Rule2025-21001
Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through the Equipment Authorization Program
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
November 25, 2025
Effective
December 26, 2025
Issuing agencies
Federal Communications Commission
Abstract
In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) clarifies that rules prohibiting authorization of covered equipment include modular transmitters and adopts a prohibition on authorization of devices that include modular transmitters that are covered equipment. The Commission also adopts a procedure to limit previously granted authorizations of covered equipment to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of such equipment. It further discusses the broad scope of the prohibition on authorization of equipment identified on the Covered List by clarifying the term "produced by" as used in the Commission's rules concerning covered equipment and clarifying the prohibition on modification to previously authorized covered equipment.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 225 (Tuesday, November 25, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 225 (Tuesday, November 25, 2025)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 53227-53237]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-21001]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 2
[ET Docket No. 21-232; FCC 25-71; FR ID 318540]
Protecting Against National Security Threats to the
Communications Supply Chain Through the Equipment Authorization Program
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission or FCC) clarifies that rules prohibiting authorization of
covered equipment include modular transmitters and adopts a prohibition
on authorization of devices that include modular transmitters that are
covered equipment. The Commission also adopts a procedure to limit
previously granted authorizations of covered equipment to prohibit the
continued importation and marketing of such equipment. It further
discusses the broad scope of the prohibition on authorization of
equipment identified on the Covered List by clarifying the term
``produced by'' as used in the Commission's rules concerning covered
equipment and clarifying the prohibition on modification to previously
authorized covered equipment.
DATES: Effective December 26, 2025.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jamie Coleman of the Office of
Engineering and Technology, at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#a7edc6cacec289e4c8cbc2cac6c9e7c1c4c489c0c8d1"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="2369424e4a460d604c4f464e424d634540400d444c55">[email protected]</span></a> or 202-418-2705.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Second
Report and Order, in ET Docket No. 21-232, FCC 25-71, adopted on
October 28, 2025, and released on October 29, 2025. The full text of
this document is available for public inspection and can be downloaded
at <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-71A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-71A1.pdf</a>. Alternative
formats are available for people with disabilities (Braille, large
[[Page 53228]]
print, electronic files, audio format) by sending an email to
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6c0a0f0f595c582c0a0f0f420b031a"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="6a0c09095f5a5e2a0c0909440d051c">[email protected]</span></a> or calling the Commission's Consumer and Governmental
Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 (voice), (202) 418-0432 (TTY).
Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980,
as amended (RFA), requires that an agency prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis for notice-and-comment rulemaking, unless the
agency certifies that ``the rule will not, if promulgated, have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.'' Accordingly, the Commission has prepared a Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) concerning the possible impact of the rule
and policy changes contained in the Second Report and Order on small
entities. The FRFA is set forth in Appendix C of the Second Report and
Order.
Paperwork Reduction Act. This document contains proposed new or
modified information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13. The Commission, as part
of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, will be inviting
the general public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
comment on any information collection requirements contained in this
document. In addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief
Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), the
Commission will seek specific comment on how it might ``further reduce
the information collection burden for small business concerns with
fewer than 25 employees.''
Congressional Review Act. The Commission has determined, and the
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget, concurs, that this rule is ``non-
major'' under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The
Commission will send a copy of the Second Report and Order and Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Congress and the Government
Accountability Office pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
Synopsis
In November 2022, as part of the Commission's ongoing efforts to
protect the security of America's communications networks and equipment
supply chains, the Commission adopted the Equipment Authorization
Security Report and Order, Order, and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, ET Docket No. 21-232 and EA Docket 21-233 (EA Security R&O
and FNPRM). In that item, the Commission adopted rules as part of its
equipment authorization program to prohibit authorization of
communications equipment that has been determined to ``pose an
unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the
security and safety of United States persons'' (covered equipment),
which the Commission publishes in its Covered List. The rules
constituted significant changes to the prior equipment authorization
program. The Commission recognized that these revisions were only first
steps and that further revisions should be considered to better ensure
effective implementation of this prohibition. In the FNPRM portion of
the item, the Commission sought comment on taking additional steps in
the equipment authorization program to protect our nation's
communications networks and supply chains. Building on the record
received, Commission experience implementing the prohibition, and other
recent Commission actions aimed at protecting our nation's
communications networks and supply chain, the Commission adopted this
Second Report and Order to take important next steps in modifying the
equipment authorization program.
Background
Enacted in March 2020, the Secure Networks Act requires the
Commission to publish a list of equipment and services that pose ``an
unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the
security and safety of United States persons'' based solely on specific
determinations made by certain enumerated sources (Covered List). In
June 2021, the Commission initiated this proceeding in Protecting
Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain
through the Equipment Authorization Program; Protecting Against
National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through
the Equipment Authorization Program, ET Docket No. 21-232 & EA Docket
No. 21-233, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry (2021)
(EA Security NPRM). The Commission noted that this proceeding--which
involves revising the Commission's equipment authorization program--is
part of the Commission's overall efforts in carrying out its important
role in protecting the security of America's equipment supply chains,
and also is part of the ongoing efforts of Congress, the Executive
Branch, and the Commission to identify and eliminate potential security
vulnerabilities in communications networks and supply chains.
In the EA Security R&O and FNPRM, the Commission established
several new rules to prohibit authorization of equipment identified on
the Commission's Covered List developed pursuant to the Secure Networks
Act. In particular, the Commission adopted several revisions to its
part 2 rules concerning equipment authorization requirements,
processes, and guidance that involve significant changes to the
equipment authorization program. These changes include new requirements
placed on applicants seeking equipment authorizations as well as
``responsible parties'' associated with equipment authorizations and
entities that are identified on the Covered List. These rules also
place significant new responsibilities on telecommunication
certification bodies (TCBs), private third-party organizations
recognized by the Commission and to which the Commission has delegated
particular responsibilities pursuant to section 302 of the
Communications Act. TCBs are now tasked with reviewing equipment
authorization applications and certifying that the subject equipment
complies with all applicable Commission requirements, both technical
(such as based on information submitted by test labs) and non-technical
(such as those prohibiting authorization of covered equipment).
