Rule2025-11993
Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving CIBanco S.A., Institución De Banca Multiple
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Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
June 30, 2025
Issuing agencies
Treasury DepartmentFinancial Crimes Enforcement Network
Abstract
FinCEN is issuing notice of an order prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving CIBanco S.A., Instituci[oacute]n De Banca Multiple, a financial institution operating outside of the United States determined to be of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 123 (Monday, June 30, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 123 (Monday, June 30, 2025)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 27770-27777]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-11993]
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
31 CFR Chapter X, Part 1010
Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of
Funds Involving CIBanco S.A., Instituci[oacute]n De Banca Multiple
AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Treasury.
ACTION: Order.
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SUMMARY: FinCEN is issuing notice of an order prohibiting certain
transmittals of funds involving CIBanco S.A., Instituci[oacute]n De
Banca Multiple, a financial institution operating outside of the United
States determined to be of primary money laundering concern in
connection with illicit opioid trafficking.
DATES: This action is effective [21 days after publication in the
Federal Register].
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The FinCEN Resource Center at
<a href="http://www.fincen.gov/contact">www.fincen.gov/contact</a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Summary of Order
This order sets forth FinCEN's finding that CIBanco S.A.,
Instituci[oacute]n De Banca Multiple (CIBanco), a Mexico-based
commercial bank, is a financial institution operating outside of the
United States that is of primary money laundering concern in connection
with illicit opioid trafficking--specifically, through its provision of
financial services that facilitate illicit opioid trafficking by
Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), including (1) the
Gulf Cartel, (2) the Beltran-Leyva Organization (BLO) Cartel, and (3)
Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)--and imposes a prohibition on
certain transmittals of funds involving CIBanco by any covered
financial institution.\1\
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\1\ The application of FinCEN's authorities in this order is
specific to authorities provided by the Fentanyl Sanctions Act and
codified at 21 U.S.C. 2313a. It is not intended to otherwise reflect
the applicability of, or obligations under, any provision of the
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) or its implementing regulations.
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II. Background
A. Statutory Provisions
In 2024, Congress enacted the FEND Off Fentanyl Act,\2\ which among
other things, added 21 U.S.C. 2313a \3\ (section 2313a). Section 2313a
grants the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) the authority to make
a finding that ``reasonable grounds exist for concluding'' that any of
the following is of primary money laundering concern in connection with
illicit opioid trafficking:
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\2\ The FEND Off Fentanyl Act is Division E of Public Law 118-50
(Apr. 24, 2024).
\3\ Section 2313a codifies section 7213A of the Fentanyl
Sanctions Act, as amended by section 3201(a) of the FEND Off
Fentanyl Act. The Fentanyl Sanctions Act is Title LXXII of Public
Law 116-92 (Dec. 20, 2019).
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(1) One or more financial institutions operating outside of the
United States;
(2) One or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a
jurisdiction outside of the United States; or
(3) One or more types of accounts within, or involving, a
jurisdiction outside of the United States.\4\
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\4\ 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a).
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Upon making such a finding, the Secretary is authorized to require
domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to take
certain ``special measures,'' which are safeguards that may be employed
to defend the United States financial system from money laundering
risks connected to illicit opioid trafficking.\5\ The authority of the
Secretary to administer section 2313a has been delegated to FinCEN.\6\
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\5\ See 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a).
\6\ In accordance with Treasury Order 101-05 and 31 U.S.C.
321(b)(2), the authority vested in the Secretary under section 2313a
has been delegated to the Director of FinCEN.
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Pursuant to section 2313a, the Secretary may impose one or more of
six special measures.\7\ First, the Secretary may impose any of the
five special measures provided for in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b), commonly
known as section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act.\8\ Special measures one
through four, codified at 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)-(4), describe
additional recordkeeping, information collection, and reporting
requirements. Through these special measures, the Secretary may impose
such information collection and reporting requirements on covered
domestic financial
[[Page 27771]]
institutions and domestic financial agencies--collectively, ``covered
financial institutions.'' \9\ Special measure five, codified at 31
U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5), authorizes the Secretary, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to prohibit, or impose
conditions upon, the opening or maintaining in the United States of
correspondent or payable-through accounts by any domestic financial
institution or domestic financial agency for, or on behalf of, a
foreign banking institution, if such correspondent account or payable-
through account involves one or more financial institutions operating
outside of the United States that the Secretary has found to be of
primary money laundering concern.\10\ Special measure six, codified at
21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(2), allows the Secretary to ``prohibit, or impose
conditions upon, certain transmittals of funds (to be defined by the
Secretary) by any domestic financial institution or domestic financial
agency, if such transmittal of funds involves any such institution,
class of transaction, or type of accounts.'' \11\
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\7\ 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a).
\8\ See 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(1). 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(1) explicitly
references ``the special measures provided for in section 9714(a)(1)
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Pub.
L. 116-283; 31 U.S.C. 5318A note)'' (section 9714). Section 9714, in
turn, references the five special measures set out in 31 U.S.C.
5318A(b)(1)-(5).
\9\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)-(4).
\10\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5).
\11\ 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(2).
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Importantly, in connection with finding that a financial
institution is of primary money laundering concern and imposing any
special measure, section 2313a requires a finding that the relevant
financial institution is ``of primary money laundering concern in
connection with illicit opioid trafficking'' (emphasis added). 21
U.S.C. 2302 provides the operative definition of ``opioid trafficking''
for purposes of section 2313a, as any illicit activity:
(1) to produce, manufacture, distribute, sell, or knowingly finance
or transport--(a) synthetic opioids, including controlled substances
that are synthetic opioids and listed chemicals that are synthetic
opioids; or (b) active pharmaceutical ingredients or chemicals that are
used in the production of controlled substances that are synthetic
opioids;
(2) to attempt to carry out an activity described above; or
(3) to assist, abet, conspire, or collude with other persons to
carry out such an activity.\12\ For purposes of this order, FinCEN
interprets the term ``synthetic opioid'' to include fentanyl and
fentanyl analogs, as well as precursors to fentanyl and precursors to
fentanyl analogs.\13\
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\12\ 21 U.S.C. 2302(8).
