Notice2025-05208
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to a Participant System Disruption
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
March 27, 2025
Issuing agencies
Securities and Exchange Commission
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 58 (Thursday, March 27, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 58 (Thursday, March 27, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13942-13949]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-05208]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-102713; File No. SR-FICC-2025-006]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation;
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to a Participant
System Disruption
March 21, 2025.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that
on March 14, 2025, Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (``FICC'') filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the
proposed rule change as described in Items I, II and III below, which
Items have been prepared by the clearing agency. The Commission is
publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change
from interested persons.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the
Proposed Rule Change
The proposed rule change consists of amendments to Rule 50A of the
FICC Government Securities Division (``FICC-GSD'') Rulebook and Rule
40A of the FICC Mortgage-Backed Securities Division (``FICC-MBSD'')
Clearing Rules (Systems Disconnect: Threat of Significant Impact to the
Corporation's Systems). FICC's two affiliate clearing agencies,
National Securities Clearing Corporation (``NSCC'') and The Depository
Trust Company (``DTC,'' and together with NSCC and FICC, the ``Clearing
Agencies,'' or ``Clearing Agency'' when referring to one of any of the
three Clearing Agencies) \3\ will each file with the Commission
substantively similar proposals to amend their corresponding rules:
Rule 60A of the NSCC Rules & Procedures and Rule 38(A) of the Rules,
By-Laws and Organization Certificate of DTC (collectively with FICC-GSD
Rule 50A and FICC-MBSD Rule 40A, the ``Disruption Rules'').\4\
Accordingly, each respective filing is written from the perspective of
the Clearing Agencies, collectively, instead of FICC, NSCC, and DTC
individually, but application of the proposed rule changes would only
apply to the DTCC Systems Participant (as defined below) of the
corresponding Clearing Agency or Clearing Agencies.\5\
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\3\ The Clearing Agencies are each a subsidiary of The
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (``DTCC''). DTCC operates on
a shared service model with respect to the Clearing Agencies. Most
corporate functions are established and managed on an enterprise-
wide basis pursuant to intercompany agreements under which it is
generally DTCC that provides relevant services to the Clearing
Agencies.
\4\ Each Disruption Rule is publicly available in the respective
rules of the applicable Clearing Agency at <a href="https://www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures">https://www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures</a>.
\5\ Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the
meaning as set forth in the respective rules of the Clearing
Agencies, available at <a href="https://www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures">https://www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures</a>.
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In addition, FICC proposes to make an administerial change to
Article III, Rule 1, Section 5 of the FICC-MBSD EPN Rules (``EPN
Rules'') to reflect the proposed new name of FICC-MBSD Rule 40A, as
described below.
The current Disruption Rules contain provisions identifying the
events or circumstances that would be considered a Major Event \6\ or
Systems Disruption.\7\ During the pendency of a Major Event, the
Disruption Rules authorize the Clearing Agencies to take certain
actions, within a prescribed governance framework, to mitigate the
effect of the Major Event on the Clearing Agencies, their respective
members or participants as defined in the respective rules of the
applicable Clearing Agency (hereinafter, ``Respective
Participants''),\8\ their Affiliates, and the industry more broadly.
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\6\ ``Major Event'' is currently defined in the Disruption Rules
as, ``the happening of one or more System Disruption(s) that is
reasonably likely to have a significant impact on the Corporation's
operations, including the DTCC Systems, that affect the business,
operations, safeguarding of securities or funds, or physical
functions of the Corporation, [Respective Participants] and/or other
market participants.'' Disruption Rules, supra note 2, Section 1.
\7\ ``Systems Disruption'' is currently defined in the
Disruption Rules as, ``the unavailability, failure, malfunction,
overload, or restriction (whether partial or total) of a DTCC
Systems Participant's systems that disrupts or degrades the normal
operation of such DTCC Systems Participant's systems; or anything
that impacts or alters the normal communication, or the files that
are received, or information transmitted, to or from the DTCC
Systems.'' Disruption Rules, supra note 2, Section 1.
\8\ Under the current Disruption Rules, Respective Participants
for NSCC are Members and Limited Members; for DTC, Participants; for
FICC-GSD and FICC-MBSD, Members. Under the proposed changes to the
Disruption Rules, as referenced herein, Respective Participants for
NSCC will be Members, Limited Members, and Sponsored Members; for
DTC, Participants, Limited Participants, and Pledgees; for FICC-GSD,
Netting Members, CCIT Members, Comparison Only Members, and Funds-
Only Settling Bank Members; and for FICC-MBSD, Members, Clearing
Members, and Cash Settling Bank Members.
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The proposed rule changes would (i) update and add definitions used
throughout the Disruption Rules; (ii) update the provisions and
governance for declaring a Major Event (which would be redefined as a
Major System Event \9\); (iii) clarify and enhance the
[[Page 13943]]
requirements of the DTCC Systems Participant \10\ to notify the
Clearing Agencies of a Systems Disruption (which would be redefined as
a Participant System Disruption \11\); (iv) add provisions
incorporating the reporting, testing, and approval requirements,
process, legal obligations, and governance necessary for
``reconnection'' (as defined by this proposed rule change) \12\ of a
DTCC Systems Participant that was ``disconnected'' from DTCC Systems
\13\ pursuant to a Disruption Rule; and (v) make technical,
ministerial, and other conforming and clarifying changes, including
updating the name of the Disruption Rules.
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\9\ Pursuant to this proposed rule change, Major Event would be
deleted and replaced with ``Major System Event,'' to be defined as,
``a Participant System Disruption that has or is reasonably
anticipated to, for example, disrupt, degrade, cause a delay in,
interrupt or otherwise alter the normal operation of DTCC Systems;
result in unauthorized access to DTCC Systems; result in the loss of
control of, disclosure of, or loss of DTCC Confidential Information;
or cause a strain on, loss of, or overall threat to the
Corporation's resources, functions, security or operations.''
