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Proposed Rule2025-21324

Advancing IP Interconnection

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Published

November 26, 2025

Issuing agencies

Federal Communications Commission

Abstract

In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that proposes to eliminate burdensome legacy interconnection regulations that may prevent providers of modern, internet Protocol (IP)-based networks from interconnecting efficiently, and also seeks comment on ways the Commission can facilitate a successful transition to all-IP interconnection for voice services while retaining critical oversight in areas of public safety and consumer protection, and ensuring competition. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposes to forbear from incumbent local exchange carrier (LEC)-specific interconnection and related obligations, and to eliminate the Commission's rules implementing those provisions by December 31, 2028. The Commission also seeks comment on whether and to what extent eliminating the incumbent LEC-specific interconnection regulatory framework may affect other statutory frameworks or Commission rules, and whether the Commission should revisit any other provisions or rules that are rendered redundant by the elimination of incumbent LECs' interconnection obligations. Finally, the Commission seeks comment on what, if any, regulatory framework for IP interconnection should replace the current interconnection framework under section 251(c)(2), and on the scope of the Commission's authority to regulate IP interconnection under any such framework.

Full Text

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 226 (Wednesday, November 26, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 226 (Wednesday, November 26, 2025)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 54266-54281]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-21324]

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 51

[WC Docket Nos. 25-304, 25-208, 17-97; FCC 25-73; FR ID 319327]

Advancing IP Interconnection

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission) adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that proposes to
eliminate burdensome legacy interconnection regulations that may
prevent providers of modern, internet Protocol (IP)-based networks from
interconnecting efficiently, and also seeks comment on ways the
Commission can facilitate a successful transition to all-IP
interconnection for voice services while retaining critical oversight
in areas of public safety and consumer protection, and ensuring
competition. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposes to forbear from
incumbent local exchange carrier (LEC)-specific interconnection and
related obligations, and to eliminate the Commission's rules
implementing those provisions by December 31, 2028. The Commission also
seeks comment on whether and to what extent eliminating

[[Page 54267]]

the incumbent LEC-specific interconnection regulatory framework may
affect other statutory frameworks or Commission rules, and whether the
Commission should revisit any other provisions or rules that are
rendered redundant by the elimination of incumbent LECs'
interconnection obligations. Finally, the Commission seeks comment on
what, if any, regulatory framework for IP interconnection should
replace the current interconnection framework under section 251(c)(2),
and on the scope of the Commission's authority to regulate IP
interconnection under any such framework.

DATES: Comments are due on or before December 26, 2025; reply comments
are due on or before January 26, 2026. Written comments on the
Paperwork Reduction Act proposed information collection requirements
must be submitted by the public, Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
and other interested parties on or before January 26, 2026.

ADDRESSES: Pursuant to Sec. Sec. 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's
rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and
reply comments. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic
Comment Filing System (ECFS). You may submit comments, identified by WC
Docket Nos. 25-304, 25-208, and 17-97, by the following methods:
<bullet> Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically
using the internet by accessing the ECFS: <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs">https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs</a>.
<bullet> Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and one copy of each filing.
<bullet> Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by
commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be
addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
<bullet> Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for
the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.
by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with
rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of
before entering the building.
<bullet> Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the
U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701. Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class
Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L
Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
<bullet> People with Disabilities. To request materials in
accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print,
electronic files, audio format), send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#5b3d38386e6b6f1b3d3838753c342d">[email&#160;protected]</a> or
call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.

In addition to filing comments with the Secretary, a copy of any
comments on the Paperwork Reduction Act proposed information collection
requirements contained herein should be submitted to the Federal
Communications Commission via email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#1d4d4f5c5d7b7e7e337a726b">[email&#160;protected]</a> and to Nicole
Ongele, FCC, via email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#cf81a6aca0a3aae180a1a8aaa3aa8fa9acace1a8a0b9">[email&#160;protected]</a>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information about this
proceeding, please contact Jesse Goodwin, Competition Policy Division,
Wireline Competition Bureau, at (202) 418-0958, or
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#1476717a7e75797d7a3a737b7b70637d7a547277773a737b62">[email&#160;protected]</a>, or Erik Beith, Competition Policy Division,
Wireline Competition Bureau, at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f693849f9dd894939f829eb6909595d8919980">[email&#160;protected]</a>, or (202) 418-0756.
For additional information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act
proposed information collection requirements contained in this
document, send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#3b6b697a7b5d5858155c544d">[email&#160;protected]</a> or contact Nicole Ongele at
(202) 418-2991.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in WC Docket Nos. 25-304, 25-208, 17-97;
FCC 25-73, adopted on October 28, 2025, and released on October 29,
2025. The full text of this document is available for public inspection
at the following internet address: <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-73A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-73A1.pdf</a>.
Paperwork Reduction Act: This document may contain proposed new or
revised information collection requirements. The Commission, as part of
its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general
public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on the
information collection requirements contained in this document, as
required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. In
addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002,
Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment
on how we might further reduce the information collection burden for
small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.
Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act: Consistent with
the Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act, a summary of the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is available at <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings">https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings</a>. To request materials in accessible formats for
people with disabilities (e.g. Braille, large print, electronic files,
audio format), send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ddbbbebee8ede99dbbbebef3bab2ab">[email&#160;protected]</a> or call the Consumer &
Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530.
Ex Parte Rules: The proceeding this document initiates shall be
treated as a ``permit-but-disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the
Commission's ex parte rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must
file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any
oral presentation within two business days after the presentation
(unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period
applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that
memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons
attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex
parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and
arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted
in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already
reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other
filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such
data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other
filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where
such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the
memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must
be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by
rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of
electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda
summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto,
must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available
for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g.,
.doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding
should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980,
as amended (RFA), requires that an agency prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis for notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings,
unless the agency certifies that ``the rule will not, if promulgated,
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.'' Accordingly, the Commission has

[[Page 54268]]

prepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) concerning
potential rule and policy changes contained in this NPRM. The IRFA is
set forth below. The Commission invites the general public, in
particular small businesses, to comment on the IRFA. Comments must be
filed by the deadlines for comments on the NPRM indicated on the first
page of this document and must have a separate and distinct heading
designating them as responses to the IRFA.

Synopsis

I. Discussion

A. Current State of Interconnection

1. Current Arrangements for TDM Interconnection for Voice Services
We seek comment on the (time-division multiplexing) TDM-based
interconnection arrangements that remain in place today for all types
of providers. What types of carriers continue to require or employ TDM-
based interconnection--for example, large incumbent LECs, small or
rural incumbent LECs, competitive LECs, or access tandem operators--and
for what services? To what extent are IP-based providers today required
to interconnect with incumbent LECs in TDM, even when traffic
originates and/or terminates in IP? Are calls still aggregated at TDM
access tandems or central offices for routing and transit? Are tandems
necessary for routing, or are they an artifact of existing routing
arrangements that rely on databases such as the Local Exchange Routing
Guide (LERG)? How do carriers exchange TDM traffic today, and do any
alternate (non-tandem) interconnection arrangements exist? We ask
commenters to describe the typical TDM network topology in use (e.g.,
local switches, tandems, SS7 signaling points, 911 selective routers),
including any legacy functions that depend on TDM interconnection and
the classes of providers and categories of service recipients that rely
on those arrangements.
1. How do interconnection arrangements between LECs for local
traffic differ from arrangements between incumbent LECs and
interexchange carriers for long-distance traffic? How do
interconnection agreements between other types of providers work, and
how do they differ from those governed by section 251(c)? For example,
how do competitive LECs interconnect with other competitive LECs? How
do competitive LECs interconnect with mobile carriers? How do
competitive LECs interconnect with rural telephone companies? How do
mobile carriers interconnect with each other or with rural telephone
companies? How do interexchange carriers interconnect with mobile
carriers or rural telephone companies? Are there subgroups of carriers
that should be examined differently? For example, are there some
competitive LECs that function as interconnection points, similar to
the tandems of incumbent LECs, and are their interconnection
arrangements different from competitive LECs that serve a local market?
Recognizing that incumbent LEC switched access lines encompass only
3.1% of the voice telephony market, we seek further comment how often
interconnection arrangements are actually facilitating the origination
or termination of traffic on the legacy public switched telephone
network and how often section 251(c)(2) interconnection arrangements
are leveraged for the transit of calls to other networks.
We also seek comment on where TDM interconnection actually occurs.
Currently, under section 251(c)(2)(B), an incumbent LEC must allow a
requesting telecommunications carrier to interconnect at any
technically feasible point. The Commission has interpreted this
provision to mean that competitive LECs have the discretion to
interconnect at multiple points or just at a single point of
interconnection (POI) in a given local access and transport area
(LATA). We seek comment on where these TDM POIs are located within the
network, and how are they geographically distributed. How many TDM POIs
are still in use, and how concentrated are these POIs among networks?
Do different categories of providers tend to use different types of
POIs? For instance, do large incumbent LECs primarily interconnect at
their tandems, while smaller competitive and rural LECs rely on third-
party tandem hubs or other arrangements? We invite commenters to detail
how many POIs exist in a given region and how they are used. For
example, how many TDM tandems are active, how many end offices
interconnect directly, and to what extent are carrier hotels and other
centralized POIs used? Finally, are most, if not all, TDM POIs resident
in facilities that do not have SIP POIs? And if so, does this place a
burden for providers in transitioning to an all-IP SIP interconnection
point with one or more providers?
What are the operational or financial impacts of TDM
interconnection arrangements on competitive carriers, particularly
rural and small LECs, and those that have already transitioned to all-
IP networks? We note concerns that ending incumbent LECs' section
251(c)(2) interconnection obligations could shift new cost among
carriers. We therefore seek comment regarding current TDM
interconnection practices of small and rural carriers. Do rural
telephone companies currently avail themselves of section 251(c)(2)?
What interconnection costs do these providers face under existing
rules? Are there potential system-wide efficiencies and cost savings
from an all-IP network? Are any small and rural carriers now required
to interconnect at an IP POI, and if so, under what cost arrangements?
What interconnection arrangements do carriers subject to the rural
exemption under section 251(f)(1) or (f)(2) have for TDM or IP voice
services? Given that such carriers, despite being incumbent LECs, are
largely exempt from section 251(c)(2), how do those arrangements with
competitive LECs differ from other such interconnection arrangements?
We also seek comment on the architecture of hybrid connections
between IP networks and legacy TDM networks, and on the effect of such
network arrangements on interconnection agreements. In a typical
scenario, an IP-originated call is handed off to a TDM network, or vice
versa, requiring media and signaling gateways at the IP-TDM boundary to
handle protocol conversions. How often are calls that originate or
terminate on the PSTN converted to VoIP for transport and
interconnection, and vice versa? Where in the network is the IP-to-TDM
or TDM-to-IP conversion occurring? Which providers deploy VoIP-to-TDM
and TDM-to-VoIP gateways when calls are exchanged between networks,
which providers are responsible for the protocol conversions, and where
are these gateways located? What carriers own and operate those
gateways, including emergency services gateways that connect to
selective routers, and signaling links? How is traffic routed through
the TDM portion (e.g., via which tandem switches or trunks), and who
bears the costs of these conversions and transport? Do certain
incumbent LECs offer interconnection in both TDM and IP, and if so, at
what frequency?
We seek comment on the volume of voice traffic still transiting
legacy TDM networks. We ask commenters to quantify the remaining TDM
usage that providers carry or expect to carry in the near term. For
example, what percentage of calls or trunks in providers' networks
remain on TDM switches? What service categories (e.g., legacy telephone
lines, business T-1/PRI, alarm and elevator lines, 911 services) are
still provisioned via TDM,

