Notice2025-19709
Tracy Amerson-Rivers, A.P.R.N.; Decision and Order
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Published
October 30, 2025
Issuing agencies
Justice DepartmentDrug Enforcement Administration
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 208 (Thursday, October 30, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 208 (Thursday, October 30, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48884-48887]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-19709]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Tracy Amerson-Rivers, A.P.R.N.; Decision and Order
I. Introduction
On January 30, 2025, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of
Registration (OSC/ISO) to Tracy Amerson-Rivers, A.P.R.N., of Houston,
Texas (Registrant). Request for Final Agency Action (RFAA), Exhibit
(RFAAX) 1, at 1. The OSC/ISO informed Registrant of the immediate
suspension of her DEA Certificate of Registration, No. MA5242792,
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(d), alleging that Registrant's continued
registration constitutes ```an imminent danger to the public health or
safety.' '' Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. 824(d)). The OSC/ISO also proposed
the revocation of Registrant's registration, alleging that Registrant's
continued registration is inconsistent with the public interest. Id.
(citing 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), 824(a)(4)).\1\
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\1\ According to the OSC/ISO and Agency records, Registrant's
registration expired on June 30, 2025. RFAAX 1, at 3. The fact that
a registrant allows her registration to expire during the pendency
of an administrative enforcement proceeding does not impact the
Agency's jurisdiction or prerogative under the Controlled Substances
Act to adjudicate the OSC/ISO to finality. Jeffrey D. Olsen, M.D.,
84 FR 68474, 68476-79 (2019).
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More specifically, the OSC/ISO alleged that Registrant, an advanced
practice registered nurse (APRN), issued six controlled substance
prescriptions, despite lacking a prescriptive authority agreement with
a licensed physician, which is required in Texas for an APRN to
prescribe controlled substances. RFAAX 1, at 1-2. The OSC/ISO further
alleged that Registrant obtained controlled substances by fraud. Id. at
6.\2\
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\2\ The Agency need not adjudicate the criminal violations
alleged in the OSC/ISO. Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450 (2022)
(decided in the context of criminal proceedings).
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On May 20, 2025, the Government submitted a RFAA requesting that
the Agency issue a default final order revoking Registrant's
registration. RFAA, at 1-5. After carefully reviewing the entire record
and conducting the analysis as set forth in more detail below, the
Agency grants the Government's RFAA and revokes Registrant's
registration.
II. Default Determination
Under 21 CFR 1301.43, a registrant entitled to a hearing who fails
to file a timely hearing request ``within 30 days after the date of
receipt of the [OSC/ISO] . . . shall be deemed to have waived their
right to a hearing and to be in default'' unless ``good cause'' is
established for the failure. 21 CFR 1301.43(a), (c)(1). In the absence
of a demonstration of good cause, a registrant who fails to timely file
an answer also is ``deemed to have waived their right to a hearing and
to be in default.'' 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(2). Unless excused, a default is
deemed to constitute ``an admission of the factual allegations of the
[OSC/ISO].'' 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
The OSC/ISO notified Registrant of her right to file a written
request for hearing and answer, and that if she failed to file such a
request and answer, she would be deemed to have waived her right to a
hearing and be in default. RFAAX 1, at 7-8. The OSC/ISO further
notified Registrant that ``[s]hould [she] request a hearing and fail to
timely file an answer, plead, or otherwise defend, . . . [she] shall be
deemed to have waived the right to a hearing and to be in default.''
Id. at 8 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(2), (c)(3), (d)).
Registrant filed a timely hearing request, but did not file an
answer. RFAA, at 2; RFAAX 3; RFAAX 4, at 1. The matter was assigned to
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Paul Soeffing, who issued an Order for
Prehearing Statements on March 4, 2025, directing Registrant to file a
compliant answer by 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time (ET)/4:00 p.m. Central Time
(CT) on March 7, 2025. RFAA, at 2; RFAAX 4, at 1-2, 5. On March 10,
2025, the ALJ granted Registrant's request to extend the deadline for
filing an answer to 5:00 p.m. ET/4:00 p.m. CT on April 21, 2025. RFAA,
at 2; RFAAX 6, at 1-2.
