Notice2025-14662
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation; Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change by The Options Clearing Corporation Concerning Amendments to OCC's Comprehensive Stress Testing & Clearing Fund Methodology, and Liquidity Risk Management Description (“Methodology Description”) and Clearing Fund Methodology Policy (Together With the Methodology Description, the “Risk Policies”) To Enhance Its Stress Testing Methodology
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
August 4, 2025
Issuing agencies
Securities and Exchange Commission
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 147 (Monday, August 4, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 147 (Monday, August 4, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 36457-36461]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-14662]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-103597; File Nos. SR-OCC-2025-009]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation;
Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change by The Options Clearing
Corporation Concerning Amendments to OCC's Comprehensive Stress Testing
& Clearing Fund Methodology, and Liquidity Risk Management Description
(``Methodology Description'') and Clearing Fund Methodology Policy
(Together With the Methodology Description, the ``Risk Policies'') To
Enhance Its Stress Testing Methodology
July 30, 2025.
I. Introduction
On June 11, 2025, the Options Clearing Corporation (``OCC'') filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the
proposed rule change SR-OCC-2025-009, pursuant to Section 19(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
[[Page 36458]]
(``Exchange Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 \2\ thereunder, to enhance its
stress testing methodology.\3\ The proposed rule change was published
for public comment in the Federal Register on June 27, 2025.\4\ The
Commission has received no comments regarding the proposed rule change.
For the reasons discussed below, the Commission is approving the
proposed rule change (hereinafter defined as ``Proposed Rule Change'').
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
\3\ See Notice, infra note 4, at 90 FR 27739.
\4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 103308 (June 24,
2025), 90 FR 27739 (June 27, 2025) (File No. SR-OCC-2025-009)
(``Notice'').
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II. Background
OCC is a central counterparty (``CCP''), which means that, as part
of its function, it interposes itself as the buyer to every seller and
the seller to every buyer for certain financial transactions. As the
CCP for the listed options markets in the United States,\5\ as well as
for certain futures and stock loans, OCC is exposed to certain risks
arising from providing clearing and settlement services to its Clearing
Members. Because OCC is obligated to perform on the contracts it
clears, even where one of its Clearing Members defaults, OCC is exposed
to credit risk \6\ and liquidity risk \7\ in the form of exposure to a
Clearing Member's trading activities. OCC manages such risk, in part,
by performing daily stress testing \8\ that covers a wide range of
scenarios.\9\
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\5\ OCC describes itself as ``the sole clearing agency for
standardized equity options listed on a national securities exchange
registered with the Commission (`listed options').'' See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 96533 (Dec. 19, 2022), 87 FR 79015 (Dec.
23, 2022) (File No. SR-OCC-2022-012).
\6\ Credit risk is the risk that a counterparty will be unable
to meet fully its financial obligations when due, or at any time in
the future. Bank for International Settlements & International
Organization of Securities Commissions, Principles for Financial
Market Infrastructures section 2.5, <a href="https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf">https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf</a>.
\7\ Liquidity risk is the risk that a counterparty will have
insufficient funds to meet its financial obligations as and when
expected, although it may be able to do so in the future. Id. at
section 2.6.
\8\ Stress testing is the estimation of credit or liquidity
exposures that would result from the realization of potential stress
scenarios, such as extreme price changes, multiple defaults, or
changes in other valuation inputs and assumptions. 17 CFR 240.17Aa-
22(a).
\9\ See OCC Rule 1001, OCC's Rules and By-Laws, available at
<a href="https://www.theocc.com/about/publications/bylaws.jsp">https://www.theocc.com/about/publications/bylaws.jsp</a>.
