Rule2025-12247
Extension of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the Kabul Flight Information Region (FIR) (OAKX)
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
July 1, 2025
Effective
July 1, 2025
Issuing agencies
Transportation DepartmentFederal Aviation Administration
Abstract
This action extends the prohibition against certain flight operations in the Kabul Flight Information Region (FIR) (OAKX) by all: U.S. air carriers; U.S. commercial operators; persons exercising the privileges of an airman certificate issued by the FAA, except when such persons are operating U.S.-registered aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and operators of U.S.-registered civil aircraft, except when the operator of such aircraft is a foreign air carrier, for an additional three years, from July 25, 2025, to July 25, 2028. FAA finds this action necessary to address continuing risks to persons and aircraft engaged in such flight operations.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 124 (Tuesday, July 1, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 124 (Tuesday, July 1, 2025)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 27981-27987]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-12247]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 91
[Docket No. FAA-2023-1415; Amdt. No. 91-369B]
RIN 2120-AM09
Extension of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the Kabul
Flight Information Region (FIR) (OAKX)
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This action extends the prohibition against certain flight
operations in the Kabul Flight Information Region (FIR) (OAKX) by all:
U.S. air carriers; U.S. commercial operators; persons exercising the
privileges of an airman certificate issued by the FAA, except when such
persons are operating U.S.-registered aircraft for a foreign air
carrier; and operators of U.S.-registered civil aircraft, except when
the operator of such aircraft is a foreign air carrier, for an
additional three years, from July 25, 2025, to July 25, 2028. FAA finds
this action necessary to address continuing risks to persons and
aircraft engaged in such flight operations.
DATES: This final rule is effective on July 1, 2025.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bill Petrak, Flight Standards Service,
through the Washington Operations Center, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591;
telephone (202) 267-3203; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#023b2f4443432f4d74677071676371446e6b656a7652706d6a6b606b766b6d6c71426463632c656d74"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="556c78131414781a2330272630342613393c323d2105273a3d3c373c213c3a3b26153334347b323a23">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Executive Summary
This action extends the expiration date of Special Federal Aviation
Regulation (SFAR) No. 119, title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14
CFR), 91.1619, from July 25, 2025, to July 25, 2028. SFAR No. 119,
Sec. 91.1619, prohibits certain flight operations in the Kabul FIR
(OAKX) at altitudes below Flight Level (FL) 320, except to operate
transiting overflights of the Kabul FIR (OAKX) on jet routes P500-G500
at altitudes at and above FL300, by all: U.S. air carriers; U.S.
commercial operators; persons exercising the privileges of an airman
certificate issued by the FAA, except when such persons are operating
U.S.-registered aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and operators of
U.S.-registered civil aircraft, except when the operator of such
aircraft is a foreign air carrier. FAA finds this action necessary to
address significant unacceptable safety-of-flight risks to U.S. civil
aviation that continue to exist in the Kabul FIR (OAKX). FAA also
republishes the approval process and exemption information for this
flight prohibition SFAR, consistent with other recently published
flight prohibition SFARs.
II. Authority and Good Cause
A. Authority
FAA is responsible for the safety of flight in the United States
and for the safety of U.S. civil operators, U.S.-registered civil
aircraft, and U.S.-certificated airmen throughout the world. Section
106(f) of title 49, U.S. Code (U.S.C.), subtitle I, establishes the FAA
Administrator's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle
VII of title 49, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope
of the agency's authority. Section 40101(d)(1) provides that the
Administrator shall consider in the public interest, among other
matters,
[[Page 27982]]
assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the
highest priorities in air commerce. Section 40105(b)(1)(A) requires the
Administrator to exercise this authority consistently with the
obligations of the U.S. Government under international agreements.
FAA is promulgating this rule under the authority described in 49
U.S.C. 44701, General requirements. Under that section, FAA is charged
broadly with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by
prescribing, among other things, regulations and minimum standards for
practices, methods, and procedures that the Administrator finds
necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.
This regulation is within the scope of FAA's authority because it
continues to prohibit the persons described in paragraph (a) of SFAR
No. 119, Sec. 91.1619, from conducting certain flight operations in
the Kabul FIR (OAKX) due to the continuing hazards to the safety of
U.S. civil flight operations, as described in the preamble to this
final rule.