\13\ See, e.g., Drug Enforcement Administration, Synthetic
Opioids Fact Sheet (Dec. 2024), <a href="https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-01/Synthetic-Opioids-Drug-Fact-Sheet.pdf">https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-01/Synthetic-Opioids-Drug-Fact-Sheet.pdf</a>; World Health
Organization, Opioid Overdose (Aug. 29, 2023), <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/opioid-overdose">https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/opioid-overdose</a>; see also Drug
Enforcement Administration, Docket No. DEA-1086, Special
Surveillance List of Chemicals, Products, Materials and Equipment
Used in the Manufacture of Controlled Substances and Listed
Chemicals (Oct. 24, 2023), <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-10-24/pdf/2023-23478.pdf">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-10-24/pdf/2023-23478.pdf</a>.
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B. Illicit Opioid Trafficking
The sustained influx of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids into
the United States has profound consequences, resulting in drug overdose
becoming the leading cause of death for people aged 18 to 44 in the
United States.\14\ To address the synthetic opioid crisis, it is
necessary to target the money laundering efforts of the Mexico-based
DTOs that are the primary source of fentanyl and other synthetic
opioids trafficked into the United States. These DTOs manufacture
synthetic opioids in clandestine laboratories in Mexico using precursor
chemicals sourced largely from the People's Republic of China (China),
traffic these synthetic opioids into and throughout the United States,
and launder the illicit profits back to Mexico.\15\
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\14\ See Centers for Disease Control, CDC Reports Nearly 24%
Decline in U.S. Drug Overdose Deaths (Feb. 25, 2025), <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2025/2025-cdc-reports-decline-in-us-drug-overdose-deaths.html">https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2025/2025-cdc-reports-decline-in-us-drug-overdose-deaths.html</a>; E.O. 14159, Imposing Duties To Address the
Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People's Republic of China, 90
FR 9121 (Feb. 7, 2025), <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/07/2025-02408/imposing-duties-to-address-the-synthetic-opioid-supply-chain-in-the-peoples-republic-of-china">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/07/2025-02408/imposing-duties-to-address-the-synthetic-opioid-supply-chain-in-the-peoples-republic-of-china</a>.
\15\ See Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-010-24,
2024 National Drug Threat Assessment (May 2024), pp. 46-50, <a href="https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf">https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf</a>; FinCEN, FIN-2024-A002, Supplemental Advisory on the
Procurement of Precursor Chemicals and Manufacturing Equipment Used
for the Synthesis of Illicit Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids
(June 20, 2024), <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2024-06-20/FinCEN-Supplemental-Advisory-on-Fentanyl-508C.pdf">https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2024-06-20/FinCEN-Supplemental-Advisory-on-Fentanyl-508C.pdf</a>; Congressional Research Service, Illicit Fentanyl and
Mexico's Role (Dec. 19, 2024), pp.1-2, <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10400">https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10400</a>.
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These DTOs could not profit on trafficking fentanyl and other
synthetic opioids if not for their ability to launder and remit the
monetary proceeds back to Mexico. DTOs and third-party money launderers
use a diverse array of methods to launder money, including using
financial institutions, remittance payments, bulk cash smuggling,
trade-based money laundering, mirror trades, and cryptocurrencies.\16\
It is therefore critical to address the role that financial
institutions operating outside the United States play in facilitating
the money laundering that enables and facilitates the DTOs and their
illicit opioid trafficking and related money laundering.
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\16\ See Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-010-24,
2024 National Drug Threat Assessment (May 2024), pp. 46-50, <a href="https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf">https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf</a>.
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III. Finding That CIBanco Is a Financial Institution Operating Outside
the United States That Is of Primary Money Laundering Concern in
Connection With Illicit Opioid Trafficking
Based on public and non-public information available to FinCEN,
FinCEN finds that reasonable grounds exist to conclude that CIBanco, a
financial institution operating outside of the United States, is of
primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid
trafficking through its provision of financial services that facilitate
illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs, including the Gulf
Cartel, the BLO Cartel, and CJNG. In making this finding, FinCEN has
considered the relevant evidence in light of factors identified in 31
U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B), taking into account the specific circumstances
of money laundering activities in connection with illicit opioid
trafficking and the protection of U.S. national security and the U.S.
financial system. While FinCEN is under no obligation pursuant to
section 2313a to consider any particular factor or set of factors when
making a finding that a financial institution operating outside of the
United States is of primary money laundering concern in connection with
illicit opioid trafficking, it nonetheless finds these factors
instructive in guiding the analysis set forth below.\17\
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\17\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B) provides, as relevant here, that
in making a finding that reasonable grounds exist for concluding
that a financial institution outside the United States is of primary
money laundering concern and to apply one or more of special
measures one through four to such a financial institution, the
Secretary shall consider such information as the Secretary
determines to be relevant, including the following potentially
relevant factors:
(1) the extent to which such financial institutions,
transactions, or types of accounts are used to facilitate or promote
money laundering in or through the jurisdiction, including any money
laundering activity by organized criminal groups, international
terrorists, or entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction or missiles;
(2) the extent to which such institutions, transactions, or
types of accounts are used for legitimate business purposes in the
jurisdiction; and
(3) the extent to which such action is sufficient to ensure,
with respect to transactions involving the jurisdiction and
institutions operating in the jurisdiction, that the purposes of
this subchapter continue to be fulfilled, and to guard against
international money laundering and other financial crimes.
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[[Page 27772]]
A. CIBanco Is a Financial Institution Operating Outside the United
States
CIBanco is a Mexico-based commercial bank. By its own account,
CIBanco offers various banking products and services to individuals and
entities in Mexico, including term deposits in U.S. dollars (USD),
certificates of deposit, money market instruments, checking accounts,
car loans, business credit, and credit cards. It also provides foreign
trade, trust, investment, securities, and currency exchange
services.\18\ According to commercially available bank data, CIBanco is
headquartered in Mexico City, Mexico, and as of 2024 had over 200 known
branches in Mexico and was the majority owner of two non-depository
finance companies: Finanmadrid Mexico, S.A. de C.V. and CI Fondos S.A.
de C.V.\19\ According to public and non-public information, CIBanco
provides USD correspondent relationships banking services through two
U.S. financial institutions.\20\ Considering the services it provides,
CIBanco is a financial institution within the meaning of 31 U.S.C.