On April 21, 2025, Registrant filed a purported answer. RFAA, at 2;
RFAAX 7. On the same day, the ALJ issued an order notifying Registrant
of deficiencies that made her purported answer noncompliant. RFAA, at
2-3; RFAAX 8, at 1-2. The ALJ found that Registrant's purported answer
failed to ``admit, deny, or state that [she] does not have and is
unable to obtain sufficient information to admit or deny'' each
allegation of the OSC/ISO, as required by 21 CFR 1301.37(d)(3). RFAAX
8, at 2. The ALJ provided Registrant another opportunity to file a
compliant answer by 5:00 p.m. ET/4:00 p.m. CT on April 24, 2025. RFAA,
at 2-3; RFAAX 8, at 1-2.
On April 24, 2025, Registrant filed a second purported answer after
the filing deadline. RFAA, at 3; RFAAX 9; RFAAX 10, at 1. On April 25,
2025, the ALJ issued an order notifying Registrant that her second
purported answer was untimely and remained noncompliant with 21 CFR
1301.37(d)(3). RFAA, at 3; RFAAX 10, at 1-2. The ALJ directed
Registrant to submit a filing by 2:00 p.m. ET/1:00 p.m. CT on May 2,
2025, correcting the deficiencies in her second purported answer and
showing good cause to accept the untimely second purported answer.
RFAA, at 3; RFAAX 10, at 2. Registrant did not respond to this order.
RFAA, at 3; RFAAX 11, at 1-2.
On May 2, 2025, the ALJ issued an order terminating the proceeding
based on his finding that Registrant had failed to file a timely and
compliant answer to the OSC/ISO allegations. Id. The ALJ further found
that Registrant's failure to submit a timely and compliant answer
constituted a waiver of her right to a
[[Page 48885]]
hearing and that she was in default.\3\ RFAAX 11, at 2 (citing 21 CFR
1301.43(c)(1), (e)). The Agency finds that the ALJ did not err in
finding Registrant to be in default due to her untimely second
purported answer, failure to show good cause to excuse the untimely
second purported answer and correct the deficiencies in her purported
answers, and failure to respond to the ALJ's April 25 order.
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\3\ The ALJ's numerous orders repeatedly reminded Registrant
that failure to file a timely and compliant answer could result in a
finding of default under DEA rules. See RFAA, at 2-3; RFAAX 4, at 2
(March 4, 2025 order); RFAAX 6, at n.3 (March 10, 2025 order); RFAAX
8, at 2 n.2 (April 21, 2025 order); RFAAX 10, at 2 n.4 (April 25,
2025 order). In addition, the OSC/ISO itself notified Registrant
that if she ``fail[ed] to file . . . [an] answer, [she] shall be
deemed to have waived [her] right to a hearing and to be in
default.'' RFAAX 1, at 7 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(1)).
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``A default, unless excused, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver
of the [registrant's] right to a hearing and an admission of the
factual allegations of the [OSC/ISO].'' 21 CFR 1301.43(e). Because
Registrant is in default, the Agency finds that Registrant has admitted
to the factual allegations in the OSC/ISO. 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(1), (e),
(f)(1).
Further, ``[i]n the event that [a registrant] . . . is deemed to be
in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action
with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In
such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order
pursuant to [21 CFR] 1316.67.'' 21 CFR 1301.43(f)(1). Here, the
Government has requested final agency action based on Registrant's
default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c), (f), and 1301.46. RFAA, at 1, 5;
see also 21 CFR 1316.67.
III. Findings of Fact
In light of Registrant's default, the Agency finds that the factual
allegations in the OSC/ISO are deemed admitted.\4\ 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
Accordingly, Registrant is deemed to have admitted to each of the
following facts.
