Notice2025-17487
Chanelle D. Remien, DVM; Decision and Order
Primary source
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Published
September 11, 2025
Issuing agencies
Justice DepartmentDrug Enforcement Administration
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 174 (Thursday, September 11, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 174 (Thursday, September 11, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 44104-44106]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-17487]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Chanelle D. Remien, DVM; Decision and Order
On March 1, 2021, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Chanelle D. Remien,
DVM, of East Wenatchee, Washington (Applicant). Request for Final
Agency Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 2, at 1, 3. The OSC proposed the
denial of Applicant's pending application for DEA Certificate of
Registration No. W17076337C,\1\ alleging that Applicant's application
should be denied because Applicant is ``currently without
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authority to handle controlled substances in Washington, the state in
which [she has] applied to be registered with DEA.'' Id. at 2 (citing
21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).
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\1\ The OSC does not specify the Certificate of Registration
number for Applicant's application, but the Government's RFAA
references the number throughout.
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The OSC notified Applicant of her right to file a written request
for hearing, and that if she failed to file such a request, she would
be deemed to have waived her right to a hearing and be in default. Id.
at 2 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Applicant did not request a
hearing. RFAA, at 2.\2\ ``A default, unless excused, shall be deemed to
constitute a waiver of the registrant's/applicant's right to a hearing
and an admission of the factual allegations of the [OSC].'' 21 CFR
1301.43(e).
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\2\ Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated
March 24, 2025, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on
Applicant was adequate. The included declaration from a DEA
Diversion Investigator (DI 2) indicates that on March 11, 2021, the
DI previously assigned to this matter mailed a copy of the OSC to
Applicant's registered address through FedEx. RFAAX 3, at 3; see
also RFAAX 3, Attachment E. On August 26, 2024, DI 2 contacted FedEx
to ensure service of the OSC. RFAAX 3, at 3. DI 2 states in the
Declaration that a FedEx customer service representative told DI 2
on this date that FedEx had a ``[s]ignature release on file,'' thus
confirming delivery of the OSC to Applicant to her registered
address. Id. at 4; see also id., Attachment H.
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Further, ``[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be
in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action
with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In
such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order
pursuant to [21 CFR] 1316.67.'' Id. 1301.43(f)(1). Here, the Government
has requested final agency action based on Applicant's default pursuant
to 21 CFR 1301.43(d), (e), 1301.46. RFAA, at 4; see also 21 CFR
1316.67.
Findings of Fact
The Agency finds that, in light of Applicant's default, the factual
allegations in the OSC are deemed admitted. According to the OSC, on
November 25, 2020, the Washington State Department of Health,
Veterinary Board of Governors suspended Applicant's Washington
veterinary license. RFAAX 2, at 2.
According to Washington online records, of which the Agency takes
official notice,\3\ Applicant's Washington veterinary license remains
suspended. Washington State Department of Health Provider Credential
Search, <a href="https://fortress.wa.gov/doh/providercredentialsearch">https://fortress.wa.gov/doh/providercredentialsearch</a> (last
visited date of signature of this Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds
that Applicant is not licensed to practice veterinary medicine in
Washington, the state in which she has applied to be registered with
DEA.\4\
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\3\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ``may take
official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--even in the
final decision.'' United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979).
\4\ Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ``[w]hen an agency decision
rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the
evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to
an opportunity to show the contrary.'' The material fact here is
that Applicant, as of the date of this decision, is not licensed to
practice veterinary medicine in Washington. Accordingly, Applicant
may dispute the Agency's finding by filing a properly supported
motion for reconsideration of findings of fact within fifteen
calendar days of the date of this Order. Any such motion and
response shall be filed and served by email to the other party and
to the DEA Office of the Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration, at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c3a7a6a2eda2a7a7aceda2b7b7acb1ada6bab083a7a6a2eda4acb5"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="4d29282c632c292922632c3939223f2328343e0d29282c632a223b">[email protected]</span></a>.
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Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General may suspend
or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 ``upon a finding
that the registrant . . . has had his State license or registration
suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State authority and is
no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . . . dispensing of
controlled substances.'' With respect to a practitioner, DEA has also
long held that the possession of authority to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the state in which a practitioner engages
in professional practice is a fundamental condition for obtaining and
maintaining a practitioner's registration. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243, 270 (2006) (``The Attorney General can register a physician to
dispense controlled substances `if the applicant is authorized to
dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in
which he practices.' . . . The very definition of a `practitioner'
eligible to prescribe includes physicians `licensed, registered, or
otherwise permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which
he practices' to dispense controlled substances. Sec. 802(21).''). The
Agency has applied these principles consistently. See, e.g., James L.
Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71,371, 71,372 (2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 F.
App'x 826 (4th Cir. 2012); Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR 27,616,
27,617 (1978).\5\
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\5\ This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA). First, Congress defined the term
``practitioner'' to mean ``a physician . . . or other person
licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by . . . the
jurisdiction in which he practices . . . . to distribute, dispense,
. . . [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of
professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration, Congress
directed that ``[t]he Attorney General shall register practitioners
. . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.'' 21
U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress has clearly mandated that a
practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a
practitioner under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation
of a practitioner's registration is the appropriate sanction
whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the state in which he practices. See,
e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR at 71,371-72; Sheran Arden
Yeates, M.D., 71 FR 39,130, 39,131 (2006); Dominick A. Ricci, M.D.,
58 FR 51,104, 51,105 (1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11,919, 11,920
(1988); Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR at 27,617.
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According to Washington statute, ``[a] practitioner may dispense or
deliver a controlled substance to or for an individual or animal only
for medical treatment or authorized research in the ordinary course of
that practitioner's profession.'' Wash. Rev. Code Sec. 69.50.308(j)
(2025). Further, a ``prescription'' means ``an order for controlled
substances issued by a practitioner duly authorized by law or rule in
the state of Washington to prescribe controlled substances within the
scope of his or her professional practice for a legitimate medical
purpose.'' Id. Sec. 69.50.101(41). Finally, a ``practitioner'' as
defined by Washington statute includes ``[a] veterinarian licensed to
practice veterinary medicine.'' Id. Sec. 69.50.101(40)(c).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Applicant lacks
authority to practice veterinary medicine in Washington. As already
discussed, an individual must be a licensed practitioner to dispense a
controlled substance in Washington. Thus, because Applicant lacks
authority to practice veterinary medicine in Washington and, therefore,
is not authorized to handle controlled substances in Washington,
Applicant is not eligible to obtain or maintain a DEA registration in
Washington. Accordingly, the Agency will order that Applicant's
application for DEA registration be denied.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby deny the pending application for a
Certificate of Registration, Control No. W17076337C, submitted by
Chanelle D. Remien, DVM, as well as any other pending application of
Chanelle D. Remien, DVM, for additional registration in Washington.
This Order is effective October 14. 2025.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
September 4, 2025, by Administrator Terrance Cole. That document with
the original signature and date is
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maintained by DEA. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance
with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the
undersigned DEA Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to
sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as
an official document of DEA. This administrative process in no way
alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the
Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2025-17487 Filed 9-10-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
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