Proposed Rule2025-14992
Normalizing Unmanned Aircraft Systems Beyond Visual Line of Sight Operations
Primary source
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Published
August 7, 2025
Issuing agencies
Transportation DepartmentFederal Aviation AdministrationHomeland Security DepartmentTransportation Security Administration
Abstract
This action proposes performance-based regulations to enable the design and operation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) at low altitudes beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) and for third-party services, including UAS Traffic Management (UTM), that support these operations. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 directs the development of this proposed rule. This proposed rule is necessary to support the integration of UAS into the national airspace system (NAS). This proposed rule is intended to provide a predictable and clear pathway for safe, routine, and scalable UAS operations that include package delivery, agriculture, aerial surveying, civic interest, operations training, demonstration, recreation, and flight testing. TSA proposes to make complementary changes to its regulations to ensure it can continue to impose security measures on these operations under its current regulatory structure for civil aviation.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 150 (Thursday, August 7, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 150 (Thursday, August 7, 2025)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 38212-38391]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-14992]
[[Page 38211]]
Vol. 90
Thursday,
No. 150
August 7, 2025
Part III
Department of Transportation
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Federal Aviation Administration
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14 CFR Parts 36, 43, 45, et al.
Department of Homeland Security
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Transportation Security Administration
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49 CFR Parts 1540 and 1544
Normalizing Unmanned Aircraft Systems Beyond Visual Line of Sight
Operations; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 90 , No. 150 / Thursday, August 7, 2025 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 38212]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 36, 43, 45, 48, 89, 91, 107, 108, 119, 133, 135, 137,
and 146
[Docket No. FAA-2025-1908; Notice No. 25-07]
RIN 2120-AL82
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Transportation Security Administration
49 CFR Parts 1540 and 1544
RIN 1652-AA80
Normalizing Unmanned Aircraft Systems Beyond Visual Line of Sight
Operations
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation, and Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
Department of Homeland Security.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
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SUMMARY: This action proposes performance-based regulations to enable
the design and operation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) at low
altitudes beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) and for third-party
services, including UAS Traffic Management (UTM), that support these
operations. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 directs the development
of this proposed rule. This proposed rule is necessary to support the
integration of UAS into the national airspace system (NAS). This
proposed rule is intended to provide a predictable and clear pathway
for safe, routine, and scalable UAS operations that include package
delivery, agriculture, aerial surveying, civic interest, operations
training, demonstration, recreation, and flight testing. TSA proposes
to make complementary changes to its regulations to ensure it can
continue to impose security measures on these operations under its
current regulatory structure for civil aviation.
DATES: Send comments on or before October 6, 2025.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2025-1908
using any of the following methods:
<bullet> Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to <a href="https://www.regulations.gov/">https://www.regulations.gov/</a> and follow the online instructions for sending
your comments electronically.
<bullet> Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
<bullet> Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
<bullet> Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at (202) 493-2251.
Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
<a href="https://www.regulations.gov/">https://www.regulations.gov/</a> at any time. Follow the online
instructions for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in
Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michelle Ferritto, ARM-100, Federal
Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC
20592; Phone: Phone: 844 359-6982; Email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e6dfcba0a7a7cbb3a7b5cba4b0aaa9b5cbb4938a83a6808787c8818990"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="f0c9ddb6b1b1dda5b1a3ddb2a6bcbfa3dda2859c95b0969191de979f86">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document
AAM--Advanced Air Mobility
AC--Advisory Circular
ACAS--Airborne Collision Avoidance System
ADS--B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
AE--Associated Elements
AGL--Above Ground Level
API--Application Programming Interface
ARC--Aviation Rulemaking Committee
ASOS--Automated Surface Observing System
ASRS--Aviation Safety Reporting System
ATC--Air Traffic Control
ATM--Air Traffic Management
AWOS--Automated Weather Observing System
BVLOS--Beyond Visual Line of Sight
C2--Command-and-Control
CBI--Confidential Business Information
CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
CMSA--Conformance Monitoring for Situational Awareness
COA--Certificate of Waiver or Authorization
COMAT--Company Materials
ConOps--Concept of Operations
COS--Continued Operational Safety
DAA--Detect and Avoid
DOC--Declaration of Compliance
DOT--Department of Transportation
DSS--Discover and Synchronization Service
EASA--European Union Aviation Safety Agency
EC--Electronic Conspicuity
FAA--Federal Aviation Administration
FRIA--FAA-Recognized Identification Areas
FSDO--Flight Standards District Office
GA--General Aviation
GCS--Ground Control Station
GPS--Global Positioning Systems
HAZMAT--Hazardous Materials
HIRF--High Intensity Radiated Field
HME--Hazardous Materials Endorsement
HMR--Hazardous Materials Regulations
IBR--Incorporation by Reference
ICAO--International Civil Aviation Organization
IRFA--Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
IUEI--Intentional Unauthorized Electronic Interaction
JARUS--Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems
LAANC--Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability
MAIS--Maximum Abbreviated Injury Scale
METAR--Meteorological Aerodrome Report
MIT/LL--Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory
MOA--Memorandum of Agreement
MOC--Means of Compliance
MOPS--Minimum Operational Performance Standards
MOSAIC--Modernization of Special Airworthiness Certification
NAICS--North American Industry Classification System
NAS--National Airspace System
NASA--National Aeronautics and Space Administration
nm--Nautical Miles
NOTAM--Notice to Airmen
NPRM--Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NTSB--National Transportation Safety Board
NWS--National Weather Service
OMB--Office of Management and Budget
OpSpecs--Operation Specifications
OST--Office of the Secretary of Transportation
PAO--Public Aircraft Operation
PHMSA--Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
PNT--Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
POI--Principal Operations Inspector
RFA--Regulatory Flexibility Act
RPA--Rule of Particular Applicability
SAC--Special Airworthiness Certificate
SARPS--Standards and Recommended Practices
SBA--Small Business Administration
SDSP--Supplemental Data Service Provider
SMS--Safety Management System
SOH--State of Health
SORA--Specific Operations Risk Assessment
SPSO--Service Provider Standard Order
SRA--Safety Risk Assessment
STA--Security Threat Assessment
STEM--Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
sUAS--Small UAS
SUI--Simplified User Interaction
sXu--System X for sUAS
TAF--Terminal Area Forecast
TRACON--Terminal Radar Approach Control
TSA--Transportation Security Administration
TSO--Technical Standards Order
UA--Unmanned Aircraft
UAS--Unmanned Aircraft System
UAT--Universal Access Transceiver
UES--Universal Enrollment Service(s)
UFT--UTM Field Test
UPP--UTM Pilot Program
USS--Unmanned Aircraft System Service Supplier
USSP--U-Space Service Provider
[[Page 38213]]
UTM--Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management
VLOS--Visual Line of Sight
VSL--Value of Statistical Life
VTOL--Vertical Takeoff and Landing
xTM--Extensible Traffic Management
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of This Regulatory Action
B. Overview of Proposed Rule
C. Summary of the Costs and Benefits
II. Authority for This Rulemaking
A. Section 44807 Statutory Findings
B. Authority for Regulating Third-Party Services
C. Authority for Regulating Noise
III. Background
A. Related FAA and Department of Transportation (DOT) Actions
B. Use of Exemptions, Type Certificates, and Waivers
C. Beyond Visual Line of Sight Aviation Rulemaking Committee
D. BVLOS Operations and International Leadership
IV. UAS Integration Into the NAS
A. Enabling UAS BVLOS Operations
B. Need for Automated Data Service Providers
C. Definitions (Sec. 108.5)
V. Part 108 General Requirements (Subpart A)
A. Applicability (Sec. 108.1)
B. Reporting and Prohibitions
C. Recordkeeping (Sec. 108.40)
D. Reporting (Sec. 108.45)
VI. Conducting UAS BVLOS Operations (Subpart B)
A. Operating Unmanned Aircraft Under Part 108
B. General Operating Rules (Sec. 108.120)
C. ADS-B and Transponder Use (Sec. 108.160)
D. Area of Operations (Sec. 108.165)
E. Preflight Requirements (Sec. 108.170)
F. Operating Restrictions (Sec. 108.175)
G. Operation in Controlled Airspace (Sec. 108.180)
H. Operations Over People (Sec. 108.185)
I. Use of Strategic Deconfliction and Conformance Monitoring
(Sec. 108.190)
J. Operations Near Aircraft: Low Altitude Right-of-Way Rules
(Sec. 108.195)
K. Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft (Sec. 108.200)
L. Operation in Shielded Areas (Sec. 108.205)
M. Operations of Multiple Unmanned Aircraft (Sec. 108.210)
N. Careless and Reckless Operation (Sec. 108.125)
O. Manuals (Sec. Sec. 108.130 and 108.135)
P. Emergency Conditions (Sec. 108.215)
Q. Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restriction (Sec. 108.220)
VII. Personnel Requirements (Subpart C)
A. Approach to Personnel in Part 108
B. Personnel Roles and Responsibilities
C. Personnel Knowledge and Training (Sec. 108.315)
D. Medical Condition (Sec. 108.320)
E. Alcohol or Drugs (Sec. 108.325)
F. Duty and Rest (Sec. 108.330)
G. Security Threat Assessment for Certain Personnel (Sec.
108.335)
VIII. Permitted and Certificated Operations (Subparts D and E)
A. Requesting Operating Permits or Operating Certificates
(Sec. Sec. 108.400 and 108.500)
B. Permitted Operations
C. Certificated Operations
IX. Maintenance and Alterations (Subpart F)
A. Applicability
B. Persons Authorized To Perform Maintenance (Sec. 108.605)
C. Persons Performing Maintenance and Alterations (Sec.
108.605)
D. Unmanned Aircraft Maintenance (Sec. 108.610)
E. Life-Limited Parts (Sec. 108.615)
F. Unmanned Aircraft Batteries (Sec. 108.620)
G. Repairs and Alterations (Sec. 108.625)
H. Operations After Maintenance (Sec. 108.630)
X. Procedures for Unmanned Aircraft System Airworthiness (Subpart G)
A. Unmanned Aircraft System Airworthiness
B. Associated Elements (Sec. 108.5)
C. Applying for a Part 108 Airworthiness Acceptance
D. Means of Compliance (Sec. Sec. 108.705 and 108.710)
E. Compliance With Design, Test, Production, Noise, and
Airworthiness Requirements (Sec. 108.710)
F. Declaration of Compliance (Sec. 108.715)
G. Required Documents for Airworthiness Acceptance (Sec.
108.720)
H. Flight Data and Data Reporting (Sec. 108.725)
I. Quality Assurance System (Sec. 108.730)
J. Production Acceptance (Sec. 108.735)
K. Continued Operational Safety Program (Sec. 108.740)
L. Inspections and Audits (Sec. 108.745)
M. Design Changes (Sec. 108.750)
N. Repairs and Alterations (Sec. 108.755)
O. Record Retention (Sec. 108.760)
P. Rescission (Sec. 108.765)
XI. Design and Testing Requirements for Airworthiness Acceptance
(Subpart H)
A. General (Sec. 108.800)
B. Size, Weight, and Speed (Sec. 108.805)
C. Simplified User Interaction (Sec. 108.810)
D. Signal Monitoring and Transmission (Sec. 108.815)
E. Position, Navigation, and Timing (Sec. 108.820)
F. Collision Avoidance (Sec. 108.825)
G. Anti-Collision Lighting Requirements (Sec. 108.830)
H. Position Lighting Requirements (Sec. 108.835)
I. Power Generation, Storage, and Distribution System (Sec.
108.840)
J. Propulsion System (Sec. 108.845)
K. Fuel System (Sec. 108.850)
L. Fire Protection (Sec. 108.855)
M. Software (Sec. 108.860)
N. Electronic Hardware (Sec. 108.865)
O. Systems and Equipment (Sec. 108.870)
P. Cybersecurity (Sec. 108.875)
Q. Associated Elements Design and Performance Requirements
(Sec. 108.880)
R. Suitability and Durability of Materials (Sec. 108.885)
S. Operating Environment Conditions (Sec. 108.890)
T. Lightning Protection (Sec. 108.895)
U. Flight Data Recorder (Sec. 108.900)
V. Flight Data Analysis (Sec. 108.905)
W. Noise (Sec. 108.910)
X. Placards (Sec. 108.915)
Y. Identification and Marking (Sec. 108.920)
Z. Additional Design and Performance Requirements for
Operational Purposes (Sec. 108.925)
AA. Testing
XII. Corresponding Regulatory Updates
A. Updates to Noise Requirements
B. Updates to Other Operating Rules
XIII. Part 146: Automated Data Service Providers
A. Introduction
B. Legal Authority to Regulate Automated Data Service Providers
C. BVLOS ARC Recommendations
D. Overview of Proposed Part 146
E. Subpart A--General
F. Subpart B--Certificate
G. Subpart C--Service Authorizations
H. Subpart D--Certificated Service Providers
I. Subpart E--Authorized Service Requirements
J. Subpart F--Due Process
K. Proposed Advisory Circulars
XIV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Regulatory Impact Analysis
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
F. International Compatibility
G. Environmental Analysis
H. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska
XV. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
B. Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination With
Indian Tribal Governments
C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
D. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation
E. Executive Order 14192, Unleashing Prosperity Through
Deregulation
XVI. Incorporation by reference
XVII. Privacy
XVIII. Additional Information
A. Comments Invited
B. Confidential Business Information
C. Electronic Access and Filing
D. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of This Regulatory Action
This action proposes performance-based regulations for the design
and operation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) beyond visual line of
sight (BVLOS) and for third-party services that support these
operations, including UAS Traffic Management (UTM). The purpose of this
proposed rule is to enable the expansion of BVLOS UAS operations for
commercial and recreational purposes at low altitudes in the national
airspace system (NAS).\1\ To
[[Page 38214]]
date, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has allowed some such
operations through individualized exemptions and waivers to existing
regulations. This NPRM leverages lessons learned from individual
exemptions and waivers to create the repeatable, scalable regulatory
framework FAA proposes here that would allow for wide-scale adoption of
UAS technologies. This proposed rule would be the next phase of
integrating UAS into the NAS and provide a predictable and clear
pathway for operators to conduct expanded operations safely. Further,
this proposed rule's Automated Data Service requirements would provide
clarity for manufacturers and service providers producing UAS and
offering key enabling services, such as UTM, to UAS operators. FAA
anticipates that this proposed rulemaking will allow operators to
conduct a variety of operations, including package delivery,
agriculture, aerial surveying, civic interest (to include wildfire
recovery, wildlife conservation, and public safety), flight training,
demonstration, flight testing, and recreation.
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\1\ Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(4), FAA has provided a summary
of this proposed rule in the docket for 2120-AL82, available at
<a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a>.
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Since the promulgation of 2016's operating requirements for small
UAS in part 107, FAA has sought to incorporate more complex operations
(e.g., larger, and more automated aircraft operating BVLOS of the
operator) safely into the NAS through appropriate regulatory means. In
June 2021, FAA chartered the UAS BVLOS Aviation Rulemaking Committee
(ARC), soliciting recommendations to support a regulatory framework
reflective of the technological capabilities of UAS. In March 2022, the
ARC provided FAA with recommendations on how BVLOS operations could be
safely integrated into the NAS.
Further, in May of 2024, Congress passed FAA Reauthorization Act of
2024 (Public Law [Pub. L.] 118-63). Section 930 of Public Law 118-63
directs the FAA Administrator to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) and subsequent final rule establishing a performance-based
regulatory pathway for UAS to operate BVLOS. In addition, section 932
directs the FAA Administrator to establish procedures to approve third-
party service suppliers of UTM. As part of its ongoing efforts to
integrate UAS operations into the NAS, and pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 44807,
the FAA Administrator is proposing to amend FAA regulations to adopt
specific rules for BVLOS operations of UAS in the NAS.
Based on its experience over the past few years with enabling
limited BVLOS operations through exemption or waiver and with the
comprehensive set of recommendations from the UAS BVLOS ARC, FAA has
developed the framework proposed in this rule to enable routine and
scalable BVLOS operations in the NAS. This proposed framework would
accommodate technologies as they evolve and mature using a performance-
based regulatory framework.
In addition, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
proposing revisions to its regulations to ensure that the decision to
regulate these UAS operations under part 108 does not inadvertently
create a security gap under TSA regulations. Under this proposal, which
has been developed in consultation with FAA, TSA would continue to
ensure the security of the national airspace by imposing appropriate
security requirements. TSA notes that in the sections of this preamble
related to package delivery operations, TSA has included a request for
comment regarding potential security program applicability in a final
rule. This request for comment relates to a broader set of activities
than package delivery operations. While FAA and TSA are issuing a joint
proposed rulemaking, the agencies intend to concurrently issue separate
final rules.
B. Overview of the Proposed Rule
This proposed rule would establish requirements for conducting UAS
BVLOS operations in United States airspace. FAA anticipates many,
though not all, operations under proposed part 108 will be commercial.
This action would normalize certain low altitude UAS operations and
expedite the introduction of BVLOS UAS operations in the NAS while
ensuring the safety and efficiency of United States airspace. This
proposed rule is the next step in integrating UAS into the NAS, which
FAA anticipates would provide safety, societal, and economic benefits.
Section II of this preamble details the legal authority for this
rulemaking, while section III of this preamble provides a background of
prior rulemakings and policy efforts FAA has undertaken to allow UAS
operations in the United States. Section IV of this preamble describes
the approach FAA has proposed to integrate BVLOS UAS operations,
including the novel approaches to authorizing aircraft and personnel
proposed under part 108 and the framework for third-party service
suppliers proposed by part 146. Section V of this preamble describes
the operational requirements applicable to all BVLOS operations
conducted under part 108. These general operating requirements include
the administrative requirements for the two tiers of operational
authorization, permits and certificates, as discussed in section VIII
of this preamble. Section VI of this preamble outlines FAA's approach
for airspace management, including requirements for strategic
deconfliction, detect and avoid (DAA), operations in uncontrolled and
controlled airspace, operations over people, operations of multiple
aircraft, and other conditions for safe operation.
This rule proposes a novel structure for operations personnel, as
discussed in section VII of this preamble. Under this proposal, FAA
would not require airman certificates but would require each operator--
both permitted and certificated--to have an operations supervisor
responsible for the overall safety of the operation. In addition, FAA
proposes that operators must have qualified flight coordinators, who
are individuals responsible for monitoring and, if necessary,
intervening in an operation to ensure safe conditions. Whereas the
operations supervisor has operational control over the entire
operation, the flight coordinator(s) would have tactical oversight of
individual aircraft.
FAA anticipates that the operations conducted under part 108 would
have a variety of operational personnel positions and therefore does
not propose to require any additional operations personnel positions.