[[Page 54269]]

and why have they not yet transitioned to modern alternatives? (``T-1''
refers to a physical transmission line standard in North America for
digital voice and data services. ``PRI,'' or ``Primary Rate
Interface,'' refers to a high capacity digital voice and data service
delivered over a T-1 line.) To what extent do carriers still offer
stand-alone local exchange and/or long-distance service? How relevant
is the distinction between local exchange and long-distance service to
today's consumers? How often do voice service customers choose a long-
distance carrier that is unaffiliated with their local exchange
carrier? We ask that commenters provide any data or studies on TDM
traffic volumes by category, if possible.
We seek comment on the technical, financial, and regulatory factors
that account for the persistence of TDM architectures in our nation's
networks. Are there statutory or public safety-related mandates that
have effectively required maintaining circuit-switched networks? To
what extent do state-level regulatory requirements compel certain
carriers to maintain legacy TDM infrastructure or continue offering
TDM-based service? To what extent do the costs associated with
upgrading networks to IP account for providers' continued reliance on
TDM interconnection arrangements? To what extent do certain providers
operate IP networks for their own services but rely on TDM solely for
interconnection? We seek comment on the contexts and services for which
carriers, utilities, and government agencies assert TDM must be
maintained alongside IP to prevent disruption to critical services.
Despite significant industry progress in transitioning to all-IP
networks, some observers have previously noted that certain critical
services still depended on existing TDM infrastructure to function, and
that complex issues related to these services must be addressed before
the IP transition can be completed. For example, the Department of
Transportation has emphasized that the Federal Aviation
Administration's Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) network ``is
heavily dependent on obsolete 1960s TDM technology across over 30,000
services at 4,600 sites.'' To what extent do infrastructure or
emergency services currently continue to rely on TDM circuits for
critical applications like aviation communications, railway operations,
industrial process control, infrastructure monitoring, rural call
completion, public safety radio backhaul, or selective routing for
legacy 911 networks? Are there other known over-the-top services, such
as medical monitors, security alarms, or point of sale terminals, that
still use and/or require TDM facilities? Are there commercially
available alternatives that could be used, should TDM interconnection
become unavailable? We ask that commenters provide detailed examples of
such TDM-reliant services, as well as traffic volume estimates, to the
extent possible. Are there technical, financial, security, or other
practical reasons to maintain certain technologies, in an all-IP world?
What specific portion(s) of the network must be TDM to accommodate TDM-
reliant services?
2. Current Arrangements for IP Interconnection for Voice Services
We seek comment on current carrier practices and arrangements for
IP-to-IP interconnection for voice services. Today's IP-based voice
networks often use managed IP cores and session border controllers
(SBCs) to carry VoIP calls end-to-end. When an IP-initiated call must
transit a TDM network, the VoIP call is handed off via a media gateway
to TDM at the network edge. We seek comment on the current network
architecture underlying IP interconnection for interconnected VoIP
services--how has it evolved since the Commission first took action to
promote IP-to-IP interconnection for voice services? In referring to
``interconnected VoIP service,'' we include those services elsewhere
deemed ``IP-enabled voice service.'' For example, do carriers exchange
traffic via Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) trunks, public internet
gateways, or private IP networks? How often do carriers use IP-to-IP
peering to interconnect directly in IP versus indirectly via IP
``tandems'' or intermediate providers? How are commercial arrangements
for direct IP voice interconnection structured? Do carriers need to
individually negotiate each direct connection agreement? What are the
costs associated with interconnecting directly over IP compared to
exchanging voice traffic over existing internet connections? What
protocols and quality-of-service (QoS) mechanisms ensure voice quality?
Some stakeholders have previously noted that voice traffic can be
routed and exchanged over the public internet--is the ``best efforts''
QoS model sufficient to preserve existing voice quality? What
mechanisms, protocols, or redundancies are available or in place to
prevent voice service disruption when there are network outages or
unusual strain on a network's capacity, such as during a natural
disaster? How does call routing work when voice traffic is exchanged
over the public internet? How are IP addresses and routing handled at
IP POIs? Is the Domain Name Service (DNS) used within or between
providers in support of SIP? Or, are IP addresses manually set for
static routes between points set by a provider? Are there concerns
about hijacking of IP address prefixes used for border gateway protocol
(BGP) routing? We seek comment on any QoS, latency, or interoperability
issues that have arisen in current IP voice interconnection. Are there
technical barriers to IP interconnection that the Commission should
address and what types of providers are impacted? Commenters should
describe in detail the network layers and equipment used in VoIP
interconnection today.
We also seek comment on how interconnection practices vary by size,
type of provider, and network technology. For example, are small or
rural incumbent LECs offering direct IP interconnection at the same
frequency as larger incumbent LECs? What percentage of rural carriers
have deployed IP facilities and services in their networks, and are
they currently providing, or capable of providing, VoIP services? Have
competitive LECs and cable operators generally adopted IP-to-IP
interconnection, and if so, what models do they use? How do wireless
carriers interconnect for Voice over LTE (VoLTE) traffic, and do they
require special gateways? Do VoIP providers interconnect directly, or
do they rely on their carrier partners? Do large incumbent LECs and
rural incumbent LECs also currently offer IP interconnection? What
types of providers currently have direct IP interconnection agreements,
and how do these agreements account for different network architectures
and regulatory status? For cases involving intermediaries, such as
third-party IP tandems or transit providers, what role do these
intermediaries play, and how widely are such services used?
We also seek comment on the types and number of IP interconnection
agreements for interconnected VoIP service that exist today, and how
parties to those agreements treat technical and financial issues. For
example, in past proceedings, some parties have noted that carriers
historically have relied primarily on the LERG and local number
portability database (Number Portability Administration Center--NPAC)
to route calls, but these databases cannot identify SIP endpoints.
Additionally, other parties have previously noted that the preference
to route calls to the VoIP provider's competitive LEC partner via PSTN

[[Page 54270]]

trunks, rather than to the VoIP provider directly, has hampered the
implementation of VoIP interconnection. Are these issues still relevant
in the context of current IP interconnection arrangements, and if so,
how have parties responded to these challenges? How do providers
allocate the cost burdens of exchanging IP traffic? How do
interconnection arrangements accommodate features like number
portability, caller ID authentication, and emergency calling (911)? Are
there regulatory burdens or other transaction costs that have stymied
the growth of such arrangements in the voice market? We recognize that
IP interconnection implicates certain regulatory issues stemming
directly from the legacy TDM framework, including intercarrier
compensation, access charges, and universal service. While this item is
focused on the technological and regulatory frameworks for
interconnection the Commission will address other issues as appropriate
in separate items. Are carriers negotiating new IP interconnection
contracts, or modifying existing TDM agreements? How do state
requirements regarding TDM interconnection affect the negotiation and
implementation of IP interconnection agreements? Are there other
factors affecting negotiations that the Commission has not considered?
What lessons can be drawn from providers or states that have made
substantial progress toward IP-only infrastructure?
In a legacy TDM world, carriers tend to interconnect at many local
central offices and tandems. By contrast, IP networks can span larger
regions and aggregate traffic at fewer POIs, such as carrier hotels and
internet exchanges. We seek comment on where interconnection for
interconnected VoIP traffic is happening today and between which types
of carriers. One industry report notes that national carriers have
negotiated traffic exchange at a small number of POIs, such as carrier
hotels, rather than on a per-LATA basis. Is this the current trend, and
if so, why? How do parties negotiate the POIs? Do the location and use
of POIs vary with the size and type of provider or modality (e.g.,
wireline or wireless)? At how many physical POIs do VoIP providers
currently exchange traffic with other voice providers and where are
these POIs located? Are IP voice POIs co-located with TDM POIs, or are
they separate? Are there regional interconnection hubs or multiple
local interconnects per area? To what extent are carriers exchanging
traffic over the public internet, and where are the POIs located in
such arrangements? We ask that comments provide data or estimates on
the number and location of current IP POIs.
We also seek comment, specifically, on the effect of recent
Commission efforts to facilitate the NG911 transition on current IP
interconnection arrangements and the role of TDM architecture during
the NG911 transition. In the 2024 NG911 Order, the Commission adopted
rules requiring originating service providers (OSPs) to take steps to
transition from legacy analog 911 technology to the IP-based NG911
system. Pursuant thereto, OSPs, upon a ``valid request'' for delivery
of 911 traffic in IP-based format by a 911 Authority, must follow a
two-phase process for transitioning to NG911. In jurisdictions that
have submitted valid requests under the Commission's NG911 transition
framework, would NG911 Delivery Points for the delivery of 911 traffic
in an IP format to ESInet or other NG911 network facilities play a role
in facilitating the IP transition? Has the ongoing transition to NG911
impacted providers' existing interconnection arrangements, and if so,
how? How do IP interconnection agreements for interconnected VoIP
account for providers' obligations to implement NG911? To what extent
does deployment of NG911 promote IP interconnection arrangements? Do
any providers rely on existing TDM interconnection to prevent
disruption to emergency communications pending completion of the NG911
transition, and what alternative arrangements can be used in these
situations? Commenters should address the interplay between any
continuing TDM needs for jurisdictions that have not begun or completed
the transition to NG911 and interconnection agreements. In what other
ways has the NG911 transition affected IP interconnection arrangements
for voice service? Commenters should explain in detail the interplay
between the NG911 transition and the current state of IP
interconnection for interconnected VoIP.

