Notice2025-19612

Hil Rizvi, M.D.; Decision and Order

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Published
October 21, 2025

Issuing agencies

Justice DepartmentDrug Enforcement Administration

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 201 (Tuesday, October 21, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 201 (Tuesday, October 21, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48435-48439]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-19612]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. 25-24]


Hil Rizvi, M.D.; Decision and Order

    On December 2, 2024, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or 
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Hil Rizvi, M.D., of 
Salt Lake City, Utah (Applicant). Request for Final Agency Action 
(RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 2, at 1, 9. The OSC proposed the denial of 
Applicant's application for DEA registration, Control No. W24074770C, 
alleging that he materially falsified his application. Id. at 1 (citing 
21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1)). Specifically, the OSC alleged that Applicant's 
application was materially false because he failed to disclose relevant 
information in response to Liability Questions 2 and 3.\1\ Id. at 1, 4-
6; RFAA, at 4.
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    \1\ The Government further alleged that granting Applicant's 
application would be outside the public interest because during 
DEA's investigation Applicant demonstrated a lack of candor, which 
threatened the public health and safety. RFAAX 2, at 1, 7-8 (citing 
21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1)(E)); RFAA, at 5. However, due to the Agency's 
finding that Applicant submitted a materially false application, 
which serves as an independent basis for sanction under 21 U.S.C. 
824(a)(1), the Agency need not make a finding on the public interest 
allegation. Even without being a basis for denial, Applicant's lack 
of candor is relevant to the Agency's determination of an 
appropriate sanction. See infra Section IV.
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    On February 25, 2025, the Government submitted a RFAA requesting 
that the Agency issue a default final order denying Applicant's 
application for registration. RFAA, at 1, 4-5. After carefully 
reviewing the entire record and conducting the analysis as set forth in 
detail below, the Agency grants the Government's request for final 
agency action and denies Applicant's application for registration. As a 
preliminary matter, this Decision addresses whether or not Applicant is 
in default and finds that he is. Next, this Decision considers whether 
Applicant submitted a materially false application for registration and 
finds that he did. Lastly, this Decision determines that the 
appropriate sanction is denial of Applicant's materially false 
application.

I. Default Determination

    Under 21 CFR 1301.43, a registrant or applicant entitled to a 
hearing who fails to file a timely hearing request ``within 30 days 
after the date of receipt of the [OSC] . . . shall be deemed to have 
waived their right to a hearing and to be in default'' unless ``good 
cause'' is established for the failure. 21 CFR 1301.43(a), (c)(1). In 
the absence of a demonstration of good cause, a registrant or applicant 
who fails to timely file an answer also is ``deemed to have waived 
their right to a hearing and to be in default.'' 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(2).
    The OSC notified Applicant of his deadline to file a written 
request for hearing and answer, and that if he failed to file such a 
request and answer, he would be deemed to have waived his right to a 
hearing and be in default.\2\ RFAAX 2, at 8 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). 
Applicant filed a hearing request and the matter was assigned to 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Teresa Wallbaum. RFAA, at 2; RFAAX 4, at 
1-2. During prehearing proceedings, the ALJ concluded that Applicant's 
hearing request was untimely, that he failed to demonstrate good cause 
to excuse the untimely filing, that he failed to file an adequate or 
timely answer, and that he failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse 
the untimeliness or inadequacy of his answer. RFAA, at 2-3; RFAAX 4, at 
4-9. Accordingly, the ALJ found Applicant in default and terminated the 
proceedings. RFAA, at 3-4; RFAAX 4, at 9. The Agency finds that the ALJ 
did not err in finding Applicant to be in default.
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    \2\ Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated 
February 25, 2025, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on 
Applicant was adequate. Specifically, the Declaration from a DEA 
Diversion Investigator (DI) indicates that on December 16, 2024, DI 
emailed a copy of the OSC to Applicant after mailed copies were 
returned as undeliverable. RFAAX 3. During prehearing proceedings, 
Applicant confirmed that he received the emailed OSC on December 17, 
2025, which the Agency construes as a typographical error and that 
Applicant intended to indicate he received the OSC on December 17, 
2024. RFAAX 4, at 5. Therefore, due process notice requirements have 
been satisfied.
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    ``A default, unless excused, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver 
of the [applicant's] right to a hearing and an admission of the factual 
allegations of the [OSC].'' 21 CFR 1301.43(e). Because Applicant is in 
default, the Agency finds that Applicant has admitted to the factual 
allegations in the OSC. 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(1), (e), (f)(1).
    Further, ``[i]n the event that [an applicant] . . . is deemed to be 
in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action 
with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In 
such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order 
pursuant to [21 CFR] 1316.67.'' 21 CFR 1301.43(f)(1). Here, the 
Government has requested final agency action based on Applicant's 
default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c), (f), and 1301.46. RFAA, at 3-5; 
see also 21 CFR 1316.67.

