Proposed Rule2025-20001
2022 Quadrennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
November 17, 2025
Effective
December 17, 2025
Issuing agencies
Federal Communications Commission
Abstract
In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) seeks comment on the Commission's media ownership rules. It asks whether the Local Radio Ownership Rule, the Local Television Ownership Rule, and the Dual Network Rule remain necessary in their existing form, or whether they should be modified of repealed. Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the Commission to conduct such review every four years.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 219 (Monday, November 17, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 219 (Monday, November 17, 2025)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 51291-51300]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-20001]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 73
[MB Docket No. 22-459; FCC 25-64; FR ID 317689]
2022 Quadrennial Regulatory Review--Review of the Commission's
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission) seeks comment on the Commission's media ownership rules.
It asks whether the Local Radio Ownership Rule, the Local Television
Ownership Rule, and the Dual Network Rule remain necessary in their
existing form, or whether they should be modified of repealed. Section
202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the Commission to
conduct such review every four years.
DATES: Comments due on or before December 17, 2025. Reply comments due
on or before January 16, 2026.
ADDRESSES: Interested parties may submit comments and replies,
identified by MB Docket. No. 22-459, by any of the following methods:
<bullet> Electronic Filers. Comments may be filed electronically by
accessing ECFS at: <a href="http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/">http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/</a>. Follow the instructions
for submitting comments.
<bullet> Paper Filers. Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and one copy of each filing.
<bullet> Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by
commercial courier, or by U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be
addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary,
Federal Communications Commission.
<bullet> Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for
the Commission's Secretary are now accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00
p.m. by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with
rubber bands
[[Page 51292]]
or fasteners. Any envelopes must be disposed of before entering the
building.
<bullet> Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries other than
U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701.
<bullet> Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class, Express,
and Priority Mail must be addressed to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC
20554.
<bullet> People With Disabilities. To request materials in
accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print,
electronic files, audio format), send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#187e7b7b2d282c587e7b7b367f776e"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="6e080d0d5b5e5a2e080d0d40090118">[email protected]</span></a> or
call the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.
<bullet> In addition to filing comments with the Secretary, a copy
of any comments on the Paperwork Reduction Act proposed information
collection requirements contained herein should be submitted to the
Federal Communications Commission via email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#50000211103633337e373f26"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="e4b4b6a5a4828787ca838b92">[email protected]</span></a> and to Cathy
Williams, FCC, via email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#d192b0a5b9a8ff86b8bdbdb8b0bca291b7b2b2ffb6bea7"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="cd8eacb9a5b4e39aa4a1a1a4aca0be8dabaeaee3aaa2bb">[email protected]</span></a>.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ty Bream, Industry Analysis Division,
Media Bureau, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#fca885d2be8e999d91bc9a9f9fd29b938a"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="80d4f9aec2f2e5e1edc0e6e3e3aee7eff6">[email protected]</span></a>, (202) 418-0644.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), FCC 25-64, in MB Docket No. 22-459,
adopted and released on September 30, 2025. The full text of this
document is available electronically via the search function on the
FCC's website at: <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-64A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-64A1.pdf</a>.
Paperwork Reduction Act. This document may contain proposed new or
modified information collections. The Commission, as part of its
continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general
public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on any
information collections contained in this document, as required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. In addition, pursuant to the Small
Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, we seek specific comment on how
we might further reduce the information collection burden for small
business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.
Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act. The Providing
Accountability Through Transparency Act requires each agency, in
providing notice of a rulemaking, to post online a brief plain-language
summary of the proposed rule. Accordingly, the Commission will publish
the required summary of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings">https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings</a>.
Synopsis
1. With this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), we seek comment
on the Commission's media ownership rules pursuant to section 202(h) of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which directs the Commission to
review such rules every four years to determine whether they remain
``necessary in the public interest as the result of competition'' and
to ``repeal or modify any regulation [that it] determines to be no
longer in the public interest.'' This periodic review aims to ensure
that the media ownership rules continue to serve the public interest in
light of new and emerging technologies and ever-evolving marketplace
conditions. The rules subject to our review in this proceeding are: (1)
the Local Radio Ownership Rule; (2) the Local Television Ownership
Rule; and (3) the Dual Network Rule. As discussed below, we seek
comment on whether these rules remain necessary in their existing form,
or whether any such rules should be modified or repealed.
Background
2. The three rules within the scope of our review in this
proceeding have been part of the Commission's broadcast regulatory
framework for more than half a century. The Commission concluded the
most recent of these statutorily mandated periodic reviews in December
2023, with the issuance of a Report and Order in its 2018 Quadrennial
Review proceeding.
3. The 2018 Quadrennial Review Order, among other things,
reaffirmed the relevant legal framework for evaluating the Commission's
media ownership rules pursuant to section 202(h). First, the Commission
stated that the phrase ``necessary in the public interest'' in section
202(h) establishes a `` `plain public interest' standard under which
`necessary' means `convenient,' `useful,' or `helpful,' not `essential'
or `indispensable.' '' Second, the Commission stated then the principle
that section 202(h) creates no ``presumption in favor of repealing or
modifying the ownership rules,'' and that the agency, therefore, has
discretion ``to make [the rules] more or less stringent.'' Third, the
Commission then reaffirmed its broad statutory authority, as validated
by the Supreme Court in FCC v. Prometheus, to regulate broadcast
stations in the public interest. In particular, the Commission
reaffirmed that the public interest analysis under section 202(h)
should continue to focus on whether the ownership rules remain
necessary to advance the agency's three traditional policy goals of
competition, localism, and viewpoint diversity, and that the Commission
should not abandon this approach in favor of an approach that elevates
one public interest goal (e.g., competition) over another.
4. In applying this framework, the Commission concluded in the 2018
proceeding that two of the three rules noted above--the Local Radio
Ownership Rule and the Local Television Ownership Rule--remain
necessary in the public interest, with some modifications.
