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Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks

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Published

October 27, 2025

Effective

November 26, 2025

Issuing agencies

Federal Communications Commission

Abstract

In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Report and Order that updates the Commission's submarine cable licensing process and adopts rule changes to protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign adversary threats, specifically those posed by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. The Report and Order adopts a requirement for certain licensees to file an annual report about the licensee, submarine cable system ownership, and submarine cable operations. The Report and Order adopts a one-time information collection for licensees to identify, among other things, how many entities currently own or operate submarine line terminal equipment (SLTEs) on existing licensed cable systems. The Report and Order also requires applicants and licensees to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and requires applicants to certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. With respect to the circuit capacity data collection, the Report and Order adopts streamlined rules and eliminates the requirement for licensees to file a cable operator report about the capacity on a cable and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual basis.

Full Text

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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 205 (Monday, October 27, 2025)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 48648-48703]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-19658]

[[Page 48647]]

Vol. 90

Monday,

No. 205

October 27, 2025

Part III

Federal Communications Commission

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47 CFR Parts 0, 1, and 43

Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To
Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and
Trade Policy Risks; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 90 , No. 205 / Monday, October 27, 2025 /
Rules and Regulations

[[Page 48648]]

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Parts 0, 1, and 43

[OI Docket No. 24-523, MD Docket No. 24-524; FCC 25-49; FR ID 311064]

Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To
Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and
Trade Policy Risks

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission or FCC) adopted a Report and Order that updates the
Commission's submarine cable licensing process and adopts rule changes
to protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign
adversary threats, specifically those posed by an entity that is owned
by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a
foreign adversary. The Report and Order adopts a requirement for
certain licensees to file an annual report about the licensee,
submarine cable system ownership, and submarine cable operations. The
Report and Order adopts a one-time information collection for licensees
to identify, among other things, how many entities currently own or
operate submarine line terminal equipment (SLTEs) on existing licensed
cable systems. The Report and Order also requires applicants and
licensees to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented a
cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and requires
applicants to certify that the submarine cable system will not use
equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. With
respect to the circuit capacity data collection, the Report and Order
adopts streamlined rules and eliminates the requirement for licensees
to file a cable operator report about the capacity on a cable and
clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual
basis.

DATES: These rules are effective November 26, 2025, except for
amendatory instructions 6 (Sec. 1.767), 7 (Sec. 1.768), 10 (Sec.
1.70002), 11 (Sec. 1.70003), 12 (Sec. Sec. 1.70005 and 1.70006), 13
(Sec. 1.70007), 14 (Sec. Sec. 1.70008 and 1.70009), 15 (Sec. Sec.
1.70011 through 1.70013), 16 (Sec. 1.70016), 17 (Sec. 1.70017), 18
(Sec. 1.70020), 19 (Sec. Sec. 1.70023 and 1.70024), and 22 (Sec.
43.82), which are indefinitely delayed. The One-Time Information
Collection will also be indefinitely delayed. The Commission will
publish a document in the Federal Register announcing the effective
date of these rule sections and the One-Time Information Collection.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Desiree Hanssen, Office of
International Affairs, Telecommunications and Analysis Division, at
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#41252432283324246f29202f3232242f012722226f262e37">[email&#160;protected]</a> or at (202) 418-0887. For additional
information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act information
collection requirements contained in this document, contact Cathy
Williams at 202-418-2918 or <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#dc9fbda8b4a5f28bb5b0b0b5bdb1af9cbabfbff2bbb3aa">[email&#160;protected]</a>, or send an email to
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#0b5b594a4b6d6868256c647d">[email&#160;protected]</a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report
and Order, in OI Docket No. 24-523 and MD Docket No. 24-524; FCC 25-49,
adopted on August 7, 2025 and released on August 13, 2025. The full
text of this document is available online at <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-49A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-49A1.pdf</a>. The full text of this document is
also available for inspection and copying during business hours in the
FCC Reference Center, 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554. To request
materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities, send an
email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f7b1b4b4c2c7c3b7919494d9909881">[email&#160;protected]</a> or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs
Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY).

Synopsis

I. Introduction

1. In this item, we modernize and streamline the Commission's
submarine cable rules to facilitate faster and more efficient
deployment of submarine cables, while at the same time ensuring the
security and resilience of this critical infrastructure. We recognize
that investment in such infrastructure is vital to American prosperity
and economic dynamism. The rules that we adopt today will ensure that
the United States remains ready and able to deploy submarine cable
infrastructure with increasing amounts of capacity to meet current and
future internet and data demands so that the United States remains
``the unrivaled world leader in critical and emerging technologies--
such as artificial intelligence.'' With global competition for
submarine cables increasing, connections to the United States should
continue to be at the forefront of the submarine cable marketplace.
Nonetheless, ``[i]nvestment at all costs is not always in the national
interest,'' because of the potential for foreign adversary
exploitation. We also recognize that ``[e]conomic security is national
security,'' and thus protecting our communications networks against
foreign threats is crucial. With these principles in mind today, we
undertake the first major comprehensive update of our submarine cable
rules since 2001. Since that time, technology, consumer expectations,
international submarine cable traffic patterns, submarine cable
infrastructure, and the foreign threat landscape have changed greatly.
2. To advance the Commission's comprehensive strategy to build a
more secure and resilient communications supply chain, we adopt rules
that place a strong emphasis on preventing and mitigating national
security risks from foreign adversaries, while welcoming investment
from United States allies and partners. We also lighten the regulatory
burden on industry by modernizing and simplifying the submarine cable
license approval process.
3. In this Report and Order, we take action to protect the
security, integrity, and resilience of submarine cable systems by
targeting foreign adversary threats to this critical U.S.
communications infrastructure. Specifically, we adopt a clear and
consistent standard that incorporates the Department of Commerce's
definitions for identifying a ``foreign adversary,'' ``foreign
adversary country,'' and an individual or entity ``owned by, controlled
by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign
adversary.'' Using these definitions, we adopt rules that will better
protect U.S. national security and critical U.S. communications
infrastructure from foreign adversaries.
4. We update the Commission's submarine cable licensing process to
protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign
adversary threats. Specifically, we adopt a presumption that will
preclude the grant of applications filed by any entity owned by,
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign
adversary; any entity identified on the Commission's ``Covered List'';
\1\ and/or

[[Page 48649]]

any entity whose authorization, license, or other Commission approval,
whether or not related to operation of a submarine cable, was denied or
revoked and/or terminated or is denied or revoked and/or terminated in
the future on national security and law enforcement grounds, as well as
the current and future affiliates or subsidiaries of any such entity.
To ensure that applicants have the requisite character qualifications,
we adopt a character presumptive disqualifying condition that an
applicant is not qualified to hold a cable landing license if it meets
certain criteria. We adopt a presumption that denial of an application
is warranted where an applicant seeks to land a submarine cable in a
foreign adversary country. Additionally, we adopt a condition
prohibiting cable landing licensees from entering into a new or
extension of an existing arrangement for Indefeasible Rights of Use
(IRU) or leases for capacity where such arrangements would give an
entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction
or direction of a foreign adversary, the ability to install, own, or
manage Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTE) on a submarine cable
landing in the United States. For current licensees that meet the
presumptive disqualifying criteria or whose cable lands in a foreign
adversary country, we adopt a tool for increased oversight. We require
these licensees to file an annual report (Foreign Adversary Annual
Report) containing information about the licensee, submarine cable
system ownership, and submarine cable operations. We also adopt a
written hearing process to take action to deny or revoke and/or
terminate a cable landing license and a process to address a cable
landing license or a licensee that is insolvent or no longer exists.
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\1\ Pursuant to sections 2(a) and (d) of the Secure and Trusted
Communications Networks Act, and Sec. Sec. 1.50002 and 1.50003 of
the Commission's rules, the Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau (PSHSB) publishes a list of communications equipment and
services that have been determined by one of the sources specified
in that statute to pose an unacceptable risk to the national
security of the United States or the security and safety of United
States persons (``covered'' equipment and services). See Secure and
Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, Public Law 116-124, 133
Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 1601-1609 (Secure
Networks Act); see also 47 CFR 1.50002-1.50003; Federal
Communications Commission, List of Equipment and Services Covered by
Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act, <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist">https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist</a> (last updated June 5, 2025) (List of Covered
Equipment and Services). PSHSB added the latest entry to the Covered
Equipment or Services list on July 23, 2024. Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau Announces Update to List of Covered
Equipment and Services Pursuant to Section 2 of the Secure Network
Act, WC Docket No. 18-89 et al., Public Notice, 39 FCC Rcd 8395
(PSHSB July 23, 2024) (2024 Covered List PSHSB Public Notice),
<a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-24-712A1_Rcd.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-24-712A1_Rcd.pdf</a>.
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5. We modernize our submarine cable rules by adopting a definition
of the term, ``submarine cable system,'' that acknowledges the range of
technological advancement in existing submarine cable systems. This
definition incorporates the future technological evolution of submarine
cable systems, all of which include SLTE as a significant component of
the system itself. While at this time we decline to require SLTE owners
and operators to become licensees, we take steps to identify, through a
one-time information collection, how many entities currently own or
operate SLTEs on existing licensed cable systems. The one-time
information collection we adopt will further inform the Commission
about the identities of SLTE owners and operators and their role in
operating a portion of the submarine cable system, including
information about system capacity, spectrum, or the lighting of a
fiber. The one-time collection will also assess for insolvent cables or
licensees, and require licensees to disclose whether or not their
submarine cable systems use covered equipment or services. Importantly,
this one-time information collection will inform our proposed
regulatory approach to SLTEs as discussed in the Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking.
6. We also codify the Commission's longstanding practice of
requiring a cable landing license for submarine cables that lie
partially outside of U.S. territorial waters. Moreover, while we do
retain a number of our current rules, we eliminate the requirement that
entities that solely own, and do not control, a U.S. cable landing
station must be applicants for, and licensees on, a cable landing
license. We update our application rules to require a statement that
grant of the application is in the public interest, and require
applicants to provide detailed information about the submarine cable
system and to report whether or not they use and/or will use third-
party foreign adversary service providers in the operation of the
submarine cable. We also require applicants and licensees to certify
that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and
physical security risk management plan and will take reasonable
measures to protect their systems and services from cybersecurity and
physical security risks that could affect their provision of
communications services through the submarine cable system.
Additionally, applicants for a cable landing license are required to
certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or
services identified on the Commission's Covered List. These rules will
ensure that licensees will protect their networks from cybersecurity
and physical security threats and threats from foreign adversaries.
Finally, to make it easier for applicants and licensees to navigate our
rules, we clarify and update the rules for applications to modify,
assign, transfer control of, or renew or extend a cable landing license
or request special temporary authority. We adopt rules to obligate
licensees to keep the Commission abreast of changes to important
information such as the contact information of the licensee and other
information that will enable the Commission to maintain accurate
records regarding licensees.
7. With respect to the circuit capacity data collection, we
streamline our rules and eliminate the requirement for licensees to
file a Cable Operator Report about the capacity on a cable and clarify
the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual basis.
Instead, we require licensees and common carriers to report their
capacity on domestic and international cables in a single report, the
Capacity Holder Reports--a report filed by each Filing Entity on an
individual basis--that will enable the Commission to continue
collecting accurate and important data for national security and public
safety purposes. Importantly, consistent with other actions, we require
cable landing licensees and common carriers to provide certain
information about their SLTEs in the Capacity Holder Report.
8. In short, we ``maintain[ ] the strong, open investment
environment that benefits our economy and our people, while enhancing
our ability to protect the United States from new and evolving
threats'' in the submarine cable ecosystem.

II. Background

9. In November 2024, the Commission adopted the 2024 Cable NPRM, 88
FR 50486, August 1, 2023, initiating a comprehensive review of the
submarine cable rules to develop forward-looking rules to better
protect submarine cables, identify and mitigate harms affecting
national security and law enforcement, and facilitate the deployment of
submarine cables and capacity to the market. As explained in the 2024
Cable NPRM, the Commission's authority to grant, withhold, revoke, or
condition submarine cable landing licenses derives from the Cable
Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530. The Commission discussed
in detail its rules and coordination of applications with the Executive
Branch agencies, including the Committee, to assess applicants and
licensees for assessment of any national security, law enforcement,
foreign policy, and/or trade policy concerns. The Commission also
discussed the existing procedures by which it coordinates with the
State Department on all submarine cable applications and obtains
approval of any proposed grant of an application or revocation of a
cable landing license pursuant to the Cable Landing License Act and
Executive Order 10530.

[[Page 48650]]

10. Recent Commission Actions Regarding National Security. The
Commission has recognized that national security is built on both
protecting the nation's communications infrastructure from foreign
adversary threats and promoting the prosperity and robustness of the
communications sector. The Commission in its recent rulemaking
proceedings and actions is continuing its ongoing efforts to secure and
protect communications networks from foreign adversaries, while
recognizing that investment in U.S. communications networks bolsters
national security. In December 2024, the Commission engaged with
stakeholders in light of U.S. government confirmed reports that state-
sponsored foreign actors tied to the People's Republic of China (PRC)
infiltrated at least eight U.S. communications companies in a massive
espionage effort, an incident known as Salt Typhoon. The Commission has
continued to remain vigilant against this and other foreign adversary
cyberthreats.
11. Earlier this year, shortly after President Trump announced in
February 2025 the America First Investment Policy, which states that
``[e]conomic security is national security'' and discusses the need to
limit certain investments in strategic sectors by six identified
foreign adversaries, the Commission initiated a series of actions. In
March 2025, the Commission responded to threats posed by the People's
Republic of China and to the evolving threat environment more
generally, by establishing a Council for National Security to bring
together the Commission's regulatory, investigatory, and enforcement
authorities to counter foreign adversaries. The Council was established
with a three-part goal: ``(1) Reduce the American technology and
telecommunications sectors' trade and supply chain dependencies on
foreign adversaries; (2) Mitigate America's vulnerabilities to
cyberattacks, espionage, and surveillance by foreign adversaries; and
(3) Ensure the U.S. wins the strategic competition with China over
critical technologies, such as 5G and 6G, AI, satellites and space,
quantum computing, robotics and autonomous systems, and the Internet of
Things.'' In the same month, the Commission opened a separate
proceeding, the Delete, Delete, Delete proceeding, with an aim to
remove outdated and unnecessary regulations to clear away obstacles to
investment.
12. On May 22, 2025, the Commission took action in two distinct
proceedings to protect our nation's communications infrastructure from
foreign adversary threats. First, in the Equipment Authorization Report
and Order and FNPRM, the Commission adopted new rules to help ensure
that the telecommunication certification bodies (TCBs), measurement
facilities (test labs), and laboratory accreditation bodies that
participate in our equipment authorization program are not subject to
ownership, direction, or control by untrustworthy actors, including
foreign adversaries, that pose a risk to national security. The
Equipment Authorization Report and Order prohibits Commission
recognition of any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body
owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited
entity, and prohibits such TCBs, test labs, and laboratory
accreditation bodies from participating in the Commission's equipment
authorization program.
13. Second, in the Foreign Adversary NPRM, the Commission proposed
to adopt certification and information collection requirements that
would fill gaps in the Commission's existing rules and give the
Commission, and the public, a new and comprehensive view of threats
from foreign adversaries in the communications sector. Specifically,
the Commission proposed to apply new certification and disclosure
requirements on entities holding every type of license, permit, or
authorization, rather than only certain specific licenses, and to go
beyond foreign adversary ownership to also cover all regulated entities
controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign
adversary. The Commission stated that, by focusing on foreign adversary
ownership or control, rather than foreign influence more broadly, the
proposed rules are tailored to avoid needless burden on regulated
entities.
14. 2024 Cable NPRM. On November 22, 2024, the Commission adopted
the 2024 Cable NPRM, which initiated the first major review of the
submarine cable rules since 2001, and sought comment on how best to
improve and streamline the rules to facilitate efficient deployment of
submarine cables while ensuring the security, resilience, and
protection of this critical infrastructure. Among other things, the
Commission sought comment on codifying the scope of the Commission's
licensing requirements under the Cable Landing License Act and
Executive Order 10530 and other legal requirements, improving the
Commission's oversight of submarine cable landing licenses, and
adopting targeted requirements to protect submarine cables from
national security and law enforcement risks. The Commission further
sought comment on streamlining procedures to expedite submarine cable
review processes and improving the quality of the circuit capacity data
and facilitating the sharing of such information with other federal
agencies. To address evolving national security, law enforcement, and
other risks, the Commission sought comment on updating application
requirements for national security purposes and ensuring the Commission
has targeted and granular information regarding the ownership, control,
and use of a submarine cable system, adopting new compliance
certifications, and on any additional steps the Commission can take to
protect this critical infrastructure, including activities in
coordination with other federal agencies.
15. Earlier this year, the Commission received 18 comments, nine
reply comments, and several ex partes pertaining to a wide range of
topics discussed in the 2024 Cable NPRM. Several commenters supported
the proposal to codify a definition of a submarine cable system in the
Commission's rules. Some commenters offered reservations about
potentially duplicative requirements between the proposed periodic
reporting, which sought updated ownership and other information, and
similar requirements in mitigation agreements with the Committee, as
well as concerns about requiring SLTE owners and operators to be
licensees. Other commenters offered generally critical views about the
proposal to lower the ownership threshold for reportable interests from
10% to 5%, with some further refinements suggested. Some commenters
expressed reservations about including capacity holders or IRU holders
and lessees under a licensing requirement. Meanwhile, several
commenters supported the effort to streamline applications and offered
recommendations. As explained below, we have considered these and other
comments in the thorough record received and either take action today
or seek additional comment.