B. Eliminating Interconnection Obligations Under Section 251(c)(2)

1. Effects of Burdensome Interconnection Obligations on the Transition
to an All-IP Network
We invite comment on the costs to incumbent LECs of complying with
sections 251(c)(2) and (c)(6) of the Act and our rules implementing
those provisions, sections 51.305, 51.321, and 51.323, and their impact
on the IP transition. We observe that the additional interconnection
obligations imposed under section 251(c) of the Act can create heavy
burdens for incumbent LECs. These costs can in turn divert resources
away from investments in high-speed communications infrastructure,
slowing the transition to all-IP networks. Consequently, we seek
comment on these observations and on whether forbearance from these
additional requirements will speed the move away from TDM-based
technologies.
What kinds of expenses--capital, operating, or otherwise--do the
additional interconnection mandates found in section 251(c) of the Act
impose? On whom, and to what extent? Does the asymmetry in regulatory
duties between competing carriers and incumbent LECs encourage
investments in outmoded TDM technologies? For example, Digital Progress
Institute contends that section 251(c)'s requirements necessitate that
incumbent LECs design and maintain outdated TDM facilities, facilities
in which they claim competing carriers invest further to gain a
regulatory advantage. At the same time, CCA argues that smaller
carriers' dependency on incumbent LECs to route their calls stymies IP
network investments because smaller carriers must ``subtend[]
[incumbent LECs'] non-IP tandem facilities.'' We seek comment on what
burdens carriers, particularly small and rural carriers, face as a
result of section 251(c)'s requirements. For example, what costs must
carriers bear in converting IP voice traffic to TDM? From TDM to IP?
What costs must competing carriers bear in having to interconnect in
TDM? How should the Commission evaluate competing costs among different
categories of providers? Do these costs for carriers impede the IP
transition? How would carriers otherwise allocate resources associated
with section 251(c)'s additional interconnection obligations for
incumbent LECs? To the extent that resources would be otherwise
allocated towards speeding up a carrier's IP transition, how much more
quickly could a move to all-IP networks occur? Do these requirements
inhibit certain types of commercial agreements that could benefit
consumers? Would a determination that interconnection for the exchange
of VoIP traffic is not subject to the requirements of section 251(c)
facilitate the negotiation of VoIP interconnection agreements? Finally,
what kinds of state and local laws and regulations exist for
interconnection, and what kinds of costs do they impose?

[[Page 54271]]

2. Forbearance From Incumbent LECs' Additional Interconnection and
Related Obligations
We propose to forbear, as of the adopted sunset date, from section
251(c)(2) of the Act, forbear from section 251(c)(6) of the Act to the
extent it requires incumbent LECs to provide for physical collocation
of interconnection equipment, and eliminate our rules implementing
those statutory provisions (47 CFR 51.305 (interconnection); 47 CFR
51.321 (methods for obtaining interconnection and access to unbundled
elements); 47 CFR 51.323 (standards for physical collocation and
virtual collocation)). Below, we seek comment on whether the
forbearance criteria outlined in section 10 of the Act have been met.
Additionally, we seek comment on the extent to which we should forbear
from section 251(c) of the Act, how the Commission should potentially
modify its rules, and what steps could be taken to mitigate any
potential harm to critical infrastructure services and consumers that
may result from forbearance.
Section 10 of the Act requires the Commission to forbear from
applying any requirement of the Act or of our regulations to a
telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service, or class of
telecommunications carriers or telecommunications services, if the
Commission determines that: (1) enforcement of the requirement ``is not
necessary to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or
regulations by, for, or in connection with that telecommunications
carrier or telecommunications service are just and reasonable and are
not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory''; (2) enforcement of that
requirement ``is not necessary for the protection of consumers''; and
(3) ``forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is
consistent with the public interest.'' Satisfaction of all three
criteria mandates forbearance. With respect to the third prong, the
Commission must consider ``whether forbearance from enforcing the
provision or regulation will promote competitive market conditions.''
Ensuring practices are just and reasonable (section 10(a)(1)). Were
we to forbear from section 251(c)(2) and section 251(c)(6) (to the
extent it requires incumbent LECs to provide for physical collocation
of interconnection equipment) and eliminate the Commission's
implementing rules, incumbent LECs would no longer be subject to
additional interconnection requirements not imposed on other kinds of
carriers. We believe that these requirements are no longer necessary to
ensure that interconnection practices for voice services are just and
reasonable and not unreasonably discriminatory. We believe changes in
the marketplace since the passage of the 1996 Act's monopoly-ending
provisions have reduced competing providers' reliance on incumbent LECs
in provisioning service to their customers. In the span of a little
over 20 years, reliance on legacy networks has dropped precipitously:
the number of reported end-user switched access lines declined from 181
million to just 18 million, far fewer than the 64.5 million
interconnected VoIP subscriptions or 288.3 million mobile subscriptions
reported in June 2024. Consequently, we seek comment on whether
incumbent LECs continue to have the ability or the incentive to engage
in the kinds of harmful practices typically associated with a monopoly
power with respect to retail voice service, and whether it is still
necessary to differentiate incumbent LECs from other carriers with
regard to interconnection. We also seek comment on whether
interconnection needs could be met pursuant to sections 201 and 251(a).
To what extent, if any, are these additional requirements for
incumbent LECs still necessary to ensure providers' practices remain
just and reasonable? Assuming carriers cannot avoid interconnecting
with incumbent LECs, would incumbent LECs have incentive to take
advantage of that? Do incumbent LECs still exert sufficient control
over the marketplace to do so? How does the balance of negotiating
power differ among the providers today and would that negotiating power
change depending on whether the proposals herein are adopted? Absent
Commission regulations, would disputes arise between incumbent LECs and
competing carriers that could lead to access issues, such as for
terminating access or selective router access for 911? Do the
Commission's 911 service rules affect LECs' pricing power over
facilities used to route 911 calls? How does the Act's collocation
requirement ensure just and reasonable practices, if at all? How does
the transition of providers' networks to IP affect the necessity of the
Act's collocation mandate? Are there any cost savings for incumbent LEC
from not having to collocate equipment?
Ensuring protection of consumers (section 10(a)(2)). We seek
comment on whether enforcement of these statutes and regulations is
necessary for the continued protection of consumers. We believe that
the Act's additional interconnection requirements for incumbent LECs
are no longer necessary for consumers' protection given the explosive
growth in competition from competitive carriers and interconnected VoIP
service providers. We believe that such competition renders the kinds
of consumer protections afforded by sections 251(c)(2) and (c)(6)
unnecessary. We seek comment on this belief. With incumbent LECs' need
to compete on more even grounds as a result of their eroded market
dominance, we do not anticipate rate increases by incumbent LECs or
that other costs would otherwise be absorbed by consumers. Do
commenters agree? Does forbearance risk stranding consumers, as alleged
by NCTA? Would forbearance expose consumers to disruptions,
discontinuation of voice service, or otherwise affect carriers' ability
to provide service? Are there concerns specific to customers of small
and rural carriers? What role does our collocation requirement play, if
any, in continuing to protect consumers?
Consistent with the public interest (section 10(a)(3)). We believe
that forbearance from the Act's additional interconnection requirements
for incumbent LECs would be consistent with the public interest, in
part by improving market competition and ultimately encouraging the
transition to modernized networks and services. As outlined above, we
seek comment whether burdening incumbent LECs alone with direct
interconnection obligations for retail voice service continues to make
sense given their lack of dominance in the market. Rather, we seek
comment on whether incumbent LECs no longer possess especial leverage
in negotiating with competitive LECs or in competing for customers, and
whether competitive carriers' stronger market position today enables
them to negotiate agreements to interconnect and collocate their
equipment in the absence of rules requiring as much. We also seek
comment on whether the Act's current requirements distort the market
unnecessarily by shifting costs almost entirely to incumbent LECs
rather than allowing the parties to negotiate their distribution. By
forbearing, we would seek to remedy this distortion and in turn improve
market competition. Do commenters agree with our assessment? Is this
analysis of the market correct? Do competitive carriers today face
challenges in interconnecting with incumbent LECs, particularly in IP?
Should we consider whether large incumbents can leverage other services
to exact market concessions from smaller providers? Do incumbent LECs
ever refuse outright to interconnect in IP or otherwise resist
interconnecting

[[Page 54272]]