Specifically, the Commission found that the public interest would be
served by revising the Local Radio Ownership Rule to make permanent the
interim contour-overlap methodology historically used to determine
ownership limits in areas outside the boundaries of defined Nielsen
Audio Metro markets and in Puerto Rico. The Commission determined that
these minor modifications would enable the Local Radio Ownership Rule
to promote the public interest more effectively going forward. The
Commission also found that it was necessary to revise the Local
Television Ownership Rule by (1) updating the methodology for
determining station ranking within a geographic market and (2)
expanding the existing prohibition on transactions involving certain
network affiliations in a market. The Commission stated that these
modest adjustments to the Local Television Ownership Rule were
justified in view of changes that occurred in the television
marketplace, and that the rule ensures competition among local
broadcasters while allowing for flexibility in appropriate
circumstances. As for the Dual Network Rule, the Commission concluded
that, despite marketplace changes, the rule remains necessary in the
public interest without modification. In particular, the Commission
found that the Dual Network Rule continues to promote competition in
the provision of programming intended for large national audiences and
the sale of national advertising time, and continues to foster localism
by maintaining a balance of bargaining power between the Big Four
broadcast networks (Big Four networks) and their respective affiliate
groups.
5. Parties raised legal challenges to the 2018 Quadrennial Review
Order shortly after its adoption, which were decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. On July 23, 2025, the
court largely upheld the 2018 Quadrennial Review Order but vacated and
remanded components of the Local Television Ownership Rule. The court
found that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
[[Page 51293]]
retaining the Top-Four Prohibition--the provision requiring that, at
the time an application to acquire or construct a television station is
filed, at least one of the stations is not ranked among the top-four
stations in terms of audience share in the local television market. The
court also held that the Commission's expansion of the existing
prohibition on television transactions involving certain network
affiliations was adopted in excess of section 202(h)'s grant of
statutory authority. Regarding section 202(h)'s grant of statutory
authority, the court held that the statute allows the Commission to
loosen regulations but not tighten them.
6. The Media Bureau sought comment on the media ownership rules
with a December 22, 2022 Public Notice (2022 Quadrennial Review Public
Notice). We received comments from various parties in response to this
notice, including broadcasters, network affiliates, trade associations,
public interest groups, academics, and individuals. Those comments
helped to inform the discussion that follows below.
Policy Goals
7. As discussed above, the Commission historically has reviewed its
ownership rules with the express purpose of determining whether such
rules remain necessary in the public interest. This analysis has
focused principally on whether the particular rule continues to advance
the agency's traditional policy goals of competition, localism, and
viewpoint diversity. Where there is a conflict between competing goals,
the Commission has weighed the potential effects to determine whether,
on balance, the rule continues to serve the public interest. As such,
the public interest analysis under section 202(h) has been conducted as
a multi-factor review in which no one factor is controlling.
8. We seek comment on the three traditional policy goals of
competition, localism, and viewpoint diversity. As prescribed by
section 202(h), competition is a central policy goal of our quadrennial
review. We weigh and balance tradeoffs among the three goals where they
arise, as the goals are not always discrete and mutually exclusive. We
recognize that, in some respects, they may overlap and complement each
other. Accordingly, we seek comment on whether there are new ways to
think about or define these goals and how best to balance them in the
course of this review. We also seek comment on how to measure localism,
viewpoint diversity, and competition. Have changes in the marketplace
rendered certain of these goals obsolete in the context of this review?
If so, how should we refine our analysis to reflect these changes?
9. In Zimmer v. FCC, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that the Commission's prior definition of
competition was consistent with section 202(h). The court found that
section 202(h)'s public interest standard provides significant
discretion to the Commission. The court also held that the Commission
likewise has discretion to interpret ``competition'' so as to serve the
public interest most effectively. The court noted that the Commission's
exercise of its discretion must be consistent with the law and does not
operate outside the constraints of the Administrative Procedure Act's
arbitrary-and-capricious review. We seek comment on how our review of
the remaining media ownership rules may be undertaken within these
parameters. Specifically, when proposing that the Commission take a
certain action, commenters should also explain how the proposed action
fits within the boundaries of our discretion.
10. We also seek comment on whether there are other public interest
goals we should consider as part of our quadrennial review process. For
instance, some commenters emphasize the importance of broadcast media
for public safety purposes during times of emergency as a means to
disseminate news and other critical information. iHeart points out that
AM radio broadcasters play an important role in disseminating national
emergency announcements. Along these lines, should we consider the
continued existence of a nationwide broadcast infrastructure, and its
importance for national security purposes, as a policy goal?
Media Ownership Rules
A. The Local Radio Ownership Rule
11. The Local Radio Ownership Rule limits both the total number of
radio stations an entity may own within a local market and the number
of radio stations within the market that the entity may own in the same
service, AM or FM (the latter limits referred to as AM/FM subcaps).
Specifically, the Local Radio Ownership Rule incorporates a sliding
scale based on market size, permitting an entity to own: (1) up to
eight commercial radio stations in radio markets with at least 45 radio
stations, no more than five of which may be in the same service (AM or
FM); (2) up to seven commercial radio stations in radio markets with
30-44 radio stations, no more than four of which may be in the same
service (AM or FM); (3) up to six commercial radio stations in radio
markets with 15-29 radio stations, no more than four of which may be in
the same service (AM or FM); and (4) up to five commercial radio
stations in radio markets with 14 or fewer radio stations, no more than
three of which may be in the same service (AM or FM), provided that the
entity does not own more than 50 percent of the radio stations in the
market unless the combination comprises not more than one AM and one FM
station. Overlap between two stations in different services is allowed
if neither of those stations overlaps a third station in the same
service. Only full-power commercial and noncommercial radio stations
count when calculating the total number of stations in the market.
Radio markets are defined geographically by Nielsen Audio Metros where
available, while the contour-overlap methodology is used in areas
outside of defined and rated Nielsen Audio Metro markets and in Puerto
Rico.
12. The current radio ownership limits were established by Congress
in 1996. In the past, the Commission has found that local radio
ownership limits promote competition and should be retained. In the
last quadrennial review, the Commission retained the Local Radio
Ownership Rule with one modification to codify the interim contour-
overlap methodology long used to determine ownership limits in areas
outside the boundaries of defined Nielsen Audio Metro markets and in
Puerto Rico. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
subsequently upheld the Commission's retention and modification of the
Local Radio Ownership Rule. Comments submitted in response to the 2022
Quadrennial Public Notice reflect disagreements over the benefits of,
and need for, the current rule.