These rules require that, going forward, no communications
equipment produced by entities identified on the Covered List can
obtain an equipment authorization unless the authorization is pursuant
to the certification process, which would require filing an application
with supporting data that TCBs review. Commission rules no longer
permit authorization of any such equipment through the Supplier's
Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) procedures, which does not require an
application filing, nor can such equipment now qualify for any
exemption from the need for an equipment authorization. To help
implement the prohibition on authorization of any covered equipment,
applicants seeking such authorization are required to make certain
attestations (in the form of certifications) about the equipment for
which they seek authorization-these include attesting that the
equipment is not covered and indicating whether the applicant is an
entity identified on the Covered List. To further help with
implementation of the prohibition, the Commission adopted a requirement
that each of the entities named on the Covered List file a report with
the Commission identifying its
[[Page 53229]]
associated but unnamed entities (e.g., its subsidiaries and
affiliates). TCBs, pursuant to their responsibilities as part of the
Commission's equipment authorization program, review the applications
and must ensure that only devices that meet all of the Commission's
applicable technical and non-technical requirements are ultimately
granted authorization, and that none of these grants are for covered
equipment. To help TCBs perform their responsibilities, and to provide
guidance to TCBs, applicants, and other interested parties, the
Commission provides guidance on what constitutes covered equipment,
with delegated authority to the Office of Engineering and Technology
(OET) and the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) to
update that guidance as appropriate. The Commission has also adopted
streamlined revocation procedures for authorizations of equipment in
cases in which an applicant submitted false statements or
representations in the newly required attestations relating to the
equipment for which they had sought authorization.
In adopting the EA Security R&O and FNPRM, the Commission decided
not to require, at that time, that the applicant make attestations that
address individual component parts contained within the applicant's
equipment and it did not revoke previously granted authorizations of
covered equipment. The Commission determined that both of these
matters, along with several other issues, would receive further
consideration.
The Commission sought comment on whether the presence of certain
component parts would result in the device being covered equipment
prohibited from authorization and, if so, how the prohibition should be
implemented in the Commission's equipment authorization program. It
also sought comment on the role that applicants and responsible parties
would play were the Commission to prohibit authorization of devices
that include certain component parts. In addition, it sought comment on
the extent to which the Commission should revoke any previous
authorizations of covered equipment and, if so, based on which
considerations and procedures, and the scope such revocations should
take, as well as the extent to which it should take into account supply
chain considerations. It also sought comment on whether to require all
applicants seeking equipment certification to have a U.S.-based
responsible party to help ensure compliance with the Commission's
equipment authorization program rules. Finally, the Commission sought
comment on various other issues concerning implementation of the
prohibition on authorization of covered equipment, such as applicants'
provision of additional information on equipment; additional activities
that TCBs should conduct in light of the goals of this proceeding; the
review of authorizations after grant by TCBs through post-market
surveillance; and enforcement of the Commission's newly-adopted rules.
Recent developments concerning the equipment authorization program.
In 2023, Hikvision USA, Inc. and Dahua Technology USA, Inc. petitioned
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to
review aspects of the Commission's EA Security R&O and FNPRM that
affected them. Hikvision USA, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission, 97 F.4th 938 (D.C. Cir. 2024). On April 2, 2024, the court
issued a partial remand concerning one part of the Commission's
decision. Specifically, the court vacated those portions of the
Commission's decision defining ``critical infrastructure'' for purposes
of understanding when video surveillance and telecommunications
equipment produced by Hytera Communications Corporation (Hytera),
Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company (Hikvision), and Dahua
Technology Company (Dahua) (or their respective subsidiaries and
affiliates) is used ``for the purpose of . . . physical security
surveillance of critical infrastructure,'' statutory language drawn
from Congress's proscription regarding such equipment as set forth in
section 889(f)(3) of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019
(NDAA). The court found that the Commission's definition of ``critical
infrastructure'' was ``unjustifiably broad,'' and remanded those
portions of the Equipment Authorization Security R&O to the Commission
to ``comport its definition and justification for it'' with the NDAA
statutory provision.
In May 2025, the Commission adopted Promoting the Integrity and
Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement
Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program, ET Docket No. 24-
136 (2025) (EA Integrity R&O and FNPRM), in which it took steps, and
proposed further steps, to promote the integrity and security of TCBs,
measurement facilities (test labs), and laboratory accreditation
bodies, which play an integral role in the Commission's equipment
authorization program. Specifically, it adopted a prohibition on FCC
recognition of any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body
owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited
entity (as defined by the EA Integrity R&O and FNPRM). These entities
are barred from participating in the Commission's equipment
authorization program, including both the equipment certification
process and SDoC process. To help ensure that the Commission has the
necessary information to enforce this prohibition, the Commission
expanded its reporting and certification requirements for all
recognized TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies to
certify to the Commission that they are not owned by, controlled by, or
subject to the direction of a prohibited entity and to report all
equity or voting interests of 5% or greater by any entity. It also
adopted amendments to the rules to state that the Commission will not
recognize--and will revoke any existing recognition of--any TCB, test
lab, or laboratory accreditation body that fails to provide, or that
provides a false or inaccurate, certification; or that fails to
provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information regarding equity
or voting interests of 5% or greater. In addition, it also clarified
that Commission rules apply equally to all TCBs, test labs, and
laboratory accreditation bodies regardless of the existence of MRAs or
the physical location of the relevant facility. In the EA Integrity R&O
and FNPRM, the Commission proposed and sought comment on further
measures to safeguard the integrity of the equipment authorization
program. Namely, it sought comment on whether to extend the
prohibitions to also include entities subject to the jurisdiction of a
foreign adversary and whether to expand the group of prohibited
entities to include several additional lists from federal agencies or
statutes. It also sought further comment on ways the Commission can
facilitate and encourage more equipment authorization testing to occur
at test labs located within the United States or United States allied
countries. Finally, it sought further comment on post-market
surveillance procedures to ensure compliance relating to prohibitions
on authorization of covered equipment.
Report and Order
In the Second Report and Order, the Commission clarifies that rules
prohibiting authorization of covered equipment include modular
transmitters and adopts a prohibition on authorization of devices that
include modular transmitters that are covered equipment. The Commission
also adopts a procedure to limit previously granted authorizations of
covered equipment to prohibit the continued importation and marketing
of such
[[Page 53230]]
equipment. The Commission further discusses the broad scope of the
prohibition on authorization of equipment identified on the Covered
List by clarifying the term ``produced by'' as used in the rules
concerning covered equipment and clarifying the prohibition on
modification to previously authorized covered equipment.
Prohibition on Modular Transmitters on the Covered List
In general, the Commission permits authorization of transmitters as
standalone devices that can then be incorporated into a host device
that may either rely on the authorization of that modular transmitter
or require its own additional authorization. Because modular
transmitters are not required to obtain their own authorization as
standalone devices, they can also be incorporated as a component in a
host device that requires its own authorization. In this Second Report
and Order, the Commission clarifies that the existing rules prohibiting
the authorization of covered equipment include modular transmitters.