II. Findings of Fact

    The Agency finds that, in light of Applicant's default, the factual 
allegations in the OSC are deemed admitted. 21 CFR 1301.43(e). 
Accordingly, Applicant is deemed to have admitted to each of the 
following facts.\3\ On June 11, 2024, he applied for DEA registration 
as a practitioner in Schedules II through V with a registered address 
in Salt Lake City, Utah.\4\ RFAAX 2, at 4; RFAAX 1, at 1. This 
application was assigned Control No. W24074770C. Id. An application for 
DEA registration includes liability questions, which an applicant must 
answer either affirmatively or negatively. Id.
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    \3\ According to the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 
``[f]indings of fact by the [DEA Administrator], if supported by 
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.'' 21 U.S.C. 877. Here, 
where Applicant is found to be in default, all the factual 
allegations in the OSC are deemed to be admitted. These uncontested 
and deemed admitted facts constitute evidence that exceeds the 
``substantial evidence'' standard of 21 U.S.C. 877; it is unrebutted 
evidence.
    \4\ The OSC alleges that Applicant applied for a registration in 
Wisconsin. RFAAX 2, at 4. Agency records reflect that Applicant 
transferred this application to Utah. RFAAX 1, at 1; RFAAX 2, at 1.
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Liability Question 2

    Liability Question 2 asks, ``Has the applicant ever surrendered 
(for cause) or had a federal controlled substances registration 
revoked, suspended, restricted, or denied, or is any such action 
pending?'' RFAAX 2, at 4. If the applicant answers affirmatively, he or 
she must provide additional information about the date, location, 
nature, and result of the incident that is being referenced. Id.; RFAAX 
1, at 1.
    On December 21, 2020, Applicant's prior DEA registration, No. 
BR4988599, was revoked. RFAAX 2, at 3, 5; RFAAX 1, at 1; see also Hil 
Rizvi, M.D., 85 FR 73804, 73804-06 (2020) (Agency final order revoking 
Applicant's DEA registration based on lack of state authority in 
Pennsylvania). Thereafter, on his June 2024 application for DEA 
registration, Applicant provided an affirmative answer to Liability 
Question 2. RFAAX 2, at 4; RFAAX 1, at 1. He identified the incident 
date as May 1, 2020, and the incident location as

[[Page 48436]]

``Tyrone PA.'' Id. For incident nature, he disclosed: ``Pennsylvania 
medical license revoked by reciprocal action from Maine license 
denial.'' Id. For incident result, he disclosed: ``Change of address 
submitted to DEA to maintain old registration BR4988599 for another 
state NH, overlooked by DEA registration staff Senator John Hoeven 
North Dakota has confirmed DEA failed to update a change of address. 
DEA registration and Pennsylvania medical license are separate 
registration. Maine denial affected Ohio Pennsylvania eventually all 
licenses. This applicant never practiced in Maine.'' Id.
    Applicant's follow-up narrative in response to Liability Question 2 
did not disclose that on December 21, 2020, his prior DEA registration 
was revoked. RFAAX 2, at 3, 5; RFAAX 1, at 1; see also Hil Rizvi, M.D., 
85 FR at 73804-06.