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\4\ According to the Controlled Substances Act (CSA),
``[f]indings of fact by the [DEA Administrator], if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.'' 21 U.S.C. 877. Here,
where Registrant is found to be in default, all the factual
allegations in the OSC/ISO are deemed to be admitted. These
uncontested and deemed admitted facts constitute evidence that
exceeds the ``substantial evidence'' standard of 21 U.S.C. 877; it
is unrebutted evidence.
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A. Dispensing Controlled Substances Without Authority
In Texas, an APRN, such as Registrant, may only ``order or
prescribe'' drugs that are ``authorized by a prescriptive authority
agreement.'' 22 Tex. Admin. Code Sec. 222.4(a)(1)(A); RFAAX 1, at 3.
``A physician may delegate to an [APRN] . . . the act of prescribing or
ordering a drug or device as authorized through a prescriptive
authority agreement between the physician and the [APRN].'' 22 Tex.
Admin. Code Sec. 193.7(a); \5\ RFAAX 1, at 3. ``The prescriptive
authority agreement is a mechanism by which an APRN is delegated the
authority to order or prescribe drugs or devices by a physician.'' 22
Tex. Admin. Code Sec. 222.5(a); RFAAX 1, at 3. An APRN must also
possess valid state authority under state law to qualify as a
practitioner for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and to
issue controlled substance prescriptions. 21 U.S.C. 802(21), 823(g)(1),
824(a)(3); RFAAX 1, at 4.
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\5\ This version of 22 Texas Administrative Code Sec. 193.7(a)
was in effect during all periods relevant to the OSC/ISO
allegations.
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On February 1, 2022, pursuant to a prescriptive authority
agreement, Registrant was granted prescriptive authority in Texas by
Dr. R.K.Y. RFAAX 1, at 4. Dr. R.K.Y. died on March 5, 2023. Id. The
prescriptive authority agreement, and therefore Registrant's
prescriptive authority, terminated by operation of law upon the death
of Dr. R.K.Y. Id. On April 20, 2023, Registrant was granted
prescriptive authority by Dr. A.E.G. pursuant to a prescriptive
authority agreement, which was terminated on June 9, 2023. Id.
Thus, Registrant lacked prescriptive authority in Texas from March
5, 2023, to April 20, 2023. Id. Nevertheless, between March 5, 2023,
and April 20, 2023, Registrant issued six prescriptions for controlled
substances. Id. Each controlled substance prescription listed Dr.
R.K.Y. as Registrant's supervising physician, even though he was
deceased when the prescription was issued. Id. Accordingly, the Agency
finds unrebutted record evidence, and Registrant is deemed to have
admitted, that she issued six prescriptions for controlled substances
without possessing the requisite prescriptive authority in Texas.
B. Obtaining Controlled Substances by Fraud
Under Texas law, it is an offense to knowingly obtain and possess a
controlled substance ``by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, [or]
deception.'' Tex. Health & Safety Code Sec. 481.129(a)(5)(A).
On March 15, 2023, a prescription for alprazolam \6\ was issued to
individual D.R. in the name of Dr. R.K.Y., even though Dr. R.K.Y. died
on March 5, 2023. RFAAX 1, at 4, 6. On the day the prescription was
issued, Registrant used the prescription to personally obtain
alprazolam by claiming that she was filling the prescription for
individual D.R. Id. Registrant knew this claim was false because she
knew that D.R. was incarcerated at the time. Id.
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\6\ Alprazolam is a schedule IV depressant. 21 CFR
1308.14(c)(2).
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IV. Public Interest Determination
A. Legal Background
As discussed above, the OSC/ISO alleges that Registrant violated
provisions of the CSA and its implementing regulations. As the Supreme
Court stated in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), ``the main
objectives of the CSA were to conquer drug abuse and control the
legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.'' Id. at
12. Gonzales explained that:
Congress was particularly concerned with the need to prevent the
diversion of drugs from legitimate to illicit channels. To
effectuate these goals, Congress devised a closed regulatory system
making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess
any controlled substance except in a manner authorized by the CSA .