The Commission also now further prohibits the authorization of any
device that includes a modular transmitter when that modular
transmitter is itself covered equipment. Under the existing attestation
requirement, applicants and responsible parties will be required to
attest that the subject equipment for which authorization is sought
does not include such modular transmitters. The Commission finds that
these rule modifications advance both FCC national security objectives
and the congressional directive to prevent the authorization of
equipment that poses an unacceptable risk to national security.
Background. In the EA Security NPRM adopted in June 2021, the
Commission proposed to require that applicants, when seeking equipment
authorization, ``attest that no equipment (including component part) is
comprised of any `covered' equipment,'' as identified on the Covered
List. Many commenters opposed including an attestation requirement that
considered component parts. In the subsequently adopted EA Security R&O
and FNPRM, the Commission required that each applicant attest that the
equipment for which it seeks authorization is not covered equipment,
but it declined at that time, based on the state of the record and the
need for further consideration, to require that the applicant
attestation address individual component parts contained within the
applicant's equipment. In declining to address component parts at that
time, the Commission noted that it was seeking further comment on
potentially including certain component parts within the scope of
covered equipment.
In seeking comment, the Commission ``endeavor[ed] to ensure that
equipment [ ] that include[s] component parts that pose an unacceptable
risk to national security also be prohibited from authorization.''
Accordingly, the Commission, noting many of the concerns that
commenters raised, sought comment on whether certain component parts,
if included in equipment, would result in that equipment being covered
equipment prohibited from authorization, and, if so, how the
prohibition on the inclusion of any such component parts in equipment
could be implemented in the Commission's equipment authorization
program. In particular, the Commission sought comment on whether it
should attempt to identify components based on a risk assessment (e.g.,
examining whether the equipment contains components that are produced
by entities identified on the Covered List and that process and retain
data, or that only process data). The Commission recognized that if it
prohibited certain component parts, it would need to provide guidance
on which components would be prohibited.
The Commission focused much discussion on seeking comment on
prohibiting authorization of equipment that incorporates as component
parts certain types of modules produced by entities on the Covered
List, whether authorized under the Commission's certification
procedures or under the SDoC procedures. As explained, the Commission
permits specific types of modules-modular transmitters-to be authorized
as ``standalone'' equipment under existing rules (provided the
equipment meets all applicable Commission requirements). A modular
transmitter is a completely self-contained transmitter that only
requires an input signal and power source to make it functional. 47 CFR
15.212. Commission rules provide that when an authorized modular
transmitter is incorporated as a component part into another product,
host, or device (e.g., composite systems, personal computers), no
further equipment authorization is required insofar as the final
product, host, or device conforms to the terms of the module's
authorization. Considering these existing rules, the Commission further
noted that telecommunications or video surveillance equipment could
contain, as component parts, one or more such modular transmitters
produced by entities identified on the Covered List, or could be
assembled as a composite system and contain such equipment.
The Commission specifically asked whether applicants (under
certification procedures) and responsible parties (under SDoC
procedures) should be required to use the Commission's equipment
certification procedures to obtain an equipment authorization if the
equipment or composite system includes, as a component part, a modular
transmitter produced by an entity identified on the Covered List.
Further, the Commission inquired whether it should apply this equipment
certification requirement to any equipment that incorporates, as a
component part, a previously authorized modular transmitter produced by
these entities (i.e., a modular transmitter authorized prior to
adoption of the Commission's rules prohibiting authorization of covered
equipment). It also asked about potential additional costs in time and
money that such approaches would impose on device developers.
Similarly, the Commission inquired whether composite systems should be
treated in the same general manner as modular transmitters. Relatedly,
the Commission asked whether it should deem as covered equipment (and
thus prohibited from authorization) any equipment that includes a
component part that could be authorized as equipment on a standalone
basis but for the fact that the standalone equipment would be
prohibited from authorization as covered equipment.
Further, the Commission asked for comment on the potential impact
that prohibiting authorization of particular component parts (those
that would be deemed covered equipment) would have on both equipment
security and the economy. Specifically, it sought comment and data on
the effect of prohibiting particular component parts on the U.S. market
(including quantity and market share of modules or other component
parts that might be prohibited in products intended for sale in the
U.S. market), the availability and costs of substitute modules,
devices, and component parts from suppliers that are not identified on
the Covered List, and the average lifespan/product cycle of affected
final products. It also inquired about the different impacts on both
equipment security and the economy that would be expected depending on
the breadth of the scope of a component part(s) prohibition. In
addition, the Commission generally sought comment on supply chain
considerations, including whether the Commission should take into
account
[[Page 53231]]
how any prohibition of modular transmitters, if implemented immediately
without advance notice or opportunity for the development of
alternative sources of equipment, could have a deleterious effect on
the public interest.
The Commission received many comments on potentially including as
covered equipment certain component parts produced by entities
identified on the Covered List. Commenters include equipment and vendor
associations, industry associations, U.S. equipment producers,
consultants, producers of covered equipment, small businesses, and
think tanks.
Discussion. Consistent with the potential approach on modules
discussed in the EA Security R&O and FNPRM, the Commission concludes
that any ``modular transmitter'' (as defined in 47 CFR 15.212) that is
covered equipment is prohibited from authorization under the rules.
Furthermore, it concludes that authorizing equipment that includes such
a modular transmitter would effectively be authorizing the transmitter.
As such, the Commission prohibits from authorization any modular
transmitter that is covered equipment, and any product, host, or device
that incorporates a modular transmitter that is covered equipment,
regardless of any previous authorization of the modular transmitter.
This includes any transmitter identified on the Covered List that
otherwise could be authorized as a module or on a standalone basis
regardless of whether it is authorized. The Commission believes this
particular approach is necessary to ensure that modular transmitters
that pose an unacceptable risk to national security or the safety and
security of U.S. persons cannot be imported or marketed in the United
States either as standalone devices or as incorporated into another
device. And it believes that this approach ensures that it is
addressing the national security threats that Congress intended for the
Commission to address in the Secure Equipment Act, when Congress
directed the Commission to not ``approve any application for equipment
authorization for [covered] equipment.''
Section 15.212 provides for a standalone authorization of modular
transmitters under the Commission's certification procedures. 47 CFR
15.212. The Commission concludes that modular transmitters, as defined
in Sec. 15.212, constitute communications equipment insofar as they
are used in fixed or mobile broadband networks and provide high-speed,
switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to
originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video
telecommunications using any technology with connection speeds of at
least 200 kbps in either direction. To the extent that a modular
transmitter falls within the scope of what constitutes covered
communications equipment under Commission rules, the modular
transmitter is itself covered equipment and thereby prohibited from
authorization under the rules. 47 CFR 2.903(a), 1.50001(d).
