement a chain of
agreements requirement whereby gateway providers
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accept traffic only from foreign providers that agree to cooperate with
traceback requests and that, in turn, only accept calls from providers
that agree to the same conditions? How many providers upstream of the
gateway provider could such a requirement effectively reach? Similarly,
how can we promote implementation of STIR/SHAKEN or other interoperable
call authentication solutions in other countries and to achieve cross-
border authentication? Could we require gateway providers to accept
only calls with United States NANP number that have been authenticated?
Would this enable United States providers to identify the source of
calls? We also seek comment on potential collaboration with foreign
governments to identify the sources of calls or more broadly mitigate
unlawful foreign-originated calls.
62. Do the answers to the questions posed above differ depending on
whether the goal is to identify the country of origin, the originating
voice service provider, or the maker of the call? If so, how? How can
the process of identifying the source of a call that originates from
outside of the United States be automated or made a part of
transmitting a call? Is there a way or a basis to treat calls
differently depending on whether the origin of the call is known or on
the specific origin of the call? For example, should a factor in call
analytics be that a call originated from a country, voice service
provider, or maker known to be a source of unlawful calls or should
calls be blocked from entering the United States if the origin of the
call is not known?
63. Spoofing of United States Numbers for Foreign-Originated Calls.
We seek comment on whether we should continue to permit callers to
spoof NANP United States telephone numbers for calls that originate
from outside of the United States for calls that are made by or made on
behalf of a person, usually a business, that is authorized to use the
spoofed number. Callers sometimes spoof the originating number for a
call for legitimate reasons. For example, a business might have its
main contact number or a toll-free number sent for presentation on call
recipients' handsets. Or a doctor placing a call to a patient from a
personal phone might prefer to have the patient's handset present the
number of the medical office. As long as the caller spoofs a number
that it is authorized to use, this type of spoofing is permitted.
64. Should we prohibit spoofing of United States telephone numbers
on calls that originate from outside of the United States? Does the
practice mislead consumers about a call's origin? Does it make
consumers more susceptible to unlawful calls involving spoofing, such
as by increasing their trust in calls that originate from outside of
the United States? How many calls that originate from outside of the
United States spoof a United States telephone number? Of those, how
many are unlawfully spoofed? Do calls that originate from outside of
the United States and spoof a United States number carry a greater risk
of being unlawful, such as being a scam, than calls that originate from
within the United States and spoof a United States number? What is the
magnitude of that risk?
65. Are there other factors that we should consider? If we were to
prohibit spoofing of United States numbers for calls that originate
from outside of the United States, what, if any, changes would be
required to existing technical standards, such as STIR/SHAKEN or RCD?
How would such a prohibition impact businesses that have offshored
certain operations, including call centers? Would this prohibition
encourage businesses to invest in the United States or return jobs to
the United States? What effect, if any, would this prohibition have on
calls that originate from other countries that are part of the NANP?
And if we adopt our proposal to require voice service providers to
transmit to handsets an indicator that a call originated from outside
of the United States, would that indicator be sufficient to alert the
called party when the call appears to originate from a United States
number?
66. Should spoofing or other use of NANP United States numbers for
calls originating from outside of the United States be addressed in
memoranda of understanding or other collaborative efforts among the
United States and other countries? If so, what should the content of
such memoranda be? Should calls be treated differently depending on
whether the country of origin has entered into a memorandum of
understanding or other agreement with the United States? If so, how?
E. Legal Authority
67. We seek comment on our authority to adopt these proposals and
on our authority regarding other actions on which we seek comment
above, including under the Truth in Caller ID Act, the TRACED Act, and
section 251(e) of the Communications Act. We also seek comment on any
other bases of authority for our proposals and other actions on which
we seek comment.
68. The Truth in Caller ID Act defines caller identification
information as including both the originating telephone number and
``other information regarding the origination of the call.'' It also
prohibits any person from ``caus[ing] any caller identification service
to knowingly transmit misleading or inaccurate caller identification
information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully
obtain anything of value'' and directs the Commission to prescribe
implementing regulations. We believe that requiring originating
providers to verify caller identity information--a subset of caller
identification information--will reduce opportunities for bad actors to
manipulate caller identification information. We seek comment on this
reasoning and on whether our proposed rules and other actions on which
we seek comment are consistent with the Truth in Caller ID Act. If our
proposals or other actions do not align with the Truth in Caller ID
Act's scienter and intent elements, are there ways our proposals and
other actions can be structured to come into alignment?