. . . The CSA and its implementing regulations set forth strict
requirements regarding registration, labeling and packaging,
production quotas, drug security, and recordkeeping.
Id. at 12-14.
Here, the OSC/ISO's allegations concern the CSA's ``strict
requirements regarding registration'' and ``the need to prevent the
diversion of drugs from legitimate to illicit channels.'' Id.
Therefore, the allegations go to the heart of the CSA's ``closed
regulatory system'' specifically designed ``to conquer drug abuse and
to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled
substances.'' Id. at 12-14.
When the CSA's requirements are not met, the Agency \7\ ``may deny,
suspend, or revoke [a] registration if . . . the [registrant's]
registration would be `inconsistent with the public interest.'''
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 251 (2006) (quoting 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4)).\8\ In the case of a ``practitioner,'' the Agency is
directed to consider five factors in making the public interest
determination. Id.; 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1)(A)-(E).\9\
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\7\ The CSA delegates power to the Attorney General, who has
delegated authority to the Administrator of DEA (the Agency). 28 CFR
0.100.
\8\ The Government has the burden of proof in this proceeding.
21 CFR 1301.44(e).
\9\ The five factors are:
(A) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board
or professional disciplinary authority.
(B) The [registrant's] experience in dispensing, or conducting
research with respect to controlled substances.
(C) The [registrant's] conviction record under Federal or State
laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
controlled substances.
(D) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws
relating to controlled substances.
(E) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and
safety.
21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1)(A)-(E).
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[[Page 48886]]
The five factors are considered in the disjunctive. Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. at 292-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (``It is well
established that these factors are to be considered in the
disjunctive'' (quoting In re Arora, 60 FR 4447, 4448 (1995))); Robert
A. Leslie, M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). Each factor is weighed on a
case-by-case basis. David H. Gillis, M.D., 58 FR 37507, 37508 (1993).
Any one factor, or combination of factors, may be decisive, Gillis, 58
FR at 37508, and the Agency ``may give each factor the weight . . .
deem[ed] appropriate in determining whether a registration should be
revoked or an application for registration denied.'' Morall v. Drug
Enf't Admin., 412 F.3d 165, 185 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Henderson, J.,
concurring) (quoting Robert A. Smith, M.D., 70 FR 33207, 33208 (2007));
see also Penick Corp. v. Drug Enf't Admin., 491 F.3d 483, 490 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
Moreover, while the Agency is required to consider each of the
factors, it ``need not make explicit findings as to each one.'' MacKay
v. Drug Enf't Admin., 664 F.3d 808, 816 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Volkman v. U.S. Drug Enf't Admin., 567 F.3d 215, 222 (6th Cir. 2009));
Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug Enf't Admin., 881 F.3d
823, 830 (11th Cir. 2018); Hoxie v. Drug Enf't Admin., 419 F.3d 477,
482 (6th Cir. 2005). ``In short, . . . the Agency is not required to
mechanically count up the factors and determine how many favor the
Government and how many favor the registrant. Rather, it is an inquiry
which focuses on protecting the public interest; what matters is the
seriousness of the registrant's misconduct.'' Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D.,
74 FR 459, 462 (2009). Accordingly, as the Eleventh Circuit has
recognized, Agency decisions have explained that findings under a
single factor can support the revocation of a registration. Jones Total
Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 830.
B. Registrant's Registration Is Inconsistent With the Public Interest
While the Agency has considered all the public interest factors of
21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1),\10\ the Government's evidence in support of its
prima facie case is confined to Factors B and D. RFAA, at 4; RFAAX 1,
at 7. Evidence is considered under Factors B and D when it reflects
experience dispensing controlled substances and compliance or non-
compliance with laws related to controlled substances. Kareem Hubbard,
M.D., 87 FR 21156, 21162 (2022).