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OCC groups its stress testing scenarios into different categories,
including Sufficiency Scenarios, Adequacy Scenarios, Sizing Scenarios,
and Informational Scenarios.\10\ OCC states that its current
Sufficiency Scenarios are variations of historical scenarios that
attempt to replicate historical events under current market
conditions.\11\ These scenarios are designed to measure OCC's potential
exposure to a Clearing Member Group's portfolios relative to OCC's
resources so that OCC can determine whether to call for additional or
different collateral.\12\
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\10\ Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the
meanings specified in OCC's Rules and By-Laws, supra note 9.
\11\ See Notice, 90 FR at 27740. For example, among the listed
Sufficiency Scenarios are scenarios that replicate the most extreme
rally and decline in 2008.
\12\ Notice, 90 FR at 27740.
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Adequacy Scenarios allow OCC to assess whether collected resources
are adequate to cover OCC's risk tolerance of a 1-in-50 year
statistical market event over a two-year lookback, while sizing
scenarios help OCC size its financial resources.\13\ Finally, OCC uses
Informational Scenarios to monitor and assess the size of OCC's
prefunded financial resources against a wide range of stress scenarios
for informational and risk monitoring purposes.\14\ Informational
Scenarios are used for risk monitoring and informational purposes, and
not used to determine the size and composition of OCC's financial
resources, but OCC's Risk Committee may approve adjustments that
recategorize an Informational Scenario as an Adequacy, Sufficiency, or
Sizing Scenario.\15\
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\13\ Id.
\14\ Id.
\15\ Id.
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II. Description of the Proposed Rule Change
The Proposed Rule Change would make three groups of changes related
to OCC's stress testing methodology in its Risk Policies. First, it
would recategorize certain Informational Scenarios as Sufficiency
Scenarios, while conversely also recategorizing certain Sufficiency
Scenarios into Informational Scenarios. As a result, six recategorized
scenarios would be promoted to determine potential calls for additional
collateral as Sufficiency Scenarios. Eight current Sufficiency
Scenarios, meanwhile, would be demoted and no longer used to determine
such calls. Second, the Proposed Rule Change would modify the sample
list of stress scenarios in the Methodology Description \16\ to
streamline and more clearly present the sample of scenarios codified in
the document and would add detail to OCC's Rules outlining
circumstances under which OCC could require Clearing Members to
contribute additional collateral due to the results of Sufficiency
Scenarios. Third, OCC proposes to amend language in its Risk Policies
related to scenario calibration to more clearly describe cadence and
implementation. Such differences are described in more detail below.
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\16\ The Methodology Description describes the Comprehensive
Stress Testing & Clearing Fund Methodology and Liquidity Risk
Management Description that OCC uses to analyze the adequacy of its
financial resources and to challenge its risk management framework.
See Exchange Act Release No. 100147 (May 15, 2024), 89 FR 44752,
44753 n.5 (May 21, 2024 (File No. SR-OCC-2024-006).
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A. Recategorization of Scenarios
As stated above, OCC is proposing to recategorize certain scenarios
that are part of its Risk Policies.\17\ OCC's Methodology Description
lists a subset of the Sufficiency Scenarios that have been implemented
in OCC's stress testing system.
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\17\ See Notice, 90 FR at 27740.
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OCC proposes to promote six Informational Scenarios to Sufficiency
Scenarios. OCC also proposes to demote eight historical Sufficiency
Scenarios to Informational Scenarios. Four of the Informational
Scenarios that OCC proposes to promote to Sufficiency Scenarios are
sector-specific scenarios. The proposed sector-specific scenarios are
hypothetical scenarios that apply price shocks based on a corresponding
sector exchange-traded-fund's return during the selected time period.
These would become OCC's first sector-specific Sufficiency Scenarios.
OCC states that the proposed sector-specific scenarios yielded
exposures that were generally in line with its current, most impactful
Sufficiency Scenarios.\18\
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\18\ See Notice, 90 FR at 27741. See also Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 90827 (Dec. 30, 2020), 86 FR 659 (Jan. 6, 2021)
(File No. SR-OCC-2020-015). OCC provided data and analysis
concerning the proposed rule change in a confidential exhibit to
File No. SR-OCC-2025-009, including the performance of the proposed
scenarios relative to existing scenarios.