69. We believe that the TRACED Act provides additional authority
for our proposals and other actions on which we seek comment. In it,
Congress directed the Commission to require implementation of the STIR/
SHAKEN framework in IP networks and granted us the authority to
``revise or replace'' call authentication frameworks after assessing
the efficacy of such frameworks following notice and an opportunity to
comment. Although the TRACED Act requires us to conduct formal
triennial assessments and submit a report to Congress, we believe the
statute provides authority to conduct ongoing assessments and take
responsive action in the interim, so long as we provide notice and
opportunity to comment. We can use comments in this proceeding as part
of a future assessment to evaluate STIR/SHAKEN's effectiveness and need
for revision. The TRACED Act also grants us authority over non-IP
networks, including to require robocall mitigation programs. We also
believe that we have authority under the TRACED Act to promulgate rules
governing when providers may block calls based on call authentication
information. We seek comment on our belief that these provisions
provide authority for our proposals and other actions on which we seek
comment. We also seek comment on our authority under section 4(d) of
the TRACED Act, which provides that ''[n]othing in this section shall
preclude the Commission from initiating a rule making pursuant to its
existing statutory authority.'' We believe that this provision confirms
that
[[Page 56111]]
the TRACED Act, despite its specificity, does not limit the
Commission's ability to exercise its broader statutory authorities,
including those discussed herein, to address the same matters as the
TRACED Act, provided that our exercise of broader authorities cannot
conflict with Congress' directives in the TRACED Act. We seek comment
on this belief.
70. We also seek comment on whether our exclusive jurisdiction over
the United States portion of the North American Numbering Plan pursuant
to section 251(e) provides authority for our proposals and other
actions on which we seek comment. The Commission previously has found
that section 251(e) provides ample authority to take actions to
``prevent the fraudulent abuse of NANP resources'' and that unlawfully
spoofed originating telephone numbers are an abuse of those resources.
We believe that our proposals and other actions here similarly are
aimed at preventing abuse of NANP resources. We also believe that it is
within our authority more generally to prohibit actions resulting in
the presentation of NANP numbers in a manner that misleads consumers or
aids in making scam and other unlawful calls more believable. We
further believe that our authority extends to requiring providers to
take actions that prevent the authentication and presentation of NANP
numbers in combination with caller identity information from being
misleading. We note that the Commission long has invoked these
statutory provisions to adopt rules regarding caller identification
obligations. We seek comment on these beliefs and on whether section
227(e) provides authority to adopt rules aimed at averting misleading
caller identification information even if the statutory scienter and
intent requirements of the Truth in Caller ID Act are not met.
F. Costs and Benefits
71. This document proposes to require terminating providers to
transmit to consumer handsets verified caller identity information
whenever they transmit an indicator that a call has received an A-level
attestation and similarly to transmit an indicator that a call
originated from outside of the United States when they know or have a
reasonable basis to know that a call originated from outside of the
United States. In addition, this document proposes to require
originating providers that transmit caller identity information to
employ reasonable measures to verify that that the information is
accurate and for gateway providers to mark calls that originate from
outside of the United States. This document further proposes to require
intermediate providers across the entire call path to transmit
information that a call originated from outside of the United States.
This document also seeks comment on requirements to ensure that caller
identity information is securely transmitted over the entire call path,
including whether to require providers to use RCD to securely transmit
this information, and on prohibiting spoofing of United States
telephone numbers on calls that originate from outside of the United
States, including where the caller is authorized to use the spoofed
number. Further, this document seeks comment on the impact of our
proposals on people with disabilities who use assistive devices,
services, and technologies, and on providers of TRS and other services.
