Notice2025-17815
Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Securities Clearing Corporation; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change To Amend the CNS Fails Charge in the NSCC Rules
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Published
September 16, 2025
Issuing agencies
Securities and Exchange Commission
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 177 (Tuesday, September 16, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 177 (Tuesday, September 16, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 44735-44739]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-17815]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-103952; File No. SR-NSCC-2025-013]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Securities Clearing
Corporation; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change To Amend the CNS
Fails Charge in the NSCC Rules
September 11, 2025.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that
on September 5, 2025, National Securities Clearing Corporation
(``NSCC'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II
and III below, which Items have been prepared by the clearing agency.
The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the
proposed rule change from interested persons.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the
Proposed Rule Change
The proposed rule change consists of amendments to provisions in
the NSCC Rules & Procedures (``Rules'') regarding the margin charge
that is applied when a Member fails to settle a Short Position or a
Long Position by the applicable settlement date (``CNS Fails
Charge'').\3\ Specifically, the proposed changes would (i) discontinue
the application of the CNS Fails Charge on Long Positions (i.e., fails
to receive), (ii) eliminate the
[[Page 44736]]
Credit Risk Rating Matrix (``CRRM'') \4\ from the calculation, and
(iii) assess the charge based on the duration that the failed Short
Positions remains outstanding.\5\
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\3\ The CNS Fails Charge is currently imposed by NSCC pursuant
to Procedure XV (Clearing Fund Formula and Other Matters), Section
I.(A)(1)(d). Id.
\4\ The CRRM is a credit risk rating model NSCC utilizes to
evaluate and rate the credit risk of NSCC's U.S. bank, foreign bank,
and U.S. broker-dealer Members, and rate such Members based upon
qualitative and quantitative information. See definition of Credit
Risk Rating Matrix in Rule 1 (Definitions and Descriptions), infra
note 5.
\5\ Terms not defined herein are defined in the Rules, available
at <a href="http://www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures">www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures</a>.
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II. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis
for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the clearing agency included
statements concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule
change and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule
change. The text of these statements may be examined at the places
specified in Item IV below. The clearing agency has prepared summaries,
set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant
aspects of such statements.
(A) Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis
for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The proposed rule change would amend provisions in the Rules
regarding the CNS Fails Charge. Specifically, the proposed changes
would (i) discontinue the application of the CNS Fails Charge on Long
Positions (i.e., fails to receive), (ii) eliminate the CRRM from the
calculation, and (iii) assess the charge based on the duration that the
failed Short Positions remains outstanding.
(i) Overview of the Required Fund Deposit and the CNS Fails Charge
As part of its market risk management strategy, NSCC manages its
credit exposure to Members by calculating the appropriate Required Fund
Deposits to the Clearing Fund and monitoring the Clearing Fund's
sufficiency, as provided for in the Rules.\6\ The Required Fund Deposit
serves as each Member's margin.
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\6\ See Rule 4 (Clearing Fund) and Procedure XV, supra note 5.
NSCC's market risk management strategy is designed to comply with
Rule 17ad-22(e)(4) under the Act, where these risks are referred to
as ``credit risks.'' 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(4).
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The objective of an NSCC Member's deposit is to mitigate potential
losses to NSCC associated with a default by an NSCC Member. Each NSCC
Member's Required Fund Deposit is comprised of several risk-based
component charges, including the CNS Fails Charge, which is calculated
and assessed daily. The aggregate of all Members' Required Fund
Deposits constitutes the Clearing Fund of NSCC. NSCC would access its
Clearing Fund should a defaulting Member's own Required Fund Deposit be
insufficient to satisfy losses to NSCC caused by the liquidation of
that Member's portfolio. The Clearing Fund reduces the risk that NSCC
would need to mutualize any losses among non-defaulting members during
the liquidation process.
When a Member does not either deliver a Short Position or receive a
Long Position due by the applicable Settlement Date, NSCC, as a central
counterparty, is exposed to credit and market risks. To offset the risk
exposures to NSCC and to incentivize Members to satisfy their
obligations relating to their outstanding trades on Settlement Date,
NSCC currently calculates and collects the CNS Fails Charge from
Members with Short Positions and Long Positions that did not settle on
the Settlement Date (``CNS Fails Positions''). The amount of the CNS
Fails Charge imposed on a Member varies based on the Member's credit
rating derived from the CRRM.
