Notice2025-13889

McNally Tunneling Corp./ASI Marine Southerly Tunnel and Consolidation Project; Application for Permanent Variance and Interim Order; Grant of Interim Order; Request for Comments

Primary source

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Published
July 24, 2025
Effective
July 24, 2025

Issuing agencies

Labor DepartmentOccupational Safety and Health Administration

Abstract

In this notice, OSHA announces the application of McNally Tunneling Corp./ASI Marine (McNally/ASI Marine) for a permanent variance and interim order from provisions of the OSHA standard that regulates work in compressed air environments, presents the agency's preliminary finding on McNally/ASI Marine's application and announces the grant of an interim order. OSHA invites the public to submit comments on the variance application to assist the agency in determining whether to grant the applicant a permanent variance based on the conditions specified in this application.

Full Text

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 140 (Thursday, July 24, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 140 (Thursday, July 24, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 34887-34897]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-13889]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

[Docket No. OSHA-2025-0004]


McNally Tunneling Corp./ASI Marine Southerly Tunnel and 
Consolidation Project; Application for Permanent Variance and Interim 
Order; Grant of Interim Order; Request for Comments

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA announces the application of McNally 
Tunneling Corp./ASI Marine (McNally/ASI Marine) for a permanent 
variance and interim order from provisions of the OSHA standard that 
regulates work in compressed air environments, presents the agency's 
preliminary finding on McNally/ASI Marine's application and announces 
the grant of an interim order. OSHA invites the public to submit 
comments on the variance application to assist the agency in 
determining whether to grant the applicant a permanent variance based 
on the conditions specified in this application.

DATES: Submit comments, information, documents in response to this 
notice, and request for a hearing on or before August 25, 2025. The 
interim order described in this notice will become effective on July 
24, 2025, and shall remain in effect until the completion of the 
Southerly Tunnel and Consolidation (SOTC) Project for Cleveland, Ohio, 
the interim order is modified or revoked, or OSHA publishes a decision 
on the permanent variance application.

ADDRESSES: 
    Electronically: You may submit comments, including attachments, 
electronically at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a>, the Federal eRulemaking 
Portal. Follow the instructions online for making electronic 
submissions.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency's name and 
the docket number for this rulemaking (Docket No. OSHA-2025-0004). All 
comments, including any personal information you provide, are placed in 
the public docket without change and may be made available online at 
<a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a>. Therefore, OSHA cautions commenters about 
submitting information they do not want made available to the public or 
submitting materials that contain personal information (either about 
themselves or others), such as Social Security numbers and birthdates.
    Docket: To read or download comments or other material in the 
docket, go to <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a>. Documents in the docket 
(including this Federal Register notice) are listed in the <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a> index; however, some information (e.g., copyrighted 
material) is not publicly available to read or download through the 
website. All submissions, including copyrighted material, are available 
for inspection through the OSHA Docket Office. Contact the OSHA Docket 
Office at (202) 693-2350 (TTY (877) 889-5627) for assistance in 
locating docket submissions.
    Extension of comment period: Submit requests for an extension of 
the comment period on or before August 25, 2025 to the Office of 
Technical Programs and Coordination Activities, Directorate of 
Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution 
Avenue NW, Room N-3653, Washington, DC 20210, or by fax to (202) 693-
1644.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is 
available from the following sources:
    Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office 
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor; telephone: (202) 693-1999; 
email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#066b636f6a6f686163742860746768656f75344662696a28616970"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="ef828a86838681888a9dc1899d8e818c869cddaf8b8083c1888099">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.
    General and technical information: Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson, 
Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities, 
Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor; telephone: 
(202) 693-1911; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#780a171a11160b171656131d0e1116381c1714561f170e"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="42302d202b2c312d2c6c2927342b2c02262d2e6c252d34">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.
    Copies of this Federal Register notice. Electronic copies of this 
Federal Register notice are available at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a>. 
This Federal Register notice, as well as news releases and other 
relevant information, also are available at OSHA's web page at <a href="http://www.osha.gov">http://www.osha.gov</a>.
    Hearing Requests. According to 29 CFR 1905.15, hearing requests 
must include: (1) a concise statement of facts detailing how the 
permanent variance would affect the requesting party; (2) a 
specification of any statement or representation in the variance 
application that the commenter denies, and a concise summary of the 
evidence offered in support of each denial; and (3) any views or 
arguments on any issue of fact or law presented in the variance 
application.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Notice of Application

    On July 16, 2024, McNally Tunneling Corp./ASI Marine (McNally/ASI 
or the applicant), submitted under Section 6(d) of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 
1905.11 (variances and other relief under section 6(d)) an application 
for a permanent variance from several provisions of the OSHA standard 
that regulates work in compressed air, 1926.803 of 1926 Subpart S--
Underground Construction, Caissons, Cofferdams, and Compressed Air, and 
an interim order allowing it to proceed while OSHA considers the 
request for a permanent variance (OSHA-2025-0004-0002). This notice 
addresses McNally/ASI's application for a permanent variance and 
interim order for construction of the Southerly Tunnel and 
Consolidation (SOTC) Project in Cleveland, Ohio, only and is not 
applicable to future McNally/ASI Marine or McNally-related joint 
venture tunneling projects.
    Specifically, this notice addresses McNally/ASI Marine's 
application for a permanent variance and interim order from the 
provisions of the standard that: (1) prohibit compressed-air worker 
exposure to pressures exceeding 50 pounds per square inch (p.s.i.) 
except in an emergency (29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5)); \1\ (2) require the use 
of the decompression values specified in decompression tables in 
Appendix A of the compressed-air standard for construction (29 CFR 
1926.803(f)(1)); and (3) require the use of automated operational 
controls and a special decompression chamber (29 CFR

[[Page 34888]]

1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii), respectively).
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    \1\ The decompression tables in Appendix A of subpart S express 
the maximum working pressures as pounds per square inch gauge 
(p.s.i.g.), with a maximum working pressure of 50 p.s.i.g. 
Therefore, throughout this notice, OSHA expresses the 50 p.s.i. 
value specified by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5) as 50 p.s.i.g., consistent 
with the terminology in Appendix A, Table 1 of subpart S.
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    OSHA has previously approved nearly identical provisions when 
granting several other very similar variances, as discussed in more 
detail in Section II. OSHA preliminarily concludes that the proposed 
variance is appropriate, grants an interim order temporarily allowing 
the proposed activity, and seeks comment on the proposed variance.