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\10\ As to Factor A, there is no record evidence of disciplinary
action against Registrant's state medical license. 21 U.S.C.
823(g)(1)(A). However, ``[t]he fact that the record contains no
evidence of a recommendation by a state licensing board does not
weigh for or against a determination as to whether continuation of
[Registrant's] DEA certification is consistent with the public
interest.'' Roni Dreszer, M.D., 76 FR 19434, 19444 (2011). As to
Factor C, there is no evidence in the record that Registrant has
been convicted of any federal or state law offense ``relating to the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances.''
21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1)(C). However, as Agency cases have noted, ``the
absence of such a conviction is of considerably less consequence in
the public interest inquiry'' and is therefore not dispositive.
Dewey C. Mackay, M.D., 75 FR 49956, 49973 (2010). As to Factor E,
the Government's evidence fits squarely within the parameters of
Factors B and D and does not raise ``other conduct which may
threaten the public health and safety.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1)(E).
Accordingly, Factor E does not weigh for or against Registrant.
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Here, the Agency finds unrebutted record evidence, and Registrant
is deemed to have admitted, that between March 5, 2023, and April 10,
2023, Registrant issued six prescriptions for controlled substances
without a prescriptive authority agreement outside the usual course of
professional practice and in violation of federal and Texas law. 21 CFR
1306.04; 22 Tex. Admin. Code Sec. Sec. 222.4(a)(1)(A), 222.5(a); see
also Stephen McCarthy, P.A., 89 FR 71427, 71430 (2024) (``Respondent
repeatedly issued controlled substance prescriptions outside the usual
course of professional practice by issuing such prescriptions while
lacking an active agreement with a supervisory physician as required by
state law.''); Richard J. Settles, D.O., 81 FR 64940, 64947 (2016)
(finding registrant ``violated the CSA and DEA regulations'' when he
issued controlled substance prescriptions without ``the requisite state
authority to dispense controlled substances''). Such non-compliance
with laws related to controlled substances reflects on Registrant's
experience handling controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1)(B), (D).
Furthermore, the Agency finds unrebutted record evidence, and
Registrant is deemed to have admitted, that on March 15, 2023,
Registrant used a prescription issued to another individual to obtain a
controlled substance for herself by fraudulently claiming that she was
filling the prescription for someone else, in violation of Texas law.
Tex. Health & Safety Code Sec. 481.129(a)(5)(A). Such non-compliance
with laws related to controlled substances reflects on Registrant's
experience handling controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1)(B), (D).
After considering the factors of 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), the Agency
finds that the Government satisfied its prima facie burden of showing
that Registrant's registration would be ``inconsistent with the public
interest.'' \11\ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). The Agency also finds that there
is no mitigating evidence to rebut the Government's prima facie case,
and therefore, finds that Registrant's registration is ``inconsistent
with the public interest.'' Id. Thus, the only remaining issue is
whether, in light of the Agency's finding that Registrant violated the
law, Registrant can be trusted with a DEA registration.
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\11\ Given the violations of law proven by unrebutted record
evidence as discussed herein, the Agency need not reach the
remaining allegations related to the inadequacy of Registrant's
medical records and the issuance of controlled substance
prescriptions outside the usual course of professional practice.
RFAAX 1, at 4-6. Registrant's prescribing controlled substances
without authority and obtaining a controlled substance by fraud are
sufficient to revoke.
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V. Sanction
Where, as here, the Government has presented a prima facie case
showing that a registrant's registration is inconsistent with the
public interest, the burden shifts to Registrant to show why she can be
trusted with a registration. Morall, 412 F.3d at 181; Jones Total
Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 830; Garrett Howard Smith, M.D., 83
FR 18882, 18904 (2018). The issue of trust is a fact-dependent
determination based on the circumstances presented by the individual
practitioner. Jeffrey Stein, M.D., 84 FR 46968, 46972 (2019); see also
Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 833. Historically, the
Agency has considered acceptance of responsibility, egregiousness, and
deterrence when making this assessment.