Liability Question 3

    Liability Question 3 asks, ``Has the applicant ever surrendered 
(for cause) or had a state professional license or controlled substance 
registration revoked, suspended, denied, restricted, or placed on 
probation, or is any such action pending?'' RFAAX 2, at 4.
    On his June 2024 application for DEA registration, Applicant 
provided an affirmative answer to Liability Question 3. Id.; RFAAX 1, 
at 1. He identified the incident date as May 1, 2020, and the incident 
location as ``Tyrone PA.'' Id. For incident nature, he disclosed: 
``Penn physician license revocation, with DEA registration also 
revoked.'' Id. For incident result, he disclosed: ``Maine physician 
license denial 2014, led to all medical licenses affected. This matter 
has been evaluated by a Penn board consultant Dr James Cornish (and law 
professor Dr C Wm Hinnant MD JD). It has been determined, there is no 
clinical liability from the Maine license denial. Commonwealth 
Pennsylvania Judge Mary Hanna Leavitt has written an opinion, the 
Pennsylvania license revocation secondary to Maine denial, is an abuse 
of authority by the Pennsylvania licensing Board of Medicine. A copy of 
this opinion is available, Dr Cornish fitforduty report is available.'' 
Id.
    His follow-up narratives in response to Liability Question 3 did 
not disclose the following events:
    (a) Vermont. On September 2, 1999, the Vermont Board of Medical 
Practice summarily suspended his license to practice medicine in 
Vermont after having found that he took the U.S. Medical Licensing 
Examination 3 (USMLE 3) three times before obtaining a passing score 
and thereby failed to meet the qualifications for medical licensure in 
Vermont. RFAAX 2, at 5.
    (b) West Virginia. On August 17, 1999, his West Virginia medical 
license was revoked and immediately stayed for a period of five years 
with probation, based on his failure to provide complete and accurate 
information on a licensure application in Ohio and for having 
represented himself as a resident physician when he was no longer 
participating in a training program. RFAAX 2, at 5. On March 12, 2001, 
the West Virginia Board of Medicine restored his license to full and 
unrestricted status. Id. His West Virginia medical license subsequently 
expired on June 30, 2013. Id.
    (c) New Hampshire. On January 13, 2021, Applicant's New Hampshire 
license to practice medicine was revoked because of the issues reported 
by the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine, including that his license 
to practice medicine was refused by the Maine Board of Licensure in 
Medicine and that his license to practice medicine had been revoked by 
the Medical Board of Ohio. RFAAX 2, at 6.
    (d) New Mexico. On May 10, 2023, Applicant's application to 
practice as a medical doctor in New Mexico was denied because of his 
extensive history of adverse licensure actions in multiple 
jurisdictions based on, but not limited to, his failure to disclose 
information, dishonesty in applications, unprofessional conduct, and 
non-compliance with other state Board Orders concerning practice 
monitoring and recommendations. RFAAX 2, at 6.
    (e) Oklahoma. On September 14, 2023, based on findings of 
misconduct from other state boards, the Oklahoma State Board of Medical 
Licensure and Supervision denied Applicant's application for full 
medical licensure in Oklahoma. RFAAX 2, at 6.