A. Background

    The applicant is a contractor that works on complex underground 
tunnel projects using innovations in tunnel-excavation methods. The 
applicant's workers engage in the construction of tunnels using 
advanced shielded mechanical excavation techniques in conjunction with 
an earth pressure balanced micro-tunnel boring machine (TBM). Using 
shielded mechanical excavation techniques, in conjunction with precast 
concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, TBMs provide methods to 
achieve the face pressures required to maintain a stabilized tunnel 
face through various geologies and isolate that pressure to the forward 
section (the excavation working chamber) of the TBM.
    McNally/ASI Marine asserts that generally it bores tunnels using a 
TBM at levels below the water table through soft soils consisting of 
clay, silt, and sand. TBMs are capable of maintaining pressure at the 
tunnel face, and stabilizing existing geological conditions, through 
the controlled use of a mechanically driven cutter head, bulkheads 
within the shield, ground-treatment foam, and a screw conveyor that 
moves excavated material from the working chamber. The forward-most 
portion of the TBM is the working chamber, and this chamber is the only 
pressurized segment of the TBM. Within the shield, the working chamber 
consists of two sections: the forward working chamber and the staging 
chamber. The forward working chamber is immediately behind the cutter 
head and tunnel face. The staging chamber is behind the forward working 
chamber and between the man-lock door, and the entry door to the 
forward working chamber.
    The TBM has twin man-locks located between the pressurized working 
chamber and the non-pressurized portion of the machine. Each man-lock 
has two compartments. This configuration allows workers to access the 
man-locks for compression and decompression, and medical personnel to 
access the man-locks if required in an emergency.
    McNally/ASI Marine's variance application indicated that the 
maximum pressure to which it is likely to expose workers during project 
interventions for the SOTC Project is 58 p.s.i. Therefore, to work 
effectively, McNally/ASI Marine must perform hyperbaric interventions 
in compressed air at pressures 16 percent higher than the maximum 
pressure specified by the existing OSHA standard, 29 CFR 
1926.803(e)(5), which states: ``No employee shall be subjected to 
pressure exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. except in emergency'' (see footnote 1).
    McNally/ASI Marine employs specially trained personnel for the 
construction of the tunnel. To keep the machinery working effectively, 
McNally asserts that these workers must periodically enter the 
excavation working chamber of the TBM to perform hyperbaric 
interventions during which workers would be exposed to air pressures up 
to 58 p.s.i.g., which exceeds the maximum pressure specified by the 
existing OSHA standard at 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5). These interventions 
consist of conducting inspections or maintenance work on the cutter-
head structure and cutting tools of the TBM, such as changing 
replaceable cutting tools and disposable wear bars, and, in rare cases, 
repairing structural damage to the cutter head. These interventions are 
the only time that workers are exposed to compressed air. Interventions 
in the working chamber (the pressurized portion of the TBM) take place 
only after halting tunnel excavation and preparing the machine and crew 
for an intervention.
    During interventions, workers enter the working chamber through one 
of the twin man-locks that open into the staging chamber. To reach the 
forward part of the working chamber, workers pass through a door in a 
bulkhead that separates the staging chamber from the forward working 
chamber. The man-locks and the working chamber are designed to 
accommodate three people, which is the maximum crew size allowed under 
the proposed variance. When the required decompression times are 
greater than work times, the twin man-locks allow for crew rotation. 
During crew rotation, one crew can be compressing or decompressing 
while the second crew is working. Therefore, the working crew always 
has an unoccupied man-lock at its disposal.
    McNally/ASI Marine asserts that these innovations in tunnel 
excavation have greatly reduced worker exposure to hazards of 
pressurized air work because they have eliminated the need to 
pressurize the entire tunnel for the project and would thereby reduce 
the number of workers exposed, as well as the total duration of 
exposure, to hyperbaric pressure during tunnel construction. These 
advances in technology substantially modified the methods used by the 
construction industry to excavate subaqueous tunnels compared to 
caisson work.
    In addition to the reduced exposures resulting from the innovations 
in tunnel-excavation methods, McNally/ASI Marine asserts that 
innovations in hyperbaric medicine and technology improve the safety of 
decompression from hyperbaric exposures. These procedures, however, 
would deviate from the decompression process that OSHA requires for 
construction in 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5) and (f)(1) and the decompression 
tables in Appendix A of 29 CFR 1926, subpart S. Nevertheless, according 
to McNally/ASI Marine, their use of decompression protocols 
incorporating oxygen is more efficient, effective, and safer for tunnel 
workers than compliance with the decompression tables specified by the 
existing OSHA standard.
    McNally/ASI Marine therefore believes its workers will be at least 
as safe under its proposed alternatives as they would be under OSHA's 
standard because of the reduction in number of workers and duration of 
hyperbaric exposures, a better application of hyperbaric medicine, and 
the development of a project-specific Hyperbaric Operations Manual 
(HOM), (OSHA-2025-0004-0003) that requires specialized medical support 
and hyperbaric supervision to provide assistance to a team of specially 
trained man-lock attendants; and hyperbaric or compressed-air workers 
(CAWs).
    Based on an initial review of McNally/ASI Marine's application for 
a permanent variance and interim order for the construction of the SOTC 
Project in Cleveland, Ohio, OSHA has preliminarily determined that 
McNally/ASI Marine has proposed an alternative that would provide a 
workplace at least as safe and healthful as that provided by the 
standard.

II. The Variance Application

    Pursuant to the requirements of OSHA's variance regulations (29 CFR 
1905.11), the applicant has certified that it notified its workers \2\ 
of the variance application and request for interim order by posting, 
at prominent locations where it normally posts workplace notices, a 
summary of the application and information specifying where the workers 
can examine a copy of the

[[Page 34889]]

application. In addition, the applicant informed its workers and their 
representatives of their rights to petition the Assistant Secretary of 
Labor for Occupational Safety and Health for a hearing on the variance 
application.
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    \2\ See the definition of ``Affected employee or worker'' in 
section V.D of this Notice.
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A. OSHA History of Approval of Nearly Identical Variance Requests

    OSHA has previously approved several nearly identical variances 
involving the same types of tunneling equipment used for similar 
projects. OSHA notes that it granted several subaqueous tunnel 
construction permanent variances from the same provisions of OSHA's 
compressed-air standard (29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), 
and (g)(1)(xvii)) that are the subject of the present application: (1) 
Impregilo, Healy, Parsons, Joint Venture (IHP JV) for the Anacostia 
River Tunnel in Washington, DC (80 FR 50652, August 20, 2015); (2) 
Traylor JV for the Blue Plains Tunnel in Washington, DC (80 FR 16440, 
March 27, 2015); (3) Tully/OHL USA Joint Venture for the New York 
Economic Development Corporation's New York Siphon Tunnel project (79 
FR 29809, May 23, 2014); (4) Salini-Impregilo/Healy Joint Venture for 
the Northeast Boundary Tunnel in Washington, DC (85 FR 27767, May 11, 
2020); (5) McNally/Kiewit SST for the Shoreline Storage Tunnel in 
Cleveland, Ohio (88 FR 15080, March 10, 2023); (6) Traylor Shea Joint 
Venture for the Alexandria RiverRenew Tunnel Project in Alexandria, 
Virginia and Washington, DC (88 FR 15090, March 10, 2023); (7) Traylor-
Sundt Joint Venture, for the Integrated Pipeline Tunnel Project in 
Dallas, Texas (88 FR 83152, November 28, 2023); (8) Ballard Marine 
Construction for the Bay Park Conveyance Tunnel Project in Nassau 
County, New York (89 FR 8442, February 7, 2024); and (9) Ballard Marine 
Construction for the Lower Olentangy Tunnel Project in Columbus, Ohio 
(89 FR 78906, September 26, 2024). OSHA also granted an interim order 
to Ballard Marine Construction for the Suffolk County, New York Outfall 
Tunnel Project (86 FR 5253, January 19, 2021). The proposed alternate 
conditions in this notice are nearly identical to the alternate 
conditions of the previous permanent variances and interim orders. OSHA 
is not aware of any injuries or other safety issues that arose from 
work performed under these conditions in accordance with the previous 
variances.

B. Variance From Paragraph (e)(5) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Prohibition of 
Exposure to Pressure Greater Than 50 p.s.i.g. (See Footnote 1)

    The applicant states that it may perform hyperbaric interventions 
at pressures up to 58 p.s.i.g. in the working chamber of the TBM; this 
pressure exceeds the pressure limit of 50 p.s.i. specified for 
nonemergency purposes by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5). The TBM has twin man-
locks, with each man-lock having two compartments. This configuration 
allows workers to access the man-locks for compression and 
decompression, and medical personnel to access the man-locks if 
required in an emergency.
    TBMs are capable of maintaining pressure at the tunnel face, and 
stabilizing existing geological conditions, through the controlled use 
of a mechanically driven cutter head, bulkheads within the shield, 
ground-treatment foam, and a screw conveyor that moves excavated 
material from the working chamber. As noted earlier, the forward-most 
portion of the TBM is the working chamber, and this chamber is the only 
pressurized segment of the TBM. Within the shield, the working chamber 
consists of two sections: the staging chamber and the forward working 
chamber. The staging chamber is the section of the working chamber 
between the man-lock door and the entry door to the forward working 
chamber. The forward working chamber is immediately behind the cutter 
head and tunnel face.
    McNally/ASI Marine will pressurize the working chamber to the level 
required to maintain a stable tunnel face. Pressure in the staging 
chamber ranges from atmospheric (no increased pressure) to a maximum 
pressure equal to the pressure in the working chamber. The applicant 
asserts that they may have to perform interventions at pressures up to 
58 p.s.i.g.
    During interventions, workers enter the working chamber through one 
of the twin man-locks that open into the staging chamber. To reach the 
forward part of the working chamber, workers pass through a door in a 
bulkhead that separates the staging chamber from the forward working 
chamber. The maximum crew size allowed in the forward working chamber 
is three. At certain hyperbaric pressures (i.e., when decompression 
times are greater than work times), the twin man-locks allow for crew 
rotation. During crew rotation, one crew can be compressing or 
decompressing while the second crew is working. Therefore, the working 
crew always has an unoccupied man-lock at its disposal.
    Further, the applicant asserts that it has developed a project-
specific HOM (OSHA-2025-0004-0003) that describes in detail the 
hyperbaric procedures, the required medical examination used during the 
tunnel-construction project, the standard operating procedures and the 
emergency and contingency procedures. The procedures include using 
experienced and knowledgeable man-lock attendants who have the training 
and experience necessary to recognize and treat decompression illnesses 
and injuries. The attendants are under the direct supervision of the 
hyperbaric supervisor and attending physician. In addition, procedures 
include medical screening and review of prospective compressed-air 
workers (CAWs). The purpose of this screening procedure is to vet 
prospective CAWs with medical conditions (e.g., deep vein thrombosis, 
poor vascular circulation, and muscle cramping) that could be 
aggravated by sitting in a cramped space (e.g., a man-lock) for 
extended periods, or by exposure to elevated pressures and compressed 
gas mixtures. A transportable recompression chamber (shuttle) is 
available to extract workers from the hyperbaric working chamber for 
emergency evacuation and medical treatment; the shuttle attaches to the 
topside medical lock, which is a large recompression chamber. The 
applicant believes that the procedures included in the HOM provide safe 
work conditions when interventions are necessary, including 
interventions above 50 p.s.i.g.
    OSHA has comprehensively reviewed the project-specific HOM and has 
determined that the safety and health instructions and measures it 
specifies are appropriate, conform with the conditions in the variance, 
and adequately protect the safety and health of the CAWs.