All operators would be responsible for identifying the necessary
operations personnel to ensure the safety of the operation, in addition
to ensuring that the operations personnel have the necessary knowledge
and skills for their role. In this manner, responsibility is tied to
the company operating the UAS rather than an individual that has
limited control of the actual operation and can be removed from their
position if necessary.
As noted above, section VIII of this preamble describes the permit
and certificate structure proposed by this rule. Permitted operations
would allow operators to conduct certain BVLOS operations using a
streamlined approach under a permit issued by FAA. The permit structure
would allow package delivery, agricultural operations, aerial
surveying, civic interest, unmanned aircraft (UA) operations training,
flight test, demonstration, and recreational operations, though subject
to certain limitations on size, number of aircraft, and other operating
requirements. Those operators conducting higher risk
[[Page 38215]]
threshold operations, due to size, weight, speed, or other parameters,
would instead need to seek operational certification. Obtaining an
operating certificate would allow for more complex package delivery,
agricultural operations, aerial surveying, and civic interest
operations than operating under an operating permit. Certificated
operations would receive greater oversight from FAA but would also be
able to use larger aircraft, have more aircraft, and have more
flexibility to operate over people. Operations conducted under an
operating certificate would require operators to develop a safety
management system (SMS) and a training program for operations
personnel.
Maintenance personnel would not be certificated under this proposed
rule. Section IX of this preamble details the requirements for
maintenance and maintenance personnel. Maintenance standards for these
aircraft would be set by the manufacturer and be based on industry
adopted consensus standards, and personnel that maintain them would be
required to be competent in their duties and receive the training
required by the manufacturer to perform those duties.
Sections X and XI of this preamble lay out the proposal for the new
airworthiness acceptance process developed to allow for an efficient
approval process of part 108 UAS, while maintaining the integrity of
the NAS and the safety of the public. Using industry consensus
standards, this action would establish a regulatory process for
airworthiness acceptance of a UAS, consisting of a UA and its
associated elements (AE), where the UA weighs not greater than 1,320
pounds (including anything attached to, or carried by the UA). Proposed
part 108 would include new operational requirements for UA with
airworthiness acceptance, enabling routine BVLOS operations without
waivers or exemptions.
Section XII of this preamble discusses corresponding changes to
related regulations in other parts of title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) including a noise regulatory approach for UAS
operating under proposed part 108.
Finally, this action would create a defined regulatory approval
pathway for third-party services and providers of those services--first
to approve services that support UTM, and then eventually, to approve
services that support extensible traffic management (xTM). FAA broadly
defines all those service providers--be it third-party service
suppliers or services self-provided by the operators--as Automated Data
Service Providers.\2\
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\2\ The term Extensible Traffic Management (xTM) is used to
refer to cooperative service environments in general and is
comprised of UTM, AAM, etc. FAA further discusses these concepts in
its Urban Air Mobility (UAM) Version 2.0 Concept of Operations
(ConOps) (Apr. 26, 2023), available at <a href="http://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/Urban%20Air%20Mobility%20%28UAM%29%20Concept%20of%20Operations%202.0_1.pdf">www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/Urban%20Air%20Mobility%20%28UAM%29%20Concept%20of%20Operations%202.0_1.pdf</a>.
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As further discussed in section XIII of this preamble, FAA would
create a new part 146 to establish the process by which FAA would
regulate automated data service providers as well as their automated
data services. The purpose of part 146 is to provide a regulatory
framework for appropriate government oversight of automated data
services that support aircraft operations, especially those conducted
under part 108. At the same time, the framework is designed to be
flexible enough to accommodate the natural evolution and development of
the technologies and systems on which these services are based. Through
proposed part 146, FAA would authorize automated data service providers
certificated under part 146 to provide services that would manage UAS
traffic and information necessary for safe and efficient operation in
the airspace. The provision of such services would be crucial, given
the projected increase in numbers of UAS operating in the NAS once part
108 is finalized. Under this proposal, strategic deconfliction and
conformance monitoring services provided under part 146 would be key to
the successful integration of UAS into the NAS and would be a
requirement for several categories of UAS BVLOS operations under
proposed part 108.
C. Summary of the Costs and Benefits
The benefits of the proposed rule are the economic, safety, and
health values that would result from scaled BVLOS operations. These
benefits derive from the increase in regulatory certainty and
efficiency, and framework for scaled operations, that proposed rule
would provide. FAA evaluates the benefits of the proposed rule
qualitatively. Compared with operations under the current regulatory
framework, this proposed rule may result in incremental costs to comply
with requirements for design, production, and operations. There may
also be cost implications to becoming certificated to provide automated
data services. FAA provides potential unit costs and example total
costs.
However, given that the proposed rule includes requirements that
mirror current BVLOS exemptions while also proposing several new
requirements to mitigate risks inherent in expanded BVLOS operations,
incremental costs are few, and benefits would likely exceed costs. See
section XIV.A of this preamble for more information.
II. Authority for This Rulemaking
FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in title
49 of the United States Code (U.S.C.). subtitle I, Sec. 106 describes
the authority of FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of FAA's authority.
This rulemaking is issued under the authority described in subtitle
VII part A, subpart iii, Sec. 44807, Special authority for certain
UAS, which permits FAA Administrator \3\ to use a risk-based approach
to determine if certain UAS may operate safely in the NAS. Section
44807(b) provides a list of factors that the FAA Administrator must
consider when determining which types of UAS may operate safely in the
NAS, including size, weight, speed, operational capability, proximity
to airports and populated areas, operation over people, operation
within visual line of sight (VLOS), or operation during the day or
night. Section 44807(b) further requires the FAA Administrator to
consider whether an airman certificate under Sec. 44703, a type,
production, airworthiness, or design and production certificate under
section 44704 of chapter 447, or a Certificate of Waiver or
Authorization (COA) is required. Per Sec. 44807(c), when the FAA
Administrator determines that certain UAS may operate safely in the NAS
per that section, ``the Administrator shall establish requirements, or
a process to accept proposed requirements, for the safe and efficient
operation of unmanned aircraft systems in the national airspace
system.''
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\3\ See section 927 of FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, Public
Law 118-63.
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In addition, FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (section 930 of Pub.
L. 118-63) amended chapter 448 of title 49 of the U.S.C. by adding
section 44811 to require the FAA Administrator to establish
performance-based regulations for UAS to be used for BVLOS operations.
The FAA Administrator must, at a minimum, establish acceptable risk
levels for BVLOS operations; standards for remote pilots or UAS
operators; an approval or acceptance process for UAS which may leverage
special airworthiness certificates (SAC) or a manufacturer declaration
of compliance (DOC) process; operating rules for UAS that are approved
or accepted; protocols of
[[Page 38216]]
networked information; and safety of manned aircraft operating in the
NAS. However, Sec. 44811 does not require the FAA Administrator to
rescope any ongoing rulemaking efforts. This regulation is within the
scope of these authorities.
The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Pub. L. 115-254), which
adopted 49 U.S.C. 44808, requires FAA to conduct rulemaking to
authorize the carriage of property by small UAS for compensation or
hire within the United States. FAA intends this proposal will also
address that requirement. Furthermore, this rulemaking is promulgated
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(1) and (2), which directs FAA to issue
regulations: (1) to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use
of airspace; and (2) to govern the flight of aircraft for purposes of
navigating, protecting, and identifying aircraft, and protecting
individuals and property on the ground. In addition, 49 U.S.C.
44701(a)(5) charges FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft by
prescribing regulations FAA finds necessary for safety in air commerce
and national security.
On June 6, 2025, the President issued Executive Order No. 14307,
Unleashing American Drone Dominance, which directs that ``the Secretary
of Transportation, acting through the Administrator of the FAA, shall
issue a proposed rule enabling routine BVLOS operations for UAS for
commercial and public safety purposes.\4\ A final rule shall be
published within 240 days of the date of this order, as appropriate.''
FAA is publishing this proposed rule to fulfill that directive.
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\4\ 90 FR 24727.
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A. Section 44807 Statutory Findings
To determine whether certain UAS may operate safely in the NAS
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 44807, the Administrator must find that the
operation of the UAS would not create a hazard to users of the NAS or
the public. The Administrator must also determine whether a certificate
under 49 U.S.C. 44703 (``Airman certificates'') or section 44704
(``Type certificates, production certificates, and airworthiness
certificates, and design and production organization certificates''),
or a certificate of waiver or certificate of authorization, is required
for the operation of the UAS subject to this proposed rule. Using a
risk-based approach, the Administrator has determined that UAS
operations under this proposed rule would operate safely in the NAS;
the individual findings required by section 44807 are as follows.
1. Hazard to Users of the NAS or the Public
Section 44807(b)(1) requires the Administrator to determine which
types of UAS operations, because of their size, weight, speed,
operational capability, proximity to airports and populated areas,
operation over people, and operation within or BVLOS, or operation
during the day or night do not create a hazard to users of the NAS or
the public.
The hazards to the NAS and the public from BVLOS UAS operations are
twofold: the collision risk posed to other users of the NAS (including
manned aviation and other UAS), and the risk of collision debris or a
faulty UAS posed to persons and property on the ground. Here, these
safety concerns would be mitigated by the provisions of this rule. The
risks to other NAS users and to persons and property on the ground
would be mitigated by the airworthiness acceptance process, the
personnel regulations, the general operating rules, and the specific
operating rules for operating permits and operating certificates. The
risks to other NAS users are further mitigated with the use of
strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring. In addition, the
risks to people and property on the ground are mitigated through the
designation of population density categories (and the corresponding
restrictions on certain operations to certain population density
categories), the general prohibition of operations over open-air
assemblies, and the hazardous material carriage restrictions.\5\
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\5\ This rulemaking uses the definition of hazardous material as
defined in 49 U.S.C. 5102(2) and 49 CFR 171.8.
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Accordingly, the Administrator has found that the UAS operations
subject to this proposed rule would not create a hazard to users of the
NAS or the public. FAA invites comments on this finding.
2. Certificate Requirements
In addition, 49 U.S.C. 44807(b)(2) requires the Administrator to
determine whether the UAS operations subject to this proposed rule pose
a safety risk sufficient to require airworthiness certification or
airman certification.
i. Airworthiness Certification
The Administrator has determined that airworthiness certification
should not be required for the UAS subject to this proposed rule. As
discussed in section X of this preamble, the proposed airworthiness
acceptance regulatory framework would prevent incidents like loss of
flight or control stemming from factors such as structural integrity,
software and hardware functionality, performance attributes, and
operational factors. Specifically, the proposed design and performance
standards require the UAS to handle all expected flight and ground
stresses during its operations without compromising the UAS's safe
operation.
From a risk perspective, FAA considers UAS operations under
proposed part 108 fall between part 107 small UAS and aircraft with a
SAC.\6\ Part 108, which encompasses BVLOS operations, presents higher
risks than part 107 due to the potential for airspace conflicts with
other users, operation of larger aircraft, operation over densely
populated areas, and riskier operational use cases such as package
delivery. The intrinsic risks associated with routine BVLOS operations
of UAS require mitigations beyond what is required under part 107.
Conversely, the SAC process would require a higher level of initial FAA
oversight than would be necessary for BVLOS operations envisioned under
part 108, because it would require FAA to conduct an airworthiness
inspection of each UAS produced. Proposed part 108 airworthiness
acceptance requirements described in section X aim to mitigate those
risks and promote the safety of people on the ground and other airspace
users. FAA determined the requirements proposed in section X are
appropriate for UA without passengers or crew where airworthiness
certification under 14 CFR part 21 is more appropriate to ensure the
safety of those on board those aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ FAA has proposed changes to the SAC process to enable
enhancements in safety and performance and to increase privileges
under a number of sport pilot and light-sport aircraft rules in the
Modernization of Special Airworthiness Certification notice of
proposed rulemaking, 88 FR 47650 (July 24, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consequently, the regulatory and certification demands for BVLOS
operations are more stringent than those for part 107 but less so than
for light-sport aircraft. This intermediate positioning supports a
balance between flexibility and safety. Therefore, the Administrator
finds, pursuant to Sec. 44807(b)(2), that airworthiness certification
would be unnecessary for the UAS subject to this proposed rule. FAA
invites comments on this finding.
ii. Airman Certification
The Administrator has also determined that airman certification
[[Page 38217]]
should not be required because certification is not consistent with the
envisioned UAS and operations subject to this proposed rule. On manned
aircraft, the pilot is responsible for operational control and safety
of flight from the flightdeck. Pilot responsibilities on the flightdeck
are constructed around pilot control, including seeing and avoiding
other aircraft, interacting with air traffic control (ATC), and
monitoring instruments and displays. With the increasing autonomy of
UAS, particularly those anticipated for use under this proposal, the
role of the pilot has and will continue to decrease. The UAS industry
has increasingly come to rely on technology, rather than human
interaction or intervention, to ensure safe operation. Industry
reliance on technology rather than human interaction is driven in part
by the fact that UAS do not carry responsible persons that can control
and ensure the safety of flight from within the aircraft.
As discussed herein, the proposed personnel provisions serve to
provide personnel with the knowledge, training, and skills to operate
the anticipated UAS safely under this proposed rule. In addition, other
mitigating provisions of this rule would ensure that the risk posed by
the UAS is offset by the design requirements (section XI of this
preamble) and general operating requirements (section VI of this
preamble) that further mitigate risk as operations increase in
complexity. Therefore, the Administrator finds, pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
44807(b)(2), that airman certification would be unnecessary for the UAS
and operations subject to this proposed rule. FAA invites comments on
this finding.
B. Authority for Regulating Third-Party Services
Section 932 of FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, Public Law 118-63,
directs the FAA Administrator to establish procedures, including
rulemaking, to approve third-party service suppliers. Those would
include suppliers of UTM services to support the safe integration and
commercial operation of UAS. In accordance with this provision, the
Administrator must ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that
industry consensus standards are included as an acceptable means of
compliance for third-party services. Consistent with this direction
from Congress, FAA proposes to regulate third-party service suppliers
and the use of third-party services.
FAA also has authority to regulate air agencies under chapter 447
of title 49, U.S.C. FAA may issue certificates to air agencies (49
U.S.C. 44702) as well as ``examine and rate'' air agencies (49 U.S.C.
44707). Congress defined air agencies to include certain aviation
schools (Sec. 44707(1)), repair stations (Sec. 44707(2)), and ``other
air agencies the Administrator decides are necessary in the public
interest'' (Sec. 44702(3)). FAA proposes to regulate automated data
service providers that support aircraft operations using a distributed
computational system under this authority to regulate air agencies.\7\
Regulation of these automated data service providers is necessary in
the public interest. In 49 U.S.C. 40101(d), Congress identified the
following matters for FAA to consider as being in the public interest:
``assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and security'' and
``encouraging and developing civil aeronautics, including new aviation
technology.'' Enabling automated data services to mitigate the
potential risk that BVLOS operations could pose to the NAS would
enhance aviation safety and aid in the development of new aviation
technology.
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\7\ 49 U.S.C. chapter 447.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For further discussion on the legal authority of third-party
services and FAA rulemaking procedure for regulating such services, see
section XIII.B of this preamble.
C. Authority for Regulating Noise
In 49 U.S.C. 44715, FAA has the responsibility to ``protect the
public health and welfare from aircraft noise.'' This responsibility
came with broad authority to adopt regulations and noise standards to
carry out this mandate. Historically, FAA has applied the part 36 noise
certification regulations when the agency issued type certificates as
provided in Sec. 44715(a)(3).
However, FAA has authority to apply noise standards for aircraft
with or without type certificates. As such, FAA is proposing in this
rule to exercise that authority and use a regulatory approach for UAS
operating under part 108 that would apply noise requirements as part of
airworthiness acceptance.
For further discussion on the legal authority of FAA to regulate
noise as part of the airworthiness acceptance process, see section
XII.A of this preamble.
D. Transportation Security Administration Authority
The security of the nation's transportation systems is vital to the
economic health and security of the United States. Ensuring
transportation security while promoting the movement of legitimate
travelers and commerce is a critical counter-terrorism mission assigned
to TSA.
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress created TSA
under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) and
established the agency's primary federal role to enhance security for
all modes of transportation. The scope of TSA's authority includes
assessing security risks, developing security measures to address
identified risks, and enforcing compliance with these measures. TSA has
broad regulatory authority to issue, rescind, and revise regulations as
necessary to carry out its transportation security functions.\8\
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\8\ See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(1), 44903(b).
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III. Background
A. Related FAA and Department of Transportation (DOT) Actions
FAA began developing its regulatory framework for UAS in 2012 after
Congress passed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Pub. L.
112-95). Section 333 of Public Law 112-95 directed the Secretary of
Transportation to determine which types of UAS do not create a hazard
to users of the NAS or the public or pose a threat to national
security. Based on such findings, Congress directed the Secretary to
establish requirements for the safe operation of such UAS. Since the
passage of Public Law 112-95, FAA has been incorporating limited UAS
operations into the NAS using a phased, incremental, and risk-based
approach to enable UAS operations through narrowly tailored
regulations, individual grants of regulatory relief through FAA
exemptions and waivers, and by authorizations based on discrete
statutory authorities. Understanding the steps FAA has already taken to
integrate UAS into the NAS is critical to understanding why these
proposed regulations to enable scaled BVLOS operations is the
appropriate next step in this phased approach.
1. Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft
On December 16, 2015, FAA published the Registration and Marking
Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft interim final rule
(Registration Rule).\9\ The Registration Rule, which established 14 CFR
part 48, enabled a simplified, web-based registration
[[Page 38218]]
system for small UA,\10\ as an alternative to the registration
requirements found in 14 CFR part 47. The Registration Rule required
all small UAS owners to register under the existing part 47 or 48 by
March 31, 2016.
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\9\ Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned
Aircraft interim final rule, 80 FR 78645 (Dec. 16, 2015).
\10\ ``Small UAS'' is defined in 14 CFR 1.1 as an unmanned
aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds on takeoff, including
everything that is on board or otherwise attached to the aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Registration Rule also established marking requirements for
small UA. In accordance with that rule, all small UA must display a
unique identifier. Each small UA operated in accordance with part 107
must display a unique registration number, visible on inspection of the
small UA.
2. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems
On June 28, 2016, FAA and DOT jointly published the Operation and
Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems final rule (the 2016
Final Rule) establishing 14 CFR part 107.\11\ Part 107 created a
regulatory structure allowing small UAS to operate within specified
parameters without requiring airworthiness certification, exemption, or
waiver. Part 107 established operational rules for certain routine
civil operation of small UAS in the NAS in a safe manner. To mitigate
risk to people and property on the ground and to other users of the
airspace, the 2016 Final Rule established operating limitations for
small UAS such as limiting operations to daylight and civil twilight,
within confined areas, and within visual line-of-sight. The 2016 Final
Rule also established airspace restrictions, remote pilot
certification, visual observer requirements, and operating limitations.