B. Good Cause for Immediate Adoption
Section 553(b)(B) of title 5, U.S. Code, authorizes agencies to
dispense with notice and comment procedures for rules when the agency
for ``good cause'' finds that those procedures are ``impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' Also, section 553(d)
permits agencies, upon a finding of good cause, to issue rules with an
effective date less than 30 days from the date of publication. In this
instance, FAA finds good cause to forgo notice and comment and the
delayed effective date because they would be impracticable and contrary
to the public interest.
Providing notice and the opportunity for the public to comment here
would be impracticable. FAA's flight prohibitions, and any amendments
thereto, need to include appropriate boundaries that reflect the
agency's current understanding of the risk environment for U.S. civil
aviation. This allows FAA to protect the safety of U.S. operators'
aircraft and the lives of their passengers and crews without over-
restricting or under-restricting U.S. operators' routing options.
However, the risk environment for U.S. civil aviation in airspace
managed by other countries with respect to safety of flight is fluid in
circumstances involving fighting, violent extremist and militant
activity, or periods of heightened tensions, particularly where weapons
capable of targeting or otherwise negatively affecting U.S. civil
aviation are or may be present. This fluidity, and the potential for
rapid changes in the risks to U.S. civil aviation, significantly limits
how far in advance of a new or amended flight prohibition FAA can
usefully assess the risk environment. The delay that would be
occasioned by providing an opportunity to comment on this action would
significantly increase the risk that the resulting final action would
not accurately reflect the current risks to U.S. civil aviation
associated with the situation and thus would not establish boundaries
for the flight prohibition commensurate with those risks.
While FAA sought and responded to public comments, the boundaries
of the area in which unacceptable risks to the safety of U.S. civil
aviation existed might change due to: evolving military or political
circumstances; violent extremist and militant group activity; the
introduction, removal, or repositioning of more advanced anti-aircraft
weapon systems; or other factors. As a result, if the situation
improved while FAA sought and responded to public comments, the rule
FAA finalized might be over-restrictive, unnecessarily limiting U.S.
operators' routing options and potentially causing them to incur
unnecessary additional fuel and operations-related costs, as well as
potentially causing passengers to incur unnecessarily some costs
attributed to their time. Conversely, if the situation deteriorated
while FAA sought and responded to public comments, the rule FAA
finalized might be under-restrictive, allowing U.S. civil aviation to
continue operating in areas where unacceptable risks to their safety
had developed. Such an outcome would endanger the safety of these
aircraft, as well as their passengers and crews, exposing them to
unacceptable risks of death, injury, and property damage that could
occur if a U.S. operator's aircraft were shot down (or otherwise
damaged) while operating in the Kabul FIR (OAKX).
Alternatively, if FAA made changes to the area in which U.S. civil
aviation operations would be prohibited between a notice of proposed
rulemaking and a final rule due to changed conditions, the version of
the rule the public commented on would no longer reflect FAA's current
assessment of the risk environment for U.S. civil aviation.
In addition, seeking comment would be contrary to the public
interest because some of the rational basis for the rulemaking is based
upon classified information and controlled unclassified information. In
order to provide comment on a proposal meaningfully, the public would
need access to the basis for the agency's decision-making, which FAA
cannot provide. Disclosing classified information or controlled
unclassified information to seek meaningful comment on the proposal
would harm the public interest. Accordingly, FAA meaningfully seeking
comment on the proposal is contrary to the public interest.
Therefore, providing notice and the opportunity for comment would
be impracticable as it would hinder FAA's ability to maintain
appropriate flight prohibitions based on up-to-date risk assessments of
the risks to the safety of U.S. civil aviation operations in airspace
managed by other countries. It also would be contrary to the public
interest, as FAA cannot protect classified information and controlled
unclassified information and meaningfully seek public comment.
For the same reasons discussed above, the potential safety impacts
and the need for prompt action on up-to-date information that is not
public would make delaying the effective date impracticable and
contrary to the public interest.
Accordingly, FAA finds good cause exists to forgo notice and
comment and any delay in the effective date for this rule.