C. Variance From Paragraph (f)(1) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement To 
Use OSHA Decompression Tables

    OSHA's compressed-air standard for construction requires 
decompression in accordance with the decompression tables in Appendix A 
of 29 CFR 1926, subpart S (see 29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)). As an 
alternative to the OSHA decompression tables, the applicant proposes to 
use newer decompression schedules (the 1992 French Decompression 
Tables) that rely on staged decompression and supplement breathing air 
used during decompression with air or oxygen (as

[[Page 34890]]

appropriate).\3\ The applicant asserts decompression protocols using 
the 1992 French Decompression Tables for air or oxygen as specified by 
the SOTC Project-specific HOM are safer for tunnel workers than the 
decompression protocols specified in Appendix A of 29 CFR 1926, subpart 
S. Accordingly, the applicant would commit to following the 
decompression procedures described in that HOM, which would require it 
to follow the 1992 French Decompression Tables to decompress 
compressed-air worker (CAWs) after they exit the hyperbaric conditions 
in the working chamber.
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    \3\ In 1992, the French Ministry of Labour replaced the 1974 
French Decompression Tables with the 1992 French Decompression 
Tables, which differ from OSHA's decompression tables in Appendix A 
by using: (1) staged decompression as opposed to continuous (linear) 
decompression; (2) decompression tables based on air or both air and 
pure oxygen; and (3) emergency tables when unexpected exposure times 
occur (up to 30 minutes above the maximum allowed working time).
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    Depending on the maximum working pressure and exposure times, the 
1992 French Decompression Tables provide for air decompression with or 
without oxygen. McNally/ASI Marine asserts that oxygen decompression 
has many benefits, including (1) keeping the partial pressure of 
nitrogen in the lungs as low as possible; (2) keeping external pressure 
as low as possible to reduce the formation of bubbles in the blood; (3) 
removing nitrogen from the lungs and arterial blood and increasing the 
rate of nitrogen elimination; (4) improving the quality of breathing 
during decompression stops so that workers are less tired and to 
prevent bone necrosis; (5) reducing decompression time by about 33 
percent as compared to air decompression; and (6) reducing 
inflammation.
    In addition, the project-specific HOM requires a physician 
certified in hyperbaric medicine to manage the medical condition of 
CAWs during hyperbaric exposures and decompression. A trained and 
experienced man-lock attendant is also required to be present during 
hyperbaric exposures and decompression. This man-lock attendant is to 
operate the hyperbaric system to ensure compliance with the specified 
decompression table. A hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), who is 
trained in hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety, directly 
oversees all hyperbaric interventions, and ensures that staff follow 
the procedures delineated in the HOM or by the attending physician.

D. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of 29 CFR 1926.803, 
Automatically Regulated Continuous Decompression

    The applicant is applying for a permanent variance from the OSHA 
standard at 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii), which requires automatic 
controls to regulate decompression. As noted above, the applicant is 
committed to conducting the staged decompression according to the 1992 
French Decompression Tables under the direct control of the trained 
man-lock attendant and under the oversight of the hyperbaric 
supervisor.
    Breathing air under hyperbaric conditions increases the amount of 
nitrogen gas dissolved in a CAW's tissues. The greater the hyperbaric 
pressure under these conditions and the more time spent under the 
increased pressure, the greater the amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in 
the tissues. When the pressure decreases during decompression, tissues 
release the dissolved nitrogen gas into the blood system, which then 
carries the nitrogen gas to the lungs for elimination through 
exhalation. Releasing hyperbaric pressure too rapidly during 
decompression can increase the size of the bubbles formed by nitrogen 
gas in the blood system, resulting in decompression illness (DCI), 
commonly referred to as ``the bends.'' This description of the etiology 
of DCI is consistent with current scientific theory and research on the 
issue (see footnote 12 in this notice discussing a 1985 NIOSH report on 
DCI).
    The 1992 French Decompression Tables proposed for use by the 
applicant provide for stops during worker decompression (i.e., staged 
decompression) to control the release of nitrogen gas from tissues into 
the blood system. Studies show that staged decompression, in 
combination with other features of the 1992 French Decompression Tables 
such as the use of oxygen, result in a lower incidence of DCI than the 
use of automatically regulated continuous decompression.\4\ In 
addition, the applicant asserts that staged decompression administered 
in accordance with its HOM is at least as effective as an automatic 
controller in regulating the decompression process because the HOM 
includes a hyperbaric supervisor (a competent person experienced and 
trained in hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety) who directly 
supervises all hyperbaric interventions and ensures that the man-lock 
attendant, who is a competent person in the manual control of 
hyperbaric systems, follows the schedule specified in the decompression 
tables, including stops.
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    \4\ See, e.g., Dr. Eric Kindwall, EP (1997), Compressed air 
tunneling and caisson work decompression procedures: development, 
problems, and solutions. Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine, 24(4), 
pp. 337-345. This article reported 60 treated cases of DCI among 
4,168 exposures between 19 and 31 p.s.i.g. over a 51-week contract 
period, for a DCI incidence of 1.44 percent for the decompression 
tables specified by the OSHA standard. Dr. Kindwall notes that the 
use of automatically regulated continuous decompression in the 
Washington State safety standards for compressed-air work (from 
which OSHA derived its decompression tables) was at the insistence 
of contractors and the union, and against the advice of the expert 
who calculated the decompression table and recommended using staged 
decompression. Dr. Kindwall then states, ``Continuous decompression 
is inefficient and wasteful. For example, if the last stage from 4 
p.s.i.g. . . . to the surface took 1h, at least half the time is 
spent at pressures less than 2 p.s.i.g. . . ., which provides less 
and less meaningful bubble suppression . . . .'' In addition, Dr. 
Kindwall addresses the continuous-decompression protocol in the OSHA 
compressed-air standard for construction, noting that ``[a]side from 
the tables for saturation diving to deep depths, no other widely 
used or officially approved diving decompression tables use straight 
line, continuous decompressions at varying rates. Stage 
decompression is usually the rule, since it is simpler to control.''
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E. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement 
of Special Decompression Chamber

    The OSHA compressed-air standard for construction requires 
employers to use a special decompression chamber of sufficient size to 
accommodate all CAWs being decompressed at the end of the shift when 
total decompression time exceeds 75 minutes (see 29 CFR 
1926.803(g)(1)(xvii)). Use of the special decompression chamber enables 
CAWs to move about and flex their joints to prevent neuromuscular 
problems during decompression.
    Space limitations in the TBM do not allow for the installation and 
use of an additional special decompression lock or chamber. The 
applicant proposes that it be permitted to rely on the man-locks and 
staging chamber in lieu of adding a separate, special decompression 
chamber. Because only a few workers out of the entire crew are exposed 
to hyperbaric pressure, the man-locks (which, as noted earlier, connect 
directly to the working chamber) and the staging chamber are of 
sufficient size to accommodate all of the exposed workers during 
decompression. The applicant uses the existing man-locks, each of which 
adequately accommodates a three-member crew for this purpose when 
decompression lasts up to 75 minutes. When decompression exceeds 75 
minutes, crews can open the door connecting the two compartments in 
each man-lock (during decompression stops) or exit the man-

[[Page 34891]]

lock and move into the staging chamber where additional space is 
available. The applicant asserts that this alternative arrangement is 
as effective as a special decompression chamber in that it has 
sufficient space for all the CAWs at the end of a shift and enables the 
CAWs to move about and flex their joints to prevent neuromuscular 
problems.