outside of TDM? If so, to what extent is this the result of incumbent
LECs' additional interconnection obligations under 251(c)? Would
forbearance encourage interconnection in IP? What incentives exist for
incumbent LECs to interconnect with competitive LECs and other
competing providers in TDM versus IP?
We also believe that forbearing from the Act's additional
interconnection requirements for incumbent LECs would free up resources
for use in development and deployment of next-generation networks,
promoting the public interest and counseling in favor of forbearance.
Do commenters agree? Do we need to forbear from any section to support
the transition to IP? Would forbearance assist in ending the digital
divide, whether through hastening the IP transition or otherwise? What
other benefits might inure to the public as a result of forbearance?
Would forbearance need to be tailored in any way to accommodate the
particular needs of small or rural carriers, and if so, how? What harms
to the public interest do commenters anticipate, if any, and are they
outweighed by the benefits resulting from increased competition, more
efficient networks, and availability of additional resources for next-
generation high-speed networks?
Extent of forbearance. We further seek comment on whether the
Commission should forbear from section 251(c)(2) entirely or whether we
should only partially forbear to the extent that section 251(c)(2)
imposes obligations on incumbent LECs interconnecting in TDM,
specifically. That is, to the extent that section 251(c)(2) could be
read to authorize the FCC to newly impose additional requirements on
incumbent LECs when they interconnect with other carriers for the
exchange of IP voice traffic, we seek comment on whether the Commission
should preserve that possibility by tailoring the scope of its
forbearance. As outlined above, we seek comment whether incumbent LECs
hold a specially advantaged position in the market relative to their
competitors in the exchange of IP-based traffic. Is our analysis of the
competitiveness of the market correct? How do we account for the
continued existence of bottlenecks in voice markets? How does any of
the foregoing forbearance analysis differ if we were to only partially
forbear from section 251(c)(2)? Are there other reasons the Commission
should maintain the possibility of additional obligations for incumbent
LECs in the IP context? Do carriers rely on our rules implementing
section 251(c)(2) when they interconnect for the exchange of VoIP
traffic? Absent section 251(c)(2), what would happen to interconnection
arrangements reliant thereon? If the Commission were to only partially
forbear, how should the Commission approach making any changes to our
implementing rules?
Commission rules. We seek comment on how the Commission should
address its implementing rules in light of the proposed forbearance.
Could the Commission delete Sec. Sec. 51.305, 51.321, and 51.323
outright? Are there reasons to maintain those rules, whether in whole
or in part? If the Commission partially forbore from sections 251(c)(2)
and (6) of the Act, and did not eliminate its rules implementing those
sections, would any changes need to be made? Would other sections of
the Commission's rules require reevaluation or amendment in light of
their deletion or modification?
Interruptions to 911 service. We also seek comment whether
forbearing from the interconnection and collocation requirements in
section 251(c)(2) and (6) create any risk of interruptions to 911
service. As we noted recently, there are areas where 911 authorities
and OSPs have either not begun or have not yet completed the transition
to NG911 and continue to rely on legacy selective routers and other
TDM-based infrastructure for delivery of 911 calls to public safety
answering points (PSAPs). Some commenters have suggested that delivery
of 911 calls could be disrupted if carriers of 911 traffic lose access
to critical TDM circuits in the 911 call path and are not provided
sufficient opportunity to establish alternate IP connections to those
facilities. To what extent do carriers rely on the interconnection and
collocation rights in sections 251(c)(2) and (6) to obtain access to
selective routers and other critical 911 circuits? Is there a risk that
incumbent LECs may refuse access or charge unfair prices if we exercise
forbearance? If we sunset incumbent LEC interconnection and collocation
obligations under sections 251(c)(2) and (6) on December 31, 2028--as
we propose below--will that provide carriers sufficient time to secure
long-term access to alternative facilities that support routing and
delivery of 911 calls? We seek comment on whether any additional
safeguards are needed to ensure the continuity of 911 service. For
example, should we carve out an exception to our forbearance for
interconnections and collocations at a selective router? Should the
Commission, on a case-by-case basis, direct incumbent LECs to
interconnect or allow collocation when necessary to preserve 911
service? On what basis would the Commission have the authority to do
so?
Mitigating harm to critical infrastructure services. We seek
comment on how the Commission can avoid any harm to critical
infrastructure services in forbearing from interconnection and
collocation obligations specific to incumbent LECs. Would forbearance
affect the ability of critical infrastructure industries, government
agencies, or public safety entities to maintain operations and
services? If so, how and to what extent? Can the Commission take steps
to mitigate any potential harms? For example, should forbearance from
these obligations be conditional, or include a carveout for
interconnection and collocation arrangements that are used to provide
services to public safety entities or critical infrastructure purposes?
Full implementation of section 251(c) of the Act (section 10(d)).
Section 10(d) of the Act requires the Commission to determine whether
the requirements in section 251(c) of the Act ``have been fully
implemented'' before forbearing from its provisions. We believe that
section 251(c) of the Act has been fully implemented, and seek comment
on this view. The Commission has previously concluded that full
implementation occurred when its implementing rules went into effect.
The D.C. Circuit upheld this conclusion in Qwest Corp. v. FCC. We seek
comment on any current and relevant aspects of the fully implemented
requirement. We further seek comment on whether the Commission's
determination in the Qwest Forbearance Order that section 251(c) has
been fully implemented constitutes the best reading of the statute,
consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright.
3. Establishing a Date Certain
We propose to forbear from the interconnection obligations specific
to incumbent LECs under sections 251(c)(2) and (6) of the Act, as well
as our rules implementing those provisions, as of December 31, 2028. We
seek comment on our proposal. We believe that this date provides
sufficient time for affected parties to make any necessary alternative
arrangements. Importantly, we note that sunsetting incumbent LEC-
specific interconnection obligations is not tantamount to a prohibition
on TDM interconnection. Incumbent LECs, like other providers, could
continue interconnecting in TDM, and all telecommunications carriers
would still bear the duty to interconnect pursuant to sections 201 and
251(a) of the Act.

[[Page 54273]]

Do commenters agree with our proposal? We seek comment on the costs
and benefits of establishing December 31, 2028 as the sunset date. If
commenters believe that a different date would be more appropriate,
what criteria should the Commission use in evaluating the feasibility
of a given date? Should there be a single date by which all incumbent
LECs' additional interconnection obligations under section 251(c)(2)
and (6) are sunset, or should the Commission stagger its sunsetting of
these requirements? Do the particular challenges of small and rural
carriers necessitate a different or tailored approach? What other dates
do commenters propose, and what are the costs and benefits associated
with those dates? What other factors or issues should the Commission
take into account when determining a sunset date's feasibility? Is this
timeframe feasible for seamless accessibility-related transitions?
We seek comment on what changes carriers will need to make to their
networks prior to our proposed date of December 31, 2028, for
forbearance. What steps must be taken, both by incumbent LECs and the
providers with which they interconnect? What steps do small and rural
carriers, specifically, need to take, and what are the associated
costs? What steps would other relevant parties, such as those that
provide critical infrastructure services, need to take? Should the
Commission establish intermediate deadlines by which certain benchmarks
must be met, e.g., if we imposed requirements on establishing new or
modified agreements? Are there any kinds of benchmarks we should
establish after the sunset date?
We also seek comment on how existing agreements might be affected.
For example, change-in-law provisions of a contract might allow for
renegotiation of terms or establish the means by which to resolve
disputes. Do providers anticipate modifying existing interconnection
agreements or entering into new agreements? What opportunities or
challenges might arise? How does the balance of negotiating power
differ among the providers today and would that negotiating power
change depending on whether the proposals herein are adopted? Would
forbearance from certain requirements be likely to necessitate
renegotiation of existing agreements, or are those agreements likely to
remain unaffected by forbearance? Do small and rural carriers
anticipate particular challenges with making arrangements following the
elimination of our additional interconnection requirements for
incumbent LECs, such as by needing to lease third-party networks or
services or purchase equipment and other technology for network
upgrades? Are there any steps the Commission should take to prevent
unnecessary disruption and costs to providers while they make
preparations to transition their networks and agreements?
Other Commission timelines. Additionally, we seek comment on
whether and how setting December 31, 2028 as the date certain for
ending incumbent LEC-specific interconnection obligations will affect
other related and adjacent timeframes adopted or being considered by
the Commission. As discussed below, the Commission has previously
established or proposed timelines for matters that may affect
providers' transitions of their networks to IP. Simultaneously, we
recognize that the additional interconnection obligations imposed on
incumbent LECs under sections 251(c)(2) and (6) may affect the parties'
willingness or ability to interconnect in IP. How should the timeframe
for forbearance account for our other timeframes? We specifically seek
comment in the context of NG911, caller ID authentication, and
technology transitions.
First, we seek comment on the effect of our NG911 requirements on
any proposed date certain for ending incumbent LEC-specific
interconnection obligations. We note that although the Commission
declined to ``reference any specific standard or set of standards as
part of the codified definition of NG911,'' at least one of the
commonly accepted standards envisions an end-state NG911 as contingent
on ubiquitous IP networks. Would forbearing from sections 251(c)(2) and
(6) to the extent described above impact changes being made to upgrade
networks to IP and deploy NG911 systems? How else might deployment of
NG911 affect the feasibility of our proposed sunset date for additional
interconnection obligations for incumbent LECs, or vice versa?
Second, we seek comment on extending the two-year timeframe
proposed in the Non-IP Caller ID Authentication NPRM, which would give
providers two years to either upgrade their networks to IP or to
implement a non-IP caller ID authentication solution, to December 31,
2028, or whatever sunset date we ultimately adopt. We believe that
aligning the dates of our proposals in this manner best facilitates the
goals of each item and avoids any inconsistencies or redundancies that
might otherwise arise. Do commenters agree? What other considerations
should we take into account in light of the Non-IP Caller ID
Authentication NPRM's proposals?
Third, we seek comment on the effect our proposals in the
Technology Transitions NPRM would have on sunsetting additional
interconnection obligations for incumbent LECs. Do these proposals bear
on our proposed date of December 31, 2028? Or vice versa? Specifically,
how does the timing of our streamlining or forbearance proposals in the
Technology Transitions NPRM affect setting a date for ending incumbent
LECs' additional interconnection obligations? What are the implications
of forbearing from section 251(c)(5) before, concurrently, or after
forbearing from sections 251(c)(2) and (6)? Are there other
considerations about which the Commission should be mindful?
4. Other Regulatory Frameworks and Rules Affected by Eliminating the
Incumbent LEC-Specific Interconnection Obligations
We seek comment on whether forbearing from section 251(c)(2) and
from section 251(c)(6) (to the extent it requires incumbent LECs to
provide for physical collocation of interconnection equipment) and
eliminating the Commission rules implementing those provisions would
require updating other Commission rules or bear on other statutory
frameworks. For example, our numbering rules require an interconnected
VoIP provider that has obtained an authorization for direct access to
numbering resources from the Commission to demonstrate that the
applicant is or will be capable of providing service to the area within
sixty (60) days of the numbering resources activation date--often
referred to as ``facilities readiness''--before obtaining North
American Numbering Plan (NANP) numbers. The Commission has explained
that an interconnected VoIP provider can satisfy that requirement by
providing (1) a combination of an agreement between the interconnected
VoIP provider and its carrier partner and an interconnection agreement
between that carrier and the relevant LEC, or (2) proof that the
interconnected VoIP provider obtains interconnection with the PSTN
pursuant to a tariffed offering or a commercial arrangement (such as a
TDM-to-IP or VoIP interconnection agreement) providing access to the
PSTN. We seek comment on whether an IP-to-IP interconnection agreement
for local call exchange should be sufficient under section 52.15(g)(2),
if the Commission were to adopt its proposal to forbear from
interconnection and

