Emergency Order Establishing Additional Requirements for Ensuring the Safe Operation of Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority Passenger Trains

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Published

October 6, 2025

Issuing agencies

Transportation DepartmentFederal Railroad Administration

Abstract

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) of the U.S. Department of Transportation has determined that public safety compels the issuance of an Emergency Order (Order) requiring the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) to take immediate action in accordance with this Order to abate the risk of fires and other thermal incidents, and resulting smoke and emergency situations, on SEPTA passenger trains, notably trains comprised of Silverliner IV electric multiple-unit locomotives (Silverliner IV EMUs). This Order establishes additional requirements that SEPTA must meet to continue the safe operation of its passenger trains and, specifically, Silverliner IV EMUs.

Full Text

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 191 (Monday, October 6, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 191 (Monday, October 6, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48120-48123]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-19467]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[Emergency Order No. 34, Notice No. 1; Docket No. FRA-2025-0885]

Emergency Order Establishing Additional Requirements for Ensuring
the Safe Operation of Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority Passenger Trains

SUMMARY: The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) of the U.S.
Department of Transportation has determined that public safety compels
the issuance of an Emergency Order (Order) requiring the Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) to take immediate action
in accordance with this Order to abate the risk of fires and other
thermal incidents, and resulting smoke and emergency situations, on
SEPTA passenger trains, notably trains comprised of Silverliner IV
electric multiple-unit locomotives (Silverliner IV EMUs). This Order
establishes additional requirements that SEPTA must meet to continue
the safe operation of its passenger trains and, specifically,
Silverliner IV EMUs.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary Fairbanks, Staff Director, Motive
Power & Equipment Division, FRA, telephone: (202) 230-9594, email:
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#deb9bfaca7f0b8bfb7acbcbfb0b5ad9ebab1aaf0b9b1a8">[email&#160;protected]</a>; or Elliott Gillooly, Attorney Adviser, Office
of the Chief Counsel, at (202) 897-8666, email:
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f1949d9d989e8585df96989d9d9e9e9d88b1959e85df969e87">[email&#160;protected]</a>; or Michael Masci, Attorney Adviser, Office of
the Chief Counsel, telephone: (202) 302-7177, email:
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e68b8f858e87838ac88b8795858fa6828992c8818990">[email&#160;protected]</a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Introduction

SEPTA provides commuter passenger railroad service in five counties
located in the southeastern portion of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Its system extends south of Wilmington, Delaware, and
Trenton, New Jersey, and serves a population of over 3.7 million
people. SEPTA operates 13 commuter rail lines, covering approximately
300 route miles (and approximately 450 track miles) over rights-of-way
owned by SEPTA, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak),
and CSX Transportation, Inc. In addition to sharing the railroad right-
of-way with freight and other passenger trains, SEPTA's commuter trains
operate in tunnels and over viaducts and bridges. All of SEPTA's
commuter trains are electrified, typically made up of EMU equipment,
and draw electrical current from an overhead catenary system.
In 2025, there have been five instances of Silverliner IV EMUs in
commuter service on SEPTA's system catching fire or otherwise
experiencing an emergency situation from a thermal event such as an
electrical component overheating and associated smoke. Year to date,
these incidents occurred as follows:
<bullet> February 6, 2025: Car #132 caught fire as it departed Crum
Lynne Station in a southbound train on the Wilmington/Newark Line,
resulting in the evacuation of the train's approximately 325 passengers
directly onto the ballasted right-of-way and the total loss of the car.
<bullet> June 3, 2025: Car #442 was found to be emitting smoke from
its roof at Levittown Station, while operating in a westbound train on
the Trenton Line, resulting in the train's evacuation at the station.
<bullet> July 22, 2025: Car #114 caught fire at Paoli Station,
while operating in an eastbound train on the Paoli/Thorndale Line,
resulting in the total loss of the car and the train's evacuation at
the station. One crewmember and one firefighter were injured.
<bullet> September 23, 2025: Car #442 experienced a thermal event
in the vicinity of Fort Washington Station, while operating in a train
on the Lansdown/Doylestown Line, resulting in the train's evacuation at
the station. This was the same car involved in the incident on June 3,
2025, and involved the same cause, discussed further below.
<bullet> September 25, 2025: Car #396 experienced a thermal event
in the vicinity of Gravers Station, while operating in a train on the
Chestnut Hill East Line, resulting in the train's evacuation at the
station.
As provided below, FRA has determined that public safety compels
the issuance of this Order requiring SEPTA to take certain immediate
actions to abate the risk of additional fires and other thermal
incidents and implement steps to ensure the safe operation of its
passenger trains consistent with Federal railroad safety requirements,
namely 49 U.S.C. ch. 207 and 49 CFR parts 229 and 238. This Order does
not require SEPTA to discontinue operation of Silverline IV EMUs at
this time, except to the extent cars shall be removed from service in
order to comply with the emergency mechanical inspection required by
this Order.