III. Discussion

    A DEA registration may be denied, suspended, or revoked upon a 
finding that the applicant or registrant materially falsified any 
application filed pursuant to or required by the Controlled Substances 
Act (CSA). 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1).\5\ To present a prima facie case for 
material falsification, the Government's record evidence must show (1) 
the submission of an application, (2) containing a false statement and/
or omitting information that the application requires, (3) when the 
submitter knew or should have known that the statement is false and/or 
that the omitted information existed and the application required its 
disclosure, and (4) the false statement and/or required but omitted 
information is material, that is, it ``connect[s] to at least one of 
[the section 823] factors that, according to the CSA, [the 
Administrator] `shall' consider'' when analyzing ``whether issuing a 
registration `would be inconsistent with the public interest.' '' Frank 
Joseph Stirlacci, M.D., 85 FR 45229, 45238 (2020) (citing 21 U.S.C. 823 
and Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771). The Government must establish material 
falsification with record evidence that is clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 772; Stirlacci, 85 FR at 45230-39.
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    \5\ A statutory basis to deny an application pursuant to section 
823 is also a basis to revoke or suspend a registration pursuant to 
section 824, and vice versa, because doing ``otherwise would mean 
that all applications would have to be granted only to be revoked 
the next day . . . .'' Robert Wayne Locklear, M.D., 86 FR 33738, 
33744-45 (2021) (collecting cases).
    The Supreme Court's decision in Kungys v. United States, 485 
U.S. 759 (1988), and its progeny, guide the Agency's implementation 
of these CSA provisions.
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    First, the Government must prove that the applicant or registrant 
submitted an application for registration pursuant to the CSA. 21 
U.S.C. 824(a)(1); see also 21 U.S.C. 822 (persons required to 
register); 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1) (registration requirements).
    Second, the Government must prove that the application contained a 
false statement or omitted information that the application required, 
either of which may constitute a material falsity. See, e.g., Emed 
Medical Company LLC and Med Assist Pharmacy, 88 FR 21719, 21720 (2023) 
(applicant falsely answered ``no'' to Liability Question 3 on seventeen 
applications when the true answer was ``yes''); Richard J. Settles, 
D.O., 81 FR 64940, 64945-46 (2016) (applicant failed to disclose an 
interim consent agreement restricting his license based on findings 
that he issued controlled substance prescriptions without federal or 
state legal authority to do so). In making this assessment, the Agency 
will examine the entire application, including registrant's ``yes/no'' 
answers to the liability questions and any follow-up response(s). 
Daniel A. Glick, D.D.S., 80 FR 74800, 74802, 74,808-09 (2015). To 
establish an omission, the Government must show both that omitted 
information existed and that the application required inclusion of that 
information. See, e.g., Richard A. Herbert, M.D., 76 FR 53942, 53956 
(2011) (omission of a probation which the application required to be 
identified); Michel P. Toret, M.D., 82 FR 60041, 60042 (2017) 
(Voluntary Surrender Form alone is insufficient evidence to find 
material falsification based on registrant's ``no'' answer to the

[[Page 48437]]

question regarding ``surrender[s] (for cause)'').
    Third, the Government must prove that the applicant or registrant 
knew or should have known that the statement is false and/or that the 
omitted information existed and the application required its 
disclosure. See John J. Cienki, M.D., 63 FR 52293, 52295 (1998) (``[I]n 
finding that there has been a material falsification of an application, 
it must be determined that the applicant knew or should have known that 
the response given to the liability question was false.''); Samuel 
Arnold, D.D.S., 63 FR 8687, 8688 (1998) (``It is also undisputed that 
Respondent knew that his Ohio dental license had previously been 
suspended.''); Bobby Watts, M.D., 58 FR 46995, 46995 (1993) 
(``Respondent knew that the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners had 
suspended his medical license on May 7, 1987, and had placed his state 
medical license on probation on May 2, 1988.''); see also Stirlacci, 85 
FR at 45236-37 & nn. 22-23 (collecting cases).
    Fourth, the Government must prove that the false statement and/or 
required but omitted information is ``material.'' Kungys holds that a 
statement is material if it is ``predictably capable of affecting, 
i.e., had a natural tendency to affect, the [Agency's] official 
decision,'' or stated differently, ``had a natural tendency to 
influence the decision.'' Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771-72. As already 
discussed, materiality, for the purposes of the CSA, is tied to the 
factors that the Administrator ``shall'' consider when determining 
whether issuance of a registration ``would be inconsistent with the 
public interest.'' \6\ 21 U.S.C. 823; Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771-72; 
Stirlacci, 85 FR at 45234, 45238.
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    \6\ Because the bases for revocation listed in 21 U.S.C. 824 may 
also serve as bases to deny an application, see supra n.5, a finding 
of materiality may also be tied to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1)-(5).
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    The Government has the burden of proof in this proceeding. 21 CFR 
1301.44. Here, the Agency finds that the Government's record evidence 
presents a prima facie case that Applicant submitted a materially false 
application. 21 U.S.C. 823, 824(a)(1).
    Applicant truthfully answered Liability Questions 2 and 3 in the 
affirmative. RFAA, at 1, 4; RFAAX 2, at 4-5. The Government alleges, 
however, that Applicant's follow-up narratives in response to his 
affirmative answers are materially false because they failed to 
disclose relevant, required information. RFAA, at 1; RFAAX 2, at 5-6. 
Having read and analyzed all the record evidence, Applicant is deemed 
to have admitted and the Agency finds clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing record evidence that Applicant's narrative response to 
Liability Question 3 omitted relevant, required information, that these 
omissions constitute falsities, and that these falsities are material. 
21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1); 21 CFR 1301.43(e); Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771-72; 
Herbert, 76 FR at 53956.

