Rule2025-11990
Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving Intercam Banco S.A., Institución de Banca Multiple
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Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
June 30, 2025
Issuing agencies
Treasury DepartmentFinancial Crimes Enforcement Network
Abstract
FinCEN is issuing notice of an order prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam Banco S.A., Instituci[oacute]n de Banca Multiple, a financial institution operating outside of the United States determined to be of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 123 (Monday, June 30, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 123 (Monday, June 30, 2025)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 27777-27783]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-11990]
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
31 CFR Chapter X, Part 1010
Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of
Funds Involving Intercam Banco S.A., Instituci[oacute]n de Banca
Multiple
AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Treasury.
ACTION: Order.
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SUMMARY: FinCEN is issuing notice of an order prohibiting certain
transmittals of funds involving Intercam Banco S.A., Instituci[oacute]n
de Banca Multiple, a financial institution operating outside of the
United States determined to be of primary money laundering concern in
connection with illicit opioid trafficking.
DATES: This action is effective [21 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION IN THE
FEDERAL REGISTER].
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The FinCEN Resource Center at
<a href="http://www.fincen.gov/contact">www.fincen.gov/contact</a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Summary of Order
This order sets forth FinCEN's finding that Intercam Banco S.A.,
Instituci[oacute]n de Banca Multiple (Intercam), a Mexico-based
commercial bank, is a financial institution operating outside of the
United States that is of primary money laundering concern in connection
with illicit opioid trafficking--specifically, through its provision of
financial services that facilitate illicit opioid trafficking by
Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), including the
Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generaci[oacute]n (CJNG)--and imposes a
prohibition on certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam by any
covered financial institution.\1\
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\1\ The application of FinCEN's authorities in this order is
specific to authorities provided by the Fentanyl Sanctions Act and
codified at 21 U.S.C. 2313a. It is not intended to otherwise reflect
the applicability of, or obligations under, any provision of the
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) or its implementing regulations.
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II. Background
A. Statutory Provisions
In 2024, Congress enacted the FEND Off Fentanyl Act,\2\ which among
other things, added 21 U.S.C. 2313a \3\ (section 2313a). Section 2313a
grants the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) the authority to make
a finding that ``reasonable grounds exist for concluding'' that any of
the following is of primary money laundering concern in connection with
illicit opioid trafficking:
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\2\ The FEND Off Fentanyl Act is Division E of Public Law 118-50
(Apr. 24, 2024).
\3\ Section 2313a codifies section 7213A of the Fentanyl
Sanctions Act, as amended by section 3201(a) of the FEND Off
Fentanyl Act. The Fentanyl Sanctions Act is Title LXXII of Public
Law 116-92 (Dec. 20, 2019).
(1) One or more financial institutions operating outside of the
United States;
(2) One or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a
jurisdiction outside of the United States; or
(3) One or more types of accounts within, or involving, a
jurisdiction outside of the United States. \4\
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\4\ 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a).
Upon making such a finding, the Secretary is authorized to require
domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to take
certain ``special measures,'' which are safeguards that may be employed
to defend the United States financial system from money laundering
risks connected to illicit opioid trafficking. \5\ The authority of the
Secretary to administer section 2313a has been delegated to FinCEN.\6\
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\5\ See 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a).
\6\ In accordance with Treasury Order 101-05 and 31 U.S.C.
321(b), the authority vested in the Secretary under section 2313a
has been delegated to the Director of FinCEN.
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Pursuant to section 2313a, the Secretary may impose one or more of
six special measures.\7\ First, the Secretary may impose any of the
five special measures provided for in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b), commonly
known as section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act.\8\ Special measures one
through four, codified at 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)-(4), describe
additional recordkeeping, information collection, and reporting
requirements. Through these special measures, the Secretary may impose
such information collection and reporting requirements on covered
domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies--
collectively, ``covered financial institutions.'' \9\ Special measure
five, codified at 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5), authorizes the Secretary, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to
prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or maintaining in the
United States of correspondent or payable-through accounts by any
domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency for, or on
behalf of, a foreign banking institution, if such correspondent account
or payable-through account involves one or more financial institutions
operating outside of the United States that the Secretary has found to
be of primary money laundering concern.\10\ Special measure six,
codified at 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(2), allows the Secretary to ``prohibit,
or impose conditions upon, certain transmittals of funds (to be defined
by the Secretary) by any domestic financial institution or domestic
financial agency, if such transmittal of funds involves any such
institution, class of transaction, or type of accounts.'' \11\
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\7\ 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a).
\8\ See 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(1). 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(1) explicitly
references ``the special measures provided for in section 9714(a)(1)
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
(Public Law 116-283; 31 U.S.C. 5318A note)'' (section 9714). Section
9714, in turn, references the five special measures set out in 31
U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)-(5).
\9\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)-(4).
\10\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5).
\11\ 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(2).
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Importantly, in connection with finding that a financial
institution is of primary money laundering concern and imposing any
special measure, section 2313a requires a finding that the relevant
financial institution is ``of primary money laundering concern in
connection with illicit opioid trafficking'' (emphasis added). 21
U.S.C. 2302 provides the operative definition of ``opioid trafficking''
for purposes of section 2313a, as any illicit activity:
(1) to produce, manufacture, distribute, sell, or knowingly finance
or transport--(a) synthetic opioids, including controlled substances
that are synthetic opioids and listed chemicals that are synthetic
opioids; or (b) active pharmaceutical ingredients or chemicals that are
used in the production of controlled substances that are synthetic
opioids;
(2) to attempt to carry out an activity described above; or
(3) to assist, abet, conspire, or collude with other persons to
carry out such an activity.\12\
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\12\ 21 U.S.C. 2302(8).