III. Background
On August 30, 2021, FAA issued Notice To Airmen (NOTAM) KICZ A0029/
21 to address the then-existing unacceptable risks to the safety of
U.S. civil aviation operations in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) at all
altitudes, except for transiting overflight operations on jet routes
P500-G500. This NOTAM prohibited, with certain limited exceptions, U.S.
civil aviation operations in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) at all altitudes by
all: U.S. air carriers; U.S, commercial operators; persons exercising
the privileges of an airman certificate issued by the FAA, except when
such persons are operating U.S.-registered aircraft for a foreign air
carrier; and all operators of U.S.-registered civil aircraft, except
when the operator of such aircraft is a foreign air carrier, due to the
risk posed by violent extremist and militant activity, lack of adequate
risk mitigation capabilities, and disruption to air traffic services.
The NOTAM allowed U.S. civil aviation overflights to transit the Kabul
FIR (OAKX) on jet routes P500-G500, as such operations are only in the
Kabul FIR (OAKX) very briefly.
Following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Asia-Pacific Office contacted
Afghanistan's civil aviation authority and stood up a contingency
coordination team (CCT)
[[Page 27983]]
composed of Afghanistan and neighboring air navigation service
providers, as well as International Air Transport Association (IATA)
representation. Afghanistan's civil aviation authority and the CCT
worked with neighboring air navigation service providers to establish a
contingency plan for the safe resumption of civil overflights in the
Kabul FIR (OAKX).
Subsequently, Afghanistan issued a series of NOTAMs delineating
overflight procedures and established altitude blocks for specific
categories of flight operations across various regions. The overflight
procedures rely upon internationally recognized traffic information
broadcasts by aircraft (TIBA) procedures, which pilots use in areas
around the world where air traffic services are very limited or
unavailable to maintain safe separation between aircraft. Consequently,
FAA determined that U.S. civil aviation operations throughout the Kabul
FIR (OAKX) could resume at altitudes at and above FL320 due to
diminished risks to U.S. civil aviation operations at those altitudes.
On July 25, 2023, FAA published in the Federal Register a final rule
allowing U.S. civil overflights of the Kabul FIR (OAKX) to resume at
altitudes at and above FL320.\1\ However, as described in more detail
in the preamble to the July 2023 final rule, FAA continued to assess
the situation in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) at altitudes below FL320 as being
hazardous for U.S. civil aviation and prohibited U.S. civil aviation
operations at those altitudes.
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\1\ Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the Kabul Flight
Information Region (FIR) (OAKX) final rule, 88 FR 47765 (Jul. 25,
2023).
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Although FAA did not identify or assess that there existed any
increased safety-of-flight risks to transiting U.S. civil aviation
overflights operating on jet routes P500-G500 due to violent extremist
or militant activity, FAA prohibited operations on those routes at
altitudes below FL320 in the July 2023 final rule because the Kabul FIR
Air Traffic Management Contingency Plan indicates that, as necessary,
FL300 may be reserved for military operations by NOTAM. Consequently,
FAA decided to establish a minimum allowed overflight level of FL320
for U.S. civil aviation operations in the entirety of the Kabul FIR
(OAKX) to help ensure aircraft separation between any military
operations being conducted in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) at FL300 and U.S.
civil aviation overflights.
Subsequently, FAA received two petitions for exemption from SFAR
No. 119, Sec. 91.1619, from U.S. air carriers requesting to operate on
jet routes P500-G500 at altitudes at and above FL300, instead of at
altitudes at and above FL320 as required by SFAR No. 119, Sec.
91.1619, due to aircraft performance issues under certain
meteorological conditions.\2\
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\2\ American Airlines, docket FAA-2023-1985. United Parcel
Service, Co., docket FAA-2023-2065.
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Since the publication of the Kabul FIR Air Traffic Management
Contingency Plan and continuing since FAA issued the July 2023 final
rule, Afghanistan had issued a series of NOTAMs permitting overflight
operations between waypoints FIRUZ and MOTMO on jet routes P500-G500 at
altitudes between FL300-FL510. FAA was not aware of any safety or
security incidents experienced by civil aircraft operating on jet
routes P500-G500 in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) at altitudes at or above FL300
due to military flight operations. In addition, FAA was not aware of
any active threats to U.S. civil aviation operations on jet routes
P500-G500 in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) from violent extremist and militant
activity and was not aware of any reports of security incidents
involving violent extremist and militant activity posing safety-of-
flight risks to civil aircraft overflights using these jet routes at
altitudes at or above FL300 in the Kabul FIR (OAKX). The very limited
flight time in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) minimizes both potential exposure
to any military operations in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) that might be
operating at FL300 and to potential opportunistic threats from violent
extremists. Specifically, the flight distance between waypoints FIRUZ
and MOTMO on jet routes P500-G500 is approximately 12 nautical miles,
which takes approximately 95 seconds at cruising speeds.