13. We seek comment on whether the Local Radio Ownership Rule
remains necessary to further the public interest. As trustees of
publicly-owned spectrum, radio licensees must meet statutory public
interest requirements, which include obligations to operate stations in
a manner responsive to local community needs and interests. We seek
comment on the Local Radio Ownership Rule's role in the audio
marketplace and its impact on the public interest. Is the existing rule
limiting the ability or potential of broadcast radio to deliver public
interest benefits to listeners? If the rule were to be loosened or
eliminated, would the current audio marketplace deliver the same or
comparable benefits to consumers, particularly with respect to
[[Page 51294]]
our policy goals of competition, localism, and viewpoint diversity?
14. Audio Marketplace Competition. While the Commission has
previously treated local broadcast radio as its own discrete market, we
seek comment on whether we should revise the product market definition,
as NAB and the Joint Commenters suggest, to include such non-broadcast
audio sources as satellite radio, audio streaming services, webcasting,
podcasting, or other programming platforms as substitutes for broadcast
radio. Such commenters have noted the abundance of audio and other
media options available to consumers. Although this is not entirely a
new phenomenon, and the broadcast radio industry has witnessed the
arrival of new forms of media and technology in the past, does
competition exist among the digital media platform field and the radio
broadcasting industry? Do online audio and other media platforms
compete directly with broadcast radio today? Are there any challenges
that new sources of audio programming exert on broadcast radio revenues
or business models, today? If there are challenges, how have those
challenges changed over time, and what are the public interest
implications? Are there any alternative or new sources of competition
in the audio marketplace that are of particular concern and why?
15. Does radio's free, over-the-air availability or local nature
make it unique or difficult to substitute in the audio marketplace with
respect to fulfilling the Commission's traditional public interest
objectives of competition, localism, and viewpoint diversity?
Alternatively, should we continue to focus on broadcast radio's unique
attributes when evaluating competition from non-broadcast sources that
are not subject to the ownership limits, including, among others,
satellite radio, podcasts, and audio streaming services? Despite the
lack of public interest obligations, do these non-broadcast audio
sources nonetheless provide a competitive service from the listener's
perspective? Should we continue to retain limits on the concentration
of radio stations, independent of whether we find that broadcast radio
remains a distinct product market? Should we consider other public
interest benefits or other objectives, including those that are non-
economic in nature, that broadcast radio, generally, or AM or FM,
separately, offer to listeners? For example, does the use of broadcast
media for public safety purposes during times of emergency as a means
to disseminate news and other critical information make it unique or
difficult to substitute in the audio marketplace?
16. In light of the importance of advertising revenue to local
commercial radio's viability, do advertisers view satellite radio,
audio streaming services, podcasting, or any other audio source as
substitutes for broadcast radio? What is the current impact of social
media or other online platforms, such as Google and Facebook, on local
advertising markets? Do non-broadcast audio services provide
programming that responds to the needs and interests of local markets,
and if so, how? To what extent, if any, should we take into account the
deployment of digital, over-the-air radio technology (especially for AM
stations) and its role in enabling station owners to expand their
program offerings, improve listenability, and increase their economies
of scale and scope?
17. If we were to revise the product market definition beyond our
traditional focus on local broadcast radio service and thereby include
non-broadcast sources in our definition, how should we do so? What non-
broadcast sources should we include in the analysis, and how should we
count them or otherwise factor them into our rule for purposes of
setting or administering limits? Would an expanded product market
definition better serve our core public interest goals of competition,
localism, and viewpoint diversity?
18. Local Radio Ownership Limits. If the Commission determines that
broadcast radio ownership limits remain necessary in the public
interest as the result of competition, we seek comment on whether the
existing market size tiers and limits on the number of stations an
entity may own are set appropriately and whether the limits are
producing any unintended consequences with respect to the public
interest. For instance, should the Commission retain, modify, or
eliminate existing limits on the total number of radio stations owned
in a local market? Should the Commission consider new or different
market size tiers (e.g., the creation of one or more market size tiers
above the 45-station tier that would allow for additional ownership
beyond the current eight station cap)? Should the Commission take a
different approach altogether (e.g., using population or some other
metric to define the tiers)? Would changing the existing limits or
market size tiers contravene the understanding or intent of Congress,
which adopted the current approach based on the number of stations in a
market?
19. If we retain overall limits in some form, should we continue to
have separate limits (or subcaps) for ownership of FM and/or AM
stations that limit the number of radio stations a licensee can own in
the same service (AM or FM) in a single market? If so, what should
those limits be? Is there an overall disparity (either competitive or
technical) between the FM and AM services? Has the digital radio
transition affected evaluation of the subcaps? To the extent commenters
believe that loosening or eliminating the subcaps would devalue or
jeopardize the viability of AM radio stations, in particular, by
causing a migration of ownership or investment from AM to FM stations,
what analysis or other evidence supports this belief. Is there evidence
that subcaps historically have promoted market entry? If so, what are
some tradeoffs? Do subcaps promote competition or otherwise serve the
public interest? If that is the case, are they currently set at
appropriate levels? Should the Commission consider relaxing one of the
subcaps (AM or FM) but not the other, as some commentators suggest?
20. In addition to seeking comment on the current structure of the
Local Radio Ownership Rule, we seek comment on whether there are any
other changes we should make with respect to the rule. For instance,
should we provide relief via the rule that is specific to smaller
markets, smaller owners, or struggling stations? What market and
industry criteria should smaller entities have to meet to qualify for
relief? How would the Commission determine when a station is struggling
so that it qualifies for relief? Should the Commission consider
revising the rule to account more directly for concentration or other
characteristics of stations, perhaps by limiting or permitting
consolidation based not only on the number of stations an entity owns,
but also based on the relative strength or reach of those stations
within local radio markets? Should we establish a process for case-by-
case review of station acquisitions in certain circumstances or
presumptions in favor of relief that would apply? To the extent
commenters propose revisions to the existing limits, we ask that they
explain specifically where the Commission should draw lines and what
data or analysis supports their proposals.