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For purposes of this order, FinCEN interprets the term ``synthetic
opioid'' to include fentanyl and fentanyl analogs,
[[Page 27778]]
as well as precursors to fentanyl and precursors to fentanyl
analogs.\13\
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\13\ See, e.g., Drug Enforcement Administration, Synthetic
Opioids Fact Sheet (Dec. 2024), <a href="https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-01/Synthetic-Opioids-Drug-Fact-Sheet.pdf">https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-01/Synthetic-Opioids-Drug-Fact-Sheet.pdf</a>; World Health
Organization, Opioid Overdose (Aug. 29, 2023), <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/opioid-overdose">https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/opioid-overdose</a>; see also Drug
Enforcement Administration, Docket No. DEA-1086, Special
Surveillance List of Chemicals, Products, Materials and Equipment
Used in the Manufacture of Controlled Substances and Listed
Chemicals (Oct. 24, 2023), <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-10-24/pdf/2023-23478.pdf">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-10-24/pdf/2023-23478.pdf</a>.
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B. Illicit Opioid Trafficking
The sustained influx of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids into
the United States has profound consequences, resulting in drug overdose
becoming the leading cause of death for people aged 18 to 44 in the
United States.\14\ To address the synthetic opioid crisis, it is
necessary to target the money laundering efforts of the Mexico-based
DTOs that are the primary source of fentanyl and other synthetic
opioids trafficked into the United States. These DTOs manufacture
synthetic opioids in clandestine laboratories in Mexico using precursor
chemicals sourced largely from the People's Republic of China (China),
traffic these synthetic opioids into and throughout the United States,
and launder the illicit profits back to Mexico.\15\
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\14\ See Centers for Disease Control, CDC Reports Nearly 24%
Decline in U.S. Drug Overdose Deaths (Feb. 25, 2025), <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2025/2025-cdc-reports-decline-in-us-drug-overdose-deaths.html">https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2025/2025-cdc-reports-decline-in-us-drug-overdose-deaths.html</a>; E.O. 14159, Imposing Duties To Address the
Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People's Republic of China, 90
FR 9121 (Feb. 7, 2025), <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/07/2025-02408/imposing-duties-to-address-the-synthetic-opioid-supply-chain-in-the-peoples-republic-of-china">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/07/2025-02408/imposing-duties-to-address-the-synthetic-opioid-supply-chain-in-the-peoples-republic-of-china</a>.
\15\ See Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-010-24,
2024 National Drug Threat Assessment (May 2024), pp. 46-50, <a href="https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf">https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf</a>; FinCEN, FIN-2024-A002, Supplemental Advisory on the
Procurement of Precursor Chemicals and Manufacturing Equipment Used
for the Synthesis of Illicit Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids
(June 20, 2024), <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2024-06-20/FinCEN-Supplemental-Advisory-on-Fentanyl-508C.pdf">https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2024-06-20/FinCEN-Supplemental-Advisory-on-Fentanyl-508C.pdf</a>; Congressional Research Service, Illicit Fentanyl and
Mexico's Role (Dec. 19, 2024), pp. 1-2, <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10400">https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10400</a>.
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These DTOs could not profit on trafficking fentanyl and other
synthetic opioids if not for their ability to launder and remit the
monetary proceeds back to Mexico. DTOs and third-party money launderers
use a diverse array of methods to launder money, including using
financial institutions, remittance payments, bulk cash smuggling,
trade-based money laundering, mirror trades, and cryptocurrencies.\16\
It is therefore critical to address the role that financial
institutions operating outside the United States play in facilitating
the money laundering that enables and facilitates the DTOs and their
illicit opioid trafficking and related money laundering.
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\16\ See Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-010-24,
2024 National Drug Threat Assessment (May 2024), pp. 46-50, <a href="https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf">https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf</a>.
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III. Finding That Intercam is a Financial Institution Operating Outside
the United States That is of Primary Money Laundering Concern in
Connection With Illicit Opioid Trafficking
Based on public and non-public information available to FinCEN,
FinCEN finds that reasonable grounds exist to conclude that Intercam, a
financial institution operating outside of the United States, is of
primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid
trafficking through its provision of financial services that facilitate
illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs, including CJNG. In
making this finding, FinCEN has considered the relevant evidence in
light of factors identified in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B), taking into
account the specific circumstances of money laundering activities in
connection with illicit opioid trafficking and the protection of U.S.
national security and the U.S. financial system. While FinCEN is under
no obligation pursuant to section 2313a to consider any particular
factor or set of factors when making a finding that a financial
institution operating outside of the United States is of primary money
laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking, it
nonetheless finds these factors instructive in guiding the analysis set
forth below.\17\
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\17\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B) provides, as relevant here, that
in making a finding that reasonable grounds exist for concluding
that a financial institution outside the United States is of primary
money laundering concern and to apply one or more of special
measures one through four to a financial institution, the Secretary
shall consider such information as the Secretary determines to be
relevant, including the following potentially relevant factors:
(1) the extent to which such financial institutions,
transactions, or types of accounts are used to facilitate or promote
money laundering in or through the jurisdiction, including any money
laundering activity by organized criminal groups, international
terrorists, or entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction or missiles;
(2) the extent to which such institutions, transactions, or
types of accounts are used for legitimate business purposes in the
jurisdiction; and
(3) the extent to which such action is sufficient to ensure,
with respect to transactions involving the jurisdiction and
institutions operating in the jurisdiction, that the purposes of
this subchapter continue to be fulfilled, and to guard against
international money laundering and other financial crimes.