Liability Question 2

    The Agency finds the following based on clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing record evidence, and Applicant is deemed to have admitted to 
the same. Liability Question 2 asks whether the applicant has ever had 
a federal controlled substance registration revoked, suspended, 
restricted, or denied. RFAAX 2, at 4. When Applicant truthfully 
answered ``yes'' to this question, he was required to provide 
additional details concerning the date, location, nature, and result of 
the incident or incidents that prompted the affirmative answer. Id.
    In his follow-up narrative to Liability Question 2, Applicant's 
response focused on his various state licenses and applications, and a 
previous request to change his registered address with DEA. Id.; RFAAX 
1, at 1. Applicant's follow-up narrative to Liability Question 2 did 
not clearly state that his previous DEA registration was revoked, but 
Applicant, by answering ``yes,'' had already admitted that he had a DEA 
registration revoked, suspended, restricted, or denied. Id. Then, in 
his follow-up response to Liability Question 3, Applicant clearly 
stated: ``Penn physician license revocation, with DEA registration also 
revoked.'' Id. (emphasis added). Applicant's disclosure notified DEA 
that he had a previous DEA registration revoked and that it was related 
to losing his medical license in Pennsylvania. Id. Thus, the 
application contained a truthful and accurate disclosure.\7\ See RFAAX 
1, at 1; RFAAX 2, at 4; Rizvi, 85 FR at 73804-06. The Government has 
provided no argument or legal authority that more detail is required. 
Even though the information was provided most clearly in response to 
the liability question asking about state licensure, the Agency is 
required to look at the entire application. Glick, 80 FR at 74808-09.
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    \7\ Even if the Agency were to find that the lack of clarity in 
Applicant's narrative response to Liability Question 2 constituted a 
falsification by omitting information that the application required, 
the falsity would not have been material. Applicant went on to 
explicitly include the allegedly omitted information in response to 
the next question on the application. RFAAX 1, at 1; RFAAX 2, at 4. 
Accordingly, Applicant provided the Agency all the information it 
needed to conduct the required analysis under 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1) 
and 21 U.S.C. 824 such that any omission in Liability Question 2 
could not be ``predictably capable of affecting . . . the [Agency's] 
official decision.'' Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771-72.
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    In sum, the Government has not established by clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing record evidence that Applicant failed to disclose on his 
application that he had a previous DEA registration revoked. Thus, the 
Government has not established a prima facie case that Applicant's 
response to Liability Question 2 was materially false.