Finally, the 2016 Final Rule included a waiver provision \12\ allowing
individual operators to deviate from certain specifically identified
operating limitations if FAA found the applicant could safely conduct
the proposed operation under the terms of the COA.
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\11\ Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems final rule, 81 FR 42064 (Jun. 28, 2016).
\12\ See 14 CFR 107.200 and 107.205.
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3. Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People
Published by FAA on January 15, 2021, the Operation of Small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People final rule \13\ allowed routine
operations over people in accordance with part 107 and routine
operations at night under certain conditions without a waiver or
exemption. Under regulations implemented by the rule, the requirements
for routine operations over people vary depending on the level of risk
that operations of small UA present to people on the ground. In the
Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People final rule,
FAA established four categories of permissible operations over people
based on the risk of injury they present: Category 1, Category 2,
Category 3, and Category 4. Under this rule, operations over people (in
accordance with the categories) are permitted with small UA that have
an airworthiness certificate.
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\13\ Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems over People
final rule, 86 FR 4314 (Jan. 15, 2021). Operation of Small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Over People; Delay of Effective Date; Correction
final rule, 86 FR 11623 (Feb. 26, 2021); Operation of Small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Over People; Delay; Withdrawal; Correction final
rule, 86 FR 3630 (Mar. 10, 2021).
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4. External Marking Requirement for Small Unmanned Aircraft
The External Marking Requirement for Small Unmanned Aircraft
interim final rule (External Marking Rule, 2019) was published on
February 13, 2019.\14\ The External Marking Rule requires small UA
owners to display the unique identifier assigned by FAA upon completion
of the registration process (registration number) on an external
surface of the aircraft. Small UA owners are no longer permitted to
enclose the FAA-issued registration number in a compartment on the
aircraft, such as inside of a battery compartment.
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\14\ External Marking Requirement for Small Unmanned Aircraft
interim final rule, 84 FR 3669 (Feb. 13, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft
The Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft final rule (Remote
ID Final Rule) was published on January 15, 2021.\15\ The Remote ID
Final Rule requires that UA broadcast certain identification, location,
and performance information while in-flight. The remote identification
of UA is necessary to ensure public safety and the safety and
efficiency of the NAS. Remote identification provides airspace
awareness to FAA, national security agencies, law enforcement entities,
and other government officials. The broadcasted information can be used
to distinguish compliant airspace users from those potentially posing a
safety or security risk. The Remote ID Final Rule applies to UA flown
for both recreational and commercial purposes. It allows operators to
request authorization to operate without remote identification for
aeronautical research and other limited purposes. UA manufactured for
operation in the NAS are subject to the production requirements of the
Remote ID Final Rule. There are limited exceptions in the Remote ID
regulations that allow manufacturing UA without remote identification,
including home-built UA and United States Government UA, amongst
others.
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\15\ Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft final rule, 86
FR 4390 (Jan. 15, 2021); Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft;
Delay final rule, 86 FR 13629 (Mar. 10, 2021).
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6. Modernization of Special Airworthiness Certification Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and the Safety Continuum
On July 24, 2023, FAA published the Modernization of Special
Airworthiness Certification (MOSAIC) NPRM.\16\ The MOSAIC NPRM proposed
enabling enhancements in safety and performance and would increase
privileges under several sport pilot and light-sport aircraft rules.
The proposed language in the MOSAIC NPRM would also expand the types
and characteristics of aircraft that sport pilots may operate. The
proposed changes would increase the suitability of light-sport category
aircraft for flight training, limited aerial work, and personal travel.
As the MOSAIC NPRM notes, FAA is updating the requirements for light-
sport aircraft due to a developed understanding about the purposes and
flexibilities of light sport aircraft. This development is framed in
the context of the safety continuum. As noted in the MOSAIC NPRM, FAA
bases the rigor of certification requirements and operational
limitations on a safety continuum that looks at public exposure to risk
for each aircraft and operation. As the risk increases due to increased
operating privileges and aircraft capability, so do the requirements
and corresponding rigor of requirements and procedures for aircraft and
airman certification.\17\
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\16\ Modernization of Special Airworthiness Certification notice
of proposed rulemaking, 88 FR 47650 (Jul. 24, 2023).
\17\ 88 FR 47653.
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The safety continuum represents the targeted level of safety
because of FAA regulation, guidance, and oversight, which changes based
on risk and societal expectations of safety. FAA uses the safety
continuum to determine the appropriate level of regulatory oversight
for a variety of aircraft, from small UAS to large transport category
aircraft. The differing targeted level of safety balances the needs of
the flying public, applicants, and operators while facilitating both
the advancement of safety and the encouragement of technological
innovation.
[[Page 38219]]
Light-sport aircraft appear at the low end of the safety continuum
for manned operations because of its aircraft design and recreational
use. As a result, there is less FAA oversight. Given there is no pilot
nor passengers on board UAs, FAA has decided UA operations involve less
risk and should fall lower on the safety continuum than light sport
aircraft. Therefore, UAS operations under parts 107 and 108 are
positioned on the lower end of the safety continuum and FAA is
proposing a level of oversight for part 108 operations are positioned
between the oversight for part 107 small UAS and MOSAIC aircraft. The
reasons for this placement and for more information as to risk, please
see section III.A of this preamble.
B. Use of Exemptions, Type Certificates, and Waivers
The intent of this proposed rule is to provide a predictable,
stable, and transparent regulatory construct that enables scaled BVLOS
operations. Presently, UAS operators looking to conduct BVLOS
operations require some level of regulatory relief by way of exemption
or waiver.
1. Exemptions for UAS BVLOS operations
The exemption process has proven to be a useful tool for FAA to
enable operations that cannot be conducted under part 107, particularly
for operations using UA weighing 55 pounds or more.\18\ However,
operating by exemption often requires navigating a labyrinth of
regulations designed for both manned and unmanned aviation to determine
from which regulations exemption should be sought to operate UAS BVLOS.
Each exemption is specific to the operation that the petitioner is
pursuing, but typically the exemptions include relief from certain
requirements of parts 91 and 135 that are not compatible with UAS
operations. This section describes the history of using the exemption
process for UAS operations and what the exemption process requires.
This background is intended to help draw out how this rulemaking will
move UAS operations from the limits of ``enablement though exemption'',
which requires case-by-case assessment and contributes to the current
``patchwork'' of rules and exemption precedents that today's operators
rely on, to ``enablement by rule'', in which a right-size regulatory
framework could streamline how FAA enables operation, manufacture, and
supporting services of BVLOS UAS.
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\18\ The 55 lb. weigh limit for UAS operating under part 107 is
not waivable under Sec. 107.205.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the early 2010s, prior to the development and implementation of
the regulatory framework of part 107 (the 2016 Final Rule), FAA relied
on the flexibility provided in section 333 of Public Law 112-95 to
allow certain UAS operations in the NAS by way of the FAA exemption
process. Under the section 333 authority, the Secretary of
Transportation was granted the authority to determine if an
airworthiness certificate was necessary for safe operation of a UAS.
While this statutory flexibility permitted FAA to issue thousands of
exemptions, the regulatory framework resulting from the 2016 Final Rule
created a much more stable, transparent, and scalable system for early
civil UAS operations and this process of evolving from operation by
exemption to operation by rule is a precursor to FAA's objectives
through this proposed rule.
Section 347 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Pub. L. 115-
254) granted the Secretary the authority to determine, using a risk-
based approach, which UAS may operate safely in the NAS. Congress
further extended this discretionary authority to determine if an
airworthiness certificate was necessary and clarified that the
Secretary may determine if an airman certificate under section 44703
was necessary. This authority, codified at 49 U.S.C. 44809, was further
extended in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024.\19\ The FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 also established an additional avenue for
limited recreational operations under 49 U.S.C. 44809.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Per updates to 49 U.S.C. 44807 as provided by Sec. 927 of
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (Pub. L. 118-63), the authority to
determine if certain UAS are safe for operation the NAS rests with
the Administrator the of FAA rather than with the Secretary of
Transportation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 44807 grants the Administrator of FAA the authority to use
a risk-based approach to determine if certain UAS may operate safely in
the NAS on a case-by-case basis. The requirements for petitioning for
an exemption are codified in 14 CFR part 11. Under 14 CFR 11.15, a
petition for exemption is a request to FAA by an individual or entity
(``petitioner'') asking for relief from the requirements of a
regulation. Under 14 CFR 11.81, petitioners must include the following
information in their petitions for exemption: name, mailing address,
and other contact information (such as email or fax number); the
specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which they are seeking
exemption; the extent of relief that is being sought and the reason for
seeking relief; the reasons why granting this request would be in the
public interest, that is, how this exemption would benefit the public
as a whole; the reasons why granting the exemption would not adversely
affect safety, or how the exemption would provide a level of safety at
least equal to that provided by the rule from which exemption is
sought; a summary that FAA can publish in the Federal Register that
states the rule from which the exemption is sought along with a brief
description of the nature of the exemption sought; any additional
information, views, or arguments available to support the exemption
request; and, if a petitioner wants to exercise the privileges of their
exemption outside of the U.S., the reason why the petitioner needs to
do so.
FAA recommends that the petitioner review all FAA guidance to
ensure that the petition includes all necessary information, if
relevant, including concept of operations, operations manual, emergency
procedures, checklists, maintenance manual, training program, flight
history (hours, cycles, accidents), and a safety risk analysis.\20\ The
safety risk analysis is required for all complex operations for any
proposal that includes, but is not limited to, flight over or in the
proximity of people, flight beyond visual line of sight, operation of
multiple UAS, operations from a moving vehicle, package delivery, part
135 operations, or ground speeds. Guidance for the safety risk analysis
can be found in FAA Order 8040.4, Safety Risk Management Policy, and
FAA Order 8040.6, UAS Safety Risk Management Policy.
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\20\ FAA, Section 44807: Special Authority for Certain Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (Mar. 20, 2024), available at <a href="http://www.faa.gov/uas/advanced_operations/certification/section_44807">www.faa.gov/uas/advanced_operations/certification/section_44807</a>.
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FAA has issued thousands of exemptions using the 49 U.S.C. 44807
authority described herein.\21\ Many of
[[Page 38220]]
these exemptions permit the use of UAS for agricultural operations,
including thousands of exemptions enabling agricultural operations with
UAS over 55 pounds. Agricultural spraying operations comprise the vast
majority of exemptions for UAS above 55 pounds, with over 1,700
operator certificates issued for agricultural operations at the time of
publication of this proposed rule. FAA-issued exemptions also include
advanced UAS operations reflected in four precedent-setting exemptions
issued in fall of 2023 expanding BVLOS operational capabilities and
supporting the Unmanned Traffic Management Operational Evaluation.\22\
FAA has also issued several exemptions for UAS operators operating
under part 135. Upon obtaining their exemption(s), operators must then
seek operational approval, typically by obtaining an operating
certificate under 14 CFR part 135 or 137, depending on the operation
type.
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\21\ Prior to the finalization of the 2016 Final Rule, FAA had
granted numerous exemptions to unmanned aircraft operators for
purposes such as experimental operations, agricultural operations,
BVLOS and other various use-case applications. These exemptions were
granted with minimal Part 61 pilot certification requirements to the
remote pilot-in-command. Examples include unmanned aircraft
agricultural operations only requiring the remote pilot-in-command
to possess a private pilot certificate or even in later cases a
minimum of remote pilot certificate, as opposed to similar
operations with manned aircraft that require a commercial pilot
certificate. The 2016 Final Rule obviated the need for exemptions
for this particular relief for UA under 55 pounds with the
establishment of a part 107 remote pilot certificate but did not
extend to UA weighing 55 pounds or more. The first exemption to
substitute a part 61 commercial pilot certificate with a part 107
remote pilot certificate with additional training requirements under
these circumstances was to DroneSeed Co., Exemption No. 17936. FAA
subsequently issued several grants of exemption allowing the use of
a remote pilot certificate for commercial operations with UA above
55 pounds, although requiring a second-class medical certificate. In
November 2022, FAA issued a grant of exemption to Amazon Prime Air
permitting them to conduct BVLOS operations with a UA weighing 55
pounds or more and requiring the pilot-in-command to hold a part 107
remote pilot certificate with a third-class medical certificate,
Exemption No. 18601B.
\22\ See Phoenix Air Unmanned, LLC, Exemption No. 20973,
Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2023-1827, available at
<a href="http://www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2023-1827-0009">www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2023-1827-0009</a>; uAvionix
Corporation, Exemption No. 21097, Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2022-
0921, available at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2022-0921-0013">www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2022-0921-0013</a>;
Zipline International, Inc. Exemption No. 19111B, Regulatory Docket
No. FAA-2020-0499, available at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2020-0499-0033">www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2020-0499-0033</a>; UPS Flight Forward, Exemption No. 18339D, Regulatory
Docket No. FAA-2019-0628, available at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2019-0628-0029">www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2019-0628-0029</a>.
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Exemptions are issued on a case-by-case basis and each exemption
petition is individually assessed by FAA. This process can be time and
resource-intensive for operators. This proposed rule is intended to
level the playing field for operators by offering a well-defined and
purpose-built set of regulations for the operation, manufacture, and
supporting services for BVLOS UAS operations. Furthermore, this
proposed rule should foster innovation and growth among U.S. businesses
in this market and simultaneously allow these businesses to serve a
larger U.S. customer base.
2. Type Certification for UAS
Furthermore, FAA also allows UAS manufacturers to pursue type
certification for their UAS. However, the type certification process
was not designed for UAS, which have shorter expected lifespans than
manned aircraft, do not carry people, and are redesigned easily and
often by manufacturers. As such, the type certification pathway may not
be the most appropriate path for most of the operational uses
envisioned for these aircraft. Like the exemption process, operators
using a type certificated UAS must then seek operational approval,
typically under 14 CFR part 135 or 137 depending on the operation type.
3. Current Use of Waivers for UAS
In addition, FAA continues to use the flexibility of the waiver
process in issuing waivers for more complex operations under part 107.
FAA has issued thousands of waivers since the 2016 Final Rule. Since
the Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Over People final rule
eliminated the need for most night waivers, the most common types of
waivers granted in recent years have been for altitude limitations,
BVLOS operations, operation of multiple UA, and operations over people.
Waivers are processed faster than exemptions and submission and
approval of them has improved as UAS operators have become more
familiar with the appropriate safety cases. FAA recognizes the
flexibility that comes with waivers and, as noted in various sections
below, many of the proposed requirements of part 108 are subject to
waiver.
C. Beyond Visual Line of Sight Aviation Rulemaking Committee
On June 8, 2021, FAA established the UAS Beyond Visual Line-of-
Sight Operations ARC with the goal of providing recommendations to FAA
for performance-based regulatory requirements to normalize safe,
scalable, and economically viable UAS BVLOS operations that are not
receiving the provisioning of Air Traffic Management (ATM)
services.\23\ This ARC took a holistic approach in recommending a
performance-based regulatory framework for BVLOS operations.
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\23\ FAA, UAS Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight Operations Aviation
Rulemaking Committee, Aviation Rulemaking Committee Charter (Jun. 8,
2021), available at <a href="http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/UAS%20BVLOS%20ARC%20Charter%20">www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/UAS%20BVLOS%20ARC%20Charter%20</a>(eff.%206-
8-2021).pdf.
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FAA requested that, at a minimum, the ARC's recommendations clearly
address requirements to support the following concept of operations
(ConOps): long-line linear infrastructure inspections, industrial
aerial data gathering, small package delivery, and precision
agriculture aircraft operations, including crop spraying. The ARC did
not specifically address aircraft or operations carrying passengers or
crew, nor did it address the integration of operations for which ATM
services are being provided.
The ARC's final report was submitted to FAA on March 10, 2022.\24\
In this report, the ARC provided an extensive list of recommendations
to FAA. Overall, the ARC recommended that FAA set an acceptable level
of risk for UAS that is consistent across all types of operations being
performed. The ARC also recommended a series of modifications to the
right-of-way rules in Low Altitude Shielded Areas (within 100 feet of a
structure or critical infrastructure as defined in 42 U.S.C. 5195c) and
in Low Altitude Non-Shielded Areas (below 400 feet above ground level
(AGL)) to accommodate UAS operations. The ARC's report provided
comprehensive recommendations that the UAS industry argued would enable
BVLOS operations by regulation, including package delivery by UAS, in a
safe and economically viable manner. In addition, it provided
recommendations for developing a regulatory approach to enable the use
of third-party services to support UAS BVLOS operations.\25\ As
discussed throughout this preamble, FAA considered the recommendations
provided by the BVLOS ARC in developing this proposed framework.
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\24\ Unmanned Aircraft Systems Beyond Visual Line of Sight
Aviation Rulemaking Committee Final Report (``BVLOS ARC Report'')
(Mar. 10, 2022), available at <a href="http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/documentID/5424">www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/documentID/5424</a>.
\25\ Section XIII of this preamble discusses the ARC
recommendation regarding third-party services in greater detail.
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D. BVLOS Operations and International Leadership
Establishing a regulatory framework for BVLOS operation that
enables several valuable use cases would establish the U.S. as a global
leader in UAS operations. Home of the Wright Brothers and the Chicago
Convention, the U.S. has long been a leader in aviation and has claimed
many firsts in this industry including the first powered airplane, the
home of the pilot who flew the first solo transatlantic flight, and the
first pilot to break the sound barrier.\26\ For UAS, however, the
[[Page 38221]]
United States has strong peers competing for leadership in this space.
Globally, several countries have taken significant steps to enable
BVLOS operations including China, the United Kingdom, Ireland,
Australia, Japan, and Rwanda.\27\ Key to other countries' successes is
that these other countries have provided the UAS industry with a clear
regulatory framework that facilitates the scaling of BVLOS operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Vaughn College, Greatest First Flights in Aviation History
in Honor of Aviation History Month (Nov. 14, 2019), available at
<a href="http://www.vaughn.edu/blog/greatest-first-flights-in-aviation-history-in-honor-of-aviation-history-month/">www.vaughn.edu/blog/greatest-first-flights-in-aviation-history-in-honor-of-aviation-history-month/</a>.
\27\ Commercial Drone Alliance, U.S. Global Leadership in
Aviation at Stake: Scaled BVLOS UAS Operations Around the World
(Nov. 27, 2024).