21. Commenters supporting changes to the rule should explain how
such changes would promote the public interest and how those benefits
would offset or outweigh any harms. Do current limits adequately
prevent a single licensee from amassing excessive local market power?
Conversely, do they permit sufficient growth and innovation
[[Page 51295]]
to enable radio broadcasters to obtain assets they may need to improve
service? Are the current limits standing in the way of pro-competitive
or pro-consumer transactions that would otherwise take place? For
instance, would loosening or eliminating the existing limits lead to a
greater ability for small or midsized station owners to combine and
better compete with larger owners in individual markets? Would
loosening or eliminating the existing limits lead to more or less local
programming? We ask commenters to provide concrete examples in markets
where they see the current limits as either too restrictive or too
lenient, explain how those examples typify situations in other markets,
specify benefits to be gained by revising or eliminating the limits,
and explain why those proposed benefits should be expected to flow from
any proposed rule change. Commenters should provide supporting evidence
and economic analysis to the extent possible.
B. Local Television Ownership Rule
22. The Local Television Ownership Rule provides that an entity may
own up to two television stations in the same Nielsen Designated Market
Area (DMA) if: (1) the digital noise limited service contours (NLSCs)
of the stations do not overlap; or (2) at the time the application to
acquire or construct the station(s) is filed, at least one of the
stations is not ranked among the top-four stations in the DMA--referred
to as the Top-Four Prohibition.
23. The Commission concluded in its most recent media ownership
review that local television ownership limits remained necessary to
promote the Commission's public interest goals of competition,
localism, and viewpoint diversity given the unique obligations
broadcast television licensees have as trustees of the public's
airwaves to serve their local communities. The Commission also found
that, based on the record in that proceeding, broadcast television
remained its own distinct product market. The Commission also modified
the methodology for administering the rule's Top-Four Prohibition. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit subsequently
vacated the Top-Four Prohibition along with the modifications to Note
11 adopted in the previous media ownership review.
24. The initial question of this review remains whether the Local
Television Ownership Rule is necessary in the public interest as a
result of competition, notwithstanding substantial changes that have
occurred in the video marketplace with changes in technology (including
online video, and digital television broadcasting) and the challenges
now facing the broadcast television industry. The provision of local
programming that serves the needs and interests of a local community
through free, over-the-air transmission remains the hallmark of
broadcast television and is an important means by which broadcast
licensees serve the public in exchange for their use of the spectrum.
With new competition for viewers' attention, however, come new
challenges for the broadcast television industry as stations seek to
fulfill their public interest obligations. Accordingly, we seek comment
on whether the Local Television Ownership Rule continues to further
broadcast television service to American consumers, or whether, in
light of the pressures local television stations now face, the existing
rule stands in the way of their ability to better serve their local
communities and allowing local broadcasters to compete. We seek comment
on all aspects of the rule's implementation and on whether the current
version of the rule is necessary to serve the public interest in the
current television marketplace or, alternatively, whether the rule
should be modified or repealed. Comments submitted in response to the
2022 Quadrennial Public Notice also inform our questions below.
25. Video Marketplace Competition. We seek comment on the
appropriate product market definition and market participants that the
Commission should consider as part of its Local Television Ownership
Rule analysis, including whether an alternative market definition would
better reflect how consumers access and make use of video programming.
Multiple commenters point to the enormous number of video programming
options now available to consumers. We seek comment on whether or how
the Commission can account for non-broadcast video programming in our
market definition analysis. We also seek comment on whether and to what
extent non-broadcast video entities provide local news and other local
content. For example, among the video streaming services that offer
local content, are there any that provide local content from sources
other than broadcast television? Are any such options available for
free to the public at large? Do these options differ by market? Are
they comparable to traditional media in terms of scale and reach? Are
there certain segments of the population that rely primarily on over-
the-air broadcasting and what data support this? Does the amount of
local video programming available to the public depend on a television
market's attributes? What sources of local video programming are
present in most television markets?
26. Broadcast commenters also continue to focus on the broad
advertising marketplace and the increased competition for advertising
revenue from entities not subject to the Commission's ownership limits.
We seek comment on how permitting broadcasters to achieve economies of
scale through common ownership will enhance their ability to compete
against non-broadcast entities and serve the public interest.
Specifically, broadcasters describe the loss of audiences and
advertisers to online outlets. Despite this, are there certain
advertisers for whom online advertising is not an adequate substitute
for broadcast television advertising? Do some advertisers use both
online and television advertising to reach different audiences? Are
there reasons to differentiate among markets by the size of the DMA?
Does broadcast television advertising have characteristics that other
forms of advertising do not have and that are valuable to some
advertisers?
27. While the considerable expansion of options for accessing video
content has benefited viewers, to what extent do such developments make
it more difficult for broadcast television stations to serve their
local communities? Are there reasons to differentiate among markets by
the size of the DMA? Should the Local Television Ownership Rule still
aim to foster a variety of broadcast television station owners in a
local market without taking the larger video landscape into
consideration? Accordingly, we seek comment on whether broadcast
television stations are spurred by competing local stations to produce
benefits for consumers (e.g., more choice, better quality, innovation,
reinvestment in stations, or technology improvements). We also seek
comment on whether and how non-broadcast sources affect broadcast
television stations' ability to produce benefits for consumers. In what
ways are broadcast television stations spurred to produce more local
programming, respond to local issues, or offer new or different
viewpoints within the local marketplace? Are there direct metrics or
appropriate proxies by which we can measure and assess the levels of
these responses or their trends over time?
28. Broadcast commenters assert that the competitive pressures from
non-broadcast sources of video programming would more than suffice to
incentivize them to continue producing content that
[[Page 51296]]
serves consumers and their communities. However, consumer advocacy
interest groups consistently maintain that the ownership limits for
television prevent consumer harm. We seek comment on whether, how, and
to what extent viewers continue to be served by television stations at
the local community level. We also seek comment on whether there is any
correlation between consolidation and investment by broadcasters back
into their local station operations. Do large television ownership
groups invest in locally focused programming, national and regional
content, or both? How do these factors differ by the size of a DMA?