The CNS Fails Charge is calculated by multiplying the Current
Market Value for such Member's aggregate CNS Fails Positions by a
percentage. For a Member that is not rated on the CRRM and for a Member
that is rated 1 through 4 on the CRRM, the CNS Fails Charge is 5% of
the Member's aggregate CNS Fails Positions. For a Member that is rated
5 or 6 on the CRRM, the CNS Fails Charge is 10% of the Member's
aggregate CNS Fails Positions. For a Member that is rated 7 on the
CRRM, the CNS Fails Charge is 20% of the Member's aggregate CNS Fails
Positions.
(ii) Proposed Changes to the CNS Fails Charge
NSCC regularly assesses its margining methodologies to evaluate
whether margin levels are commensurate with the particular risk
attributes of each relevant product, portfolio, and market. In
connection with such reviews, NSCC is proposing to enhance the CNS
Fails Charge by (a) discontinuing the application of the CNS Fails
Charge on Long Positions, (b) eliminating the CRRM from the
calculation, and (c) assessing the charge based on the duration that
the Short Position has been failing to be delivered as discussed below.
(a) Discontinue CNS Fails Charge on Long Positions
NSCC's Continuous Net Settlement System (``CNS'') is an automated
accounting and securities settlement system that centralizes and nets
the settlement of compared and recorded securities transactions and
maintains an orderly flow of security and money balances.\7\ Within
CNS, all eligible compared and recorded transactions for a particular
Settlement Date are netted by issue into one position per Member. The
position can be a net Long Position (receive), net Short Position
(deliver) or flat. As a continuous net system, those positions are
further netted with positions of the same CNS Security that remain open
after their original scheduled settlement date (usually one business
day after the trade date or T+1), so that transactions scheduled to
settle on any day are netted with CNS Fails Positions (i.e., positions
that have failed in delivery or receipt on the Settlement Date), which
results in a single deliver or receive obligation for each Member for
each CNS Security in which the Member has activity.
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\7\ See NSCC Rule 11 (CNS System) and Procedure VII (CNS
Accounting Operation), supra note 5.
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CNS is a net flat system and allocates shares received via an
algorithm to those who are set to receive. CNS can only allocate shares
if a Member with a Short Position makes the delivery into CNS on the
Settlement Date. Members have limited control \8\ on whether they will
receive shares from CNS if the corresponding Members set to deliver do
not deliver shares in their entirety to CNS. Given this limited ability
to control if they are allocated shares that they are set to receive,
NSCC believes it is not appropriate to assess a CNS Fails Charge on
Members who fail to receive an allocation from CNS for a Long Position.
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\8\ NSCC provides a ``Buy-In'' process which enables receiving
Members to (i) submit a Buy-In Intent and receive priority on
allocation of receipt of securities and (ii) allow Members that have
failed to receive securities by settlement date the ability to
purchase the securities in the market to cover their fails position.
See Section J of Procedure VII and Procedure X (Execution of Buy-
Ins), supra note 5.
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In addition, CNS Fails Positions, including Long Positions where
the Member failed to receive, are currently subject to NSCC's normal
risk margining procedures and risk associated with these positions is
accounted for in the existing risk calculations. Fail positions are re-
netted into Members' unsettled guaranteed portfolios, which is subject
to NSCC's full margin methodology. The CNS Fails Charge, while part of
that methodology, is an additive charge on
[[Page 44737]]
top of the model-based components and any Market-to-Market collected.
As part of its ongoing review of risk management programs--and in
conjunction with other proposed changes to the CNS Fails Charge
outlined below--NSCC is proposing to eliminate the application of the
CNS Fails Charge on failed Long Positions.
(b) Eliminate CRRM From CNS Fails Charge Calculation
The CNS Fails Charge is currently calculated using a percentage
based on each Member's CRRM rating. The risk posed from the fail to
deliver is specific to the individual position that is failing, and
NSCC believes that a better measure of the risk related to the CNS
Fails Position is how long the position has been outstanding. As the
risk posed by the failed position is less influenced by the Member that
failed to make delivery, NSCC believes that the CNS Fails Charge should
not be scaled to Member specific criteria such as CRRM and is therefore
proposing to eliminate CRRM from the CNS Fails Charge calculation and
replacing it with a charge based on the length of time that the CNS
Fails Position remains outstanding.