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There are several recent examples of countries advancing the
integration of UAS operations into their airspaces, including BVLOS
operations. In June of 2023, Canada's Minister of Transport announced
standardized BVLOS rules for small and medium drones.\28\ In 2021, the
European Aviation Safety Administration (EASA) adopted three
regulations that together create the conditions necessary for both
drones and manned aircraft to operate safely and has begun the gradual
implementation of U-space, a type of airspace designated for safely
integrated operation of manned and unmanned aircraft.\29\ The U-space
approach provides cooperative airspace for manned and unmanned aircraft
where the manned aircraft are equipped with technology to enable
sharing airspace with the UAS. Australia and the EU have also published
guidance for BVLOS operators seeking to fly using the specific
operations risk assessment (SORA) framework developed by the Joint
Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS).\30\ In
Shenzhen, China, a commercial drone company made over 100,000 drone
deliveries in 2022, demonstrating UAS logistics at scale.\31\ In
Rwanda, UAS are regularly deployed to transport blood and medicines to
hospitals in remote regions and these programs have existed as early as
2016.\32\
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\28\ Minister of Transport Announces Canada's first proposed
drone safety regulations for beyond visual line-of-sight operations,
Transport Canada (Jun. 23, 2023), available at www.canada.ca/en/
transport-canada/news/2023/06/minister-of-transport-announces-
canadas-first-proposed-drone-safety-regulations-for-beyond-visual-
line-of-sight-operations.html.
\29\ Drones: Commission adopts new rules and conditions for
safe, secure and green drone operations, Directorate-General for
Mobility and Transportation, European Commission (Apr. 22, 2021),
available at transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/drones-
commission-adopts-new-rules-and-conditions-safe-secure-and-green-
drone-operations-2021-04-22_en.
\30\ See European Aviation Safety Agency, Specific Category--
Civil Drones, available at www.easa.europa.eu/en/domains/drones-air-
mobility/operating-drone/specific-category-civil-
drones#Registration%20of%20drone%20operators; see also Civil
Aviation Safety Authority. Beyond visual line of sight operations,
available at<a href="http://www.casa.gov">www.casa.gov</a>.au/drones/flight-authorisations/beyond-
visual-line-sight-operations#HowtorenewyourBVLOSflightapproval.
\31\ See Zeyi Yang, Food delivery by drone is just part of daily
life in Shenzhen, MIT Technology Review (May 23, 2023), available at
<a href="http://www.technologyreview.com/2023/05/23/1073500/drone-food-delivery-shenzhen-meituan">www.technologyreview.com/2023/05/23/1073500/drone-food-delivery-shenzhen-meituan</a>.
\32\ See World Economic Forum, Medicines from the sky: how
drones can save lives (Apr. 21, 2020), available at <a href="http://www.weforum.org/stories/2020/04/medicines-from-the-sky-how-a-drone-may-save-your-life/">www.weforum.org/stories/2020/04/medicines-from-the-sky-how-a-drone-may-save-your-life/</a>; see also World Economic Forum, Medicine from the Sky:
Opportunities and Lessons Learned from Drones in Africa (Mar. 2021),
available at<a href="http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Medicine_from_the_Sky_2021.pdf">www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Medicine_from_the_Sky_2021.pdf</a>.
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Foreign commercial aviation authorities (CAAs) enabling BVLOS
operations through their own regulatory frameworks have fostered
attractive environments for U.S. companies to expand their operations
abroad. Today, U.S. companies are performing BVLOS operations abroad
including in Italy, the U.K., Rwanda, and Japan.\33\ An overarching
goal of this proposed rule is to encourage U.S. UAS companies to
expand, innovate, and thrive domestically. A robust domestic UAS BVLOS
operating environment could spur technological innovation, bolster U.S.
aerospace manufacturing, provide services like package delivery to
large swaths of the public, create skilled jobs, and secure the U.S. as
a leader for UAS BVLOS operations, UTM, and UAS manufacturing.
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\33\ Italy Chosen For Amazon Prime Air Service In Late 2024,
Intrieste (Oct. 20, 2023), available at <a href="http://www.intrieste.com/2023/10/20/italy-chosen-for-amazon-prime-air-service-in-late-2024/">www.intrieste.com/2023/10/20/italy-chosen-for-amazon-prime-air-service-in-late-2024/</a>; Jack
Daleo, Google's Wing to Use Drones to Fly Blood Between London
Hospitals, Flying Magazine (Sep. 17, 2024), available at
<a href="http://www.flyingmag.com/modern/googles-wing-to-use-drones-to-fly-blood-between-london-hospitals/">www.flyingmag.com/modern/googles-wing-to-use-drones-to-fly-blood-between-london-hospitals/</a>; Jack Daleo, Rwanda launches nationwide
drone delivery service with Zipline, Freight Waves (Dec. 15, 2022),
available at <a href="http://www.freightwaves.com/news/rwanda-launches-nationwide-drone-delivery-service-with-zipline">www.freightwaves.com/news/rwanda-launches-nationwide-drone-delivery-service-with-zipline</a>; Skydio Secures Nationwide BVLOS
Approval for Remote Drone Operations In Japan, Skydio (Jun. 6,
2023), available at <a href="http://www.skydio.com/blog/nationwide-bvlos-approval-for-remote-drone-operations-in-japan">www.skydio.com/blog/nationwide-bvlos-approval-for-remote-drone-operations-in-japan</a>.
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Due to the relatively low cost of highly capable UAS technology,
hundreds of thousands \34\ of new operators have entered the aviation
community. This significant increase in the volume of UAS and UAS
operators, as well as the rapid advancement of UAS technologies, has
created significant opportunities--and challenges--for the integration
of UAS into the United States airspace. These UAS in the NAS pose new
challenges and risks but safety remains paramount for FAA. Through
research, industry partnerships and feedback, and regulatory changes,
FAA has made steady progress toward integrating UAS operations of
varying complexity in the NAS in a safe, timely, and equitable manner.
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\34\ FAA, Drones by the Numbers, available at <a href="http://www.faa.gov/uas">www.faa.gov/uas</a>.
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In proposing this rule, FAA fully expects that the scope and
frequency of UAS operations in the NAS would increase as BVLOS
operations become normalized. FAA also appreciates that this proposal
would open a new range of opportunities and possible concepts of
operations for local communities interested in leveraging the benefits
of UAS. FAA emphasizes that it is important for community leaders,
local elected officials, and operators to ensure that the general
public is informed and engaged in early planning discussions and that
the individuals involved in planning the operation have a clear plan
for how they will respond to the public's interest, questions, and
concerns about operations occurring in local communities. FAA will
support community leaders, local elected officials, and operators with
responding to the public in its role as a regulator and encourages
localities and operators to leverage best practices for community
engagement in introducing UAS operations.\35\
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\35\ For more information regarding legal considerations
applicable to state and local regulation of UAS, please see FAA and
DOT's 2023 Fact Sheet, available at <a href="http://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/State-Local-Regulation-of-Unmanned-Aircraft-Systems-Fact-Sheet.pdf">www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/State-Local-Regulation-of-Unmanned-Aircraft-Systems-Fact-Sheet.pdf</a>.
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IV. UAS Integration Into the NAS
A. Enabling UAS BVLOS Operations
FAA has long intended to develop a regulatory framework for more
advanced UAS operations, enabling the more complex operations that
industry has successfully demonstrated at small scale using waivers and
exemptions. Waivers, exemptions, and other authorizations, such as
operations conducted at UAS Test Sites or through the Integration Pilot
Program \36\ and BEYOND \37\ initiatives, have safely enabled numerous
BVLOS operations including infrastructure inspection, package delivery,
and surveillance. These operational advancements have occurred within
the existing aviation regulatory framework, one that did not imagine
the types of technologies that could, at a minimum, replace the human
eye or that could coordinate operations through decentralized
automation platforms. To realize the
[[Page 38222]]
next phase in UAS operations, FAA proposes a new set of regulations
specific to UAS.
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\36\ Available at <a href="http://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/completed/integration_pilot_program">www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/completed/integration_pilot_program</a>.
\37\ Available at <a href="http://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/beyond">www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/beyond</a>.
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UAS technology, as well as the various systems that support it, has
advanced faster than the regulatory framework. Having clear regulations
and guidance about how to operate BVLOS is essential for future
integration of UAS. This rule proposes requirements for airworthiness
acceptance, operating requirements, and a framework for automated data
service providers to enable scalable, repeatable, and safe BVLOS
operations.
The airworthiness and operating requirements would reside in part
108 of title 14 of the CFR, a new part that represents FAA's commitment
to a regulatory framework that permits increasingly complex UAS
operations while building on the knowledge gleaned from existing rules.
The proposed requirements for automated data service providers would
reside in new part 146. This proposed framework would provide assurance
that operations can be conducted safely, but also within the
appropriate position on the safety continuum. As discussed throughout
this rule, FAA recognizes that type certification may not be the most
appropriate regulatory regime for the safe operation of proposed part
108 aircraft, nor may the airman certification structure of manned
aviation be appropriate for these types of operations.
Proposed part 108 would enable UAS BVLOS operations through design,
procedural, and operational requirements. Operations traditionally
accomplished through manned aviation could be executed more safely and
at greater scale than currently conducted. In this context, UAS, using
programmed paths managed by third-party services, operating BVLOS, can
offer alternatives to manned aircraft to perform the same function
safely. UAS can supplement tasks that would otherwise be accomplished
by surface transportation or individuals, which could have a positive
impact on safety. A UA can fly over crops distributing pesticide or
fertilizer without the need for a person to fly a full-sized aircraft
low to the ground and risk an accident or pilot exposure to chemicals.
Enabling BVLOS operations could have a transformative impact on
logistics. Life-saving medicine, equipment, or even human organs can be
transported rapidly between points, without having to contend with
traffic congestion, or requiring a pilot to fly a helicopter into a
high-risk situation. Local regulatory authorities can use UAS to
inspect the underside of bridges or check the integrity of the railroad
tracks that crisscross the wide expanse of the United States, both more
efficiently and more safely than is possible without UAS. UAS-based
collection and analytics can inspect more energy production,
transmission, and storage infrastructure per day compared to a manual,
ground-based inspection, which significantly increases the opportunity
to detect and remedy leaks and other issues.
Through the proposed airworthiness acceptance process, operational
and personnel frameworks, and standards for automated data service
supply, the level of risk proposed in this rulemaking would be
equivalent to the level of acceptable risk in part 107, but for more
complex aircraft and operations. Part 107 notably did not require any
airworthiness certification or design standards, instead fixing the
weight at 55 pounds and relying on operating limitations to ensure safe
operation. In the 2016 Final Rule, FAA acknowledged the biggest
concerns for risk were the inability of a pilot to maintain safe
separation from other aircraft and the possibility of a loss of control
in flight due to a failure of the control link. The risk-based approach
in part 107 has proven to be safe and effective for operations
conducted within VLOS.
As we have seen through existing operations that we have enabled
through exemptions and waivers, the existing technological tools to
enable these operations are generally already available, and need only
a repeatable, scalable regulatory framework that would allow the
various potential benefits that UAS BVLOS operations could provide to
be realized. This can also be seen through the new and novel approaches
FAA has seen implemented through special programs such as BEYOND. Under
existing systems, operators can equip a UAS with technology that will
detect other aircraft, both manned and unmanned, and program it to
avoid other aircraft in a consistent, safe manner. Similarly, should a
mechanical malfunction occur, the technology is able to avoid impacting
people through pre-programmed flight responses. This use of technology,
in combination with management of the areas within which the UAS
operates, helps mitigate the risks involved in these operations, as
described in this preamble.
The regulations under this proposal would also ensure that
operators address and manage cybersecurity risks. To that end, this
proposed rule would require cybersecurity policies be in place for most
operators. The security of computers and networked systems is an
overarching goal. Operators under proposed part 108, with the limited
exception of recreational operators, would be required to assess and
monitor cybersecurity risks continuously and take appropriate
precautions to protect their operations from being compromised on an
ongoing basis.
The part 107 framework for small UAS operations prioritized
individual responsibility for operations, placing the burden of safe
operations on the remote pilot in command. While there is merit in this
approach, it does not always align with the way UAS are used,
especially in a BVLOS operation. This proposed rule would place
responsibility at a corporate level, utilizing flexible approaches to
training, operations personnel duty assignment, and development of
manuals, while also providing the flexibility to allow operators to
make risk-based decisions to conduct operations safely. Under this
proposed rule, the person exercising control over the operation would
not be certificated by FAA. Instead, FAA proposes to require an
operations supervisor who would act on behalf of the company and be
responsible for the overall safety and security of the operation,
including ensuring that operations are conducted within the parameters
of the applicable requirements and that personnel are appropriately
trained for their role. The position would also demand knowledge of the
relevant regulatory requirements, as well as company procedures and the
specific requirements associated with the UA used in their operations.
In addition, this rule proposes the utilization of flight coordinators,
if required by the aircraft design, who would have more direct
involvement in the operation of a UA and would similarly require
training in safe operation.
This proposed rule is designed to assess and manage risks to people
and property on the ground and other users in the NAS while allowing
the growth of UAS operations. The main factors considered in assessing
the risks are the industry-consensus standards that inform the design
of the UAS, the weight, speed, and size of the UA, the environment it
is operating in or over, technological mitigations to include strategic
deconfliction, conformance monitoring, and DAA capabilities, and what,
if anything, it is transporting.
Under proposed part 108, many types of operations would take place
over people. One significant risk factor for these operations would
depend on the number of people the UA is operating over. Proposed part
108 would address a variety of operating environments. To
[[Page 38223]]
present an accurate and consistent picture of population, FAA is
proposing the use of LandScan, a Federally sponsored and freely
accessible set of population data. LandScan provides a basis for
operational categories to allow complex operations over areas with
increased population density, with both technological and operational
requirements to ensure continued safety.
In proposed part 108, operations would be conducted primarily below
400 feet AGL (unless authorized by the Administrator to go higher), and
this rule would establish new requirements to allow for safe operations
BVLOS in this more integrated airspace. UAS operating under part 108
would be required to yield right of way to traffic broadcasting their
position using Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
equipment. Under proposed part 108, strategic deconfliction would be
required for operations over certain populated areas, and operations in
controlled airspace would require strategic deconfliction, conformance
monitoring, and the ability to detect cooperative and non-cooperative
aircraft in certain airspace classifications. Operators would need to
be aware of factors such as the location, weather, obstacles, and other
traffic to ensure safe operation, even as they may not be physically
present at the flight operation.
As discussed in section III.A.5 of this preamble, FAA is
approaching airworthiness in the context of a safety continuum that
considers exposure of the public to risk for each aircraft and
operation. Whereas traditional manned aircraft generally require a type
certification or special airworthiness certification to operate in the
NAS, FAA is proposing a process that would ensure public safety while
also being mindful of the level of appropriate rigor associated with
the operational envelope of UA operating under proposed part 108. While
type certification is appropriate for manned operations, it does not
necessarily follow that the time, resources, or requirements for type
certification are appropriate to allow safe operation of UAS under
proposed part 108. With airworthiness acceptance and industry consensus
standards, FAA is proposing a process that will provide a more time and
resource appropriate avenue to allow more complex UAS operations while
appropriately mitigating risk. FAA is also proposing changes that will
streamline compliance with UAS noise requirements. FAA recognizes that
a fast and efficient process is critical as the UAS technology is
constantly changing. A particular model of UAS may only be produced for
a matter of months before substantial changes occur and a new version
is produced. A lengthy approval process would not only slow
advancement, but the costs would be greater to implement design
improvements. Thus, the airworthiness acceptance, as proposed under
part 108, will allow the use of industry consensus standards and a
streamlined acceptance process.
Likewise, FAA proposes a streamlined approach for operations. An
operator would apply for authorization to operate using a UA that holds
an airworthiness acceptance. Proposed part 108 has a two-level
framework that manages risk in an efficient manner: permits and
certificates. A smaller-scale operator can apply for an operating
permit, which could be issued with sufficient oversight in a prompt and
efficient manner. For those operators wanting to expand by operating
larger aircraft in size or number, operating over larger concentrations
of people, or conducting higher risk or more complex operations, an
operating certificate would be required. This certificate would be more
akin to operating certificates in traditional aviation and would entail
a higher level of interaction with FAA for both issuance and oversight
of the certificate.
FAA further proposes new part 146 to create requirements for the
standards and establish FAA oversight of automated data service
providers. As part 108 enables UAS BVLOS operation, data is critical to
the safe and effective operation of these aircraft, as the ability to
operate BVLOS is predicated on the fidelity and assurance of the data.
To support the operational and airworthiness requirements of part 108,
FAA proposes part 146 to enable those providing these services to
obtain certification and defines minimum performance standards for
those services using industry consensus standards. Proposed part 146 is
essential for laying the groundwork for the next step for UAS
operations and providing a service approval pathway that could be used
to support other types of operations, both manned and unmanned, in the
future. This proposal would ensure operators have options in the
services that they use depending on their needs, while being assured
that they meet a standard that will keep the public safe. And by
keeping the regulation flexible, and allowing operators to choose the
service they need, future technological innovations would be recognized
while allowing choice by the part 108 operators and competition among
the part 146 service providers.
B. Need for Automated Data Service Providers
An automated data service provider is a person or company who
provides an automated data service using a distributed computational
system to support or manage aircraft operations, promoting safety and
efficiency of the operation. Automated data service providers may or
may not be directly involved in the aircraft operation but would
nonetheless support the operation before or during its flight.
Automated data service providers would add an important layer of safety
and risk mitigation benefits to the operating requirements proposed in
this rulemaking. To realize those benefits to scale, FAA proposes to
regulate automated data service providers and their services under
proposed part 146.\38\
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\38\ See section XIII of this preamble for further discussion on
FAA's proposal to regulate automated data service providers and
authorize their services.
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Not all automated data services and providers of those services
would be subject to proposed part 146. Only those that provide services
to support an aircraft operators' ability to comply with an FAA
requirement by promoting the safety and efficiency of the operation
would be subject to part 146. FAA would not, nor intends to, regulate
an entity that does not fall under its purview; as such, providers of
automated data services that are not provided to support an aircraft
operators' ability to comply with an FAA requirement or do not impact
NAS safety nor efficiency would not be enabled through proposed part
146.\39\
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\39\ Strategic deconfliction is one example of an automated data
service that would be promulgated under proposed part 146. Strategic
deconfliction would significantly scale UAS BVLOS operations under
proposed part 108. Using strategic deconfliction, a UAS operator can
strategically deconflict flight paths, thereby operate safely in the
NAS. In contrast, automated data services providers providing fleet
management services to aircraft operators would not be regulated
under proposed part 146. Fleet management services are used by
operators to fulfill a business need, not a safety objective, thus
would not be regulated under proposed part 146. For a detailed
discussion on the scope and applicability of automated data services
and providers of those services under proposed part 146, see section
XIII.E of this preamble.