III. Report and Order

16. We adopt rules that streamline, modernize, and enhance
investment in submarine cable infrastructure, while protecting this
critical infrastructure against foreign adversaries in an evolving
threat environment. In recent actions, the Commission has taken
concrete steps to identify and halt foreign adversaries from
participating in U.S. communications markets and supply chains. Our
rules take similar steps for submarine cables while reducing regulatory
burdens.

[[Page 48651]]

A. Foreign Adversary Rules

17. We take action to protect the security, integrity, and
resilience of the nation's critical infrastructure by adopting
proposals to implement certain information requirements, certification
requirements, conditions, and prohibitions that will enable the
Commission to identify and mitigate foreign adversary threats, as
discussed below. We adopt a modified and tailored version of the
Commission's proposals by simplifying and providing a clear and
consistent standard that incorporates the Department of Commerce's
definitions for identifying a ``foreign adversary,'' ``foreign
adversary country,'' and ``[p]erson owned by, controlled by, or subject
to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.'' Our approach
is aligned with long-standing interagency rules and regulations,
pursuant to Executive Order 13873, to identify and mitigate foreign
adversary threats to U.S. critical infrastructure, including
exploitation through individuals and entities owned by, controlled by,
or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.
This approach is further supported by the record. For example, FDD
states that the Commission should prohibit entities subject to the
jurisdiction, direction, or control of a foreign adversary from owning
submarine cables connected to the United States. The Committee for the
Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications
Services Sector (Committee) also supports the Commission relying on the
Department of Commerce's determinations and definitions in its efforts
to mitigate threats to submarine cable infrastructure presented, such
as prohibiting the use of such vendors for equipment or services.
1. Foreign Adversary Definition
18. Foreign Adversary. We define ``foreign adversary'' consistent
with the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.2, which defines
``foreign adversary'' as ``any foreign government or foreign non-
government person determined by the Secretary to have engaged in a
long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse
to the national security of the United States or security and safety of
United States persons.''
19. In identifying foreign adversaries for the purposes of
implementing the rules we adopt today, we follow the Department of
Commerce's determinations. Currently, the Department of Commerce's
rule, 15 CFR 791.4(a), identifies the following ``foreign governments
or foreign non-government persons'' as ``foreign adversaries'': (1) The
People's Republic of China, including the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and the Macau Special Administrative Region
(China); (2) Republic of Cuba (Cuba); (3) Islamic Republic of Iran
(Iran); (4) Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea); (5)
Russian Federation (Russia); and (6) Venezuelan politician
Nicol[aacute]s Maduro (Maduro Regime). For purposes of the submarine
cable rules, we define ``foreign adversary'' to include the foreign
governments and foreign non-government persons identified in 15 CFR
791.4(a), including the Maduro Regime.
20. Foreign Adversary Country. In this Report and Order, our use of
the term ``foreign adversary country'' incorporates the meaning of the
Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4, which specifically
identifies ``foreign governments or foreign non-government persons''
(in lieu of ``countries'') as ``constitut[ing] foreign adversaries.''
For purposes of the submarine cable rules, we define ``foreign
adversary country'' to include both the foreign governments identified
as foreign adversaries in 15 CFR 791.4, and countries controlled by a
foreign adversary (including foreign non-government persons) identified
in 15 CFR 791.4. For example, we will apply any reference to ``a
government organization of a foreign adversary country'' to include the
Maduro Regime. Further, we will apply the term ``foreign adversary
country'' to include Venezuela as a country controlled by a foreign
adversary identified in 15 CFR 791.4.
21. Owned By, Controlled By, or Subject to the Jurisdiction or
Direction of a Foreign Adversary. For purposes of the submarine cable
rules, we define an individual or entity ``owned by, controlled by, or
subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary''
consistent with Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.2, with
certain narrow modifications. Specifically, we define ``owned by,
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign
adversary'' to apply to:
(1) Any individual or entity, wherever located, who acts as an
agent, representative, or employee, or any person who acts in any other
capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a
foreign adversary or of an individual or entity whose activities are
directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or
subsidized in whole or in majority part by a foreign adversary;
(2) Any individual, wherever located, who is a citizen of a foreign
adversary or a country controlled by a foreign adversary, and is not a
United States citizen or permanent resident of the United States;
(3) Any entity, including a corporation, partnership, association,
or other organization, that has a principal place of business in, or is
headquartered in, incorporated in, or otherwise organized under the
laws of a foreign adversary or a country controlled by a foreign
adversary; or
(4) Any entity, including a corporation, partnership, association,
or other organization, wherever organized or doing business, that is
owned or controlled by a foreign adversary, to include circumstances in
which any person identified in paragraphs (1) through (3) of this
section possesses the power, direct or indirect, whether or not
exercised, through the ownership of a majority or a dominant minority
(10% or greater) of the total outstanding voting interest and/or equity
interest, or through a controlling interest, in an entity, board
representation, proxy voting, a special share, contractual
arrangements, formal or informal arrangements to act in concert, or
other means, to determine, direct, or decide important matters
affecting an entity.
22. In the 2024 Cable NPRM, the Commission proposed similar
language with the term ``influence.'' However, we adopt here a clearer
and narrower version of the proposal to align with other recent
Commission actions. Moreover, our adopted approach is also aligned with
interagency national security regulations deriving from President
Trump's Executive Order 13873, covering the closely related matter of
``Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services
Supply Chain.'' We also recognize that industry has recommended and
prefers clear lines and directions rather than ambiguous and
potentially capacious terminology. After all, while every major global
company is ``subject to the influence'' of the government of the
People's Republic of China, including many prominent cable landing
licensees, not all companies may be subject to a degree of influence
such that they threaten national security and law enforcement
interests. While we wish to sweep broadly enough to cover private
entities subject to multi-faceted forms of foreign adversary control,
we do not desire or intend a scope as broad as ``subject to the
influence'' by itself implies.
23. Our approach is also recommended by the Committee, whose
expertise the Commission frequently

[[Page 48652]]

seeks on national security matters, and others. The Heritage
Foundation, for example, states that, ``the Commission could adopt the
phrasing `persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary,' as has been
recommended by other commenters.'' Horizon Advisory also references 15
CFR 791.2, stating that ``[a] practical approach to start in the right
direction would be to apply the US Commerce Department's definition of
`person owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or
direction of a foreign adversary' for defining restrictions.''
24. Importantly, our rule will also assess private entities that
are operating in foreign adversary countries. Some entities that are ``
`ostensibly private and civilian' '' may `` `directly support China's
military, intelligence, and security apparatuses and aid in their
development and modernization.' '' Horizon Advisory stresses that ``no
Chinese company is private in any traditional sense,'' adding that
``[a]s the Chinese government refines its use and messaging around
authorities like the National Security Law, the Anti-Espionage Law, and
the Personal Information Protection Law, any firm operating in China is
at risk of official influence that belies traditional conceptions of a
private company.'' Recently, the Supreme Court unanimously accepted
findings that a privately held company that has operations in China
``is subject to Chinese laws that require it to `assist or cooperate'
with the Chinese Government's `intelligence work' and to ensure that
the Chinese Government has the power to access and control private data
the company holds.''
25. We note that the Commission's rules recognize that ``[b]ecause
the issue of control inherently involves issues of fact, it must be
determined on a case-by-case basis and may vary with the circumstances
presented by each case.'' While we include factors indicative of
control in our definition of ``owned by, controlled by, or subject to
the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary,'' a determination
of control is not limited to these factors. The Commission will
consider the totality of the circumstances reflected in the record.
26. We make certain modifications from the Department of Commerce's
definition to appropriately tailor the Commission's definition and
clearly define terms for purposes of the submarine cable rules,
including the disclosure requirements and conditions adopted herein.
First, we use the specific terms ``individual'' and/or ``entity'' to
clarify the applicability of each subpart of the definition. Second,
our definition of an individual ``owned by, controlled by, or subject
to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary,'' does not
include a resident of a foreign adversary country.
27. Finally, we define ``that is owned . . . by a foreign
adversary'' in subpart (4) to include both voting and equity interests,
as well as controlling interests, and also define the term ``dominant
minority'' in subpart (4) as 10% or greater direct or indirect voting
and/or equity interests. We find that this ownership threshold is
consistent with the Commission's consideration of the ownership
threshold of concern in the 2024 Cable NPRM and our rules requiring
disclosure of such ownership information in submarine cable
applications. Our approach is also consistent with Commission precedent
and recent actions in other proceedings related to the ownership
threshold that we adopted or proposed to adopt to determine foreign
adversary ownership or control. The Commission has found that an
individual or entity may exert direction or control, or significant
influence, over a subject entity even without holding a majority of the
equity and/or voting interests and that ownership interests as low as
five and ten percent are relevant to protecting national security by
identifying foreign adversary involvement in a licensee.
2. Foreign Adversary Presumptive Disqualifying Condition
28. To protect the security, integrity, and resilience of this
critical U.S. communications infrastructure against national security,
law enforcement, and other threats, we adopt a presumption that a
foreign adversary applicant, as further described below, is not
qualified to hold a cable landing license unless the applicant
overcomes the adverse presumption. No commenter opposes the
Commission's proposals. We find that adopting this presumptive
disqualifying condition is consistent with the Commission's authority
to withhold cable landing licenses and condition the grant of licenses
to ``promote the security of the United States'' under the Cable
Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530, and will protect this
critical submarine cable infrastructure and help ensure that it is
secure from foreign adversaries and entities identified on the
Commission's Covered List.
29. Specifically, the disqualifying condition will presumptively
preclude the grant of a submarine cable application filed by any
applicant:
(1) That is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction
or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g);
(2) That is identified on the Covered List that the Commission
maintains pursuant to the Secure Networks Act; and/or
(3) Whose authorization, license, or other Commission approval,
whether or not related to operation of a submarine cable, was denied or
revoked and/or terminated or is denied or revoked and/or terminated in
the future on national security and law enforcement grounds, as well as
the current and future affiliates or subsidiaries of any such entity.
30. We will apply this presumptive disqualifying condition to: (1)
any initial application for a cable landing license that is filed after
the effective date of the Report and Order, and (2) all other types of
submarine cable applications--including an application for
modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension
of a cable landing license--that are filed after the effective date of
the Report and Order by a licensee whose initial application for a
cable landing license is granted after the effective date of the Report
and Order or by an existing licensee that currently does not exhibit
(prior to the effective date of the Report and Order) any of the
aforementioned criteria set out in the disqualifying condition. In this
Report and Order, we use the term ``existing licensees'' to refer to a
cable landing licensee whose license was or is granted prior to the
effective date of the Report and Order or the new rules, as applicable
and discussed herein. An applicant can overcome this adverse
presumption only by establishing through clear and convincing evidence
that the applicant does not fall within the scope of the adverse
presumption, as described above, or that grant of the application would
not pose risks to national security or that the national security
benefits of granting the application would substantially outweigh any
risks. Given our adoption of this presumption is necessitated by
national security threats to critical U.S. communications
infrastructure presented by untrustworthy actors, including foreign
adversaries, we find it is appropriate and justified to apply a clear
and convincing evidence standard to overcome the adverse presumption
rather than NASCA's recommendation to apply a standard for rebutting a
presumption that considers licensing conditions and other safeguards.
We will exercise our discretion to exclude such applications from
referral to the

[[Page 48653]]

Executive Branch agencies. We address below the process that will apply
where the Commission considers whether denial of a submarine cable
application is warranted. If an applicant fails to overcome any of the
criteria in the presumptive disqualifying condition, we will find that
denial of the application is warranted to promote the security of the
United States and we will deny the application.
31. To the extent an application for modification, assignment,
transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license
is filed after the effective date of the Report and Order by existing
licensees that currently exhibit (prior to the effective date of the
Report and Order) any of the criteria set out in the presumptive
disqualifying condition, instead of applying the presumption, we will
refer those applications to the Executive Branch agencies, irrespective
of whether the applicant has reportable foreign ownership.
32. Importantly, we will presume that denial of an application as
specified herein is warranted where it is filed by any applicant that
is subject to any of the aforementioned criteria. First, foreign
adversaries are deemed to present a national security threat that
undermines the security, integrity, and resilience of critical
submarine cable infrastructure and the national security interests of
the United States. Entities subject to foreign adversary ownership,
control, jurisdiction, or direction are identified through the
application process, or through the Commission's Covered List, or by
Commission action. Second, entities identified on the Commission's
Covered List have been found to produce or provide equipment and
services that have been deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to the
national security of the United States or the security and safety of
United States persons. Third, we conclude that the Commission's
determinations in denial and revocation and/or termination proceedings
concerning any regulated activity are directly relevant to the
determination as to whether denial of a submarine cable application by
an affected entity or its current and future affiliates and
subsidiaries would ``promote the security of the United States.''
33. For example, the presumptive disqualifying condition will apply
to any initial application for a cable landing license filed by China
Mobile International (USA) Inc. (China Mobile USA), China Telecom
(Americas) Corporation (CTA), China Unicom (Americas) Operations
Limited (CUA), Pacific Networks Corp. (Pacific Networks), and ComNet
(USA) LLC (ComNet) and their current and future affiliates and
subsidiaries. In the China Telecom Americas Order on Revocation and
Termination, China Unicom Americas Order on Revocation, and Pacific
Networks and ComNet Order on Revocation and Termination, the Commission
extensively evaluated national security and law enforcement concerns
and determined, based on thorough record development, that each entity
is ``subject to exploitation, influence, and control by the Chinese
government and is highly likely to be forced to comply with Chinese
government requests without sufficient legal procedures subject to
independent judicial oversight.'' In the China Mobile USA Order, the
Commission found that the entity is ``vulnerable to exploitation,
influence, and control by the Chinese government'' and there is a
significant risk that the Chinese government would use the entity ``to
conduct activities that would seriously jeopardize the national
security interests and law enforcement activities of the United
States.''
3. Character Presumptive Disqualifying Condition
34. Today, we adopt a standard by which the Commission will
consider whether an applicant seeking a cable landing license or
modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension
of a cable landing license has the requisite character qualifications.
To ensure that applicants have the requisite character qualifications,
we adopt a presumption that an applicant is not qualified to hold a
cable landing license if it meets any of the criteria listed below,
unless the applicant overcomes the adverse presumption. This
presumption will supplement the foreign adversary presumptive
disqualifying condition and codifies a narrower application of the
longstanding Commission practice of considering the character
qualifications of applicants for submarine cable applications.
35. We presume an applicant does not possess the requisite
character qualifications to become a cable landing licensee if the
applicant has within the last 20 years:
(1) Materially violated the Cable Landing License Act where the
violation (a) was not remediated with an adjudication involving a
consent decree and/or compliance plan, (b) resulted in a loss of
Commission license or authorization, or (c) was found by the Commission
to be intentional;
(2) Committed national security-related violations of the
Communications Act or Commission rules as identified in Commission
orders, including but not limited to violations of rules concerning the
Covered List that the Commission maintains pursuant to the Secure
Networks Act;
(3) Made materially false statements or engaged in fraudulent
conduct concerning national security or the Cable Landing License Act;
(4) Been subject to an adjudicated finding of making false
statements or engaging in fraudulent conduct concerning national
security before another U.S. government agency; or
(5) Materially failed to comply with the terms of a cable landing
license, including but not limited to a condition requiring compliance
with a mitigation agreement with the Executive Branch agencies,
including the Committee, where the violation (a) was not remediated
with an adjudication involving a consent decree and/or compliance plan,
(b) resulted in a loss of Commission license or authorization, or (c)
was found by the Commission to be intentional.
36. We will apply this presumptive disqualifying condition to (1)
any initial application for a cable landing license that is filed after
the effective date of the Report and Order, and (2) all other types of
submarine cable applications--including an application for
modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension
of a cable landing license--that are filed after the effective date of
the Report and Order by a licensee whose initial application for a
cable landing license is granted after the effective date of the Report
and Order or by an existing licensee that currently does not exhibit
(prior to the effective date of the Report and Order) any of the
aforementioned criteria set out in the disqualifying condition. Where
such an application is filed for an assignment or transfer of control
of a cable landing license, we will apply this presumptive
disqualifying condition in our evaluation of the licensee, assignor/
transferor, and assignee/transferee. We will not apply this presumptive
disqualifying condition where an application for modification,
assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable
landing license is filed after the effective date of the Report and
Order by existing licensees that currently exhibit (prior to the
effective date of the Report and Order) any of the criteria set out in
the presumptive disqualifying condition.
37. The criteria set out in this presumptive disqualifying
condition are not the only grounds on which the Commission may deny an
application