(c) Assess Charge Based on Length Outstanding
While any position specific risk from a failed position is
addressed by NSCC's existing margin methodology, a position for which a
Member has been failing to deliver for an extended period may be
indicative of additional risk associated with the position. To
encourage timely delivery of settlement obligations and address this
additional risk, NSCC is proposing to assess the CNS Fails Charge using
a percentage ranging from 5% to 100% based on the length of time a
Member has been failing to deliver a position. The percentages
initially will be (i) 5% for CNS Fails Positions that have remained
outstanding 1 to 4 Business Days, (ii) 15% for CNS Fails Positions that
have remained outstanding 5 to 10 Business Days, (iii) 20% for CNS
Fails Positions that have remained outstanding 11 to 20 Business Days,
and (iv) 100% for CNS Fails Positions that have remained outstanding
longer than 20 Business Days. If a Member delivers a position for a CNS
Fails Position in the night cycle following the applicable settlement
date, NSCC will account for the delivery amount and offset the failed
quantity by the quantity delivered in the night cycle. Additionally, if
a Member's start of day position in a CUSIP that failed to be delivered
the prior settlement date is net long for the portion of that position
settling on the current business date, a fails charge will not be
assessed.
The proposed percentages are designed to provide a mechanism to
reduce fails and protect NSCC from potentially incurring higher costs
in sourcing the CNS Fails Positions in a Member default event, where
the haircut applied increases the longer the CNS Fails Position remains
outstanding. NSCC determined the proposed percentages by using the
existing haircut range of 5-20% for the current CNS Fails Charge as a
baseline for charges under the new proposal. NSCC then escalated the
charge to 100% for fails aged over 20 Business Days, which is grounded
in both risk sensitivity and behavioral incentives. NSCC determined
that the risk associated with a failed position increases the longer it
remains unsettled. While short-term fails may reflect operational
delays, extended fails, especially those exceeding 20 Business Days,
might signal a reduced or impaired market liquidity that increases
market price risk to NSCC. The proposed 100% charge is intended to
reflect this elevated risk exposure and ensure NSCC is adequately
protected. By escalating the charge to 100% after 20 Business Days,
NSCC aims to discourage prolonged settlement failures and promote
market discipline.
In connection with its regular assessment of its margining
methodologies, NSCC would review the CNS Fails Charge haircut
percentages to determine the effects on the Members and whether the
percentages continue to be adequate.
NSCC will post the applicable percentages for CNS Fails Positions
on its website and provide reports to Members detailing their open
positions, including their CNS Fails Positions and associated CNS Fails
Charges for each.
(iii) Detailed Description of the Proposed Rule Changes
NSCC is proposing to revise the definition of CNS Fails Position in
Rule 1 to remove Long Position.
NSCC is also proposing to amend Procedure XV, Section I.(A)(1)(d)
to remove the references to CRRM and provide that Members would be
charged percentages for CNS Fails Position ranging from 5% to 100%
based on the number of Business Days that the CNS Fails Positions have
remained outstanding. The proposed changes would provide that NSCC
shall post the applicable percentages on the NSCC website, and the
percentages may be updated from time to time as announced by Important
Notice.
(iv) Member Impact of Proposed Changes
NSCC conducted an impact study of the proposed changes based on
data from January 2, 2024 through April 30, 2025 (``Impact Study'').
The Impact Study indicated that if the proposed changes had been in
place during the Impact Study period, the proposed changes would have
led to an aggregate reduction in CNS Fails Charges by approximately
56.1% or $238.5 million. This reduction was primarily due to the
removal of the charge on Long Positions. NSCC observed a charge
decrease of 16.9%, or $35.6 million, in failure to deliver positions
during the Impact Study. This was primarily due to increases in the CNS
Fails Charge on older CNS Fails Positions which offset the reduction in
charge on positions failing for only a few days. The Impact Study also
revealed that NSCC level backtest coverage remained above 99%, and no
Member level coverage fell below 99%, with the proposed changes.
