Notice2025-19600
Chantal F. Nouvellon, D.O.; Decision and Order
Primary source
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Published
October 20, 2025
Issuing agencies
Justice DepartmentDrug Enforcement Administration
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 200 (Monday, October 20, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 200 (Monday, October 20, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48378-48379]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-19600]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Chantal F. Nouvellon, D.O.; Decision and Order
On April 2, 2025, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Chantal F.
Nouvellon, D.O. (Registrant). Request for Final Agency Action (RFAA),
Exhibit (RFAAX) 1, at 1, 4. The OSC proposed the revocation of
Registrant's Certificate of Registration Nos. BN5595775 and FN5439016,
alleging that Registrant's registrations should be revoked because
Registrant is ``currently without authority to handle controlled
substances in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the states in which [she
is] registered with DEA.'' Id. at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).
The OSCs notified Registrant of her right to file with DEA a
written request for hearing, and that if she failed to file such a
request, she would be deemed to have waived her right to a hearing and
be in default. Id. (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not
request a hearing, and the Agency finds that he is in default. RFAA, at
3.\1\ ``A default, unless excused, shall be deemed to constitute a
waiver of the registrant's/applicant's right to a hearing and an
admission of the factual allegations of the [OSC].'' 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
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\1\ Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated July
7, 2025, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on Registrant was
adequate. The included declaration from a DEA Diversion Investigator
(DI) indicates that on April 4, 2025, the DI attempted to personally
serve Registrant at her residence but was unsuccessful. RFAAX 2, at
2. The following day, the DI received a phone call from Registrant's
attorney regarding a separate matter, and the attorney stated that
he would accept service on Registant's behalf. Id. On April 6, 2025,
the DI emailed a copy of the OSC to the attorney and the attorney
confirmed receipt on April 7, 2025. However, on May 21, 2025, the DI
was informed by the attorney that while he accepted service of the
OSC on behalf of Registrant, he never represented Registrant in this
administrative matter. Id. The DI then emailed Registrant a copy of
the OSC that same day, to which Registrant later responded stating,
``I have no idea what this means as I am not prescribing since my
suspension.'' Id. at 3. The DI responded stating the instructions
were included within the OSC documents but received no further
response from Registrant. Id.
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Further, ``[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be
in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action
with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In
such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order
pursuant to [21 CFR] 1316.67.'' Id. at 1301.43(f)(1). Here, regarding
both of Registrant's DEA registrations, the Government has requested
final agency action based on Registrant's default pursuant to 21 CFR
1301.43(c), (f), and 1301.46. RFAA, at 1; see also 21 CFR 1316.67.
Findings of Fact
The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the
factual allegations in the OSC are deemed to be admitted. According to
the OSC, on or about October 17, 2024, Registrant's Massachusetts
medical license was suspended. RFAAX 1, at 2. According to
Massachusetts online records, of which the Agency takes official
notice,\2\ Registrant's Massachusetts medical license remains
suspended. Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine License
Verification, <a href="https://findmydoctor.mass.gov/">https://findmydoctor.mass.gov/</a> (last visited date of
signature of this Order).
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\2\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ``may take
official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--even in the
final decision.'' United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979).
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Further, according to the OSC, on Decemeber 20, 2024, Registrant's
New Hampshire medical license was also suspended. Id. According to New
Hampshire online records, of which the Agency takes official notice,
Registrant's New Hampshire medical license remains suspended. New
Hampshire Online Licensing Person Search, <a href="https://forms.nh.gov/licenseverification/Search.aspx">https://forms.nh.gov/licenseverification/Search.aspx</a> (last visited date of signature of this
Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds that Registrant is not licensed
to practice medicine in Massachusetts or New Hampshire, the states in
which she is registered with DEA.\3\
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\3\ Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ``[w]hen an agency decision
rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the
evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to
an opportunity to show the contrary.'' The material fact here is
that Registrant, as of the date of this Order, is not licensed to
practice medicine in Massachusetts or New Hampshire. Accordingly,
Registrant may dispute the Agency's finding by filing a properly
supported motion for reconsideration of findings of fact within
fifteen calendar days of the date of this Order. Any such motion and
response shall be filed and served by email to the other party and
to the Office of the Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration,
at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#1f7b7a7e317e7b7b70317e6b6b706d717a666c5f7b7a7e31787069"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="1c78797d327d787873327d6868736e7279656f5c78797d327b736a">[email protected]</span></a>.