5312(a)(2), and based on the foregoing, FinCEN has determined that
CIBanco is a financial institution operating outside of the United
States, as described in section 2313a.
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\18\ See CIBanco's homepage, <a href="https://www.cibanco.com">https://www.cibanco.com</a> (last
accessed Jun. 02, 2025).
\19\ See BankCheck Profile for CIBanco, <a href="https://bankcheck.app">https://bankcheck.app</a>
(last accessed Feb. 26, 2025).
\20\ Id.
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B. CIBanco Is a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering
Concern in Connection With Illicit Opioid Trafficking
FinCEN has considered the extent to which accounts at CIBanco are
used to ``facilitate or promote money laundering,'' including in
connection with organized criminal groups associated with illicit
opioid trafficking.\21\ Based on information available to FinCEN,
FinCEN has determined that CIBanco has a history of ties to
international DTOs and facilitation of transactions on their behalf.
CIBanco's exposure to, and facilitation of, transactions associated
with suspected illicit opioid trafficking-related activities is
consistent with its long-standing pattern of associations with and
conducting transactions for the Gulf Cartel, the BLO Cartel, and CJNG,
all of whom are DTOs designated by Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC),\22\ and as of February 20, 2025, two of whom are also
designated as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) pursuant to
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as
amended.\23\
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\21\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B)(i).
\22\ OFAC, Press Release, Treasury Uses New Sanctions Authority
to Combat Global Illicit Drug Trade (Dec. 15, 2021), <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535</a>.
\23\ Department of State, Designation of International Cartels
Fact Sheet, <a href="https://www.state.gov/designation-of-international-cartels/">https://www.state.gov/designation-of-international-cartels/</a> (last accessed Feb. 27, 2025); see also Department of
State, Foreign Terrorist Organization Designations of Tren de
Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha, Cartel de Sinaloa, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva
Generaci[oacute]n, Carteles Unidos, Cartel del Noreste, Cartel del
Golfo, and La Nueva Generacion, Carteles Unidos, Cartel del Noreste,
Cartel del Golfo, and La Nueva Familia Michoacana, 90 FR 10030-31
(Feb. 20, 2025), <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-20/pdf/2025-02873.pdf">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-20/pdf/2025-02873.pdf</a>; Department of State, Specially Designated Global
Terrorist Designations of Tren de Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha, Cartel
de Sinaloa, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generaci[oacute]n, Carteles
Unidos, Cartel del Noreste, Cartel del Golfo, and La Nueva Familia
Michoacana, 90 FR 10030 (Feb. 20, 2025), <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-20/pdf/2025-02873.pdf">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-20/pdf/2025-02873.pdf</a>; 8 U.S.C. 1189
(codifying section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
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1. CIBanco Provided Financial Services That Benefitted DTOs, Including
the Gulf Cartel, the BLO Cartel, and CJNG
a. The Gulf Cartel
On February 20, 2025, the Department of State designated the Gulf
Cartel as a foreign terrorist organization.\24\ The Gulf Cartel
receives fentanyl produced by partner cartels and moves it into the
United States.\25\ Illicit opioid traffickers affiliated with the Gulf
Cartel have been convicted in the United States. For example, in 2023,
an individual operating on behalf of the Gulf Cartel pleaded guilty to
international drug trafficking and money laundering conspiracy
involving the trafficking of six kilograms of fentanyl, along with
other illicit narcotics, for which 15 other individuals were also
convicted as part of the conspiracy.\26\ In December 2024, the
Department of Justice described the Gulf Cartel as ``one of Mexico's
oldest criminal syndicates, engaging in drug trafficking, violence,
human smuggling, and more.'' \27\
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\24\ Department of State, Public Notice 12672, Foreign Terrorist
Organization Designations of Tren de Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha,
Cartel de Sinaloa, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, Carteles
Unidos, Cartel del Noreste, Cartel del Golfo, and La Nueva Familia
Michoacana, 90 FR 10030-31, (Feb. 20, 2025), <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-20/pdf/2025-02873.pdf">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-20/pdf/2025-02873.pdf</a>. OFAC
had previously designated the Gulf Cartel under its authorities in
2007 and 2021. See OFAC, Press Release, Treasury Uses New Sanctions
Authority to Combat Global Illicit Drug Trade (Dec. 15, 2021),
<a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535</a>; The White
House, Press Release, Presidential Designation of Foreign Narcotics
Kingpins (June 1, 2007), <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070601-23.html">https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070601-23.html</a>;
OFAC, Kingpin Act Update (June 1, 2007), <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20070601">https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20070601</a>.
\25\ S. Dudley and P. Asmann, ``Gulf Cartel Still `Public Enemy
No. 1' on U.S.-Mexico Border: Homeland Security,'' InSight Crime
(May 18, 2023), <a href="https://insightcrime.org/news/interview/gulf-cartel-public-enemy-us-mexico-border-homeland">https://insightcrime.org/news/interview/gulf-cartel-public-enemy-us-mexico-border-homeland</a> -security/.
\26\ Drug Enforcement Administration, Press Release, Money
Launderer for Cartel Sent to Prison (Dec. 13, 2023), <a href="https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2023/12/13/money-launderer-cartel-sent-prison">https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2023/12/13/money-launderer-cartel-sent-prison</a>; IRS, Press Release, Money launderer for cartel sent to
prison (Dec. 12, 2023), <a href="https://www.irs.gov/compliance/criminal-investigation/money-launderer-for-cartel-sent-to-prison">https://www.irs.gov/compliance/criminal-investigation/money-launderer-for-cartel-sent-to-prison</a>.
\27\ U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of Texas, Press
Release, Gulf Cartel Drug Trafficker Sent to Prison Following Major
Cocaine and Cash Seizures (Dec. 18, 2024), <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/gulf-cartel-drug-trafficker-sent-prison-following-major-cocaine-and-cash-seizures">https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/gulf-cartel-drug-trafficker-sent-prison-following-major-cocaine-and-cash-seizures</a>.