29. We recognize the many challenges faced by the broadcast
television industry but also note that, throughout all of the changes
in the video marketplace, the one constant that remains is the duty of
broadcast licensees to serve the public interest. How are the
challenges today different in nature or scope from the various
challenges the industry has endured or adapted to over the decades? Can
alleviating pressures faced by television broadcasters through
deregulatory measures promote the interests of the public? In what
ways, if any, does robust cross-platform competition mitigate or
alleviate the harms that could flow from concentration of broadcast
television ownership? Are there other measures outside of this
rulemaking that the Commission could take to allow broadcast licensees
to continue serving the public interest while facing robust cross-
platform competition? We seek comment on how developments in the video
programming industry affect whether the Local Television Ownership Rule
remains necessary as a result of competition.
30. Broadcast commenters assert that further consolidation is the
only viable path for broadcast television stations to maintain their
role in providing news and programming to local communities. We seek
comment on whether consolidation has produced verifiable public
interest benefits or harms. Has consolidation resulted in increased
content originating outside the communities of license, duplicative
news reporting across regions, or reduced coverage of local news and
events? Are there metrics that suggest consolidation has resulted in
more or better local news or are there metrics that suggest the
opposite is true? Is there evidence that shows that prior actions by
the Commission to loosen or eliminate ownership restrictions resulted
in more or better local news, in a way that might help inform what
might occur in the broadcast market? Is the broader video programming
marketplace competitive enough to act itself as a check on any
potential harms from undue concentration that might occur in the
absence of television ownership limits? Given that many broadcast
television stations earn a significant share of revenue from
retransmission consent payments from multichannel video programming
distributors (MVPDs), should any effect on these payments resulting
from a change in the Local Television Ownership Rule be included in the
Commission's public interest analysis? And if so, how should the
Commission account for the share of these revenues that are paid by the
station back to the national networks? Should such payments be
considered differently than other payments for content and, if so, why?
31. Local Television Ownership Limits. If the Commission determines
that broadcast television ownership limits remain necessary in the
public interest as the result of competition, we seek comment on
whether the existing components of the rule are appropriately set. With
respect to the existing limit of two stations per Nielsen DMA, should
the Commission retain, modify, or eliminate that limit? To what extent,
if at all, does the limit curtail the ability of broadcast television
stations to serve the public interest? What benefits or harms, if any,
to competition, localism, or viewpoint diversity would be likely to
accrue if the Commission loosened or eliminated the limit? How should
the Commission measure or balance those benefits or harms? We ask
commenters to provide supporting evidence and economic analysis to the
extent possible. Should the Commission consider either adopting case-
by-case flexibility for the review of transactions involving ownership
of a third station in a local market or establishing a presumption in
favor of granting ownership of a third station under certain
circumstances? Should the same numerical limit be applied across all
television markets, or should the limit be based on market size or
tiers as it is with the Local Radio Ownership Rule? Are there other
actions the Commission could take to minimize or limit potential harms
from reduced viewpoint diversity? Has the grandfathering of existing
combinations of broadcast stations under prior versions of the rules
produced advantages for those grandfathered stations that are not
available to new entrants under the current restrictions?
C. Dual Network Rule
32. The Dual Network Rule provides that ``[a] television broadcast
station may affiliate with a person or entity that maintains two or
more networks of television broadcast stations unless such dual or
multiple networks are composed of two or more persons or entities that,
on February 8, 1996, were `networks' as defined in Sec. 73.3613(a)(1)
of the Commission's regulations (that is, ABC, CBS, Fox and NBC).'' The
rule, therefore, permits common ownership of multiple broadcast
networks by a single entity, but effectively prohibits a merger between
or among any of the Big Four networks, i.e., ABC, CBS, FOX, and NBC.
33. In the 2018 Quadrennial Review Order, the Commission concluded
that, despite intervening marketplace developments, the Dual Network
Rule remains necessary in the public interest because it advances the
agency's core policy objectives of competition and localism. In
particular, the Commission found, consistent with past findings, that
the Dual Network Rule promotes competition in the provision of
programming intended for large national audiences and the sale of
national advertising time as well as fosters localism by preserving the
balance of bargaining power between the Big Four broadcast networks and
their respective affiliate groups.
34. We seek comment on whether the Dual Network Rule remains
necessary to promote the Commission's public interest goals of
competition, localism, and viewpoint diversity. In previous assessments
of the Dual Network Rule, the Commission generally has viewed the Big
Four networks as participating in the marketplace in two principal
ways: (1) by aggregating and distributing a collection of programming
intended for large, national audiences; and (2) by selling blocks of
advertising time to entities wishing to target ads to large, national
audiences. The Commission found that competition among the Big Four
networks for audience share and advertising revenues advanced the
public interest by incentivizing each of those networks to create and
distribute the most appealing, innovative, and high-quality programming
to consumers. The Commission further determined that a merger of two or
more Big Four networks would reduce competition along these dimensions
and enable the networks to create barriers to market entry. The
Commission arrived at this conclusion by analyzing data that show the
Big Four broadcast networks are in a class of their own when it comes
to producing national
[[Page 51297]]
programming and selling national advertising time as compared to the
other broadcast and cable networks.
35. We seek comment on metrics that best reflect the nature and
scope of competition by or among the Big Four networks. In response to
the 2022 Quadrennial Review Public Notice, Network Commenters contend
that the Big Four networks are no longer unique within the larger media
landscape--particularly with respect to video entertainment programming
and national advertising--and therefore maintaining a rule specific to
the networks no longer makes sense. We seek comment on this position.
What impact does network dominance have on consumer choice? Does the
Big Four networks' historical or continued dominance in certain
categories give them unique or outsized leverage in negotiations with
the owners or producers of certain content? Would such leverage change
with a merger between two of these networks, and what would any such
change mean for viewers?