72. We seek comment on the costs and benefits of these proposals.
By giving consumers better and verified information about the identity
of those who call them, we believe that our proposals would help
consumers avoid scam, fraudulent, and otherwise unlawful calls. These
proposals also are expected to help businesses reach more consumers
over the phone for legitimate purposes. Because these proposed
requirements apply only when a terminating provider chooses to transmit
to consumer handsets an indicator that a call received an A-level
attestation or when an originating provider chooses to transmit caller
identity information, we expect the benefits to extend gradually to
consumers and businesses as more providers choose to transmit verified
caller identity information. We expect that providers will transmit
verified caller identity information when the benefits of doing so
outweigh the associated costs and seek comment on the costs to
implement the proposals discussed above. We note that our proposals
rely upon the already-implemented STIR/SHAKEN framework and upon the
existing RCD standards, which builds upon the STIR/SHAKEN framework to
enable secure transmission of additional data. Thus, the ingredients
that underlie our proposals already exist. We recognize, however, that
verifying information to ensure its accuracy and that ensuring
interoperability might necessitate some additional costs. We seek
comment on our views, including cost estimates from providers over the
entire length of the call path and from providers of TRS and other
assistive devices, services, and technologies. Will smaller providers
face unique challenges implementing our proposals?
73. This document also seeks comment on the alternative approach of
requiring implementation of RCD in IP networks. We seek comment on the
costs and benefits of requiring implementation of RCD in IP networks.
We note that the particular RCD standard or standards that providers
would be required to implement have not yet been determined. Therefore,
we seek comment on the costs and benefits of all possible standards for
implementation. The document also seeks comment on requiring caller
identity information verification as a condition of A-level
attestation. We seek comment on the costs and benefits of this
approach. We further seek comment on the costs and benefits, including
the potential for job creation and investment in the United States, of
prohibiting spoofing of domestic United States numbers for calls that
originate from outside of the United States, including when the caller
is authorized to use the spoofed number.
II. Eliminating Outdated Rules
74. We seek comment on whether some of our calling-related rules
can be simplified, streamlined, or eliminated, perhaps because they are
outdated or have not been enforced for a substantial amount of time.
A. Telephone Consumer Protection Act Rules and Do-Not-Call
Implementation Act Rules
1. Older Rules That Might No Longer Be Necessary
75. Call Abandonment Rules. We seek comment on whether to eliminate
our rules prohibiting callers from disconnecting an unanswered
telemarketing call prior to at least 15 seconds or four rings, and from
abandoning more than three percent of all telemarketing calls. The
Commission adopted these rules in response to the Do-Not-Call
Implementation Act (DNC Act), which, among other things, required the
Commission to ``maximize consistency'' between its rules and a portion
of the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC's) Telemarketing Sales Rule
(TSR). The FTC's current TSR contains comparable provisions to these
two Commission rules.
76. The Commission adopted the rules in 2003 to ensure consumers do
not answer calls only to get silence, or to be hung up on, largely as a
result of the predictive dialers callers used at the time. Today's
predictive dialers appear to leverage advances in technology, including
Artificial Intelligence, to drive
[[Page 56112]]
efficiencies. Their evolution, along with marketers' incentives to
avoid negative consumer impressions via dead air and abandoned calls,
may mean our rules are no longer necessary.
77. We seek comment on whether the calling practices these rules
target are no longer a significant source of consumer frustration. Have
changes since 2003 rendered the rules unnecessary? Would eliminating
the rules relieve callers of the burden of tracking their calls to
comply, and to be prepared in the event the Commission were to ask
about them? Would consumers be harmed by elimination of these rules?
Does the DNC Act require us to retain these rules and does the
Commission's differing jurisdiction from the FTC favor retaining or
deleting these rules? Are there any other factors affecting whether
these rules may or should be deleted? For example, would application of
the FTC's corresponding rules to only those callers over which the FTC
has jurisdiction result in potential confusion among callers and
consumers regarding the applicable standard for call abandonment?
78. Artificial and Pre-Recorded Voice Caller Identification Rules.
We propose to amend and streamline the rule requiring a caller making
artificial or pre-recorded voice calls to include a telephone number
other than a 900 number or any other number for which charges exceed
local or long distance transmission charges. This rule should be
updated to reflect changes in the telecommunications marketplace that
could result in a consumer making a return call and incurring charges
that exceed typical ``local or long distance'' charges. For
telemarketing and certain other calls to consumers' residential
numbers, the number provided must be able to accept DNC requests during
regular business hours. We propose to modernize this rule to require
only that such callers identify themselves with their telephone number
to enable called consumers to know who is calling. We seek comment on
this proposal. Does this change better reflect the modern
telecommunications marketplace where, for example, ``local or long
distance charges'' are far less common? To the extent consumers use
these numbers to contact callers, how would our proposal benefit or
harm them? Some parties state that the current rule aids robocall
enforcement by facilitating the identification of illegal calls. Would
our proposed approach, or other alternatives, similarly advance those
enforcement interests?