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FAA selected the term ``automated data service provider'' to avoid
confusion with terms used to describe services provided by FAA's Air
Traffic Organization, which are not subject to this rulemaking. In
addition, in presentations and discussions, FAA personnel and industry
stakeholders have also used terms such as ``third-party service
suppliers'' and ``UTM
[[Page 38224]]
service providers.'' The term automated data service provider is
intended to cover both of those terms. The selected term would also
include persons and companies that self-provision their own services
(often referred to as vertically integrated companies), as well as
persons and companies that provide distributed services dependent on
ground-based sensors or equipment--sometimes referred to as
Infrastructure-as-a-Service. In addition, the term ``automated data
service providers,'' and part 146 in general, may apply to companies
that are new to aviation and market a specific product to UAS
operators, such as mobile network operators that have a UAS-specific
command-and-control (C2) link offering.\40\
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\40\ Under proposed part 146, all these terms referring to UTM
servicers or third-party servicers and the providers of such
services would fall within the umbrella term of automated data
service provider. Whether the automated data services are self-
provided or outsourced to a third-party, any entity that provides
automated data services to support an aircraft operation complying
with an FAA regulation would be subject to proposed part 146
regulations.
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Automated data services may fulfill a variety of purposes,
including mitigating risk, depending on their exact functionality. For
example, automated data services that provide strategic coordination
for UAS operations reduce the risk of midair collision between UA,
thereby reducing the risk of harm to people and property due to falling
debris from that midair collision. Other kinds of automated data
services may support operators' DAA responsibilities, including by
providing surveillance information or avoidance maneuvering
instructions that could be more comprehensive or accurate than those
the operators may provide using their own systems. Automated data
services may also help operators avoid controlled flight into terrain,
or loss of control, by providing operators with specialized data before
and during flight operations to manage a variety of risk factors.
FAA recognizes that it might not be feasible for some UAS operators
to provide all the services and functionality necessary to meet BVLOS
safety requirements in-house. This could be for a variety of reasons,
including resource and technical knowledge constraints. Automated data
services may provide a cost-effective, safe, and scalable means for
those UAS operators to meet some of the regulatory requirements in part
108. As a result, automated data services that meet the minimum
requirements proposed in this rule would provide a viable set of
alternative solutions to ensure operational safety and regulatory
compliance without placing undue restrictions or responsibilities on
UAS operators.
FAA expects that automated data service providers will deploy
services to meet emerging demands and capabilities, some of which are
yet to be developed. These services may be based on emerging industry
standards that will develop to meet market demands. Recognizing the
rapid pace of technological change, FAA proposes a flexible regulatory
structure designed to enable the recognition of new services as future
standards are designed. Section XIII of this preamble provides the
framework for regulating automated data service providers and their
services.
C. Definitions (Sec. 108.5)
FAA proposes to add several definitions in Sec. 108.5 that are
unique to operations conducted under proposed part 108. FAA is
proposing definitions for AE, C2 link, conformance monitoring, DAA,
flight coordinator, ground control station, hazardous material, life-
limited part, operational intent, operations personnel, package
delivery, safe distance, strategic deconfliction, strategic conflict
detection, strategic conflict resolution, and target average
conformance. These terms have specific meanings and usage in part 108
that may be unfamiliar to readers, or their usage in part 108 is
specifically important to the new UAS framework. These definitions
would help the public understand the context of how these terms are
used and identify their specific usages throughout part 108. FAA
invites comments on the use of the terms and the associated language
used in the definitions, as well as if any definitions are not needed,
or if any definitions should be added to the list. Discussion and
further context for the definitions included in this section can be
found in the pertinent sections of the preamble.
V. Part 108 General Requirements (Subpart A)
Currently, most UAS operations in the United States fall under part
107, which applies to small UAS operated within VLOS of the remote
operator. Since larger and more complex UAS operations are not covered
by part 107, nor are operations permitted beyond VLOS under part 107
without a waiver, UAS operators continue to rely on requesting
regulatory exemptions and waivers to allow them to conduct such
operations. While FAA has utilized the flexibility of the existing
structure broadly to permit increasingly complex and advanced UAS
operations, the current regulatory framework impedes full integration
of all operations into the U.S. airspace. FAA seeks to fulfill its
regulatory responsibility of ensuring the safety and efficiency of the
NAS by facilitating the increased integration of UAS into the NAS and
realizing UAS operational benefits. Therefore, FAA proposes to enable
complex UAS operations, specifically those conducted BVLOS of the
operator, under the proposed structure of part 108.
FAA understands that expanding UAS operations may introduce certain
safety risks to the NAS. As part of addressing those safety risks,
proposed part 108 would require new sets of processes and guidelines
for UAS BVLOS operations, including requirements for UAS operators and
maintenance personnel.
Under this proposed rule, FAA would require all UAS operators to
obtain either an operating permit or an operating certificate to
conduct their UAS operations under this part. Operators without an
operating permit or certificate would not be allowed to operate under
proposed part 108. Under this proposed rule, whether a UAS operator
applies for a part 108 operating permit or an operating certificate
would depend on the scale and overall risk of their UAS operation. FAA
expects that presenting UAS operators with those two options would
cultivate a flexible approach for operators to obtain the necessary
credentials to then be able to comply with the requirements of this
proposed part.\41\
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\41\ See section VIII of this preamble for the process of
obtaining a part 108 operating permit or certificate.
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Under this proposed rule, FAA would require operators who wish to
conduct BVLOS operations using an operating permit to comply with
subpart D of part 108. Likewise, operators who wish to conduct BVLOS
operations using an operating certificate would be required to comply
with subpart E of proposed part 108. For a discussion on the
distinction between part 108 operating permits versus operating
certificates, see section VIII of this preamble.
Regardless of whether an operator holds an FAA-issued operating
certificate or an FAA-issued operating permit, the proposed rule would
require all part 108 operators to comply with the applicable operating
rules under subpart B. Subpart B of proposed part 108 would prescribe
the general rules of engagement that each operator would need to abide
by in order to conduct UAS BVLOS operations under part 108, including
preflight operating
[[Page 38225]]
requirements and regulations related to operating BVLOS over people. A
further discussion on general operating rules is contained in section
VI.B of this preamble. Lastly, proposed part 108 would also prescribe
operating personnel requirements under subpart C, aircraft maintenance
and alterations requirements under subpart F, and general procedural
requirements--which includes inspection requirements and prohibitions
against engaging in fraudulent or deceptive practices--under subpart A
of the proposed part.\42\
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\42\ For subpart A, General, see section V of this preamble; for
subpart C, Operations Personnel, see section VII of this preamble;
for subpart F, Maintenance and Alterations, see section IX of this
preamble.
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A. Applicability (Sec. 108.1)
Proposed Sec. 108.1 states that the requirements in proposed part
108 would apply to any person \43\ who wishes to conduct UAS BVLOS
operations in the NAS. Regarding operator requirements, as proposed in
Sec. 108.1(a), the requirements of part 108 would apply to any person
who (1) conducts, or intends to conduct, UAS BVLOS operations in U.S.
airspace; (2) requests FAA issuance of an operating permit or an
operating certificate; (3) performs maintenance on a UAS under an
operating permit or certificate issued in accordance with this proposed
part; (4) is involved in the design, manufacture, or production of UAS
to be operating in accordance with part 108; (5) requests FAA
airworthiness acceptance of a UAS in accordance with subparts G and H
of this part; or (6) submits a voluntary consensus standard for
acceptance or approval by FAA as a means of compliance for any
provision of part 108.
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\43\ Per 14 CFR 1.1, a person is described as an individual or
an entity, including a corporation, company, association,
governmental entity, etc.
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In addition to noting who part 108 would apply to, FAA is also
proposing specific exclusions from part 108 to delineate between the
different regulations that UAS could be operated under. As proposed in
Sec. 108.1(b), part 108 would not be applicable to any persons who
choose to conduct UAS operations under 14 CFR part 107 or part 91.
In addition, UAS operations conducted under the recreational flyer
provisions of 49 U.S.C. 44809 would not be subject to this rulemaking.
FAA anticipates that certain operations such as agricultural, package
delivery, aerial surveying, photography, and flight testing currently
conducted under waivers or exemptions to 14 CFR part 107, 91, or 135
would transition to the operations under part 108 when their exemptions
expire, and a reasonable transition can occur. For operations that
would not fall within the proposed operating requirements of part 108,
FAA believes those operators who are currently complying with FAA
requirements to conduct safe and efficient UAS operations may continue
to do so in accordance with their existing framework. Proposed part 108
is not intended to fulfill the need for every type of operation related
to UAS but rather would expand the types of operations that can be
conducted under existing FAA regulations.
FAA considered whether it would be appropriate to amend part 107 or
to add an additional subpart to proposed part 108 to provide a
regulatory path for certain VLOS operations with aircraft weighing 55
pounds or greater with less automation than envisioned for
airworthiness acceptance under this proposed part. Ultimately, FAA
determined that adding a VLOS subpart to proposed part 108 would
unnecessarily complicate the rule, as the risk mitigations under this
proposed part rely on minimal human intervention to manage risk for
BVLOS operations of larger aircraft with more complex operations.
Operation of larger VLOS aircraft is a different risk set than what is
being addressed in proposed part 108 and including it would add
significant complexity to the structure of this proposed rule.
In addition, at this time FAA has also opted out of expanding the
VLOS rules under part 107 to add UAS weighing 55 pounds or greater
because doing so could unnecessarily delay this proposed rule. The 55-
pound limit within part 107 functions as a significant risk mitigation
in VLOS UAS operations and increasing the weight threshold would
require FAA to either develop new risk mitigation measures or have
sufficient data to establish that operations can be safely conducted at
a higher weight threshold with no additional risk mitigation measures.
Also, FAA is unable to gauge the public's need or desire for VLOS
operations of aircraft weighing 55 pounds or greater where the operator
cannot, or would be seriously disadvantaged to, meet the airworthiness
or operational requirements proposed for part 108. While FAA
anticipates that there may be business cases in which manually operated
UA equal to or exceeding 55 pounds may be the best option, FAA expects
these cases to be limited in number based on current operations.
Further, FAA's intention with proposed part 108 is to create a
regulatory framework for greatly expanded UAS operations with new and
more capable UA, not to create a retrofit model for existing UAS with
limited lifespans. Nevertheless, FAA recognizes that there are many
existing UAS weighing 55 pounds or greater that are currently operating
under an exemption to part 91 and those types of operations will be
able to continue as they always have. FAA invites comments on whether
there is a need or desire to expand part 107 for VLOS UAS operations
weighing 55 pounds or greater. FAA also considered updating the
relevant part 91 regulations \44\ that are not currently in alignment
with operations of a UA and are frequently the cause of exemptions
needed for operators choosing to operate under that part. FAA, however,
has opted out of updating part 91 in this way because doing so could
unnecessarily prolong this rulemaking. In addition, FAA is unsure how
great the need would be for part 91 exemptions after the framework for
part 108 is put into place. Finally, FAA invites comments on the
assumptions above related to parts 91 and 107, and areas where FAA may
be lacking information.
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\44\ FAA has granted relief from several regulations within 14
CFR; notably, from Sec. Sec. 91.7(a), 91.109(a), 91.119(b),
91.119(c), 91.121, 91.151(a), 91.151(b), 91.209(a)(1), 91.403(b),
91.405(a), 91.407(a)(1), 91.409(a)(1), 91.409(a)(2), 91.417(a),
91.417(b), among other sections of part 91.
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It is important to note that, while proposed part 108 enables the
operation of UA BVLOS, there is no prohibition from operating within
VLOS under proposed part 108, so long as all the regulatory
requirements are met. To illustrate this, an aircraft weighing less
than 55 pounds that is to be operated within VLOS would have several
options for which part they could operate under. They could operate
under part 107, proposed part 108, part 91, or 49 U.S.C. 44809. Each
regulation has its own set of unique requirements and allowances. An
operator would have to meet all relevant requirements associated with
the regulatory part they choose to operate under.
Proposed part 108 is not intended to be used for carriage of
people. The risk mitigations provided by this part are not sufficient
for passenger carriage nor were they designed with carriage of people
in mind. To that end, FAA proposes in Sec. 108.1(b)(4) that UA
operated under part 108 are not permitted to carry a person. Operations
contemplating carriage of people would appropriately occur under other
regulatory parts, such as 14 CFR parts 91 or 135.
[[Page 38226]]
B. Reporting and Prohibitions
1. Reproduction or Alteration (Sec. 108.10)
FAA expects that all parties affected by this proposed rulemaking
would comply with FAA requirements when conducting UAS BVLOS operations
under proposed part 108. Engaging in fraudulent or deceptive practices
would be prohibited under proposed part 108, as it is under all
existing FAA regulations.\45\
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\45\ As proposed in the Falsification, Reproduction, Alteration,
Omission, or Incorrect Statements notice of proposed rulemaking (89
FR 8560), FAA intends to use a comprehensive prohibition on
fraudulent or deceptive practices that covers all FAA regulations.
If that rule becomes final, proposed Sec. 108.10 would be
redundant.
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Proposed Sec. 108.10(a) would prohibit anyone from making any
fraudulent or intentionally false statement to any information
submitted to FAA to show compliance with proposed part 108. Persons
would be prohibited from fraudulently reproducing or altering an FAA-
issued operating certificate or permit. If anyone were to engage in
fraudulent or deceptive practices, proposed Sec. 108.10(b) would
enable FAA to issue penalties to those persons for their violations.
Those penalties could include issuing a denial to applications for part
108 operating permits, part 108 operating certificates, certificates of
waiver or authorizations, or declarations of compliance. Under the
proposed rule, FAA may also penalize violators by suspending or
revoking any permit, certificate, authorization, DOC, or similar that
were already issued or accepted by FAA. Lastly, anyone violating this
provision may also be subject to civil penalties.
2. Prohibition on Interference With Unmanned Aircraft Operations
Personnel (Sec. 108.15)
Proposed Sec. 108.15 would prohibit anyone from assaulting,
threatening, intimidating, or interfering with operations personnel of
a UA in the performance of their duties regarding the operation of a
UA. This requirement would be necessary to protect the safety and
efficiency of the NAS. Bad actors who interfere with UAS operations may
endanger public safety, or any persons or property--both in the air or
on the ground--which is anathema to FAA's obligation to ensure the safe
and efficient use of the NAS. FAA notes that nothing in this
requirement would preclude law enforcement, emergency services, the
intelligence community, military personnel, or FAA personnel executing
their authorized duties from intervening in operations in the interests
of national security, emergency response, or oversight and surveillance
necessary for the safety of the NAS.
3. Inspection, Testing, and Demonstration of Compliance (Sec. 108.20)
To ensure operations are conducted in accordance with existing
rules and limitations, and FAA's statutory oversight
responsibilities,\46\ Sec. Sec. 108.20(a)(1) and (2) proposes that an
operator would need to have their authorization to operate and
identification readily accessible when operating and present it to any
of the following: FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),
and law enforcement officers. This measure would ensure that all
operators are appropriately authorized, enhancing the safety and
security of airspace operations. This requirement would set the stage
for obligations aimed at maintaining operational integrity and
oversight. This mandate would hold the operator accountable for
unauthorized access and operation of UAS, which could result in
incidents or accidents. The proposed requirement that operators have
their authorization and identification on hand is so that government
personnel would be able to verify that the operation is authorized and
that qualified personnel are in control. This would ensure that
operations are conducted efficiently and in compliance with regulatory
standards.
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\46\ See 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(2)(A).
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Section 108.20(a)(3) further proposes that an operator would need
to make available, upon request of FAA or any authorized representative
of the NTSB, any document, record, or report required to be kept under
the regulations of 14 CFR chapter I. By ensuring that all relevant
documents, records, and reports are readily available for inspection,
government representatives would be able to monitor compliance with
established safety standards and regulations. This oversight would be
essential for identifying potential areas of non-compliance or safety
risks that could jeopardize the safety of operations. Utilizing these
documents as part of regular and ad-hoc inspections would allow for a
proactive approach to safety management, enabling the early detection
and resolution of safety issues before they lead to accidents or
incidents.
In the aftermath of an incident, the availability of comprehensive
documentation is important for thorough investigations conducted by the
NTSB or other relevant authorities. These documents would provide a
detailed account of operational procedures, maintenance records,
personnel qualifications, and other factors that might contribute to
understanding the root causes of an incident. Access to such
information supports developing effective recommendations to prevent
future occurrences, thereby improving overall safety standards.
Section 108.20(b) proposes that each operator of UAS would be
required to, upon request, allow FAA to make or witness any test or
inspection of the UAS, including any aspect of the operation of a UAS,
and if applicable, the automated data services utilized, to determine
compliance with this part, including access to the operations area for
the aircraft. This proposed requirement is consistent with FAA's
exercise of its authority to ensure operational safety in the NAS. In
circumstances in which FAA were to identify a safety issue that
warrants review of the operation, this proposed requirement would
permit FAA review of all applicable information to make any appropriate
determinations about the safety of the operation.
The ability for FAA to perform inspections without prior notice
would ensure that operators consistently adhere to the highest
standards of safety as a fundamental practice, not just when an
inspection is anticipated. This continuous state of readiness and
compliance would safeguard not only the operators and their assets, but
also the public potential hazards.
Moreover, these inspections would serve as a feedback loop. They
would allow FAA to observe operational practices, the state of
equipment, and adherence to regulations. Such inspections would promote
transparency and accountability. By allowing FAA access to conduct
these evaluations, operators would demonstrate their commitment to
operating within existing limitations and requirements. This openness
would build trust among stakeholders, including regulatory bodies, the
public, and other airspace users.
Section 108.20(c) proposes that each employee of, or person used
by, the operator who is responsible for maintaining the operator's
records would need to make those records available to FAA. Making
records accessible to FAA would allow for thorough audits and reviews
that can verify compliance with safety standards, operational
procedures, and maintenance practices. These records would include, but
would not be limited to, logs of operational procedures, maintenance
and repair
[[Page 38227]]
records, safety assessments, and employee training records and any
other record relating to compliance.
Requiring records to be available for inspection would encourage
operators to maintain accurate and comprehensive documentation of their
operations. This practice would support continuous improvement by
facilitating regular reviews and updates to safety practices based on
insights gained from record analysis.
As part of FAA's safety oversight framework, this proposal would
require individuals holding an FAA airworthiness acceptance to make
available evidence of such acceptance and any other requisite documents
upon request. It would ensure that aircraft operating within FAA's
regulatory jurisdiction meet the safety standards, thereby protecting
the public, enhancing the integrity of the aviation industry, and
fostering continuous improvement in aviation safety.
Section 108.20(d) proposes that failure by any operator to make
available to the Administrator upon request, the certificate,
operations specifications, or any required record, document, or report
would be grounds for suspension of all or any part of the operator's
permit or certificate.