[[Page 48654]]

due to character concerns. The public interest may require, in a
particular case, that the Commission deny an application on other
grounds or evidence that may be indicative of the applicant's
truthfulness and reliability, including violation of other provisions
of the Communications Act, Commission rules, or laws.
38. An applicant subject to any of the aforementioned criteria can
overcome this adverse presumption only by establishing that the
applicant has the requisite character, despite its past conduct. We
will not require applicants to disclose pending investigations, but
rather only disclose violations as preliminarily or finally determined
by the Commission, and as adjudicated by another U.S. government agency
or a court in the United States.
39. We disagree with Microsoft's and NASCA's comments that the
Commission's proposal regarding character qualifications was
``overbroad.'' Nevertheless, we choose to narrow the scope of the
character qualifications to initially prioritize considerations related
to national security in our assessment of an applicant's truthfulness
and reliability and to better allocate administrative resources.
Microsoft and NASCA disagree, for example, with any requirement to
disclose any felony absent a material or specific threshold. The
Commission considers all felonies as relevant to its evaluation of
character qualifications in the broadcast licensing context, as such is
indicative of an applicant's or licensee's ``propensity to obey the
law.'' Further, the Commission retains the authority to take
enforcement action or to revoke a licensee's cable landing license when
warranted, including but not limited to reasons involving these or
other character qualifications or misconduct of a licensee. Finally,
while we agree with Microsoft's and NASCA's recommendation to limit the
scope of the character qualifications to conduct related to ownership
and operation of a submarine cable, we consider that fraudulent conduct
and false statements before the Commission or other U.S. government
agencies are relevant to determining the qualification of an applicant
to become a cable landing licensee because such conduct bears directly
on the licensee's truthfulness and propensity to obey the law and thus
our ability to rely on the licensee to comply with our rules and the
Cable Landing License Act. We find that the character qualifications
discussed above are relevant to the determination of whether denial of
a submarine cable application is warranted.
4. Foreign Adversary Cable Landing Presumptive Disqualifying Condition
40. To further protect U.S. communications networks from national
security and law enforcement threats, we adopt a presumption that
denial of an application, as specified below, is warranted where an
applicant seeks to land a submarine cable in a foreign adversary
country, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(f) of our newly adopted rules,
unless the applicant overcomes the adverse presumption. The Committee
supports a presumption of denial on building new cable landings
connecting foreign adversary countries to the United States, given the
intent and capabilities of such countries to harm U.S. interests and
the vulnerabilities inherent in submarine cable infrastructure. No
other commenter addressed this issue. We find that adopting this
presumptive disqualifying condition is consistent with the Commission's
authority to withhold cable landing licenses and condition the grant of
licenses to ``promote the security of the United States'' under the
Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530, and will protect
this critical submarine cable infrastructure and ensure that it is
secure from foreign adversaries and entities identified on the
Commission's Covered List.
41. Specifically, we adopt a disqualifying condition that will
presumptively preclude the grant of a submarine cable application filed
by any applicant:
(1) That seeks to land a new submarine cable in a foreign adversary
country, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(f).
(2) That seeks to modify, renew, or extend its cable landing
license to add a new landing located in a foreign adversary country, as
defined in Sec. 1.70001(f).
42. We will apply this presumptive disqualifying condition to: (1)
any initial application for a cable landing license that is filed after
the effective date of the Report and Order, and (2) an application for
modification or renewal or extension of a cable landing license that is
filed after the effective date of the Report and Order by a licensee
whose initial application for a cable landing license is granted after
the effective date of the Report and Order or by an existing licensee.
An applicant can overcome this adverse presumption only by establishing
through clear and convincing evidence that the applicant does not fall
within the scope of the adverse presumption, as described above, or
that grant of the application would not pose risks to national security
or that the national security benefits of granting the application
would substantially outweigh any risks. We will exercise our discretion
to exclude such applications from referral to the Executive Branch
agencies. We address below the process that will apply where the
Commission considers whether denial of a submarine cable application is
warranted. If an applicant fails to overcome any of the criteria in the
presumptive disqualifying condition, we will find that denial of the
application is warranted to promote the security of the United States
and we will deny the application.
43. We agree with the Committee that there are substantial and
serious national security and law enforcements risks associated with
landing submarine cables in foreign adversary countries. Since 2017,
there have been two submarine cable applications filed in part by
entities with ties to foreign adversary countries and with the proposed
cable landings in foreign adversary countries. The Executive Branch
agencies recommended that the Commission partially deny the PLCN cable
system application due to national security and law enforcement risks,
stating that the proposed connection to Hong Kong, ``combined with
other pending applications seeking to directly connect the United
States to Hong Kong, furthers the PRC's ambitions to have access to an
information hub that is directly linked to U.S. ICT infrastructure''
and ``potentially could place voluminous amounts of sensitive U.S.
person data in these companies' possession at risk.'' The Committee
recommended that the Commission deny the ARCOS-1 modification
application due to national security and law enforcement risks, stating
that ``[i]f the application is granted as proposed, U.S. persons'
internet traffic, data, and communications transiting the proposed
ARCOS-1 cable expansion (Segment 26) to Cuba are very likely to be
compromised,'' given the ``Cuban government maintains tight control of
the Cuban telecommunications networks through [Empresa de
Telecomunicaciones de Cuba S.A. (ETECSA)].''
5. Prohibition on IRUs and Capacity Leases With Foreign Adversaries
44. To further protect U.S. communications networks from national
security, law enforcement, and other threats, we adopt a condition that
cable landing licensees are prohibited from entering into arrangements
for Indefeasible Rights of Use (IRUs) or leases for capacity on
submarine cable systems landing in the United States,

[[Page 48655]]

where such arrangement for IRUs or lease for capacity would give an
entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction
or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g),
the ability to install, own, or manage SLTE on a submarine cable
landing in the United States. While we clarify that we do not apply a
strict liability standard, we expect licensees to conduct substantial
due diligence to ensure compliance with FCC requirements. To the extent
a licensee conducts substantial due diligence to verify all relevant
information and reasonably believes the entity is not owned by,
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign
adversary, as defined herein, such licensee would not be subject to
enforcement sanctions. We would consider all of the facts and
circumstances raised in an individual case and take into consideration
the steps a licensee took in conducting substantial due diligence to
ensure compliance with the rule. We adopt this condition with respect
to new and extension of existing arrangements for IRUs or leases for
capacity between a cable landing licensee and any of the aforementioned
entities, subject to any exception granted by the Commission. A
licensee may petition the Commission for waiver of the condition. Any
waiver of the condition would be granted only to the extent the
licensee demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that such new or
extension of an existing arrangement or lease would serve the public
interest and would present no risks to national security or that the
national security benefits of granting the waiver would substantially
outweigh any risks.
45. The Commission sought comment on whether it should prohibit
cable landing licensees from entering into arrangements for IRUs or
leases for capacity on submarine cables landing in the United States
with entities associated with foreign adversaries. Specifically, the
Commission sought comment on applying this prohibition to any entity
that is directly and/or indirectly owned or controlled by, or subject
to the influence of, (1) a government organization of a foreign
adversary country, and/or (2) any individual or entity that has a
citizenship(s) or place(s) of organization in a ``foreign adversary''
country, as defined under 15 CFR 791.4. For the reasons discussed
above, we instead adopt the narrower, more precise, and previously-used
formulation ``owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction
or direction of a foreign adversary.''
46. We are persuaded by the record support for our action today.
NASCA argues that the proposal ``to ban certain commercial transactions
is not supported by specific findings that the transactions pose a
national security or law enforcement risk, given that the customers in
such transactions typically do not have the ability to exert influence
or control over the cable.'' Other commenters, however, address
national security risks associated with submarine cables in the current
threat environment. FDD states that ``Beijing has also repeatedly
demonstrated its willingness to use security gaps within U.S. critical
infrastructure'' and ``[t]hese risks are heightened by private firms'
use of remote network management systems, particularly those connected
directly to the [I]nternet, to control submarine cable systems.'' The
Committee states that ``the United States and its networks are under
constant threat from various foreign adversaries, particularly China''
and recent compromise of U.S. telecommunications infrastructure
``reflects the increasing capability of China to target critical
American infrastructure and systems.'' The Committee states that
prohibiting cable landing licensees from entering into dark fiber IRU
agreements with foreign adversary-affiliated entities would reduce
risks posed by such entities owning or operating SLTE on submarine
cables landing in the United States ``pursuant to an IRU or similar or
similar legal instrument,'' and also provide ``a bright line rule''
requested by commenters. The Committee emphasizes the national security
risks presented by foreign adversary entities with this type of access,
including serious counterintelligence risks where an adversary could
intercept or misroute U.S. persons' communications and sensitive data
transiting the submarine cable.
47. We find there are serious national security and law enforcement
risks associated with access, ownership, and control of communications
fiber and principal equipment on this critical U.S. infrastructure by
entities that are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. Capacity may be held
on submarine cables through ownership, leasing, purchasing, selling,
buying, or swapping of capacity, spectrum, or fiber (partial fiber pair
or a full fiber pair) for transmission of voice, data, and internet
over the submarine cable system to interconnect with a U.S. terrestrial
network. Significant national security and law enforcement risks are
raised where an untrustworthy actor has access to U.S.-based
infrastructure and sensitive information that traverses such
infrastructure. In the China Telecom Americas Order on Revocation and
Termination, for example, the Commission discussed that ``the
opportunities for harmful conduct associated with [China Telecom
(Americas) Corporation's (CTA)] ability, as a service provider, to
carry U.S. communications traffic present risks of unauthorized access
to U.S. customer data and/or metadata.'' Moreover, there are serious
national security and law enforcement risks where an untrustworthy
actor with access, ownership, and control of submarine cable
communications fiber and principal equipment, has physical presence
within U.S. communications networks and ``can potentially access and/or
manipulate data where it is on the preferred path for U.S. customer
traffic.'' Our action today further protects the submarine cable
infrastructure from threats and ensures foreign adversaries are
precluded from exploiting the domestic supply chain.

B. Cable Landing License Processes To Withhold or Revoke and/or
Terminate a License

1. Process To Withhold or Revoke and/or Terminate a License
48. We adopt the Commission's proposal to apply an informal written
process in cases involving withholding or revocation and/or termination
of a cable landing license. Below, we describe the procedures we will
use for revocations and denials, respectively. We find that these
procedures are consistent with due process and procedural requirements
under the Cable Landing License Act, the Communications Act, and the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
49. The Cable Landing License Act states that the President may
``withhold or revoke such [cable landing] license . . . after due
notice and hearing,'' but does not identify particular procedures that
must be followed. Where a statute does not expressly require an ``on
the record'' hearing and instead calls simply for a ``hearing,'' a
``full hearing,'' or uses similar terminology, the statute does not
trigger the APA's formal adjudication procedures absent clear evidence
of congressional intent to do so. Agencies must adhere to the formal
hearing procedures in sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA only in
cases of ``adjudication required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing.'' In addition to the
Cable Landing License

[[Page 48656]]

Act, neither the Communications Act, the Commission's rules, nor the
APA requires the Commission to use trial-type hearing procedures when
it withholds or revokes a cable landing license. Congress has granted
the Commission broad authority to ``conduct its proceedings in such
manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to
the ends of justice.'' The Commission has broad discretion to craft its
own rules ``of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of
permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.'' Furthermore,
the Communications Act gives the Commission the power of ruling on
facts and policies in the first instance. In exercising that power, the
Commission may resolve disputes of fact in an informal hearing
proceeding on a written record. Below, we explain how we will conduct
application and revocation proceedings.
50. Revocation Informal Written Process. We adopt an informal
written process for revocations that will allow for the presentation
and exchange of full written submissions before the Commission or OIA.
The informal written process will provide cable landing licensees with
timely and adequate notice of the reasons for any revocation action,
and opportunity to cure noncompliance to the extent such an opportunity
is required by the APA, and to respond to allegations and evidence in
the record and to make any factual, legal, or policy arguments through
the presentation and exchange of full written submissions. To the
extent required by the APA, licensees will also be afforded the
opportunity to cure any noncompliance before the institution of a
revocation proceeding. See 5 U.S.C. 558(c) (``Except in cases of
willfulness or those in which public health, interest, or safety
requires otherwise, the withdrawal, suspension, revocation, or
annulment of a license is lawful only if, before the institution of
agency proceedings therefor, the licensee has been given--(1) notice by
the agency in writing of the facts or conduct which may warrant the
action; and (2) opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with
all lawful requirements.''). We adopt the proposal that the Commission
may commence a revocation proceeding either on its own initiative or
upon the filing of a recommendation by the Executive Branch agencies,
including the Committee, to revoke the license of a cable landing
licensee. A few commenters state that the Commission cannot revoke a
cable landing license ``without prior coordination and approval from
the State Department.'' We note that the Commission and the State
Department have existing procedures by which the State Department
approves the Commission's grant of a cable landing license application
or revocation of a cable landing license, as required by Executive
Order 10530, and these procedures would continue to apply to any
revocation of a cable landing license.
51. While we believe that oral hearing procedures are not warranted
in all cases involving revocation of cable landing licenses, we
delegate authority to OIA to determine appropriate procedures on a case
by case basis, including addressing requests for oral hearing
procedures, providing an opportunity for oral hearing procedures where
warranted by the facts and circumstance, and designating an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) as the presiding officer if the hearing
includes oral procedures, if OIA determines that doing so would be
appropriate based on the ALJ's expertise or for other reasons. Courts
have held that the question of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing
is ``within [the agency's] discretion, and it may `properly deny an
evidentiary hearing if the issues, even disputed issues, may be
adequately resolved on the written record, at least where there is no
issue of motive, intent or credibility.''' As stated in the 2024 Cable
NPRM, we do not believe it would be appropriate to require live hearing
procedures involving testimony and cross-examination in all proceedings
to revoke cable landing licenses, particularly in cases involving
national security issues, where the Commission has previously concluded
that the burdens on the Government of implementing such procedures
outweighed the private interest and the probable value of additional
procedures. We also believe that live hearing procedures could entail
significant administrative burdens on the Commission even in cases
involving other issues that do not involve the Executive Branch
agencies, such as character concerns, or other Commission rule
violations. The informal written process we will apply is also distinct
from the Commission's subpart B hearing rules, including the written
hearing rules codified in Sec. Sec. 1.371 through 1.377. No commenter
addressed these proposals or argued that we should require oral hearing
procedures in cases involving revocation of cable landing licenses.
52. While no commenter opposed an informal written hearing process,
a few commenters state that revocation procedures should provide
licensees with notice and an opportunity to resolve or cure concerns. A
few commenters state generally that revocation will have an impact on
investments, or that the Commission should ``provide licensees with a
clearly established process to revoke a license,'' but they do not
claim that the informal written process itself would provide
insufficient process or fail to provide adequate opportunities for
affected licensees to address the Commission's concerns. However, a few
commenters propose mitigation as an additional procedural safeguard to
resolve concerns or as a substitute for any revocation action. For
example, INCOMPAS states that, ``[b]efore the Commission resorts to
revocation, it first should engage with licensees'' to provide an
opportunity to work with the Commission and Executive Branch agencies
to identify national security concerns and develop mitigation measures.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce states that licensees should be provided ``a
meaningful opportunity'' to respond to allegations of misconduct and to
cure or to mitigate concerns. As discussed below, we delegate authority
to OIA to implement procedures on a case by case basis in accordance
with section 558(c) of the APA, including providing notice and
opportunity, where appropriate, to achieve compliance unless the facts
and circumstances indicate willfulness or that the public interest or
safety requires otherwise (including harm to national security). The
Commission may determine, for example, in light of the relevant facts
and circumstances that national security and law enforcement risks
presented in a particular case cannot be addressed through mitigation
with the Executive Branch agencies. Moreover, Executive Order 10530
requires the Commission to obtain the approval of the State Department,
and, ``as the Commission may deem necessary,'' to seek advice from
other Executive Branch agencies, before granting or revoking or
terminating a cable landing license. The Commission has sought the
expertise of the relevant Executive Branch agencies in identifying and
evaluating issues of concern that may arise from an applicant's or
licensee's foreign ownership, while also emphasizing that it will make
an independent decision and will evaluate concerns raised by the
Executive Branch agencies in light of all the issues raised. Further,
revocation cases may involve other issues that do not involve the
Executive Branch agencies, such as character concerns, or other
Commission rule violations. To

[[Page 48657]]