Consequently, FAA determined that U.S. civil aviation overflights
of the Kabul FIR (OAKX) at altitudes at and above FL300 on jet routes
P500-G500 presented a low risk. Therefore, FAA amended SFAR No. 119,
Sec. 91.1619, to permit U.S. civil aviation to conduct transiting
overflights of the Kabul FIR (OAKX) on jet routes P500-G500 at
altitudes at and above FL300, subject to the approval of, and in
accordance with the conditions established by, the appropriate
authorities of Afghanistan.\3\
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\3\ Amendment of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the
Kabul Flight Information Region (FIR) (OAKX) final rule, 89 FR 55500
(Jul. 5, 2024).
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IV. Discussion of the Final Rule
FAA continues to assess the situation in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) as
being hazardous for U.S. civil aviation. While the Taliban continues to
encourage international air carriers to return to Afghanistan, FAA
assesses a number of factors exist that pose safety of flight hazards
to civil aviation operations at lower altitudes and while aircraft are
on the ground in Afghanistan. These factors include the continued
presence and operations of terrorist groups--including the Islamic
State of Iraq and ash-Sham, Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and al-Qa'ida
(AQ)--as well as anti-Taliban forces such as the National Resistance
Front (NRF) and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), whose members
likely maintain access to small arms, automatic machine guns, anti-
aircraft artillery (AAA), anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). These types of weapons could pose a
threat to aircraft during low-altitude flight operations, including the
arrival and departure phases of flight, as well as to aircraft on the
ground at targeted airports and airfields in Afghanistan. Additionally,
some of these groups also may have access to legacy man-portable air
defense systems (MANPADS), which may be capable of reaching a maximum
altitude of up to 25,000 feet above ground level.
Further, these groups maintain the ability to conduct attacks in
the Afghan capital, as evidenced most recently by an NRF-claimed attack
in December 2024 on the Ministry of Interior in Kabul--adjacent to
Kabul International Airport (OAKB) and less than 4,500 feet from the
end of the runway--and an AFF-claimed attack on Kabul International
Airport (OAKB) in mid-October 2024. Several other attacks occurred
throughout Kabul in 2024, and as recently as mid-February 2025,
underscoring the continued lack of security in the Afghan capital.
ISIS-K claimed responsibility for many of these attacks, showing that,
despite Taliban pressure, the group--which was responsible for the
August 2021 attack on Kabul International Airport (OAKB) that killed 13
U.S. service members and at least 170 civilians--maintains the
capability to operate in Afghanistan. As of early 2025, the Taliban has
not demonstrated the ability to mitigate the low-altitude civil
aviation risks posed by these myriad threat actors.
In addition to the low-altitude threats posed by armed groups
operating within Afghanistan, recent cross-border strikes by
neighboring states on Afghan territory highlight airspace deconfliction
challenges. Pakistan conducted likely uncoordinated airstrikes on
multiple locations in eastern Afghanistan in late December 2024, which
Taliban representatives claimed killed dozens of Afghan civilians.
Pakistani authorities claimed to have targeted Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) hideouts, after
[[Page 27984]]
TTP claimed responsibility for an attack on a Pakistani border outpost
that killed 16 soldiers. While the Taliban later claimed to have
conducted retaliatory attacks on targets in Pakistan allegedly
responsible for coordinating the airstrikes on Afghanistan, there were
no details available regarding how they were conducted or any
associated casualties or damage reported in Pakistan. Regardless,
continued perceived Taliban support for the TTP will likely drive
further unannounced and uncoordinated Pakistani airstrikes on targets
in Afghanistan, as well as Taliban responses. The continued risk of
these cross-border exchanges--particularly in the airspace along the
border between the two countries--presents a deconfliction challenge
further complicating airspace management in the Kabul FIR (OAKX).
Therefore, as a result of the significant, continuing, unacceptable
risks to the safety of U.S. civil aviation operations in the Kabul FIR
(OAKX), FAA extends the expiration date of SFAR No. 119, Sec. 91.1619,
from July 25, 2025, until July 25, 2028.