Liability Question 3

    The Agency finds the following based on clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing record evidence, and Applicant is deemed to have admitted to 
the same. Liability Question 3 asks whether the applicant has ever had 
any adverse action taken against a state professional or controlled 
substance license, to include surrender for cause, revocation, 
suspension, denial, restriction, or probation. RFAAX 2, at 4. When 
Applicant truthfully answered ``yes'' to this question, he was required 
to provide additional details concerning the date, location, nature, 
and result of the incident or incidents that prompted the affirmative 
answer. Id. In his follow-up narrative to Liability Question 3, 
Applicant disclosed that his Pennsylvania medical license had been 
revoked and his application for medical licensure in Maine had been 
denied. Id.; RFAAX 1, at 1. In his follow-up response to Liability 
Question 2, Applicant disclosed that the denial of his application in 
Maine ``affected Ohio.'' RFAAX 2, at 4; RFAAX 1, at 1.
    Applicant, however, omitted additional relevant information 
responsive to Liability Question 3, namely that his West Virginia 
medical license was revoked and placed on probation in 1999; his 
Vermont medical license was suspended in 1999; his New Hampshire 
medical license was revoked in 2021; his application for medical 
licensure in Oklahoma was denied in 2023; and his application for 
medical licensure in New Mexico was denied in 2023.\8\ RFAAX 2, at 5-6; 
RFAAX 1, at 1-2.
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    \8\ The OSC further alleged that Applicant failed to disclose a 
``Stipulation and Order'' issued by the Utah Division of 
Professional Licensing; denial of his application for medical 
licensure in Maine; and revocation of his medical license in Ohio. 
RFAAX 2, at 6.
    Regarding the Utah allegation, the OSC does not indicate whether 
the ``Stipulation and Order'' involved any of the adverse actions 
listed in Liability Question 3, namely surrender for cause, 
revocation, suspension, denial, restriction, or probation. Id. Thus, 
the factual record is insufficient to determine whether Applicant 
was obligated to disclose this information in response to Liability 
Question 3.
    Regarding the Maine allegation, Applicant wrote in his follow-up 
narrative: ``Maine physician license denial 2014.'' RFAAX 2, at 4; 
RFAAX 1, at 1. Thus, this allegation is not sustained, because the 
record evidence shows that Applicant did, in fact, disclose the 
denial of an application in Maine.
    Regarding the Ohio allegation, Applicant disclosed in his 
follow-up narrative to Liability Question 2 that denial of his 
application in Maine ``affected Ohio.'' RFAAX 2, at 4; RFAAX 1, at 
1. This response informed DEA of an adverse action against him in 
Ohio and the Government has not provided any authority to support 
the proposition that the application required more detailed 
information than this. Thus, Applicant did not provide a false 
answer with respect to the adverse action against his Ohio license. 
Further, even if the Agency were to find this response to be false, 
it would not be material. See supra n.7.

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[[Page 48438]]