4. Aviation Safety Reporting System: Prohibition Against Use of Reports
for Enforcement Purposes (Sec. 108.25)
Proposed Sec. 108.25 would prohibit FAA from using reports
submitted to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
under the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) in any enforcement
action against part 108 operators. This prohibition would not apply,
however, in cases where the information submitted to NASA concerns
accidents or criminal offenses, which are wholly excluded from ASRS.
ASRS was originally created to collect aviation safety event
information from pilots, mechanics, air traffic controllers, and other
users of the NAS. Under part 107, UAS pilots operating within the VLOS
may also use ASRS to report safety events.
The prohibition in proposed Sec. 108.25 against FAA using ASRS
data in enforcement actions would be very similar to how such reports
are protected and used for part 91 pilots, part 107 UAS pilots, and
other airspace users who are subject to various portions of FAA
regulations. FAA and NASA have recognized the benefit of having
accurate, candid, and timely reports of unsafe (or potentially unsafe)
conditions in the NAS. Such data and reports are vital for proactive
and generative safety assurance, enabling FAA to identify leading
indicators of increasing risk prior to an accident or incident. As FAA
stated in Advisory Circular (AC) 00-46F, ``the effectiveness of this
program in improving safety depends on the free, unrestricted flow of
information from the users of the NAS.'' FAA is concerned that, without
such a prohibition on enforcement actions, pilots, UAS operators and
other NAS users would be disincentivized from making safety reports,
including acknowledging unintentional or honest mistakes, for fear of
being penalized by FAA.
5. Base of Operation and Operator Identification (Sec. Sec. 108.30 and
108.35)
FAA proposes in Sec. Sec. 108.30(a) and (b) that each operator
would be required to maintain a principal base of operations in the
United States and would be required to provide FAA with a physical
address. This physical address would serve as the primary point of
contact for FAA, though (per proposed Sec. 108.30(d)) the operator may
perform operations at locations other than the principal base of
operations, as authorized by FAA. Further, per proposed Sec.
108.30(c), the operator would need to notify FAA at least 30 days prior
to changing their principal base of operations. However, recreational
operators would not be required to submit a principal base of
operations, in accordance with proposed Sec. 108.475(f)(3).
Recreational operators would only be required to submit a physical
address.
By ensuring that all operators supply a physical address, FAA would
have the ability to accomplish prompt and cost-effective service of
process and service of other safety-critical or time-sensitive
documents, including notices of proposed civil penalties, orders of
suspension or revocation, and emergency orders of suspension or
revocation. In addition, as this proposed rule would only apply to
operations conducted within the United States, FAA finds it necessary
that the physical base of operations is also located in the United
States. While part 47 aircraft registration does require the aircraft
owner to provide a mailing address, FAA is including this requirement
for a principal base of operations in proposed part 108 because it is
important for FAA to know the primary location where the operator will
be conducting operations to conduct inspections. The address required
for part 47 is the owner's mailing address, which may or may not be
where the UA is located or from which it is operated.
In addition, FAA proposes in Sec. 108.35(a) that an operator would
not be able to operate or advertise services of a UA under part 108
using a business name other than what is listed on the operating permit
or operating certificate. If the operator were to operate under a d/b/
a, the business names would need to be provided on the application and
listed on the permit or certificate to be valid. Furthermore, in
proposed Sec. 108.35(b), no person would be able to operate a UA under
part 108 unless the identity of the operator is displayed on the UA in
a manner acceptable to FAA. In addition to the registration number, FAA
proposes that an operator would need to include the company name or
trademark on the exterior of the aircraft for ease of identity in the
case of a lost aircraft or off-site landing. FAA also encourages the
addition of contact information in the form of a phone number, QR code,
or other method to enable people who may come across the UA be able to
report the sighting easily.
These proposed requirements in Sec. 108.35 would be consistent
with FAA practices for other commercial operations and would ensure FAA
has sufficient information to contact the operator as necessary,
including in instances where a UA is destroyed and access to remote ID
or other electronic systems is not possible, or FAA has other reason to
contact the operator. In addition, as with other regulations applicable
to commercial operations, the proposed prohibition on advertising under
a different name would ensure that the people using the operator have
the assurance that the company is operating within the regulatory
framework established by FAA and would ensure FAA can appropriately
link the operator who is advertising with the approval for the
operation.
C. Recordkeeping (Sec. 108.40)
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.40 to require each operator under
proposed part 108 to maintain records for each aircraft used in part
108 operations, each required operations personnel used in part 108
operations, any mechanical irregularities for the UA and its AE, any
maintenance or alterations performed on the UA or its AE, and all
initial and recurrent training taken by each person required to receive
training under proposed part 108. The operator would also be expected
to provide FAA access to the records upon request, either
electronically or in paper form.
For aircraft records, FAA proposes under Sec. 108.40(a) that
operators would need to include a current list of UA used in the
permitted or certificated operation, the total time in service of each
UA, and the status of any life-limited parts. FAA and industry rely
[[Page 38228]]
heavily on current aircraft status and past aircraft servicing and
inspections to determine airworthiness of an aircraft. FAA would
therefore require these records to be kept by the operator under this
part.
FAA further proposes in Sec. 108.40(a)(3) that an operator who
performs a flight under this proposed rule would need to maintain
records of each flight, including the date, time, and duration of the
flight; the aircraft registration number; the type of operation (e.g.,
package delivery); the flight path including destination, origin, and
altitude(s); the name of the designated operations personnel assigned
to each flight; and landing locations if different from origin and
destination locations. FAA is proposing this recordkeeping to ensure
the availability of information critical to incident or accident
investigations. By requiring the operator to maintain these, FAA and
operator would have historical data to determine root causes of
occurrences, incidents, or accidents.
Proposed Sec. Sec. 108.40(a)(3)(vii) and 108.40(a)(3)(viii)
include operation type-specific recordkeeping requirements for package
delivery and agricultural operators. Under proposed Sec.
108.40(a)(3)(vii), FAA would require package delivery operators to keep
a record of the pickup points and delivery locations for each
operation. FAA is proposing this requirement in addition to
destination, origin, and landing locations because some UA do not
physically land to pick up or deliver packages and it would be critical
for FAA to know who the customers or warehousers are and where they are
located in the event of an incident or accident investigation. Under
proposed Sec. 108.40(a)(3)(viii), FAA would also require the operators
performing agricultural operations to keep a record of the name and
address of each person for whom agricultural UA services were provided,
the date of the service, and the name and quantity of the substance
dispensed be kept as a record by the operator. The rationale for this
additional requirement is that the agricultural operator may be
contracted to provide services to one or more customers, and it is
important for FAA to know who these customers are and where they are
located in the event of an incident or investigation. Oftentimes, FAA
does not discover non-compliance, accidents, or incidents involving
aircraft until after the flight has been completed. By requiring these
detailed records to be kept by the operator, FAA and operator would
have historical data to look back on to determine root causes to
occurrences, incidents, or accidents.
Because personnel are a key contributor to how any permit or
certificate holder conducts safe operations, FAA proposes in Sec.
108.40(b) that each operator would need to maintain records on each
person required for the safe operation of the UAS used in its
operations, including their full name, qualifications in sufficient
detail to determine the individual's ability to participate in part 108
operations, current duties and date of duty assignment, and information
relating to an individual's release from employment for cause. In
addition, for operators holding an operating certificate, the operator
would also need be required to maintain records on the date and times
of operations personnel assigned work shifts, the length of the rest
period prior to each duty period for each of the required personnel,
and the total hours on duty per calendar day for each of the required
operations personnel which, as discussed in VII.F, would require a
minimum of 10-hour rest periods and maximum 14-hour duty days. This
information would be valuable in understanding if persons are fit for
duty and appropriately qualified. In addition, this information would
be beneficial to FAA for continued surveillance purposes.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.40(c) that operators would need to
provide logs for personnel to record mechanical irregularities. Having
this log would allow personnel to view current and previous
discrepancies for corrections and airworthiness of the aircraft. FAA
further proposes that operations personnel would be required to enter,
or to have entered, in the log each mechanical irregularity for the UA
and their AE that comes to the person's attention. For operators to
ensure that faulty or inoperative equipment is addressed per
manufacturers' maintenance instructions, operations personnel would
need to create a log of the faulty item should it come to their
attention. This log would ultimately be used by both maintenance
personnel for correction and operations personnel for determining
overall UA airworthiness. In addition, when entering a log of
mechanical irregularity, FAA proposes that personnel who take
corrective action concerning a reported or observed failure or
malfunction would need to enter, or need to have entered, the action
taken in the log. This would ensure that any person(s) responsible for
determining UA airworthiness can decide the UA's overall operational
status.
Further, FAA proposes that, under Sec. 108.40(d), the operator
would be required to maintain records of the UA inspection status for
each maintenance or alteration activity to the UA or its AE. It is
important for anyone operating the UA to be able to determine when the
last inspections were performed and the status of all the required
inspections as outlined in the manufacturer's maintenance instructions.
In addition, persons performing maintenance on the UA would be required
under proposed Sec. 108.40(d)(1) to make a record of that activity,
including a description of the work performed, the date of completion
of the work, the identification of the person who performed the
maintenance, and a return to service approval. These requirements would
additionally help persons responsible for airworthiness determination
to ensure proper airworthiness status of the UA by showing a complete
log of all work performed.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.40(d)(2) that operators would not need to
comply with the logging and documenting requirements of proposed Sec.
108.40 for removal and replacement of UA batteries designed for
frequent, toolless replacement if the operator has other means of
tracking battery use, life, and performance. Some UA designs
necessitate the removal of the aircraft batteries on every flight for
charging. Aircraft designed this way are expected to have an easy,
toolless feature that prevents the battery from being installed
improperly and ensures that the battery is secure. Therefore, all of
the information generally required for other maintenance entries may
not be needed in these cases and may become overly burdensome if
required for every flight. However, FAA recognizes that batteries are
essential to most UA operations and does propose that operators would
still need a way to track battery use, life, and performance.
FAA also proposes in Sec. 108.40(d)(3) that operators would not
need to comply with the logging and documenting requirements of Sec.
108.40 for removal and replacement of UA components that are designed
for toolless removal and installation, such as removable rotors which
may be necessary to remove for UA storage, so long as the operator has
procedures for ensuring that any part that is removed is inspected for
serviceability prior to being reinstalled and: (1) the parts are
reinstalled on the same aircraft; (2) the parts are not subject to time
limits; or (3) the operator has other means of tracking installations
and use. Through current experience, FAA understands that UA often have
various removable parts that are frequently removed and replaced
without being deemed faulty. These typical parts are removed for
[[Page 38229]]
reasons such as storage or repositioning of the UA. FAA does not intend
to overburden an operator with logging and documenting parts that the
manufacturer has designed to be normally removed and reinstalled. So
long as operators have procedures for ensuring parts are removed,
inspected, and reinstalled, FAA has concluded that safety would not be
affected by not requiring logging and documenting normal removal and
reinstallation of parts.
Personnel training is of great importance, as it ensures
appropriate qualification, competency, and proficiency of a person
performing their duties. To understand each person's qualification,
competency, and proficiency, proposed Sec. 108.40(e) would require the
operator to keep a record showing personnel training. Initial and
recurrent training records are important because they show a person's
baseline qualifications and continuing proficiency. In addition to
requiring recordkeeping of all initial and recurrent training,
operators would additionally need to maintain records on initial and
recurrent training on handling hazardous materials and for agricultural
operations. As described in section VIII.C 9, these types of operations
would have additional knowledge requirements to address the use of
agricultural products. In addition, these training records would give a
snapshot of company policies and procedures at the time that the
training occurred. This may be of importance when reviewing archival
records for root cause of non-compliance or a safety incident.
FAA proposes that the records required by Sec. 108.40(e) would
need to contain the person's name, the date of hire or start of a
related job function, the most recent training completion date, a
description, copy, or reference to training materials used to meet the
training requirement, the name and address of the organization
providing the training, and a copy of the certification issued when the
individual was trained, which would show that training has been
completed satisfactorily. All of this documentation would help not only
the operator to have a complete description of the training event for
tracking, scheduling of future training, and archival documentation for
non-compliances, but also would help FAA to determine continued
compliance.
Finally, this proposal would include minimum retention periods. FAA
recognizes that operators may struggle to keep track of old records and
the necessity for archival data from those records becomes unnecessary
and non-applicable as time goes on. FAA therefore proposes that UA
records, mechanical irregularity records, and maintenance records would
need to be kept either for the life of the aircraft, or for 24 months,
as applicable. Records of the total time in service of each UA and the
status of any life-limited parts must be kept for the life of the
aircraft as they establish important history for the UA that must be
maintained. Records of each flight performed, must be retained for a
period of 24 months. Personnel records must generally continue to be
maintained as long as the employee is employed and continue until 12
months after the person has separated from the company, to include any
training performed or received, however, duty and rest records only
have to be maintained for 3 months. Records of mechanical
irregularities and maintenance performed must also be retained for a
period of 24 months.
In addition, personnel and training records would need to be
retained for 12 months following the separation of the personnel from
the operator. This amount of time would be sufficient for these records
to be useful. FAA does not want to impose on an operator record filing
that, after years of retention, may create faulty, inundated databases
with records that have not shown to be of concern within the previous
12 months. FAA proposes that initial and recurrent training records
required by Sec. 108.315, initial and recurrent training records
required by Sec. 108.440(b), initial and recurrent training records
required by Sec. 108.570(a) and records received for agricultural
operations required by Sec. Sec. 108.445(i)-(j) and 108.575(g) would
need to be retained under the proposed above requirements for 12 months
after separation.
Finally, FAA proposes that operators holding an operating
certificate would need to retain records in proposed Sec. 108.40(b)(5)
concerning the date and times of operations personnel assigned work
shifts, the length of the rest period prior to each duty period for
each of the required operations personnel, and the total hours on duty
per calendar day for each of the required operations personnel for a
period of 3 months. Information contained in these records are related
to individual flights. FAA would use this type of data during routine
surveillance inspections to determine individual flight compliance with
regulations. FAA does however recognize the burden that would be
imposed on an operator should records for multiple flights be required
to be kept for long periods at a time. Operator databases would be
overloaded with data. During routine surveillance, FAA typically
reviews samplings of this type of data to determine overall compliance.
FAA does not see the need to retain lengthy archival data concerning
individual flights.
D. Reporting (Sec. 108.45)
FAA has a duty to ensure the safety of the NAS. To do so, FAA needs
to be aware of accidents, incidents, and precursor safety events and
occurrences in the NAS. The reporting requirements proposed in Sec.
108.45 are intended to capture a diverse set of data ensuring that FAA
can appropriately track and monitor the safety of UAS operations under
this part.
In Sec. 108.45(a)(1), FAA proposes that each operator would be
required to report aggregate flight data to FAA. This data would
include the total number of flight hours operated for each individual
UA, including the specific make, model, or series of aircraft and the
associated FAA registration number. This data would be helpful for
three reasons. First, it would support FAA's safety oversight
functions. By collecting flight data, FAA would gain insights into UAS
operations. This information would help FAA identify potential risks,
and areas for improvement. Second, this data would be useful in
identifying trends that could otherwise lead to accidents or incidents.
Monitoring flight hours would allow FAA to track usage patterns and
identify any anomalies or excessive usage. This would also aid in
preventing accidents due to overuse or fatigue-related issues. Third,
reporting flight data would ensure compliance with regulations by
enabling FAA to verify that operators are adhering to their operational
limits.
In Sec. 108.45(a)(2) FAA proposes requiring operators to provide
flight data to the manufacturer or permit and facilitate flight data
collection by the manufacturer to ensure continued operational support
for the operator. Traditionally, these data collection systems are
already voluntarily implemented within the industry to analyze flight
data to aid in the identification of safety issues with the UA design.
FAA envisions that this could be accomplished by submitting the data
log file to support both Sec. 108.725 and Sec. 108.905. In Sec.
108.45(b), FAA proposes requiring each operator to report the
registration and serial numbers of each aircraft used in part 108
operations. This report would need to be made in a form or manner
acceptable to the Administrator. FAA notes in proposed Sec. 108.45(b)
that this reporting can be combined with the flight data reporting
required under
[[Page 38230]]
proposed Sec. 108.45(a). Requiring this reporting allows FAA to easily
determine an operator's compliance with Sec. 108.115 as well as to
ensure ongoing regulatory compliance.
In Sec. 108.45(c), FAA proposes that operators would be required
to submit a monthly interruption report summary to FAA when there is an
occurrence related to an unplanned or precautionary landing away from
the normally designated landing location or where the planned UAS route
is altered due to known or suspected mechanical difficulties or
malfunctions. By analyzing these occurrences, FAA would gain insights
into common failure modes. This information would inform maintenance
practices and would help improve reliability--including potential
changes that the manufacturer may need to make or that can be addressed
through revisions to industry consensus standards. Aggregated reports
would allow FAA to assess the overall health of a growing and diverse
fleet of UAS. This would inform regulatory decisions, training
programs, and safety best practices, among other outcomes. Taken
together, these reporting requirements would serve as essential tools
for maintaining safety, compliance, and operational efficiency.
FAA further proposes that operators certificated under subpart E
would be mandated under Sec. 108.45(d)(1) to report to the UA
manufacturer any failure, malfunction, or defect that results in a
momentary or permanent loss of control or communication of the UAS if
it has endangered, or may endanger, the safe operation of the UA. Under
the proposed rule, operators would also have to provide such reports to
FAA upon request. FAA's intent for this proposed requirement is that
this information could be used by the manufacturer to monitor and
identify negative trends affecting the safe operation of the UA and its
AE. Reporting reliability issues to the UAS manufacturer would provide
a vital source of data to help detect and mitigate potential hazards
and improve aircraft design. Safety reporting can provide precursor
data before a hazard leads to a more significant event. By analyzing
these events, industry may be able to avoid future incidents or
accidents.
Operators would need to include specific details in their reports,
including the date, aircraft identification and nature of the failure.
Furthermore, FAA proposes in Sec. 108.45(d)(1) that service difficulty
reports would also need to include identification of a part or system
involved, which aids in pinpointing root causes and assessing overall
system reliability. FAA also proposes in Sec. 108.45(d)(1) requiring
operators to indicate the apparent cause of the failure, malfunction,
or defect. This could include factors such as wear, cracks, a design
deficiency, or a personnel error on the part of the operator.
Regardless of what the cause is, understanding the root cause would
inform better preventive measures. To assist manufacturers in
determining the best course to address a service difficulty report, FAA
also proposes in Sec. 108.45(d)(1) that operators would need to report
any corrective actions taken.
The service difficulty reporting requirements for operators to
report to automated data service providers in proposed Sec.