the extent any revocation proceeding is commenced either on the
Commission's own initiative or upon the filing of a recommendation by
the Executive Branch agencies, we find that our informal written
process will ensure the development of an adequate administrative
record and appropriate procedural safeguards to ensure due process,
including procedures for participation by affected licensees, the
Executive Branch agencies, and other interested parties.
53. We disagree with proposals to curtail the Commission's
authority to revoke and/or terminate a cable landing license under the
Cable Landing License Act, Executive Order 10530, and the Commission's
rules. Commenters suggest, for example, that the Commission should only
revoke the license of a cable landing licensee on national security and
economic security grounds or solely based on a history of
noncompliance, or otherwise provide a clear standard such as specific
national security threats posed by changed circumstances or
noncompliance with the terms of a license or Commission rules. We
cannot effectively discharge our duty to protect national security by
limiting our revocation and termination process to a prescribed list of
circumstances, as we cannot predict with certainty what circumstances
might threaten national security in the future. However, in general, we
will consider the possibility of initiating revocation proceedings, for
example, where a licensee's actions or failure to act, or other
circumstances, raise concerns about our ability to trust the licensee
to comply with the Cable Landing License Act, our submarine cable
rules, and/or national security commitments, or to otherwise protect
national security interests. Further, a licensee's violation of other
statutory or regulatory requirements, as well as serious non-FCC
misconduct, may call into question our ability to trust a licensee in
this regard. We will consider the possibility of initiating termination
proceedings where a licensee fails to comply with any condition of its
license. Separate and apart from revocation, the Commission uses the
term ``termination'' where a license or authorization is terminated
based on the licensee's or authorization holder's failure to comply
with a condition of the license or authorization, and has determined
that the informal written procedures applicable to termination need not
mirror the procedures used for revocation of licenses or
authorizations. To the extent any revocation and/or termination
proceeding is commenced, we find that our informal written hearing
process will ensure the Commission obtains the approval of the State
Department, and will seek advice from other Executive Branch agencies,
``as the Commission may deem necessary,'' before revoking or
terminating a cable landing license. As discussed below, we delegate
authority to OIA to determine appropriate procedures on a case by case
basis for revocation and/or termination of a cable landing license, as
required by due process and applicable law and in light of the relevant
facts and circumstances.
54. Application Proceedings. As stated in the 2024 Cable NPRM, we
believe that the statutory language ``withhold . . . such license''
authorizes the denial of an application, including an initial
application for a cable landing license and an application to modify,
assign, transfer control of, or renew or extend a cable landing
license. The 2024 Cable NPRM sought comment on the extent to which the
Commission's existing procedures for denial of applications should be
modified in any respect. The Commission also sought comment on whether
its procedures for denial of an application to modify, assign, or
transfer control of a license, or for renewal and extension
applications should mirror its procedures for denial of an initial
application. One commenter addressed the procedural framework
applicable to denial. We conclude that additional informal written
procedures beyond our existing procedures are not warranted for denial
of applications, but as proposed we delegate authority to OIA to adopt
additional procedures on a case-by-case basis as circumstances warrant,
and consistent with due process.
55. Consistent with Executive Order 10530, we also adopt the
proposal to amend Sec. 1.767(b) of the rules so that it does not state
that denial of an application requires approval by the Secretary of
State. No commenter addressed this proposal. Executive Order 10530 does
not require the State Department's approval of a denial action and
expressly states that ``no such license shall be granted or revoked by
the Commission except after obtaining approval of the Secretary of
State . . . .'' Section 1.767(b) of the current rules, however, is
inconsistent with the language in Executive Order 10530, as it states
that submarine cable applications are ``acted upon by the Commission
after obtaining the approval of the Secretary of State.'' The term
``acted upon'' would appear to include denial of an application.
Therefore, we remove the language ``[t]hese applications are acted
upon'' in the rule and state instead, ``[c]able landing licenses shall
be granted or revoked by the Commission after obtaining the approval of
the Secretary of State . . . .''
56. Delegation of Authority to OIA to Implement Procedures.
Further, we adopt the Commission's proposal to modify OIA's existing
delegated authority to permit OIA to deny an application and to revoke
and/or terminate a cable landing license under the Cable Landing
License Act and Executive Order 10530. While no commenter opposes this
proposal, INCOMPAS asserts that any codification of the revocation
procedures should state that any reservation of the Commission's
authority to modify its approach as circumstances warrant ``is limited
by the requirements of due process.'' The rule we adopt sets forth,
among other things, that OIA shall determine appropriate procedures,
initiate revocation and/or termination proceedings, and revoke and/or
terminate a cable landing license, ``as required by due process and
applicable law.'' Specifically, we delegate authority to OIA to
determine appropriate procedures on a case by case basis for grant or
denial of an application or revocation and/or termination of a cable
landing license, to initiate and conduct application, revocation and/or
termination proceedings, and to grant or deny an application and revoke
and/or terminate a cable landing license, as required by due process
and applicable law and in light of the relevant facts and
circumstances, including providing the applicant or licensee with
notice and opportunity to cure noncompliance to the extent such an
opportunity is required by the APA, and to respond to allegations and
evidence in the record.
2. Process To Revoke Licenses of Licensees That Are Insolvent or No
Longer Exist
57. We adopt a process to revoke the cable landing licenses of
licensees that are insolvent or no longer exist. Section 1.767(m)(2) of
the rules requires that ``[a]ny licensee that seeks to relinquish its
interest in a cable landing license shall file an application to modify
the license.'' The Commission's records in the International
Communications Filing System (ICFS) and other records, indicate that
some submarine cables licensed by the Commission may not have commenced
service and/or some cable landing licensees of record may be insolvent
or no longer in operation. Furthermore, some licensees that may be
insolvent or no longer exist did not file a modification application to

[[Page 48658]]

relinquish their interest in the cable landing license or otherwise
notify the Commission. In the 2024 Cable NPRM, the Commission sought
comment on what processes it should adopt when submarine cables and/or
licensees are insolvent or no longer exist. No commenter addressed this
issue. Given we are conducting a one-time collection below, we will
require all licensees to provide updated information so that the
Commission can ensure it has accurate information regarding submarine
cables and licensees subject to its oversight and begin a process to
revoke licenses for insolvent cables and/or held by insolvent
licensees.
58. If a licensee fails to timely respond to the information
collection required in the Report and Order adopted herein and
subsequently fails to achieve compliance after notice of the failure,
we will apply our revocation process to revoke its license or remove
the licensee from a license held by multiple licensees. We would deem
the failure to respond to this Report and Order as presumptive evidence
that the licensee is no longer in operation. We will publish in the
Federal Register a list of non-responsive licensees and non-operating
licensees identified by responding licensees and provide an additional
thirty (30) days from that publication for those licensees to respond
to the information collection requirement or file a notification to
relinquish their interests in the license.
59. In situations where a licensee has gone out of business and is
no longer able to make the filing on its own behalf, other licensees
that jointly hold the license, if any, may appoint one licensee to make
a filing that demonstrates and certifies that the licensee has ceased
to exist and that the remaining licensee(s) will retain collectively de
jure and de facto control of the U.S. portion of the cable system. If
the licensee has not responded within thirty (30) days of the
publication of the notice in the Federal Register, we will institute a
proceeding to revoke the license or the licensee's rights under a
license held by multiple licensees. We note that licensees that fail to
comply fully and timely with the information collection required in
this Report and Order are subject to enforcement action, including
forfeitures, revocation, or termination. We find this process is
reasonable and necessary to ensure the accuracy of the Commission's
records regarding cable landing licensees.
60. Any licensee whose cable landing license is revoked for failure
to respond following the institution of a proceeding may file a
petition for reinstatement nunc pro tunc of the license or its rights
under a license held by multiple licensees. A petition for
reinstatement will be considered: (1) if it is filed within six months
after publication of the Federal Register notice; (2) if the petition
demonstrates that the licensee is currently in operation, including
operation of the submarine cable; and (3) if the petition demonstrates
good cause for the failure to timely respond. A licensee whose cable
landing license or whose rights under a license held by multiple
licensees is cancelled under these procedures would be able to file a
new application to become a licensee in accordance with the
Commission's rules, which would be subject to full review.

C. Cable Landing License General Requirements

1. FCC Licensing Authority Under the Cable Landing License Act
61. In the 2024 Cable NPRM, the Commission proposed to codify its
longstanding practice of applying the licensing requirement to
submarine cables that lie partially outside of U.S. territorial waters.
The Commission sought to bring additional clarity to the application
process as well as regulatory certainty to submarine cable owners and
operators. Based on the comments, we codify the proposal with one
nomenclature change. That is, to clarify the application of the rule,
we replace the originally proposed term ``international waters'' with
the phrase ``areas beyond the U.S. territorial waters, which extend 12
nautical miles seaward from the coastline.''
62. Accordingly, we agree with the suggestion of NTIA and the State
Department that we refrain from using the term ``international waters''
because the term is not used in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and to instead use ``areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction'' or similar phrasing. Although the United States
has neither signed nor ratified UNCLOS, the United States considers
provisions of UNCLOS concerning traditional uses of the ocean as
generally reflective of customary international law binding on all
States. One provision of UNCLOS that the United States abides by is
that:

``[t]he territorial sea is a belt of ocean established by a coastal
State extending seaward up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline of
that State and subject to its sovereignty.''

Our practice has been to require a cable landing license for a cable
that connects points within the continental United States, Alaska,
Hawaii, or a territory or possession if part of that cable is laid in
an area beyond 12 nautical miles from the U.S. coastline, which is
consistent with UNCLOS. Therefore, we adopt this modification to the
proposed rule to ensure that the industry clearly understands when a
cable landing license is required, which will benefit applicants and
promote efficiency for the Commission. Our clarification is consistent
with the Act's definition of ``United States'' to mean territory
``subject to the jurisdiction of'' the United States.
63. We therefore adopt the proposed rule with clarification as
follows:
A cable landing license must be obtained prior to landing a
submarine cable that connects:
(1) The continental United States with any foreign country;
(2) Alaska, Hawaii, or the U.S. territories or possessions with:
(i) a foreign country,
(ii) the continental United States, or
(iii) with each other; or
(3) Points within the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or
a territory or possession in which the cable is laid in areas beyond
U.S. territorial waters, which extend 12 nautical miles seaward from
the coastline.
64. One Portion of the United States. We disagree with Lumen and
USTelecom that the Commission's rule is overbroad based on their view
that the term ``portion'' as used in the Cable Landing License Act is
intended to mean state, territory, or possession and that the Act does
not require a license if a cable connects two points within one
``portion.'' Based on this interpretation, these commenters claim that
the Act does not require a license if a cable connects two points
within a single state, territory, or possession, because the statute
only requires a license when a submarine cable connects ``one portion
of the United States with any other portion,'' i.e., one state with any
other state. We reject this interpretation. Rather, we believe the best
reading of the statute is that the phrase ``connecting one portion of
the United States with any other portion thereof'' was intentionally
broad and refers to cables connecting any parts of the United States.
The Cable Landing License Act does not define the term ``portion.'' Had
Congress meant for the term ``portion'' to mean state, territory, or
possession, it could have used those terms instead, or it could have
included such a definition as it did when it defined the term ``United
States.'' Likewise, if Congress intended for this term to be limited in
scope, it could have included an exception to the licensing requirement
just as it did in

[[Page 48659]]

the second sentence of the same statutory section. Instead, Congress
included no such limiting language. To help shed light on the
requirement's intended scope, we thus look to the term's ``ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning'' when that term was adopted by Congress
in 1921. At that time, the ``ordinary, contemporary, common meaning''
of the term ``portion'' was ``a part of any whole.'' And a cable
connecting two landing points--even if they lie within a single state,
territory, or possession--connects parts of the whole of the United
States. Accordingly, our interpretation best satisfies the statutory
language chosen by Congress. Lumen further argues that there is ``no
textual basis in the statute'' for treating differently cables
connecting two points in a single state based on whether the cable is
laid in international waters, as proposed in the NPRM. Lumen thus
suggests that under the Commission's proffered reading of the statute,
a license would be required under such circumstances unless the
statutory exception relating to cables lying ``wholly within the
continental United States'' applies--an exception that would not apply
in the case of Hawaii, whether or not the cable is laid in
international waters. Nonetheless, consistent with longstanding
practice and to avoid any possible impingement of intrastate matters
with respect to such cables, we codify our existing practice of not
requiring a cable landing license for wholly local cables that remain
within the territorial waters of the United States. For example, a
submarine cable that connects one point in Hawaii to another point in
Hawaii, if laid within U.S. territorial waters, would not require a
cable landing license.
65. Alaska and Continental United States. ATA argues that ``cables
solely connecting points within the state of Alaska, or connecting
Alaska to the lower 48 states, are outside the scope of the licensing
requirement [the Cable Landing License Act].'' We disagree with ATA's
arguments and will address them in turn.
66. First, we disagree that the licensing requirement in the Cable
Landing License Act is not intended to apply to cables connecting
Alaska to other parts of the United States. Congress limited the
application of the Cable Landing License Act by adding the following
language that is now codified at section 34 of title 47 of the U.S.
Code: ``The conditions of sections 34 to 39 of this title shall not
apply to cables, all of which, including both terminals, lie wholly
within the continental United States.'' Even if Alaska was a part of
the continental United States as ATA would argue is a proper
interpretation, a cable landing license would nonetheless be required
for a submarine cable connecting Alaska to the United States because
the submarine cable would in no way meet the statutory exception that
the ``cable[ ], all of which, including both terminals, lie[s] wholly
within the continental United States.'' The plain language of the
statute does not state that only the terminals of the submarine cable
must lie within the continental United States, instead, it says that
all of the cable, which includes the terminals, must lie within the
continental United States. There is no basis in the plain text of the
statute to read ``all of which, including both terminals,'' to exclude
the ``wet segment'' of the cable, and ATA's reliance on legislative
history does not support its reading. Moreover, construing the language
in this way would conflict with the Commission's longstanding
interpretation, which reflects the best reading of the statute. Thus,
in order for a cable connecting Alaska to other states to be exempt
from the licensing requirement, i.e., wholly within the continental
United States, the entire submarine cable system would need to remain
within U.S. territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles seaward from the
coastline, which we know geographically would be impossible for a cable
laid from Alaska to the continental United States. Therefore, even if
Alaska was a part of the continental United States, a cable connecting
Alaska to another state would not meet the exception under the Act.
Second, our rule will not require a cable landing license when a
submarine cable connects points within Alaska if the cable remains
within U.S. territorial waters. Thus, cables connecting two points in
Alaska are subject to the same licensing requirement as cables
connecting any other two points within the United States.
67. ATA makes two additional claims. First, ATA claims that
``submarine cables connecting solely domestic points--even those laid
in international or foreign waters--do not implicate any of the
evolving national security risks that the NPRM seeks to address.''
ATA's argument is based on the mistaken premise that domestic cables
are only owned or operated by domestic entities, such as U.S. carriers.
This is an inaccurate assessment of the submarine cable industry in the
United States as foreign entities are often cable landing licensees
subject to Commission rules or there may be other foreign components of
submarine cables, domestic or international. Further, domestic cables
connect the United States to faraway U.S. territories such as Guam,
where U.S. military bases are strategically located. It is inaccurate
to indicate that there are no such concerns regarding national security
or law enforcement with regard to domestic submarine cables. The
Commission has long stated that foreign participation in submarine
cables licensed by the Commission may pose risks to national security,
law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy for which Executive
Branch agencies' expertise is needed to assist the Commission with its
public interest determination. Therefore, we reject ATA's claim that
cables connecting solely domestic points do not implicate national
security risks. Second, ATA states that ``[i]f the Commission finds
that any category of purely domestic submarine cables is subject to the
Cable Act's licensing mandate, it should streamline that requirement by
granting blanket license authority by rule to land such fully domestic
cables, whether or not they traverse international waters.'' We address
this request in the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
2. Submarine Cable System Definition
68. We adopt a submarine cable system definition that will provide
regulatory certainty to submarine cable owners and operators and ensure
administrative efficiency for the Commission. The 2024 Cable NPRM
sought comment generally on whether it is necessary to adopt a
definition of a submarine cable system for purposes of licensing a
submarine cable system and whether we should codify a submarine cable
definition in our rules. As the record overwhelmingly demonstrates,
commenters support the proposal to define a submarine cable system and
to codify a definition of a submarine cable system in the Commission's
rules, stating that it will add clarity to the Commission's rules and
licensing regime.
69. We adopt a definition that is consistent with the Committee's
proposed definition as well as the Commission's definition in its
outage reporting rules. Importantly, our definition ensures that a
submarine cable system extends to and includes the SLTE, whether it is
located in a cable landing station near the initial beach landing or
further in-land within data centers. We believe this definition
captures what a submarine cable system is under the Cable Landing
License Act and clearly identifies the demarcation point of where the
submarine cable system ends and the terrestrial system begins. Based on
the record, we adopt the following definition:

[[Page 48660]]

A submarine cable system carries bidirectional data and voice
telecommunications traffic consisting of one or more submarine cable(s)
laid beneath the water, and all associated components that support the
operation of the submarine cable system end-to-end, including the
segments up to the system's terrestrial terminations at one or more
SLTEs as well as the transponders that convert optical signals to
electrical signals and vice versa.

70. Where the submarine cable system ends and the terrestrial
system begins has changed over time and our definition establishes that
the cable extends to and includes the SLTE, whether it is located in a
cable landing station near the initial beach landing or further in-land
within data centers. In older architectural deployments prior to the
advent of open cable systems, the SLTE was placed at the cable landing
stations. Some subsequent architectural deployments place an Optical
Add-Drop Multiplexer (OADM), or a Reconfigurable Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexer (ROADM) in the cable landing station, with the SLTEs
distributed further inland. ROADMs facilitate adding and dropping
optical signals used in a fiber cable, and ROADMs add additional
flexibility by allowing the operator to reconfigure the device. Both of
these components add efficiency and flexibility to the optical network
by inserting or removing channels. Remote management of the SLTE and
all other submarine cable system equipment is also a necessity of
modern systems. Remote management includes configuration, performance
and fault management and testing, which emphasizes the need to have
trusted management systems and personnel who can access the cable
system and all associated components and facilities, including the
SLTE.
71. The Committee stated that it has historically viewed a
submarine cable system as including SLTE, adding that the Committee
shares the Commission's view on the importance of the SLTE and the
access and control it offers its owners and users. NASCA, a trade
association whose members include over 25 submarine cable owners and
submarine cable maintenance authorities for cable systems operating in
North America, supports codification of a submarine cable definition,
stating that such is ``clear and consistent with licensees' current
reporting requirements to the Team Telecom agencies.'' Microsoft also
maintains that the proposed definition--cable system SLTE to cable
system SLTE--is consistent with the Committee's current mitigation
instrument conditions imposed on many licensees.
72. Some commenters disagreed with the proposed definition, and
argued that the Commission should define a submarine cable system in
terms of its components that would not include SLTE. NASCA does not
specifically address or take a position on inclusion of SLTE in the
Commission's proposed definition, but does propose that the Commission
could define a submarine cable to include only the components up to and
including the optical distribution frame (ODF),'' contending that the
ODF is the ``demarcation point at which the submarine cable terminates
and interconnects to terrestrial fiber.'' NASCA maintains that because
the ``SLTE also converts terrestrial signals to submarine signal,'' the
SLTE is ``just as much a terrestrial network element as a submarine
network element.'' Microsoft also takes the position that the SLTE is a
terrestrial component used to ``convert terrestrial signals to
submarine signals,'' and states that the ``Commission equally could
modify the NPRM's proposed definition to delimit the end points of a
submarine cable at the ODF,'' claiming this is the demarcation point at
which a submarine cable terminates and interconnects to SLTE. ICC
disagrees with inclusion of SLTE as the end point of the submarine
cable system, arguing that the definition is somewhat outdated and that
modern submarine cable systems typically terminate at an ODF, Open
Cable Interface (OCI), ROAD-M, or similar device--which serves as a
given system's interface with a particular user's optical network.
73. While we adopt ICC's recommendation to clarify in our
definition that the components relate to the ``operation of'' the
submarine cable system, we decline to accept commenters recommendations
concerning SLTEs or comments that would limit the definition. For
example, ICC recommends that we limit the definition to cover only
transponders that are solely located within the SLTEs. We find that
doing so would incorrectly limit the definition because transponders
that support the operation of submarine cable systems can be located
elsewhere. We also decline to accept NCTA's recommendation to exclude
fully domestic SLTE operators and lessees as some SLTE operators and
lessees do not have foreign ownership and may not pose a meaningful
risk to U.S. national security. Contrary to NCTA's argument, the
definition is meant to encapsulate the scope of what constitutes a
submarine cable system, not whether particular components of the system
pose risks.
74. Finally, we do not accept commenters' suggestion that ODF, OCI,
ROADM, and similar devices should be considered as the end point of a
submarine cable system. We recognize that the Commission's proposed
definition of a submarine cable reflects traditional/legacy
architecture when the terminal cable landing station was located near
the shore and cable operators were not, as is the case today,
purchasing SLTE(s) from independent equipment vendors that can be
remotely managed. We also understand that cable operators today require
multiplexing and other equipment to manage their fiber in cable landing
stations, and that SLTE equipment allows for routing of fiber from one
cable landing station to another cable landing station, or a data
center located further inland and beyond the initial cable landing
station. We find it necessary to include SLTE as a component in our
definition because it is the SLTE that converts between submarine cable
signals and terrestrial signals. While the reverse is also true, as was
raised by commenters, only the SLTE converts cable signals to
terrestrial signals. Therefore, whether this conversion occurs at the
first, or initial, cable landing station, or occurs inland at a cable
landing station or data center, we include the SLTE as the end point
component of the submarine cable in our definition of a submarine cable
under the Cable Landing License Act. Several commenters, noting that
the Commission's proposed definition of a submarine cable system aligns
with that used by the Committee in its mitigation agreements (SLTE to
SLTE), support continued engagement by the Commission with other
governmental entities to address risks to submarine cable
infrastructure and to limit regulatory compliance burdens by avoiding
unnecessary duplication on licensees' parallel Committee obligations.
3. Twenty-Five Year License Term
75. Based on the comments in the record, we retain the 25-year term
for cable landing licenses. In the 2024 Cable NPRM, the Commission
sought comment, as an alternative to the proposed periodic reporting,
on whether shortening the current 25-year submarine cable license term
or adopting a shorter license term in combination with periodic
reporting would similarly account for evolving national security, law
enforcement, and other risks. We agree with the commenters that
shortening the 25-year license term could have outsized negative
impacts on the deployment and resilience of submarine cable systems

[[Page 48661]]

without providing a corresponding benefit to national security, and we
therefore do not adopt a shortened license term. Instead, we retain the
routine condition that a cable landing license shall expire twenty-five
(25) years from the in-service date, unless renewed or extended.

