Notice2025-06825
John Stanton, M.D.; Decision and Order
Primary source
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Published
April 21, 2025
Issuing agencies
Justice DepartmentDrug Enforcement Administration
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 75 (Monday, April 21, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 75 (Monday, April 21, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16706-16707]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-06825]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
John Stanton, M.D.; Decision and Order
On November 22, 2023, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to John Stanton, M.D.,
of Clarksville, Tennessee (Registrant). Request for Final Agency Action
(RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 2, at 1, 4. The OSC proposed the revocation of
Registrant's DEA Certificate of Registration No. BS1750048, alleging
that Registrant's registration should be revoked because Registrant is
``currently without authority to handle controlled substances in the
State of Tennessee, the state in which [he is] registered with DEA.''
Id. at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).\1\
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\1\ The OSC also proposed the revocation of Registrant's
registration because Registrant was convicted of a federal felony
related to controlled substances and was mandatorily excluded from
participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and all federal health care
programs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7(a). Id. at 1. In its RFAA,
the Government referenced these additional allegations in the
introductory paragraph, the procedural background, and the proposed
findings of fact. RFAA, at 1-3. However, in the ``Proposed
Conclusions of Law and Argument'' section of the RFAA through the
remainder of the document, the Government only discussed the
aforementioned loss of state authority allegation. Id. at 3-6. As
such, the Government appears to have dropped the felony conviction
and mandatory exclusion allegations and the Agency does not consider
them in this decision.
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The OSC notified Registrant of his right to file a written request
for hearing, and that if he failed to file such a request, he would be
deemed to have waived his right to a hearing and be in default. RFAAX
2, at 3 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not request a
hearing. RFAA, at 2.\2\ ``A default, unless excused, shall be deemed to
constitute a waiver of the registrant's/applicant's right to a hearing
and an admission of the factual allegations of the [OSC].'' 21 CFR
1301.43(e).
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\2\ Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated
February 14, 2024, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on
Registrant was likely adequate. Specifically, an included
Declaration from a DEA Diversion Investigator (DI) indicates that on
or about December 11, 2023, Registrant was sent a copy of the OSC
through certified mail to his registered address, the address where
he is currently incarcerated, and two separate attorney addresses.
RFAAX 3, at 1-2. Though there is no documented confirmation of
receipt from either Registrant or his attorneys, all copies of the
OSC that were mailed had tracking numbers attached. Id., Attachments
A-D.
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Further, ``[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be
in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action
with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In
such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order
pursuant to [21 CFR] Sec. 1316.67.'' Id. Sec. 1301.43(f)(1). Here,
the Government has requested final agency action based on Registrant's
default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c), (f), 1301.46. RFAA, at 3; see
also 21 CFR 1316.67.
Findings of Fact
The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the
factual allegations in the OSC are admitted. According to the OSC, on
April 27, 2023, the State of Tennessee Department of Health, Board of
Medical Examiners revoked Registrant's Tennessee medical license. RFAAX
2 at 2. According to Tennessee online records, of which the Agency
takes official notice, Registrant's Tennessee medical license remains
revoked.\3\ Tennessee Department of Health Licensure Verification,
<a href="https://internet.health.tn.gov/Licensure">https://internet.health.tn.gov/Licensure</a> (last visited date of
signature of this Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds that Registrant
is not licensed to practice as a physician in Tennessee, the state in
which he is registered with DEA.\4\
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\3\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ``may take
official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--even in the
final decision.'' United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979).
\4\ Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ``[w]hen an agency decision
rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the
evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to
an opportunity to show the contrary.'' The material fact here is
that Registrant, as of the date of this Decision, is not licensed to
practice medicine in Tennessee. Accordingly, Registrant may dispute
the Agency's finding by filing a properly supported motion for
reconsideration of findings of fact within fifteen calendar days of
the date of this Order. Any such motion and response shall be filed
and served by email to the other party and to Office of the
Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration at
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#620607034c0306060d4c0316160d100c071b11220607034c050d14"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="46222327682722222968273232293428233f350622232768212930">[email protected]</span></a>.
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Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 ``upon a
finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license or
registration suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State
[[Page 16707]]
authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . .
. dispensing of controlled substances.'' With respect to a
practitioner, DEA has also long held that the possession of authority
to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which
a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental
condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner's registration.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (``The Attorney General
can register a physician to dispense controlled substances `if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under
the laws of the State in which he practices.' . . . The very definition
of a `practitioner' eligible to prescribe includes physicians
`licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or
the jurisdiction in which he practices' to dispense controlled
substances. Sec. 802(21).''). The Agency has applied these principles
consistently. See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71371, 71372
(2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 F. App'x 826 (4th Cir. 2012);
Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR 27616, 27617 (1978).\5\
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\5\ This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA). First, Congress defined the term
``practitioner'' to mean ``a physician . . . or other person
licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by . . . the
jurisdiction in which he practices . . ., to distribute, dispense, .
. . [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of
professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration, Congress
directed that ``[t]he Attorney General shall register practitioners
. . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.'' 21
U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress has clearly mandated that a
practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a
practitioner under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation
of a practitioner's registration is the appropriate sanction
whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the state in which he practices. See,
e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR at 71371-72; Sheran Arden Yeates,
M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR
51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11919, 11920 (1988);
Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR at 27617.
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According to Tennessee statute, ``dispense'' means ``to deliver a
controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject by or
pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner, including the
prescribing, administering, packaging, labeling, or compounding
necessary to prepare the substance for that delivery.'' Tenn. Code Ann.
sec. 39-17-402(7) (2024). Further, a ``practitioner'' means ``a
physician . . . or other person licensed, registered or otherwise
permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to or
administer a controlled substance in the course of professional
practice or research in this state.'' Id. at sec. 39-17-402(23)(A).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant
lacks authority to practice medicine in Tennessee. As discussed above,
an individual must be a licensed practitioner to dispense a controlled
substance in Tennessee. Thus, because Registrant lacks authority to
practice medicine in Tennessee and, therefore, is not authorized to
handle controlled substances in Tennessee, Registrant is not eligible
to maintain a DEA registration. Accordingly, the Agency will order that
Registrant's DEA registration be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No.
BS1750048 issued to John Stanton, M.D.
Further, pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby deny any pending applications of John
Stanton, M.D., to renew or modify this registration, as well as any
other pending application of John Stanton, M.D., for additional
registration in Tennessee. This Order is effective May 21, 2025.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
April 15, 2025, by Acting Administrator Derek Maltz. That document with
the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document
of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect
of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2025-06825 Filed 4-18-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on April 21, 2025.
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