Many modular transmitters are designed to be incorporated into
equipment to enable that equipment to have certain critical or
essential functionalities associated with the provision of fixed or
mobile services. While such transmitters could be independently
authorized, they are not required to be. Given the conclusion that
Commission rules prohibit from authorization standalone transmitters
that fall within the scope of what constitutes covered equipment, the
Commission correspondingly prohibits from authorization equipment that
includes, as a component part, a transmitter that meets the
requirements for a modular transmitter, even if the transmitter is not
independently authorized as a module. The Commission notes that
cellular IoT devices would fall within the scope of modular
transmitters under Commission rules. This approach is consistent with
the Commission's suggested approach in the EA Security R&O and FNPRM to
prohibit authorization of any equipment that includes a component part
that could be authorized on a standalone basis but for the fact that
the standalone equipment would be prohibited from authorization.
Because this communications equipment is covered equipment, preventing
authorization of equipment that includes this covered equipment is
necessary and appropriate, and consistent with the Commission's
authority under the Act, the Secure Networks Act, and the Secure
Equipment Act to prohibit authorization of equipment that poses an
unacceptable risk to national security, and covered equipment more
specifically. That is, the Commission concludes that granting an
authorization for equipment that includes a modular transmitter that is
covered equipment would, in effect, be granting an authorization to
equipment that, by inclusion of this covered modular transmitter, would
pose an unacceptable risk to national security and would undermine
Congress's goals in the Secure Equipment Act when it directed the
Commission to cease authorizing covered equipment. The Commission
agrees with the Heritage Foundation that such equipment can ``present[
] risks to national security that are equally severe as risks from
finished products.'' Authorizing devices containing one or more covered
modular transmitters is tantamount to authorizing the modular
transmitter(s). It makes little sense for the Commission to prohibit
certain modular transmitters from obtaining independent authorization,
but to allow authorization for devices containing exactly those modular
transmitters. In this sense, the Commission agrees with the Hudson
Institute that continued authorization of devices that contain these
modular transmitters ``undermine the intent of'' the Secure Networks
Act and the Secure Equipment Act.
The Commission therefore modifies its rules to explicitly prohibit
authorization of any modular transmitter that is covered equipment, and
any product, host, or device that incorporates a modular transmitter
that is covered equipment, regardless of whether the Commission
previously authorized that modular transmitter. Modular transmitters,
as defined in Sec. 15.212 of the Commission's rules, that can be
authorized under the rules as standalone devices (each consisting of a
completely self-contained transmitter device) and incorporated into
other devices, include ``single-modular transmitters,'' ``split-modular
transmitters,'' and ``limited modular transmitters.'' The Commission
also includes in its prohibition modular transmitters that operate
pursuant to licensed radio services rules. The Commission concludes
that this prohibition furthers the objectives of the equipment security
rules, as well as the congressional directive to prohibit authorization
of equipment that poses an unacceptable risk to national security. In
adopting rules to prohibit use of modular transmitters in equipment for
which authorization is sought, the Commission is in effect prohibiting
composite systems that include modular transmitters that are covered
equipment.
The Commission rejects the contention of some commenters either
that the Commission may not have the requisite legal authority to
prohibit use of any component parts or that only the enumerated sources
identified in the Secure Networks Act should make determinations on
whether component parts constitute covered equipment. First, the only
component parts that the Commission is prohibiting with the rules
announced in this item are those
[[Page 53232]]
that are themselves covered equipment, which have already been
determined to pose ``an unacceptable risk to the national security of
the United States or the security and safety of United States
persons.'' 47 U.S.C. 1601(b); 47 CFR 1.50002(b)(1). While the
Commission lacks independent authority to add new equipment to the
Covered List without the specific determination of an enumerated source
or direction from Congress, it concludes that the Commission has the
requisite RF equipment expertise to reach the conclusion that whatever
unacceptable risks are posed by modular transmitters are posed
regardless of whether those modular transmitters are initially approved
as standalone devices or incorporated within a product, host, or
device, as modular transmitters are generally intended to be. In
issuing this prohibition, the Commission is not making impermissible
national security determinations. The Commission is rather using its
decades-long technical expertise concerning RF equipment and
familiarity with its equipment authorization process to close a
loophole that would undermine both the Secure Equipment Act's
directives and Congress's and the Executive Branch's determinations as
to national security risks.
Second, the Secure Equipment Act directed the Commission to ``adopt
rules in the [EA Security NPRM proceeding].'' Congress thus directed
the Commission to adopt final rules in a proceeding which had proposed
to require that applicants ``attest that no equipment (including
component parts) is comprised of any `covered' equipment, as identified
on the [Covered List].'' Had Congress (incongruously) intended for the
Commission to not authorize certain covered equipment but to authorize
devices containing covered equipment, Congress could have prohibited
the Commission from addressing components parts, as proposed. Congress
chose not to.
Third, even in the absence of the Secure Equipment Act, the
Commission concludes that the Commission possesses sufficient legal
authority under the Act to implement the prohibitions contained in this
section. As explained in the EA Security R&O and FNPRM, section 302 of
the Act authorizes the Commission to make regulations ``consistent with
the public interest, convenience, and necessity . . . governing the
interference potential of [radio frequency] devices.'' This public
interest regulatory authority implicates other statutory
responsibilities, including the missions for which the Commission was
created--promoting national defense and the safety of life and
property; interests clearly furthered by prohibiting the importation
and marketing of devices that pose ``unacceptable risks to the national
security of the United States or the safety and security of United
States persons.'' 47 U.S.C. 1601. Other statutory authorities confirm
this. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. 303(g), 303(e), 303(r), 154(i). If there was
any doubt that the Commission possessed this pre-existing authority,
Congress confirmed it with the Secure Equipment Act. The Secure
Equipment Act's direction of Congress to adopt rules in the EA Security
NPRM ratified the Commission's tentative legal conclusions and
decisively established the Commission's legal authority to enact the
proposals in the EA Security NPRM, one of which was to require
attestation as to component parts.
Limitation on Existing Authorization of Covered Equipment
The Commission sets forth a process to place limitations on
previously granted authorizations of covered equipment to prohibit the
continued importation and marketing of such equipment. Through this
approach, the Commission aims to effectively address the established
national security risks posed by previously authorized covered
equipment while minimizing the impact on users. The goal is to mitigate
potential national security risks associated with covered equipment
that was authorized prior to adoption of the EA Security R&O and FNPRM
in November 2022.