108.45(d)(2) would substantially mirror those discussed in proposed
Sec. 108.45(d)(1), albeit with several notable exceptions. The
requirement to make service difficulty reports related to service usage
would apply to all users of a service, not just operational certificate
holders. Because the operational use of automated data services is new,
FAA wants to enable greater information exchange between users and
service providers when the failure, malfunction, or defect of an
authorized service has endangered or may endanger the safe operation of
the aircraft. This proposed rule would require that users report
details of the apparent failure of an automated data service, which
could include operational or functional issues including notification
of a contingent state, interface issues, data issues, time delay/
latency issues, or the operational response to information or alerts
from a service. FAA intends for this to be broad so that users and
service providers alike can recognize a range of issues, including
systemic incorrect usage of a service that may be due to ambiguities in
documentation, design, or other factors.
Prompt reporting of service difficulties of not later than 7 days
after the occurrence would enable manufacturers and automated data
service providers to play a proactive role in assessing and mitigating
potential safety risks. By reporting to the aircraft manufacturer or
the automated data service providers, operators would contribute to a
broader understanding of real-world performance and reliability. This
feedback would inform design improvements, corrective actions, and
other sets of standards upon which the airworthiness acceptance and
service authorization rely. Therefore, in proposed Sec. 108.45(h)(4),
FAA proposes that reporting under (d)(1) and (d)(2) would need to occur
no later than 7 days after the occurrence.
FAA proposes several security-related reporting requirements in
Sec. 108.45(e). Any security breach where an operator loses control of
the UAS would need to be reported to FAA. This would include
unauthorized control that may be careless in nature or perpetrated by a
malicious agent, regardless of if that individual is an employee or an
outsider. Furthermore, an operator would need to report unauthorized
access to the operator's facilities, including areas where UAS are
loaded, hazardous materials are stored, or goods are prepared for
transport. Finally, an operator would need to report unauthorized
access to the operator's networks, devices, or data, regardless of its
impact on UAS operations' integrity, accuracy, or reliability. In the
report for any incident, the operator would need to include the date
and time of the incident, the nature and scope of the incident,
identification of any vulnerabilities that led to loss of control or
unauthorized access, and corrective actions taken. These security-
related reporting requirements would work in conjunction with similar
requirements FAA proposes for aircraft manufacturers (sections X and
XI) and automated data service providers (section XIII). Reporting
security incidents would ensure that potential threats are identified
and addressed promptly and contributes to national security by
preventing misuse of UAS technology. Reporting would allow FAA to
investigate breaches, assess vulnerabilities, and implement corrective
measures. It also would help prevent future incidents. Reporting such
breaches helps safeguard critical data and maintain public trust.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.45(f) that part 108 UAS operators report
any deviation from this part in the event of an emergency within 10
days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and federal holidays. While
emergencies may necessitate deviations from standard procedures,
reporting these deviations would ensure transparency and accountability
on the part of the operator, and may provide insights into operational
challenges that could inform changes in training or operational
policies.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.45(g) that operators must report to FAA
any operation of a UA that involves damage to property, other than the
UA, which exceeds $500, and for any malfunction or failure of any
system that leads to operations into an unauthorized area. Note that
these reports are in addition to the reporting of aircraft accidents
and
[[Page 38231]]
serious incidents required under 49 CFR 830. FAA chose not to add a
duplicative reporting requirement as FAA would also receive these
notifications in due course through that regulatory process. FAA
intends to use the data both to track overall safety performance and to
establish and update relevant safety policies for ongoing BVLOS UAS
operations under the rule. Reports under proposed Sec. 108.45(g) would
need to include the date, time, and location of the event, as well as a
description of the event (including operational factors including
whether use, failure, malfunction, or defect of an automated data
service provider was a factor) and any known contributing factors. FAA
proposes requiring reports within 10 days of the event. This would be
consistent with the corresponding reporting requirement in proposed
Sec. 107.20.
Finally, FAA proposes in Sec. 108.45(h) reporting timeframes for
each reporting requirement enumerated under proposed Sec. 108.45.
Under the proposed rule, flight data and UA registration and serial
numbers (Sec. Sec. 108.45(a) and 108.45(b)) would need to be provided
to FAA at least once each calendar month. FAA intends to provide an
automated interface to facilitate the collection of this data and
anticipates that most manufacturers and operators will incorporate
automation to comply with this request, so that data collection could
be as frequent as near real-time, weekly, or any other frequency that
is at least once a month. As this is a new requirement, FAA invites
comments on the impact this might have on operators, including
potentially less-burdensome alternatives.
Summaries of occurrences under interruption reports (Sec.
108.45(c)) would need to be provided no later than the end of the 10th
day of the following month in which the occurrence took place, which
would be consistent with other similar requirements in other
regulations.\47\ Service difficulty reports (Sec. 108.45(d)) would
need to be submitted 7 days after the occurrence, with additional
information provided as needed to supplement the initial report which
is also consistent with similar requirements.\48\ Security occurrences
(Sec. 108.45(e)) would need to be reported no later than 96 hours
after the occurrence, with supplemental information after the initial
report as needed, which would be a new requirement but is being
proposed as a 96-hour requirement due to the nature of the information.
Emergency conditions and event reporting (Sec. Sec. 108.45(f) and (g))
would need to be submitted within 10 days of the deviation or event,
respectively.
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\47\ See, e.g., 14 CFR 135.417, 14 CFR 121.705, 14 CFR 91.1417.
\48\ See, e.g., 14 CFR 135.415, 14 CFR 121.703, 14 CFR 125.409.
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Lastly, in considering appropriate reporting requirements for
operations under part 108, FAA is considering requiring UA operators to
report to FAA all aircraft traffic targets received by their UA
operating under this part. This would include reporting ADS-B targets
used to meet Sec. 108.195 and part 89 compliant remote ID received by
the operator's UA. The latter remote ID reporting requirement would
have required additional aircraft reception capability that is not
explicitly required by the proposed part 108 rule. This reporting
requirement would allow FAA to have a more comprehensive awareness of
operations within airspace used by part 108 operators. It would allow
FAA to better respond to governmental or public inquiries about UAS
operations as low altitude UAS operations increase in scale. However,
the presumed additional cost to meet the reporting requirement for the
UA manufacturer, part 108 operator, and FAA is considerable. FAA
requests comment on whether FAA should require this traffic target
reporting, and if so, what type of general time latency would be
appropriate for FAA to require.
VI. Conducting UAS BVLOS Operations (Subpart B)
Subpart B of proposed part 108 prescribes the general operating
requirements for all operators conducting operations under proposed
part 108. To conduct UAS BVLOS operations in the NAS under this
proposed rule, FAA would require part 108 operators to comply with all
applicable requirements of this part. As noted in proposed Sec.
108.100(a), this rule would establish two pathways for operation under
part 108, operating permits and operating certificates. Subpart B
applies to operations conducted under an operating permit (subpart D)
and operations conducted under an operating certificate (subpart E).
Further description of the operating permits and certificates can be
found in section VIII of this preamble and personnel requirements can
be found in section VII of this preamble.
This rule proposes requirements for BVLOS operations conducted
within the United States, using risk-based criteria that permit further
evolution of operations than currently allowed in existing regulations.
The below section lays out FAA's reasoning and proposed requirements
for a BVLOS operating framework, while this section describes the
overall requirements applicable to all BVLOS operations envisioned
under this rule.
Proposed part 108, like part 107, would have specific risk
mitigation and hazard reduction provisions that would facilitate
integration. The requirement for all part 108 operations to have a
means to avoid manned aircraft broadcasting their position using ADS-B
Out equipment would extend to Class G airspace, providing additional
collision risk reduction compared with the strategic mitigations
provided through the regulatory requirements of part 107. In addition,
UAS would be required to have anti-collision lighting that conforms to
an industry standard to ensure that they are visible to manned
aircraft.
To meet the requirements of proposed part 108, operations under
this proposed part would require the use of a registered aircraft
(section VI.A.2) with an airworthiness acceptance received in
accordance with subparts G and H of part 108, with an exception for
flight testing. The UA and its AE would be required to be equipped with
aircraft lighting (section VI.A) and be in safe condition for operation
(section VI.B). This rule proposes to permit operations in both
uncontrolled (section VI.F) and controlled airspace (section VI.G),
with operations limited to 400 feet AGL and below. Access to controlled
airspace would depend on the operator holding an approved method for
strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring, as discussed in
section VI.I.
This rule also proposes a set of criteria by which operators could
operate over people (section VI.H). These criteria would rely on a
population distribution data set called LandScan USA, developed by the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and define categories and criteria for
operation. This rule would continue to prohibit operations over open-
air assemblies.
In order to enable operations in controlled airspace and over
people, this rule also proposes requirements for strategic
deconfliction (section VI.I), changes to right-of-way rules (section
VI.J), and Remote ID performance (section VI.K). These three proposed
requirements would provide a framework for the kind of shared, dynamic
environment FAA anticipates this proposed rulemaking could enable. In
addition, this rule sets requirements for shielded operations (section
VI.L), which would permit BVLOS operations within 50 feet of an
obstacle or a structure or other designated areas, without further
authorization. The
[[Page 38232]]
proposed rule would permit operations with multiple UA (section VI.M).
Finally, this rule proposes requirements to prohibit careless or
reckless operation (section VI.N), manuals (section VI.O), and
emergency conditions (section VI.P).
A. Operating Unmanned Aircraft Under Part 108
As explained in section X of this preamble, FAA is proposing that a
UA operating under this rule would be required to have an airworthiness
acceptance rather than an airworthiness certification. Because an
individual UA evaluation by FAA would not take place, FAA would
additionally require under proposed Sec. 108.720(a)(1) that the
manufacturer develop limitations for the UAS to be operated as
specified in the manufacturer's UAS operating instructions. This
requirement would ensure that operators do not exceed the
manufacturer's operational limits on the UA, which could lead to UA
failure. Under this proposed rulemaking, manufacturers would develop
and test UA to meet consensus standards for FAA airworthiness
acceptance. Manufacturers would need to demonstrate that the UAS design
may be safely used in BVLOS operations in accordance with FAA-accepted
consensus standards.
Accordingly, to operate under proposed part 108, operators would be
required to use a UA that holds an airworthiness acceptance, as noted
in proposed Sec. 108.105(b), except for UA operated under the flight
test permit of proposed Sec. 108.470. These UA and AE would need to be
in condition for safe operation and, per proposed Sec. 108.105(a),
meet the equipage requirements of subpart H, further described in
section XI. These equipage requirements to meet proposed Sec.
108.105(c) would provide the assurance that the aircraft would be able
to operate safely, including the fidelity of the AE, suitability and
durability of materials, and lighting requirements.
1. Aircraft Lighting (Sec. 108.110)
Using an anti-collision lighting system or position lights on UA
would provide a means for a manned aircraft pilot to observe UA. As
such, FAA has proposed in Sec. 108.110 that aircraft lighting would be
required for operations under part 108. Proposed Sec. 108.110(a) would
require operators to use an anti-collision lighting system during all
flight operations, day or night, except when in the interest of safety,
as discussed below. To comply with proposed Sec. 08.110(a), the anti-
collision lighting system would need to meet the requirements of
proposed Sec. 108.830. In addition, proposed Sec. 108.110(b) would
require operators use lighted position lights during all operations at
night when operating a UA that is equipped with position lights per the
requirements of proposed Sec. 108.835.
An anti-collision light is designed to minimize the risk of
collision with other aircraft while airborne. Anti-collision lighting
usually consists of white pulsating strobe-type lights. The bright
flash of an anti-collision light is typically the first visual a pilot
has at night of another aircraft, allowing pilots to take appropriate
actions to avoid collisions. Under this proposal, anti-collision lights
would be required during all operations, as the use of the anti-
collision lights can always provide awareness of an aircraft operation
prior to and during flight.
As stated in Sec. 108.110(c), this proposal would also permit the
flight coordinator to reduce the intensity of, or turn off, the anti-
collision lighting if they determine that, because of operating
conditions, it would be in the interest of safety to do so. FAA
anticipates that there may be situations, primarily during takeoff and
landing, where the flight coordinator may want to either reduce the
intensity of or turn off the anti-collision lighting due to close
proximity with the flight coordinator or other persons on the ground.
Allowing the flight coordinator to reduce the intensity of or turn off
the anti-collision lighting during takeoff and landing would help to
maintain the flight coordinator's full night vision adaptation, which
generally takes 30 minutes after exposure to bright lights. If the
flight coordinator were to lose their night vision adaptation from
exposure to the anti-collision light, they might no longer be able to
ensure that the takeoff or landing area is clear for operations.
The primary purpose of requiring lighted position lights on UA
during night operations is to enhance the visibility of these aircraft
to other airspace users. This requirement would help prevent midair
collisions and ensure safe distance between aircraft, particularly in
areas of high traffic density or when operating in proximity to manned
aircraft. Position lights would make it easier for pilots of manned
aircraft and other UA operators to see and track UA, thereby
facilitating better situational awareness and decision-making in
flight.
Enforcing the use of lighted position lights at night would align
with existing regulations for manned aircraft, promoting a consistent
and predictable environment for all airspace users. This requirement
would ensure that UA are visible to other pilots and air traffic
control, thereby supporting safer coexistence and minimizing the risk
of incursions or airspace violations.
2. Registration (Sec. 108.115)
Per 49 U.S.C. 44101, all aircraft operated in the NAS must be
registered with FAA. No person is allowed to operate a UA unless it has
been registered by its owner, unless the aircraft meets a limited
exception from registration.\49\ There are currently two ways to
register a UAS. Part 47, which broadly applies to all aircraft,
including UA, and part 48, which provides an alternate route to
register a small UA, defined as those weighing less than 55 pounds.
Since part 108 would cover operations of UA weighing greater than 55
pounds, part 48 could not be used for all part 108 operations without
making significant changes to part 48. FAA has determined that it is
appropriate for UA operated under part 108 to follow the existing
registration structure set out in part 47. Though small UA may operate
under part 108, FAA is proposing that all aircraft conducting part 108
operations would be required to follow the registration procedures of
part 47, as proposed in Sec. 108.115(a). As a result, FAA is proposing
to amend Sec. 48.1, Applicability, to require small UA that operate
under 108 to use the registration procedures of part 47.
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\49\ Section 48.105 Registration: Small unmanned aircraft
intended exclusively for limited recreational operations adds an
exception to the general registration requirement for small UA for
recreational flyers. In those cases, a Certificate of Aircraft
Registration issued in accordance with Sec. 48.110 constitutes
registration for all the small UA used exclusively for operations in
compliance with 49 U.S.C. 44809 owned by the individual identified
on the application.
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The web-based registration process under part 48 was designed as an
alternative streamlined system for the registration and marking of
small UA. Aircraft records created under part 48 only contain a minimal
amount of data, such as the owner's name, email address, physical
address, and phone number, the manufacturer and model of the UA, and
the standard remote identification serial number or remote
identification broadcast module serial number, if applicable. The part
48 database cannot house document images, such as transfers, security
conveyances, or airworthiness applications and certificates. Such
documents would likely be commonplace for part 108 UAS. Therefore, any
UAS operating under part 108 would be required to register under part
47 (e.g., an N-number), regardless of weight. To facilitate this,
[[Page 38233]]
FAA is also proposing to amend the applicability under part 48 to
restrict the registration of small UA operating under part 108, in
addition to small UA that hold an airworthiness certificate. UA
operating under part 107 may continue to be registered under the
requirements of part 48.
The aircraft registration requirements in part 47, along with the
requirements pertaining to the recording of aircraft title and security
documents in part 49, necessitate a filing and recording system for the
collection of ownership and financial interests in aircraft. FAA
Aircraft Registry is the official repository for all title and security
documents affecting an interest in aircraft and all airworthiness
applications and certificates. Contrary to part 48, part 47 does not
restrict the eligibility for aircraft registration based on aircraft
weight.
It is possible that a UA currently registered under part 48 could
obtain airworthiness acceptance under proposed part 108. However, to be
operated under part 108, the aircraft would need to be registered under
part 47. While it is not possible to transfer a part 48 registration to
part 47, due to the nature of the registrations and the necessary
information for each, a current part 48 registration holder could
cancel that registration and then submit a new application for a part
47 registration.
While FAA proposes to amend part 47 to apply its registration
requirements to part 108 operators, the Agency also considered allowing
registration under part 48 or even imposing registration requirements
in part 108 itself. If the registration requirements were implemented
under part 108, they would be tailored to the particularities of
operations under this rule. This could eliminate requests for
information that are not available to UAS operators and issuing proof
of registration other than a physical registration certificate. FAA
requests comment on a potential registration process tailored to UAS
operations under this part.
B. General Operating Rules (Sec. 108.120)
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.120(a) that operations conducted under
part 108 would need to be conducted with a UAS that is in a condition
for safe operation, including both the UA and the AE. Proposed Sec.
108.120(a) would prohibit an operator from initiating or continuing a
flight if they know or have reason to know that the UA or the AE are no
longer in a condition for safe operation. As noted in the 2016 Final
Rule, FAA considers safe operation to be essential to ensure overall
safety of flight. Determinations made of the overall condition of the
UAS include an evaluation based on the make, model, age, type and
completeness of continued maintenance and inspections of the aircraft
and AE. The varied designs of possible UAS mean that FAA cannot
prescribe every possible condition that could render a UAS unfit for
operation. An unsafe condition could include damage to the structure of
the UA, damaged or inoperative flight control systems, data link
failures, or damage to propulsion systems.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.120(b) that operations conducted under
part 108 would need to be conducted in accordance with the
manufacturer's operating instructions or other procedures acceptable to
FAA. While the manufacturer's operating instructions would be the
authoritative source of the limits and capabilities associated with the
operation of the UA, as discussed in section X.G, FAA recognizes that
some operators may have additional operational considerations that may
require deviations from the operating instructions defined by the
manufacturer. In those circumstances, the operator may request
additional operational flexibility from FAA by demonstrating how the
operation could still be safely conducted. Possible permutations could
include different ratios of flight coordinator to aircraft operations
or operating environment conditions not considered by the manufacturer.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.120(c) that, except for operations
conducted under a flight test permit under Sec. 108.470 or in
accordance with Sec. 108.555, operations conducted under part 108
would need to be conducted with properly installed and operational
instruments and equipment. The manufacturer, as required under proposed
Sec. 108.720, would develop a list of parts necessary for the safe
operation of the aircraft, or a list of equipment that is allowed to be
inoperative.