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The other two Informational Scenarios that OCC proposes to promote
to Sufficiency Scenarios represent the most extreme market rally and
decline moves in 2020. OCC has already implemented Sufficiency
Scenarios related to extreme 2020 market moves under its waterfall
approach.\19\ The two scenarios now proposed for promotion
[[Page 36459]]
would complement OCC's existing Sufficiency Scenarios by directly
applying a risk driver beta-derived price shock instead of using the
waterfall approach.\20\ OCC found that the proposed scenarios yielded
exposures that were consistently higher than those generated by the
corresponding Sufficiency Scenarios and were comparable to overall peak
Sufficiency Scenario exposures.\21\
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\19\ See Notice, 90 FR at 27741 n.11. For OCC's waterfall
approach, the actual return of the risk factor during the historical
event is used as the price shock, if available. If unavailable, a
proxy market return from a corresponding sector is used as the price
shock. Finally, if data is unavailable for both actual and sector
returns, the price shock is determined by the beta of the risk
factor to its assigned risk driver multiplied by the corresponding
risk driver shock (the ``risk driver beta-derived price shock'').
The beta is the sensitivity of the price of a security relative to
the price of the risk driver. See Notice, 90 FR at 27741 n.10.
\20\ OCC previously promoted Informational Scenarios that take a
beta derived price shock approach to complement existing scenarios
that rely on a waterfall approach for scenarios related to extreme
market moves in 2008. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 100147
(May 15, 2024), 89 FR 44752 (May 21, 2024) (File No. SR-OCC-2024-
006).
\21\ See Notice, 90 FR at 27741.
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OCC states that the proposed rule change would enable OCC to test
the sufficiency of its financial resources under a wider range of
relevant stress scenarios and respond quickly when OCC believes
additional financial resources are necessary.\22\ OCC would also be
able to measure the exposure of OCC's Clearing Fund to the portfolios
of individual Clearing Member Groups to determine whether to call for
additional resources.\23\
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\22\ See Notice, 90 FR at 27743.
\23\ See Notice, 90 FR at 27741.
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As stated above, OCC also proposes to demote certain Sufficiency
Scenarios to Informational Scenarios. These eight scenarios attempt to
replicate historical events that occurred between 1974 and 2008, but
using current market conditions. OCC states that these scenarios
consistently ranked the lowest in terms of shortfalls generated and had
no impact on the amount of financial resources OCC collected from its
members.\24\ OCC states that proposed changes would avoid unnecessary
complexity in OCC's stress testing methodology by removing superfluous
Sufficiency Scenarios.\25\
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\24\ Id.
\25\ Id.
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B. Streamlining the Methodology Description
As stated above, OCC also proposes to streamline the sample of
scenarios it presents in its Methodology Description.\26\ To do this,
OCC proposes three specific changes. First, OCC proposes to change the
format of its ``Clearing Fund Sizing and Stress Testing'' section
within its Methodology Description into a narrative from the current
list-format. OCC also proposes to make conforming changes to the
Liquidity Stress Testing section. The proposed changes would allow OCC
to add new scenarios approved through its internal governance
processes.
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\26\ Id.
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Second, OCC proposes changes to clarify its authority to size the
Clearing Fund. OCC establishes the size of its Clearing Fund to cover
losses arising under a 1-in-80 year hypothetical market event.\27\
OCC's Clearing Fund Methodology Policy allows the Stress Testing
Working Group (``STWG'') to recommend that a 1-in-90 year event be used
in OCC's Sizing Scenarios, subject to applicable governance
requirements.\28\ OCC proposes to clarify in the Methodology
Description that OCC can size the Clearing Fund in accordance with a
standard that exceeds a 1-in-80 year event, if the STWG, Management
Committee, and Risk Committee determine a more extreme scenario is
necessary.