2. More Recent Rules That Might Harm Consumers
79. Consent Revocation Rules. We seek comment on ways we can modify
the requirement that a caller must treat an opt-out request made in
response to one type of call to be an opt-out request for all types of
calls or to modify it to give consumers greater control over their
right to stop unwanted calls. The Consumer and Governmental Affairs
Bureau delayed until April 11, 2026 implementation of this rule ``to
the extent that it requires callers to treat a request to revoke
consent made by a called party in response to one type of message as
applicable to all future robocalls and robotexts from that caller on
unrelated matters.''
80. Does the rule unduly restrict consumers' ability to receive
wanted calls? For example, does it unduly restrict consumers' ability
to receive calls from healthcare providers that might have multiple
locations or practice specialties or from pharmacies? What about banks
or other financial institutions where consumers might have different
types of accounts or other businesses that have multiple locations,
operating units, or lines of business? How does this affect consumers
who both are customers of a business and are employees, job applicants,
or contractors of that same business? Does this requirement place an
undue burden on callers to modify their communications systems or is an
all-or-nothing requirement less burdensome to implement? Would
requiring consumers to revoke consent separately for each business
unit, location, practitioner, or other sub-division of a caller create
an undue burden under this rule modification? How can we modify the
rule so that consumers continue to receive calls they want and in so
doing ensure that callers honor consent revocation for those they do
not, including empowering consumers to specify the scope of their
revocations?
81. We also propose to amend Sec. 64.1200(a)(10). For example,
commenters in the Delete Proceeding asked us to permit callers to
designate the exclusive means by which consumers may revoke prior
express consent rather than requiring callers to honor all revocation
requests made using ``reasonable means.'' We seek comment on this
proposal. At the same time, we seek comment on whether there are less
restrictive ways for consumers to revoke consent that nevertheless
avoid the potential ambiguity of the current reasonable-means standard.
82. Are there any methods of revoking consent that should be
required, even if other methods are permitted? Are there any that
should be prohibited? What standards, if any, should we establish to
ensure that revocation methods clearly are disclosed to consumers? Is
there a significant risk that callers will demand revocations to be
made by unduly complex, difficult, or cumbersome methods that could
prevent or deter consumers from revoking consent effectively? Is there
a significant risk that consumers would be less likely to give prior
express consent? Would amending the rule as suggested provide more
certainty to callers and consumers by making the rule less vague? Would
it improve efficiency for callers or consumers?
83. Fraud Alert Call Rules. We seek comment on whether to eliminate
the rule limiting financial institutions to calling only the number
provided by the consumer when making a fraud alert or similar call
pursuant to a TCPA exception to the general consent requirement. The
Commission did not explain why it imposed the limitation, but we
believe it was likely to ensure that financial institutions would not
call or alert the wrong consumers. We now believe that allowing an
exception for fraud alert and similar calls only when a financial
institution calls the number provided by the consumer might unduly
restrict critical calls about the consumer's financial accounts. We
believe that financial institutions have incentives to ensure they are
calling only their customer. We seek comment on this view.
84. Are there significant concerns about misdirected calls or about
financial information being improperly disclosed if we were to broaden
the exception for fraud alert and similar calls to cover calls to
numbers other than those provided by consumers? Does the ability of
financial institutions to obtain prior express consent for such calls,
and thus to make calls outside the exception, resolve these concerns?
Are there applicable federal or state laws or best practices with which
we should align our proposal to alleviate any such concerns? Would it
improve the ability of financial institutions to reach consumers and
reduce consumers' exposure to fraud? How does the risk of misdirected
calls weigh against the benefits of allowing financial institutions to
better reach consumers? Are there other factors we should consider?