[[Page 54274]]

related obligations under sections 251(c)(2) and (6) of the Act. We
note that in 2023 the Commission declined to revise section 52.15(g)(2)
to specify additional documentation, instead retaining flexibility to
consider each application. Is that approach still appropriate now, or
should our rules explicitly recognize IP-based interconnection as
fulfilling the requirement? Would interconnection to the PSTN still be
necessary? Are there other numbering administration matters that
providers would need to address before and after a transition to IP
interconnection, such as call routing, number assignments, and toll-
free routing? In the event that we grant relief from incumbent LEC-
specific interconnection obligations, are there any changes necessary
to the definition of interconnected VoIP?
Do LECs leasing remaining UNEs pursuant to section 251(c)(3)
require interconnection pursuant to section 251(c)(2) and Sec. 51.323
of our rules? To what extent would ending such interconnection
obligations have the practical effect of eliminating remaining
incumbent LEC UNE obligations? If they do, is this a desirable result?
We invite comment on whether our rules governing UNE loops, subloops,
network interface devices, or other legacy elements would need to be
revised or forborne from.
While the NPRM we adopt today focuses on interconnection
obligations for incumbent LECs and immediately related issues, we note
that the Commission's rules related to tariffing and access charge
requirements stem directly from the legacy TDM framework; we intend to
address any such related issues as needed in separate future items. In
this item, however, we welcome commenters' views on any other rules or
sections of the Act that might be rendered obsolete or redundant by the
elimination of incumbent LEC-specific interconnection obligations. We
also ask commenters to identify any provisions (for example, in
sections 251(b)(1)-(4) or 252 of the Act, Parts 51 or 52 of our rules,
or elsewhere) that should be updated or clarified, or from which we
should forbear. For example, should we eliminate any requirement that
local exchange carriers offer presubscribed interexchange providers and
the information-sharing requirements associated with that requirement?
Does the strict distinction between local and long-distance service,
and associated concepts like presubscribed interexchange carriers and
LATAs continue to make sense in an all-IP world?

C. Appropriate Regulatory Framework for Interconnection for IP Voice
Services

We seek comment on whether and how the Commission should modify its
regulatory framework for interconnection to account for IP voice
services. As the Commission has previously stated, ``[i]t is important
that any IP-to-IP interconnection policy framework adopted by the
Commission be narrowly tailored to avoid intervention in areas where
the marketplace will operate.'' Today, carriers can freely negotiate
how IP-to-IP interconnection occurs absent heavy-handed Commission
regulation. We seek comment on whether there has been any demonstrated
need for Commission intervention. Have market incentives proved
sufficient to meet the needs contemplated by Congress and the Act? Do
any carriers possess sufficient market power to pressure other carriers
into accepting unfavorable interconnection terms?
Does the regulatory framework established for traffic exchange
under section 251(a) continue to make sense for IP-to-IP
interconnection for voice services, or should it more closely resemble
the light-touch regulatory approach taken in other areas, including
internet traffic exchange? How does the network architecture for
interconnected VoIP differ from that of best-efforts internet? Do any
particular technical characteristics counsel toward or away from the
need for Commission oversight of interconnection for VoIP service? To
what extent might the current dynamics of the IP-to-IP voice
interconnection marketplace change if we forbore from the TDM
interconnection obligations for incumbent LECs under sections 251(c)(2)
and (6)? Are there aspects of section 251(c)(2)'s framework that are
needed in an IP interconnection environment, and if so, who should
those aspects apply to? For example, is the incumbent LECs'
responsibility to exchange TDM traffic within existing LATA boundaries
appropriate for VoIP traffic today? If so, given that incumbent LECs
serve approximately one fourth of all wireline subscriptions, should
that burden fall exclusively on one part of the market (such as today's
incumbent LECs or comparable carriers) or on all VoIP operators? What
protections are needed to ensure secure and efficient delivery of VoIP
calls? How should any IP interconnection framework for general voice
traffic account for the existing NG911 framework and its requirement
for carriers to hand off 911 traffic in IP at designated points of
connection within each state? To what extent would a transition to an
all-IP infrastructure affect accessibility for people with
disabilities? Are there still devices or services, such as TTY or
speech-to-speech, that require TDM technology? We invite detailed
comment on how the Commission should account for these issues and those
raised below.
Scope of traffic and services. We seek comment on the scope of
traffic and services that a framework specific to IP-to-IP
interconnection for voice traffic should encompass. Should the
Commission distinguish between managed or facilities-based VoIP and
over-the-top VoIP? Should the Commission's framework encompass all U.S.
domestic voice providers that use NANP resources? Are there any
definitional or other challenges that exist in attempting to categorize
the different types of VoIP traffic? How can we avoid any regulatory
asymmetries that could distort the market or otherwise harm consumers?
Would adopting an IP interconnection framework for interconnected VoIP
traffic compel providers to exchange VoIP traffic under different
technological or legal arrangements from those that providers use to
exchange other IP traffic? Could the interconnection framework be
structured to provide certain interconnection rights with respect to
the exchange of VoIP traffic, or certain types of VoIP traffic, while
giving providers the freedom to exchange other IP traffic as they are
doing now? What impact, if any, would such an approach have on any
preexisting arrangements for the exchange of voice or non-voice IP
traffic?
We also seek comment on whether any such regulatory framework
should distinguish between different types of carriers. For example,
should our rules differentiate between incumbent LECs, rural LECs,
competitive LECs, or interconnected VoIP providers, particularly if
providers interconnect through the internet and not through individual
incumbent LEC switches in multiple LATAs? Do other classes of
providers, such as originating versus terminating, require specific
rule subsets? Does the type of VoIP service provided--e.g., facilities-
based versus over-the-top--warrant or necessitate different regulatory
schemes?
Duty to interconnect. We seek comment on whether the Commission
should adopt rules to require carriers to interconnect in IP,
specifically, for voice traffic. Should the Commission mandate that
carriers provide direct IP-to-IP interconnection? Alternatively, should
the Commission require IP-to-IP interconnection but permit carriers to

[[Page 54275]]

do so indirectly? Should the Commission require carriers to make an IP
address available on public internet at which it will receive voice
traffic, and should such a requirement be instead of or in addition to
a direct interconnection requirement? Should the Commission prohibit
incumbent LECs from requesting that other carriers or VoIP providers
exchange traffic in TDM, or alternatively, require the provider
requesting TDM interconnection to bear the costs of conversion of IP
traffic? Should the Commission prohibit carriers from distinguishing
between different types of traffic or providers in its receipt of voice
traffic? What requirements would the Commission need to specify if it
undertook any such approach? What are the benefits and drawbacks of
these various alternatives?
We seek comment whether the Commission should impose certain
baseline requirements, such as particular terms and conditions, on IP-
to-IP interconnection agreements. Does the application of terms like
``just and reasonable'' under section 201 and ``not unjust or
unreasonably discriminatory'' under section 202 of the Act differ in an
all-IP context? If so, how? How otherwise might any VoIP
interconnection obligation differ from that currently imposed on
incumbent LECs and other telecommunications carriers in the TDM
context? Would incumbent LECs and interconnecting carriers need to
specify a date by which there could no longer be changes to existing
TDM interconnection arrangements, or to certain terms in those
agreements, in preparation of a proposed sunset date? Would a numbering
directory similar to that required for telecommunications relay
services (TRS) under Sec. 64.613 of our rules allow IP-to-IP traffic
to be easily routed in the absence of direct interconnection
agreements? What would the costs and benefits of any of the approaches
outlined above be? For small and rural carriers, specifically?
Duty to negotiate in good faith. We also seek comment on whether
the Commission should impose additional or specific requirements for
IP-to-IP interconnection for voice service related to a carrier's duty
to negotiate in good faith. The Commission has previously recognized
that the ``duty to negotiate in good faith has been a longstanding
element of interconnection requirements under the Communications Act,''
irrespective of the ``network technology underlying the
interconnection, whether TDM, IP, or otherwise.'' The Commission in
2011 espoused its expectation that all carriers negotiate in good faith
in response to requests for IP-to-IP interconnection for the exchange
of voice traffic and that such good faith negotiations will result in
interconnection arrangements between IP networks. We seek comment on
whether the Commission's expectation has been realized in the past
decade and a half. Was the Commission's stated expectation sufficient
to ensure that IP interconnection arrangements for the exchange of
voice traffic came to fruition in a timely manner? If not, how can the
Commission ensure that all providers of voice services negotiate in
good faith in response to requests for IP-to-IP interconnection for the
exchange of voice traffic?
IP voice traffic POIs. We seek comment on whether the Commission
should determine POIs for VoIP in an all-IP world. If so, how would the
Commission do so? Could or should the Commission require POIs in each
state, region, or tandem, or at certain ``technically feasible''
points? How does the concept of technical feasibility apply in end-to-
end IP networks? Does the concept of LATAs continue to make sense in an
all-IP world? By comparison, how many interconnection points do
providers use to interconnect with the internet? Should the Commission
limit the number of required POIs? We seek comment on what role, if
any, the Commission should play in developing a POI framework for IP
interconnection for voice services, and on approaches that do not
impose overly prescriptive regimes that detract from the efficiencies
of IP networks. Could or should the Commission require interconnection
at existing NG911 Delivery Points where they exist? Would doing so
interfere with a state's ability to determine the configuration of
their emergency services networks? What call routing requirements are
needed, if any, to ensure continued functionality of services such as
E911 or 988? Should the Commission require certain categories of voice
traffic be managed? What should be the role of technical standards-
setting bodies in developing a framework for IP interconnection?
Exchanging VoIP traffic over the public internet. We seek comment
on whether the Commission can and should encourage the exchange of IP
voice traffic over the public internet. What efficiencies could be
derived through exchanging IP-based voice traffic over the internet?
Would individually-negotiated contracts be needed? Are there voice
carriers today that do not have existing connections to the internet
for the provision of consumer internet connectivity to their customers?
We seek comment on what tools would need to be developed to efficiently
implement such a solution. For example, how would call routing work?
Would a database connecting phone numbers to a carrier gateway's IP
address need to be developed? Would such a database require technical
standards work, and are there any efforts on this front already
underway?
Role of states. Finally, we seek comment on what role states should
play, if any, in VoIP interconnection and on the landscape of state
regulation of IP-to-IP interconnection today. Has any state role been
necessary for the establishment of IP interconnection agreements for
voice traffic to date? What equities do the states have in ensuring
efficient interconnection of intrastate and interstate voice traffic?
What role should the Commission play in overseeing any state regulation
of VoIP interconnection? Have state actions with respect to VoIP
interconnection been consistent with federal policy? Have they been
helpful, or a hindrance, to promoting the IP transition? We seek
comment whether the Commission should exercise preemption authority
over matters related to interconnected VoIP interconnection. If the
Commission adopts rules for a framework for IP-to-IP interconnection,
should those rules limit the states' role in IP-to-IP interconnection,
or prohibit states from attaching certain conditions to IP
interconnection negotiations and agreements?