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A. Intercam is a Financial Institution Operating Outside the United
States
Intercam is a Mexico-based commercial bank. By its own account,
Intercam offers multiple financial services, including international
banking, foreign exchange, insurance, investment services, and import
and export services.\18\ According to commercially available
information, Intercam is headquartered in Mexico City, Mexico, has over
70 branches across Mexico, and provides U.S. dollar (USD) correspondent
banking services through at least two U.S. financial institutions.\19\
Considering the services it provides, Intercam is a financial
institution within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2), and based on
the foregoing, FinCEN has determined that Intercam is a financial
institution operating outside of the United States, as described in
section 2313a.
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\18\ See Intercam's homepage, <a href="https://www.intercam.com.mx/one-stop-banking/?lang=en">https://www.intercam.com.mx/one-stop-banking/?lang=en</a> (last accessed Feb. 27, 2025).
\19\ Detailed descriptions of Intercam's financial services can
be found under the About Intercam dropdown menu at <a href="https://www.intercam.com.mx/about-intercam/nuestra-vision/?lang=en">https://www.intercam.com.mx/about-intercam/nuestra-vision/?lang=en</a> (last
accessed May 08, 2025). See also Bankers Almanac, Intercam Bank
profile (last accessed Jan. 23, 2024).
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Intercam has a wholly owned U.S.-based subsidiary bank--Intercam
Banco Internacional, Inc., which is headquartered in Guaynabo, Puerto
Rico, and is a registered international financial entity in Puerto
Rico.\20\ Intercam also owns other U.S.-based financial services
companies--Intercam Futures, Inc. (d/b/a Intercam FX) and Intercam
Wealth Management Group, including its affiliates Intercam Advisors,
Inc., and Intercam Securities, Inc.\21\ This order expressly excludes
all
[[Page 27779]]
of Intercam's U.S.-based subsidiaries from the definition of
``Intercam,'' and, accordingly, Intercam's U.S.-based subsidiaries are
outside the scope of this order.
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\20\ Intercam Banco Internacional, Who is Intercam Banco
International, Inc., <a href="https://intercam.com.pr/english/Who-We-Are.html">https://intercam.com.pr/english/Who-We-Are.html</a>
(last accessed May 08, 2025).
\21\ See Intercam International Wealth Management, about us,
<a href="https://www.intercam.us/english/about-intercam-wealth-management/intercam-grupo-financiero.html">https://www.intercam.us/english/about-intercam-wealth-management/intercam-grupo-financiero.html</a> (last accessed May 20, 2025) (stating
that Intercam Grupo Financiero is an integrated group of financial
services companies headquartered in Mexico City, including Intercam
Banco, Intercam Casa de Bolsa, and Intercam Banco Internacional,
Inc. in Puerto Rico); Intercam International Wealth Management,
affiliated entities, <a href="https://www.intercam.us/english/about-intercam-wealth-management/affiliated-entities.html">https://www.intercam.us/english/about-intercam-wealth-management/affiliated-entities.html</a> (last accessed May 20,
2025) (stating that Intercam International Wealth Management
conducts business through two affiliated entities, Intercam
Advisors, Inc. and Intercam Securities, Inc.); IntercamFX,
affiliated entities, <a href="https://www.intercamfx.us/affiliated-entities.html">https://www.intercamfx.us/affiliated-entities.html</a> (last accessed May 20, 2025) (stating that ``Intercam
FX is an affiliated entity under common control of Intercam Grupo
Financiero''); FinCEN, Money Services Business Registration No.
31000289206987 (filed by Intercam Futures, Inc., d/b/a Intercam FX
in Miami, Florida, received on Dec. 24, 2024).
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B. Intercam is a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering
Concern in Connection With Illicit Opioid Trafficking
FinCEN has considered the extent to which accounts at Intercam are
used to ``facilitate or promote money laundering,'' including in
connection with organized criminal groups associated with illicit
opioid trafficking.\22\ Based on information available to FinCEN,
FinCEN has determined that Intercam has a history of suspected ties to
international DTOs and facilitation of transactions on their behalf.
Intercam's exposure to, and facilitation of, transactions associated
with suspected illicit opioid trafficking-related activities is
consistent with its long-standing pattern of associations with, and
conduct of transactions for, multiple actors operating on behalf of or
in tandem with, DTOs, including CJNG, which has been designated by OFAC
and, as of February 20, 2025, was also designated as a foreign
terrorist organization (FTO) pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), as amended.\23\
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\22\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B)(i).
\23\ Department of State, Designation of International Cartels
Fact Sheet, <a href="https://www.state.gov/designation-of-international-cartels/">https://www.state.gov/designation-of-international-cartels/</a> (last accessed Feb. 27, 2025); see also Department of
State, Foreign Terrorist Organization Designations of Tren de
Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha, Cartel de Sinaloa, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva
Generaci[oacute]n, Carteles Unidos, Cartel del Noreste, Cartel del
Golfo, and La Nueva Generacion, Carteles Unidos, Cartel del Noreste,
Cartel del Golfo, and La Nueva Familia Michoacana, 90 FR 10030-31
(Feb. 20, 2025), <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-20/pdf/2025-02873.pdf">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-20/pdf/2025-02873.pdf</a>; Department of State, Specially Designated Global
Terrorist Designations of Tren de Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha, Cartel
de Sinaloa, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generaci[oacute]n, Carteles
Unidos, Cartel del Noreste, Cartel del Golfo, and La Nueva Familia
Michoacana, 90 FR 10030 (Feb. 20, 2025), <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-20/pdf/2025-02873.pdf">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-20/pdf/2025-02873.pdf</a>; 8 U.S.C. 1189
(codifying section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
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1. Intercam Processed Funds Transfers on Behalf of Exporters and
Importers of Synthetic Opioid-Related Precursor Chemicals
Based on non-public information available to FinCEN, FinCEN has
determined that Intercam has a history of processing USD-denominated
funds transfers that finance the importation of precursor chemicals
used for the production of illicit synthetic opioids on behalf of DTOs.