Background. In the EA Security R&O and FNPRM, the Commission
adopted a prohibition on the authorization, going forward, of covered
equipment, and concluded that it has the requisite legal authority
under the Act, confirmed by the Secure Equipment Act, to revoke
existing authorizations, but it did not at that time revoke any
existing authorizations. The Commission also adopted streamlined
revocation procedures for equipment authorizations granted after
adoption of the prohibition if the applicant included a false statement
or representation that the equipment for which it had sought and
obtained a grant is not ``covered'' equipment. The Commission sought
further comment on the issues raised in the EA Security NPRM concerning
revocation of covered equipment authorizations granted prior to the
Commission's adoption of a prohibition on authorization of such
equipment. It sought to expand the record that developed in response to
the EA Security NPRM, particularly in light of the actions taken and
guidance provided in the EA Security R&O and FNPRM, and sought comment
on several different issues concerning revocation.
Specifically, the Commission sought comment on the scope of
revocation of existing authorizations the Commission should consider,
whether there might be situations that would warrant revocation in
certain circumstances and, if so, how the Commission should identify
particular covered equipment for which continued authorization poses an
unacceptable risk to national security. Further, considering the
potential risk to national security, it asked whether the Commission
should consider revoking all existing authorizations of covered
equipment and, if so, how such revocations could be implemented. The
Commission also asked to what extent revocation of any particular
equipment should depend on establishing a reimbursement program. It
also inquired how supply chain issues or consumer-related concerns
should figure into the Commission's considerations, and what
information and data might be useful to such a consideration. The
Commission requested comment on an appropriate transition period in the
event that the Commission were to decide to revoke any existing
authorizations of covered equipment. In addition, the Commission sought
comment on what process to use for revocation of existing
authorizations, and whether it should adopt different or expedited
procedures than provided for under Sec. 2.939 of the Commission's
rules. Further, the Commission asked about the best enforcement
mechanisms of any revocation, such as an enforcement policy to address
violations related to the continued marketing, sale, or operation of
covered equipment for which authorization was revoked. The Commission
asked what educational and outreach efforts may be needed to inform the
public of any revocations of covered equipment authorizations.
The Commission also requested comment on possible alternative
approaches to full revocation of existing authorizations. It sought
comment on what it termed a ``partial'' revocation by which the
continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered
equipment would be prohibited without impacting the continued use of
such equipment. The Commission noted that such an approach could
eliminate user device replacement costs while also promoting national
security concerns related to the continued importation and marketing of
this equipment.
Commenters, including CTA, CTIA, TIA, Competitive Carriers
Association, and NCTA generally oppose any
[[Page 53233]]
widespread revocation of existing authorizations of covered equipment
that would require removal and replacement of equipment in use, while
other commenters, including ITI, ZTE, Hikvision, and Dahua, contend
that any revocation of existing authorizations is precluded by the
Secure Equipment Act or otherwise would violate due process. Some
commenters are supportive of a broad revocation of covered equipment
authorizations. Finally, some commenters state that, apart from
retroactive revocation of existing authorizations (including
prohibiting continued use of equipment) or revocation of authorizations
of specific equipment based on extraordinary circumstances, the
Commission could consider some form of prospective approach to
revocation of covered equipment that would prohibit the future
marketing or sale of currently authorized covered equipment.
Discussion. To promote the goal of mitigating the national security
risks associated with previously authorized covered equipment in our
nation's infrastructure and communications supply chain, the Commission
adopts a procedure whereby the Commission can limit previously granted
authorizations of covered equipment to prohibit the continued
importation and marketing, without prohibiting the continued use of
such devices. This is a simplified, prospective approach along the
general lines of the prospective ``partial'' revocation proposal on
which the Commission sought comment in the EA Security R&O and FNPRM
that would not affect consumers' continued use or operation of devices
they already possess. Absent a process by which the Commission can
restrict the continued importation and marketing of covered equipment,
it is concerned that already-authorized covered equipment devices would
continue to flow into our nation and into the infrastructure and
communications supply chain, which could contribute to further
unacceptable risks. These devices have been determined to pose ``an
unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the
security and safety of United States persons'' alongside all other
covered equipment. 47 U.S.C. 1601(b)(1). The Commission further
concludes that it is insufficient to rely solely on the obsolescence of
particular equipment models to abate the inflow of more covered
equipment. Years-old covered devices are still widely sold in the U.S.,
suggesting obsolescence is not a quick process. Older models of covered
equipment poses an unacceptable risk today when imported or marketed in
the United States, not only when such equipment is new to the market.
Waiting many years for this equipment to become obsolete would not
address the present ``unacceptable risks. The Commission agrees with
the Heritage Foundation that certain previously authorized devices that
are now considered covered equipment ``likely remains marketable in the
United States'' and ``may present continuing national security
threats.'' Furthermore, as FDD noted, such devices, embedded within
American communications networks, ``can still undergo firmware updates,
conduct remote communication, and transmit data back to their
manufacturers.''
In the EA Security R&O and FNPRM, the Commission concluded that it
has the requisite authority under the Act to review any existing
authorization for covered equipment, and to determine the necessity for
revoking such authorization, and that the Commission can undertake such
revocation pursuant to current rules. Under its current rules in Sec.
2.939(a), the Commission has already established procedures to revoke
an equipment authorization because of conditions coming to the
attention of the Commission which would warrant it in refusing to grant
an original application. 47 CFR 2.939(a)(4). In the case of previously
authorized covered equipment, the implementation of the Covered List
and the resulting prohibition on authorization of equipment identified
on the Covered List create conditions that would warrant the Commission
in refusing to grant an original application for any covered equipment.
47 CFR 1.50002, 2.903. The Commission does not today alter the existing
process to revoke covered equipment, as proposed in the EA Security R&O
and FNPRM, which in most cases involve the process generally afforded
radio licenses. 47 CFR 2.939(b). Instead, the Commission adopts a new
process well-tailored to address unacceptable national security risks
without disrupting continued use or operation of devices.
The Commission revises the rules to adopt a procedure to limit the
scope of an existing authorization of covered equipment to prohibit
continued importation or marketing of such equipment, without revoking
the underlying authorization. The Commission has in various proceedings
adopted prohibitions on the manufacture and importation of equipment
where doing so served the public interest. Section 302 of the Act
authorizes the Commission--consistent with the public interest,
convenience, and necessity--to promulgate regulations applicable to the
manufacture, import, sale, offer for sale, shipment, and use of
radiofrequency devices and to prohibit the manufacture, import, sale,
offer for sale, shipment, or use of such devices that fail to comply
with those regulations. 47 U.S.C. 302a(b). Consistent with existing
regulatory procedures to revoke an equipment authorization, the
Commission finds, through this rulemaking proceeding, it has the
requisite authority to evaluate, craft, and implement this process to
limit the scope of an existing authorization of covered equipment to
prohibit continued importation and marketing of such equipment, and to
establish a procedure to apply this limitation as appropriate. This
action is consistent with ``the public interest'' insofar as it
protects American communications networks from devices specifically
determined to ``pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of
the United States or the security and safety of United States
persons.'' 47 U.S.C. 1601(b).