D. Submarine Cable Applicant/Licensee Requirements

1. Licensee Requirements
76. In this Report and Order, we largely retain the current
requirements for who must be an applicant/licensee for a cable landing
license. We retain the licensing requirements for those entities that
own or control a 5% or greater interest in the cable system and use the
U.S. points of the cable system and those entities that control a cable
landing station, but we exclude those entities that merely own, but do
not control, a cable landing station from becoming an applicant/
licensee for a cable landing license. At this time, we decline to adopt
a licensing requirement for SLTE owners and operators. Instead, based
on the comments in the record, we seek to further develop the record
with a one-time information collection. The one-time information
collection will assist the Commission to better understand the scope of
SLTE owners and operators. In the Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, the results from the one-time information collection will
assist us in adopting a more targeted SLTE regulatory framework.
a. Five Percent Ownership Threshold and Use of U.S. Points
77. We retain the requirement that an entity owning or controlling
a 5% or greater interest in the cable system and using the U.S. points
of the cable system must submit an application to become a licensee. We
decline to adopt other proposals at this time. In the 2024 Cable NPRM,
the Commission sought comment on whether to retain the requirement that
an entity that owns or controls a 5% or greater interest in the cable
and uses the U.S. points of the cable system shall be an applicant for
and licensee on a cable landing license. The Commission also sought
comment on whether to require any entity that owns the submarine cable
system or any entity that has capacity on the submarine cable system to
become a licensee. The Commission additionally sought comment on
whether it should require entities that own or control a U.S. landing
station or submarine line terminal equipment (SLTE) to become
licensees.
78. Commenters generally support the Commission's retention of the
current requirement with its 5% interest threshold and use of the U.S.
points of the cable system, and oppose other options. Commenters argue
that the rule continues to serve a good purpose. The Coalition, for
example, asserts that there is no need to change the 5% threshold
because it is still an efficient method to remove regulatory burden for
small carriers or investors that do not have any ability to control the
submarine cable system. NASCA and INCOMPAS echo this point and state
that ``imposing licensing burdens on [cable] owners [with no interest
in the U.S. territory portion of a submarine cable system] would harm
the market by making it less attractive for systems with multiple non-
U.S. landing points to partner with investors who have no interest in
the U.S. endpoint.'' Many commenters, including Microsoft, ICC,
INCOMPAS, AP&T, ITI, CTIA, USTelecom, and the Coalition disagree that
capacity holders should be licensees because they assert that there is
no basis under the Cable Landing License Act to require such entities
to become licensees, as capacity holders do not land or operate the
cable system.
79. We agree with commenters that there is not a sufficient reason
to disturb the requirement that any entity owning or controlling a 5%
or greater interest in the cable system and using the U.S. points of
the cable system must become an applicant/licensee. Additionally,
requiring entities that merely own capacity on the cable system,
without meeting the requisite licensing requirements of ownership of 5%
or greater interest and using the U.S. points of the cable system, to
become applicants/licensees would greatly increase the number of
entities that must comply with our regulatory framework. At this time,
pure capacity holdings, without ownership of infrastructure or
deployment of certain equipment, have a negligible impact or harm on
national security and do not rise to the level of requiring a license.
Instead, we tailor the licensing requirements to identify those
entities that can exercise ownership or control over the submarine
cable system, as discussed below and in the Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking. This approach, as raised by commenters, maintains our
ability to know about potential foreign adversaries without harming the
market and investment in and deployment of submarine cable systems
connecting to the United States.
b. Control of Cable Landing Station
80. In this Report and Order, we revise our license requirement
with respect to cable landing stations and require entities that
control cable landing stations to be licensees. Entities that merely
own a cable landing station are no longer required to become licensees.
In the 2024 Cable NPRM, the Commission sought comment on an appropriate
rule that would capture which entities should be an applicant/licensee
on a cable landing license under the Cable Landing License Act to
ensure the Commission meets its public interest responsibilities. The
Commission sought additional comment on the applicability of the
Commission's rules to entities that own the real property/facility in
which the cable landing station is located, but do not have any ability
to significantly affect the cable system's operation, such as data
center owners, who often request waivers from the Commission because
they do not seek to be an applicant or a licensee. Moreover, the
Commission sought comment on the applicability of its rules to data
center owners, ``including the access they have over submarine cables
and the site operations, such as physical security, power, backup
power, HVAC, and other environmental support essential to proper
operations of cable landing systems housed in their facilities.''
81. We agree with commenters that licensing requirements should not
apply to entities that may own the cable landing station but are not
directly involved in cable operations and do not control the operations
of the cable system. Commenters were generally supportive of the
proposal to reduce the licensing requirement. INCOMPAS does not support
licensing for data center owners, claiming it would be a shift beyond
the Commission's legal authorities and would not yield useful
information for advancing the Commission's national security goals
because ``data center owners often lack visibility into or control over
cable operations'' unlike licensed cable operators. The Commission's
standard practice has been to grant requests for waiver of the
licensing requirements filed by entities that own the real property or
facility in which the cable landing station is located but that do not
have the ability to significantly affect the cable system's operation.
Instead of continuing to process waivers on a case-by-case basis, we
now revise our licensing requirement to require a license for ``[a]ny
entity that controls a cable landing station in the United States'' and
to require the applicant to

[[Page 48662]]

provide specific information in an application regarding ownership of
the cable landing station. We find that adoption of this rule will
streamline and clarify our licensing process and will reduce burdens by
narrowing the scope of the licensing requirement and making it
unnecessary for non-controlling property or facility owners to file
waiver requests.
c. Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTE) Owners and Operators
82. While we include SLTE within the definition of a submarine
cable system, we decline to adopt a licensing requirement for owners
and operators of SLTE at this time. A SLTE owner would need to be a
licensee if it otherwise meets the Commission's requirements to be a
licensee (i.e., 5% or greater ownership in the cable system or controls
a cable landing station). For purposes of this section, SLTE refers to
technology that converts optical signals that traverse the submarine
cable system into electrical signals that transmit across terrestrial
networks and vice versa. We agree with commenters that we should seek
comment in the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking as to how the
Commission can best incorporate such entities into its regulatory
framework. We recognize that we need further information on the number
of SLTE owners and operators. We understand that at least one SLTE is
needed per fiber, but due to dark fiber IRU or lease agreements where
entities light their own fiber that could then be subject to further
resale through separate IRU or lease agreements for fiber, capacity, or
spectrum, there may be numerous SLTEs deployed on one fiber alone. We
adopt below a one-time information collection to assist the Commission
in obtaining comprehensive and current information on SLTEs so that the
Commission may consider appropriate rules for purposes of ensuring the
safety and security of submarine cable infrastructure. As the
Commission stated in the 2024 Cable NPRM, we need to know which
entities own or control SLTE so that we can protect national security
and law enforcement interests in carrying out our licensing duties. As
the Committee noted, ``[a] foreign adversary-controlled non-licensee
entity that owns, controls, or operates its own SLTE, or equivalent
equipment, on a submarine cable landing in the United States may have
connectivity comparable to operating their own communications cable to
the United States without a license, or any regulatory review,
mitigation, or monitoring for national security or law enforcement
risk.'' Through the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we
anticipate developing a record to take the best approach balancing our
focus on supporting industry's ability to deploy submarine cable
systems and our obligations to protect national security.
2. Application Requirements
83. Today, we adopt new application requirements that will ensure
the Commission has targeted and granular information about the
submarine cable system and third-party foreign adversary service
providers, which is critical to improve the Commission's assessment of
national security risks. We also adopt new certification requirements
that will require applicants and licensees to certify whether or not
they meet any of the Commission's presumptive disqualifying conditions;
that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and
physical security risk management plan; and that they comply with
Covered List requirements. For purposes of the information
requirements, unless otherwise indicated, we use the terms
``applicant'' or ``applicants'' to refer to an applicant or licensee
that currently files the following applications or notifications: (1)
applicants that file an initial application for a cable landing license
or an application for modification, substantial assignment, substantial
transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing
license; (2) cable landing licensees that file a notification of pro
forma assignment or transfer of control of a cable landing license;
and/or (3) applicants that file a request for special temporary
authority (STA) related to the operation of a submarine cable. See 47
CFR 1.767(a), (g)(6)-(7); 63.24(e) (referring to ``substantial''
transactions); 63.24(d) (defining ``Pro forma assignments and transfers
of control''). Unless otherwise indicated, we use the term
``application'' or ``submarine cable application'' to refer to an
initial application for a cable landing license; an application for
modification, substantial assignment, substantial transfer of control,
or renewal or extension of a cable landing license; and a pro forma
assignment or transfer of control notification. These requirements will
apply to all applications for a cable landing license and modification,
assignment, transfer of control, renewal or extension of a cable
landing license. We will retain the current requirement for applicants
to identify their 10% or greater direct and indirect equity and/or
voting interests.
a. Public Interest Statement
84. Consistent with longstanding practice, we adopt the proposed
requirement that ``an applicant seeking a submarine cable landing
license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or
extension of a submarine cable landing license shall include in the
application a statement demonstrating how the grant of the application
will serve the public interest.'' The Commission has long found that
national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy
concerns are important to its public interest analysis of submarine
cable applications, and these concerns warrant continued consideration
in view of evolving and heightened threats to the nation's
communications infrastructure.
85. We agree with NASCA that the requirements of the public
interest standard should be clarified so they are ``targeted,
objective, and express.'' Accordingly, our final rule clarifies the
scope of this obligation. Specifically, and consistent with the express
statutory objectives, the public interest statement must explain how
the application will ``assist in securing rights for the landing or
operation of cables in foreign countries, or in maintaining the rights
or interests of the United States or of its citizens in foreign
countries, or will promote the security of the United States,'' provide
``just and reasonable rates and service,'' and prohibit ``exclusive
rights of landing or of operation in the United States.''
86. NASCA acknowledges that a reasonably tailored public interest
standard ``would not be overly burdensome,'' observing that
``applicants already routinely include information relevant to the
public interest in their applications.'' However, NASCA argues that
``the Commission must have an identifiable legal basis'' for imposing
such requirements, which it claims the 2024 Cable NPRM fails to do. We
disagree. As articulated in the 2024 Cable NPRM, the Commission has
``long found that national security, law enforcement, foreign policy,
and trade policy concerns are important to its public interest analysis
of submarine cable applications, and these concerns warrant continued
consideration in view of evolving and heightened threats to the
nation's communications infrastructure.'' The legal basis to require
applicants to provide this public interest statement is grounded on our
authority to grant, withhold, revoke, or condition a license and the
statutory criteria for doing so. First, the Commission can withhold the
grant of

[[Page 48663]]

a license to protect the interests of the public as expressed in the
statutory licensing criteria. The determination of whether to grant a
license rests on the same statutory criteria, including consideration
of how grant of the application will ensure the security of the United
States. Second, the Cable Landing License Act authorizes the Commission
to impose terms upon grant of a license that are ``necessary to assure
just and reasonable rates and service,'' and to prohibit ``exclusive
rights of landing or of operation in the United States.'' Accordingly,
the legal basis for the public interest standard we adopt today is
derived from Congress' directive as reflected in the statutory
language.
b. Ten Percent Threshold for Reportable Interests
87. We retain our current requirement for applicants to identify
the 10% or greater direct and indirect equity and/or voting interests
held in the submarine cable applicants. In the 2024 Cable NPRM, the
Commission sought comment on whether to lower the current 10% ownership
reporting threshold to five percent (5%) or greater direct or indirect
equity and/or voting interests in the applicant(s) and licensee(s).
Some commenters raised concerns about cost burden of compliance, impact
on investment, privacy for smaller investors, and raised doubts that
owners of smaller interests could wield significant influence over the
cable, while others urged we go further and consider requiring the
reporting of any known foreign adversary interest in cable landing
license applicants and licensees instead of adopting the 5% reportable
ownership threshold. At this time, we will not modify the 10% ownership
threshold for disclosing reportable interest holders, because we assess
that national security risks are best addressed through the
certifications regarding whether the applicant is owned by, controlled
by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.
c. Submarine Cable System Information
88. Below, we adopt rules to provide the Commission with important
and relevant information concerning the submarine cable system. As
discussed, we find that collection of this information is critical to
our review of submarine cable applications and cable landing licensees
for national security purposes and will advance our efforts to protect
the security, integrity, and resilience of this critical U.S.
infrastructure.
89. We adopt the Commission's proposal to require applicants
seeking a cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer
of control, or renewal or extension of a license, and licensees
submitting a Foreign Adversary Annual Report, to provide additional
detailed information concerning the submarine cable system.
Specifically, we adopt the proposal to require applicants and licensees
to submit with these applications and/or Foreign Adversary Annual
Reports the following detailed information regarding the submarine
cable system:
(1) the states, territories, or possessions in the United States
and the foreign countries where the submarine cable system will land;
(2) the number of segments in the submarine cable system and the
designation of each (e.g., Segment A, Main Trunk, A-B segment);
(3) the length of the submarine cable system by segment and in
total;
(4) the location, by segment, of any branching units;
(5) the number of optical fiber pairs, by segment, of the submarine
cable system;
(6) the design capacity, by segment, of the submarine cable system;
(7) specific geographic location information (geographic
coordinates, street address, county or county equivalent, as
applicable), or if not available, a general geographic description and
specific geographic location information to be filed no later than
ninety (90) days prior to construction regarding:
(i) each U.S. and non-U.S. cable landing station and beach manhole;
(ii) each network operations center (NOC) and backup NOC and, if
distinct from the NOC, each security operations center (SOC) and backup
SOC, or else a statement that the SOC and backup SOC are not distinct
from the NOC and/or backup NOC;
(iii) where each Power Feed Equipment (PFE) and each Submarine Line
Terminal Equipment (SLTE) is connected with the terrestrial land based
system(s) and from where each is operated; and
(iv) the route position list including the wet segment of the
submarine cable system; and
(8) Anticipated time frame when the applicant(s) intends to place
the submarine cable system into service.
90. In addition, we adopt the proposal to modify the rules by
requiring applicants to provide a specific description of the submarine
cable system, including a map and geographic data in generally accepted
GIS formats or other formats. We adopt the proposal to delegate
authority to OIA, in coordination with the Office of Economics and
Analytics (OEA), to determine the file formats and specific data fields
in which data will ultimately be collected. We will allow applicants
for a cable landing license to initially file a general geographic
description of the geographic location information described in our
newly adopted rule at Sec. 1.70005(e)(7) concerning the submarine
cable, but grant of the application will be conditioned on the
Commission's final approval of specific geographic location
information, consistent with the new requirements, to be filed by the
applicant no later than ninety (90) days prior to construction.
91. With respect to route position lists, cable landing licensees
with a license granted prior to the effective date of the new rules
must submit a route position list consistent with the requirement under
Sec. 1.70005(e)(7)(iv) under the relevant license file number in the
Commission's International Communications Filing System (ICFS), or any
successor system, no later than sixty (60) days after the effective
date of the new rules. Existing licensees may petition the Commission
for waiver of the requirement, which may be granted only to the extent
the licensee demonstrates that the required information is unavailable
by the submission deadline.
92. We disagree with commenters' suggestions that requiring
applicants and licensees to provide this information does not serve a
regulatory purpose. We find that requiring specific information about
the submarine cable system, including a map and route list data, is
essential for ensuring the Commission can properly evaluate
applications for cable landing licenses for their national security
implications, determining if the application is in the public interest,
and ensuring the Commission has fundamental and accurate knowledge
about the security and resilience of submarine cable systems. The
Coalition, for example, is generally supportive of requiring the
specific location of each beach manhole, cable landing station
(including locations of each PFE and each SLTE), NOC, and route
position lists, provided the Commission ensures it does not involve
disclosure of material non-public technical information and does not
delay the review of the Commission or the Committee. We find the
concerns about application delay are addressed by our adopted rules,
permitting a general description at the application stage supplemented
by landing points notifications. We find that concerns regarding
confidentiality are addressed

