Notice2025-19597
James Orrington, II, D.D.S.; Decision and Order
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
October 20, 2025
Issuing agencies
Justice DepartmentDrug Enforcement Administration
Full Text
<html>
<head>
<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 200 (Monday, October 20, 2025)</title>
</head>
<body><pre>
[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 200 (Monday, October 20, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48379-48381]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-19597]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
James Orrington, II, D.D.S.; Decision and Order
On May 23, 2025, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to James Orrington, II,
D.D.S., of Chicago, Illinois (Registrant). Request for Final Agency
Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 1, at 1, 4. The OSC proposed the
revocation of Registrant's DEA Certificate of Registration, No.
BO7484811, alleging that Registrant is ``currently without authority to
. . . handle controlled substances in the State of Illinois, the state
in which [he is] registered with DEA.'' Id. at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(3)).
The OSC notified Registrant of his right to file a written request
for hearing, and that if he failed to file such a request, he would be
deemed to have waived his right to a hearing and be in default. Id. at
2-3 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not request a hearing
and the Agency finds that he is in default. RFAA, at 2-3.\1\ ``A
[[Page 48380]]
default, unless excused, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the
registrant's/applicant's right to a hearing and an admission of the
factual allegations of the [OSC].'' 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated
August 15, 2025, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on
Registrant was adequate. The included declaration from a DEA
Diversion Investigator (DI) indicates that on May 30, 2025, DI
unsuccessfully attempted to contact Registrant via phone to
coordinate service of the OSC. RFAAX 2, at 1. On June 4, 2025, DI
attempted to personally serve Registrant at his registered address,
but was also unsuccessful. Id. On June 9, 2025, DI mailed a copy of
the OSC to Registrant's registered address, which was not returned
as undeliverable. Id. Finally, on June 17, 2025, DI emailed a copy
of the OSC to Registrant via his registered email address. Id. at 2.
DI's email was not returned as undeliverable and Registrant never
responded. Id. The Agency has consistently held that when all other
forms of service have been attempted and found to be unsuccessful,
service by email that is not returned as undeliverable satisfies due
process requirements. See Mohammed S. Aljanaby, M.D., 82 FR 34552,
34552 (2017); Emilio Luna, M.D., 77 FR 4829, 4830 (2012); see also
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006) (due process requires
``notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections''). Accordingly, the
Agency finds that the Government's service of the OSC on Registrant
was adequate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, ``[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be
in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action
with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In
such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order
pursuant to [21 CFR] 1316.67.'' Id. at 1301.43(f)(1). Here, the
Government has requested final agency action based on Registrant's
default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c), (f), and 1301.46. RFAA, at 1;
see also 21 CFR 1316.67.
Findings of Fact
The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the
factual allegations in the OSC are deemed admitted. According to the
OSC, Registrant's Illinois dental and controlled substance licenses
were suspended on May 23, 2024. RFAAX 1, at 1-2; see also RFAAX 3, at
2. According to Illinois online records, of which the Agency takes
official notice,\2\ Registrant's Illinois licenses have a status of
``Suspended.'' Illinois DFPR License Search, <a href="https://online-dfpr.micropact.com/lookup/licenselookup.aspx">https://online-dfpr.micropact.com/lookup/licenselookup.aspx</a> (last visited date of
signature of this Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds that Registrant
is not licensed as a practitioner in Illinois, the state in which he is
registered with DEA.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ``may take
official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--even in the
final decision.'' United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979).
\3\ Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ``[w]hen an agency decision
rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the
evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to
an opportunity to show the contrary.'' The material fact here is
that Registrant, as of the date of this Order, is not licensed as a
dentist or otherwise authorized to handle controlled substances in
Illinois. Accordingly, Registrant may dispute the Agency's finding
by filing a properly supported motion for reconsideration of
findings of fact within fifteen calendar days of the date of this
Order. Any such motion and response shall be filed and served by
email to the other party and to the Office of the Administrator,
Drug Enforcement Administration, at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#157170743b7471717a3b7461617a677b706c66557170743b727a63"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="76121317581712121958170202190418130f053612131758111900">[email protected]</span></a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General may suspend
or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 ``upon a finding
that the registrant . . . has had his State license or registration
suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State authority and is
no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . . . dispensing of
controlled substances.'' With respect to a practitioner, DEA has also
long held that the possession of authority to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the state in which a practitioner engages
in professional practice is a fundamental condition for obtaining and
maintaining a practitioner's registration. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243, 270 (2006) (``The Attorney General can register a physician to
dispense controlled substances `if the applicant is authorized to
dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in
which he practices.' . . . The very definition of a `practitioner'
eligible to prescribe includes physicians `licensed, registered, or
otherwise permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which
he practices' to dispense controlled substances. [21 U.S.C.]
802(21).''). The Agency has applied these principles consistently. See,
e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71371, 71372 (2011), pet. for rev.
denied, 481 F. App'x 826 (4th Cir. 2012); Frederick Marsh Blanton,
M.D., 43 FR 27616, 27617 (1978).\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA). First, Congress defined the term
``practitioner'' to mean ``a physician . . . or other person
licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by . .. the
jurisdiction in which he practices . . ., to distribute, dispense, .
. . [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of
professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration, Congress
directed that ``[t]he Attorney General shall register practitioners
. . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.'' 21
U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress has clearly mandated that a
practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a
practitioner under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation
of a practitioner's registration is the appropriate sanction
whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the state in which he practices. See,
e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR at 71371-72; Sheran Arden Yeates,
M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR
51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11919, 11920 (1988);
Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR at 27617.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Illinois statute, ``dispense'' means ``to deliver a
controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject by or
pursuant to the lawful order of a prescriber, including the
prescribing, administering, packaging, labeling, or compounding
necessary to prepare the substance for that delivery.'' 720 ILCS 570/
102(p) (2025). Further, a ``practitioner'' means a ``dentist . . . or
other person licensed, registered, or otherwise lawfully permitted by .
. . [Illinois] to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect
to, [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of
professional practice or research.'' Id. at 570/102(kk).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant is
not a currently licensed practitioner in Illinois. As discussed above,
a dentist must be a licensed practitioner to dispense a controlled
substance in Illinois. Thus, because Registrant's dental and controlled
substance licenses are suspended in Illinois and, therefore, he is not
currently authorized to handle controlled substances in Illinois,
Registrant is not eligible to maintain a DEA registration in Illinois.
Accordingly, the Agency will order that Registrant's DEA registration
be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No.
BO7484811 issued to James Orrington, II, D.D.S. Further, pursuant to 28
CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I
hereby deny any pending applications of James Orrington, II, D.D.S., to
renew or modify this registration, as well as any other pending
application of James Orrington, II, D.D.S., for additional registration
in Illinois. This Order is effective November 19, 2025.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
October 9, 2025, by Administrator Terrance Cole. That document with the
original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative
purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the
Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal Register Liaison Officer
has been authorized to sign and submit the
[[Page 48381]]
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document
of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect
of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2025-19597 Filed 10-17-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>Indexed from Federal Register on October 20, 2025.
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.