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\27\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90603 (Dec. 8,
2020), 85 FR 80829 (Dec. 14, 2020) (File No. SR-OCC-2020-015).
\28\ See Notice, 90 FR at 27742.
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Finally, OCC proposes to replace references to specific
Informational Scenarios in its Clearing Fund Methodology Policy with a
more general description of such scenarios. The Clearing Fund
Methodology Policy already affords the STWG the authority to approve
both the creation and retirement of Informational Scenarios. OCC
proposes to describe the Informational Scenarios, but to remove
references to specific scenarios entirely. Informational Scenarios have
no impact on the amount of financial resources collected from OCC's
members. Because these specific scenarios are not needed to understand
how the model currently works, do not impact model results, and are
subject to change from time to time based on market conditions, OCC
does not believe that they need not be maintained in its rules.\29\
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\29\ See Notice, 90 FR at 27742.
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C. Cadence and Implementation
As stated above, OCC has also proposed additional changes regarding
cadence and other administrative matters.\30\ In this regard, OCC's
proposal generally consists of three larger categories of changes.
First, OCC proposes to change how frequently it is required to
calibrate stress scenarios. Currently, OCC's Methodology Description
requires OCC to calibrate scenarios annually and to review them
quarterly. OCC's practice, however, is to recalibrate scenarios at
least quarterly.\31\ OCC proposes to amend the Methodology Description
to require quarterly recalibration. Relatedly, OCC proposes changes
regarding who determines whether more frequent calibration is required.
The Methodology Description currently states that either OCC's
Quantitative Risk Management team (``QRM'') or STWG determines that
updates are necessary. OCC proposes to amend the Methodology
Description consistent with its current practice for STWG to make such
determinations.\32\
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\30\ Id.
\31\ Id.
\32\ Id.
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Second, OCC proposes changes to the Comprehensive Stress Testing
Methodology to document two missing entries from the list of key tenors
for computing volatility, specifically adding 1-week and 2-week tenors.
OCC states that these entries were inadvertently excluded from
previously approved changes made by OCC in connection with enhancements
to its modelling approach for implied volatility.\33\
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\33\ Id.
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Finally, OCC proposes to correct errors in the Methodology
Description. The Liquidity Stress testing section of the Methodology
Description currently states that OCC adheres to a Cover 2 standard for
liquidity stress testing. OCC proposes to correct the Methodology
Description to state that OCC adheres to a Cover 1 standard for
liquidity stress testing, which is OCC's practice. OCC also proposes
changes to resolve typographical errors, such as grammatical changes
and updating the list of references in the Methodological Description.
III. Discussion and Commission Findings
Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Exchange Act directs the Commission to
approve a proposed rule change of a self-regulatory organization if it
finds that such proposed rule change is consistent with the
requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations
thereunder applicable to such organization.\34\ Under the Commission's
Rules of Practice, the ``burden to demonstrate that a proposed rule
change is consistent with the Exchange Act and the rules and
regulations issued thereunder . . . is on the self-regulatory
organization [`SRO'] that proposed the rule change.'' \35\
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\34\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C).
\35\ Rule 700(b)(3), Commission Rules of Practice, 17 CFR
201.700(b)(3).
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The description of a proposed rule change, its purpose and
operation, its effect, and a legal analysis of its consistency with
applicable requirements must all be sufficiently detailed and specific
to support an affirmative Commission finding,\36\ and
[[Page 36460]]
any failure of an SRO to provide this information may result in the
Commission not having a sufficient basis to make an affirmative finding
that a proposed rule change is consistent with the Exchange Act and the
applicable rules and regulations.\37\ Moreover, ``unquestioning
reliance'' on an SRO's representations in a proposed rule change is not
sufficient to justify Commission approval of a proposed rule
change.\38\
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\36\ Id.
\37\ Id.