In the United States, precursor chemicals are substances regulated
by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in order to prevent the
illicit manufacture of controlled substances. As of December 2024, most
U.S.-destined illicit fentanyl was produced in clandestine labs in
Mexico, using precursor chemicals imported from China.\24\ Although the
Mexican and Chinese governments have established controls on multiple
precursor chemicals, China-based suppliers remain the main source for
precursor chemicals used by DTOs in Mexico to produce illicit
opioids.\25\
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\24\ Congressional Research Service, Illicit Fentanyl and
Mexico's Role (Dec. 19, 2024), p. 1, <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10400/13">https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10400/13</a>.
\25\ Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-010-24,
National Drug Threat Assessment 2024 (May 2024), p. 7, <a href="https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/508_5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf">https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/508_5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf</a>; FinCEN, FIN-2024-A002, Supplemental Advisory on the
Procurement of Precursor Chemicals and Manufacturing Equipment Used
for the Synthesis of Illicit Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids
(Jun. 20, 2024), pp. 2-6, <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2024-06-20/FinCEN-Supplemental-Advisory-on-Fentanyl-508C.pdf">https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2024-06-20/FinCEN-Supplemental-Advisory-on-Fentanyl-508C.pdf</a>.
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DTOs are known to employ transnational funds transfer services via
various financial institutions and agencies, including, but not limited
to, banks, money services businesses, and online payment processors to
facilitate illicit opioid-related financial flows.\26\ A common method
employed by DTOs to obfuscate illicit opioids trafficking-related
payments includes using shell and front companies to disguise the
origin and destination of illicit funds.\27\
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\26\ See supra note 24, pp. 1-2.
\27\ Shell companies are businesses that exist only as an entity
through which money may be transferred to hide beneficial ownership.
Front companies operate partially as normal businesses; however,
DTOs commingle drug proceeds with legitimate revenue from the front
companies in an effort to disguise them. Drug Enforcement
Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-008-21, 2020 National Drug Threat
Assessment (Mar. 2021), p. 88, <a href="https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/DIR-008-21%202020%20National%20Drug%20Threat%20Assessment_WEB.pdf">https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/DIR-008-21%202020%20National%20Drug%20Threat%20Assessment_WEB.pdf</a>.
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Based on non-public information, FinCEN assesses that Intercam has
been instrumental in facilitating payments on behalf of Mexico-based
companies involved in the procurement of precursor chemicals for
illicit purposes. Examples of Intercam's likely facilitation of
payments in furtherance of illicit opioid trafficking include, but are
not limited to, the transactions listed below:
<bullet> In late 2019, Germany- and China-based precursor chemical
brokers likely facilitated a shipment of hydroxylamine hydrochloride
through a Mexico-based company for a CJNG-affiliated precursor chemical
broker based on prior similar arrangements. From 2021 through 2024,
this Mexico-based company sent over 1,000 funds transfers totaling over
USD 8 million to shipping companies in countries, including Singapore
and Hong Kong, through Intercam.
<bullet> Another Mexico-based company facilitated methamphetamine
and fentanyl production in Mexico by importing precursor chemicals
through U.S. ports. Since 2022, over 300 tons of precursor chemicals
have been seized from shipping containers enroute to this company.
Notably, from 2023 through 2024, this second Mexico-based company
received over 25 funds transfers totaling over USD 700,000 from other
Mexico-based companies involved in the trade of chemicals, through
Intercam.
Furthermore, based on non-public information, FinCEN also assesses
that Intercam has been instrumental in processing funds transfers to
China-based companies known to have shipped precursor chemicals to
Mexico for illicit purposes. Since at least 2019, over 20 China-based
companies, including the three highlighted below, were known to have
shipped precursor chemicals to Mexico for illicit purposes. For
instance:
<bullet> Between 2016 and 2024, one China-based company known or
suspected of having shipped precursor chemicals to Mexico was tied to
over 50 international funds transfers totaling over USD 850,000 through
Intercam.
<bullet> Between 2022 and 2024, a second China-based company was
tied to over 12 international funds transfers totaling over USD 925,000
through Intercam.
<bullet> Between 2018 and 2024, a third China-based company was
tied to over 120 international funds transfers totaling over USD 4
million through Intercam.
Separately, a China-based company was associated with Manu Gupta,
who was arrested in 2019 for manufacturing and trafficking fentanyl
from India to Mexico, as well as moving precursor chemicals from China
to Mexico. From 2021 through 2024, this China-based company received
over 40 funds transfers totaling over USD 1.5 million from at least
three Mexico-based companies involved in the trade of chemicals through
Intercam.
Given the conduct of these various entities and based on the volume
and dollar amounts of funds transfers that Intercam processed over a
number of years with these entities, FinCEN assesses that such
transactions likely facilitated illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-
based DTOs.
[[Page 27780]]
2. Intercam Facilitated Transactions Linked to Illicit Opioid-Related
Money Laundering
Based upon non-public information, FinCEN assesses that Intercam
facilitated money laundering by suspected money mules on behalf of
DTOs. For example, between 2021 and 2024, a suspected money mule opened
accounts at multiple banks in Southern California and made 627 ATM
deposits, totaling approximately USD 2.6 million. During the same
period, the suspected money mule sent 125 wires, totaling approximately
USD 1.9 million, from their United States-based accounts to an Intercam
account in Mexico. Between 2022 and 2024, a different suspected money
mule opened accounts at multiple banks in Southern California and made
431 ATM deposits, totaling approximately USD 1.4 million. During the
same period, the suspected money mule sent 81 wires, totaling
approximately USD 1.2 million, to Intercam accounts in Mexico. FinCEN
assesses that such activity is consistent with current DTO money
laundering techniques and supports FinCEN's assessment that Intercam
was integral in money mules' operations to repatriate illicit funds to
Mexico on behalf of DTOs.