Authority

Authority to enforce Federal railroad safety laws has been
delegated by the U.S. Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to the
Administrator of FRA. 49 U.S.C. 103; 49 CFR 1.89(e). Railroads

[[Page 48121]]

are subject to FRA's safety jurisdiction under the Federal railroad
safety laws. 49 U.S.C. 20101, 20103. FRA is authorized to issue
emergency orders where ``an unsafe condition or practice, or a
combination of unsafe conditions and practices, causes an emergency
situation involving a hazard of death, personal injury, or significant
harm to the environment.'' 49 U.S.C. 20104. Emergency orders may
immediately impose ``restrictions and prohibitions . . . that may be
necessary to abate the situation.'' Id.

Background

Silverliner IV EMUs and Passenger Train Safety Requirements

SEPTA operates approximately 225 Silverliner IV EMUs, which SEPTA
acquired from General Electric between 1974 and 1976. EMUs are both
locomotives and passenger cars, self-propelled by electric motors and
also designed to be occupied by passengers. Accordingly, EMUs are
subject to the requirements of the Locomotive Inspection Act (49 U.S.C.
ch. 207), FRA's Locomotive Safety Standards (49 CFR part 229), and
FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards (49 CFR part 238). EMUs may
operate individually but typically operate semi-permanently coupled
together as a pair or triplet from a control cab. During peak commuting
hours, multiple pairs or triplets of EMUs, or a combination of both,
are typically operated together as a single passenger train, without a
conventional locomotive as a primary means of motive power.
EMUs are subject to an inspection cycle under FRA's Locomotive
Safety Standards (49 CFR part 229), including a daily inspection (Sec.
229.21), a 33-day inspection (Sec. 229.23), and a 92-day inspection
(Sec. 229.23).
Locomotives that develop defects en route, such as EMUs with
traction motor malfunctions, are non-compliant for passenger service.
Such locomotives may be used in repair service.\1\ Specifically, while
utilizing its propelling motors, such a locomotive is permitted to move
only until the earlier of: (1) the next calendar day inspection, or (2)
the nearest forward point where the repairs necessary to bring it into
compliance can be made, but only if a qualified person determines that
it is safe to move the locomotive and the maximum speed and other
restrictions necessary for safely conducting the movement and other
conditions are met. Critically, when the locomotive is using its
propelling motors, a railroad must repair the defective condition no
later than the next day it is subject to a daily inspection, before
being placed in service.
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\1\ Section 229.9 permits using a locomotive for the purpose of
repairs if a qualified person determines that it can be moved safely
with any necessary restrictions and a tag is properly prepared and
shared.
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Under FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, an EMU must also
receive a daily exterior mechanical inspection as passenger equipment
(49 CFR 238.303) and a daily interior mechanical inspection as a
passenger car (Sec. 238.305), in addition to undergoing periodic
mechanical inspection (Sec. 238.307) and other inspection and
maintenance requirements. These requirements cover electrical
components. Each passenger railroad must also have an inspection,
testing, and maintenance (ITM) plan that establishes inspection
procedures, intervals, and criteria for the passenger equipment it
operates (Sec. 238.107), and it must have developed and adopted a
training, qualification, and designation program for its employees and
contractors that perform any of the required inspections, tests, or
maintenance (Sec. 238.109).