36. Additionally, we seek comment on the role the Big Four networks
play in the advertising marketplace and what impact it has on
consumers. As has existed in the past, does there remain a meaningful
disparity in advertising rates between Big Four networks and other
programming networks? Is looking at audience size and ad revenue data
enough to compare the Big Four rates to other programming networks? If
not, what data sources bear that out? Is this a relevant metric to use?
If not, why not?
37. Along similar lines, we seek comment on whether the Big Four
networks remain a ``unique and discrete group'' within the larger
marketplace as measured by their net advertising revenues. Does there
persist a meaningful disparity between the net advertising revenues of
the Big Four networks and other broadcast and cable networks? To the
extent that the most recent data reflect a continuing disparity in net
advertising revenues between the Big Four networks and other networks,
does such data support a finding that the Big Four networks remain more
attractive to advertisers seeking consistent, national audiences than
other programming networks and thus continue to operate as a
``strategic group'' in the national advertising market? Does
competition for advertisers among the Big Four networks spur them to
act in ways that serve the public interest?
38. One of the most significant marketplace developments in recent
decades has been the online distribution of programming from a
multiplicity of sources. Network Commenters point out that online video
distributors now devote large budgets to creating original programming
for online distribution and such programming is increasingly drawing
larger numbers of viewers and/or views. The largest among these online
video providers currently reach millions of consumers, and digital
advertising on these and other online platforms has risen steadily.
How, if at all, have online video distributors changed the marketplace
for programming intended for large, national audiences? Are there
ratings or other metrics the Commission could use to adequately compare
the programming of online video distributors to that of the networks?
Are there instances of online video distributors acting in a way to
serve the public interest, similar to the requirement that broadcasters
have? Notably, the Big Four networks now also own their own online
video distribution platforms. How, if it at all, should their ownership
of these platforms factor into our evaluation of the Dual Network Rule
and its relationship to our public interest goals?
39. In addition, how, if at all, has the increase in national
advertising via online platforms affected competition for advertising
revenues by and among the Big Four networks? How, if at all, should the
increase in national advertising revenues earned by online platforms
(and the concomitant relevant or absolute decrease in such revenues
earned by broadcast networks, if any) factor in to our assessment of
whether the Dual Network Rule remains necessary in the public interest
as the result of competition? Previously, the Commission found that Big
Four broadcast networks offer a unique advertising product that reaches
the largest audience possible. Do online video distributors sell
advertising time in linear programming in a manner that competes with
the advertising opportunities afforded by Big Four broadcast networks,
or do advertisers see those platforms as serving a different market or
providing a different product? Further, how, if at all, should any
other marketplace developments (e.g., the growth of diginets) factor
into our analysis of the rule?
40. To the extent the metrics above reflect competition among the
Big Four networks, in what ways, specifically, do viewers benefit from
such competition? What would be lost and how, if at all, would viewers
be harmed if the industry had fewer independently owned Big Four
networks? While there may be other entities that compete with aspects
of what the Big Four networks offer--in terms of sports or other live
events, national news, or entertainment programming--are there any
entities that currently, and consistently, provide, or that have a
similar well-established track record of providing, the amalgam of
offerings provided by the Big Four broadcast networks?
41. We also seek comment on whether the Dual Network Rule remains
necessary to advance the Commission's longstanding policy goal of
localism. To maximize their national audience, the Big Four networks
traditionally have acquired their own local broadcast stations
(typically in the largest television markets) and entered into
affiliation agreements with station owners throughout the rest of the
country. Through this affiliation model, the Big Four networks have
benefitted by obtaining wide scale delivery of their programming;
network affiliates have benefitted by obtaining access to high-quality
network programming. Television viewers benefit from localism to the
extent that their network-affiliated, local television stations have
latitude to preempt national, network programming in favor of local
programming that is of greater value or importance to them and to
create programming that serves local needs and interests. As the
Commission has explained, this network-affiliate model has long sought
to balance two competing interests: that of broadcast networks, which
are economically motivated to ensure that their programming appeals to
a nationwide audience and is carried broadly by affiliates; and that of
local network affiliates, which are economically motivated to attract
viewers and advertising dollars by tailoring their programming to local
audiences.
42. In the context of this network-affiliate model, we seek comment
on whether, by virtue of the Dual Network Rule, having four
independently owned networks remains necessary in the public interest
to preserve or promote localism. For example, as some commenters have
suggested, would repealing or modifying the rule harm local viewers by
strengthening the leverage that Big Four networks exert over their
local station affiliates, thereby reducing the power of such affiliates
to influence network programming decisions or to act independently and
in a manner that best serves their local communities? In addition, does
the Dual Network Rule still give leverage to affiliates who may be in a
disagreement with their affiliated Big Four network? For example, does
having alternative Big Four networks with whom they can seek
affiliation give them more bargaining power if they came to a
[[Page 51298]]
negotiating impasse regarding the terms of their affiliation? What, if
any, recent marketplace developments argue in favor of preserving or
altering the Dual Network Rule as a necessary check on the ability of
Big Four networks to exercise undue power over their affiliates in a
way that harms consumers? To what extent has compensation paid by local
affiliates to their affiliated Big Four networks (via reverse
compensation or otherwise), an issue relevant to our assessment of the
networks' present bargaining leverage, increased since our last
quadrennial review? How, if at all, do the Big Four networks, or
affiliation with the Big Four networks, provide support (economic or
otherwise) for the network-affiliate model that has traditionally
underpinned broadcast television and fostered a balance between
national and local programming carried by local affiliates? To what
extent, if at all, would other, existing network affiliation rules
serve to maintain an adequate balance between the networks and their
affiliates in the absence of the Dual Network Rule?
43. We also seek comment on whether, and if so how, the rise of
online video distribution platforms in recent years has altered the
traditional network-affiliate relationship. As noted above, consumer
access to online video distributors is now largely ubiquitous, and this
development has enabled broadcast networks, including Big Four
networks, to achieve widespread distribution of program content without
relying on their local network affiliates. To what extent, if at all,
has the ability of broadcast networks to bypass local affiliates as
vehicles for content distribution tilted the balance of bargaining
power in favor of broadcast networks? How has this development, or
other marketplace developments, affected local network affiliates and
consumers? Are there examples of online video distribution platforms
partnering with local broadcasters? What are the implications of such
developments for the Dual Network Rule and its localism rationale?