3. Intercam Provided Financial Services That Benefited CJNG
In 2024, the DEA stated that CJNG, along with the Sinaloa Cartel,
was ``at the heart'' of the synthetic opioid crisis, using its global
supply chain network to gain access to the pill presses and precursor
chemicals needed to manufacture synthetic opioids in Mexico for
distribution in the United States.\28\ The DEA described the CJNG
Cartel as ``one of the largest producers and traffickers of illicit
fentanyl, in both powder and pill form, to the United States.'' \29\
DEA further stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ See supra note 16, p. 2.
\29\ See supra note 16, p. 13.
Although the Jalisco Cartel [CJNG] cannot match the Sinaloa
Cartel's fentanyl production capacity, they have flooded American
streets with fentanyl, often mixed with other drugs like heroin,
cocaine, and xylazine. The cartel has its own connections to
precursor chemical suppliers in China for the production of fentanyl
and methamphetamine and exerts control over a number of seaports for
importing the chemicals. They also control an extensive network of
smuggling routes into the United States, and lucrative distribution
hubs in major U.S. cities like Atlanta, Georgia.\30\
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\30\ See supra note 16, p. 16.
Indeed, the DEA reports that CJNG traffics a significant proportion
of the fentanyl and other deadly drugs that enter the United States and
uses extreme violence against rivals and Mexican authorities to expand
and maintain territory in strategic drug trafficking corridors.\31\ As
such, according to the DEA's 2024 National Drug Threat Assessment, CJNG
is a ``key driver of fatal drug poisonings in the United States'' and
reaps billions of dollars in profit from the manufacture of
methamphetamine and illicit fentanyl.\32\
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\31\ OFAC, Press Release, Treasury Uses New Sanctions Authority
to Combat Global Illicit Drug Trade (Dec. 15, 2021), <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535</a>.
\32\ See supra, note 16, p. 12.
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In 2015, OFAC designated CJNG pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act and later designated the cartel under E.O.
14059 in 2021.\33\ In 2021, OFAC described the cartel as ``one of the
most powerful cartels in Mexico and one of the five most dangerous
transnational criminal organizations in the world, according to the
Department of Justice.'' Furthermore, as previously noted, as of
February 20, 2025, CJNG was also designated as an FTO pursuant to
section 219 of the INA, as amended.\34\
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\33\ OFAC, Press Release, Treasury Uses New Sanctions Authority
to Combat Global Illicit Drug Trade (Dec. 15, 2021), <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535</a>; OFAC, Press Release,
Treasury Sanctions Two Major Mexican Drug Organizations and Two of
Their Leaders (Apr. 8, 2015), <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl10020">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl10020</a>.
\34\ See supra note 23.
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CJNG uses its vast financial resources, violence, and bribery of
corrupt officials to maintain its dominance in Mexico's illicit drug
trade. FinCEN assesses that Intercam helped finance such illicit
activity by facilitating funds transfers for CJNG. For example,
lntercam mid-level leadership has been involved in corrupt practices.
In the latter part of 2022, Intercam executives met directly with
suspected CJNG members to discuss money laundering schemes, including
transferring funds from China. FinCEN assesses that such direct
engagement with CJNG by Intercam leadership creates a significant risk
of Intercam's services being used for future money laundering or other
illicit financial activity.
4. Longstanding Compliance Concerns With Intercam and Other Indicia of
Illicit Financial Activity
Notwithstanding the specific information presented by this order,
both FinCEN and certain financial institutions have previously flagged
certain perceived compliance concerns and other indicia of Intercam's
potential facilitation of illicit financial activity. In 2015, FinCEN
made Mexico's bank regulator, CNBV, aware of the bank's facilitation of
a variety of activities that constituted money laundering, including
transactions processed by Intercam involving suspicious purchases of
cashier's checks along the United States-Mexican border, possible
funnel account activity, and possible trade-based money laundering.
CNBV imposed fines on Intercam for inadequate anti-money laundering
controls, including failures to report suspicious transactions, for 14
offenses occurring from 2013 to 2017.\35\
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\35\ Government of Mexico, CNBV, Sanciones Consolidadas, <a href="https://sanciones.cnbv.gob.mx">https://sanciones.cnbv.gob.mx</a> (last accessed May 20, 2025).
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Certain financial institutions have identified similar activity and
compliance deficiencies. According to information available to FinCEN,
Intercam previously maintained accounts at several U.S.-based financial
institutions that exited their relationships with Intercam for
compliance concerns. These concerns included Intercam facilitating wire
transfers lacking beneficiary information, processing checks funded by
cash deposits, and using a trading account primarily for conducting
same-name wire transfers.
This history of deficient compliance underscores the ongoing threat
that Intercam poses as a facilitator of illicit financial activity.
Despite being previously cited by regulators, as set out in this order,
Intercam continues to facilitate illicit transactions related to
illicit opioid trafficking. As such, these historical examples support
FinCEN's finding that Intercam is a financial institution of primary
money laundering concern.
C. Extent To Which Intercam Is Used for Legitimate Business Activity
In reaching its finding, FinCEN has considered the extent to which
Intercam is used for legitimate business purposes.\36\ Intercam is the
25th largest financial institution in Mexico, worth Mexican Pesos (MXN)
81.692 billion (USD 4.04 billion) in total assets as of December 2024,
and maintains at least two U.S. correspondents.\37\ According to CNBV,
as of February 2025, Intercam is
[[Page 27781]]
one of 51 registered banking institutions in Mexico.\38\ As of December
2024, Intercam constituted 0.5 percent of commercial bank assets in
Mexico. By comparison, the assets of the two largest Mexico-based banks
in December 2024 represented 22.25 percent with MXN 3.384 trillion (USD
167.22 billion) and 13.19 percent with MXN 2.006 trillion (USD 99.15
billion), respectively, of commercial assets in Mexico.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B)(ii).