III. Agency Preliminary Determinations

    After reviewing the proposed alternatives, OSHA has preliminarily 
determined that the applicant's proposed alternatives on the whole, 
subject to the conditions in the request and imposed by this interim 
order, provide measures that are as safe and healthful as those 
required by the cited OSHA standards addressed in section II of this 
document.
    In addition, OSHA has preliminarily determined that each of the 
following alternatives are at least as effective as the specified OSHA 
requirements:

A. 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5)

    McNally has developed, and proposed to implement, effective 
alternative measures to the prohibition of using compressed air under 
hyperbaric conditions exceeding 50 p.s.i. The proposed alternative 
measures include use of engineering and administrative controls of the 
hazards associated with work performed in compressed-air conditions 
exceeding 50 p.s.i. while engaged in the construction of a subaqueous 
tunnel using advance shielded mechanical-excavation techniques in 
conjunction with the TBM. Prior to conducting interventions in the 
TBM's pressurized working chamber, McNally/ASI Marine halts tunnel 
excavation and prepares the machine and crew to conduct the 
interventions. Interventions involve inspection, maintenance, or repair 
of the mechanical-excavation components located in the working chamber.

B. 29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)

    McNally/ASI Marine has proposed to implement equally effective 
alternative measures to the requirement in 29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1) for 
compliance with OSHA's decompression tables. The HOM specifies the 
procedures and personnel qualifications for performing work safely 
during the compression and decompression phases of interventions. The 
HOM also specifies the decompression tables the applicant proposes to 
use (the 1992 French Decompression Tables). Depending on the maximum 
working pressure and exposure times during the interventions, the 
tables provide for decompression using air, pure oxygen, or a 
combination of air and oxygen. The decompression tables also include 
delays or stops for various time intervals at different pressure levels 
during the transition to atmospheric pressure (i.e., staged 
decompression). In all cases, a physician certified in hyperbaric 
medicine will manage the medical condition of CAWs during 
decompression. In addition, a trained and experienced man-lock 
attendant, experienced in recognizing decompression sickness or 
illnesses and injuries, will be present. Of key importance, a 
hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in hyperbaric 
operations, procedures, and safety, will directly supervise all 
hyperbaric operations to ensure compliance with the procedures 
delineated in the project-specific HOM or by the attending physician.
    As it did when granting the nine previous tunneling permanent 
variances to IHP JV, Traylor JV, Tully JV, Salini-Impregilo JV, 
McNally/Kiewit, Traylor-Shea, Traylor-Sundt JV, Ballard (Lower 
Olentangy), Ballard (Bay Park), and one interim order to Ballard 
(Suffolk), OSHA conducted a review of the scientific literature and 
concluded that the alternative decompression method (i.e., the 1992 
French Decompression Tables) McNally/ASI Marine proposed would be at 
least as safe as the decompression tables specified by OSHA when 
applied by trained medical personnel under the conditions that would be 
imposed by the proposed variance.
    Some of the literature indicates that it may be safer, concluding 
that decompression performed in accordance with these tables resulted 
in a lower occurrence of DCI than decompression conducted in accordance 
with the decompression tables specified by the standard. For example, 
H.L. Andersen studied the occurrence of DCI at maximum hyperbaric 
pressures ranging from 4 p.s.i.g. to 43 p.s.i.g. during construction of 
the Great Belt Tunnel in Denmark (1992-1996).\5\ This project used the 
1992 French Decompression Tables to decompress the workers during part 
of the construction. Andersen observed 6 DCI cases out of 7,220 
decompression events and reported that switching to the 1992 French 
Decompression tables reduced the DCI incidence to 0.08 percent compared 
to a previous incidence rate of 0.14 percent. The DCI incidence in the 
study by H.L. Andersen is substantially less than the DCI incidence 
reported for the decompression tables specified in Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Anderson HL (2002). Decompression sickness during 
construction of the Great Belt tunnel, Denmark. Undersea and 
Hyperbaric Medicine, 29(3), pp. 172-188.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA found no studies in which the DCI incidence reported for the 
1992 French Decompression Tables were higher than the DCI incidence 
reported for the OSHA decompression tables.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Le P[eacute]chon JC, Barre P, Baud JP, Ollivier F (September 
1996). Compressed air work--French Tables 1992--operational results. 
JCLP Hyperbarie Paris, Centre Medical Subaquatique Interentreprise, 
Marseille: Communication a l'EUBS, pp. 1-5 (see Ex. OSHA-2012-0036-
0005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA's experience with the other previous tunneling permanent 
variances, which all incorporated nearly identical decompression plans 
and did not result in safety issues, also provides evidence that the 
alternative procedure as a whole is at least as effective for this type 
of tunneling project as compliance with OSHA's decompression tables. 
The experience of State Plans \7\ that either granted variances 
(Nevada, Oregon and Washington) \8\ or promulgated a new standard 
(California) \9\ for hyperbaric exposures occurring during similar 
subaqueous tunnel-construction work, provide additional evidence of the 
effectiveness of this alternative procedure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Under Section 18 of the OSH Act, Congress expressly provides 
that States and U.S. territories may adopt, with Federal approval, a 
plan for the development and enforcement of occupational safety and 
health standards. OSHA refers to such States and territories as 
``State Plans.'' Occupational safety and health standards developed 
by State Plans must be at least as effective in providing safe and 
healthful employment and places of employment as the Federal 
standards (29 U.S.C. 667).
    \8\ These state variances are available in the docket for the 
2015 Traylor JV variance: Exs. OSHA-2012-0035-0006 (Nevada), OSHA-
2012-0035-0005 (Oregon), and OSHA-2012-0035-0004 (Washington).
    \9\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7, 
Group 26, Article 154, available at <a href="http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html">http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii)

    McNally/ASI Marine developed, and proposed to implement, an equally 
effective alternative to 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii), which requires the 
use of automatic controllers that continuously decrease pressure to 
achieve decompression in accordance with the tables specified by the 
standard. The applicant's alternative includes using the 1992 French 
Decompression Tables for guiding staged decompression to achieve lower 
occurrences of DCI, using a trained and competent attendant for 
implementing appropriate hyperbaric entry and exit procedures, and 
providing a competent hyperbaric supervisor and attending physician 
certified in hyperbaric medicine to oversee all hyperbaric operations.

[[Page 34892]]

    In reaching this preliminary conclusion, OSHA again notes the 
experience of previous nearly identical tunneling variances, the 
experiences of State Plans, and a review of the literature and other 
information noted earlier.

D. 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(xvii)

    McNally/ASI Marine developed, and proposed to implement, an 
effective alternative to the use of the special decompression chamber 
required by 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(xvii). The TBM's man-lock and working 
chamber appear to satisfy all of the conditions of the special 
decompression chamber, including that they provide sufficient space for 
the maximum crew of three CAWs to stand up and move around, and safely 
accommodate decompression times up to 360 minutes. Therefore, again 
noting OSHA's previous experience with nearly identical tunneling 
variances including the same alternative, OSHA preliminarily determined 
that the TBM's man-lock and working chamber function as effectively as 
the special decompression chamber required by the standard.
    Pursuant to section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 655), and based on the record discussed above, the 
agency preliminarily finds that when the employer complies with the 
conditions of the proposed variance, the working conditions of the 
employer's workers would be at least as safe and healthful as if the 
employer complied with the working conditions specified by paragraphs 
(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803.