Specifically, the Agency requires the practitioner to accept
responsibility for his or her violation. Jones Total Health Care
Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 833; ALRA Labs, Inc. v. Drug Enf't Admin., 54
F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995). Acceptance of responsibility must be
unequivocal. Janet S. Pettyjohn, D.O., 89 FR 82639, 82641 (2024);
Mohammed Asgar, M.D., 83 FR 29569, 29573 (2018); see also Jones Total
Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 830-31. In addition, the Agency
considers the egregiousness and extent of the misconduct in determining
the appropriate sanction. Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at
834 & n.4. The Agency also considers the need to
[[Page 48887]]
deter similar acts by Registrant, the registrant community, and by
future applicants for registration. Stein, 84 FR at 46972-73.
Here, Registrant did not timely or properly answer the allegations,
and was therefore deemed to be in default. 21 CFR 1301.43(c), (e), (f);
RFAA, at 1-4. To date, Registrant has not filed a motion with the
Office of the Administrator to excuse the default. 21 CFR
1301.43(c)(1). Registrant has thus failed to timely or properly answer
the allegations contained in the OSC/ISO and has not otherwise availed
herself of the opportunity to refute the Government's case. As such,
Registrant has not accepted responsibility for the proven violations,
has made no representations regarding her future compliance with the
CSA, and has not made any demonstration that she can be trusted with a
registration.\12\
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\12\ Even if the Agency were to consider Registrant's purported
answers, which were deemed noncompliant by the ALJ, the Agency would
still find that Registrant has failed to accept responsibility. In
this regard, in her April 21 and April 24 purported answers,
Registrant characterized the OSC/ISO factual allegations as the
result of ``administrative oversight,'' and not ``diversion'' or
``abuse of prescribing authority.'' Registrant's inability or
unwillingness to accept that the proven violations constitute
diversion of controlled substances undermines any attempt on her
part to accept responsibility for the misconduct. See Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 12-14 (``Congress was particularly concerned with
the need to prevent the diversion of drugs from legitimate to
illicit channels.''); Phong H. Tran, M.D., 90 FR 14383, 14385 (2025)
(``Respondent's attempts to minimize this egregious misconduct
undermine any purported acceptance of responsibility.'').
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Further, the interests of specific and general deterrence weigh in
favor of revocation. Registrant's misconduct in this matter concerns
the CSA's ``strict requirements regarding registration'' and ``the need
to prevent the diversion of drugs from legitimate to illicit
channels,'' and, therefore, goes to the heart of the CSA's ``closed
regulatory system'' specifically designed ``to conquer drug abuse and
to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled
substances.'' Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. at 12-14. Registrant's
egregious misconduct involved issuing controlled substance
prescriptions without state authority to so do and obtaining a
controlled substance by fraud. Supra Section IV.B. If the Agency were
to allow Registrant to keep her registration under these circumstances,
it would send a dangerous message that compliance with the law and
preventing diversion are not essential to maintaining a registration.
In sum, Registrant has not offered any evidence on the record that
rebuts the Government's case for revocation of her registration, and
Registrant has not demonstrated that she can be entrusted with the
responsibility of a registration. Accordingly, the Agency will order
the revocation of Registrant's registration.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 823(g)(1) and 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4), I hereby revoke DEA
Certificate of Registration No. MA5242792 issued to Tracy Amerson-
Rivers, A.P.R.N. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority
vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1) and 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4), I hereby
deny any pending applications of Tracy Amerson-Rivers, A.P.R.N., to
renew or modify this registration, as well as any other pending
application of Tracy Amerson-Rivers, A.P.R.N., for additional
registration in Texas. This Order is effective December 1, 2025.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
October 9, 2025, by Administrator Terrance Cole. That document with the
original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative
purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the
Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal Register Liaison Officer
has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic
format for publication, as an official document of DEA. This
administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this
document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2025-19709 Filed 10-29-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
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