The Impact Study indicated that the largest increase in CNS Fails
Charges for any Member would have been $12.7 million on average, and
the largest decrease in CNS Fails Charges for any Member would have
been $41.1 million on average had the proposed changes been in place
during the Impact Study period.
(v) Implementation Timeframe
NSCC would implement the proposed rule changes by no later than 60
Business Days after the approval of the proposed rule change by the
Commission. NSCC would announce the effective date of the proposed
changes by an Important Notice posted to its website.
2. Statutory Basis
NSCC believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with the
requirements of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder
applicable to a registered clearing agency. Specifically, NSCC believes
that the proposed rule change is consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F)
of the Act \9\ and Rules 17ad-22(e)(4) and (e)(6)(i),\10\ each as
promulgated under the Act, for the reasons described below.
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\9\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
\10\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(4) and (e)(6)(i).
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Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act requires that the Rules be designed
to promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of
securities transactions and to assure the safeguarding of securities
and funds which are in the custody or control of
[[Page 44738]]
NSCC or for which it is responsible.\11\ The proposed rule changes to
modify the assessment and collection of the CNS Fails Charge would
enable NSCC to more appropriately and accurately calculate a CNS Fails
Charge based on the risk failed positions pose to NSCC. First, the
proposed changes would provide a more appropriate and effective
incentive for Members to limit outstanding fails positions. The removal
of the charge on Long Positions is appropriate as Members have limited
control on whether they will receive shares from CNS if the
corresponding Members do not deliver their shares in their entirety to
CNS, and risk associated with these positions is adequately accounted
for in the existing risk calculations. In addition, providing an
increasing CNS Fails Charge based on how long the CNS Fails Position
has been outstanding would provide a greater incentive to Members to
deliver on aged CNS Fails Positions. Second, the proposed changes would
provide for a charge that more accurately reflects the risk of the CNS
Fails Positions. Replacing the CRRM criteria with percentages based on
the age of the CNS Fails Positions would lead to a more accurate
calculation of the CNS Fails Charge because the risk associated with
the fail to deliver is specific to the individual position that is
failing. Therefore, a better measure of the risk related to the CNS
Fails Position is the duration the position has been outstanding,
rather than a Member's CRRM rating that failed to deliver the position
into CNS. More accurately and effectively mitigating NSCC's risk
exposure from CNS Fails Positions would promote the prompt and accurate
clearance and settlement of securities transactions, consistent with
Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act.
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\11\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
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Rule 17ad-22(e)(4) under the Act requires NSCC to establish,
implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures
reasonably designed to effectively identify, measure, monitor and
manage its credit exposures to participants and those exposures arising
from its payment, clearing and settlement processes.\12\ The CNS Fails
Charge is being imposed on Members with CNS Fails Positions in order to
reduce credit exposures to NSCC resulting from those positions. As
proposed, it is designed to obtain from such Members financial
resources commensurate with the credit exposures posed to NSCC by such
Member's CNS Fails Positions. The proposed changes would result in a
more appropriate and accurate assessment and calculation of CNS Fails
positions based on the risk exposure to NSCC. Removing the charge for
Long Positions is appropriate as Members have limited control on the
ability to receive and risk associated with these positions is
adequately accounted for in the existing risk calculations. Replacing
the CRRM criteria with percentages based on the age of the CNS Fails
Positions would lead to a more accurate calculation of the CNS Fails
Charge because the risk associated with the fail to deliver is specific
to the individual position that is failing. A better measure of the
risk related to the CNS Fails Position is the duration the position has
been outstanding, rather than a Member's CRRM rating that failed to
deliver the position into CNS. Therefore, NSCC believes that management
of its credit exposures to its Members through a more appropriate and
accurate CNS Fails Charge is consistent with Rule 17ad-22(e)(4) under
the Act.
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\12\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(4).
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Rule 17ad-22(e)(6)(i) under the Act requires NSCC to establish,
implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures
reasonably designed to cover its credit exposures to its Members by
establishing a risk-based margin system that, at a minimum, considers,
and produces margin levels commensurate with, the risks and particular
attributes of each relevant product, portfolio and market.\13\ When
applicable, the CNS Fails Charge is a component of a Member's Required
Fund Deposit and is designed to cover NSCC's credit exposures to
Members with CNS Fails Positions. As described above, the CNS Fails
Charge would be determined based on the amount of time that a fails
position remains outstanding which would be more commensurate with the
risk of such positions and provide a greater incentive to timely
deliver settlement obligations. Therefore, NSCC believes the coverage
of its credit exposures to its Members through the CNS Fails Charge is
consistent with Rule 17ad-22(e)(6)(i) under the Act.