IV. Grant of Interim Order, Proposal for Permanent Variance, and 
Request for Comment

    OSHA hereby announces the preliminary decision to grant an interim 
order allowing McNally/ASI Marine's CAWs to perform interventions in 
hyperbaric conditions not exceeding 58 p.s.i.g. during the SOTC 
Project, subject to the conditions that follow in this document. This 
interim order will remain in effect until completion of the SOTC 
Project or until the agency modifies or revokes the interim order or 
makes a decision on McNally/ASI Marine's application for a permanent 
variance. During the period starting with the publication of this 
notice until completion of the SOTC Project, or until the agency 
modifies or revokes the interim order or makes a decision on its 
application for a permanent variance, the applicant is required to 
comply fully with the conditions of the interim order as an alternative 
to complying with the following requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803 
(hereafter, the standard) that:
    1. Prohibit exposure to pressure greater than 50 p.s.i. (29 CFR 
1926.803(e)(5));
    2. Require the use of decompression values specified by the 
decompression tables in Appendix A of the compressed-air standard (29 
CFR 1926.803(f)(1));
    3. Require the use of automated operational controls (29 CFR 
1926.803(g)(1)(iii)); and
    4. Require the use of a special decompression chamber (29 CFR 
1926.803(g)(1)(xvii)).
    In order to avail itself of the interim order, McNally/ASI Marine 
must: (1) comply with the conditions listed in the interim order for 
the period starting with the grant of the interim order and ending with 
McNally/ASI Marine's completion of the SOTC Project (or until the 
agency modifies or revokes the interim order or makes a decision on its 
application for a permanent variance); (2) comply fully with all other 
applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926; and (3) provide a copy of 
this Federal Register notice to all employees affected by the proposed 
conditions, including the affected employees of other employers, using 
the same means it used to inform these employees of its application for 
a permanent variance.
    OSHA is also proposing that the same requirements (see above 
section III) would apply to a permanent variance if OSHA ultimately 
issues one for this project. OSHA requests comment on those conditions 
as well as OSHA's preliminary determination that the specified 
alternatives and conditions would provide a workplace as safe and 
healthful as those required by the standard from which a variance is 
sought. After reviewing comments, OSHA will publish in the Federal 
Register the agency's final decision approving or rejecting the request 
for a permanent variance.

V. Description of the Specified Conditions of the Interim Order and the 
Application for a Permanent Variance

    This section describes the alternative means of compliance with 29 
CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) and provides 
additional detail regarding the proposed conditions that form the basis 
of McNally/ASI Marine's application for an interim order and for a 
permanent variance. The conditions are listed below. For brevity, the 
discussion that follows refers only to the permanent variance, but the 
same conditions apply to the interim order.

Proposed Condition A: Scope

    The scope of the proposed permanent variance would limit coverage 
to the work situations specified. Clearly defining the scope of the 
proposed permanent variance provides McNally/ASI Marine, McNally/ASI 
Marine's employees, potential future applicants, other stakeholders, 
the public, and OSHA with necessary information regarding the work 
situations in which the proposed permanent variance would apply. To the 
extent that McNally/ASI Marine exceeds the defined scope of this 
variance, it would be required to comply with OSHA's standards.
    Pursuant to 29 CFR 1905.11, an employer (or class or group of 
employers) \10\ may request a permanent variance for a specific 
workplace or workplaces. If OSHA approves a permanent variance, it 
would apply only to the specific employer(s) that submitted the 
application and only to the specific workplace or workplaces designated 
as part of the project. In this instance, if OSHA were to grant a 
permanent variance, it would apply to only the applicant, McNally/ASI 
Marine and only the SOTC Project. As a result, it is important to 
understand that if OSHA were to grant McNally/ASI Marine a permanent 
variance, it would not apply to any other employers, such as other 
joint ventures the applicant may undertake in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ A class or group of employers (such as members of a trade 
alliance or association) may apply jointly for a Variance provided 
an authorized representative for each employer signs the application 
and the application identifies each employer's affected facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Proposed Condition B: Duration

    The interim order is only intended as a temporary measure pending 
OSHA's decision on the permanent variance, so this condition specifies 
the duration of the order. If OSHA approves a permanent variance, it 
would specify the duration of the permanent variance as the remainder 
of the SOTC Project.

Proposed Condition C: List of Abbreviations

    The proposed condition defines a number of abbreviations used in 
the proposed permanent variance. OSHA believes that defining these 
abbreviations serves to clarify and standardize their usage, thereby 
enhancing the applicant's and its employees' understanding of the 
conditions specified by the proposed permanent variance.

Proposed Condition D: Definitions

    The proposed condition defines a series of terms, mostly technical 
terms,

[[Page 34893]]

used in the proposed permanent variance to standardize and clarify 
their meaning. OSHA believes that defining these terms serves to 
enhance the applicant's and its employees' understanding of the 
conditions specified by the proposed permanent variance.

Proposed Condition E: Safety and Health Practices

    This proposed condition requires the applicant to develop and 
submit to OSHA an HOM specific to the SOTC Project at least six months 
before using the TBM for tunneling operations. The applicant must also 
submit, at least six months before using the TBM, proof that the TBM's 
hyperbaric chambers have been designed, fabricated, inspected, tested, 
marked, and stamped in accordance with the requirements of ASME PVHO-
1.2019 (or the most recent edition of Safety Standards for Pressure 
Vessels for Human Occupancy). These requirements ensure that the 
applicant develops hyperbaric safety and health procedures suitable for 
the project.
    The submission of the HOM to OSHA, which McNally/ASI Marine has 
already completed, enables OSHA to determine whether the safety and 
health instructions and measures it specifies are appropriate to the 
field conditions of the tunnel (including expected geological 
conditions), conform to the conditions of the variance; and adequately 
protect the safety and health of the CAWs. It also facilitates OSHA's 
ability to ensure that the applicant is complying with these 
instructions and measures. The requirement for proof of compliance with 
ASME PVHO-1.2019 is intended to ensure that the equipment is 
structurally sound and capable of performing to protect the safety of 
the employees exposed to hyperbaric pressure.
    Additionally, the proposed condition includes a series of related 
hazard prevention and control requirements and methods (e.g., 
decompression tables, job hazard analyses (JHA), operations and 
inspections checklists, incident investigation, and recording and 
notification to OSHA of recordable hyperbaric injuries and illnesses) 
designed to ensure the continued effective functioning of the 
hyperbaric equipment and operating system.

Proposed Condition F: Communication

    This proposed condition requires the applicant to develop and 
implement an effective system of information sharing and communication. 
Effective information sharing and communication are intended to ensure 
that affected workers receive updated information regarding any safety-
related hazards and incidents, and corrective actions taken, prior to 
the start of each shift. The proposed condition also requires the 
applicant to ensure that reliable means of emergency communications are 
available and maintained for affected workers and support personnel 
during hyperbaric operations. The availability of such reliable means 
of communications would enable affected workers and support personnel 
to respond quickly and effectively to hazardous conditions or 
emergencies that may develop during TBM operations.

Proposed Condition G: Worker Qualification and Training

    This proposed condition requires the applicant to develop and 
implement an effective qualification and training program for affected 
workers. The proposed condition specifies the factors that an affected 
worker must know to perform safely during hyperbaric operations, 
including how to enter, work in, and exit from hyperbaric conditions 
under both normal and emergency conditions. Having well-trained and 
qualified workers performing hyperbaric intervention work is intended 
to ensure that they recognize, and respond appropriately to, hyperbaric 
safety and health hazards. These qualification and training 
requirements enable affected workers to cope effectively with 
emergencies, as well as the discomfort and physiological effects of 
hyperbaric exposure, thereby preventing worker injury, illness, and 
fatalities.
    Paragraph (2)(e) of this proposed condition requires the applicant 
to provide affected workers with information they can use to contact 
the appropriate healthcare professionals if the workers believe they 
are developing hyperbaric-related health effects. This requirement 
provides for early intervention and treatment of DCI and other health 
effects resulting from hyperbaric exposure, thereby reducing the 
potential severity of these effects.

