Notice2025-07153
Safety Advisory 2025-01; Proper Configuration of Grand Master 4000 and 4000A Switch Machines To Prevent Unintended Switch Movement
Primary source
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Published
April 25, 2025
Issuing agencies
Transportation DepartmentFederal Railroad Administration
Abstract
FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2025-01 to heighten awareness within the rail industry of the potential for unintended movement of Grand Master 4000 and 4000A switch machines. Improper configuration of these machines could allow power to be present at the switch machine controller when locking is in effect, creating the potential for unintended switch movement underneath or in front of a train.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 79 (Friday, April 25, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 79 (Friday, April 25, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 17502-17503]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-07153]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Safety Advisory 2025-01; Proper Configuration of Grand Master
4000 and 4000A Switch Machines To Prevent Unintended Switch Movement
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.
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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2025-01 to heighten awareness
within the rail industry of the potential for unintended movement of
Grand Master 4000 and 4000A switch machines. Improper configuration of
these machines could allow power to be present at the switch machine
controller when locking is in effect, creating the potential for
unintended switch movement underneath or in front of a train.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott Johnson, Part 236 Subject Matter
Expert, Signal, Train Control and Crossings Division, Office of
Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20590,
406-210-3608, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#aad9c9c5dede84c084c0c5c2c4d9c5c4eacec5de84cdc5dc"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="770414180303591d591d181f190418193713180359101801">[email protected]</span></a>.
Disclaimer: This Safety Advisory is considered guidance pursuant to
DOT Order 2100.6A (June 7, 2021). Except when referencing laws,
regulations, policies, or orders, the information in this Safety
Advisory does not have the force and effect of law and is not binding
in any way. This document does not review or replace any previously
issued guidance.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The Grand Master 4000 and 4000A is an electric switch machine
designed to
[[Page 17503]]
be used at controlled points, interlockings and derails.
A recent derailment was reported to the FRA that was caused by the
unintended movement of a switch underneath a train. The unintended
movement of the switch was the result of the improper configuration of
a Grand Master 4000A switch machine amplifier. Specifically, the
amplifier was configured in the 3 wire position and not the intended 4
wire position. Subsequent investigation has determined that the Grand
Master 4000 switch machine amplifier has the same configuration design
and is also at risk of causing the unintended movement of the switch
when improperly configured.
The Grand Master 4000 and 4000A switch machines have four different
motor control wiring configurations that can be selected based on the
user's needs and a 3W/4W (3 wire or 4 wire configuration) controller
key switch or plug that must be positioned correctly based on the
wiring configuration to permit safe operation of the machine. According
to the configuration instructions in the manufacturer's manual, all
configurations except the 4-wire configuration require the 3W/4W
controller key switch or plug to be placed in the 3W position.
Field testing has demonstrated that if the Grand Master 4000 and
4000A is configured in the 4-wire configuration and the 3W/4W
controller key switch or plug is placed in the 3W position, power may
be present in the switch machine controller when locking is required to
be in effect.\1\ If power is present in the switch machine controller
when locking is required to be in effect, unintended movement of the
switch may occur under a train or in front of a train approaching the
switch.
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\1\ According to the field wiring configurations table on page
3-10 in the manufacturer's manual, the 4-wire configuration is the
only configuration that does not have an input to terminal TB1-2.
Therefore, if an input wire is present on terminal TB1-2, the Grand
Master 4000 or 4000A is not configured in a 4-wire configuration.
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Recommended Railroad Actions: In light of the above discussion and
to ensure the safety of the Nation's railroads, their employees, and
the general public, FRA recommends that railroads:
1. Ensure the signal circuit plans for each location equipped with
a Grand Master 4000 or 4000A switch machine clearly indicate the
correct wiring configuration used for the switch machine and the proper
position of the 3W/4W controller key switch or plug. This configuration
should be consistent with the configuration instructions in the
manufacturer's manual.
2. Ensure the wiring configuration of each Grand Master 4000 and
4000A switch machine and the position of the 3W/4W controller key
switch or plug match the information on the signal circuit plans.
3. Include in locking test procedures a test to validate that power
is removed from the switch machine controller when locking in required.
This test may be performed by the placement of a 0.06-ohm shunt in the
OS and visual confirmation that all lights on top of the controller are
dark.
4. Perform locking tests for each Grand Master 4000 and 4000A
switch machine location to ensure power is removed from the switch
machine controller when locking is required to be in effect to prevent
unintended switch movement.
5. Ensure locking test procedures provide that employees verify
that power is removed from the switch machine controller when locking
is required to be in effect.
6. Ensure that employees are trained to verify that the wiring
configuration of each Grand Master 4000 and 4000A switch machine is
correct and the 3W/4W controller key switch or plug is in the proper
position when the wiring configuration is changed, or the switch
machine controller is replaced.
7. Ensure all lights on top of the switch machine controller are
dark before trains are allowed to proceed over the switch under signal
indication.
FRA encourages all railroad industry members to take actions
consistent with the recommendations of this Safety Advisory. FRA also
encourages railroad industry members to seek input from their workforce
as the industry prepares to act on the recommendations of this Safety
Advisory. FRA may modify this Safety Advisory, issue additional safety
advisories, or take other appropriate action necessary to ensure the
highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads, including pursuing
other corrective measures under its rail safety authority.
Issued in Washington, DC.
John Karl Alexy,
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety, Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2025-07153 Filed 4-24-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
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