3. Call Blocking Rules
85. Call Blocking Rules. We propose to eliminate the rules
permitting voice
[[Page 56113]]
service providers to block calls that are on a do-not-originate list or
that purport to be from a NANP number that is invalid, unallocated, or
unused. Because the Commission has adopted rules that require voice
service providers to do what these rules merely permit, we believe that
these provisions will become outdated when the new rules become
effective. We seek comment on this proposal.
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
86. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as
amended (RFA), the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) has
prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the
policies and rules proposed in the Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (FNPRM) assessing the possible significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities. The Commission requests
written public comments on this IRFA. Comments must be identified as
responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments
specified on the first page of the FNPRM. The Commission will send a
copy of the FNPRM including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for the SBA
Office of Advocacy. In addition, the FNPRM and IRFA (or summaries
thereof) will be published in the Federal Register.
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules
87. The Commission initiates this proceeding to enhance consumer
protection against potentially unlawful and fraudulent robocalls. While
the existing STIR/SHAKEN call authentication framework indicates
whether a caller is authorized to use a particular number, it does not
identify who is calling, meaning consumers often cannot determine the
caller's identity unless the number is in their contact list or they
otherwise recognize it. Additionally, consumers may not understand this
limitation, mistakenly believing that A-level attestation provides
assurance that a call is lawful rather than a scam or otherwise
unlawful.
88. To address these issues, this document proposes the following:
(1) When a voice service provider provides caller identification
service and includes in the caller identification information for a
call an indication that the call has received A-level attestation, the
voice service provider must include a verified caller name in the
caller identification information; (2) a voice service provider that
transmits caller identity information for an originating telephone call
must employ reasonable measures to verify that the caller identify
information is accurate; and (3) voice service providers that are the
entry point into the United States for calls that originate from
outside of the United States and know or have a reasonable basis to
know that a call originated from a country other than the United States
must include in the caller identification information for that call an
indication that the call originated from a country other than the
United States. These measures are intended to restore consumer
confidence in caller ID information and reduce the burden on consumers
of screening unlawful or potentially unlawful calls.
89. We also propose to modernize anti-robocall protections by
eliminating outdated requirements that have been superseded by
technological advances and calling practices and to enhance regulatory
certainty by dismissing older pending petitions and applications
related to TCPA implementation.
B. Legal Basis
90. The proposed action is authorized pursuant to sections 1-4,
201(b), 202(a), 227, 227b, and 251(e)of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, and 47 U.S.C. 151-154, 201, 202, 227, 227b, and 251(e).
C. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which
the Proposed Rules Will Apply
91. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be
affected by the proposed rules, if adopted. The RFA generally defines
the term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms
``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business
Act (SBA). A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) is
independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of
operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the
SBA. The SBA establishes small business size standards that agencies
are required to use when promulgating regulations relating to small
businesses; agencies may establish alternative size standards for use
in such programs, but must consult and obtain approval from SBA before
doing so.
92. Our actions, over time, may affect small entities that are not
easily categorized at present. We therefore describe three broad groups
of small entities that could be directly affected by our actions. In
general, a small business is an independent business having fewer than
500 employees. These types of small businesses represent 99.9% of all
businesses in the United States, which translates to 34.75 million
businesses. Next, ``small organizations'' are not-for-profit
enterprises that are independently owned and operated and not dominant
their field. While we do not have data regarding the number of non-
profits that meet that criteria, over 99 percent of nonprofits have
fewer than 500 employees. Finally, ``small governmental jurisdictions''
are defined as cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school
districts, or special districts with populations of less than fifty
thousand. Based on the 2022 U.S. Census of Governments data, we
estimate that at least 48,724 out of 90,835 local government
jurisdictions have a population of less than 50,000.
93. The rules proposed in this document will apply to small
entities in the industries identified in the chart below by their six-
digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes and
corresponding SBA size standard. Based on currently available U.S.
Census data regarding the estimated number of small firms in each
identified industry, we conclude that the proposed rules will impact a
substantial number of small entities. Where available, we also provide
additional information regarding the number of potentially affected
entities in the above identified industries.