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Gulf Cartel-linked money launderers seeking to evade detection from
law enforcement and regulatory authorities have sought services from
CIBanco. For example, in the beginning half of 2023, a CIBanco employee
knowingly facilitated the creation of an account to purportedly launder
USD 10 million on behalf of a Gulf Cartel member. FinCEN assesses that
this account likely facilitated illicit opioid trafficking by the Gulf
Cartel.
b. The BLO Cartel and CJNG
In 2023, OFAC designated 15 individuals and two entities as SDNs
under E.O. 14059 and described the BLO Cartel as ``one of the most
powerful drug trafficking organizations in the world'' and as being
``heavily involved in the transportation and distribution of deadly
drugs, including fentanyl, to the United States.'' \28\ In 2021, the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) included the BLO Cartel in a list
of Mexican criminal organizations with the ``the greatest drug
trafficking impact on the United States.'' \29\ The BLO Cartel was
designated as an SDN under E.O. 14059 in 2021,\30\ and was designated
as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker pursuant to the Foreign
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act) in 2008.\31\ Moreover,
on April 9, 2025,
[[Page 27773]]
OFAC sanctioned Jesus Alfredo Beltran Guzman, a key leader of the BLO
Cartel, for playing a significant role in the trafficking of illicit
drugs, including fentanyl, into the U.S.\32\
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\28\ Treasury, Press Release, Secretary Yellen Announces
Treasury Sanctions Against New Generation of Violent Drug
Trafficking Beltr[aacute]n Leyva Organization (Dec. 3, 2023),
<a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1952">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1952</a>.
\29\ Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-008-21, 2020
National Drug Threat Assessment (Mar. 2021), p. 66, <a href="https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/DIR-008-21%202020%20National%20Drug%20Threat%20Assessment_WEB.pdf">https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/DIR-008-21%202020%20National%20Drug%20Threat%20Assessment_WEB.pdf</a>.
\30\ OFAC, Press Release, Treasury Uses New Sanctions Authority
to Combat Global Illicit Drug Trade (Dec. 15, 2021), <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535</a>.
\31\ OFAC, Press Release, Treasury Designates Individuals and
Companies Tied to the Beltran Leyva Organization Under the Kingpin
Act (Dec. 3, 2009), <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg426">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg426</a>; OFAC, Kingpin Act Designation (May 30, 2008), <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20080530">https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20080530</a>; The White House, Press
Release, Presidential Designation of Foreign Narcotics Kingpins (May
30, 2008), <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080530-5.html">https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080530-5.html</a>.
\32\ OFAC, Press Release, Treasury Targets Key Leader of Violent
Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization Implicated in Record-Breaking
Seizure of Fentanyl (Apr. 2025), <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0076">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0076</a>.
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In 2024, the DEA stated that CJNG, along with the Sinaloa Cartel,
was ``at the heart'' of the synthetic opioid crisis, using its global
supply chain network to gain access to the pill presses and precursor
chemicals needed to manufacture synthetic opioid in Mexico for
distribution in the United States.\33\ The DEA described the CJNG
Cartel as ``one of the largest producers and traffickers of illicit
fentanyl, in both powder and pill form, to the United States.'' \34\
DEA further stated:
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\33\ Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-010-24, 2024
National Drug Threat Assessment (May 2024), <a href="https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-07/2024%20NDTA-updated%207.5.2024.pdf">https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-07/2024%20NDTA-updated%207.5.2024.pdf</a>.
\34\ Id. at 13.
Although the Jalisco Cartel [CJNG] cannot match the Sinaloa
Cartel's fentanyl production capacity, they have flooded American
streets with fentanyl, often mixed with other drugs like heroin,
cocaine, and xylazine. The cartel has its own connections to
precursor chemical suppliers in China for the production of fentanyl
and methamphetamine and exerts control over a number of seaports for
importing the chemicals. They also control an extensive network of
smuggling routes into the United States, and lucrative distribution
hubs in major U.S. cities like Atlanta, Georgia.\35\
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\35\ Id. at 16.
In 2015, the CJNG Cartel was designated by OFAC as an SDNT pursuant
to the Kingpin Act and later designated under E.O. 14059 in 2021.\36\
Under the latter, OFAC described the cartel as ``one of the most
powerful cartels in Mexico and one of the five most dangerous
transnational criminal organizations in the world, according to the
Department of Justice. The [DEA] reports that CJNG traffics a
significant proportion of the fentanyl and other deadly drugs that
enter the United States. CJNG uses extreme violence against rivals and
Mexican authorities to expand and maintain territory in strategic drug
trafficking corridors.'' \37\
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\36\ OFAC, Press Release, Treasury Uses New Sanctions Authority
to Combat Global Illicit Drug Trade (Dec. 15, 2021), <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535</a>; OFAC, Press Release,
Treasury Sanctions Two Major Mexican Drug Organizations and Two of
Their Leaders (Apr. 8, 2015), <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl10020">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl10020</a>.
\37\ OFAC, Press Release, Treasury Uses New Sanctions Authority
to Combat Global Illicit Drug Trade (Dec. 15, 2021), <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535</a>.
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CJNG- and BLO-linked money launderers seeking to evade detection
from law enforcement and regulatory authorities have sought out
services from CIBanco. For example, between August and September 2024,
Mexico-based money brokers working on behalf of BLO Cartel and CJNG
coordinated the movement of up to the equivalent of USD 26,000 in
illicit funds to CIBanco. FinCEN assesses that these transactions
likely facilitated illicit opioid trafficking by BLO Cartel and CJNG.
2. CIBanco Processed Funds Transfers on Behalf of Exporters and
Importers of Synthetic Opioid-Related Precursor Chemicals
Based on non-public information available to FinCEN, FinCEN has
determined that CIBanco has a history of facilitating USD transactions
that finance the importation of precursor chemicals used to produce
illicit synthetic opioids on behalf of DTOs.