[[Page 48664]]

below by our adoption of the Commission's proposal to provide
confidential treatment. We are unpersuaded by the Coalition's
suggestion that the Commission should require route position lists only
for the portion of the wet segment that is in U.S. territorial waters
because the Commission's jurisdiction does not extend beyond U.S.
territory. We agree with the Committee that route position lists would
enhance the ability of the Commission and Committee to ensure the
protection of this critical infrastructure.
93. NASCA requests that the Commission allow applicants to file
this information at a time closer to the in-service date. While we
decline to adopt the in-service date, we recognize that the final
specific geographic location information may not be available at the
time an application for a cable landing license is filed. In those
cases, the Commission will accept a general geographic description,
provided the Commission is notified of the specific geographic location
no later than ninety (90) days prior to commencing construction as a
condition of any grant of such application. NASCA also requests that
the Commission accept a route position list that is limited to the
geocoordinate data in a full route position list. We believe our
clarification to Sec. 1.70005(e)(7) of our adopted rules shows that
the Commission will require geographic location information and not
other potentially competitively-sensitive information about system
design as raised by NASCA. NASCA asserts that the Committee does not
currently require NOC information and recommends that the Commission
instead require a certification that a NOC is not located in a ``high-
risk jurisdiction.'' We find that the location information of NOCs is
critical for the Commission's knowledge and assessment of from where a
submarine cable is or will be accessed and controlled, including by
third parties, through network management, monitoring, maintenance,
performance measurement, or other operational functions, and any risks
presented by such access and control.
94. Confidential Treatment. Based on our review of the record, we
adopt the Commission's proposal to provide confidential treatment for
the exact addresses and specific geographic coordinates required by the
newly adopted rule at Sec. 1.70005(e)(7). We adopt the proposal to
withhold the exact location information from public inspection where it
concerns the wet segment as it approaches the shore, the submarine
cable as it reaches the beach manhole, and the dry segment including
the cable landing station(s), such as where the SLTE is located and/or
from where it is operated. The record supports adoption of these
proposals. Commenters explain that such location information is
competitively sensitive and that public disclosure would harm the
security of the submarine cable. We will release publicly more general
location information, such as the city or locality, state/province/
department, and country in which the submarine cable system will land.
95. Sharing with Federal Agencies. We adopt a rule to allow the
Commission to share with the Committee information about the submarine
cable system--including the location information of cable landing
stations, beach manholes, PFE, SLTE, NOCs and backup NOCs, SOCs and
backup SOCs, and route position lists--that is filed on a confidential
basis without the pre-notification procedures of Sec. 0.442(d) of the
Commission's rules. The Commission may share information that has been
submitted to it in confidence with other federal agencies when they
have a legitimate need for the information and the public interest will
be served by sharing the information. In the 2024 Cable NPRM, the
Commission sought comment on whether to adopt a rule that would allow
the Commission to share submarine cable landing geographic coordinates,
route position lists, and other information with relevant federal
agencies, including information for which confidential treatment is
requested, without the pre-notification procedures of Sec. 0.442(d).
No commenters oppose the sharing of the information with federal
agencies. The Committee supports adoption of this rule and recommends
that the Commission include all of the Committee members in any effort
to share relevant submarine cable infrastructure information.
d. Third-Party Foreign Adversary Service Provider or Access From
Foreign Adversary Information
96. We adopt a modified, narrower version of the Commission's
proposals to require applicants to report whether or not they use and/
or will use third-party foreign adversary service providers in the
operation of the submarine cable. Specifically, we will require
applicants to report whether or not they use and/or will use the
following third-party service providers in the operation of the
submarine cable system:
(1) any entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec.
1.70001(g);
(2) any entity identified on the Covered List that the Commission
maintains pursuant to the Secure Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. 1601-1609;
and/or
(3) any entity that can access the submarine cable from a foreign
adversary country, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(f), and to identify any
such foreign adversary country.
97. This targeted approach sufficiently addresses the national
security and law enforcement risks from foreign adversaries. In the
2024 Cable NPRM, the Commission used the term ``managed network service
provider'' (MNSP) to refer to the kinds of service providers licensees
should disclose. The Commission proposed to define an ``MNSP'' as ``any
entity other than the applicant(s) or licensee(s) (i.e., third-party
entity) with whom the applicant(s) or licensee(s) contracts to provide,
supplement, or replace certain functions for the U.S. portion of the
submarine cable system (including any cable landing station and SLTE
located in the United States) that require or may require access to the
network, systems, or records of the applicant(s) or licensee(s).'' We
agree with the Committee that we should refer more generally to
``service providers'' to avoid confusion about which service providers
are involved in managing networks as compared to other tasks that
involve access to and control of the cable system. We also clearly
define ``third-party service provider'' as an entity that is involved
in providing, hosting, analyzing, repairing, and maintaining the
equipment of a submarine cable system, including third-party owners and
operators of NOCs. We find that our approach provides requested clarity
in response to commenters that claim the Commission's proposed
definition of MNSP is too vague.
98. We find that obtaining information about the third-party
service providers is important and relevant to the Commission's
consideration of national security, law enforcement, and other risks
associated with a submarine cable application. We therefore disagree
with INCOMPAS' suggestion that information about providers of
``supporting services'' exceeds the scope of the Cable Landing License
Act. While NASCA and Microsoft argue that the most effective way to
address risks of third-party access involves implementing ``rigorous''
or ``robust'' access controls, we find that requiring disclosure as to
whether untrustworthy third-party

[[Page 48665]]

actors have access to this critical U.S. communications infrastructure
will ensure that the Commission and applicants and licensees
consistently identify and address such threats. The Committee supports
prohibiting licensees from using vendors for equipment or services that
are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or
direction of a foreign adversary. While we do not go so far as to
prohibit use of such third-party service providers, because the
Commission did not seek comment on it in the 2024 Cable NPRM, we do
seek comment on whether to prohibit the use of such third-party service
providers.
99. A few commenters recommend requiring such information only to
the extent it is available at the time an application is filed given
third-party service arrangements may not be known until a later time.
Based on this, if an applicant is unable to confirm this information at
the time of filing, we will require such applicants to file a request
for waiver with status updates every thirty (30) days until they
provide the information. We also find that our tailored approach
addresses concerns that the information requirements we adopt relating
to third-party service providers would duplicate information that is
currently submitted to the Committee. Finally, as discussed below, as
an initial step, we adopt a one-time collection that requires licensees
to disclose whether they use certain third-party service providers.
3. Required Certifications for Applicants and Licensees
100. Below, we adopt rules requiring applicants to certify whether
or not they exhibit any of the criteria set out in the presumptive
disqualifying conditions adopted herein; that they have created and
will implement and update a cybersecurity and physical security risk
management plan; and that they comply with Covered List requirements.
We will require licensees to inform the Commission of any Covered List
equipment/services in a one-time collection. We also hold applicants
and licensees responsible for the acts, omissions, or failures of
third-parties with whom the applicant or licensee has a contractual
relationship that impact the cybersecurity of the applicant's or
licensee's systems and services.
a. Certification of Presumptive Disqualifications
101. We adopt new certification requirements consistent with the
presumptive disqualifying conditions adopted herein. Specifically, we
will require an applicant seeking a cable landing license or
modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension
of a cable landing license to certify whether or not it exhibits any of
the criteria set out in the foreign adversary and character presumptive
disqualifying conditions. We will require an applicant seeking a cable
landing license or modification, or renewal or extension of a cable
landing license to certify whether or not it exhibits any of the
criteria set out in the foreign adversary cable landing presumptive
disqualifying condition. We delegate authority to OIA to develop the
questions and certifications for the applications.
102. As discussed above, we will apply the foreign adversary and
character presumptive disqualifying conditions to: (1) any initial
application for a cable landing license that is filed after the
effective date of the Report and Order, and (2) all other types of
submarine cable applications--including an application for
modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension
of a cable landing license--filed by a licensee whose initial
application for a cable landing license is granted after the effective
date of the Report and Order or an existing licensee that currently
does not exhibit (prior to the effective date of the Report and Order)
any of the criteria set out in the disqualifying condition. We will
apply the foreign adversary cable landing disqualifying condition to:
(1) any initial application for a cable landing license that is filed
after the effective date of the Report and Order, and (2) an
application for modification or renewal or extension of a cable landing
license that is filed after the effective date of the Report and Order
by a licensee whose initial application for a cable landing license is
granted after the effective date of the Report and Order or by an
existing licensee.
b. Cybersecurity and Physical Security Risk Management Plan
Certifications
103. To protect submarine cable infrastructure from cybersecurity
and physical security threats, we require all applicants for an initial
cable landing license to certify that they have created and will
implement and update a cybersecurity and physical security risk
management plan and will take reasonable measures to protect their
systems and services from these threats that could affect their
provision of communications services through the submarine cable
system, as supported by the record. We require all licensees seeking a
modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension
of a cable landing license to certify in the application that they have
created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security
risk management plan and will take reasonable measures to protect their
systems and services from cybersecurity and physical security risks
that could affect their provision of communications services through
the submarine cable system. We also require existing licensees to
implement a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan
within one year of the effective date of the new rules to also protect
against these threats that could affect the provision of communications
services through the submarine cable system. As discussed below, we do
not require that these plans use any particular framework, in line with
commenters who supported a flexible approach. Cybersecurity and
physical security risk management plan certification is also supported
by the Committee, as it will ``bring all licensees up to the minimum
standards . . . needed to protect our critical infrastructure from
foreign adversary threats.''
104. All applicants and licensees must certify that the
cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan meets the
following three requirements:
<bullet> The plan describes how the applicant or licensee takes or
will take reasonable measures to employ its organizational resources
and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of its systems and services that could affect their
provision of communications services through the submarine cable
system;
<bullet> The plan identifies the cyber risks they face, the
controls they use or plan to use to mitigate those risks, and how they
ensure that these controls are applied or will be applied effectively
to their operations; and
<bullet> The plan addresses both logical and physical access risks,
as well as supply chain risks.
105. Although the 2024 Cable NPRM proposal focused on
cybersecurity, rather than physical security, the Commission sought
comment on ``whether to require applicants' and licensees'
cybersecurity risk management plans to include provisions for
identifying, assessing, and mitigating supply chain cybersecurity
threats'' and proposed to require that plans cover all ``systems and
services that could affect [applicants'/licensees'] provision of
communications services.'' The 2024 Cable NPRM also sought comment on
whether the Commission should require the implementation of other
``common security controls to protect applicants' and licensees'
systems and services.''

[[Page 48666]]

Additionally, several commenters urged the Commission to address
physical risks. Most notably, the Committee ``additionally propose[d]
applicants to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented
comprehensive security risk management plans, consistent with industry
best practices, for the cable systems that would also include supply
chain risk management and physical security.'' Therefore, we require
the risk management plans have measures to address physical security
risks as well.
106. Beyond those baseline requirements, applicants and licensees
will retain flexibility to tailor their cybersecurity and physical
security risk management plans to the risks they face that could affect
their provision of communications services through the submarine cable
system and their organizational needs. Applicants and licensees will
have flexibility to determine, for example, how to best mitigate the
risks of compromised access controls by, at a minimum, using
multifactor authentication or other suitable measures to protect their
systems and services. Although we do not require applicants and
licensees to follow any particular frameworks in creating their plans,
we further find a plan will presumptively satisfy our requirements if
it is structured according to an established risk management framework,
such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), and incorporates best practices, such as
the standards and controls set forth in the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Cybersecurity Cross-Sector
Performance Goals and Objectives (CISA CPGs), or the Center for
internet Security's Critical Security Controls (CIS Controls). The plan
should address both cybersecurity and physical security risks.
107. This approach is consistent with views of commenters that
support a flexible approach to cybersecurity grounded in the NIST CSF.
Given our approach and to reflect the evolving nature of cybersecurity
risks, we decline to require that all plans include the six additional
security controls identified in the 2024 Cable NPRM or some other
subset of common security controls. However, we still expect applicants
and licensees to consider these types of controls, or reasonable
alternatives, as may be necessary to mitigate the risks that they face
or will face that could affect their provision of communications
services through the submarine cable system. Importantly, the Committee
emphasized in its reply comment, that the CISA CPGs and CIS Controls
represent a ``baseline'' of cybersecurity measures ``that all licensees
can and should surpass''--in other words, they are ``a floor, not a
ceiling, when it comes to cybersecurity.'' Thus, allowing licensees and
applicants to satisfy their duty under our rules by adopting a
cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan that adheres
to these well-established best practices ensures that submarine cable
networks will be operated with a baseline of key security controls.
108. The rules promote the harmonization of cybersecurity
certification requirements for licensees and applicants, as many
commenters requested. CTIA and USTelecom suggest that the Commission
should align its rules for submarine cable licensees with its rules for
5G Fund recipients. Submarine cable applicants and licensees that
satisfy the requirements adopted in the 5G Fund Order will necessarily
also satisfy the requirements we impose today. Those rules require 5G
Fund recipients to implement operational cybersecurity and supply chain
risk management plans that ``must reflect'' the NIST CSF as well as
``established cybersecurity best practices that address each of the
Core Functions described in the NIST CSF, such as the standards and
controls set forth in'' the CISA CPGs or the CIS Controls. The same is
true of the Commission's other rules governing the receipt of Universal
Service Funds, which similarly require recipients' plans to reflect
those sources. SCCL also urges us to also conclude that certain
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards would
satisfy the Commission's rules. While we do not conclude that
compliance with any particular ISO standard would necessarily satisfy
the rules, we observe that ISO standards, where appropriately mapped
onto the NIST CSF's Core Functions, may also be useful to applicants
and licensees seeking to comply and mitigate the risks they face or
will face.
109. We agree with commenters on the importance of harmonizing
cybersecurity certification requirements with requirements imposed by
the Committee and other Executive Branch agencies. We find that
licensees that have an existing mitigation agreement or are required to
enter into a new mitigation agreement with the Committee, and who
implement those agreements in full, will be presumed to satisfy the
cybersecurity certification requirements. We expect that the logical
security measures or other measures to prevent unauthorized or unlawful
access, use, or disclosure of information being carried on a licensee's
cable imposed by the Committee in such agreements will be comparable
to, or more demanding than, the baseline measures we require here.
110. We stress that, while this is our expectation, a mitigation
agreement would not satisfy the requirements of the rules if it does
not comprehensively identify the cybersecurity risks that the licensee
faces (including physical and supply chain risks), the controls it uses
to mitigate those risks, and how it ensures that these controls are
applied effectively to its operations. This approach is consistent with
the Committee's request in its reply comments that the Commission work
with the Committee to harmonize cybersecurity requirements to the
extent possible, while supporting the Commission's proposed
certification requirement and acknowledging that ``there may be
instances where the Commission needs . . . information independent of
the Committee's actions.'' NCTA suggests that the rules are unnecessary
in view of the Committee's imposition of logical access requirements as
part of its review. We disagree as the Committee does not review all
cable landing license applications, therefore, not all cable landing
licenses are subject to mitigation agreements. Instead, we agree with
Microsoft that ``adoption of uniform rules for cybersecurity'' is
important ``to avoid unnecessary duplication or complexity,'' and we
establish a baseline certification requirement here that applies to all
applicants and licensees, with the conditions in a mitigation agreement
presumed to satisfy these requirements, which will contribute to a more
streamlined approach across the U.S. government.
111. We also reject ICC's argument that the physical resiliency of
submarine cable infrastructure should be the sole focus of the
Commission's security requirements, and that adopting cybersecurity
requirements that also address logical access and supply chain risks
would ``significantly increase regulatory burden and privacy concerns
without meaningfully increasing the security of the underlying data.''
While the most common threat to submarine cables remains physical
damage from fishing, shipping, or undersea weather events, intentional
damage from state or non-state actors using more subtle means of
infiltration is ``of greater concern.'' These threats require holistic
planning, including both cybersecurity and physical security. Physical
resiliency protections (e.g., identity