D. Commission Authority Over VoIP Interconnection

To the extent that a regulatory framework governing interconnection
for IP voice services is necessary, we seek comment on the best
authority under which the Commission could or should adopt rules or
requirements to govern IP interconnection for voice services. We also
seek comment on which authority is most consistent with our statute as
a whole. Specifically, we seek comment on the particular statutory
authority that would provide the strongest basis for any interconnected
VoIP interconnection framework we might adopt. We also seek comment on
how to carefully circumscribe the scope of traffic or services subject
to any such framework to leave issues to the marketplace that
appropriately can be resolved there.
However, the Commission has not broadly determined whether Voice
over internet Protocol (VoIP) providers are ``telecommunications
carriers,'' whether

[[Page 54276]]

VoIP services, including interconnected VoIP, are ``telecommunications
services'' or ``information services,'' or whether VoIP services
constitute ``telephone exchange service'' or ``exchange access'' for
the purposes of interconnection rights under sections 201 and 251.
Under Commission rules and precedent, providers of interconnected VoIP
service may in certain circumstances be treated as telecommunications
carriers. For example, the Commission and states have recognized that
interconnected VoIP providers may seek designation as Eligible
Telecommunications Carriers (ETCs) to participate in universal service
programs, so long as they voluntarily hold themselves out as common
carriers and meet the applicable requirements. Commission precedent
suggests that the statutory terms defining section 251's scope are not
confined to legacy TDM-based offerings, but rather turn on the
functional nature of the service regardless of protocol. The
Commission's technology-neutral reading of these definitions is also
consistent with how the Commission has approached interconnection
rights under section 251 in the context of IP-based voice services. In
the USF/ICC Transformation Order, the Commission observed that
``interconnection requirements [under section 251] are technology
neutral--they do not vary based on whether one or both of the
interconnecting providers is using TDM, IP, or another technology in
their underlying networks.'' Although the Commission refrained from
explicitly ruling that IP-to-IP interconnection is mandated under
section 251, it found that the statutory language was neutral on its
face as to the underlying network technology, and encouraged parties to
negotiate such arrangements in good faith.
Section 251(a)(1). Section 251(a)(1) requires all
telecommunications carriers to interconnect either directly or
indirectly. The requirements of this provision extend broadly to all
telecommunications carriers, and are technology neutral on their face
with respect to the transmission protocol used for purposes of
interconnection. Can the Commission require providers of voice service
to interconnect in IP under section 251(a)? Could the Commission rely
on section 251(a)(1) to require IP interconnection between facilities-
based interconnected VoIP providers that have not been classified as
either a telecommunications service or an information service under the
Act?
We seek comment whether section 251(a) provides the Commission
authority to adopt rules, if necessary, requiring providers of voice
service to make interconnection arrangements for the exchange of voice
traffic in IP, and to negotiate good faith arrangements for the same.
To that end, we seek comment on whether providers of interconnected
VoIP service are or could be telecommunications carriers (or common
carriers). As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained in NARUC II,
``the primary sine qua non of common carrier status is a quasi-public
character, which arises out of the undertaking `to carry for all people
indifferently.' '' The court went on to explain that the second
prerequisite to common carrier status, ``formulated by the FCC with
peculiar applicability to the communications field,'' is that the
system be such that customers transmit intelligence of their own design
and choosing. We seek comment on whether providers of interconnected
VoIP service are common carriers under this test.
While the Commission has not affirmatively classified all VoIP
offerings as either a telecommunications service or information
service, it has nonetheless recognized that providers may elect to
offer interconnected VoIP as a telecommunications service. We thus seek
comment on whether the Commission must classify all interconnected VoIP
as a telecommunications service in order to regulate interconnected
VoIP providers as telecommunications carriers, given that the Act
states that a ``telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common
carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in
providing telecommunications services.'' Can providers of
interconnected VoIP service avail themselves of section 251(a) by
offering interconnected VoIP service on a common carrier basis? If so,
do both sides of IP-to-IP interconnection need to be offering VoIP on a
common carrier basis for the section 251(a) interconnection obligations
to apply? Do both sides need to agree that the VoIP service is being
offered as a common carrier service? To ensure that any carrier seeking
the benefits of such a classification also accepts the accompanying
burdens (such as the section 251(a) duty to accept interconnections
from others), should we require a carrier seeking to offer VoIP on a
common carrier basis to do so throughout their territory or throughout
an entire state? We also seek comment whether, if a carrier elects to
offer such VoIP services as telecommunications services, and does so
without changing the rates, terms, or conditions of service for the
customer, it should be viewed ``as a transition of underlying network
technology, analogous to a provider undertaking a switch migration.''
Section 201. The Commission has historically imposed
interconnection obligations pursuant to section 201 of the Act. We seek
comment on whether section 201 provides the Commission authority to
mandate IP interconnection obligations for voice traffic, including for
intrastate traffic--either alone, or in conjunction with, other
provisions of the Act--under the interconnection frameworks we explore
today. Section 201(a) imposes a duty on ``common carrier[s]'' engaged
in ``interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio'' to
``establish physical connections with other carriers'' in cases where
the Commission finds it necessary or desirable in the public interest.
(We observe that the Commission found interconnected VoIP to a be a
jurisdictionally mixed use service in the Vonage Order, and determined
that it was not possible to separate out the purely intrastate uses
from the interstate uses.) Section 201(b) further requires that all
``charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for or in
connection with common carrier service'' be just and reasonable and not
unjust or unreasonable. Section 201(b) also permits the Commission to
``prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the
public interest to carry out the provisions of'' the Communications
Act. We seek comment whether these provisions provide the Commission
authority to adopt rules, if necessary, requiring providers of voice
service to make interconnection arrangements for the exchange of voice
traffic in IP, and to negotiate good faith arrangements for the same.
Is this approach most consistent with the best reading of the statute?
Does the fact that section 251 specifically governs interconnection
bear on whether section 201 can authorize regulations governing IP
interconnection? We observe that section 251 includes a savings
provision specifying that nothing in section 251 ``shall be construed
to limit or otherwise affect the Commission's authority under section
201.'' What is the import of this provision in evaluating our authority
of section 201(a) with respect to IP interconnection? Could regulations
addressing VoIP interconnection be grounded in our authority that
``[a]ll charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for or in
connection with [common carrier] service shall be just

[[Page 54277]]

and reasonable''? Would a section 201 approach be limited only to
interstate and foreign communications?
Section 251(c)(2). Were the Commission to forbear from 251(c)(2)
with respect to TDM services, we seek comment whether section 251(c)(2)
could provide the Commission the authority to address IP-to-IP
interconnection. First, we observe that section 251(c)(2)'s direct
interconnection obligations only extend to some incumbent LECs (not
rural telephone companies nor mobile carriers nor competitive LECs) and
requesting telecommunications carriers (other than interexchange
carriers) seeking interconnection with them. Given this framework,
would it be appropriate to ground any IP-to-IP interconnection
obligations for voice services in the Commission's authority under
section 251(c)(2)? If so, would the Commission need to classify VoIP
services as telecommunications services for section 251(c)(2) to govern
interconnection for IP voice services under this provision? Or would it
be sufficient that a VoIP provider held itself out as providing its
service on a common carrier basis? Relatedly, we also seek comment
whether interconnection for the exchange of VoIP traffic would be ``for
the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and exchange
access.'' Or to put it differently, if the Commission did classify VoIP
as a telecommunications service, would section 251(c)(2) apply, if so,
to whom and in what respect? And assuming it did apply, should the
Commission nonetheless forbear from applying section 251(c)(2) to VoIP?
Section 256. We also seek comment on whether section 256 of the Act
provides the Commission authority to regulate IP interconnection for
voice service. Section 256(a) states that the purpose of the section is
``to ensure the ability of users and information providers to
seamlessly and transparently transmit and receive information between
and across telecommunications networks.'' The Commission ``shall
establish procedures for Commission oversight of coordinated network
planning by telecommunications carriers and other providers of
telecommunications service for the effective and efficient
interconnection of public telecommunications networks used to provide
telecommunications service.'' To what extent does this section provide
a source of authority for regulation of IP interconnection given the
statement in section 256(c) that ``[n]othing in this section shall be
construed as expanding or limiting any authority that the Commission
may have under law in effect before February 8, 1996''?
Section 227b. We seek comment on whether section 227b provides
authority for rules governing IP interconnection for voice services.
Pursuant to section 227b(b)(1), all voice service providers are
required to implement the STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication
framework in their IP networks, and the Commission has extended that
obligation to intermediate providers. Providers must also take
reasonable measures to implement an effective caller ID authentication
framework in their non-IP networks, but are not required to do so until
a non-IP caller ID authentication framework has been developed and is
reasonably available. In applying these provisions, the Commission
requires voice service providers to either upgrade their entire
networks to IP and fully implement STIR/SHAKEN or participate in
efforts to develop a non-IP caller ID authentication framework. Section
227b(b)(5)(D) requires the Commission to ``take reasonable measures to
address any'' burdens or barriers to the implementation of STIR/SHAKEN
or a non-IP caller ID authentication framework, and to ``enable as
promptly as reasonable full participation of all classes of providers
of voice service and types of voice calls'' in these frameworks. We
seek comment on whether regulating IP interconnection would be a
reasonable measure to address the burdens and barriers of STIR/SHAKEN
implementation as necessary to enable full participation in the
framework as promptly as reasonable.
Ancillary Authority. We seek comment whether the Commission can
rely upon ancillary authority as a basis for an IP interconnection
regulatory framework. The Commission may exercise ancillary
jurisdiction only when two conditions are satisfied: (1) the
Commission's general jurisdictional grant under Title I of the Act
covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably
ancillary to the Commission's effective performance of its statutorily
mandated responsibilities. Regarding the first prong, because
interconnected VoIP services are ``communications by wire or radio,''
the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction over IP traffic such as
packetized voice traffic. With regard to the second prong, the D.C.
Circuit in Comcast held that the Commission's use of ancillary
authority must be linked to express delegations of regulatory
authority. The Commission has previously relied in part--though not
exclusively--on ancillary authority to apply certain of Title II's
obligations to interconnected VoIP service--including obligations
pertaining to section 222 customer proprietary network information
(CPNI), local number portability, USF contribution, Form 499 regulatory
fees, section 255 disability access and TRS, section 214
discontinuance, outage reporting, truth-in-billing, and Form 477
reporting.
We seek comment whether any requirements the Commission might adopt
to regulate interconnected VoIP interconnection would be reasonably
ancillary to the Commission's exercise of its authority under a
statutory provision, such as sections 201, 251(a), (e), 254, 615a-1(b),
617(d), or other authority. For example, would the failure to make
arrangements to interconnect, directly or indirectly, for the exchange
of voice traffic in IP be reasonably ancillary to the Commission's
authority to ensure that all practices in connection with common
carrier services be just and reasonable under section 201? Would
adopting an IP interconnection regulatory framework be ancillary to the
Commission's obligation to enforce telecommunications carriers' duty to
``interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment
of other telecommunications carriers?'' Is maintaining Commission
oversight over interconnection for exchange of voice traffic ancillary
to the Commission's authority over 911 emergency access? Similarly,
under the New and Emerging Technologies 911 Improvement Act of 2008
(NET911 Act), IP-enabled voice service providers are required to
provide 911 service and enhanced 911 (E911) service in accordance with
Commission requirements, and have a right to interconnect with entities
that provide such capabilities on the same rates, terms, and conditions
as that provided to CMRS providers. Further, the Twenty-First Century
Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010 (CVAA) authorizes
the Commission to implement regulations necessary to achieve reliable
and interoperable communication that ensures access to an IP-enabled
emergency network by individuals with disabilities, where achievable
and technically feasible. We seek comment on whether oversight over IP
interconnection arrangements for voice service would be ancillary to
the Commission's authorities for 911, including its obligation under
the CVAA and its obligations to modify regulations implementing the
NET911 Act ``from time to time, as necessitated by changes