In the United States, precursor chemicals are substances regulated
by the DEA in order to prevent the illicit manufacture of controlled
substances. As of December 2024, most U.S.-destined illicit fentanyl
appears to be produced in clandestine labs in Mexico, using precursor
chemicals imported from China.\38\ Although the Mexican and Chinese
governments have established controls on multiple precursor chemicals,
China-based suppliers remain the main source for precursor chemicals
used by DTOs in Mexico to produce illicit opioids.\39\
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\38\ Congressional Research Service, Illicit Fentanyl and
Mexico's Role (Dec. 19, 2024), <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10400/13">https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10400/13</a>.
\39\ Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-010-24,
National Drug Threat Assessment 2024 (May 2024), p. 7, <a href="https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/508_5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf">https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/508_5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf</a>; FinCEN, FIN-2024-A002, Supplemental Advisory on the
Procurement of Precursor Chemicals and Manufacturing Equipment Used
for the Synthesis of Illicit Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids
(Jun. 20, 2024), pp. 2-6, <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2024-06-20/FinCEN-Supplemental-Advisory-on-Fentanyl-508C.pdf">https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2024-06-20/FinCEN-Supplemental-Advisory-on-Fentanyl-508C.pdf</a>.
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Furthermore, DTOs are known to employ transnational funds transfer
services via various financial institutions and agencies, including,
but not limited to, banks, money services businesses, and online
payment processors, to drive illicit opioid-related financial
flows.\40\ A common method employed by DTOs to obfuscate illicit opioid
trafficking-related payments includes using shell and front companies
to disguise the origin of illicit funds.<SUP>41 42</SUP> FinCEN
assesses that these same methods are being used by DTOs to import
precursor chemicals from China into Mexico under the guise of
legitimate business transactions, which are facilitated by CIBanco.
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\40\ See Congressional Research Service, Illicit Fentanyl and
Mexico's Role (Dec. 19, 2024), pp. 1-2, <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10400/12">https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10400/12</a>.
\41\ Shell companies are businesses that exist only as an entity
through which money may be transferred to hide beneficial ownership.
Front companies operate mostly as normal businesses; however, DTOs
commingle drug proceeds with the legitimate revenue from the front
company in an effort to disguise them. Drug Enforcement
Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-008-21, 2020 National Drug Threat
Assessment (Mar. 2021), p. 88, <a href="https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/DIR-008-21%202020%20National%20Drug%20Threat%20Assessment_WEB.pdf">https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/DIR-008-21%202020%20National%20Drug%20Threat%20Assessment_WEB.pdf</a>.
\42\ Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-010-24,
National Drug Threat Assessment 2024 (May 2024), p. 47, <a href="https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/508_5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf">https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/508_5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf</a>.
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Based on nonpublic information, FinCEN assesses that CIBanco has
been instrumental in facilitating payments on behalf of Mexico-based
companies involved in the procurement of precursor chemicals for
illicit purposes. Examples of CIBanco's facilitation of payments in
furtherance of illicit opioid trafficking include, but are not limited
to, the instances below.
From 2012 through 2018, Mexico and U.S. law enforcement seized at
least four shipments associated with a Mexico-based company that
contained precursor chemicals or illicit drugs including
methamphetamine. From 2016 through 2024, this Mexico-based company sent
over 40 wires totaling over USD 200,000 to shipping companies based in
countries including Japan and South Korea through CIBanco.
In mid-2019, a CJNG precursor chemical broker facilitated an order
of dimethyl carbonate from a China-based chemical supplier to a second
Mexico-based company. From 2022 through 2024, the second Mexico-based
company was associated with more than 150 funds transfers totaling over
USD 100 million involving industrial companies based in countries
including Taiwan and Switzerland through CIBanco.
In late 2019, Germany- and China-based precursor chemical brokers
likely facilitated a shipment of hydroxylamine hydrochloride through a
third Mexico-based company for a CJNG-affiliated precursor chemical
broker based on
[[Page 27774]]
prior similar arrangements. From 2016 through 2022, the third Mexico-
based company sent over 150 funds transfers totaling over USD 130,000
to industrial companies in the U.S. and Mexico through CIBanco. FinCEN
assesses that based on prior involvement in the procurement of
precursor chemicals for CJNG-affiliated chemical brokers, transactions
facilitated for the aforementioned Mexico-based companies were likely
in tandem with illicit opioid trafficking operations.
Since at least 2019, over 20 China-based companies, including three
with activity highlighted below, were known to have shipped precursor
chemicals to Mexico for illicit purposes. Based on information
available to FinCEN, the following payments are assessed to be related
to illicit opioid trafficking:
<bullet> From December 2021 to October 2022, CIBanco clients
originated over 10 funds transfers totaling more than USD 600,000 to a
company located in China.
<bullet> From December 2022 to January 2023, CIBanco clients
originated at least nine funds transfers totaling more than USD 935,000
to a second company located in China.
<bullet> From December 2020 to October 2024, CIBanco clients
originated at least 12 funds transfers totaling more than USD 600,000
to a third company located in China.
Based on non-public information, as well as the volume and dollar
amount of funds transfers that CIBanco processed over several years
with these companies, FinCEN assesses that such transactions likely
facilitated illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs.
C. The Extent To Which CIBanco Is Used for Legitimate Business Activity
In reaching its finding, FinCEN has considered the extent to which
CIBanco is used for legitimate business purposes.\43\ According to
Mexico's National Banking Securities Commission (CNBV), as of February
2025, CIBanco is one of 51 registered banking institutions in
Mexico.\44\ CIBanco is the 20th largest financial institution in
Mexico, with MXN 142.389 billion (USD 7.04 billion) in total assets, as
of December 2024, and two U.S. correspondents.\45\ As of 2024,
CIBanco's total assets represented 0.94 percent of bank assets in
Mexico.\46\ By comparison, the assets of the two largest Mexico-based
banks in 2024 represented 22.25 percent with MXN 3.384 trillion (USD
167.22 billion) and 13.19 percent with MXN 2.006 trillion (USD 99.15
billion), respectively, of bank assets in Mexico.\47\
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\43\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B)(ii).
\44\ National Banking and Securities Commission, Registry of
Supervised Entities on Multiple Banking Institutions, <a href="https://www.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/PADR%C3%93N-DE-ENTIDADES-SUPERVISADAS.aspx">https://www.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/PADR%C3%93N-DE-ENTIDADES-SUPERVISADAS.aspx</a>
(last accessed Feb. 21, 2025).