    Applicant's failure to disclose that he had prior adverse actions 
against state licenses, to include revocation, probation, and denial, 
constitutes a falsity.\9\ Pamela Monterosso, D.M.D., 73 FR 11146, 
11147-48 (2008). The application clearly requested additional 
information concerning the nature and result of each of the incidents 
which prompted a ``yes'' answer to Liability Question 3. RFAAX 2, at 4. 
Applicant knew or should have known that the actions against his West 
Virginia license, his Vermont license, his New Hampshire license, his 
Oklahoma application, and his New Mexico application existed and that 
the DEA application required their disclosure. Id. at 3-6. Indeed, 
Applicant clearly understood that the DEA application requested this 
information, because he did, in fact, disclose some actions against 
licenses in other states. Id. Although Applicant answered ``yes'' to 
Liability Question 3, he failed to identify in the follow-up response 
the revocation of his West Virginia and New Hampshire licenses, the 
suspension of his Vermont license, and the denial of his Oklahoma and 
New Mexico applications. Id. Failing to identify these adverse actions 
constitutes a falsity as to each omission.
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    \9\ Applicant's response to Liability Question 2 refers to ``all 
licenses'' and his response to Liability Question 3 refers to ``all 
medical licenses affected.'' RFAAX 2, at 4; RFAAX 1, at 1. These 
vague statements, however, do not disclose the adverse actions that 
Applicant was required to disclose in response to Liability Question 
3, and do not change the Agency's finding that Applicant omitted 
relevant information and that such omissions were materially false.
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    Furthermore, these falsities are material. Liability Question 3 is 
intended to obtain information relevant to conduct the analysis 
required by 21 U.S.C. 823 and 824. Specifically, 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1) 
directs the Administrator \10\ to consider whether the applicant is 
``authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of 
the State in which he practices,'' and to determine whether 
registration ``would be inconsistent with the public interest.'' 21 
U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Further, the public interest factors require the 
Administrator to consider the recommendation of state licensing boards, 
the applicant's experience in handling controlled substances, the 
applicant's compliance with state laws related to controlled 
substances, and other conduct which may threaten public safety. 21 
U.S.C. 823(g)(1)(A), (B), (D), (E). Additionally, 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) 
and (4) require the Administrator to consider whether the applicant has 
had a state license or registration suspended, revoked, or denied by 
state authority, and whether the applicant has committed acts 
inconsistent with the public interest. Liability Question 3, in other 
words, is tethered to provisions which the Administrator is required by 
statute to consider when reviewing applications for registration. 
Stirlacci, 85 FR at 45238. Thus, a false answer to Liability Question 3 
is material. Id.
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    \10\ The CSA vests authority in the Attorney General, who has 
delegated such authority under the CSA to the Administrator of DEA 
(the Agency). 21 U.S.C. 821, 823, 824; 28 CFR 0.100.
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    By omitting adverse actions against three state licenses and two 
state license applications, Applicant ``deprived [DEA] of information 
potentially relevant to'' the analysis that the Administrator is 
statutorily mandated to conduct. Stirlacci, 85 FR at 45234-35; 21 
U.S.C. 823(g)(1), 824(a); RFAAX 2, at 5-6; RFAAX 1, at 1. Thus, 
omission of this information directly affected the public interest 
analysis that DEA was required to make when it reviewed his 
registration application. 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), 824(a); Stirlacci, 85 FR 
at 45238. Stated differently, the omissions were material because they 
were ``predictably capable of affecting . . . [DEA's] official 
decision'' regarding whether Applicant met ``the requirements for'' 
registration.\11\ Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771.
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    \11\ The fact that Applicant truthfully disclosed some state 
adverse actions does not negate a finding of materiality regarding 
the omitted state actions. See, e.g., Settles, 81 FR at 64945-46 
(applicant disclosed state probation but failed to disclose a 
subsequent state order alleging that he violated the probation); 
Jose G. Zavaleta, M.D., 78 FR 27431, 27439 (2013) (applicant 
disclosed surrender of registration but failed to disclose state 
suspension); Herbert, 76 FR at 53956-57 (disclosed one probation but 
not another); Harold Edward Smith, M.D., 76 FR 53961, 53963-64 
(2011) (disclosed one board order but failed to disclose several 
others); Alvin Darby, M.D., 75 FR 26993, 26998-99 (2010) (disclosed 
surrender of registration but failed to disclose criminal conviction 
and state license probation); Monterosso, 73 FR at 11147-48 
(disclosed one conviction but failed to disclose another).
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    In sum, the Agency finds clear, unequivocal, and convincing record 
evidence that Applicant's response to Liability Question 3 was 
materially false for failure to disclose revocation and probation of 
his medical license in West Virginia, suspension of his medical license 
in Vermont, revocation of his medical license in New Hampshire, and 
denial of his applications for medical licensure in Oklahoma and New 
Mexico. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1); 21 CFR 1301.43(e). The Agency further 
finds that the Government has established a prima facie case for 
material falsification, that Applicant did not rebut that prima facie 
case, and that there is clear, unequivocal, and convincing record 
evidence supporting the denial of Applicant's application. 21 U.S.C. 
824(a)(1).