44. To the extent commenters assert that marketplace developments
justify revising the Dual Network Rule, we seek comment on what
specific changes to the rule are warranted and why. Should the
Commission consider revising the list of networks subject to the Dual
Network Rule? Parties advocating for repeal of the Dual Network Rule
should explain how, if at all, antitrust or other statutes, rules, or
policies would serve as an adequate backstop to prevent a single owner
of two or more Big Four networks from engaging in conduct detrimental
to the public interest. How, if at all, would such a review account for
public interest benefits, such as increased technical innovation or
improved programming?
Procedural Matters
45. Ex Parte Rules--Permit-But-Disclose. The proceeding that this
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking initiates shall be treated as a ``permit-
but-disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte
rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any
written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation
within two business days after the presentation (unless a different
deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making
oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the
presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise
participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was
made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during
the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of
the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the
presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the
proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or
arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings
(specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data
or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the
memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must
be filed consistent with Sec. 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by
Sec. 1.49(f), or for which the Commission has made available a method
of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda
summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto,
must be filed through the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System
(ECFS) available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native
format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this
proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte
rules.
46. Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980, as amended (RFA), requires that an agency prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis for notice-and-comment rulemakings, unless the
agency certifies that ``the rule will not, if promulgated, have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.'' Accordingly, the Commission has prepared an Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) concerning potential rule and
policy changes contained in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The
IRFA is set forth in the Appendix. The Commission invites the general
public, in particular small businesses, to comment on the IRFA.
Comments must be filed by the deadlines for comments on the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking indicated on the first page of this document and
must have a separate and distinct heading designating them as responses
to the IRFA.
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
47. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as
amended (RFA), the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) has
prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis (IRFA) of the
policies and rules proposed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
assessing the possible significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. The Commission requests written public
comments on this IRFA. Comments must be identified as responses to the
IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments specified on the
first page of the NPRM. The Commission will send a copy of the NPRM,
including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for the Small Business
Administration (SBA) Office of Advocacy. In addition, the NPRM and IRFA
(or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register.
A. Need for, and Objective of, the Proposed Rules
48. Every four years, the Commission is required by statute to
review its media ownership rules to determine whether they ``are
necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.'' In the
NPRM, the Commission seeks review of these rules and considers possible
changes when necessary. As part of the process of examining its media
ownership rules, the Commission must consider whether they continue to
serve the public interest or, alternatively, whether they should be
modified or eliminated. Specifically, the NPRM examines three media
ownership rules: (1) the Local Radio Ownership Rule; (2) the Local
Television Ownership Rule; and (3) the Dual Network Rule. The Local
Radio Ownership Rule limits the number of radio stations an entity may
own within the same local market. In the NPRM, the Commission seeks
comment on whether
[[Page 51299]]
the Local Radio Ownership Rule remains necessary in the public interest
as the result of competition, and if not, whether to modify or
eliminate part or all of the rule. The Local Television Ownership Rule
limits the number of full power television stations an entity may own
within the same local market. In the NPRM, the Commission seeks comment
on whether the Local Television Ownership Rule is necessary in the
public interest as the result of competition. In the event that the
Commission concludes that the existing Local Television Ownership Rule
is no longer necessary, the NPRM seeks comment on whether to revise or
eliminate the rule. Finally, the Dual Network Rule seeks to encourage
licensees to focus on local issues and maintain a balance between
nationally-focused broadcast networks and their local affiliates by
effectively prohibiting a merger between or among any of the Big Four
networks (ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC). The Commission seeks comment from
interested parties on its proposed approaches to these media ownership
rules, ideas or proposals for how to modify the rules, as well as how
to measure or balance associated costs and benefits. Lastly, the
Commission seeks comments reflecting alternative approaches, and ways
to reduce costs associated with these approaches, especially as it
relates to small entities.
B. Legal Basis
49. The proposed action is authorized pursuant to sections 1, 2(a),
4(i), 257, 303, 307, 309, 310, and 403 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, and section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.
C. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which
the Proposed Rules Will Apply
50. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and where
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be
affected by the proposed rules, if adopted. The RFA generally defines
the term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms
``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business
Act (SBA). A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) is
independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of
operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the
SBA.
51. Our actions, over time, may affect small entities that are not
easily categorized at present. We therefore describe three broad groups
of small entities that could be directly affected by our actions. In
general, a small business is an independent business having fewer than
500 employees. These types of small businesses represent 99.9 percent
of all businesses in the United States, which translates to 34.75
million businesses. Next, ``small organizations'' are not-for-profit
enterprises that are independently owned and operated and not dominant
their field. While we do not have data regarding the number of non-
profits that meet that criteria, over 99 percent of nonprofits have
fewer than 500 employees. Finally, ``small governmental jurisdictions''
are defined as cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school
districts, or special districts with populations of less than fifty
thousand. Based on the 2022 U.S. Census of Governments data, we
estimate that at least 48,724 out of 90,835 local government
jurisdictions have a population of less than 50,000.
52. Radio Stations. This industry is comprised of establishments
primarily engaged in broadcasting aural programs by radio to the
public. Programming may originate in their own studio, from an
affiliated network, or from external sources. The SBA small business
size standard for this industry classifies firms with annual receipts
of $47 million or less as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show
that there were 2,893 firms in this industry that operated for the
entire year. Of those firms, 2,837 had revenue less than $47 million.
Further, according to Commission staff review of the BIA Kelsey Inc.
Media Access Pro Television Database (BIA) on July 8, 2025,
commercially licensed AM and FM radio stations totaled 10,962. Of those
stations, 10,961 were considered small firms. Based on currently
available U.S. Census data regarding the estimated number of small
firms in each identified industry and BIA data, we conclude that the
adopted rules will impact a substantial number of small entities.
53. Television Broadcasting. This industry comprises establishments
primarily engaged in broadcasting images together with sound. These
establishments operate television broadcasting studios and facilities
for the programming and transmission of programs to the public.