\45\ Ranking determined by comparing CIBanco's total assets
reported by CNBV in December 2024 with the total assets reported for
banks in Mexico by CNBV in December 2024. See Government of Mexico,
CNBV, Banca M[uacute]ltiple (Dec. 2024) document available for
export at <a href="https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/Contenidos.aspx?ID=40&Titulo=Banca%20M%C3%BAltiple">https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/Contenidos.aspx?ID=40&Titulo=Banca%20M%C3%BAltiple</a> (last accessed
Feb. 28, 2025); see also supra note 19 for Payments Information
section of BankCheck Profile for CIBanco.
\46\ Percentage determined by comparing CIBanco's total assets
reported by CNBV in December 2024 with total assets reported for
banks by CNBV in December 2024. See Government of Mexico, CNBV,
Banca M[uacute]ltiple (Dec. 2024) document available for export at
<a href="https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/Contenidos.aspx?ID=40&Titulo=Banca%20M%C3%BAltiple">https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/Contenidos.aspx?ID=40&Titulo=Banca%20M%C3%BAltiple</a> (last accessed
Feb. 28, 2025).
\47\ Government of Mexico, CNBV, Banca M[uacute]ltiple (Dec.
2024) document available for export at <a href="https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/Contenidos.aspx?ID=40&Titulo=Banca%20M%C3%BAltiple">https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/Contenidos.aspx?ID=40&Titulo=Banca%20M%C3%BAltiple</a> (last accessed
Feb. 28, 2025).
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FinCEN has also assessed CIBanco's expressed anti-money laundering
(AML) policies, including its 2023 Report on Sustainability. In this
report, CIBanco asserts having a money laundering prevention system
screening all operations carried out by their clients in registration,
transactional, and post-transactional processes.\48\ FinCEN has not
independently examined CIBanco's AML policies or programs or otherwise
corroborated the existence or efficacy of such programs. Regardless,
even if CIBanco has some AML policies and programs, given the evidence
described in this Order and the totality of the circumstances, this
does not alter FinCEN's overall determination that CIBanco is of
primary money laundering concern.
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\48\ CIBanco, 2023 Sustainability Report, p. 28, available for
export at <a href="https://cop-report.unglobalcompact.org/COPViewer/2024?responseId=R_20HIewXAIVM4DYu">https://cop-report.unglobalcompact.org/COPViewer/2024?responseId=R_20HIewXAIVM4DYu</a> (last accessed Apr. 14, 2025).
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Moreover, FinCEN assesses that CIBanco's access to USD is used to
facilitate illicit finance by DTOs who seek to circumvent AML and
countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) obligations and obfuscate
the source of funds or their intended use, and ultimately to support
the enterprise of illicit opioid trafficking. Although CIBanco has a
significant presence across Mexico and offers services used by licit
actors, other banks provide similar services, including access to U.S.
banks via direct correspondent banking relationships, that provide for
appropriate transparency and can support international efforts to
protect the integrity of the international financial system. Further,
compliance with the prohibition on certain transmittals of funds set
out in this order requires no tools or competencies other than those
already employed by domestic financial institutions to maintain their
current AML/CFT compliance programs. Accordingly, given the flows of
illegitimate funds through CIBanco, FinCEN assesses that the need to
protect U.S. financial institutions from the money laundering risks
presented by CIBanco outweighs any potential legitimate utility its
services may provide.
D. The Extent To Which This Action Would Guard Against International
Money Laundering and Other Financial Crimes Associated With Illicit
Opioid Trafficking
A finding that CIBanco is of primary money laundering concern in
connection with illicit opioid trafficking establishes--and
emphasizes--the significant illicit finance risks posed by CIBanco's
provision of financial services that facilitate illicit opioid
trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs. This finding will place U.S. and
foreign financial institutions and regulators on notice to guard
against those risks.\49\ Moreover, such a finding--in combination with
a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds involving CIBanco by
covered financial institutions--will safeguard the U.S. financial
system, by severing CIBanco's access.
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\49\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B)(iii).
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IV. Imposition of a Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of
Funds Involving CIBanco
Having found that CIBanco is a financial institution operating
outside of the United States that is of primary money laundering
concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking, FinCEN has
determined that the imposition of a special measure prohibiting certain
transmittals of funds involving CIBanco is warranted.\50\ In making
this determination and assessing which special measures may be
appropriate, FinCEN has considered the relevant evidence in light of
factors identified in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B).
[[Page 27775]]
While FinCEN is under no obligation pursuant to section 2313a to
consider any particular factor or set of factors in selecting one or
more special measures, it nonetheless finds these factors instructive
in guiding the analysis set forth below.\51\
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\50\ In connection with this action, and consistent with 31
U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(A), FinCEN consulted with staff at the following
Departments and agencies with regard to the proposed order and
prohibition: the Department of Justice; the Department of State; the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Securities and Exchange
Commission; the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency; and the National Credit Union
Administration. None of the Departments or agencies objected to the
issuance of this order based on the information provided to staff at
the time of this consultation.
\51\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B) provides, as relevant here, that
in selecting which special measure(s) to take, the Secretary shall
consider:
(1) whether similar action has been or is being taken by other
nations or multilateral groups;
(2) whether the imposition of any particular special measure
would create a significant competitive disadvantage, including any
undue cost or burden associated with compliance, for financial
institutions organized or licensed in the United States;
(3) the extent to which the action or the timing of the action
would have a significant adverse systemic impact on the
international payment, clearance, and settlement system, or on
legitimate business activities involving the particular
jurisdiction, institution, class of transactions, or type of
account; and
(4) the effect of the action on United States national security
and foreign policy.
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A. Whether the Prohibition on Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving
CIBanco Will Address the Money Laundering Concern in a Manner
Consistent With U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy Interests
FinCEN has considered the effect this action will have on U.S.
national security and foreign policy, as well as the extent to which
multilateral groups or other nations have taken similar actions.\52\
Given CIBanco's association with DTOs and other actors engaged in
illicit opioid trafficking, FinCEN assesses that imposing a prohibition
on certain transmittals of funds involving CIBanco is necessary to
safeguard U.S. national security and the U.S. financial system, as well
as serve key U.S. national security objectives.\53\ A prohibition on
certain transmittals of funds involving CIBanco will also further
ongoing U.S. efforts to curtail illicit opioid trafficking--including
the manufacture of synthetic opioids--and related financial
transactions that facilitate the laundering of the proceeds of their
distribution. Targeting the illicit proceeds of drug traffickers and
DTOs, especially those with a nexus to illicit opioids--like the Gulf
and BLO Cartels, and CJNG--is a high priority for the United States.