\38\ Susquehanna Int'l Group, LLP v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 866 F.3d 442, 447 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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After carefully considering the Proposed Rule Change, the
Commission finds that the Proposed Rule Change is consistent with the
requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations
thereunder applicable to OCC. More specifically, the Commission finds
that the Proposed Rule Change is consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F)
of the Exchange Act,\39\ and Rules 17ad-22(e)(4) \40\ and 17ad-22(e)(7)
\41\ as described in detail below.
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\39\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
\40\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(4).
\41\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(7).
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A. Consistency With Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act
Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act requires, among other
things, that a clearing agency's rules are ``designed to promote the
prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities
transactions, . . . derivative agreements, contracts, and transactions,
. . . [and] to assure the safeguarding of securities and funds which
are in the custody or control of the clearing agency or for which it is
responsible.'' \42\
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\42\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
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As discussed above, the proposed changes would allow OCC to (1)
promote existing Informational Scenarios to Sufficiency Scenarios.
Specifically, OCC would implement its first sector-specific Sufficiency
Scenarios, as well as variations on existing Sufficiency Scenarios
focused on extreme market moves in 2020. Once these scenarios are
promoted to Sufficiency Scenarios, they would be used to determine
whether it is necessary to call for additional margin intra-day or to
increase the size of the Clearing Fund intra-month. By elevating these
Informational Scenarios to Sufficiency Scenarios, OCC creates a wider
range of stress scenarios. Similarly, OCC's proposed clarification
regarding its existing authority to size the Clearing Fund would
support OCC's ability to consider additional, more conservative
scenarios when determining the resources to collect from its members.
Having a wider range of stress scenarios should, in turn, increase the
likelihood that OCC will have sufficient collateral on hand to address
a default without resorting to loss mutualization through the use of
non-defaulting Clearing Members' contributions to the Clearing Fund.
Because it avoids loss mutualization, the Proposed Rule Change is
consistent with the safeguarding of securities and funds which are in
OCC's custody or control. While OCC also proposes demoting certain
Sufficiency Scenarios, the data provided by OCC, which the Commission
has reviewed and analyzed, demonstrates that such demotion would not
impact the financial resources OCC collects from members.
OCC also proposes to amend the Methodology Description by
transitioning its scenario list to a narrative format and removing
certain scenarios as outlined above. OCC has also proposed correcting
certain errors, including to address typographical and grammatical
errors, and to add certain tenors used for computing volatility which
OCC failed to update in the policy as part of a prior rule filing. By
streamlining the scenarios it presents in its Methodology Description,
making minor edits, and correcting errors, OCC's proposed changes would
help ensure that its Methodology Description document remains clear and
effective so that the requirements under this document continue to be
carried out properly. Similarly, the proposed changes to OCC's Clearing
Fund Methodology Policy to reflect current practice will help ensure
that document remains clear and effective.
Based on the Commission's review of the record, and for the reasons
described below, the changes described above are consistent Section
17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act.\43\
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\43\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
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B. Consistency With Rule 17ad-22(e)(4) Under the Exchange Act
Rule 17ad-22(e)(4) requires, in part, that a covered clearing
agency establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and
procedures reasonably designed to effectively identify, measure,
monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those
arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes, including
by (i) to the extent not already maintained pursuant to Rule 17ad-
22(e)(4)(i), maintaining additional financial resources at the minimum
to enable it to cover a wide range of foreseeable stress scenarios that
include, but are not limited to, the default of the participant family
that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for
the covered clearing agency in extreme but plausible market
conditions,\44\ and (ii) testing the sufficiency of its total financial
resources available to meet the minimum financial resource requirements
under Rules 17ad-22(e)(4)(i) through (iii) under the Exchange Act.\45\
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\44\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(4)(iii).
\45\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(4)(vi).