Finally, as proposed in Sec. 108.120(d), FAA proposes that persons
occupying this position would be directly responsible for, and be the
final authority as to, the safe and secure operation of all aircraft
under their purview. If a company has multiple operations supervisors,
each operations supervisor would only be responsible for the operations
of aircraft in their assigned responsibility. Similarly, FAA proposes
to require that the operations supervisor ensure that the operator
complies with all applicable regulatory requirements and its operations
manual. Accordingly, the operations supervisor should demonstrate skill
in ensuring safe operations and in management. This role would oversee
the entire operation, or where multiple operations supervisors are
used, their specific areas of responsibility. They must have knowledge
of all other roles involved, as well knowledge of the UA, the AE, and
flight plans. Though other personnel may be responsible for performing
individual safety-of-flight actions, both before and during flight, the
operations supervisor holds the overall responsibility and is the final
authority for safe operations. The operations supervisor would also be
responsible for ensuring that all applicable personnel are properly
trained and knowledgeable before an operation commences. FAA proposes
in Sec. 108.140 that operations conducted under part 108 would be
limited to a speed equal to or less than what is prescribed in the
manufacturer's operating instructions. The aircraft manufacturer is in
the best position to know the design limits for the aircraft that they
produce. FAA chose to use groundspeed because most small UAS lack the
equipment to determine true airspeed and generally rely on technologies
such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS) to determine UA speed.
However, this poses some challenges. If a UA has a strong tailwind, it
is possible that the true airspeed might be very low. As such, FAA
recognizes that some UA may need to operate at higher ground speeds to
maintain a minimum safe operating speed and FAA would provide relief
for an operator to exceed the stated groundspeed in the manufacturer's
operating instructions in those operating conditions.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.140(b) that operations conducted under
part 108 would be limited to a weight equal to or less than specified
for the type of operating permit or operating certificate that the
operator is using for that operation. The weight would include the
weight of the UA as well as the weight of any items attached to or
carried by the UA. While part 108 would allow operations with varying
sizes of UA weighing not greater than 1,320 pounds, FAA has proposed
weight limitations associated with different types of operations to
further mitigate the risks associated with BVLOS operations. For
further information about the specific weight restrictions, see the
descriptions of permitted and certificated operations in section VIII.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.145 that operations conducted under part
108 would not be allowed to be conducted in weather conditions other
than those described in the manufacturer's
[[Page 38234]]
operating instructions. In developing a UA for airworthiness acceptance
under part 108, manufacturers would be required to identify which
weather conditions the UA may safely operate in or ensure the UA has
the capability to identify and avoid those weather conditions for which
the UA is not designed to operate, per proposed Sec. Sec.
108.720(a)(1)(i) and 108.890. Operators therefore would need to ensure
the weather conditions do not exceed the design considerations and
limitations of the UAS used in the operation.
FAA also proposes in Sec. 108.145 that a UA that has frost, ice,
or snow adhering to the UA prior to takeoff, except as provided in the
manufacturer's operating instructions, would not be allowed to operate
under proposed part 108. As with manned aviation, frost, ice, and snow
can result in significant degradation of UA performance, including
controllability and changes in the weight of the aircraft. Barring any
significant mitigations identified by the manufacturer, FAA does not
find it in the interest of safety to allow any operations under these
conditions.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.150(a) that operations conducted under
part 108 would be required to be conducted from locations that are pre-
designated and access-controlled and ensure any persons who are not
directly participating in the operation are safely segregated from
flight operations. This mitigation would reduce the risk posed by and
to non-participants during any stage of the operation. Restricting
access to only those involved in the operation would ensure appropriate
oversight for safety of flight.
In addition, FAA proposes in Sec. 108.150(b) that UA operated
under part 108 would need to be monitored and controlled from a
location that is physically located within the United States, including
its territories and inter-island operations when operating in United
States airspace. This would follow the same restriction that is present
in part 107. As discussed in the part 107 final rule, the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recognizes UAS as aircraft and
therefore has applied existing standards and recommended practices
(SARPS) for aircraft to UAS. ICAO remains in the process of determining
how the SARPS can accommodate UAS, but presently, the ICAO SARPS are
quite restrictive for UAS. This proposed rulemaking would likely go
beyond what ICAO currently allows for UAS. As such, FAA would restrict
proposed part 108 to operations within United States airspace. Any
operations outside the United States would not fit within the
applicability of part 108. FAA considered adding an option to request
authorization to monitor and control UAS from outside the United
States. FAA seeks comment on whether it should expand the scope of
Sec. 108.150 to allow UAS to be monitored or controlled from outside
the United States.
Finally, FAA proposes in Sec. 108.150(c) that operators must
address physical security and seek to prevent unauthorized access to
the operation's facilities, including controlled access areas, as
applicable. An operator may use controlled access areas to protect
hazardous materials before those materials are loaded onto a UA, for
example. FAA also anticipates that, due to the size, scope, and
complexity of operations, the operator may have other areas they deem
sensitive and choose to utilize controlled access areas. FAA is
utilizing performance-based language in this proposed requirement to
provide operators flexibility with how controlled access areas are
designated.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.155 that the operator would need to be
able to determine the location of each UA during flight operations. The
ability to determine the geographic location during operations and to
find the UA when it is has landed during normal, abnormal, and
emergency situations are important considerations for maintaining
situational awareness and safety of the operation. FAA anticipates that
most UAS will have software that will provide the operator with the
appropriate information to determine its location.
C. ADS-B and Transponder Use (Sec. 108.160)
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.160 that no operator would be allowed to
operate a UA with ADS-B Out equipment in transmit mode or with a
transponder in transmit mode under part 108. As previously discussed in
the Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft final rule (86 FR 4390,
January 15, 2021), the installation and use of ADS-B Out transmitters
on UA may negatively affect the safe operation of manned aircraft in
the NAS. The projected numbers of UA operations have the potential to
saturate available ADS-B frequencies, affecting ADS-B capabilities for
manned aircraft and potentially blinding ADS-B ground receivers.
Currently, operators conducting operations under part 107 cannot
operate a UA with ADS-B Out in transmit mode, per Sec. 107.53. FAA
also prohibits the use of ADS-B Out to meet the requirements of remote
identification, as per Sec. 89.125. The proposed restriction on ADS-B
equipment in Sec. 108.160 is consistent with FAA's existing
limitations.
D. Area of Operations (Sec. 108.165)
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.165 that all operators would be required
to obtain approval from FAA for the area of intended operations prior
to operation. Understanding potential risks, anticipating their impact
on both flight and ground operations, and mitigating those risks are
all critical to safe part 108 operations. Under this proposed
requirement, before beginning operations in a new area the operator
would identify known hazards, mitigate such hazards with proper
planning and effective controls, and plan for contingencies for any new
hazards identified during operations. In developing this proposal, FAA
utilized its ongoing experience with the authorization and oversight of
waiver and exemption holders. In proposed Sec. 108.165(a), FAA would
require operators to receive approval from FAA prior to beginning
operations in an area and would expect the operator to be responsible
for certain requirements as described below for those intended
operations. In requesting approval from FAA for a new operating
location, the operator would submit information to FAA that includes
the operating area boundaries, estimated number of daily operations,
and other operating characteristics as appropriate. FAA anticipates
that operators would report, and FAA would collect, this information
through the same portal as the application process uses for permit and
certificate oversight.
Proposed Sec. 108.165(b) would require the operator to designate
safe alternate landing areas that the UA can reach if it is unable to
complete the intended flight. Proposed Sec. 108.165(b) lists specific
requirements that landing areas would have to meet to satisfy the
proposed regulation. First, the safe alternate landing area would need
to avoid areas where overflight is prohibited. Second, the safe
alternate landing area would need to provide for a landing without
posing undue hazard to persons or property on the ground. FAA has
proposed these requirements to ensure that, in a situation when an
immediate landing is required, the operator is prepared with an area
that would not create a hazard to persons and property on the ground.
In the planning of these proposed alternate landing areas, it is
critical that operators understand that the need to land the UA in a
timely manner is paramount for circumstances such as emergencies or
abnormal events.
[[Page 38235]]
In Sec. 108.165(c), FAA proposes that the operator would be
required to designate appropriate takeoff, landing, and loading areas
that have restricted access to only those persons participating in the
operation and that are free of any obstructions that could pose a
hazard to persons who are not participating in the operation.
Designating appropriate takeoff, landing, and loading areas that have
restricted access would ensure that only authorized people have access
to the operating areas. This would keep unauthorized persons away from
operating areas and lower the risk to non-participants, who may not be
aware that an operation is in progress. In addition, FAA proposes that
takeoff, landing, and loading areas would need to be adequate for the
planned operation, considering such items as size, surface,
obstructions, and lighting. FAA anticipates operators to use UA of
various sizes and capabilities, which would also have performance
characteristics that may require takeoff, landing, and loading areas of
differing complexities. By requiring operators to ensure that these
areas are adequate, operators would be required to consider the
individual necessities of the UA and the operation.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.165(d) that the operator would be
required to ensure adequate communications coverage and availability,
and appropriate lost link procedures. As discussed in section XI.D of
this preamble, a lost link or loss of control of the UA pose
significant risks to aviation safety. As part of the flight planning
for a new operational area, the operator would need to assess the
coverage area for C2 link system configuration utilized for the
intended operational area and verify operational status. The operator
would not be able to commence a UAS operation if a control link is
working improperly, whether due to a result of radio interference or
for some other reason. The operator would be expected to resolve any
radio interference or other spectrum complications prior to beginning
operations in that area.
Before beginning operations in a new area, FAA proposes in Sec.
108.165(e) that the operator would need to ensure that the planned
operations minimize risk to persons and property on the ground, as
appropriate, and consider terrain and obstacles that the operator
intends to overfly. FAA expects operators to plan for and be aware of
the number of persons and property on the ground around operations and
consider possible flight paths with the least presence of people and
moving vehicles, while also considering the terrain and human-made
obstacles the operator intends to overfly. The operator would be
required to verify the maximum height of obstructions. To accomplish
this, the operator could perform an area assessment or use a capable
third party to do so.
Further, as discussed in section VIII.C.5, Sec. 108.550(b)
proposes to also require certificated operators to perform a ground
risk assessment of pedestrians, vehicles, terrain, and man-made
obstacles.
E. Preflight Requirements (Sec. 108.170)
Ensuring the safe conduct of operations begins with determining
that the aircraft is in a safe condition for flight and reviewing
appropriate information concerning the operating environment. FAA has
proposed in Sec. 108.170 that operators would be required to meet
certain preflight requirements before conducting each operation under
part 108.
In Sec. 108.170(a), FAA proposes that, prior to operating under
part 108, the operator would need to ensure that the weather conditions
are appropriate for the intended operation, in accordance with the
aircraft limitations specified by the manufacturer, and that are
determined in a manner acceptable to FAA. This is because flying in
adverse weather conditions, or in weather conditions that the UA is not
designed to handle, may increase operational risk. Familiarity with
forecast weather conditions is an important part of the flight planning
process. Title 14 of the CFR contains requirements on the use of
weather information and the level of approval required for that
information for various operations. For example, within 14 CFR parts
121 or 135, there is a requirement to use weather reports or forecasts
from a source ``approved by the Administrator.''
Aviation weather currently provides surface weather observations
[e.g., Meteorological Aerodrome Report (METAR)] and forecasts [e.g.,
Terminal Area Forecast (TAF)] at and around many airports. These
observations and forecasts are typically only valid out to five miles
from the location where the observation was taken or around the airport
the TAF was generated for. To date, FAA's current sources ``approved by
the Administrator'' include, but are not limited to, Automated Surface
Observing System (ASOS), Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS), and
information provided by the National Weather Service (NWS).
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL)
reports \50\ from November 2017 note the sparseness of off-airport
observations of visibility, clouds and ceiling, and surface winds. The
report summaries state that: ``airport-specific weather information
(e.g., METAR, TAFs, etc.) do not readily translate to conditions at
remote launch locations, which may be 10-30 miles from the nearest
airport . . . the results show significantly less weather information
available to support low-altitude flight than for typical manned-flight
profiles.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ See MIT/LL, Preliminary UAS Weather Research Roadmap, ATC-
438 (November 2017), and MIT/LL, Preliminary Weather Information Gap
Analysis for UAS Operations, ATC-437 (November 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA estimates that, for airspace below 400 feet only, around 3% of
the continental United States and 2% of Alaska airspace is covered by
an approved source of weather information, with most of that being on
or near airport environments. However, given that part 108 UAS
operations would operate primarily outside of this area of approved
observation coverage, those operations will need additional sources of
weather information to operate safely. FAA anticipates that some of
this weather information gap could be filled by third-party weather
providers or come from other non-traditional sources, such as locally
owned and operated devices.
As BVLOS UAS operations mature, they may require a more detailed
and definitive set of meteorological information to operate safely. For
BVLOS operations, the fidelity of the meteorological information would
need to be such that the operator can determine whether the vehicle can
safely operate within the manufacturer's limitations. Traditionally FAA
has required operators to use weather information that was from sources
approved or provided by FAA. However, for the reasons stated above,
this is not practical or appropriate for most UA operations, so FAA is
proposing to allow operators to obtain weather information in other
ways. This could include the use of weather services provided under an
automated data service provider construct under proposed part 146, or
through other sources found acceptable to the Administrator.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.170(b) that the operator would need to be
familiar with any airspace and flight restrictions along the entire
route of flight, including the review of any applicable Notices to
Airmen (NOTAMs). Another important aspect of assessing the operational
environment is the consideration of airspace information to identify
any known flight restrictions along the
[[Page 38236]]
route. To comply with this requirement, FAA expects the operator to
assess the departure, enroute, and destination airspace; special use
airspace; NOTAMs; temporary flight restrictions; and UA flight
restrictions to ensure compliance with airspace rules and restrictions.
As stated in proposed Sec. 108.180 and further discussed in section
VI.G, UAS operations under this proposal would only be allowed in
controlled airspace under certain conditions and may be subject to FAA
authorization. If an operator did not assess this information prior to
conducting operations, operations could transverse through controlled
airspace and result in adverse events, such as disruptions to aircraft
receiving ATM services or loss of separation between controlled and
uncontrolled aircraft. Similarly, an operator would need to be familiar
with special use airspace, NOTAMs, and any ground hazards associated
with the flight. The operator would need to be aware of special use
airspaces to avoid conflict or potential national security issues with
the operations or events being conducted within those airspaces. In
addition, NOTAMs indicate the real-time and abnormal status of the NAS
impacting every user and concern the establishment, condition, or
change of any facility, service, procedure, or hazard in the NAS. These
impact UA operations as well as manned aircraft operations.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.170(c) that the operator would need to
assess the population density category or categories to be overflown.
Obtaining this information in advance would allow the operator to
comply with proposed Sec. 108.185. For further discussion, see section
VI.H of this preamble.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.170(d) that the operator would need to
identify the location of ground obstacles and hazards associated with
the specific flight operation being flown. Because part 108 UAS
operations are conducted at low altitudes, the operator would need to
be aware of structures, obstructions, and other hazards that may pose a
risk to the specific flight operation. Awareness of these ground
hazards would enable the flight coordinator to appropriately plan
around or avoid such hazards that may result in adverse events when
preparing to conduct the operation. Given the advances in geospatial
information systems, 3D mapping software, and publications, operators
should have access to sufficient information to be able to comply with
this requirement. FAA seeks comment on this assumption.
To comply with proposed Sec. 108.170(e), the operator would be
required to ensure that the UAS are in a condition for safe operation.
It is critical that all aircraft operated in the NAS, including UAS
operated under proposed part 108, are in a safe condition to minimize
risk. Being in a safe condition not only minimizes the risk for other
aircraft in the NAS, but also minimizes the risk for persons and
property on the ground.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.170(f) that the operator would need to
ensure there are sufficient personnel available for the operation.
While there are no specific staffing requirements under this proposal,
an operator not having sufficient personnel necessary for their
individual operation could present a safety risk. Increased pressure to
``get the job done,'' and personnel taking on additional work beyond
their duty assignment, or lack of experience with certain duties, can
degrade the safety of the operation. Operations with insufficient
personnel may experience mistakes with potential undesired results in
any part of the operation. Task saturation or diversion of attention
could create gaps in monitoring the automated systems and over-reliance
on those systems. Incomplete knowledge and experience with those
systems could cause errors that could lead to an incident or accident
at various points during an operation.
FAA is proposing in Sec. 108.170(g) that, if required by Sec.
108.180 or Sec. 108.185, the operator would need to ensure that a
strategically deconflicted operational intent is accepted prior to
takeoff. As described in section VI.I of this preamble, strategic
deconfliction is a set of functions that aid in managing conflicts
between UAS operating under part 108.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.170(h) that the operator would need to
ensure that there is enough available power or fuel, considering wind
and forecast weather conditions, for the UAS to operate for the
intended operational time, such that the UA can land without posing an
undue risk to aircraft or people and property on the ground, or the
reserve power recommended by the manufacturer, if greater, is
satisfied. A key aspect of preflight planning involves ensuring that
there is sufficient fuel or power to conduct the intended operation and
land safely. Since the amount of fuel or power necessary for an
operation may be impacted by wind and weather conditions, FAA proposes
requiring the flight coordinator to consider these conditions in making
the determination whether there is sufficient fuel or power to conduct
the intended operation. FAA considered establishing and enforcing a
standard flight time that the UAS would need to have in its power
reserve to land safely (e.g., 5 minutes, 10 minutes, etc.). However,
limitations should be relevant to the operation. As such, imposing a
standard time that a UAS needs to have in its power reserve may be
unreasonably burdensome for some UAS operations. The flight coordinator
would be better situated to determine what constitutes sufficient power
or fuel for their specific UAS operation.
FAA proposes in Sec. 108.170(i) that the operator would need to
ensure that operations would be conducted within the weight and balance
limitations defined by the aircraft manufacturer. Compliance with the
weight and balance limits of any UAS are critical to flight safety.
Operating above the maximum weight limitation compromises the
structural integrity of the UAS and adversely affects its performance.
Operators must be aware that, even while operating within center of
gravity limits, the UAS can be overloaded. Though the UAS manufacturer
may specify a maximum gross takeoff weight, and the operator would need
to comply with that limitation, there may be additional conditions that
affect overall takeoff performance such as high elevations, high
temperatures, and high humidity (high-density altitudes) that the
operator could consider in determining the weight for a specific
operation.
Conditions such as these may require a reduction in weight before a
flight is attempted. Operating with the center of gravity outside the
approved limits could result in control difficulty and unstable or
unknown flight characteristics. Operating within the center of gravity
would ensure the UA is operating in the most stable, balanced, and
predicted condition. As listed in section X of this preamble, under the
proposed process for airworthiness acceptance, the manufacturer would
need to provide weight and balance data. Therefore, because of the
effects of an out-of-balance or overweight condition, FAA proposes that
the operator should ensure that weight and balance will be calculated
and conducted within the limitations defined by the aircraft
manufacturer.
In Sec. 108.170(j), FAA proposes that, for the safety of the
operation, pro
[…truncated; see source link]Indexed from Federal Register on August 7, 2025.
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