And, for that reason, recent actions by OFAC and the Department of
State have focused on DTOs affiliated with opioid-related illicit
finance threats, including the February 20, 2025, designation of
certain DTOs--including the Gulf Cartel and CJNG--as FTOs, under E.O.
13224.\54\ Publicly countering a financing mechanism used by these
illicit entities by prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving
CIBanco will serve the national security and financial system of the
United States by further deterring and curtailing illicit opioid
trafficking, along with the activities of DTOs and FTOs. Similarly,
such a prohibition would sever a pathway that may facilitate
circumvention of U.S. economic sanctions, increasing the efficacy of
those sanctions and complementing previous actions taken by the U.S.
government.
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\52\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B)(i), (iv).
\53\ National Security Memorandum/NSM-24, DCPD-202400663,
National Security Memorandum on Prioritizing the Strategic
Disruption of the Supply Chain for Illicit Fentanyl and Synthetic
Opioids Through a Coordinated, Whole-of-Government, Information-
Driven Effort (July 31, 2024), <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/DCPD-202400663">https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/DCPD-202400663</a>; Treasury, 2024 National Strategy for Combating
Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing (May 2024), <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2024-Illicit-Finance-Strategy.pdf">https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2024-Illicit-Finance-Strategy.pdf</a>; Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-010-24,
National Drug Threat Assessment 2024 (May 2024), <a href="https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf">https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf</a>.
\54\ Department of State, Public Notice 12672, Foreign Terrorist
Organization Designations of Tren de Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha,
Cartel de Sinaloa, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, Carteles
Unidos, Cartel del Noreste, Cartel del Golfo, and La Nueva Familia
Michoacana (Feb. 20, 2025), <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/20/2025-02873/foreign-terrorist-organization-designations-of-tren-de-aragua-mara-salvatrucha-cartel-de-sinaloa">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/20/2025-02873/foreign-terrorist-organization-designations-of-tren-de-aragua-mara-salvatrucha-cartel-de-sinaloa</a>.
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Moreover, this action reinforces the expectations of AML/CFT
compliance in the financial system, highlighting the importance of
identifying and reporting suspicious activity by financial institutions
around the world. With respect to the illicit finance risks posed by
CIBanco, that is of particular importance, as no multilateral groups
and no other nations have yet acted to address those risks.
B. Whether the Prohibition on Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving
CIBanco Would Create a Significant Competitive Disadvantage, Including
Through Imposing Undue Burdens on Legitimate Activity of CIBanco or
Third Parties
FinCEN has considered whether the imposition of special measure six
would create a significant competitive disadvantage, including any
undue cost or burden associated with compliance, for financial
institutions organized or licensed in the United States, as well as the
extent to which the action could have a significant adverse systemic
impact on legitimate business activities involving CIBanco.\55\ FinCEN
assesses that prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving
CIBanco would impose a relatively limited burden on legitimate
activities currently transacted through CIBanco or the legitimate
activities of third parties impacted by this order, as similar services
are offered by other financial institutions in Mexico, and third
parties will have sufficient capability to ensure compliance.
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\55\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B)(ii), (iii).
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As noted above, CIBanco is the 20th largest financial institution
in Mexico, with MXN 142.389 billion (USD 7.04 billion) in total assets,
as of December 2024, and two U.S. correspondents.\56\ As of 2024,
CIBanco's total assets represented 0.94 percent of bank assets in
Mexico.\57\ By comparison, the assets of the two largest Mexico-based
banks in 2024 represented 22.25 percent with MXN 3.384 trillion (USD
167.22 billion) and 13.19 percent with MXN 2.006 trillion (USD 99.15
billion), respectively, of bank assets in Mexico.\58\ FinCEN assesses
that given CIBanco's size compared to the largest financial
institutions in Mexico and the array of correspondent relationships
between U.S. and Mexican financial institutions, the macroeconomic
impact of prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving CIBanco
would be negligible. Indeed, given its size and limited international
presence, the legitimate business services that it offers would be
readily available through other regulated institutions. Although this
order represents one of the first issuances of an order under section
2313a, FinCEN has afforded financial institutions an additional 21 days
to prepare for the prohibition and, regardless, assesses that this
action would not impose any undue cost or burden for financial
institutions, as covered financial institutions would be positioned to
readily incorporate the requirements of this order into their
compliance programs.
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\56\ Ranking determined by comparing CIBanco's total assets
reported by CNBV in December 2024 with the total assets reported for
banks in Mexico by CNBV in December 2024. See Government of Mexico,
CNBV, Banca M[uacute]ltiple (Dec. 2024) document available for
export at <a href="https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/Contenidos.aspx?ID=40&Titulo=Banca%20M%C3%BAltiple">https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/Contenidos.aspx?ID=40&Titulo=Banca%20M%C3%BAltiple</a>, (last accessed
Feb. 28, 2025); see also supra note 19 for BankCheck Profile for
CIBanco.
\57\ Percentage determined by comparing CIBanco's total assets
reported by CNBV in December 2024 with total assets reported for
banks by CNBV in December 2024. See Government of Mexico, CNBV,
Banca M[uacute]ltiple (Dec. 2024) document available for export at
<a href="https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/Contenidos.aspx?ID=40&Titulo=Banca%20M%C3%BAltiple">https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/Contenidos.aspx?ID=40&Titulo=Banca%20M%C3%BAltiple</a>, (last accessed
Feb. 28, 2025).
\58\ Government of Mexico, CNBV, Banca M[uacute]ltiple (Dec.
2024) document available for export at <a href="https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/Contenidos.aspx?ID=40&Titulo=Banca%20M%C3%BAltiple">https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/Contenidos.aspx?ID=40&Titulo=Banca%20M%C3%BAltiple</a>, (last accessed
Feb. 28, 2025).