While commenters generally oppose widespread revocation of existing
authorizations of covered equipment, several commenters recommend that,
instead of widespread revocation of existing authorizations, or
revoking particular authorizations because of ``extraordinary''
circumstances, the Commission should take a prospective approach to
addressing existing authorizations along the lines suggested in the EA
Security R&O and FNPRM, under which the Commission would only consider
whether to prohibit in some manner the future importation and marketing
of previously authorized covered equipment while allowing the continued
operation of equipment already in use. This allows the Commission to
avoid the ``[e]conomic harms associated with removing and replacing
Covered List equipment.'' The Commission agrees, and adopts such an
approach in this Second Report and Order--limiting equipment
authorizations to prohibit importation and marketing, while allowing
for continued operation of the relevant devices.
The Commission revises Sec. 2.939 of its rules by adopting a
mechanism to limit the continued importation and marketing of such
previously authorized covered equipment. The Commission delegates
authority to OET and PSHSB to apply such prohibitions pursuant to the
framework and process described here. The Commission revises Sec. Sec.
2.803 and 2.1204 to clarify that equipment that has been subject to
such a
[[Page 53234]]
limitation cannot be marketed or imported.
For such previously authorized covered equipment, OET and PSHSB
shall provide, through public notice, a brief analysis of the relevant
factors that would justify limitation on the authorization of
previously authorized covered equipment prohibiting the importation and
marketing of such. In each such public notice, OET and PSHSB will
specify the class, type, or other description sufficient to identify
the devices, including reference to all devices included in a specific
Covered List entry, targeted for potential limitations on importation
and marketing. The Commission directs OET and PSHSB to include in the
analysis, and seek comment on, any relevant public interest factors,
such as economic and supply chain considerations. This analysis will
primarily rely upon the details of the relevant specific
determination(s) used to inform a given entry on the Covered List. In
the public interest analysis, OET and PSHSB must give particular weight
to the fact that the relevant equipment was determined to pose ``an
unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the
safety and security of United States persons.'' 47 U.S.C. 1601(b)(1).
After all, as the Supreme Court has noted in another context, ``[i]t is
obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling
than the security of the Nation,'' and the Commission has a long
history of relying on national security determinations to inform its
public interest analysis. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
Nonetheless, in certain instances, OET and PSHSB could conclude
that other factors outweigh the national security risks. The most
relevant sources of information for these other public interest factors
are the given specific determinations, and accompanying analyses or
rules, themselves. For example, OET and PSHSB recently sought public
input on updating the Covered List to include certain equipment related
to connected vehicles pursuant to a Commerce Department determination.
In the same rule in which the Commerce Department made its specific
determinations regarding ``unacceptable risks,'' the Commerce
Department also delayed the effectiveness of its own restrictions,
explaining that ``determining the scope of the prohibitions required a
balancing of the need to address the undue or unacceptable risk posed
by foreign adversary involvement in the connected vehicles supply chain
with the impact on the public and industry.'' Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Industry and Security, Securing the Information and
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected
Vehicles, 90 FR 5360, 5363 (Jan. 16, 2025). While such balancing
cannot, under the Secure Equipment Act, affect the Commission's updates
to the Covered List and prohibition on granting new equipment
authorizations to covered equipment, the Commission may consider such
countervailing economic concerns when implementing the prohibitions for
already-authorized devices outlined in this rule.
While the specific determination must be the centerpiece of OET and
PSHSB's analysis, they also will fully consider evidence in the
Commission's record regarding whether to adopt a limitation on an
existing authorization with regard to continued importation or
marketing of the equipment. The public notice must provide an
opportunity for public comment for a minimum of 30 days and may provide
an opportunity for reply comments if OET and PSHSB find it warranted.
After the end of the comment period(s), OET and PSHSB will review all
relevant information, request additional information if needed, and
make their determination as to whether to implement the prohibition on
importation and marketing, describing what equipment is subject to the
limitation, and providing the reasons for such. So as to promote
regulatory certainty and the continued confidence of the public in the
Commission's efforts to secure the communications equipment supply
chain, OET and PSHSB should take reasonable steps to conclude these
proceedings expeditiously after the end of the relevant comment period.
The Commission directs OET and PSHSB to, as soon as practicable,
institute proceedings to determine whether to apply these prohibitions
to some or all of the equipment currently on the Covered List. The
Commission also directs OET and PSHSB to, simultaneous with any future
addition of equipment to the Covered List or as soon as practicable
thereafter, issue a Public Notice requesting public comment on whether
to apply these prohibitions to such equipment.
For any devices for which an existing equipment authorization is
limited to prohibit continued importation and marketing (which includes
sale), the relevant responsible parties would be obligated to ensure
compliance with such prohibition. 47 CFR 2.803(a). For equipment
certifications, the responsible party is the party to whom the grant of
certification is issued, also referred to as the ``grantee.'' 47 CFR
2.909(a). As for SDoC authorizations of covered equipment, the
responsible party could be the manufacturer, the assembler, the
importer, retailers, original equipment manufacturers, or the party
performing modifications to the equipment. 47 CFR 2.909(b). OET and
PSHSB should include in the initial public notice proposed timelines by
which the responsible parties must cease all importation and marketing
activities and specifically seek comment on such, thereby encouraging
dialogue not only with the responsible parties but also with the
relevant manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, and other
interested entities. Such timeline considerations should include, in
addition to the underlying national security concerns, factors such as
the quantity of devices that have already been imported into the U.S.
and are available for or being held for marketing or sale, new or
recently updated device models that are en route to the U.S. or pending
shipment, and devices that are subject to executed distribution,
marketing, or sales agreements but have not yet entered the supply
chain although they are contemplated for such.