Further amendments to SFAR No. 119, Sec. 91.1619, might be
appropriate if the risk to U.S. civil aviation safety and security
changes. In this regard, FAA will continue to monitor the situation and
evaluate the extent to which persons described in paragraph (a) of this
rule might be able to operate safely in the Kabul FIR (OAKX).
FAA also republishes the details concerning the approval and
exemption processes in Sections V and VI of this preamble, consistent
with other recently published flight prohibition SFARs, to enable
interested persons to refer to this final rule for comprehensive
information about requesting relief from FAA from the provisions of
SFAR No. 119, Sec. 91.1619.
V. Approval Process Based on a Request From a Department, Agency, or
Instrumentality of the United States Government
A. Approval Process Based on an Authorization Request From a
Department, Agency, or Instrumentality of the United States Government
In some instances, U.S. Government departments, agencies, or
instrumentalities may need to engage U.S. civil aviation to support
their activities in the Kabul FIR (OAKX). If a department, agency, or
instrumentality of the U.S. Government determines that it has a
critical need to engage any person described in paragraph (a) of SFAR
No. 119, Sec. 91.1619, including a U.S. air carrier or commercial
operator, to transport civilian or military passengers or cargo or
conduct other operations in the Kabul FIR (OAKX), that department,
agency, or instrumentality may request FAA to approve persons described
in paragraph (a) of SFAR No. 119, Sec. 91.1619, to conduct such
operations.
The requesting U.S. Government department, agency, or
instrumentality must submit the request for approval to the FAA's
Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety in a letter signed by an
appropriate senior official of the requesting department, agency, or
instrumentality.\4\ FAA will not accept or consider requests for
approval from anyone other than the requesting U.S. Government
department, agency, or instrumentality. In addition, the senior
official signing the letter requesting FAA approval must be
sufficiently positioned within the requesting department, agency, or
instrumentality to demonstrate that the organization's senior
leadership supports the request for approval and is committed to taking
all necessary steps to minimize aviation safety and security risks to
the proposed flights. The senior official must also be in a position
to: (1) attest to the accuracy of all representations made to FAA in
the request for approval, and (2) ensure that any support from the
requesting U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality
described in the request for approval is in fact brought to bear and is
maintained over time. Unless justified by exigent circumstances,
requesting U.S. Government departments, agencies, or instrumentalities
must submit requests for approval to FAA no less than 30 calendar days
before the date on which the requesting department, agency, or
instrumentality wishes the operator(s) to commence the proposed
operation(s).
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\4\ This approval procedure applies to U.S. Government
departments, agencies, or instrumentalities; it does not apply to
the public. The FAA describes this procedure in the interest of
providing transparency with respect to the FAA's process for
interacting with U.S. Government departments, agencies, or
instrumentalities that seek to engage U.S. civil aviation to operate
in the area in which this SFAR would prohibit their operations in
the absence of specific FAA approval.
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The requestor must send the request to the Associate Administrator
for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591. Electronic submissions are acceptable,
and the requesting entity may request that FAA notify it electronically
as to whether FAA grants the request for approval. If a requestor
wishes to make an electronic submission to FAA, the requestor should
contact the Washington Operations Center by telephone at (202) 267-3333
or by email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e7decaa1a6a6caa891829594828694a18b8e808f93b795888f8e858e938e888994a7818686c9808891"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="84bda9c2c5c5a9cbf2e1f6f7e1e5f7c2e8ede3ecf0d4f6ebecede6edf0edebeaf7c4e2e5e5aae3ebf2">[email protected]</span></a> for submission
instructions. The requestor must not submit its letter requesting FAA
approval or related supporting documentation to the Washington
Operations Center. Rather, the Washington Operations Center will refer
the requestor to an appropriate staff member of the Flight Standards
Service for further assistance.
A single letter may request approval from FAA for multiple persons
described in SFAR No. 119, Sec. 91.1619, or for multiple flight
operations. To the extent known, the letter must identify the person(s)
the requester expects the SFAR to cover on whose behalf the U.S.