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\13\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(6)(i).
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(B) Clearing Agency's Statement on Burden on Competition
NSCC believes that the proposed rule change could have an impact on
competition. The proposed rule change could burden competition because
it could result in increased margin charges for certain Members and a
decrease for others depending on their individual portfolios and their
CNS Fails Positions. When the proposed rule change results in a larger
Required Fund Deposit, the proposed change could burden competition for
Members that have lower operating margins or higher costs of capital
compared to other Members. NSCC does not believe that the proposed rule
change would impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the Act.\14\ NSCC believes that the CNS
Fails Charge is necessary for NSCC to limit its exposures to potential
losses from defaults by Members with CNS Fails Positions. Additionally,
NSCC believes that the proposed changes to the CNS Fails Charge are
appropriate because the charge would be imposed on Members on an
individualized basis and is reasonably calculated based on the amount
of time that the fails remain outstanding as well as the risks posed to
NSCC by the Members' CNS Fails Positions. In addition, the increase in
Required Fund Deposit would be in direct relation to the specific risks
presented by each Member's Net Unsettled Positions, and each Member's
Required Fund Deposit would continue to be calculated with the same
parameters and at the same confidence level for each Member. Therefore,
Members that present similar Net Unsettled Positions, regardless of the
type of Member, would have similar impacts on their Required Fund
Deposit amounts. Therefore, NSCC believes any burden on competition
imposed by the CNS Fails Charge would be necessary and appropriate in
furtherance of the Act in order to limit NSCC's exposures to the risks
being mitigated by such charge.
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\14\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(I).
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(C) Clearing Agency's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change
Received From Members, Participants, or Others
NSCC has not received or solicited any written comments relating to
this proposal. If any written comments are received by NSCC, they will
be publicly filed as an Exhibit 2 to this filing, as required by Form
19b-4 and the General Instructions thereto.
Persons submitting comments are cautioned that, according to
Section IV (Solicitation of Comments) of the Exhibit 1A in the General
Instructions to Form 19b-4, the Commission does not edit personal
identifying information from comment submissions. Commenters should
submit only information that they wish to make available publicly,
including their name, email address, and any other identifying
information.
All prospective commenters should follow the Commission's
instructions on
[[Page 44739]]
how to submit a comments, available at <a href="http://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/how-submit-comment">www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/how-submit-comment</a>. General questions regarding the rule filing process
or logistical questions regarding this filing should be directed to the
Main Office of the Commission's Division of Trading and Markets at
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#2a5e584b4e43444d4b444e474b58414f5e596a594f49044d455c"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="65111704010c0b02040b010804170e001116251600064b020a13">[email protected]</span></a> or 202-551-5777.
NSCC reserves the right to not respond to any comments received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change, and Timing for
Commission Action
Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register or within such longer period up to 90 days (i) as the
Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be
appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to
which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
(A) by order approve or disapprove such proposed rule change, or
(B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule
change should be disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
<bullet> Use the Commission's internet comment form (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml">https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml</a>); or
<bullet> Send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#0775726b622a64686a6a626973744774626429606871"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="7604031a135b15191b1b131802053605131558111900">[email protected]</span></a>. Please include
file number SR-NSCC-2025-013 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
<bullet> Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.
All submissions should refer to file number SR-NSCC-2025-013. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml">https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml</a>). Copies of the filing will be available for inspection and
copying at the principal office of NSCC and on DTCC's website
(<a href="http://www.dtcc.com/legal/sec-rule-filings">www.dtcc.com/legal/sec-rule-filings</a>). Do not include personal
identifiable information in submissions; you should submit only
information that you wish to make available publicly. We may redact in
part or withhold entirely from publication submitted material that is
obscene or subject to copyright protection. All submissions should
refer to File Number SR-NSCC-2025-013 and should be submitted on or
before October 7, 2025.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\15\
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\15\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Sherry R. Haywood,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2025-17815 Filed 9-15-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
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