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The Proposed Rule Change is consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)(iii)
because it clarifies the authority provided under OCC's rules to allow
OCC to rely on more conservative stress scenarios when sizing its
Clearing Fund. Allowing OCC, subject to internal governance, to rely on
more conservative sizing scenarios increases the likelihood that OCC
will foresee a wider range of stress scenarios and maintain sufficient
financial resources to cover its exposures in such scenarios.
The Proposed Rule Change is consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)(vi)
because it effectively broadens the scope of stress scenarios that OCC
conducts to test the sufficiency its financial resources. As described
above, OCC's Sufficiency Scenarios are designed to measure OCC's
potential exposure to a Clearing Member Group's portfolios relative to
OCC's resources so that OCC can determine whether to call for
additional or different collateral. Expanding the scope of stress
scenarios against which OCC monitors its financial resources would
increase the likelihood that OCC maintains sufficient financial
resources at all times. This Proposed Rule Change would expand the
scope of stress scenarios by promoting six Informational Scenarios to
Sufficiency Scenarios. This expansion could result in the collection of
additional resources available for resolving a member default, which,
in turn, would increase the likelihood that OCC maintains sufficient
financial resources at all times. OCC also proposes to demote a set of
existing Sufficiency Scenarios, but the data provided by OCC
demonstrates that such demotion would not impact the financial
resources OCC collects from members. Accordingly, the Proposed Rule
Change is consistent with Rule 17ad-22(e)(4)(iii) and (vi) under the
Exchange Act.\46\
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\46\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(4)(iii) and (vi).
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[[Page 36461]]
C. Consistency With Rule 17ad-22(e)(7) Under the Exchange Act
Rule 17ad-22(e)(7)(vi) requires, in part, that a covered clearing
agency establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and
procedures reasonably designed to effectively measure, monitor, and
manage the liquidity risk that arises in or is borne by the covered
clearing agency, including measuring, monitoring, and managing its
settlement and funding flows on an ongoing and timely basis, and its
use of intraday liquidity by, at a minimum, determining the amount and
regularly testing the sufficiency of the liquid resources held for
purposes of meeting the minimum liquid resource requirement under Rule
17ad-22(e)(7)(i) under the Exchange Act.\47\
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\47\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(7)(vi).
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As discussed above in the context of credit stress testing, OCC has
proposed changes to effectively broadens the scope of stress scenarios
that it conducts to test the sufficiency its resources. Expanding the
scope of stress scenarios against which OCC monitors its resources
would allow OCC to test the sufficiency of its liquid resources under a
wider range of stress scenarios. Also, as noted above, the proposed
demotion of certain existing Sufficiency Scenarios would not impact the
resources OCC collects from its members. The effective expansion of
Sufficiency Scenarios would increase the likelihood that OCC maintains
sufficient liquid resources at all times.
Additionally, OCC has proposed changes to more accurately document
its current practices both with regard to calibrating scenarios at
least quarterly and meeting a Cover 1 standard for liquidity. The
change with regard to calibration would not impact OCC's current
practices, but would ensure a higher frequency of calibrations going
forward than is required under the current Methodology Description. The
change to a Cover 1 standard for liquidity is merely an error correct
that improves the accuracy of OCC's rules.
Accordingly, the Proposed Rule Change is consistent with Rule 17ad-
22(e)(7)(vi) under the Exchange Act.\48\
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\48\ Id.
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IV. Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission finds that the
Proposed Rule Change is consistent with the requirements of the
Exchange Act, and in particular, the requirements of Section 17A of the
Exchange Act \49\ and rules 17ad-22(e)(4) and (e)(7) thereunder.\50\
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\49\ In approving the Proposed Rule Change, the Commission has
considered the proposed rules' impact on efficiency, competition,
and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
\50\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(4) and 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(7).
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It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the
Exchange Act,\51\ that the Proposed Rule Change (SR-OCC-2025-009) be,
and hereby is, approved.
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\51\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\52\
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\52\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Sherry R. Haywood,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2025-14662 Filed 8-1-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
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This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.