\37\ Ranking determined by comparing Intercam's total assets
reported by CNBV in December 2024 with the total assets reported for
banks in Mexico by CNBV in December 2024. See Government of Mexico,
CNBV, Banca M[uacute]ltiple (Dec. 2024), <a href="https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/PUBLICACIONES/Boletines/Paginas/CB.aspx">https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/PUBLICACIONES/Boletines/Paginas/CB.aspx</a>
(last accessed May 8, 2025). Correspondent relationships identified
through commercially available bank data for Intercam. see BankCheck
Profile for Intercam Banco, <a href="https://bankcheck.app">https://bankcheck.app</a> (last accessed
Apr. 10, 2025).
\38\ Government of Mexico, CNBV, Registry of Supervised Entities
on Multiple Banking Institutions as of February 21, 2025, <a href="https://www.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/PADR%C3%93N-DE-ENTIDADES-SUPERVISADAS.aspx">https://www.cnbv.gob.mx/Paginas/PADR%C3%93N-DE-ENTIDADES-SUPERVISADAS.aspx</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FinCEN has also assessed Intercam's statements and other public
information about Intercam's anti-money laundering and countering the
financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) policies. According to Intercam's
money-laundering prevention summary, protecting the bank from money
laundering and illicit finance activity is a priority and staff receive
constant training and evaluation for compliance with the bank's
internal code of ethics and conduct.\39\ In addition to policies and
procedures and hosting an annual Money-Laundering Prevention Convention
attended by more than 100 compliance officers across industries,
Intercam purports to prioritize Know Your Customer efforts via regular
in-person visits to clients for verification purposes and the
development of monitoring controls.\40\ FinCEN has not independently
examined Intercam's AML policies or programs or otherwise corroborated
the existence or efficacy of such programs. However, in light of the
evidence presented elsewhere in this order, FinCEN concludes that even
if such programs exist, they have not proven effective at detecting or
preventing the illicit financial activity described herein. FinCEN
therefore concludes that given the totality of the circumstances,
Intercam's AML program does not alter FinCEN's overall determination
that Intercam is of primary money laundering concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ See Intercam's website, Money Laundering Prevention,
https://www.intercam.com.mx/about-intercam/money-laundering-
prevention/
?lang=en#:~:text=Since%201997%2C%20Intercam%20has%20led%20the%20finan
cial%20industry,the%20local%20industry%20to%20comply%20with%20FATF%20
guidelines (last accessed Apr. 22, 2025).
\40\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, FinCEN assesses that Intercam's legitimate business
activities do not outweigh the risk posed by its provision of services
to facilitate illicit opioid trafficking by DTOs that seek to
circumvent AML/CFT obligations and obfuscate the source of funds or
their intended use. In particular, FinCEN analyzed references to
regulated Mexican banks and brokerage houses in 2022-2024, from non-
public information made available to FinCEN, and produced an asset-
weighted ranking based on asset data published by Mexico's National
Banking and Securities Commission. Intercam ranked first in the asset-
weighted analysis of potentially illicit activity, and FinCEN assesses
that a higher relative concentration of such activity amongst smaller
market share financial institutions such as Intercam in Mexico is
likely indicative of weak AML/CFT controls within these institutions.
Accordingly, given the extensive flows of illegitimate funds through
Intercam, FinCEN assesses that the need to protect U.S. financial
institutions from the money laundering risks presented by Intercam
outweighs any potential legitimate utility its services may provide.
D. The Extent to Which This Action Would Guard Against International
Money Laundering and Other Financial Crimes Associated With Illicit
Opioid Trafficking
A finding that Intercam is of primary money laundering concern in
connection with illicit opioid trafficking establishes--and
emphasizes--the significant illicit finance risks posed by Intercam's
provision of financial services that facilitate illicit opioid
trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs. This finding will place U.S. and
foreign financial institutions and regulators on notice to guard
against those risks.\41\ Moreover, such a finding--in combination with
a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam by
covered financial institutions--will safeguard the U.S. financial
system by severing Intercam's access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Imposition of a Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of
Funds Involving Intercam
Having found that Intercam is a financial institution operating
outside of the United States that is of primary money laundering
concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking, FinCEN has
determined that the imposition of a special measure prohibiting certain
transmittals of funds involving Intercam is warranted.\42\ In making
this determination and assessing which special measures may be
appropriate, FinCEN has considered the relevant evidence in light of
factors identified in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B). While FinCEN is under
no obligation pursuant to section 2313a to consider any particular
factor or set of factors in selecting one or more special measures, it
nonetheless finds these factors instructive in guiding the analysis set
forth below.\43\
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\42\ In connection with this action, and consistent with 31
U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(A), FinCEN consulted with staff at the following
Departments and agencies with regard to the proposed order and
prohibition: the Department of Justice; the Department of State; the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Securities and Exchange
Commission; the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency; and the National Credit Union
Administration. None of the Departments or agencies objected to the
issuance of this order based on the information provided to staff at
the time of this consultation.
