Notice2025-21885
Latania Akers-White, M.D.; Decision and Order
Primary source
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Published
December 4, 2025
Issuing agencies
Justice DepartmentDrug Enforcement Administration
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 231 (Thursday, December 4, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 231 (Thursday, December 4, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 55923-55925]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-21885]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Latania Akers-White, M.D.; Decision and Order
On March 18, 2025, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Latania Akers-White,
M.D., of Richmond, Virginia
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(Registrant). Request for Final Agency Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX),
at 1, 4. The OSC proposed the revocation of Registrant's Certificate of
Registration, No. FA2343630, alleging that Registrant's registration
should be revoked because Registrant is ``currently without authority
to prescribe, administer, dispense, or otherwise handle controlled
substances in the Commonwealth of Virginia, the state in which [she is]
registered with DEA.'' Id. at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).\1\
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\1\ According to the OSC and Agency records, Registrant's
registration expired on June 30, 2025. Id. at 1. The fact that a
registrant allows her registration to expire during the pendency of
an administrative enforcement proceeding does not impact the
Agency's jurisdiction or prerogative under the Controlled Substances
Act (CSA) to adjudicate the OSC to finality. Jeffrey D. Olsen, M.D.,
84 FR 68474, 68476-79 (2019).
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The OSC notified Registrant of her right to file a written request
for hearing, and that if she failed to file such a request, she would
be deemed to have waived her right to a hearing and be in default. Id.
(citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not request a hearing,
and the Agency finds her to be in default. RFAA, at 3.\2\ ``A default,
unless excused, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the
registrant's/applicant's right to a hearing and an admission of the
factual allegations of the [OSC].'' 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
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\2\ Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated May
8, 2025, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on Registrant was
adequate. The included declaration from a DEA Diversion Investigator
(DI) indicates that on March 24, 2025, the DI and other DEA
employees attempted to personally serve Registrant a copy of the OSC
at her last known address, but no one answered the door. RFAAX 2, at
1. The DI then called Registrant, informed her about the OSC, and
verified her mailing address. Id. at 2. On March 25, 2025, the DI
mailed a copy of the OSC to Registrant's registered address through
USPS. Id.; see also Id. at 3. The DI was able to confirm through the
USPS tracking number that the OSC was delivered to Registrant on
March 27, 2025, as the last update states, ``delivered, left with
individual.'' Id.; see also Id., at Attachment A.
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Further, ``[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be
in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action
with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In
such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order
pursuant to [21 CFR] 1316.67.'' Id. at 1301.43(f)(1). Here, the
Government has requested final agency action based on Registrant's
default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c), (f), and 1301.46. RFAA, at 4;
see also 21 CFR 1316.67.
Findings of Fact
The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the
factual allegations in the OSC are deemed admitted. According to the
OSC, on or about July 11, 2024, the Virginia Department of Health
Professions suspended Registrant's Virginia medical license. RFAAX 1,
at 2. According to Virginia online records, of which the Agency takes
official notice,\3\ Registrant's Virginia medical license is currently
``Suspended.'' Virginia Department of Health Professions License
Lookup, <a href="https://dhp.virginiainteractive.org/Lookup/Index">https://dhp.virginiainteractive.org/Lookup/Index</a> (last visited
date of signature of this Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds that
Registrant is not licensed to practice medicine in Virginia, the state
in which she is registered with DEA.\4\
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\3\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ``may take
official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--even in the
final decision.'' United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979).
\4\ Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ``[w]hen an agency decision
rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the
evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to
an opportunity to show the contrary.'' The material fact here is
that Registrant, as of the date of this Order, is not licensed to
practice medicine in Virginia. Accordingly, Registrant may dispute
the Agency's finding by filing a properly supported motion for
reconsideration of findings of fact within fifteen calendar days of
the date of this Order. Any such motion and response shall be filed
and served by email to the other party and to the Office of the
Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, at
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6a0e0f0b440b0e0e05440b1e1e0518040f13192a0e0f0b440d051c"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="a6c2c3c788c7c2c2c988c7d2d2c9d4c8c3dfd5e6c2c3c788c1c9d0">[email protected]</span></a>.
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Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 ``upon a
finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license or
registration suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State
authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . .
. dispensing of controlled substances.'' With respect to a
practitioner, DEA has also long held that the possession of authority
to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which
a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental
condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner's registration.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (``The Attorney General
can register a physician to dispense controlled substances `if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under
the laws of the State in which he practices.' . . . The very definition
of a `practitioner' eligible to prescribe includes physicians
`licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or
the jurisdiction in which he practices' to dispense controlled
substances. Sec. 802(21).''). The Agency has applied these principles
consistently. See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71371, 71372
(2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 F. App'x 826 (4th Cir. 2012);
Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR 27616, 27617 (1978).\5\
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\5\ This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA). First, Congress defined the term
``practitioner'' to mean ``a physician . . . or other person
licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by . . . the
jurisdiction in which he practices . . . , to distribute, dispense,
. . . [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of
professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration, Congress
directed that ``[t]he Attorney General shall register practitioners
. . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.'' 21
U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress has clearly mandated that a
practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a
practitioner under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation
of a practitioner's registration is the appropriate sanction
whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the state in which he practices. See,
e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR at 71371-72; Sheran Arden Yeates,
M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR
51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11919, 11920 (1988);
Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR at 27617.
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According to Virginia statute, ``dispense'' means ``to deliver a
drug to an ultimate user or research subject by or pursuant to the
lawful order of a practitioner, including the prescribing and
administering, packaging, labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare
the substance for that delivery.'' Va. Code Sec. 54.1-3401 (2025).
Additionally, Virginia statute defines ``practitioner'' as ``a
physician . . . or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise
permitted to distribute, dispense, prescribe and administer, or conduct
research with respect to a controlled substance in the course of
professional practice or research in [Virginia].'' Id.
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant
lacks authority to practice medicine in Virginia. As discussed above, a
physician must be a licensed practitioner to dispense a controlled
substance in Virginia. Thus, because Registrant lacks authority to
practice medicine in Virginia and, therefore, is not authorized to
handle controlled substances in Virginia, Registrant is not eligible to
maintain a DEA registration. Accordingly, the Agency will order that
Registrant's DEA registration be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No.
FA2343630 issued to Latania Akers-White, M.D. Further, pursuant to 28
CFR 0.100(b) and the
[[Page 55925]]
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby deny any
pending applications of Latania Akers-White, M.D., to renew or modify
this registration, as well as any other pending application of Latania
Akers-White, M.D., for additional registration in Virginia. This Order
is effective January 5, 2026.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
November 24, 2025, by Administrator Terrance C. Cole. That document
with the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document
of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect
of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2025-21885 Filed 12-3-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
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