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[[Page 27776]]
C. Whether Any Other Reasonable Alternatives or Special Measures Would
Adequately Address the Money Laundering Concern
In imposing a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds, FinCEN
considered other available special measures \59\ and, after due
consideration, has determined that a special measure prohibiting
certain transmittals of funds involving CIBanco is the appropriate
means to adequately address the illicit finance risk that CIBanco
poses.
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\59\ As noted in section II.A, pursuant to section 2313a, these
measures include: (1) the special measures described in 31 U.S.C.
5318A(b), including the imposition of additional recordkeeping,
information collection, and reporting requirements on covered U.S.
financial institutions and/or the imposition of conditions upon the
opening or maintaining of correspondent or payable-through accounts
for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution; and (2) the
prohibition, or imposition of conditions on, the transmittal of
funds.
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None of the special measures set out in 31 U.S.C. 5318A--special
measures one through five--would effectively address the illicit
finance threat posed by CIBanco. Any additional recordkeeping,
information collection, or reporting requirements, as described in 31
U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)-(4), would be insufficient to guard against the
risks posed by covered financial institutions processing transmittals
of funds involving CIBanco. Those special measures would allow such
transfers to continue to the benefit of illicit actors connected to
illicit opioid trafficking. Further, merely prohibiting and/or placing
conditions upon the opening or maintaining in the United States of
correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts for or on behalf of
CIBanco, as described in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5), would be similarly
inadequate. Neither prohibiting nor imposing conditions on such
accounts would safeguard the U.S. financial system to the same degree
as prohibiting transmittals of funds, as such a special measure would
not address the movement of funds outside of a strict correspondent or
payable-through relationship. Furthermore, the longevity and frequency
of the illicit opioid trafficking related transactional activity
indicates that CIBanco lacks effective AML/CFT oversight or has chosen
not to take action to impede illicit finance, which would not be
addressed through application of conditions upon the opening or
maintaining of the aforementioned types of accounts.\60\
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\60\ Likewise, imposing conditions on transmittals of funds,
pursuant to section 2313a, would be insufficient to address the
threat. CIBanco provides a service that is easily obtainable for
legitimate customers through other providers, and in this case the
value of any legitimate activity it may conduct is outweighed by the
significant proportion of illicit financial activity identified.
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Given CIBanco's longstanding facilitation of illicit opioid
trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs and because transmittals of funds
involving CIBanco do not necessarily have to go through a correspondent
account, FinCEN assesses that it is appropriate to more broadly
prohibit any transmittal of funds. Because such a prohibition would cut
off any transmittal of funds, and not just those conducted through a
correspondent or payable-through account, the prohibition on any
transmittal of funds involving CIBanco would more effectively prevent
CIBanco from accessing the U.S. financial system. FinCEN therefore
assesses that such a prohibition is the most appropriate special
measure to protect the U.S. financial system.
D. Whether the Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of
Funds Should be Imposed by Order or Regulation
Pursuant to section 2313a, the Secretary may impose specified
special measures, including a prohibition on certain transmittals of
funds, ``by order, regulation or otherwise as permitted by law.'' In
determining the appropriate approach in this instance, FinCEN
considered imposing special measures by order or regulation, taking
into account the nature of the underlying threat, and determined that
proceeding by an order is the most appropriate course of action given
the imminent threats posed by the illicit actors whose transactions and
access to funds CIBanco facilitates, as well as the ongoing
transactions associated with suspected activity related to illicit
opioid trafficking that continue to be processed through CIBanco.
Further, FinCEN has assessed that this order will not be unduly
burdensome or impose new or unique compliance costs on financial
institutions.
A copy of this order will be published in the Federal Register. To
the extent that CIBanco or parties have information relevant to this
order, they may submit it to FinCEN at <a href="http://www.fincen.gov/contact">www.fincen.gov/contact</a>.
V. Order
A. Definitions
1. CIBanco
The order defines CIBanco S.A., Institucion De Banca Multiple, a
Mexico-based commercial bank, to include its branches, subsidiaries,
and offices located in Mexico and operating pursuant to Mexican
financial laws and regulations. Any branches, subsidiaries, and offices
of CIBanco S.A., Institucion De Banca Multiple, operating outside of
Mexico, including any such branches, subsidiaries, and offices located
in the United States, are expressly excluded from the definition of
``CIBanco'' for the purposes of this order.
2. Covered Financial Institution
The order defines a covered financial institution as having the
same meaning as ``financial institution'' in 31 CFR 1010.100(t).
3. Transmittals of Funds
The order defines transmittals of funds as the sending and
receiving of funds, including convertible virtual currency.
4. Meaning of Other Terms
All terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the
meaning set forth in 31 CFR Chapter X, 31 U.S.C. 5312, and 21 U.S.C.
2302.
B. Prohibition on Transmittals of Funds Involving CIBanco
A covered financial institution is prohibited from engaging in any
transmittal of funds from or to CIBanco.
C. Order Period
The terms of this order are effective [21 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION IN
THE FEDERAL REGISTER], with no cessation date.
D. Reservation of Authority
FinCEN reserves authority to impose conditions on certain
transmittals of funds from or to CIBanco and to grant appropriate
exemptions from the requirements of this order.
E. Other Obligations
Nothing in this order shall be construed to modify, impair, or
otherwise affect any requirements or obligations to which a covered
financial institution is subject pursuant to the BSA, including, but
not limited to, the filing of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), or
other applicable laws or regulations, such as the sanctions
administered and enforced by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control.
F. Penalties for Noncompliance
Any covered financial institution, and any of its partners,
directors, officers, or employees may be liable for civil or criminal
penalties under 31 U.S.C. 5321 and 5322 for willfully violating this
order.
[[Page 27777]]
G. Validity of Order
Any judicial determination that any provision of this order is
invalid shall not affect the validity of any other provision of this
order, and each other provision shall thereafter remain in full force
and effect.
Andrea M. Gacki,
Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
[FR Doc. 2025-11993 Filed 6-27-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-02-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on June 30, 2025.
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.