Government department, agency, or instrumentality seeks FAA approval,
and it must describe--
<bullet> The proposed operation(s), including the nature of the
mission being supported;
<bullet> The service the person(s) covered by the SFAR will
provide;
<bullet> To the extent known, the specific locations in the Kabul
FIR (OAKX) where the proposed operation(s) will occur, including, but
not limited to, the flight path and altitude of the aircraft while it
is operating in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) and the airports, airfields, or
landing zones at which the aircraft will take off and land; and
<bullet> The method by which the requesting department, agency, or
instrumentality will provide, or how the operator will otherwise
obtain, current threat information and an explanation of how the
operator will integrate this information into all phases of the
proposed operations (i.e., the pre-mission planning and briefing, in-
flight, and post-flight phases).
The request for approval must also include a list of operators with
whom the U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality
requesting FAA approval has a current contract(s), grant(s), or
cooperative agreement(s) (or its prime contractor has a subcontract(s))
for specific flight operations in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) at altitudes
below FL320, except for transiting overflights on jet routes P500-G500
at altitudes at and above FL300 that are already permitted under this
rule. The requestor may identify additional operators to FAA at any
time after FAA issues its approval. Neither the operators listed in the
original request, nor any operators the requestor subsequently seeks to
add to the approval, may commence operations under the approval until
FAA issues them an Operations Specification (OpSpec) or Letter of
Authorization (LOA), as appropriate, for operations in
[[Page 27985]]
the Kabul FIR (OAKX) at altitudes below FL320 or at altitudes below
FL300 on jet routes P500-G500, as applicable. The approval conditions
discussed below apply to all operators. Requestors should contact the
Washington Operations Center by telephone at (202) 267-3203 or by email
at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#3c05117a7d7d11734a594e4f595d4f7a50555b54486c4e5354555e55485553524f7c5a5d5d125b534a"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="f8c1d5beb9b9d5b78e9d8a8b9d998bbe94919f908ca88a9790919a918c9197968bb89e9999d69f978e">[email protected]</span></a> for instructions on how to
submit the names of additional operators the requestor wishes to add to
an existing approval to FAA. The requestor must not submit the names of
additional operators it wishes to add to an existing approval to the
Washington Operations Center. Rather, the Washington Operations Center
will refer the requestor to an appropriate staff member of the Flight
Standards Service for further assistance.
If an approval request includes classified information or
controlled unclassified information, requestors may contact the
Washington Operations Center for instructions on submitting it to FAA.
The Washington Operations Center's contact information appears in the
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this final rule.
FAA approval of an operation under SFAR No. 119, Sec. 91.1619,
does not relieve persons subject to this SFAR of the responsibility to
comply with all other applicable FAA rules and regulations. Operators
of civil aircraft must comply with the conditions of their
certificates, OpSpecs, and LOAs, as applicable. Operators also must
comply with all rules and regulations of other U.S. Government
departments, agencies, or instrumentalities that may apply to the
proposed operation(s), including, but not limited to, regulations
issued by the Transportation Security Administration.
B. Approval Conditions
If FAA approves the request, FAA's Aviation Safety organization
will send an approval letter to the requesting U.S. Government
department, agency, or instrumentality informing it that FAA's approval
is subject to all of the following conditions:
(1) The approval will stipulate those procedures and conditions
that limit, to the greatest degree possible, the risk to the operator
while still allowing the operator to achieve its operational
objectives.
(2) Before any approval takes effect, the operator must submit to
FAA:
(a) A written release of the U.S. Government from all damages,
claims, and liabilities, including without limitation legal fees and
expenses, relating to any event arising out of or related to the
approved operations in the Kabul FIR (OAKX); and
(b) The operator's written agreement to indemnify the U.S.
Government with respect to any and all third-party damages, claims, and
liabilities, including without limitation legal fees and expenses,
relating to any event arising out of or related to the approved
operations in the Kabul FIR (OAKX).
(3) Other conditions FAA may specify, including those FAA might
impose in OpSpecs or LOAs, as applicable.
The release and agreement to indemnify do not preclude an operator
from raising a claim under an applicable non-premium war risk insurance
policy FAA issues under chapter 443 of title 49, U.S. Code.
If FAA approves the proposed operation(s), FAA will issue an OpSpec
or LOA, as applicable, to the operator(s) identified in the original
request and any operators the requestor subsequently adds to the
approval, authorizing them to conduct the approved operation(s). In
addition, as stated in paragraph (3) of this section V.B., FAA notes
that it may include additional conditions beyond those contained in the
approval letter in any OpSpec or LOA associated with a particular
operator operating under this approval, as necessary in the interests
of aviation safety. U.S. Government departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities requesting FAA approval on behalf of entities with
which they have a contract or subcontract, grant, or cooperative
agreement should request a copy of the relevant OpSpec or LOA directly
from the entity with which they have any of the foregoing types of
arrangements, if desired.