Table 1--Census Bureau Data by NAICS Code Table
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Small
Regulated industry (NAICS NAICS SBA size standard Total Small firms in
classification) code firms firms industry
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Telephone Apparatus Manufacturing...... 334210 1,250 employees.......... 189 177 93.65
Wired Telecommunications Carriers...... 517111 1,500 employees.......... 3,054 2,964 97.05
Wireless Telecommunications Carriers 517112 1,500 employees.......... 2,893 2,837 98.06
(except Satellite).
[[Page 56114]]
Telecommunications Resellers........... 517121 1,500 employees.......... 1,386 1,375 99.21
Satellite Telecommunications........... 517410 $47 million.............. 275 242 88.00
All Other Telecommunications........... 517810 $40 million.............. 1,079 1,039 96.29
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2--Telecommunications Service Provider Data
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2024 Universal service monitoring report telecommunications SBA size standard (1,500 employees)
service provider data (data as of December 2023) -----------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------- Total # FCC
Form 499A Small firms % Small
Affected entity filers entities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs)..................... 3,729 3,576 95.90
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs).............. 1,175 917 78.04
Interexchange Carriers (IXCs)................................... 113 95 84.07
Local Exchange Carriers (LECs).................................. 4,904 4,493 91.62
Toll Resellers.................................................. 411 398 96.84
Wired Telecommunications Carriers............................... 4,682 4,276 91.33
Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite)......... 585 498 85.13
Wireless Telephony.............................................. 326 247 75.77
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Description of Economic Impact and Projected Reporting,
Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements for Small Entities
94. The RFA directs agencies to describe the economic impact of
proposed rules on small entities, as well as projected reporting,
recordkeeping and other compliance requirements, including an estimate
of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the
requirements and the type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record.
95. The NPRM seeks comment on proposals that may establish new
information collection, reporting, recordkeeping, or compliance
requirements for small entities. Specifically, it proposes to require
terminating voice service providers that indicate a call has received
A-level attestation to also provide verified caller identity
information for such calls. This could require affected small entities
to implement systems and processes to provide verified caller names or
other caller identity information when they choose to provide A-level
attestation indicators to consumers.
96. This document also proposes to require originating voice
service providers that transmit caller identity information to take
steps to verify that the information is accurate. This may require
affected small entities to establish verification procedures, maintain
records of verification activities, and implement systems to ensure
caller identity information transmitted with calls is accurate before
transmission.
97. This document also proposes that voice service providers that
are the entry point into the United States for calls that originate
from outside of the United States and know or have a reasonable basis
to know that a call originated from a country other than the United
States must include in the caller identification information for that
call an indication that the call originated from a country other than
the United States. To comply with this requirement, affected small
entities may need to establish procedures indicating when a call
originated from a country other than the United States.
98. The Commission also proposes to modernize anti-robocall
protections by eliminating outdated requirements that have been
superseded by technological advances and calling practices and to
enhance regulatory certainty by dismissing older pending petitions and
applications related to TCPA implementation. If adopted, this may
reduce the recordkeeping and compliance burden on small entities.
99. The Commission invites comment on the costs and burdens of
these proposals on small entity voice service providers, telemarketing
bureaus, equipment manufacturers, and other affected small entities.
The Commission expects that information received in comments, including
cost and benefit analyses where requested, will help the Commission
identify and evaluate relevant compliance matters for small entities
that may result if the proposals and associated requirements discussed
in the document are ultimately adopted.
E. Discussion of Significant Alternatives Considered That Minimize the
Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities
100. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of any
significant alternatives to the proposed rules that would accomplish
the stated objectives of applicable statutes, and minimize any
significant economic impact on small entities. The discussion is
required to include alternatives such as: ``(1) the establishment of
differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take
into account the resources available to small entities; (2) the
clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance and
reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3) the
use of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption
from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small
entities.''
101. In the NPRM, the Commission seeks comment on several
approaches that may minimize impacts on small entities. First, the
Commission proposes that the caller identity information requirements
would apply only when a terminating provider chooses to transmit for
presentation on consumers' handsets an indication of A-level
attestation, rather than mandating that all providers provide such
indicators. This approach allows small entities flexibility in deciding
whether to provide attestation indicators and thus
[[Page 56115]]
whether to be subject to the associated caller identity requirements.