\43\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B) provides, as relevant here, that
in selecting which special measure(s) to take, the Secretary shall
consider:
(1) whether similar action has been or is being taken by other
nations or multilateral groups;
(2) whether the imposition of any particular special measure
would create a significant competitive disadvantage, including any
undue cost or burden associated with compliance, for financial
institutions organized or licensed in the United States;
(3) the extent to which the action or the timing of the action
would have a significant adverse systemic impact on the
international payment, clearance, and settlement system, or on
legitimate business activities involving the particular
jurisdiction, institution, class of transactions, or type of
account; and
(4) the effect of the action on United States national security
and foreign policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Whether the Prohibition on Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving
Intercam Will Address the Money Laundering Concern in a Manner
Consistent With U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy Interests
FinCEN has considered the effect this action will have on U.S.
national security and foreign policy, as well as the extent to which
multilateral groups or other nations have taken similar actions.\44\
Given Intercam's association with DTOs and other actors engaged in
illicit opioid trafficking, FinCEN assesses that imposing a prohibition
on certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam is necessary to
safeguard U.S. national security and the U.S. financial system, as well
as serve key U.S. national security objectives.\45\ In
[[Page 27782]]
particular, prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving
Intercam will further ongoing U.S. efforts to curtail illicit opioid
trafficking--including the manufacture of synthetic opioids--and
related financial transactions that facilitate the laundering of the
proceeds of their distribution. Targeting the illicit proceeds of drug
traffickers and DTOs, especially those with a nexus to illicit
opioids--like CJNG--is a high priority for the United States. For that
reason, recent actions by OFAC and the Department of State have focused
on DTOs affiliated with opioid-related illicit finance threats,
including the February 20, 2025, designation of certain DTOs, including
CJNG.\46\ Publicly countering a financing mechanism used by these
illicit entities by prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving
Intercam will serve the national security and protect the financial
system of the United States by further deterring and curtailing illicit
opioid trafficking, along with the activities of such DTOs and FTOs.
Similarly, such a prohibition would sever a pathway that may facilitate
circumvention of U.S. economic sanctions, increasing the efficacy of
those sanctions and complementing previous actions taken by the U.S.
government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B)(i), (iv).
\45\ See generally National Security Memorandum/NSM-24, National
Security Memorandum on Prioritizing the Strategic Disruption of the
Supply Chain for Illicit Fentanyl and Synthetic Opioids Through a
Coordinated, Whole-of-Government, Information-Driven Effort (July
31, 2024), <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/DCPD-202400663">https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/DCPD-202400663</a>;
Treasury, 2024 National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other
Illicit Financing (May 2024), <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2024-Illicit-Finance-Strategy.pdf">https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2024-Illicit-Finance-Strategy.pdf</a>; supra note 16.
\46\ See supra note 23.
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Moreover, this action reinforces the expectations of AML/CFT
compliance in the financial system, highlighting the importance of
identifying and reporting suspicious activity by financial institutions
around the world. With respect to the illicit finance risks posed by
Intercam, that is of particular importance, as no multilateral groups
and no other nations have yet acted to address those risks.
B. Whether the Prohibition on Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving
Intercam Would Create a Significant Competitive Disadvantage, Including
Through Imposing Undue Burdens on Legitimate Activity of Intercam or
Third Parties
FinCEN has considered whether the imposition of special measure six
would create a significant competitive disadvantage, including any
undue cost or burden associated with compliance, for financial
institutions organized or licensed in the United States, as well as the
extent to which the action could have a significant adverse systemic
impact on legitimate business activities involving Intercam.\47\ FinCEN
assesses that prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving
Intercam would impose a relatively limited burden on legitimate
activities currently transacted through Intercam or the legitimate
activities of third parties impacted by this order, as similar services
are offered by other financial institutions in Mexico and third parties
will have sufficient capability to ensure compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B)(ii), (iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, Intercam is the 25th largest financial institution
in Mexico, with MXN 81.692 billion (USD 4.04 billion) in assets as of
December 2024, and holds correspondent banking relationships with at
least two U.S. financial institutions.\48\ As of December 2024,
Intercam represented 0.5 percent of commercial bank assets in Mexico.
By comparison, the assets of the two largest Mexico-based banks in
December 2024 represented 22.25 percent with MXN 3.384 trillion (USD
167.22 billion) and 13.19 percent with MXN 2.006 trillion (USD 99.15
billion), respectively, of commercial assets in Mexico. FinCEN assesses
that given Intercam's size compared to the largest financial
institutions in Mexico and the array of correspondent relationships
between U.S. and Mexican financial institutions, the macroeconomic
impact of prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam
would be negligible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Ranking was determined by comparing Intercam's total assets
reported by CNBV in December 2024 with the total assets reported for
banks in Mexico by CNBV in December 2024. See Government of Mexico,
CNBV, Banca M[uacute]ltiple (Dec. 2024), <a href="https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/PUBLICACIONES/Boletines/Paginas/CB.aspx">https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/PUBLICACIONES/Boletines/Paginas/CB.aspx</a>
(last accessed May 8, 2025). Correspondent relationships were
identified through commercially available bank data for Intercam.
See BankCheck Profile for Intercam Banco, <a href="https://bankcheck.app">https://bankcheck.app</a>
(last accessed Apr. 10, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, the legitimate services that Intercam offers would be
readily available through other regulated institutions, and those
financial institutions would do so with the appropriate transparency
necessary to support international efforts to protect the integrity of
the international financial system.
Although this order represents one of the first issuances of an
order under section 2313a, FinCEN has afforded financial institutions
an additional 21 days to prepare for the prohibition and, regardless,
assesses that this action would not impose any undue cost or burden for
financial institutions, as covered financial institutions would be
positioned to readily incorporate the requirements of this order into
their compliance programs. FinCEN does anticipate that, although any
Intercam affiliates outside of Mexico would not be subject to the
restrictions set out in this order, there may yet be challenges
associated with transactions involving such entities. However, the
burden associated with any such challenges remains outweighed by the
benefits to national security from this action, and, again, FinCEN
assesses that covered financial institutions' existing compliance
programs and process will be sufficient in both navigating those
challenges and mitigating any associated burden and unintended
consequences on licit businesses and customers.