Factors Contributing to Fires and Other Thermal Incidents and SEPTA's
Response

While the investigation remains ongoing into the causes of these
Silverliner IV EMU fires and thermal incidents, SEPTA has identified
many of the factors that have allowed five serious incidents of a
similar nature over a short period of time. SEPTA met with FRA and
representatives of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on
August 8, 2025, to address thermal incidents since February 2025.\2\
FRA requested SEPTA submit an overview of SEPTA's rolling stock,
background on the thermal incidents and fires, and a mitigation plan to
address the issues and contributing factors identified by FRA and SEPTA
as direct or contributing causes. SEPTA submitted a written response to
FRA's request on August 22, 2025.
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\2\ This meeting followed prior meetings with FRA, in addition
to individual FRA Motive Power & Equipment and Operating Practices
division inspections.
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SEPTA's response focused on the three incidents it identified up to
that date as requiring the evacuation of passengers. Those incidents
occurred on February 26, June 3, and July 22, 2025. SEPTA determined
that the root cause of the fire on February 26 was an arc between
traction motor wires, though the reason for the insulation breakdown
has not been determined.\3\ SEPTA determined that the root cause of the
incident on June 3 was a stuck pilot motor in dynamic brake mode, which
caused a rooftop brake resistor to overheat and adjoining fiberglass
air duct to overheat and emit smoke. However, SEPTA had not determined
the root cause of the July 22, 2025 fire, as of its August 22, 2025
submission to FRA.\4\
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\3\ NTSB is investigating this incident and will officially
determine its probable cause.
\4\ The fire originated under the car and remains under
investigation by NTSB and FRA.
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SEPTA outlined a mitigation plan that included identification and
removal of vehicles from service as soon as precursor events are
identified; improving operational responses to failures and thermal
events to reduce risk to passengers, the crew, and the equipment;
determining the root cause of recent thermal events; and evaluating
equipment to identify any deficiencies that could contribute to a
thermal event. SEPTA's mitigation plan also included action items for
relevant departments within SEPTA as well as action timelines,
including immediate actions, short-term actions, and long-term actions.
In addition, SEPTA submitted to FRA evidence of notices it has
distributed to its employees, highlighting policies and procedures that
employees are required to implement to mitigate the risk of future
fires and other thermal incidents. FRA finds that SEPTA's proposed
mitigation plan identifies many of the problems faced by the railroad.
Nonetheless, after SEPTA's proposed strategies to address the
identified needs, two more incidents occurred in one week in September
2025.
These two most recent incidents point to failures in the
implementation of SEPTA's proposed mitigation plan, or the inadequacy
of the mitigation plan itself, or both, and highlight additional
concerns that SEPTA must address. The very same car that experienced a
thermal event on June 3, 2025 (Car #442) experienced another thermal
event on September 23, 2025. Based on preliminary information available
to FRA, this car was evacuated on September 23 because an incorrect
replacement part was installed after the June 3 incident.
The most recent Silverliner IV EMU thermal incident, on September
25, 2025, further demonstrates that SEPTA's efforts to mitigate fire
safety risks are inadequate. Car #396 was evacuated following a
traction motor fire. FRA investigators have found that multiple SEPTA
train crews failed to report and

[[Page 48122]]

respond to a known defect, as required under 49 CFR 229.9 and 238.17,
when they observed a tractor motor indicator light signifying a
detected problem. Based on information available to FRA, the indicator
light was first visible on September 24, the day before the incident,
and train crews failed to report the defect. Overnight, when the car
was inspected by SEPTA's mechanical department personnel, the light
remained visible, yet the issue causing the indicator light to activate
was not addressed. The next day, the crew on duty also failed to take
any action to report or address the indicator light, and the traction
motor subsequently caught fire while the car was in service.
Fortunately, the train's passengers were safely evacuated at the
station, but this and other incidents could have necessitated passenger
evacuation directly onto the railroad right-of-way, as experienced on
February 6, 2025, and under even less favorable or secure
circumstances, such as in a tunnel or on an elevated structure, which
present greater challenges for evacuation and rescue.
This September 25 incident was clearly preventable and, most
concerning to FRA, it points to a potentially larger problem of SEPTA
personnel showing disregard for the serious risks posed by defects on
Silverliner IV EMUs, despite ample evidence that particular care is
needed to inspect and maintain older equipment. SEPTA ultimately has
responsibility for the safety of the passenger equipment on its system,
and SEPTA's management is responsible for ensuring and overseeing
proper repairs and inspections by a workforce it equips, trains, and
supervises.