Proposed Condition H: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

    Proposed Condition H requires the applicant to develop, implement 
and operate a program of frequent, and regular inspections of the TBM's 
hyperbaric equipment and support systems, and associated work areas. 
This condition would help to ensure the safe operation and physical 
integrity of the equipment and work areas necessary to conduct 
hyperbaric operations. The condition would also enhance worker safety 
by reducing the risk of hyperbaric-related emergencies.
    Paragraph (3) of this proposed condition requires the applicant to 
document tests, inspections, corrective actions, and repairs involving 
the TBM, and maintain these documents at the jobsite for the duration 
of the job. This requirement would provide the applicant with 
information needed to schedule tests and inspections to ensure the 
continued safe operation of the equipment and systems, and to determine 
that the actions taken to correct defects in hyperbaric equipment and 
systems were appropriate, prior to returning them to service.

Proposed Condition I: Compression and Decompression

    This proposed condition would require the applicant to consult with 
the designated medical advisor regarding special compression or 
decompression procedures appropriate for any unacclimated CAW and then 
implement the procedures recommended by the medical consultant. This 
proposed provision would ensure that the applicant consults with the 
medical advisor, and involves the medical advisor in the evaluation, 
development, and implementation of compression or decompression 
protocols appropriate for any CAW requiring acclimation to the 
hyperbaric conditions encountered during TBM operations. Accordingly, 
CAWs requiring acclimation would have an opportunity to acclimate prior 
to exposure to these hyperbaric conditions. OSHA believes this 
condition would prevent or reduce adverse reactions among CAWs to the 
effects of compression or decompression associated with the 
intervention work they perform in the TBM.

Proposed Condition J: Recordkeeping

    Under OSHA's existing recordkeeping requirements in 29 CFR part 
1904 regarding Recording and Reporting Occupational Injuries and 
Illnesses, McNally/ASI Marine must maintain a record of any recordable 
injury, illness, or fatality (as defined by 29 CFR part 1904) resulting 
from exposure of an employee to hyperbaric conditions by completing the 
OSHA Form 301 Incident Report and OSHA Form 300 Log of Work Related 
Injuries and Illnesses. The applicant did not seek a variance from this 
standard and therefore must comply fully with those requirements.
    Examples of important information to include on the OSHA Form 301 
Injury and Illness Incident Report (along with the corresponding 
question on the form) are:

[[Page 34894]]

Q14

    <bullet> the task performed;
    <bullet> the composition of the gas mixture (e.g., air or oxygen);
    <bullet> an estimate of the CAW's workload;
    <bullet> the maximum working pressure;
    <bullet> temperature in the work and decompression environments;
    <bullet> unusual occurrences, if any, during the task or 
decompression

Q15

    <bullet> time of symptom onset;
    <bullet> duration between decompression and onset of symptoms

Q16

    <bullet> type and duration of symptoms;
    <bullet> a medical summary of the illness or injury

Q17

    <bullet> duration of the hyperbaric intervention;
    <bullet> possible contributing factors;
    <bullet> the number of prior interventions completed by the injured 
or ill CAW; and the pressure to which the CAW was exposed during those 
interventions.\11\
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    \11\ See 29 CFR 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational 
Injuries and Illnesses (<a href="http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631">http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631</a>); recordkeeping 
forms and instructions (<a href="http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf">http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf</a>); and OSHA Recordkeeping Handbook 
(<a href="http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/handbook/index.html">http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/handbook/index.html</a>).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Condition J would add additional reporting 
responsibilities, beyond those already required by the OSHA standard. 
The applicant would be required to maintain records of specific factors 
associated with each hyperbaric intervention. The information gathered 
and recorded under this provision, in concert with the information 
provided under proposed Condition K (using OSHA Form 301 Injury and 
Illness Incident Report to investigate and record hyperbaric recordable 
injuries as defined by 29 CFR 1904.4, 1904.7, 1904.8--1904.12), would 
enable the applicant and OSHA to assess the effectiveness of the 
permanent variance in preventing DCI and other hyperbaric-related 
effects.

Proposed Condition K: Notifications

    Under the proposed condition, the applicant is required, within 
specified periods of time, to notify OSHA of: (1) any recordable 
injury, illness, in-patient hospitalization, amputation, loss of an 
eye, or fatality that occurs as a result of hyperbaric exposures during 
TBM operations; (2) provide OSHA a copy of the hyperbaric exposures 
incident investigation report (using OSHA Form 301 Injury and Illness 
Incident Report) of these events within 24 hours of the incident; (3) 
include on OSHA Form 301 Injury and Illness Incident Report information 
on the hyperbaric conditions associated with the recordable injury or 
illness, the root-cause determination, and preventive and corrective 
actions identified and implemented; (4) provide the certification that 
affected workers were informed of the incident and the results of the 
incident investigation; (5) notify OSHA's Office of Technical Programs 
and Coordination Activities (OTPCA) and the Cleveland Ohio OSHA Area 
Office within 15 working days should the applicant need to revise the 
HOM to accommodate changes in its compressed-air operations that affect 
McNally/ASI Marine's ability to comply with the conditions of the 
proposed permanent variance; and (6) provide OTPCA and the Cleveland 
Ohio Area Office, at the end of the project, with a report evaluating 
the effectiveness of the decompression tables.
    It should be noted that the requirement for completing and 
submitting the hyperbaric exposure-related (recordable) incident 
investigation report (OSHA 301 Injury and Illness Incident Report) is 
more restrictive than the current recordkeeping requirement of 
completing OSHA Form 301 Injury and Illness Incident Report within 7 
calendar days of the incident (1904.29(b)(3)). This modified, more 
stringent incident investigation and reporting requirement is 
restricted to intervention-related hyperbaric (recordable) incidents 
only. Providing rapid notification to OSHA is essential because time is 
a critical element in OSHA's ability to determine the continued 
effectiveness of the variance conditions in preventing hyperbaric 
incidents, and the applicant's identification and implementation of 
appropriate corrective and preventive actions.
    Further, these notification requirements also enable the applicant, 
its employees, and OSHA to assess the effectiveness of the permanent 
variance in providing the requisite level of safety to the applicant's 
workers and based on this assessment, whether to revise or revoke the 
conditions of the proposed permanent variance. Timely notification 
permits OSHA to take whatever action may be necessary and appropriate 
to prevent possible further injuries and illnesses. Providing 
notification to employees informs them of the precautions taken by the 
applicant to prevent similar incidents in the future.
    Additionally, this proposed condition requires the applicant to 
notify OSHA if it ceases to do business, has a new address or location 
for the main office, or transfers the operations covered by the 
proposed permanent variance to a successor company. In addition, the 
condition specifies that the transfer of the permanent variance to a 
successor company must be approved by OSHA. These requirements allow 
OSHA to communicate effectively with the applicant regarding the status 
of the proposed permanent variance and expedite the agency's 
administration and enforcement of the permanent variance. Stipulating 
that an applicant is required to have OSHA's approval to transfer a 
variance to a successor company provides assurance that the successor 
company has knowledge of, and will comply with, the conditions 
specified by proposed permanent variance, thereby ensuring the safety 
of workers involved in performing the operations covered by the 
proposed permanent variance.

VI. Specific Conditions of the Interim Order and the Proposed Permanent 
Variance

    The following conditions apply to the interim order OSHA is 
granting to McNally/ASI Marine for the SOTC Project. These conditions 
specify the alternative means of compliance with the requirements of 
paragraphs 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and 
(g)(1)(xvii). In addition, these conditions are specific to the 
alternative means of compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 29 
CFR 1926.803 (e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) that OSHA is 
proposing for McNally/ASI Marine's permanent variance. To simplify the 
presentation of the conditions, OSHA generally refers only to the 
conditions of the proposed permanent variance, but the same conditions 
apply to the interim order except where otherwise noted.\12\
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    \12\ In these conditions, OSHA is using the future conditional 
form of the verb (e.g., ``would''), which pertains to the 
application for a permanent variance (designated as ``permanent 
variance'') but the conditions are mandatory for purposes of the 
interim order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The conditions would apply with respect to all employees of 
McNally/ASI Marine exposed to hyperbaric conditions. These conditions 
are outlined in this Section:

A. Scope

    The interim order applies, and the permanent variance would apply 
only when McNally/ASI Marine stops the tunnel-boring work, pressurizes 
the working chamber, and the CAWs either

[[Page 34895]]

enter the working chamber to perform an intervention (i.e., inspect, 
maintain, or repair the mechanical-excavation components), or exit the 
working chamber after performing interventions.
    The interim order and proposed variance apply only to work:
    1. That occurs in conjunction with construction of the SOTC 
Project, a tunnel constructed using advanced shielded mechanical-
excavation techniques and involving operation of an TBM;
    2. In the TBM's forward section (the working chamber) and 
associated hyperbaric chambers used to pressurize and decompress 
employees entering and exiting the working chamber; and
    3. Performed in compliance with all applicable provisions of 29 CFR 
part 1926 except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 
1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii).