Programming may originate in their own studio, from an affiliated
network, or from external sources. The SBA small business size standard
for this industry classifies firms with annual receipt of $47 million
or less as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were
744 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of those
firms, 657 had revenue less than $47 million. Additionally, according
to Commission staff review of the BIA Kelsey Inc. Media Access Pro
Television Database (BIA) on July 8, 2025, commercially licensed
television stations totaled 1,384. Of those stations, 1,289 were
considered small firms. Based on currently available U.S. Census data
regarding the estimated number of small firms in each identified
industry and BIA data, we conclude that the adopted rules will impact a
substantial number of small entities.
D. Description of Economic Impact and Projected Reporting,
Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements for Small Entities.
54. The RFA directs agencies to describe the economic impact of
proposed rules on small entities, as well as projected reporting,
recordkeeping and other compliance requirements, including an estimate
of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the
requirements and the type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record.
55. The NPRM seeks comment regarding the Commission's media
ownership rules and possible changes to these rules. Any changes to
these media rules, if ultimately adopted, may require the modification
of current FCC broadcast license application forms and their
instructions. The Commission also would modify, as necessary, other
forms that include in their instructions the media ownership rules or
citations to media ownership proceedings. While small and other
entities would be required to make any changes resulting from the
adoption of proposed rules, we do not anticipate that compliance would
require the expenditure of any additional resources, the hiring of
consultants or other professionals, or place additional burdens on
small businesses, as they would already be familiar with using these
forms. However, we encourage small entities to comment on any potential
economic hardship or compliance burdens they may experience as a result
of any proposed rules in this proceeding, should they be adopted.
56. We further note that the Commission expects the comments it
receives and the matters discussed in the NPRM to include information
addressing costs, benefits, and other matters of concern for small
entities, which should help the Commission identify and better evaluate
compliance costs, and relevant issues for small entities before
adopting final rules.
[[Page 51300]]
E. Discussion of Significant Alternatives Considered That Minimize the
Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities.
57. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of any
significant alternatives to the proposed rules that would accomplish
the stated objectives of applicable statutes, and minimize any
significant economic impact on small entities. The discussion is
required to include alternatives such as: (1) the establishment of
differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take
into account the resources available to small entities; (2) the
clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance and
reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3) the
use of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption
from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small
entities.
58. As discussed above, in the NPRM, the Commission begins its
statutorily mandated review of whether the three remaining media
ownership rules remain in the public interest as a result of
competition, consistent with the instruction of section 202(h). As part
of this review, the Commission seeks comment on alternatives to the
proposed rules that could minimize potential economic impact on small
entities that might be affected by any proposed rule changes, should
they be adopted, as well as any other rule changes that may ultimately
be required as the result of comments provided by interested parties.
59. For the Local Radio Ownership Rule, the Commission considers
whether to continue to consider only local broadcast radio stations for
purposes of the rule, or whether to revise the analysis to include such
non-broadcast audio sources as satellite radio, audio streaming
services, webcasting, podcasting, or other platforms as substitutes for
broadcast radio. Alternatively, in the NPRM, the Commission considers
whether circumstances have changed enough to relax or eliminate the
rule altogether. The NPRM also takes into account whether the existing
market size tiers and limits on the number of stations an entity may
own are appropriately set and if the limits are reducing the number of
competitors in the market. In the alternative, we consider various
options, ranging from new or different market size tiers to using other
metrics such as population to define the tiers. We seek comment on the
constituent parts of the rule and whether the rule adequately serves
consumers in today's radio marketplace.
60. For the Local Television Ownership Rule, the Commission
considers whether the rule should be changed to reflect prior comments
stating that due to the large number of video programming options
available to the public, non-broadcast video entities could replace
broadcast content and local news specifically. Alternatively, we
consider the possibility of retaining the rule, particularly if non-
broadcast video entities are found to provide little or no local news
and other local content. In addition, the Commission considers whether
to expand the market definition to include non-broadcast video entities
or to retain the existing definition. We consider whether to modify the
current rule to change the number of stations a single entity is
permitted to own in a local market, or to maintain the status quo if
such a determination would limit the ability of smaller stations to
compete in the market. The Commission seeks comment on whether
circumstances have changed enough to relax or eliminate the rule
altogether.
61. Finally, the Commission considers the use of alternative
metrics for the Dual Network Rule. Specifically, the NPRM considers
whether ratings or other metrics would better reflect the nature and
scope of competition by or among the Big Four networks, as well as ways
to think about or analyze effects from that competition, as opposed to
assessing the Big Four's participation in the marketplace via the
aggregation and distribution of a collection of programming intended
for large, national audiences and by selling blocks of advertising time
to entities wishing to target ads to large, national audiences. The
Commission also considers whether there is enough of a meaningful
disparity between the net advertising revenues of the Big Four networks
and other broadcast and cable networks, some of which are small
entities, to warrant either a change to the rule, or to retain the
status quo. Lastly, the Commission considers whether circumstances have
changed enough to relax or eliminate the rule altogether or if the rule
should remain as it currently stands. We seek comment from small and
other entities on all of these proposals.
62. The NPRM proposes no new reporting requirements, performance
standards or other compliance obligations, although, as discussed
above, it may modify, as necessary, certain existing forms should it
adopt any changes to its media ownership rules. Should the Commission
ultimately adopt changes to its media ownership rules that could
increase requirements or compliance burdens for small entities, it will
determine whether possible exemptions, waiver opportunities, extended
compliance deadlines, or other measures would mitigate any potential
impact on small entities.
F. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Proposed Rules
63. None.
Ordering Clauses
64. It is ordered that, pursuant to sections 1, 2(a), 4(i), 257,
303, 307, 309, 310, and 403 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, and section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, this
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is adopted.
65. It is further ordered that, pursuant to Sec. Sec. 1.415 and
1.419 of the Commission's rules, interested parties may file comments
on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in MB Docket No. 22-459 on or
before thirty (30) days after publication in the Federal Register and
reply comments on or before sixty (60) days after publication in the
Federal Register.
66. It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of the
Secretary shall send a copy of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief
Counsel for the Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2025-20001 Filed 11-14-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
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This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.