[[Page 48667]]

management, authentication and access controls) should also be included
in applicants' and licensees' cybersecurity and physical security risk
management plans, to the extent necessary to reasonably protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their communications
systems and services. While more difficult, infiltrators (including
foreign adversaries) could also tap into cables to ``record, copy, or
steal data'' for espionage, thereby compromising its confidentiality.
This could occur through backdoors inserted during the cable
manufacturing process, targeting onshore landing stations and SLTEs, or
by tapping cables at sea. Encryption alone is insufficient to ensure
cyber protections, as encrypted data can still be disrupted or delayed,
and encrypted data can be exfiltrated and stored pending technological
advances that will enable decryption and exploitation of the data at a
later time. Although some of these attack vectors present technical
challenges using current technologies, it is critical for cable systems
to be secure into the future as technology advances.
112. Submarine cable infrastructure also faces a threat of
malicious cyber activities that target the broader networks of which
submarine cables represent only one link. Malicious actors may take
advantage of vulnerabilities in these larger networks at locations with
remote access to the submarine cable infrastructure to disrupt data
flows, divert traffic, or delete data transmitted through the submarine
cables, with serious consequences for the operational security of this
critical infrastructure and the confidentiality, availability, and
integrity of the information. Accordingly, we adopt cybersecurity and
physical security risk management requirements to ensure that
appropriate cybersecurity protections are in place against the
physical, logical, and supply chain threats to applicants' and
licensees' communications systems and services that could affect their
provision of communications services through the submarine cable
system.
113. We adopt commenters' suggestion to limit the scope of the
cybersecurity certification requirement to the submarine cable system
operator and the submarine cable network management systems only. In
the interests of tailoring our requirements to the specific problem of
submarine cable security and to limit regulatory burdens, the risk
management plans only need to explain how the applicant or licensee
takes or will take reasonable measures to employ its organizational
resources and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of its systems and services that could affect its
provision of communications services through the submarine cable
system.
114. Senior Officer Review. We adopt the Commission's proposal that
an applicant's or licensee's Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief
Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Technology Officer (CTO), or a similarly
situated senior officer responsible for governance of the
organization's security practices, must sign the applicant's or
licensee's cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan. We
affirm that a signatory with organization-wide visibility and
governance authority is critical to ensuring that the plan is
comprehensively, effectively, and widely implemented.
115. Commenters raise a variety of concerns regarding this
requirement. CTIA recommends harmonizing the signatory requirement with
the 5G Fund Order, which does not specify who must sign a plan.
Microsoft contends that requiring senior staff signoff would be
impractical for large network operators and suggests allowing entities
to designate another appropriate authority within the organization.
USTelecom expresses similar concerns, and suggests that a Chief
Information Security Officer (CISO) or equivalent technical expert
would be better positioned to assess and certify the plan's content. In
response to these comments, we clarify that the requirement is not
intended to impose unnecessary burdens or to prescribe a one-size-fits-
all governance structure. Rather, the objective is to ensure meaningful
executive oversight and accountability for cybersecurity and physical
security risk management. Accordingly, we expressly recognize that an
applicant's or licensee's CISO, or an equivalent officer with overall
responsibility for the organization's security governance, qualifies as
a ``similarly situated senior officer'' under this rule. This approach
maintains the integrity of the executive accountability framework while
providing sufficient flexibility for applicants and licensees to
designate an officer who possesses the requisite authority and subject
matter expertise.
116. Submarine Cable Applications. Applicants for a cable landing
license must certify in the application that they have created and will
implement and update a cybersecurity and physical security risk
management plan consistent with the requirements herein. If an
application for a cable landing license is filed prior to the effective
date of the new rules and remains pending on or after the effective
date of the new rules, the applicant(s) must submit a certification,
within thirty (30) days of the effective date of the new rules,
attesting that it will create and implement a cybersecurity and
physical security risk management plan as of the date the submarine
cable is placed into service. All licensees seeking a modification,
assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable
landing license must certify in the application that they have created,
updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk
management plan and will take reasonable measures to protect their
systems and services from cybersecurity risks that could affect their
provision of communications services through the submarine cable
system. We delegate authority to OIA to update application forms as
necessary to include applicants' certifications.
117. Routine Conditions for Licensees. All licensees whose cable
landing license is granted after the effective date of the new rules
must implement a cybersecurity and physical security risk management
plan as of the date the submarine cable is placed into service. We will
require licensees to submit a certification, within thirty (30) days of
the date the submarine cable is placed into service, that they have
created and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk
management plan as of the in-service date. Licensees must continue to
implement and update the cybersecurity and physical security risk
management plan, as required based on material changes to the
cybersecurity and physical security risks and vulnerabilities that the
licensee faces that could affect their provision of communications
services through the submarine cable system.
118. Implementation Timeline for Existing Licensees. Existing
licensees must implement a cybersecurity and physical security risk
management plan within one year of the effective date of the new rules.
To the extent an existing licensee does not commence service on the
submarine cable by this timeframe, the licensee must implement a
cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan as of the date
the submarine cable is placed into service. Existing licensees must
file a certification, within thirty (30) days of the effective date of
the new rules, attesting that they will implement a cybersecurity and
physical security risk management plan within this timeframe. The
certification shall be submitted in the license file number(s)
associated with the licensee's cable landing license(s) in ICFS. We
find that this phased approach appropriately

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balances the urgency of enhancing cybersecurity preparedness with the
need to allow for thoughtful, effective plan development and
integration into existing operations.
119. Reporting Requirements and Confidentiality. We adopt the
Commission's proposal requiring that applicants and licensees submit
cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans to the
Commission upon request. We delegate to OIA, in coordination with
PSHSB, the authority to request, at their discretion, submission of
such plans and to evaluate them for compliance with the rules adopted
in this proceeding. We decline to adopt NCTA's recommendation that the
Commission should only obtain the plans based on a specific need.
Access to these plans will enable the Commission to confirm whether
cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans are being
regularly updated, to review a specific plan as needed, or to
proactively review a sample of plans to ensure they identify the
relevant cybersecurity risks to communications systems and services.
Consistent with the Commission's proposal and with the unanimous
support of commenters, we will treat cybersecurity and physical
security risk management plans as presumptively confidential under our
rules. We agree with commenters that this approach will best protect
and cultivate their cybersecurity practices.
120. Recordkeeping. We also adopt a recordkeeping requirement to
support Commission oversight and ensure that applicants and licensees
maintain accountability for creating and implementing their
cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans.
Specifically, applicants and licensees must preserve data and records
related to their cybersecurity and physical security risk management
plans, including documentation necessary to demonstrate how those plans
are or will be implemented, for a period of two years from the date the
related risk management plan certification is submitted to the
Commission. We agree with FDD that ensuring documentation of
cybersecurity efforts is important to bolster the resilience of
submarine cable infrastructure and mitigate intrusions. Accordingly, we
adopt the proposed two-year record retention requirement, which aligns
with industry practices and supports our ability to assess compliance
when needed.
121. Third-Party Liability. As part of today's action, we hold
applicants and licensees responsible for the acts, omissions, or
failures of third parties with whom the applicant or licensee has a
contractual relationship, or whose acts or omissions the applicant or
licensee otherwise has the ability to control, that impact the
cybersecurity of the applicant's or licensee's systems and services.
For purposes of this requirement, third parties include non-licensee
individuals and entities with access to U.S.-licensed submarine cable
systems that are hired by the licensee to provide services in
connection with the management of the cable system (including service
providers) and other third-party entities with access to the cable
system's NOC. In connection with the Commission's requirement that an
applicant or licensee take reasonable measures to protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its communications
systems and services, if an applicant or licensee relies on a third
party to provide equipment or services, and an unreasonable act or
omission of that third party results in the applicant's or licensee's
failure to protect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
its systems and services, the applicant or licensee will be responsible
for that act or omission.
122. However, we find that reliance upon a third party to manage,
route, or otherwise contribute to critical system operations does not
relieve licensees of their cybersecurity responsibilities. The
Commission has long held that ``licensees and other regulatees are
responsible for the acts and omissions of their employees and
independent contractors,'' and has recognized that ``under long
established principles of common law, statutory duties are
nondelegable.'' The risk of systemic harm to critical infrastructure
warrants a regulatory approach that ensures licensees remain ultimately
accountable for the security of their systems, including those operated
or maintained by third parties.
c. Covered List Certifications
123. We adopt the proposal in the 2024 Cable NPRM with some
modifications, as described in detail below. We require applicants
submitting initial cable landing license applications to certify that
their submarine cable system will not use covered equipment or services
(i.e., the equipment or services identified on the Covered List). We
require existing licensees to certify that they will not add covered
equipment or services to their submarine cable system under the license
in two scenarios, as described below. We further require licensees to
disclose information about the covered equipment or services in their
submarine cable system as part of the one-time information collection
adopted today. We find that such equipment and services have been
deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the
United States and the security and safety of United States persons. As
discussed below, there is general support in the record for the
proposal to protect U.S. communications networks and the communications
supply chain against national security threats. These certifications
will further both the Commission's efforts and whole-of-government
efforts to prevent untrusted equipment or services from entering the
submarine cable communications ecosystem.
124. Covered List Certification for Cable Landing License
Applications, and for Addition of New Segment to Currently Licensed
Cable. Specifically, we adopt the proposal that, as a condition of a
potential grant of an application for a cable landing license,
applicants are required to certify that the submarine cable system will
not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered
List. At this time, we decline to require such certification based on
entity lists of other Federal agencies or the Department of Commerce's
identification of foreign adversaries in 15 CFR 791.4, which were
discussed in the 2024 Cable NPRM. In addition, we decline to require
existing licensees to file a certification on or after sixty (60) days
after the date that any equipment or service is newly placed on the
Covered List, and instead seek comment in the Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking. Applicants must certify that the submarine cable
system will not use covered equipment or services. Since the
Commission's Covered List was originally created, PSHSB has added
multiple entries to the Covered List, the most recent as of July 23,
2024.
125. Many commenters are generally supportive of the use of the
Commission's Covered List as a tool to promote national security.
Equipment or services are placed on the Covered List based on a
determination made by, among others, an appropriate national security
agency that the equipment and/or services pose an unacceptable risk to
the national security of the United States or the security and safety
of United States persons pursuant to the Secure Networks Act. NASCA
explicitly supports adopting the Commission's proposal to require
applicants to certify that any proposed submarine cable systems will
not use covered equipment or services. NASCA supports the Commission's
proposal to ``require applicants . . . to certify whether or not

[[Page 48669]]

they use equipment or services identified on the Commission's `Covered
List,' provided the Commission's rules limit application to the
relevant submarine cable system.'' We agree with NASCA and will require
that the certification apply to the submarine cable system relevant to
the particular application pending before the Commission.
126. We also require, as a condition of a potential grant of an
application to modify a cable landing license to add a new segment,
that applicants must certify that the new submarine cable segment and
landing point will not use equipment or services identified on the
Commission's Covered List. For example, if a licensee files a
modification application to add a new landing point, the certification
would apply to the segment connecting the submarine cable to the new
landing point to ensure the protection of the new segment and landing
point from any national security threats.
127. We are not persuaded by CTIA's argument that we should decline
to prohibit the use of covered equipment or services in submarine cable
systems because it would expand the Covered List ``in ways that were
not originally contemplated by pertinent statutory authorities'' and
``without Congressional direction.'' The Commission's responsibility to
place equipment and services on the Covered List is set out in section
2 of the Secure Networks Act, and both that Act and the Secure
Equipment Act of 2021 impose certain related duties on the Commission.
However, the Commission can adopt, and has adopted, certain
requirements that are not specifically required by statute but that
take into consideration the fact that the Covered List represents a
list of equipment and services that have been determined to pose risks
to national security and public safety. In fact, the Secure Equipment
Act recognizes the Commission's legal authority to take actions
concerning the Covered List to fulfill the Commission's national
security mission. We act here pursuant to our authority under the Cable
Landing License Act and on the basis of this record to prevent new or
additional insecure equipment and services from being integrated into
this critical U.S. infrastructure by a cable landing licensee.
128. Finally, we received a variety of viewpoints on using other
federal government lists. For example, SentinelOne supports expanding
the sources used for identifying untrusted equipment, encouraging the
Commission ``to align its Covered List with other federal authorities,
including the Department of Defense's 1260H list, the Department of
Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security Entity List, and related U.S.
Government assessments.'' TIA argues that while it makes sense to rely
on the Covered List to limit the participation by untrusted vendors,
the Commission should also collaborate with its national security
counterparts in the federal government to investigate the need for
additional restrictions. We are not prepared at this time, however, to
draw from the lists of those other federal agencies or apply the
certification requirement to all vendors ``from'' foreign adversaries,
given the uncertain nature of this latter category. Rather, in the
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we propose instead to extend
this certification requirement to communications equipment and services
produced or provided by any entity owned by, controlled by, or subject
to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in
Sec. 1.70001(g). In the meantime, we will continue to rely on the
Commission's Covered List, which Congress has directed the Commission
to maintain and which is specific to communications equipment and
services.
129. Covered List Certification for Cable Landing Licenses. To
enhance the security of submarine cable systems, we adopt the
Commission's proposals in the 2024 Cable NPRM, with some modifications.
We require cable landing licensees to certify that they will not add to
the submarine cable system under the license (or if a licensee holds
multiple licenses, for each submarine cable system under each license),
covered equipment or services. Licensees shall submit this
certification within sixty (60) days of the effective date of the new
rules. In the 2024 Cable NPRM, the Commission proposed to require
licensees to certify whether they use, for the relevant submarine cable
system, equipment or services identified on the Covered List, and
sought comment on a requirement to remove the covered equipment or
service. Some commenters support the certification proposal, while
others explain that for substantially launched or completed projects,
the replacement costs for covered equipment or services may have
substantial cost constraints. Others oppose the certification proposal
and disfavor suggestions to replace equipment or services, explaining
that the Committee's role with respect to monitoring individual
submarine cables and the respective mitigation agreements with
licensees address national security concerns.
130. We provide an exception to this certification requirement for
existing licensees that are entities identified on the Commission's
Covered List. Such entities identified on the Covered List can continue
to add covered equipment or services on their submarine cable system.
Based on the determinations that equipment or services produced or
provided by entities on the Covered List have been found to present
national security risks, the Commission believes there is little
national security benefit to prohibiting their use of covered equipment
or services on their submarine cable system. Rather, the risks these
entities pose are best mitigated through the presumptive disqualifying
conditions and the Foreign Adversary Annual Report that we adopt in
this Report and Order.
131. We find that it is premature to establish a ``rip and
replace''-like framework for current submarine cable infrastructure. We
recognize that for existing licensees with covered equipment or
services, there are costs associated with replacing these equipment or
services, as well as other challenges, as suggested by commenters.
Unlike the context of section 4 of the Secure Networks Act, where funds
have been allocated to reimburse entities that are required by the
federal government to remove equipment determined to present a national
security risk, no such funds have been appropriated for submarine cable
systems. Under these circumstances, we find that requiring licensees to
replace existing covered equipment or services in their submarine cable
systems would be overly burdensome and could have adverse effects, such
as fewer deployment of submarine cables or related facilities.
132. In addition, given the national security risks and threats
posed by covered equipment or services, and the Commission's
responsibilities as a licensing agency for submarine cables, we believe
that the Commission should have a greater understanding of the covered
equipment or services involved with licensed submarine cables. While
the Committee may have individual mitigation agreements with certain
cable landing licensees, the Commission is in the position as the
licensing agency for submarine cables to understand the collective U.S.
submarine cable ecosystem. Therefore, we modify the proposed scope of
the certification and require licensees to certify that they will not
add to their submarine cable systems, covered equipment or services
that are currently identified or newly identified in the future.
Licensees will be required to provide this certification

[[Page 48670]]

in ICFS no later than sixty (60) days of the effective date of the new
rules.
133. Covered List One-Time Information Collection From Licensees.
We adopt the Commission's proposal in the 2024 Cable NPRM, with some
modifications, to require existing licensees to disclose as to whether
or not their submarine cable systems use equipment or services
identified on the Covered List. We require licensees to disclose this
information as part of the one-time information collection adopted in
this Report and Order. In the 2024 Cable NPRM, the Commission proposed
to require licensees to provide a certification as to whether or not
they use, for the relevant submarine cable system, equipment or
services identified on the Covered List within sixty (60) days of the
effective date of any rule adopted in this proceeding, following
approval by OMB. While commenters express support or do not otherwise
object to the proposal to require licensees to certify whether or not
they use covered equipment or service in their respective cables, we
require this certification in the one-time information collection and
require licenses to respond with information about their respective
submarine cables and any use of equipment or services identified on the
Commission's Covered List as of the date that OIA publishes notice of
the effective date of the information collection requirement and the
filing deadline in the Federal Register.