B. Duration

    The interim order granted to McNally/ASI Marine will remain in 
effect until McNally/ASI Marine completes the SOTC Project, OSHA 
modifies or revokes this interim order, or OSHA grants McNally/ASI's 
request for a permanent variance. The proposed permanent variance, if 
granted, would remain in effect until the completion of McNally/ASI's 
SOTC Project or until modified or revoked by OSHA pursuant to 29 CFR 
1905.13(a)(2).

C. List of Abbreviations

    Abbreviations used throughout this proposed permanent variance 
would include the following:
    1. CAW--Compressed-air worker
    2. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
    3. DCI--Decompression Illness
    4. DMT--Diver Medical Technician
    5. TBM--Tunnel Boring Machine
    6. HOM--Hyperbaric Operations Manual
    7. JHA--Job hazard analysis
    8. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
    9. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities

D. Definitions

    The following definitions would apply to this proposed permanent 
variance. These definitions would supplement the definitions in 
McNally/ASI Marine's project-specific HOM.
    1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is 
affected by the conditions of this proposed permanent variance, or any 
one of his or her authorized representatives. The term ``employee'' has 
the meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.).
    2. Atmospheric pressure--the pressure of air at sea level, 
generally 14.7 pounds per square inch absolute (p.s.i.a)., 1 atmosphere 
absolute, or 0 p.s.i.g.
    3. Compressed-air worker--an individual who is specially trained 
and medically qualified to perform work in a pressurized environment 
while breathing air at pressures not exceeding 50 p.s.i.g.
    4. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying 
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working 
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees, 
and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to 
eliminate them.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    5. Decompression illness--an illness (also called decompression 
sickness or ``the bends'') caused by gas bubbles appearing in body 
compartments due to a reduction in ambient pressure. Examples of 
symptoms of decompression illness include, but are not limited to: 
joint pain (also known as the ``bends'' for agonizing pain or the 
``niggles'' for slight pain); areas of bone destruction (termed 
dysbaric osteonecrosis); skin disorders (such as cutis marmorata, which 
causes a pink marbling of the skin); spinal cord and brain disorders 
(such as stroke, paralysis, paresthesia, and bladder dysfunction); 
cardiopulmonary disorders, such as shortness of breath; and arterial 
gas embolism (gas bubbles in the arteries that block blood flow).\14\
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    \14\ See Appendix 10 of ``A Guide to the Work in Compressed-Air 
Regulations 1996,'' published by the United Kingdom Health and 
Safety Executive available from NIOSH at <a href="http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive/pdfs/NIOSH-254/compReg1996.pdf">http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive/pdfs/NIOSH-254/compReg1996.pdf</a>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note: Health effects associated with hyperbaric intervention, but 
not considered symptoms of DCI, can include: barotrauma (direct damage 
to air-containing cavities in the body such as ears, sinuses, and 
lungs); nitrogen narcosis (reversible alteration in consciousness that 
may occur in hyperbaric environments and is caused by the anesthetic 
effect of certain gases at high pressure); and oxygen toxicity (a 
central nervous system condition resulting from the harmful effects of 
breathing molecular oxygen (O<INF>2</INF>) at elevated partial 
pressures).
    6. Diver Medical Technician--Member of the dive team who is 
experienced in first aid.
    7. Earth Pressure Balanced Micro Tunnel Boring Machine--the 
machinery used to excavate a tunnel.
    8. Hot work--any activity performed in a hazardous location that 
may introduce an ignition source into a potentially flammable 
atmosphere.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Also see 29 CFR 1926.1202 for examples of hot work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    9. Hyperbaric--at a higher pressure than atmospheric pressure.
    10. Hyperbaric intervention--a term that describes the process of 
stopping the TBM and preparing and executing work under hyperbaric 
pressure in the working chamber for the purpose of inspecting, 
replacing, or repairing cutting tools and/or the cutterhead structure.
    11. Hyperbaric Operations Manual--a detailed, project-specific 
health and safety plan developed and implemented by McNally/ASI Marine 
for working in compressed air during the SOTC Project.
    12. Job hazard analysis--an evaluation of tasks or operations to 
identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary controls.
    13. Man-lock--an enclosed space capable of pressurization and used 
for compressing or decompressing any employee or material when either 
is passing into, or out of, a working chamber.
    14. Medical Advisor--medical professional experienced in the 
physical requirements of compressed air work and the treatment of 
decompression illness.
    15. Pressure--a force acting on a unit area. Usually expressed as 
pounds per square inch (p.s.i.).
    16. p.s.i.a.--pounds per square inch absolute, or absolute 
pressure, is the sum of the atmospheric pressure and gauge pressure. At 
sea level, atmospheric pressure is approximately 14.7 p.s.i.a. Adding 
14.7 to a pressure expressed in units of p.s.i.g. will yield the 
absolute pressure, expressed as p.s.i.a.
    17. p.s.i.g.--pounds per square inch gauge, a common unit of 
pressure; pressure expressed as p.s.i.g. corresponds to pressure 
relative to atmospheric pressure. At sea level, atmospheric pressure is 
approximately 14.7 p.s.i.a Subtracting 14.7 from a pressure expressed 
in units of p.s.i.a. yields the gauge pressure, expressed as p.s.i.g. 
At sea level, the gauge pressure is 0 psig.
    18. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a 
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by 
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully 
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to the 
subject matter, the work, or the project.\16\
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    \16\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(m).

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[[Page 34896]]

    19. Working chamber--an enclosed space in the TBM in which CAWs 
perform interventions, and which is accessible only through a man-lock.

E. Safety and Health Practices

    1. McNally/ASI Marine would have to adhere to the project-specific 
HOM submitted to OSHA as part of the application (see OSHA-2025-0004-
0003). The HOM provides the minimum requirements regarding expected 
safety and health hazards (including anticipated geological conditions) 
and hyperbaric exposures during the tunnel-construction project.
    2. McNally/ASI Marine would have to demonstrate that the TBM on the 
project is designed, fabricated, inspected, tested, marked, and stamped 
in accordance with the requirements of ASME PVHO-1.2019 (or most recent 
edition of Safety Standards for Pressure Vessels for Human Occupancy) 
for the TBM's hyperbaric chambers.
    3. McNally/ASI Marine would have to implement the safety and health 
instructions included in the manufacturer's operations manuals for the 
TBM, and the safety and health instructions provided by the 
manufacturer for the operation of decompression equipment.
    4. McNally/ASI Marine would have to ensure that there are no 
exposures to pressures greater than 58 p.s.i.g.
    5. McNally/ASI Marine would have to ensure that air or oxygen is 
the only breathing gas in the working chamber.
    6. McNally/ASI Marine would have to follow the 1992 French 
Decompression Tables for air or oxygen decompression as specified in 
the HOM; specifically, the extracted portions of the 1992 French 
Decompression tables titled, ``French Regulation Air Standard Tables.''
    7. McNally/ASI Marine would have to equip man-locks used by 
employees with an air or oxygen delivery system, as specified by the 
HOM, for the project. McNally/ASI Marine would be required not to store 
in the tunnel any oxygen or other compressed gases used in conjunction 
with hyperbaric work.
    8. Workers performing hot work under hyperbaric conditions would 
have to use flame-retardant personal protective equipment and clothing.
    9. In hyperbaric work areas, McNally/ASI Marine would have to 
maintain an adequate fire-suppression system approved for hyperbaric 
work areas.
    10. McNally/ASI Marine would have to develop and implement one or 
more Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) for work in the hyperbaric work areas, 
and review, periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making changes 
to a planned intervention that affects its operation), the contents of 
the JHAs with affected employees. The JHAs would have to include all 
the job functions that the risk assessment \17\ indicates are essential 
to prevent injury or illness.
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    \17\ See ANSI/AIHA Z10-2012, American National Standard for 
Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    11. McNally/ASI Marine would have to develop a set of checklists to 
guide compressed-air work and ensure that employees follow the 
procedures required by the proposed permanent variance and this interim 
order (including all procedures required by the HOM approved by OSHA 
for the project, which this proposed variance would incorporate by 
reference). The checklists would have to include all steps and 
equipment functions that the risk assessment indicates are essential to 
prevent injury or illness during compressed-air work.
    12. McNally/ASI Marine would have to ensure that the safety and 
health provisions of this project-specific HOM adequately protect the 
workers of all contractors and subcontractors involved in hyperbaric 
operations for the project to which the HOM applies.