The Commission finds that this process will help to ensure that OET
and PSHSB are fully considering the ramifications of the implementation
of the proposed prohibition, not only with regard to the relevant
grantee or responsible party, but also the public at large. The
Commission is confident that this process will thereby effectuate an
outcome that remains consistent with the original specific
determination regarding the equipment pursuant to the Secure Networks
Act and the Secure Equipment Act while balancing the public interest
factors regarding the supply chain and consumer interests. Because this
limitation on existing authorizations would not result in the
revocation of an existing authorization of covered equipment, the
continued use of such equipment that is already in the hands of users
would remain authorized. The Commission thereby eliminates several
complexities and reduces the challenges that commenters suggested would
arise if the only manner to prohibit the importation and marketing of
already-authorized covered equipment was to engage in revocations that
also prohibit the use or operation of such covered equipment.
Broad Scope of the Prohibition on Authorization of Equipment Identified
on the Covered List
Interpreting whether equipment is ``produced by'' a specified
entity. To help implement the prohibition on
[[Page 53235]]
authorization of any covered equipment, applicants seeking equipment
certification are required to make certain attestations (in the form of
written and signed certifications) about the equipment for which they
seek authorization--these include certifying that the equipment is not
covered equipment and stating whether the applicant is an entity
identified on the Covered List (either a named entity or a subsidiary
or affiliate of the named entity). Congress, through the Secure
Networks Act, directed the Commission to add to the Covered List
equipment defined in 2019 NDAA Sec. 889, all of which is described as
``produced by'' certain entities: Huawei Technology Company, ZTE
Corporation, Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision
Digital Technology Company, Dahua Technology Company, and their
affiliates and subsidiaries. Accordingly, for purposes of their
attestations, applicants necessarily must determine whether the
equipment is ``produced by'' these entities. Similarly, to ensure that
no covered equipment is authorized through the SDoC process,
responsible parties that obtain authorizations under SDoC procedures
are required to attest that the equipment is not ``produced by'' any
entity identified on the Covered List.
FDD notes the potential ``ambiguity surrounding the term `produced
by' in the context of covered equipment.'' FDD expresses concern that
the term might not include certain complex forms of foreign adversary
control and encourages the Commission to formally adopt a broad
definition of the term to ensure that the Commission addresses
``instances in which covered vendors serve as original equipment
manufacturers or design contractors for companies not listed on the
Covered List.'' The Commission made clear in the EA Security R&O and
FNPRM that, considering the national security concerns implicated in
this proceeding, it was taking a ``broad and inclusive'' approach to
interpreting the scope of what constitutes covered equipment. The
Commission also expressed concern regarding authorization of re-branded
or re-labeled (``white labeled'') covered equipment produced by
entities identified on the Covered List, and it made clear that re-
branding or ``white labeling'' of any covered equipment does not change
the status of whether the equipment is covered equipment.
Consistent with the approach in the EA Security R&O and FNPRM, when
carrying out their responsibilities associated with the prohibition on
authorization of covered equipment under Sec. 2.903(a), or any of the
required attestations related to covered equipment, applicants,
responsible parties, and entities named in their reporting obligations
should take a broad view of the term ``produced by.'' This is
consistent with Congress's intent to guard against a broad array of
equipment through 2019 NDAA Sec. 889 and the Secure Networks Act.
Although the Commission declines to adopt a comprehensive definition of
``produced by'' as FDD suggests, it clarifies here that in determining
whether a device is ``produced by'' a particular entity, a broad
interpretation likely includes substantial responsibility for or
control over any major stage of the process by which a device comes
into existence. Accordingly, ``produced by'' is not limited to the
manufacture or assembly of a device. For example, a device would
generally be considered to have been ``produced by'' Huawei if Huawei
designed, manufactured, assembled, or developed the device.
Furthermore, the Commission ordinarily assumes that any entity
submitting an application for certification or serving as the
responsible party for SDoC would be considered among those producing
the device. It is entirely possible that a device would be understood
as ``produced by'' more than one entity. Determining whether a device
is produced by a particular entity could be based on multiple factors
or the totality of circumstances, particularly when considering the
role played by multiple entities to bring a device into existence. The
Commission notes that this analysis would not necessarily apply to
future listings of equipment on the Covered List. Such listings may use
different language that indicates an intent to capture a larger or
smaller set of communications equipment.
Modification of equipment, including permissive changes. In the EA
Security R&O and FNPRM, the Commission adopted revisions to Sec. 2.932
regarding modifications to equipment (e.g., changes in the design,
circuitry, or construction of the device) and Sec. 2.1043 concerning
changes to certified equipment, such as ``permissive changes.'' The
Commission noted that a modification to authorized equipment could
result in the later identification of that equipment as covered and
determined that it could not allow the continued authorization of
modified equipment if, at the time of such modification, the equipment
is covered equipment. The Commission adopted requirements, similar to
the revised provisions of Sec. 2.911, that all applications or
requests to modify already certified equipment include a written and
signed certification that the equipment is not prohibited from
receiving an equipment authorization pursuant to Sec. 2.903. 47 CFR
2.1043(b)(2)(i)(B), (b)(3)(i)(B). It also required an affirmative or
negative statement as to whether the applicant is identified on the
Covered List, as well as the written and signed certifications required
under Sec. 2.911(d)(6) regarding an agent for service of process
within the United States. 47 CFR 2.1043(b)(2)(i)(C), (b)(3)(i)(C). The
Commission adopted the same provisions for requests for Class II and
III permissive changes pursuant to Sec. 2.1043. The Commission found
these revisions sufficient to prevent modified equipment from
maintaining authorization when such modifications occur at a time after
which such equipment has been identified as posing a risk and thereby
appearing on the Covered List.
The Commission now clarifies that its intent adopting these
provisions was to prohibit modification, including permissive changes,
to previously authorized covered equipment or equipment that would
become covered as a result of such modification or permissive change.
This clarification is consistent with Congress's direction to the
Commission in the Secure Equipment Act to ``clarify that it will no
longer review or approve any application for equipment authorization
for'' covered equipment. Any application for authorization of covered
equipment is thereby prohibited under Sec. 2.903, including
applications for permissive changes. For permissive changes that do not
require an application and thereby are not reviewed by the Commission,
the prohibition still applies because such changes are approved by the
Commission if they meet the requirements of that type of change as
provided in the rules (i.e., they are ``approved by rule''). The
Commission further modifies the rule revisions of Sec. Sec. 2.932 and
2.1043 adopted in the EA Security R&O and FNPRM to clarify this
prohibition.