IV. Sanction

    Where, as here, the Government has met the burden of showing that 
Applicant submitted a materially false application for registration, 
the burden shifts to Applicant to show why he can be trusted with a 
registration. Morall v. Drug Enf't Admin., 412 F.3d 165, 181 (D.C. Cir. 
2005); Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug Enf't Admin., 881 
F.3d 823, 830 (11th Cir. 2018); Garrett Howard Smith, M.D., 83 FR 
18882, 18904 (2018). The issue of trust is necessarily a fact-dependent 
determination based on the circumstances presented by the individual. 
Jeffrey Stein, M.D., 84 FR 46968, 46972 (2019); see also Jones Total 
Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 833. Moreover, as past performance is 
the best predictor of future performance, the Agency requires that a 
registrant or applicant who has committed acts inconsistent with the 
public interest accept responsibility for those acts and demonstrate 
that he will not engage in future misconduct. See Jones Total Health 
Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 833; ALRA Labs, Inc. v. Drug Enf't Admin., 
54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995). The Agency requires acceptance of 
responsibility to be unequivocal. Janet S. Pettyjohn, D.O., 89 FR 
82639, 82641 (2024); Mohammed Asgar, M.D., 83 FR 29569, 29573 (2018); 
see also Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 830-31.
    In addition, a registrant's or applicant's candor during the 
investigation is an important factor in determining acceptance of 
responsibility and the appropriate sanction. See Jones Total Health 
Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 830-31; Hoxie, 419 F.3d at 483-84. Further, 
the Agency considers the egregiousness and extent of the misconduct as 
significant factors

[[Page 48439]]

in determining the appropriate sanction. See Jones Total Health Care 
Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 834 & n.4. The Agency also considers the need to 
deter similar acts by an applicant and by the community of registrants. 
Stein, 84 FR at 46972-73.
    Here, Applicant did not timely request a hearing, or timely or 
properly answer the allegations, and was therefore deemed to be in 
default. 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(1), (e), (f)(1); RFAA, at 1-4. To date, 
Applicant has not filed a motion with the Office of the Administrator 
to excuse the default. 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(1). Applicant has thus failed 
to answer the allegations contained in the OSC and has not otherwise 
availed himself of the opportunity to refute the Government's case. As 
such, Applicant has not accepted responsibility for the proven 
violations, has made no representations regarding his future compliance 
with the CSA, and has not made any demonstration that he can be trusted 
with registration.
    Moreover, the evidence presented by the Government shows that 
Applicant supplied DEA with materially false information in his 
application for registration, further demonstrating that Applicant 
cannot be trusted with the responsibilities of holding a controlled 
substances registration. Additionally, the material information 
Applicant failed to disclose reveals that he has engaged in a pattern 
of dishonesty over many years with multiple state jurisdictions. RFAAX 
2, at 3-6. Similarly, Applicant is deemed to have admitted that he 
``lacked candor during the course of [the] investigation by the DEA.'' 
Id. at 8. If the Agency were to issue a registration to Applicant under 
these circumstances, it would send a dangerous message that submitting 
truthful, accurate, and complete information to DEA is not essential 
for obtaining a registration. Accordingly, the Agency will order the 
denial of Applicant's application.

Order

    Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 
U.S.C. 823 and 824, I hereby deny the pending application for a DEA 
Certificate of Registration, No. W24074770C, submitted by Hil Rizvi, 
M.D., as well as any other pending application of Hil Rizvi, M.D., for 
additional registration in Utah. This Order is effective November 20, 
2025.

Signing Authority

    This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on 
October 9, 2025, by Administrator Terrance Cole. That document with the 
original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative 
purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the 
Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal Register Liaison Officer 
has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic 
format for publication, as an official document of DEA. This 
administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this 
document upon publication in the Federal Register.

Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2025-19612 Filed 10-20-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P


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Indexed from Federal Register on October 21, 2025.

This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.