F. Communication

    McNally/ASI Marine would have to:
    1. Prior to beginning a shift, implement a system that informs 
workers exposed to hyperbaric conditions of any hazardous occurrences 
or conditions that might affect their safety, including hyperbaric 
incidents, gas releases, equipment failures, earth or rock-slides, 
cave-ins, flooding, fires, or explosions.
    2. Provide a power-assisted means of communication among affected 
workers and support personnel in hyperbaric conditions where unassisted 
voice communication is inadequate.
    (a) Use an independent power supply for powered communication 
systems, and these systems would have to operate such that use or 
disruption of any one phone or signal location will not disrupt the 
operation of the system from any other location.
    (b) Test communication systems at the start of each shift and as 
necessary thereafter to ensure proper operation.

G. Worker Qualifications and Training

    McNally/ASI Marine would have to:
    1. Ensure that each affected worker receives effective training on 
how to safely enter, work in, exit from, and undertake emergency 
evacuation or rescue from, hyperbaric conditions, and document this 
training.
    2. Provide effective instruction on hyperbaric conditions, before 
beginning hyperbaric operations, to each worker who performs work, or 
controls the exposure of others, and document this instruction. The 
instruction would need to include:
    (a) The physics and physiology of hyperbaric work;
    (b) Recognition of pressure-related injuries;
    (c) Information on the causes and recognition of the signs and 
symptoms associated with decompression illness, and other hyperbaric 
intervention-related health effects (e.g., barotrauma, nitrogen 
narcosis, and oxygen toxicity);
    (d) How to avoid discomfort during compression and decompression;
    (e) Information the workers can use to contact the appropriate 
healthcare professionals should the workers have concerns that they may 
be experiencing adverse health effects from hyperbaric exposure; and
    (f) Procedures and requirements applicable to the employee in the 
project-specific HOM.
    3. Repeat the instruction specified in paragraph (G)(2)(b) of this 
proposed condition periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making 
changes to its hyperbaric operations).
    4. When conducting training for its hyperbaric workers, make this 
training available to OSHA personnel and notify the OTPCA at OSHA's 
National Office and OSHA's Cleveland Ohio Area Office before the 
training takes place.

H. Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

    1. McNally/ASI Marine would have to initiate and maintain a program 
of frequent and regular inspections of the TBM's hyperbaric equipment 
and support systems (such as temperature control, illumination, 
ventilation, and fire-prevention and fire-suppression systems), and 
hyperbaric work areas, as required under 29 CFR 1926.20(b)(2), 
including:
    (a) Developing a set of checklists to be used by a competent person 
in conducting weekly inspections of hyperbaric equipment and work 
areas; and
    (b) Ensuring that a competent person conducts daily visual checks 
and weekly inspections of the TBM.
    2. Remove from service any equipment that constitutes a safety 
hazard until it corrects the hazardous condition and has the correction 
approved by a qualified person.
    3. McNally/ASI Marine would have to maintain records of all tests 
and inspections of the TBM, as well as associated corrective actions 
and repairs, at the job site for the duration of the job.

[[Page 34897]]

I. Compression and Decompression

    McNally/ASI Marine would have to consult with its attending 
physician concerning the need for special compression or decompression 
exposures appropriate for CAWs not acclimated to hyperbaric exposure.

J. Recordkeeping

    In addition to completing OSHA Form 301 Injury and Illness Incident 
Report and OSHA Form 300 Log of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses, 
McNally/ASI Marine would have to maintain records of:
    1. The date, times (e.g., time compression started, time spent 
compressing, time performing intervention, time spent decompressing), 
and pressure for each hyperbaric intervention.
    2. The names of all supervisors and DMTs involved for each 
intervention.
    3. The name of each individual worker exposed to hyperbaric 
pressure and the decompression protocols and results for each worker.
    4. The total number of interventions and the amount of hyperbaric 
work time at each pressure.
    5. The results of the post-intervention physical assessment of each 
CAW for signs and symptoms of decompression illness, barotrauma, 
nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity or other health effects associated 
with work in compressed air for each hyperbaric intervention.

K. Notifications

    1. To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein, 
McNally/ASI Marine would have to:
    (a) Notify the OTPCA and the Cleveland, Ohio Area Office at 
<a href="http://www.osha.gov/contactus/byoffice">www.osha.gov/contactus/byoffice</a> of any recordable injury, illness, or 
fatality (by submitting the completed OSHA Form 301 Injuries and 
Illness Incident Report) resulting from exposure of an employee to 
hyperbaric conditions, including those that do not require 
recompression treatment (e.g., nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity, 
barotrauma), but still meet the recordable injury or illness criteria 
of 29 CFR 1904. The notification would have to be made within 8 hours 
of the incident or 8 hours after becoming aware of a recordable injury, 
illness, or fatality; a copy of the incident investigation (OSHA Form 
301 Injuries and Illness Incident Report) must be submitted to OSHA 
within 24 hours of the incident or 24 hours after becoming aware of a 
recordable injury, illness, or fatality. In addition to the information 
required by OSHA Form 301 Injuries and Illness Incident Report, the 
incident-investigation report would have to include a root-cause 
determination, and the preventive and corrective actions identified and 
implemented.
    (b) Provide certification to the Cleveland Ohio Area Office within 
15 working days of the incident that McNally/ASI Marine informed 
affected workers of the incident and the results of the incident 
investigation (including the root-cause determination and preventive 
and corrective actions identified and implemented).
    (c) Notify the OTPCA and the Cleveland Ohio Area Office within 15 
working days and in writing, of any change in the compressed-air 
operations that affects McNally/ASI Marine's ability to comply with the 
proposed conditions specified herein.
    (d) Upon completion of the SOTC Project, evaluate the effectiveness 
of the decompression tables used throughout the project, and provide a 
written report of this evaluation to the OTPCA and the Cleveland Ohio 
Area Office.

    Note:  The evaluation report would have to contain summaries of: 
(1) The number, dates, durations, and pressures of the hyperbaric 
interventions completed; (2) decompression protocols implemented 
(including composition of gas mixtures (air and/or oxygen), and the 
results achieved; (3) the total number of interventions and the 
number of hyperbaric incidents (decompression illnesses and/or 
health effects associated with hyperbaric interventions as recorded 
on OSHA Form 301 Injuries and Illness Incident Report and OSHA Form 
300 Log of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses, and relevant medical 
diagnoses, and treating physicians' opinions); and (4) root causes 
of any hyperbaric incidents, and preventive and corrective actions 
identified and implemented.

    (e) To assist OSHA in administering the proposed conditions 
specified herein, inform the OTPCA and the Cleveland Ohio Area Office 
as soon as possible, but no later than seven (7) days, after it has 
knowledge that it will:
    (i) Cease doing business;
    (ii) Change the location and address of the main office for 
managing the tunneling operations specified herein; or
    (iii) Transfer the operations specified herein to a successor 
company.
    (f) Notify all affected employees of this proposed permanent 
variance by the same means required to inform them of its application 
for a variance.
    2. OSHA would have to approve the transfer of the proposed 
permanent variance to a successor company through a new application for 
a permanent variance.

VII. Authority and Signature

    Amanda Laihow, Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational 
Safety and Health, 200 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20210, 
authorized the preparation of this notice. Accordingly, the agency is 
issuing this notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 655(d), Secretary of Labor's 
Order No. 7-2025 (90 FR 27878, June 30, 2025), and 29 CFR 1905.11.

    Signed at Washington, DC, on July 7, 2025.
Amanda Laihow,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2025-13889 Filed 7-23-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P


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Indexed from Federal Register on July 24, 2025.

This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.