E. New Routine Conditions for Cable Landing Licenses

134. We adopt new routine conditions and modify the Commission's
existing routine conditions that are attached to cable landing licenses
under Sec. 1.767(g) of the current rules. The routine conditions we
adopt: (1) eliminate a distinction that applies the routine conditions
only to licensees of a cable landing license granted on or after March
15, 2002, (2) ensure the protection of this critical submarine cable
infrastructure through prohibitions, (3) require commencement of
service within three years following the grant of a cable landing
license, and (4) require important updated information regarding the
submarine cable system, including contact information. These measures
are necessary to ensure that licensees remain vigilant against foreign
adversary threats and that the Commission has updated and accurate
information about licensees and the operation of licensed submarine
cable systems. The routine conditions will promote the security,
integrity, and resilience of critical submarine cable infrastructure.
135. Eliminate 2002 Distinction. We adopt the proposal to eliminate
the distinction in Sec. 1.767(g) that applies the routine conditions
only ``to each licensee of a cable landing license granted on or after
March 15, 2002.'' No commenter addressed this issue. As the Commission
explained in the 2024 Cable NPRM, we believe that this distinction is
no longer meaningful given that cable landing licenses granted prior to
March 15, 2002 either have expired or are nearing the expiration of
their 25-year term. Further, to the extent we grant applications to
renew the license of a submarine cable, our current practice is to
issue a new cable landing license based on the rules in effect at the
time of renewal, instead of renewing the terms of the license that were
in effect prior to March 15, 2002. We therefore modify Sec. 1.767(g)
by eliminating the text ``granted on or after March 15, 2002'' and
apply the routine conditions, as amended in this proceeding, ``to each
licensee of a cable landing license'' irrespective of the date of
grant.
136. Prohibition on IRUs and Capacity Leases with Foreign
Adversaries. As discussed above, to further protect U.S. communications
networks from national security, law enforcement, and other threats, we
adopt a routine condition that prohibits cable landing licensees from
entering into new or an extension of existing arrangements for IRUs or
leases for capacity on submarine cable systems landing in the United
States, where such arrangement or lease would give an entity that is
owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of
a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g), the ability to
install, own, or manage SLTE on a submarine cable landing in the United
States. This routine condition will ensure compliance with the
prohibition and ensure the security, integrity, and resilience of this
critical infrastructure against foreign adversary threats.
137. Prohibit Licensees from Adding Covered Equipment or Services.
Consistent with the actions we take in this Report and Order, we adopt
a routine condition that a licensee whose application for a cable
landing license is filed and granted after the effective date of the
Report and Order, shall not use equipment or services identified on the
Covered List on its submarine cable system subject to the license. A
licensee whose modification application to add a new segment is filed
and granted after the effective date of the Report and Order, shall not
use covered equipment or services on the new segment and the new
landing point. Cable landing licensees shall not add equipment or
services currently identified or newly identified in the future on the
Covered List to their submarine cable system(s) subject to their
respective license(s), with an exception discussed above. In the
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we propose, among other things,
to adopt a routine condition that requires cable landing licensees,
irrespective of when the license was granted, to certify, within sixty
(60) days of a Federal Register publication announcing any new addition
of equipment or services to the Covered List, if they use such covered
equipment or services in their respective submarine cable system.
138. Foreign Adversary Annual Report. As discussed below under
section III.G., we adopt a new routine condition requiring a cable
landing licensee whose license was or is granted prior to the effective
date of the new rules, to file a Foreign Adversary Annual Report if
such licensee meets one or more of the criteria specified therein.
139. Commencement of Service Requirement. We adopt a routine
condition requiring that a licensee must commence commercial service on
the submarine cable under its license within three years following the
grant of the license or submit a waiver request. In the 2024 Cable
NPRM, the Commission tentatively concluded that cable landing licensees
should retain their license only if they construct and operate the
submarine cable under that license. The Commission proposed to require
a cable landing licensee to commence commercial service on the cable
under its license within three years following the grant, and that if a
licensee requested a waiver of the three-year time period, the licensee
must identify the projected in-service date and reasons for the delay
and demonstrate good cause for grant of a waiver.
140. We did not receive comment on this proposal, and we adopt it
as a routine condition on all grants of a cable landing license granted
after the effective date of the new rules. We find this requirement
would provide the Commission with more accurate information as to which
license grants were not utilized to construct and operate submarine
cables and improve the administration of the Commission's rules.
Failure to notify the Commission of commencement of service within
three years following the grant of the license shall result in
automatic termination of the license after seeking approval of the
State Department, unless

[[Page 48671]]

the licensee submits a waiver request. If a licensee cannot commence
commercial service during that time period, we require the licensee to
submit a waiver request and provide an expected in-service date,
explain the reasons for delay, and show why the license should not be
terminated. Upon a showing of good cause, the Commission may extend the
date to commence service beyond the three-year period.
141. Notification of Name Changes of the Licensee or Submarine
Cable System. We adopt the Commission's proposal to add a new routine
condition requiring licensees to notify the Commission of any changes
to the name of the licensee (including the name under which it is doing
business) or the name of the submarine cable system within thirty (30)
days of such change. We adopt a slightly modified version of the
proposal to require the lead licensee to file the notification with the
Commission if there are multiple licensees of the submarine cable
system. Specifically, we will require that the lead licensee file a
notification of any change in the name of the submarine cable system
within the 30-day timeframe. We will require each licensee to notify
the Commission of any changes to its own name within the 30-day
timeframe as each licensee is best situated to know and timely disclose
this information. As the Commission explained in the 2024 Cable NPRM,
it is important for the Commission to maintain updated information that
is critical to identifying the licensees and the licensed submarine
cable system. No commenter addressed this proposal.
142. Changes in the Points of Contact. We adopt the proposal to add
a new routine condition requiring cable landing licensees to notify the
Commission of any changes to their contact information within thirty
(30) days of such change. Specifically, cable landing licensees must
inform the Commission of any changes to the contact information
provided in their most recent submarine cable application--including
the application for a new cable landing license or any modification,
assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of the
license--and the most recent Foreign Adversary Annual Report if
applicable. We did not receive comment on this. Among other things, it
is essential for the Commission to maintain updated contact information
for the appropriate points of contact to whom any matters concerning a
licensed submarine cable may be addressed for national security, law
enforcement, and emergency preparedness and response purposes,
including where a cable is rendered inoperable.

F. Other Changes to Current Requirements

1. Existing Streamlining Process
143. In noting existing licensing delays, commenters indicate that
applications that qualify for streamlining under the Commission's rules
often are removed from streamlined processing. Commenters encourage the
Commission to use the existing streamlining process. While the Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is pending, and to streamline the
processing of submarine cable applications during this time, we will
consistently implement our streamlined processing rules and not defer
action on a submarine cable application unless the Committee provides
specific and compelling national security, law enforcement, or other
justifications to defer action. Applicants seeking streamlined
processing must certify, among other things, that ``all ten percent or
greater direct or indirect equity and/or voting interests, or a
controlling interest, in the applicant are U.S. citizens or entities
organized in the United States.'' We believe that our streamlined
processing rules, combined with the strong national security measures
we adopt in this Report and Order--including presumptive disqualifying
conditions, prohibitions, and information and certification
requirements--to identify and mitigate foreign adversary threats to new
and existing submarine cable systems would lessen the need in many
cases to refer applications that qualify for streamlined processing. We
note that Executive Order 13913 continues to apply and is effective
when the Commission refers an application to the Committee, or when the
Committee reviews ``existing licenses'' to identify any additional or
new risks to national security or law enforcement interests of the
United States.
2. Renewal Applications, Extension Applications, and Streamlined
Processing
144. We adopt a rule specifying the requirements for an application
to renew or extend a cable landing license upon expiration of the 25-
year license term. Specifically, we adopt the proposals set out in the
2024 Cable NPRM to require applicants for renewal or extension of an
existing cable license to provide the same information and
certifications required in an application for a new license. Applicants
for a license renewal or extension must also provide a public interest
statement demonstrating how grant of the renewal application will
promote and protect national security and serve other statutory
objectives. NASCA states that licensees should not be required to
restate information to the Commission that has not changed, noting the
Commission's proposal to require periodic reports. It has been the case
that there are often changes in the licensees of a cable when a cable
landing license is renewed or extended. Further, since we are not
adopting the proposal to file periodic reports updating information
about the cable system and the licensees, except for foreign
adversaries, there may have been numerous changes to the cable system
and licensees that have not been reported to the Commission and the
information the Commission has on the cable may be outdated.
145. Renewal or Extension Must be Filed Six Months Prior to License
Expiration. We adopt the proposed rule to require licensees to file an
application for renewal or extension of a license six months prior to
its expiration. Upon the filing of a timely and complete application in
accordance with our rules, a licensee may continue operating the cable
system while the application is pending with the Commission. NASCA
supports the Commission's proposal to allow a licensee to continue to
operate the cable system while its renewal application is pending with
the Commission. In cases where the renewal or extension application is
not filed six months prior to the expiration and the Commission has not
acted on the renewal or extension application prior to expiration of
the license, the licensees will need to file a request for special
temporary authority (STA) to continue to operate the cable past the
expiration of the license, unless the Commission has granted a waiver
of the rules to allow continued operation before then. The licensees
should file the STA request at least 30 days prior to the expiration of
the license to allow the Commission to process and act on the STA
request prior to the expiration of the license.
146. Renewal or Extension Streamlined Processing Procedures. We
adopt with one modification the proposals made in the 2024 Cable NPRM
regarding streamlined processing for renewal or extension applications
similar to the existing 45-day streamlined process for initial
applications. NASCA states that any renewal process should be
streamlined, with non-streamlined processing being the exception even
if there is foreign

[[Page 48672]]

ownership. Upon further reconsideration and in light of the comments
from NASCA, we modify the criteria to allow for streamlined processing
if the only reportable foreign ownership has previously been reviewed
by the Commission and the Committee. In cases where the only reportable
foreign ownership in a renewal or extension application has been
previously reviewed by the Commission and the Committee, we will follow
our current procedure and not formally refer the renewal or extension
application but will send a courtesy copy of the Accepted For Filing
public notice to the Executive Branch agencies.
147. We will place a renewal or extension application on
streamlined Accepted for Filing public notice and take action on such
application within forty-five (45) days after release of the public
notice if: (1) the Commission does not refer the application to the
Executive Branch agencies because (a) the applicant does not have
reportable foreign ownership, as defined in Sec. 1.40001(d), or (b)
the only reportable foreign ownership is not ownership or control by a
foreign adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g), and has been
previously reviewed by the Commission and the Committee and (c) the
application does not raise other national security or law enforcement
concerns, or other considerations warranting Executive Branch review;
(2) the application does not raise other public interest
considerations, including regulatory compliance; (3) the Executive
Branch agencies do not separately request during the comment period
that the Commission defer action and remove the application from
streamlined processing; (4) no objections to the application are timely
raised by an opposing party; and (5) any proposed grant of a renewal or
extension application is approved by the State Department.
3. Requirements To File a Modification Application
148. We adopt the proposal in the 2024 Cable NPRM to set out in the
rules what changes to a submarine cable system require the filing of a
modification application or a notification and the process for review
of those filings. Based on the comments, we make changes to the
proposals to minimize the burden on licensees where a change to an
existing cable system does not present additional risks with the cable
system, but will require that the licensee(s) notify the Commission
about those changes. Specifically, we will require licensees to file
modification applications and receive prior approval from the
Commission before adding a new landing point or a new licensee to a
cable system. For other changes to the cable system, the licensees will
be required to file a notification of the change in the cable with the
Commission. The removal of a landing point or a licensee or a change in
a national security condition on a cable landing license will require a
post-action notification which must be filed within 30 days after the
change occurs. In situations where two Commission-licensed cable
systems will interconnect in waters beyond the U.S. territorial waters
or a new segment and landing point will be added to connect two (or
more) foreign points and the connection cannot be used to connect
directly or indirectly with the United States, the licensee(s) must
notify the Commission 90 days prior to the change taking effect.
a. New Landing Point or New Licensee
149. As was discussed in the 2024 Cable NPRM, the addition of a new
landing point or a new licensee is a major change to a cable landing
license that requires an application and Commission approval before the
change takes place. ICC and NASCA agree that these are major changes to
a cable. As proposed in the 2024 Cable NPRM, we will continue our
current practice and require a full application for these types of
changes to a cable system. Applications for a new landing point must
describe the proposed new landing point including the exact location,
how the new landing point will be connected to the cable, and the
ownership and control of any new U.S. landing point and the segment
connecting the cable to the new landing point. In situations where a
landing point is being moved within the same town/city/county as
approved in the cable landing license, the licensee(s) need only file a
letter informing the Commission of the new location of the landing
within 30 days of the change of location. An application to add a new
licensee must provide the contact information for the proposed
licensee, its ownership and the specific ownership interest it will
have in the cable system, and how the ownership interests of the other
licensees will change with the new licensee. If the proposed new owner
has reportable foreign ownership or the licensees on a cable proposing
a new cable landing point have reportable foreign ownership, the
application will be subject to our rules and policies regarding
coordination of submarine cable applications with the Executive Branch.
b. Removal of a Licensee or Landing Point, or Change in a National
Security Mitigation Condition
150. We find that removal of a previously approved landing point,
licensee, or condition to comply with a national security mitigation
condition does not raise concerns that would normally require a full
application. Based on the record in the proceeding, we agree with ICC
and NASCA that certain types of changes to a submarine cable system,
such as the removal of a licensee or a cable landing point or a minor
change in the location of an existing landing point can be handled
through a notification to the Commission. Consequently, we will not
adopt the proposal in the 2024 Cable NPRM. Instead, we will require the
licensee(s) to file a notification with the Commission within 30 days
of the change. Similar to a pro forma transaction notification, the
Commission will place the notification of the change to the cable
landing license on public notice. In cases where the proposed change
involves adding or modifying a condition requiring compliance with a
mitigation agreement with the Committee regarding national security and
law enforcement concerns, the modification will be effective upon
public notice.
151. Relinquishment by a Licensee. Notifications filed by a
licensee that relinquished an interest in the submarine cable must
contain the following information: (1) the name of the licensee
relinquishing its interests in the cable; (2) the ownership interests
held by that licensee prior to the relinquishment; (3) whether the
licensee relinquished all its interests or whether it is seeking to be
removed as a licensee because its interests decreased to a point where
it is no longer required to be a licensee (in which case, the remaining
interest must be identified); (4) an explanation of what happened to
the interests that were relinquished (i.e., were the interests re-
distributed pro rata amongst the remaining licensees or otherwise re-
distributed); and (5) a certification that the remaining licensees
retain collectively de jure and de facto control of the U.S. portion of
submarine cable system sufficient to comply with the requirements of
the Commission's rules and any specific conditions of the license. The
filer must also certify that the notification has been served on all
the other licensees of the cable. This requirement will also apply to
joint licensees of a submarine cable that collectively relinquish the
license.

[[Page 48673]]

152. Removal of a Licensee by the Other Licensee(s) on the Cable
Landing License. We adopt a rule based on the 2024 Cable NPRM by which
joint licensee(s) of a consortium submarine cable may collectively
request the removal of a licensee that no longer exists from the cable
landing license. Under this rule, if any joint licensee(s) of a
submarine cable no longer exists and is unable to file a notification
to modify the license to relinquish its interest in the license, the
remaining joint licensee(s) of the cable, if any, may collectively file
a notification to remove the licensee from the license by demonstrating
and certifying that (1) the licensee no longer exists as a legal
entity, and (2) the remaining joint licensee(s) retain collectively de
jure and de facto control of the U.S. portion of the submarine cable
system sufficient to comply with the requirements of the Commission's
rules and any specific conditions of the license. Any notification
submitted under this rule shall be certified and signed by each
remaining joint licensee(s) of the submarine cable, respectively. Joint
licensees may appoint one party to act as proxy for purposes of
complying with this requirement.
153. Removal of a Landing Point. Notifications regarding the
removal of a landing point must contain the following information: (1)
specific identification of the landing point that was removed from the
submarine cable and the segment connecting the cable to that landing
point; (2) an explanation of what happened with the physical facilities
of the landing point and the connecting segment upon removal from the
cable; (3) an explanation of how the removal affected the ownership of
the remaining portions of the cable; and (4) updated information on the
cable with the removal of the landing station and connecting segment.
154. Changes to National Security Condition. Notifications
regarding changes to a condition requiring compliance with a national
security mitigation agreement--typically either a letter of agreement
(LOA) or a national security agreement (NSA)--must explain the change
that has occurred. The notification must explain whether the condition
is being removed or if the mitigation agreement is being replaced. If
an existing mitigation agreement is being replaced with a new
agreement, a copy of the new mitigation agreement must be included in
the filing. The removal of the condition or the replacement of the
condition will be effective upon release of the public notice.
c. Adding an Interconnection Between Two Commission-Licensed Cables
155. We adopt a pre-action notification requirement when two
Commission-licensed cables propose to interconnect. In the 2024 Cable
NPRM, the Commission proposed to require that a modification
application be filed when two licensed cables interconnect in the
water. Both the Coalition and NASCA object to this proposal, arguing
that because there are no new landing points and no change in ownership
of the two cables, such an interconnection does not require Commission
approval or filing of a modification application. Although the
Coalition argues that the Commission has no jurisdiction over
interconnections in international waters, NASCA acknowledges that the
Commission can require notification of an interconnection. We have
jurisdiction as these interconnections allow for direct connections to
the United States from these cables to new landing points that were not
set out or approved in their respective cable landing licenses. We do
acknowledge, however, that these landings have been approved for the
pre-interconnecting cable configuration and thus these interconnections
present a lower risk than the addition of new landing points never
previously approved.
156. Although such a change may not raise concerns, there may be
instances where an interconnection--whether it be in U.S. territorial
waters or outside of U.S. territorial waters--may raise national
security concerns and the Commission should be notified about such a
change in advance. Accordingly, we adopt procedures for such changes
similar to the process used for landing point notifications. Licensees
will be required to file a notification about a proposed
interconnection at least 90 days prior to the construction of the
proposed interconnection. The Commission will give public notice of the
notification of modification. The modification will be considered
granted, without further Commission action, unless the Commission
notifies the licensees otherwise in writing no later than 60 days after
the submission of the notification. If, upon review of the
notification, the Commission finds that such an interconnection
presents a risk to national security, law enforcement, foreign policy
and/or trade policy or raises other concerns, it may require the
licensee(s) to file a complete modification application to seek
Commission approval for the interconnection. We find that this
notification process will be less burdensome on licensees than the full
modification process proposed in the 2024 Cable NPRM.
157. The notification about a proposed interconnection must be
filed 90 days prior to construction of the proposed connection. The
filing must include information on: (1) the cable systems being
interconnected, including the names and file numbers for the cables and
(2) a general description of where the interconnection will take place
and the terms of the interconnection agreement.
d. New Connection Between a Branching Unit of a Licensed Submarine
Cable System and a Foreign Landing Point
158. We agree with the Coalition and NASCA that if a new segment
and landing point only connects two (or more) foreign points and the
connection cannot be used to connect directly with the United States,
the segment does not need to be licensed by the Commission. In the 2024
Cable NPRM, the Commission proposed to require a modification
application be filed when a new segment from a foreign country is
connected to a branching unit of the licensed submarine cable system to
allow connection to another foreign country. The Coalition and NASCA
both oppose this proposal arguing that such connections are outside of
Commission jurisdiction. Such a new connection using a U.S.-licensed
cable does affect the cable, however, and the Commission should be
aware of the proposed connection. We find that the Commission should
have an opportunity to review the proposed connection before it is
constructed to determine if the Commission agrees that there will not
be a direct connection to the United States and thus the connection
requires the filing of a modification application. Therefore, we will
require the licensee(s) to file a notification with the Commission at
least 90 days before construction of the proposed connection. The
modification will be considered granted, without further Commission
action, unless the Commission notifies the licensees otherwise in
writing no later than 60 days after the submission of the notification.
If, upon review of the notification, the

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