VI. Information Regarding Petitions for Exemption
Any operations not conducted under an approval FAA issues through
the approval process set forth previously may only occur in accordance
with an exemption from SFAR No. 119, Sec. 91.1619. A petition for
exemption must comply with 14 CFR part 11. FAA will consider whether
exceptional circumstances exist beyond those described in the approval
process in the previous section. To determine whether a petition for
exemption from the prohibition this SFAR establishes fulfills the
standards described in 14 CFR 11.81, FAA consistently finds necessary
the following information:
<bullet> The proposed operation(s), including the nature of the
operation;
<bullet> The service the person(s) covered by the SFAR will
provide;
<bullet> The specific locations in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) where the
proposed operation(s) will occur, including, but not limited to, the
flight path and altitude of the aircraft while it is operating in the
Kabul FIR (OAKX) and the airports, airfields, or landing zones at which
the aircraft will take off and land;
<bullet> The method by which the operator will obtain current
threat information and an explanation of how the operator will
integrate this information into all phases of its proposed operations
(i.e., the pre-mission planning and briefing, in-flight, and post-
flight phases); and
<bullet> The plans and procedures the operator will use to minimize
the risks identified in this preamble to the proposed operations to
support the relief sought and demonstrate that granting such relief
would not adversely affect safety or would provide a level of safety at
least equal to that provided by this SFAR. FAA has found comprehensive,
organized plans and procedures of this nature to be helpful in
facilitating the agency's safety evaluation of petitions for exemption
from flight prohibition SFARs.
FAA includes, as a condition of each such exemption it issues, a
release and agreement to indemnify, as described previously.
FAA recognizes that, with the support of the U.S. Government, the
governments of other countries could plan operations that may be
affected by SFAR No. 119, Sec. 91.1619. While FAA will not permit
these operations through the approval process, FAA will consider
exemption requests for such operations on an expedited basis and in
accordance with the order of preference set forth in paragraph (c) of
SFAR No. 119, Sec. 91.1619.
If a petition for exemption includes information that is sensitive
for security reasons or proprietary information, requestors may contact
the Washington Operations Center for instructions on submitting it to
FAA. The Washington Operations Center's contact information is listed
in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this final rule.
Requestors must not submit their petitions for exemption or related
supporting documentation to the Washington Operations Center. Rather,
the Washington Operations Center will refer the requestor to the
appropriate staff member of the Flight Standards Service or the Office
of Rulemaking for further assistance.
[[Page 27986]]
VII. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Regulatory Evaluation
This rule has been determined to be a significant regulatory action
pursuant to Executive Order 12866. This rule continues to prohibit U.S.
civil flights in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) at altitudes below FL320, except
for transiting overflights on jet routes P500-G500 which are permitted
to be conducted at altitudes at or above FL300, due to the continuing
hazards to U.S. civil aviation described in this preamble. The
alternative flight routes result in some additional fuel and operations
costs to the operators, as well as some costs attributed to passenger
time. FAA finds that the incremental costs of extending SFAR No. 119,
Sec. 91.1619, are exceeded by the benefits of avoided risks of deaths,
injuries, and property damage that could occur if a U.S. operator's
aircraft were shot down (or otherwise damaged) while operating in the
Kabul FIR (OAKX) at altitudes below FL320, except for transiting
overflights on jet routes P500-G500, which are permitted to operate at
altitudes at and above FL300 while operating in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) on
those jet routes.
This rule is not an Executive Order 14192 regulatory action because
it is being issued with respect to a national security or homeland
security function of the United States. The benefit-cost analysis
demonstrates that the regulation is anticipated to improve national or
homeland security as its primary direct benefit and OIRA and the
promulgating agency agree the regulation qualifies for a `good cause'
exception under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B).