C. Whether Any Other Reasonable Alternatives or Special Measures Would
Adequately Address the Money Laundering Concern
In imposing a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds, FinCEN
considered other available special measures \49\ and, after due
consideration, has determined that a special measure prohibiting
certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam is the appropriate
means to adequately address the illicit finance risks that Intercam
poses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ As noted in section II.A, pursuant to section 2313a, these
measures include: (1) the special measures described in 31 U.S.C.
5318A(b), including the imposition of additional recordkeeping,
information collection, and reporting requirements on covered U.S.
financial institutions and/or the imposition of conditions upon the
opening or maintaining of correspondent or payable-through accounts
for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution; and (2) the
prohibition, or imposition of conditions on, the transmittal of
funds.
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None of the special measures set out in 31 U.S.C. 5318A--special
measures one through five--would effectively address the illicit
finance threat posed by Intercam. Any additional recordkeeping,
information collection, or reporting requirements, as described in 31
U.S.C 5318A(b)(1)-(4), would be insufficient to guard against the risks
posed by covered financial institutions processing transmittals of
funds involving Intercam. Those special measures would allow such
transfers to continue to the benefit of illicit actors connected to
illicit opioid trafficking. Further, prohibiting or placing conditions
upon the opening or maintaining in the United States of correspondent
accounts or payable-through accounts for or on behalf of Intercam, as
described in 31 U.S.C 5318A(b)(5), would be similarly inadequate.
Neither prohibiting nor imposing conditions on such accounts would
safeguard the U.S. financial system to the same degree as prohibiting
transmittals of funds, as such a special measure would not address the
movement of funds outside of a strict correspondent or payable-through
[[Page 27783]]
relationship, for example, through the movement of funds outside the
traditional banking relationship, which may permit Intercam to access
USD through indirect correspondent relationships via other foreign
financial institutions.
Given Intercam's longstanding facilitation of illicit opioid
trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs, and because transmittals of funds
involving Intercam do not necessarily have to go through a
correspondent account, FinCEN assesses that it is appropriate to more
broadly prohibit any transmittals of funds. Because such a prohibition
would cut off any transmittal of funds, and not just those conducted
through a correspondent or payable-through account, the prohibition on
any transmittal of funds involving Intercam would more effectively
prevent Intercam from accessing the U.S. financial system. FinCEN
therefore assesses that such a prohibition is the most appropriate
special measure to protect the U.S. financial system.
D. Whether the Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of
Funds Should Be Imposed by Order or Regulation
Pursuant to section 2313a, the Secretary may impose specified
special measures, including a prohibition on certain transmittals of
funds, ``by order, regulation or otherwise as permitted by law.'' In
determining the appropriate approach in this instance, FinCEN
considered imposing special measures by order or regulation, taking
into account the nature of the underlying threat, and determined that
proceeding by an order is the most appropriate course of action given
the imminent threats posed by the illicit actors whose transactions and
access to funds Intercam facilitates, as well as the ongoing
transactions associated with suspected activity related to illicit
opioid trafficking that continue to be processed through Intercam.
Further, FinCEN has assessed that this order will not be unduly
burdensome or impose new or unique compliance costs on financial
institutions.
A copy of this order will be published in the Federal Register. To
the extent that Intercam or parties have information relevant to this
order, they may submit it to FinCEN at <a href="http://www.fincen.gov/contact">http://www.fincen.gov/contact</a>.
V. Order
A. Definitions
1. Intercam Banco S.A., Instituci[oacute]n De Banca Multiple
The order defines Intercam Banco S.A., Instituci[oacute]n de Banca
Multiple (Intercam), a commercial bank licensed by the government of
the Republic of Mexico, to mean all of its subsidiaries, branches, and
offices located in Mexico and operating pursuant to Mexican financial
laws and regulations. Any branches, subsidiaries, and offices of
Intercam Banco S.A., Instituci[oacute]n de Banca Multiple, operating
outside of Mexico, including any such branches, subsidiaries, and
offices located in the United States, are expressly excluded from the
definition of ``Intercam'' for the purposes of this order.
2. Covered Financial Institution
The order defines a covered financial institution as having the
same meaning as ``financial institution'' in 31 CFR 1010.100(t).
3. Transmittals of Funds
The order defines transmittals of funds as the sending and
receiving of funds, including convertible virtual currency.
4. Meaning of Other Terms
All terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the
meaning set forth in 31 CFR Chapter X, 31 U.S.C. 5312, and 21 U.S.C.
2302.
B. Prohibition on Transmittals of Funds Involving Intercam
A covered financial institution is prohibited from engaging in any
transmittal of funds from or to Intercam.
C. Order Period
The terms of this order are effective [21 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION IN
THE FEDERAL REGISTER], with no cessation date.
D. Reservation of Authority
FinCEN reserves authority to impose conditions on certain
transmittals of funds from or to Intercam and to grant appropriate
exemptions from the requirements of this order.
E. Other Obligations
Nothing in this order shall be construed to modify, impair, or
otherwise affect any requirements or obligations to which a covered
financial institution is subject pursuant to the BSA, including, but
not limited to, the filing of Suspicious Activity Reports, or other
applicable laws or regulations, such as the sanctions administered and
enforced by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control.
F. Penalties for Noncompliance
Any covered financial institution, and any of its partners,
directors, officers, or employees may be liable for civil or criminal
penalties under 31 U.S.C. 5321 and 5322 for willfully violating any of
the terms of this order.
G. Validity of Order
Any judicial determination that any provision of this order is
invalid shall not affect the validity of any other provision of this
order, and each other provision shall thereafter remain in full force
and effect.
Andrea M. Gacki,
Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
[FR Doc. 2025-11990 Filed 6-27-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-02-P
</pre></body>
</html>Indexed from Federal Register on June 30, 2025.
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.