102. Second, the Commission seeks comment on alternative technical
solutions beyond Rich Call Data (RCD) for securely transmitting caller
identity information. This approach would provide small entities with
flexibility to choose cost-effective solutions that work with their
existing network infrastructure rather than mandating a single
technical standard that might be burdensome for smaller providers.
103. Third, the Commission seeks comment on whether certain
categories of calls or providers should be exempted from caller
identity verification requirements, which could reduce compliance
burdens on small entities that primarily handle such calls.
104. Additionally, the Commission proposes to eliminate several
outdated robocall requirements that may represent unnecessary burdens
on small entities, including call abandonment rules that technology and
calling practices have overtaken.
105. The Commission expects to more fully consider the economic
impact and alternatives for small entities following review of comments
filed in response to the NPRM and this IRFA. The Commission's
evaluation of this information will shape the final alternatives it
considers, the final conclusions it reaches, and any final actions it
ultimately takes in this proceeding to minimize any significant
economic impact that may occur on small entities.
F. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Proposed Rules
106. None.
List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 64
Carrier equipment, Customer premises equipment, Communications
common carriers, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Telecommunications, Telephone.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
Proposed Rules
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal
Communications Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR part 64 as follows:
PART 64--MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS
0
1. The authority citation for part 64 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154, 201, 202, 217, 218, 220,
222, 225, 226, 227, 227b, 228, 251(a), 251(e), 254(k), 255, 262,
276, 403(b)(2)(B), (c), 616, 620, 716, 1401-1473, unless otherwise
noted; Pub. L. 115-141, Div. P, sec. 503, 132 Stat. 348, 1091; Pub.
L. 117-338, 136 Stat. 6156.
Subpart L--Restrictions on Telemarketing, Telephone Solicitation,
and Facsimile Advertising
0
2. Amend Sec. 64.1200 by
0
a. Removing and reserving paragraphs (a)(6) and (7), (a)(9)(iii)(A),
(a)(10);
0
b. Revising the first sentence of paragraph (b)(2);
0
c. Removing and reserving paragraphs (k)(1), (k)(2)(i) through (iii);
and
0
d. Revising paragraph (k)(3)(ii).
The revisions read as follows:
Sec. 64.1200 Delivery restrictions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(2) During or after the message, state clearly the telephone number
(other than that of the autodialer or prerecorded message player that
placed the call) of such business, other entity, or individual; and * *
*
* * * * *
(k) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) Those analytics include consideration of caller identification
authentication information and information that a call originated from
outside of the United States, where such information is available;
* * * * *
Subpart P--Calling Party Telephone Number; Privacy
0
3. Amend Sec. 64.1600 by adding paragraphs (s) and (t) to read as
follows:
Sec. 64.1600 Definitions.
* * * * *
(s) The term ``caller identity information'' has the same meaning
given the term ``caller identification information'' in 47 CFR
64.1600(c) as it currently exists or may hereafter be amended, but
excludes the information contained in 47 CFR 64.1600(g)(1)-(2) and (5).
* * * * *
0
4. Add Sec. 64.1607 to subpart P to read as follows:
Sec. 64.1607 Verification, Transmission, and Presentation of Caller
Identity Information.
(a) When a voice service provider includes in caller identification
information transmitted to a called party an indication that the call
has received an A-level attestation pursuant to the Caller
Identification Authentication requirements contained in subpart HH of
this part, the voice service provider must include verified caller name
in the caller identification information transmitted to the called
party.
(b) A voice service provider that transmits caller identity
information for an originating telephone call must employ reasonable
measures to verify that the caller identity name is accurate.
(c) Gateway providers must include in the caller identification
information for a call that originates outside the United States an
indication that the call originated from outside of the United States.
(d) Non-gateway intermediate providers within a call path must pass
unaltered to subsequent providers in the call path caller
identification information identifying the call as having originated
from outside of the United States.
(e) When a voice service provider is the terminating voice service
provider for a call and knows or has a reasonable basis to know that a
call originated from outside of the United States, such as when the
caller identification information it receives for that call includes an
indication that the call originated from outside of the United States,
the voice service provider must include in the caller identification
information transmitted to the called party for that call an indication
that the call originated from outside of the United States.
[FR Doc. 2025-22063 Filed 12-4-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
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This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.