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[[Page 48379]]
Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 ``upon a
finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license or
registration suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State
authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . .
. dispensing of controlled substances.'' With respect to a
practitioner, DEA has also long held that the possession of authority
to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which
a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental
condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner's registration.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (``The Attorney General
can register a physician to dispense controlled substances `if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under
the laws of the State in which he practices.' . . . The very definition
of a `practitioner' eligible to prescribe includes physicians
`licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or
the jurisdiction in which he practices' to dispense controlled
substances. Sec. 802(21).''). The Agency has applied these principles
consistently. See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71371, 71372
(2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 F. App'x 826 (4th Cir. 2012);
Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR 27616, 27617 (1978).\4\
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\4\ This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA). First, Congress defined the term
``practitioner'' to mean ``a physician . . . or other person
licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by . . . the
jurisdiction in which he practices . . ., to distribute, dispense, .
. . [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of
professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration, Congress
directed that ``[t]he Attorney General shall register practitioners
. . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.'' 21
U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress has clearly mandated that a
practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a
practitioner under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation
of a practitioner's registration is the appropriate sanction
whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the state in which he practices. See,
e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR at 71371-72; Sheran Arden Yeates,
M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR
51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11919, 11920 (1988);
Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR at 27617.
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According to Massachusetts law, ``dispense'' means ``to deliver a
controlled substance to an ultimate user or . . . to the agent of an
ultimate user . . . by a practitioner or pursuant to the order of a
practitioner, including the prescribing and administering of a
controlled substance and the packaging, labeling, or compounding
necessary for such delivery.'' Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, Sec. 1 (2025).
Further, a ``practitioner'' is ``[a] physician . . . or other person
registered to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to,
or use in teaching or chemical analysis, a controlled substance in the
course of professional practice or research in the commonwealth.'' Id.
According to New Hampshire law, ``dispense'' means ``to distribute,
leave with, give away, dispose of, deliver, or sell one or more doses
of and shall include the transfer of more than a single dose of a
medication . . . '' and ``prescribe'' means ``order or designate a
remedy or any preparation containing controlled drugs.'' N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. Sec. 318-B:1 VIII, XXVII (2025). Further, a
``practitioner'' means ``any person who is lawfully entitled to
prescribe, administer, dispense or distribute controlled drugs to
patients'' and a ``prescription'' means ``an oral, written, or
facsimile or electronically transmitted order for any controlled drug
or preparation issued by a licensed practitioner to be compounded and
dispensed by a pharmacist and delivered to a patient for a medicinal or
therapeutic purpose arising from a practitioner-patient relationship.''
Id. Sec. 318-B:1 XXVI, XXVIII.
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant is
not currently licensed to practice medicine in either Massachusetts or
New Hampshire. As discussed above, an individual must be a licensed
practitioner to handle controlled substances in both Massachusetts and
New Hampshire. Thus, because Registrant lacks authority to practice
medicine in both Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and therefore, is not
authorized to handle controlled substances in either Massachusetts or
New Hampshire, Registrant is not eligible to maintain a DEA
registration in either jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Agency will order
that Registrant's respective DEA registration in each jurisdiction be
revoked.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificates of Registration Nos.
BN5595775 and FN5439016 issued to Chantal F. Nouvellon, D.O. Further,
pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
823(g)(1), I hereby deny any pending applications of Chantal F.
Nouvellon, D.O., to renew or modify these registrations, as well as any
other pending application of Chantal F. Nouvellon, D.O., for additional
registration in either Massachusetts or New Hampshire. This Order is
effective November 19, 2025.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
October 9, 2025, by Administrator Terrance Cole. That document with the
original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative
purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the
Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal Register Liaison Officer
has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic
format for publication, as an official document of DEA. This
administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this
document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2025-19600 Filed 10-17-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on October 20, 2025.
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