[[Page 54278]]

in the market or technology, to ensure the ability of an IP-enabled
voice service provider to comply with its obligations'' under the
statute, observing that ``[n]othing in this section shall be construed
to permit the Commission to issue regulations that require or impose a
specific technology or technological standard.''
Alternatively, or in addition, we seek comment on whether the
Commission should adopt regulations pertaining to interconnection for
VoIP services by relying on ancillary authority in conjunction with its
authority under section 254. Section 254 provides that ``[a]ccess to
advanced telecommunications and information services should be provided
in all regions of the Nation,'' and that the Commission's universal
service programs ``shall'' be based on this and other enumerated
principles. Section 254(c)(1) states that ``[u]niversal service is an
evolving level of telecommunications services that the Commission shall
establish periodically under this section.'' Section 254(b) requires
the Commission to base policies for the preservation and advancement of
universal service on access to ``advanced telecommunications and
information services.'' We seek comment whether rules to ensure
interconnection of networks for the exchange of IP voice traffic would
be ancillary to the Commission's obligation to enable advanced
telecommunications services to be provided in all regions of the
nation. Are there other sources of statutory authority to which
interconnected VoIP interconnection obligations are ancillary? Finally,
if the Commission were to rely on ancillary authority to impose
requirements, would it also need to adopt associated complaint
procedures, or could the existing informal and formal complaint
processes, which derive from section 208, be interpreted to extend more
broadly than alleged violations of Title II duties?
Classification of Interconnected VoIP Service. For any proposed IP
interconnection framework, we also seek comment on whether it is
necessary, or appropriate, to address classification issues associated
with facilities-based or over-the-top interconnected VoIP service. In
particular, to the extent that an entity that historically was
classified as an incumbent LEC or other telecommunications carrier
ceased offering circuit-switched voice telephone service, and instead
offered only interconnected VoIP service, we seek comment on whether
that entity would remain a ``local exchange carrier'' or
``telecommunications carrier.'' The Act defines a ``local exchange
carrier'' as ``any person that is engaged in the provision of telephone
exchange service or exchange access.'' The Act defines the term
``telephone exchange service'' as ``(A) service within a telephone
exchange, or within a connected system of telephone exchanges within
the same exchange area operated to furnish to subscribers
intercommunicating service of the character ordinarily furnished by a
single exchange, and which is covered by the exchange service charge,
or (B) comparable service provided through a system of switches,
transmission equipment, or other facilities (or combination thereof) by
which a subscriber can originate and terminate a telecommunications
service.'' The term ``exchange access'' means the offering of access to
telephone exchange services or facilities for the purpose of the
origination or termination of telephone toll services. In the universal
service context, the Commission has found that, insofar as a carrier
elected to offer VoIP on a common carrier basis, it ``did not see a
reason why such service would not also be classified as telephone
exchange service and exchange access to the same extent as traditional
voice telephone service.'' Would this same reasoning apply in the
context of interconnection for VoIP services?
As mentioned above, the Commission has not determined whether
interconnected VoIP services are ``telecommunications services'' or
``information services.'' To what extent would the Commission need to
classify interconnected VoIP service as a ``telecommunications
service'' under the Act to require voice providers to negotiate IP
interconnection agreements for interconnected VoIP services or set
other rules or requirements for IP-to-IP interconnection for VoIP
services? The Act defines ``telecommunications service'' as the
``offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or
to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the
public, regardless of the facilities used,'' and defines
``telecommunications'' as ``the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without
any change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received.'' We seek comment whether interconnected VoIP service is most
appropriately classified as a ``telecommunications service'' under the
best reading of the Act. Should all VoIP services be subject to Title
II classification, or should we limit our actions to interconnected
VoIP services? If so, why? Alternatively, are some offerings of VoIP
(or interconnected VoIP) provided on a common carrier basis and others
provided on a private carriage basis? If so, how should we distinguish
them, both as a matter of law and as to what legal obligations should
be imposed on each?
Were the Commission to classify interconnected VoIP service as a
telecommunications service, from what provisions of Title II should the
Commission forbear with respect to interconnected VoIP service? Should
the Commission forbear from provisions of Title II that it has thus far
not found necessary to impose on interconnected VoIP service? We seek
comment on whether there is any evidence of market failure in the
provision of such VoIP services, or whether broader Title II regulation
of VoIP services is otherwise necessary to protect consumers or ensure
that rates, terms, and conditions are just and reasonable. If there is
no evidence of market failure, we seek comment whether it would be in
the public interest to forbear from all Title II requirements other
than those the Commission currently applies to VoIP service.
Alternatively, we seek comment on whether the Commission should align
any forbearance for VoIP services with the forbearance granted to
commercial mobile radio services.
Other Sources of Authority. Finally, we seek comment on any other
sources of Commission authority for adopting a policy framework for IP
interconnection for interconnected voice services. What would be the
scope and substance of the Commission's authority to address IP
interconnection under that authority?

E. Cost Benefit Analysis

Benefits. We seek comment on the benefits of forbearing from our
specific interconnection obligations for incumbent LECs and on any
potential regulatory framework for IP interconnection. As outlined
above, the Commission believes that its current regulatory scheme
imposes various costs on providers, whether on incumbent LECs or
otherwise. We also anticipate that elimination of these burdens will,
among other things, speed deployment of next-generation networks and
services. We seek comment on the likely benefits of eliminating these
costs, as well as any other benefits resulting from sunsetting our
additional interconnection obligations for incumbent LECs.
What regulatory costs will incumbent LECs avoid as a result of such
deregulation? Carriers in general? What effect would the absence of
Commission

[[Page 54279]]

intervention have on market competition? What impact could the other
proposals herein have on competition? Does our current interconnection
regime promote anticompetitive conduct, and would its elimination
promote affordability of voice services or improved service offerings?
How might small and rural carriers and their customers, in particular,
benefit? What other benefits will inure to the public as a consequence?
Do commenters believe, as the Commission anticipates, that eliminating
incumbent LECs' additional interconnection obligations will hasten the
IP transition? How should the Commission account for increased
investment in next-generation networks in evaluating the benefits of
forbearance? How will providers and the public benefit from ending
carriers' reliance on expensive (and frequently stolen) copper, as well
as TDM equipment that may be difficult to source? How does the cost of
maintaining copper, TDM, and legacy facilities generally compare with
the cost of maintaining a modern all-IP network, and does that analysis
have implications for high-cost universal service programs? Are there
national security implications from ongoing sourcing of second-hand TDM
equipment from potentially unsecure supply chains, and how should the
Commission evaluate the benefits of transitioning toward an all-IP
world? Are there other security benefits to an all-IP world, or ending
legacy protocols such as SS7, that would benefit consumers?
Specifically, how should the Commission account for the potential
benefits of faster adoption of IP-based NG911 and improved
implementation of STIR/SHAKEN for the reduction robocalls? Would any
state and local laws and regulations undermine these benefits? What
kinds of new technologies or services might emerge, and how should the
Commission measure the resulting benefits? In addition to enhanced
services, do commenters expect carriers to pass along cost savings to
customers in the form of reduced prices? What other parties may benefit
from our forbearance from incumbent LEC's additional interconnection
obligations, and in what ways? We seek quantifications of any expected
benefits.
Costs. We recognize that there may be potential costs resulting
from forbearance from incumbent LECs' specific section 251(c)
interconnection obligations, including the potential to strand
customers where service may no longer be practicable for carriers.
Additionally, we acknowledge that forbearance from our collocation
requirements for incumbent LECs may impose costs on competitive LECs
that previously were borne by the former. These costs may include
incurring both capital and operating expenditures. We seek comment on
the extent of these costs and any others that may result from the
elimination of our additional interconnection rules for incumbent LECs,
including for competitive and rural providers and their customers.
Could forbearance have a negative impact on competition? We also seek
comment on whether there any technical or policy issues the Commission
should be aware of that could arise as carriers transition from TDM to
IP as a result of our proposals. For example, for carriers that have
not fully converted to IP calling, would there be a need to convert
their existing TDM traffic to IP? What would the burdens of such
conversion be? What are the costs and burdens imposed on other carriers
by those that have not converted their traffic to IP? What costs would
be associated with any potential regulatory framework for IP
interconnection? What costs might this order place on emergency
services that currently continue to rely on TDM circuits for critical
applications? In particular, we seek comment on the potential costs to
small and rural carriers and their customers. We also seek analysis
that includes quantification of these risks.

II. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended
(RFA) the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) has prepared
this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the policies and
rules proposed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) assessing
the possible significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities. The Commission requests written public comments on this
IRFA. Comments must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be
filed by the deadlines for comments specified on the first page of the
NPRM. The Commission will send a copy of the NPRM, including this IRFA,
to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration
(SBA). In addition, the NPRM and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be
published in the Federal Register.

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules

The NPRM seeks to accelerate the transition of our Nation's
communications networks to all[hyphen]internet Protocol (IP) technology
by examining our incumbent local exchange carrier (LEC)-specific
interconnection requirements. Changes in the communications marketplace
have altered how providers deliver services to consumers. To reduce
regulatory burdens that hinder providers from investing in and
deploying next-generation networks, the NPRM seeks comment on the
current state of time division multiplexing (TDM) and IP
interconnection for voice services, and on the costs to
telecommunications carriers of complying with sections 251(c)(2) and
(c)(6) of the of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the Act),
and the Commission's rules implementing those provisions, and their
impact on the IP transition. The NPRM proposes to forbear from
incumbent LEC-specific interconnection and related obligations in
sections 251(c)(2) and (c)(6), and to eliminate the Commission's rules
implementing those provisions, by December 31, 2028. The NPRM also
seeks comment on whether forbearing from sections 251(c)(2) and (c)(6)
would require updating other Commission rules or statutory frameworks.
The NPRM seeks comment on whether and how the Commission should modify
its regulatory framework for interconnection to account for IP voice
services, and on the scope of the Commission's authority to regulate IP
interconnection under any such framework. The NPRM further seeks
comment on the benefits of forbearing from the Commission's specific
interconnection obligations for incumbent LECs and on any potential
regulatory framework for IP interconnection. Finally, the NPRM seeks
comment on the potential costs that may result from the elimination of
the Commission's additional interconnection rules for incumbent LECs,
including the costs to small and rural carriers and their customers.

B. Legal Basis

The proposed action is authorized pursuant to sections 1-4, 201,
251(a), 251(c)(2), 251(c)(6) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151-54, 201, 251(a), 251(c)(2), 251(c)(6).

C. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which
the Proposed Rules Will Apply

The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be
affected by the proposed rules, if adopted. The RFA generally

[[Page 54280]]

defines the term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the
terms ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small
governmental jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business''
has the same meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the
Small Business Act.'' A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) is
independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of
operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the
SBA. The SBA establishes small business size standards that agencies
are required to use when promulgating regulations relating to small
businesses; agencies may establish alternative size standards for use
in such programs, but must consult and obtain approval from SBA before
doing so.
Our actions, over time, may affect small entities that are not
easily categorized at present. We therefore describe three broad groups
of small entities that could be directly affected by our actions. In
general, a small business is an independent business having fewer than
500 employees. These types of small businesses represent 99.9% of all
businesses in the United States, which translates to 34.75 million
businesses. Next, ``small organizations'' are not-for-profit
enterprises that are independently owned and operated and not dominant
their field. While we do not have data regarding the number of non-
profits that meet that criteria, over 99 percent of nonprofits have
fewer than 500 employees. Finally, ``small governmental jurisdictions''
are defined as cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school
districts, or special districts with populations of less than fifty
thousand. Based on the 2022 U.S. Census of Governments data, we
estimate that at least 48,724 out of 90,835 local government
jurisdictions have a population of less than 50,000.
The rules proposed in the NPRM will apply to small entities in the
industries identified in the chart below by their six-digit North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes and corresponding
SBA size standard.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulated industry (NAICS SBA size Percentage small
classification) NAICS code standard Total firms Small firms firms in industry
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wired Telecommunications 517111 1,500 employees 3,054 2,964 97.05
Carriers.
Wireless Telecommunications 517112 1,500 employees 2,893 2,837 98.06
Carriers (except Satellite).
All Other Telecommunications 517810 $40 million.... 1,079 1,039 96.29
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Based on currently available U.S. Census data regarding the
estimated number of small firms in each identified industry, we
conclude that the proposed rules will impact a substantial number of
small entities. Where available, we also provide additional information
regarding the number of potentially affected entities in the above
identified industries.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2024 Universal service monitoring report SBA size standard (1500 employees)
telecommunications service provider data (data as of --------------------------------------------------------
December 2023)
-------------------------------------------------------- Total number FCC Small firms Percent small
Affected entity Form 499A filers entities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs)............ 3,729 3,576 95.90
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs)..... 1,175 917 78.04
Interexchange Carriers (IXCs).......................... 113 95 84.07
Local Exchange Carriers (LECs)......................... 4,904 4,493 91.62
Operator Service Providers (OSPs)...................... 22 22 100
Other Toll Carriers.................................... 74 71 95.95
Wired Telecommunications Carriers...................... 4,682 4,276 91.33
Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) 585 498 85.13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Description of Economic Impact and Projected Reporting,
Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements for Small Entities

The RFA directs agencies to describe the economic impact of
proposed rules on small entities, as well as projected reporting,
recordkeeping and other compliance requirements, including an estimate
of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the
requirements and the type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record.
The NPRM seeks comment on proposals that, if adopted, we expect
will reduce reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance
requirements, as small and other carriers would then be subject to
fewer regulatory burdens. In the NPRM, we first propose to end
incumbent LECs' interconnection obligations under section 251(c)(2) and
(c)(6) of the Act, as well as our rules implementing those provisions
on December 31, 2028. We propose to forbear, as of the sunset date,
from section 251(c)(2) of the Act, partially forbear from section
251(c)(6) of the Act, and eliminate our rules implementing those
statutory provisions, by which incumbent LECs would no longer be
required to meet additional interconnection obligations or provide
collocation of interconnection equipment. The NPRM seeks comment on the
costs and benefits of these proposals, or of commercial or other
arrangements, needed for providers that may require additional time to
transition to IP technology, and whether small carriers face specific
challenges resulting from eliminating interconnection requirements,
such as needing to lease third-party networks or services to
interconnect in IP. For example, through comments received in response
to the NPRM, we seek to ascertain the potential cost of forbearance to
small and rural competitive LECs from our collocation requirements
previously borne by incumbent LECs. We then seek comment on whether
forbearing from sections 251(c)(2) and (c)(6) would require updating
other Commission rules that might be rendered obsolete or

[[Page 54281]]

redundant by the elimination of incumbent LECs' interconnection
obligations. The NPRM also seeks comment on whether the Commission
should establish a regulatory framework for IP-to-IP interconnection
for voice traffic and what such a framework would look like, and any
related costs and benefits for small carriers.
We expect that the proposals in the NPRM will decrease regulatory
burdens on small and other carriers, and also free up resources for use
in development and deployment of next-generation networks. This would
reduce costs and technical complexity associated with maintaining
parallel TDM and IP-based networks, and reduce reporting and
recordkeeping requirements associated with legacy networks, such as the
requirement to file notices of network change. While we do not
anticipate that these carriers will need to hire professionals to
comply with the proposals herein, we request comments specific to any
potential burdens or costs small entities may incur in connection with
these requirements.

E. Discussion of Significant Alternatives Considered That Minimize the
Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities

The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of any
significant alternatives to the proposed rules that would accomplish
the stated objectives of applicable statutes, and minimize any
significant economic impact on small entities. The discussion is
required to include alternatives such as: ``(1) the establishment of
differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take
into account the resources available to small entities; (2) the
clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance and
reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3) the
use of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption
from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small
entities.''
The NPRM seeks comment on proposals and alternatives that we expect
will positively impact small entities. We propose to eliminate the
obligation under section 251(c)(2) of the Act that incumbent LECs
provide direct interconnection upon request on December 31, 2028. This
proposal reflects the ongoing transition to IP-based network
architecture and the declining relevance of legacy TDM interconnection
in an environment increasingly dominated by packet-switched
technologies. In addition, the NPRM seeks comment on other factors that
may determine the feasibility of the December 31, 2028 sunset date and
any alternative benchmarks that should be met by small and other
carriers in the interim. We seek comment on whether removing this
requirement would eliminate unnecessary operational burdens and allow
carriers, including small entities, to redirect resources away from
maintaining outdated switching and signaling infrastructure and toward
investment in modern, efficient, all-IP networks. Small entities may
benefit if the Commission adopts proposed rules or other alternatives
that facilitate the retirement of legacy equipment and the streamlining
of interconnection arrangements through modern, IP-based alternatives.
We seek comment on whether any of the burdens associated with
alternatives that alter current filing, recordkeeping, and reporting
requirements described in the NPRM can be further minimized to lessen
economic impact on small entities.
The Commission will fully consider the economic impact on small
entities as it evaluates the comments filed in response to the NPRM,
including comments related to costs and benefits. Alternative proposals
and approaches from commenters will further develop the record and
could help the Commission further minimize the economic impact on small
entities. The Commission's evaluation of the comments filed in this
proceeding will shape the final conclusions it reaches, the final
alternatives it considers, and the actions it ultimately takes to
minimize any significant economic impact that may occur on small
entities from the final rules.

F. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Proposed Rules

None.

III. Ordering Clauses

Accordingly, it is ordered that pursuant to sections 1-4, 201,
251(a), 251(c)(2), 251(c)(6) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151-54, 201, 251(a), 251(c)(2), 251(c)(6) the Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking hereby is adopted.
It is further ordered that, pursuant to applicable procedures set
forth in Sec. Sec. 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR
1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments on this Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on or before 30 days after publication in the
Federal Register, and reply comments on or before 60 days after
publication in the Federal Register.
It is further ordered that, the Commission's Office of the
Secretary, shall send a copy of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 51

Communications, Communications common carriers, Telecommunications,
Telephone, Federal Communications Commission.

Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.

Proposed Rules

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal
Communications Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR part 51 as follows:

PART 51--INTERCONNECTION

0
1. The authority for part 51 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151-55, 201-05, 207-09, 218, 225-27, 251-
52, 271, 332 unless otherwise noted.

Sec. 51.305 [Removed]

0
2. Remove Sec. 51.305.

Sec. 51.321 [Removed]

0
3. Remove Sec. 51.321.

Sec. 51.323 [Removed]

0
4. Remove Sec. 51.323.

[FR Doc. 2025-21324 Filed 11-25-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P

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