Benefits and Costs
The Commission finds the targeted measures of this Second Report
and Order will advance national security objectives in an efficient
manner without incurring substantial costs. The measures on the
prohibition of modular transmitters and on the broad scope of the
prohibition on authorization of equipment produced by entities
identified on the Covered List are clarifications of the measures from
the EA Security R&O and FNPRM. As such,
[[Page 53236]]
these represent minimal changes that simply ensure realization of the
original benefits and costs of the EA Security R&O and FNPRM. The
measures on limitation of existing authorization of covered equipment
will involve additional work in compliance from affected entities. As
previously stated, the Commission finds that these measures are
necessary because obsolescence is insufficient to completely address
issues with already authorized covered equipment. However, the
Commission does believe that obsolescence will mitigate compliance
costs due to the relatively short equipment life cycles. By delegating
authority to OET and PSHSB to limit the scope of the marketing and
importation prohibition, the Commission is ensuring that any costs to
affected entities are specific enough to meet critical national
security needs but are still narrow. Moreover, the Commission
emphasizes that it is currently not requiring manufacturers to replace
equipment in the hands of consumers. In doing so, the Commission is
tailoring its rules in such a way as to make sure that the public
benefits outweigh any costs that the prohibition will impose.
Ordering Clauses
Accordingly, it is ordered, pursuant to the authority found in
sections 4(i), 301, 302, 303, 403, and 503 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 301, 302a, 303, 403, 503, and the
Secure Equipment Act of 2021, Public Law 117-55, 135 Stat. 423, 47
U.S.C. 1601 note, that this Second Report and Order is hereby adopted.
It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of the
Secretary, shall send a copy of this Second Report and Order, including
the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analyses, to the Chief Counsel of the
Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy.
List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 2
Administrative practice and procedures, Communications,
Communications equipment, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Telecommunications, and Wiretapping and electronic surveillance.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
Final Rules
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 2 as follows:
PART 2--FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AND RADIO TREATY MATTERS; GENERAL
RULES AND REGULATIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 2 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 302a, 303, and 336 unless otherwise
noted.
0
2. Amend Sec. 2.803 by revising the introductory text of paragraph (b)
to read as follows:
Sec. 2.803 Marketing of radio frequency devices prior to equipment
authorization.
* * * * *
(b) General rule. No person may market a radio frequency device
unless the radio frequency device is authorized pursuant to a valid FCC
equipment authorization that has not been limited through the
procedures described in Sec. 2.939(e) of this chapter, and:
* * * * *
0
3. Amend Sec. 2.903 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a);
0
b. Redesignating paragraphs (b) through (d) as paragraphs (d) through
(f); and
0
c. Adding new paragraphs (b) and (c).
The revisions and additions read as follows:
Sec. 2.903 Prohibition on authorization of equipment on the Covered
List.
(a) All equipment on the Covered List, as established pursuant to
Sec. 1.50002 of this chapter, is prohibited from obtaining an
equipment authorization under this subpart. This includes equipment
that:
(1) Has been certified as a modular transmitter; or
(2) Meets the modular transmitter requirements of Sec. 15.212 of
this chapter and could be certified as a modular transmitter.
(b) All equipment that incorporates equipment meeting the
descriptions in paragraph (a)(1) or (2) of this section is prohibited
from obtaining an equipment authorization under this subpart.
(c) The prohibitions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section
apply to:
(1) Equipment that would otherwise be subject to certification
procedures;
(2) Equipment that would otherwise be subject to Supplier's
Declaration of Conformity procedures; and
(3) Equipment that would otherwise be exempt from equipment
authorization.
* * * * *
0
4. Amend Sec. 2.932 by revising paragraphs (b) and (c) to read as
follows:
Sec. 2.932 Modification of equipment.
* * * * *
(b) Except for equipment prohibited from authorization pursuant to
Sec. 2.903, permissive changes may be made in certificated equipment,
and equipment that was authorized under the former type acceptance
procedure, pursuant to Sec. 2.1043.
(c) Permissive changes may be made in equipment that was authorized
under the former notification procedures unless such equipment meets
one of the criteria in paragraphs (c)(1) or (2) of this section. The
grantee must submit information documenting continued compliance with
the pertinent requirements upon request.
(1) The equipment is currently subject to authorization under the
certification procedure; or
(2) The equipment is prohibited from authorization pursuant to
Sec. 2.903.
* * * * *
0
5. Amend Sec. 2.933 by revising paragraph (b)(5) to read as follows:
Sec. 2.933 Change in identification of equipment.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(5) The photographs required by Sec. 2.1033(b)(10) or (c)(14)
showing the exterior appearance of the equipment, including the
operating controls available to the user and the identification label.
Photographs of the construction, the component placement on the
chassis, and the chassis assembly are not required to be submitted
unless specifically requested.
* * * * *
0
6. Amend Sec. 2.939 by:
0
a. Revising the section heading;
0
b. Revising the introductory text of paragraph (a); and
0
c. Adding paragraph (e).
The revisions and additions read as follows:
Sec. 2.939 Revocation, withdrawal, or limitation of equipment
authorization.
(a) The Commission may revoke, or place limitations pursuant to
paragraph (e) of this section on, any equipment authorization:
* * * * *
(e) The Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) and the Public
Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) may place limitations on an
existing authorization for covered equipment authorizations to prohibit
continued importation or marketing, pursuant to the following
procedures:
(1) OET and PSHSB will issue a public notice announcing the intent
to limit the scope of equipment authorizations to prohibit the further
importation or marketing of specified devices identified by class,
type, or other description sufficient to identify the devices.
[[Page 53237]]
(2) The public notice will include an assessment of the impact of
the proposed prohibition with consideration of public interest factors,
including: the unacceptable risks the equipment was found to pose, the
economic and supply chain impacts, and any other criteria as specified
by the Commission. The public notice should give particular weight to
the specific determination(s), and any accompanying rules or analyses,
through which the relevant equipment was added to the Covered List.
(3) The public notice will provide for a public comment period of
no less than 30 days.
(4) OET and PSHSB will review the submissions, may request
additional information as may be appropriate, and must make their
determination as to whether to place limitations on the existing
authorization to prohibit the further importation or marketing of the
relevant devices, providing the reasons for such decision.
0
7. Amend Sec. 2.1043 by revising the introductory text of paragraph
(b) to read as follows:
Sec. 2.1043 Changes in certificated equipment.
* * * * *
(b) Except for equipment prohibited from authorization pursuant to
Sec. 2.903, three classes of permissive change may be made in
certificated equipment without requiring a new application for and
grant of certification. Any of these classes of changes must not result
in a change in identification.
* * * * *
0
8. Amend Sec. 2.1204 by revising paragraph (a)(1) to read as follows:
Sec. 2.1204 Import conditions.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
(1) The radio frequency device is authorized pursuant to a valid
FCC equipment authorization that has not been limited through the
procedures described in Sec. 2.939(e).
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2025-21001 Filed 11-24-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
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This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.