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), in 5 U.S.C. 603, requires an
agency to prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis describing
impacts on small entities whenever 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law
requires an agency to publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking
for any proposed rule. Similarly, 5 U.S.C. 604 requires an agency to
prepare a final regulatory flexibility analysis when an agency issues a
final rule under 5 U.S.C. 553 after that section or any other law
requires publication of a general notice of proposed rulemaking. FAA
concludes good cause exists to forgo notice and comment and not to
delay the effective date for this rule. As 5 U.S.C. 553 does not
require notice and comment in this situation, 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604
similarly do not require regulatory flexibility analyses.
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to this Act, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
FAA has assessed the potential effect of this final rule and
determined that its purpose is to protect the safety of U.S. civil
aviation from risks to their operations in the Kabul FIR (OAKX), a
location outside the U.S. Therefore, the rule complies with the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979.
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and Tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' FAA currently uses
an inflation-adjusted value of $183 million in lieu of $100 million.
This final rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the
requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
the FAA to consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens it imposes on the public. FAA has determined no new
requirement for information collection is associated with this final
rule.
F. International Compatibility and Cooperation
In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, FAA's policy is to conform to
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. FAA has
determined no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices correspond to
this regulation. FAA finds this action is fully consistent with the
obligations under 49 U.S.C. 40105(b)(1)(A) to ensure FAA exercises its
duties consistently with the obligations of the United States under
international agreements.
While FAA's flight prohibition does not apply to foreign air
carriers, DOT codeshare authorizations prohibit foreign air carriers
from carrying a U.S. codeshare partner's code on a flight segment that
operates in airspace for which FAA has issued a flight prohibition for
U.S. civil aviation. In addition, foreign air carriers and other
foreign operators may choose to avoid, or be advised or directed by
their civil aviation authorities to avoid, airspace for which FAA has
issued a flight prohibition for U.S. civil aviation.
VIII. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
FAA has analyzed this rule under the principles and criteria of
Executive Order 13132. The agency has determined this action will not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the relationship
between the Federal Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
Therefore, this rule will not have federalism implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use
FAA analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13211. The agency has
determined it is not a ``significant energy action'' under the
executive order and will not be likely to have a significant adverse
effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy.
C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation
Executive Order 13609 promotes international regulatory cooperation
to meet shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. FAA has analyzed
this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of Executive
Order 13609 and has determined that this action will have no effect on
international regulatory cooperation.
[[Page 27987]]
IX. Additional Information
A. Electronic Access
Except for classified and controlled unclassified information, all
documents FAA considered in developing this rule, including economic
analyses and technical reports, may be accessed from the internet
through the docket for this rulemaking.
Those documents may be viewed online at <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a>
using the docket number listed above. A copy of this rule will be
placed in the docket. Electronic retrieval help and guidelines are
available on the website. It is available 24 hours each day, 365 days
each year. An electronic copy of this document may also be downloaded
from the Office of the Federal Register's website at <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov">https://www.federalregister.gov</a> and the Government Publishing Office's website
at <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov">https://www.govinfo.gov</a>. A copy may also be found on FAA's
Regulations and Policies website at <a href="https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies">https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies</a>.
Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9677.
B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
(SBREFA) (Pub. L. 104-121) (set forth as a note to 5 U.S.C. 601)
requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information or
advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its
jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document may
contact its local FAA official or the persons listed under the FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble.
To find out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit <a href="http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/">http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/</a>.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 91
Afghanistan, Air traffic control, Aircraft, Airmen, Airports,
Aviation safety, Freight.
The Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES
0
1. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40101, 40103, 40105, 40113, 40120,
44101, 44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716,
44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 47508,
47528-47531, 47534, Pub. L. 114-190, 130 Stat. 615 (49 U.S.C. 44703
note); Sec. 828 of Pub. L. 118-63, 138 Stat. 1330 (49 U.S.C. 44703
note); articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), (126 Stat. 11).
0
2. Amend Sec. 91.1619 by revising paragraph (e) to read as follows:
Sec. 91.1619 Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 119--Prohibition
Against Certain Flights in the Kabul Flight Information Region (FIR)
(OAKX).
* * * * *
(e) Expiration. This SFAR will remain in effect until July 25,
2028. The FAA may amend, rescind, or extend this SFAR, as necessary.
Issued in Washington, DC, under the authority of 49 U.S.C.
106(f), 40101(d)(1), 40105(b)(1)(A), and 44701(a)(5).
Christopher J. Rocheleau,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2025-12247 Filed 6-30-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.