Finding and Order

Despite SEPTA's remedial actions to date, the recurrence of serious
fires and other thermal events on Silverliner IV EMUs, as well as the
gravity of the hazards presented, including cars destroyed by fire,
passenger evacuations, and injuries to a crewmember and a firefighter
this year, poses an imminent threat to safety, including the threat of
serious harm to SEPTA's passengers, SEPTA's trains crews and other
personnel, and emergency responders. FRA has concluded that SEPTA's
maintenance and operation of its passenger rail equipment requires
additional oversight and corrective action. The pattern of failures
persuades FRA that reliance alone upon the prior assurances and
cooperation of SEPTA is not possible, nor in the interest of public
safety. Therefore, as the Acting Administrator of FRA, I find that the
unsafe conditions, as well as the practices discussed above, create an
emergency situation involving a hazard of death or injury to persons.
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. 20104,
delegated to me by the Secretary, it is ordered that SEPTA must
immediately ensure that each train crew is provided and follows
procedures specifying actions the crew shall take to identify and
report any equipment defect or failure on a train the crew is operating
in service (including, but not limited to, a propulsion system/traction
motor fault indication light). The procedures shall require each train
crew to provide notification to SEPTA's mechanical department, and
SEPTA's mechanical department must obtain sufficient information from
the crew when any defect or failure is reported, to determine if the
car should be immediately removed from service. SEPTA shall remove any
car from service in case of doubt. SEPTA must also immediately complete
a stand-down with all mechanical and transportation department
employees, including an explanation of the requirements of this Order
and delivery of a written notice in person to each employee that
provides the dates, locations, and consequences of the five fires and
thermal incidents that have occurred in 2025.
It is further ordered that SEPTA shall take the following actions
no later than seven calendar (7) days after the date of this Order,
unless otherwise specified.
1. Develop a plan to determine the direct and contributing causes
of each fire or thermal incident that has occurred in 2025 and identify
the root causes, circumstances, personnel, funding, or other conditions
that have caused the fires and thermal incidents to occur in this
period. SEPTA shall implement this plan and provide FRA with a written
report of its findings no later than October 30, 2025.
2. Prepare and submit to FRA for approval an emergency mechanical
inspection schedule of each Silverliner IV EMU. The schedule shall
require that each Silverliner IV EMU in SEPTA's fleet be removed from
service to complete a comprehensive inspection including, but not
limited to, high-voltage control systems, propulsion system, and
dynamic brake system, HVAC system, components and elements of safety
and warning systems, high- and low-voltage cables, harnesses and
connectors, and the condition of terminals and lugs, as well as any
associated peripheral systems. The schedule shall prioritize cars into
a number of groups and remove the first group from service no later
than the date the emergency mechanical inspection schedule is submitted
to FRA. The scheduled inspections shall be completed within 30 calendar
days of the date of this Order.
3. Review its inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM) plan
required under Sec. 238.107 and submit the plan to FRA with proposed
amendments sufficient to ensure that mechanical failures of the type
leading to fires or thermal incidents will be detected and repaired.
4. Update, as needed, SEPTA Supplemental Division Notice Number 7-
20C and any other relevant operating rule to implement the requirements
of this Order.
5. Require by issuance of a written notice to train crews that
every engineer report any sluggish or poor performance of braking or
acceleration or any anomalous vehicle behavior to the dispatcher within
5 minutes of the event.
6. Complete a stand-down and debriefing with every mechanical
employee involved with the inspection, troubleshooting, maintenance, or
repair of Silverliner IV EMUs to include review of all fire and thermal
incidents, the known direct and indirect causes, and to solicit
feedback from the employees to identify improvements that SEPTA can
make in its maintenance programs and practices.
7. Conduct random quality audits of the performance of the
mechanical department's completion of repair and maintenance work
items. Audits must occur every day and cover more than one shift each
day.
It is further ordered that within 30 days of this Order, SEPTA must
take the following actions:
8. Complete all actions under the emergency mechanical inspection
schedule that has been approved by FRA, including inspection of all
Silverliner IV EMUs for precursor conditions that increase the
likelihood of a fire or thermal incident.
9. Install thermal protection circuits at all critical locations on
every Silverliner IV EMU to shut down propulsion and auxiliary circuits
if higher than normal operating temperatures are detected.
10. Document all inspections and repairs made to the Silverliner IV
EMU fleet and present a graphical depiction of significant defects
identified to the employees performing the work to clearly show to the
employees leading and trailing indicators.
11. Review all technical documents such as repair procedures, part
lists, bills of materials, maintenance and modification instructions,
tooling, and

[[Page 48123]]

inventory requirements, and revise as needed to ensure all are up to
date.
12. Ensure that the mechanical department reviews and updates
employee training requirements and proficiency tests to address any
deficiency identified in the implementation of this Order.
13. Complete, or cause to be completed, a comprehensive update of
all root cause analyses begun in response to fire or thermal incidents
and develop a corrective action plan to prevent their recurrence and
implement continuous monitoring of mechanical systems performance.
14. Comply with all requirements of the revised ITM plan submitted
to and approved by FRA.
I direct that a copy of this Order be posted in a public location
at the railroad's offices and a copy of the Order be provided to each
employee of the railroad within 24 hours of the date of issuance. FRA
investigation of SEPTA is ongoing, and FRA may take further steps to
assure public safety. These steps may include additional notice(s)
under this Order, civil penalties against SEPTA (individuals may be
liable for civil penalties for willful violations of the Federal
railroad safety laws and regulations); or disqualification of
individuals from performing safety-sensitive functions.

Relief

SEPTA may only obtain full relief from this Order by obtaining
approval from FRA that it has met one of the following conditions:
I. Document and certify completion of all the above actions
required by this Order within the timeframes provided. If any action
required by this Order is inconsistent with optimal safety under
particular operating conditions or if any action is not possible for
reasons outside of SEPTA's control, SEPTA may document why the
particular action should not be required in lieu of completing that
action when requesting relief from this Order. FRA will determine in
its discretion if justification for not completing a required action,
in conjunction with documentation of completed actions, is sufficient
to approve SEPTA's request for relief.
OR
II. Remove Silverliner IV EMUs from service.
SEPTA shall submit all required information and certifications to
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#83c5d1c2d1d1d0ced3c6c3e7ecf7ade4ecf5">[email&#160;protected]</a> and inform the Acting FRA Administrator in writing
when it believes all of the requirements of this Order have been met.
SEPTA must specifically obtain approval from the Acting FRA
Administrator that it has either met all conditions of this Order, or
certify that it has removed the Silverliner IV EMUs from service. FRA
will conduct verification inspections and will inform SEPTA in writing
if it finds SEPTA is not in compliance with this Order. If FRA does not
lift the Order in response to SEPTA's request for relief, FRA's written
response will specifically describe what additional measures need to be
taken to meet all the requirements of this Order.

Partial Relief

For FRA to consider granting partial relief from this Order, SEPTA
must submit a written plan for approval to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#99dfcbd8cbcbcad4c9dcd9fdf6edb7fef6ef">[email&#160;protected]</a> that
provides a detailed explanation of the partial relief sought, the
specific measures that SEPTA proposes to ensure the safety of any
operations to be permitted, and the period of time for which such
partial relief is sought.
Any partial relief provided will remain subject to SEPTA's
compliance with its approved written plan to provide safety measures,
limitations on operations, and time periods for each component part of
the partial relief. Failure to comply with any material provision of
the approved plan will result in the partial relief being revoked.

Penalties

Any violation of this Order or the terms of any approved written
plan pursuant to this Order subjects the person (railroad carrier)
committing the violation to a civil penalty of up to $36,439 for
ordinary violations and $145,754 for aggravated violations for each day
the violation continues. 49 U.S.C. 21301; 88 FR 89551 (Dec. 30, 2024).
Any individual (railroad personnel) who willfully violates a provision
stated in this Order is subject to civil penalties under 49 U.S.C.
21301. In addition, such an individual (railroad personnel) whose
violation of this Order demonstrates the individual's unfitness for
safety-sensitive service may be removed from safety-sensitive service
on the railroad under 49 U.S.C. 20111.
If appropriate, FRA may pursue criminal penalties under 49 U.S.C.
522(a) and 49 U.S.C. 21311(a), as well as 18 U.S.C. 1001, for the
knowing and willful falsification of a report required by this Order.
FRA may, through the Attorney General, also seek injunctive relief to
enforce this Order. 49 U.S.C. 20112.

Effective Date and Notice to Affected Persons

This Order takes effect at 12:01 a.m., EDT, on October 2, 2025, and
applies to all employees and agents of SEPTA and all operations and
equipment on SEPTA's system. Notice of this Order will be provided by
publishing it in the Federal Register. Copies of this Order will be
sent by email prior to publication to Scott Sauer, General Manager,
SEPTA, at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#93e0e0f2e6f6e1d3e0f6e3e7f2bdfce1f4">[email&#160;protected]</a>.

Review

Opportunity for formal review of this Order will be provided in
accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20104(b) and 5 U.S.C. 554. Administrative
procedures governing such review are found at 49 CFR part 211. See 49
CFR 211.47, 211.71, 211.73, 211.75, and 211.77.

Issued in Washington, DC, on October 1, 2025.
Robert Andrew Feeley,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2025-19467 Filed 10-3-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P

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