\10\ ``DTCC Systems Participant'' is currently defined in the
Disruption Rules as, ``a [Respective Participant] or third party
service provider, or service bureau that is connecting with the DTCC
Systems.'' Disruption Rules, supra note 2, Section 1. Pursuant to
this proposed rule change, DTCC Systems Participant would be
redefined in the Disruption Rules as, ``(A) any [Respective
Participant], or an Affiliate of any [Respective Participant], that
directly or indirectly connects with DTCC Systems; or (B) any third-
party service provider, service bureau, or other similar entity that
directly or indirectly connects with DTCC Systems on behalf of or
for the benefit of any [Respective Participant], or an Affiliate of
any [Respective Participant].''
\11\ Pursuant to this proposed rule change, Systems Disruption
would be deleted and replaced with ``Participant System
Disruption,'' to be defined as, ``the actual or reasonably
anticipated unauthorized access to, or unavailability, failure,
malfunction, overload, corruption, or restriction (whether partial
or total) of one or more systems of a DTCC Systems Participant.''
\12\ Pursuant to this proposed rule change, ``Reconnection''
would be defined as the reestablishment of connectivity between DTCC
Systems and the DTCC Systems Participant that was the subject of
action taken pursuant to a Disruption Rule.
\13\ ``DTCC Systems'' is currently defined in the Disruption
Rules as, ``the systems, equipment and technology networks of DTCC,
the Corporation and/or their Affiliates, whether owned, leased, or
licensed, software, devices, IP addresses, or other addresses or
accounts used in connection with providing the services set forth in
the Rules, or used to transact business or to manage the connection
with the Corporation.'' Disruption Rules, supra note 2, Section 1.
Pursuant to this proposed rule change, the definition would be
updated to mean ``the systems, equipment and technology networks of
DTCC, the Corporation and/or any Affiliates of DTCC or the
Corporation, whether owned, leased, or licensed, and including
software, hardware, applications, devices, IP addresses, or other
addresses or accounts used in connection with such systems,
equipment and technology networks, to provide the services set forth
in these [Rules & Procedures/Rules and the Procedures/Rules], or
otherwise used to transact business or connect with DTCC, the
Corporation, or any Affiliates of DTCC or the Corporation.''
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Finally, the proposal also includes an administerial change to
Article III, Rule 1, Section 5 of the EPN Rules to reflect the proposed
change to the name of the Disruption Rules.
II. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis
for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the clearing agency included
statements concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule
change and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule
change. The text of these statements may be examined at the places
specified in Item IV below. The clearing agency has prepared summaries,
set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant
aspects of such statements.
(A) Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis
for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The purpose of the proposed rule change is to amend the Disruption
Rules. Accordingly, each respective filing is written from the
perspective of the Clearing Agencies, collectively, instead of DTC,
FICC, or NSCC individually, but application of the proposed rule
changes would only apply to the DTCC Systems Participant of the
corresponding Clearing Agency or Clearing Agencies.
In addition, FICC proposes to make an administerial change to
Article III, Rule 1, Section 5 of the EPN Rules to reflect the proposed
new name of FICC-MBSD Rule 40A, as described below.
The current Disruption Rules contain provisions identifying the
events or circumstances that would be considered a Major Event or
Systems Disruption. During the pendency of a Major Event, the
Disruption Rules authorize the Clearing Agencies to take certain
actions, within a prescribed governance framework, to mitigate the
effect of the Major Event on the Clearing Agencies, their Respective
Participants, their Affiliates, and the industry more broadly.
The proposed rule changes would (i) update and add definitions used
throughout the Disruption Rules; (ii) update the provisions and
governance for declaring a Major Event (which would be redefined as a
Major System Event); (iii) clarify and enhance the requirements of the
DTCC Systems Participant to notify the Clearing Agencies of a Systems
Disruption (which would be redefined as a Participant System
Disruption); (iv) add provisions incorporating the reporting, testing,
and approval requirements, process, legal obligations, and governance
necessary for ``reconnection'' (as defined by this proposed rule
change) of a DTCC Systems Participant that was ``disconnected'' from
DTCC Systems pursuant to a Disruption Rule; and (v) make technical,
ministerial, and other conforming and clarifying changes, including
updating the name of the Disruption Rules, each of which is described
in greater detail below.
Finally, the proposal also includes an administerial change to
Article III, Rule 1, Section 5 of the EPN Rules to reflect the proposed
change to the name of the Disruption Rules.
Background--Current Disruption Rules
The current Disruption Rules were implemented by the Clearing
Agencies on October 8, 2021.\14\ Pursuant to the Disruption Rules, the
Clearing Agencies are entitled to take action to help mitigate risk
when there is a reasonable basis for the Clearing Agencies to conclude
that there is a Major Event, as determined by one of the persons listed
in the rules and then ratified, modified, or rescinded within five
Business Days by the Clearing Agencies' management committee on which
such listed persons serve, and the Clearing Agencies' Board of
Directors (``Board'').\15\
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\14\ Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 93278 (Oct. 8, 2021),
86 FR 57229 (Oct. 14, 2021) (SR-NSCC-2021-007); 93280 (Oct. 8,
2021), 86 FR 57208 (Oct. 14, 2021) (SR-FICC-2021-004); 93279 (Oct.
8, 2021), 86 FR 57221 (Oct. 14, 2021) (SR-DTC-2021-011).
\15\ Disruption Rules, supra note 4, Section 2.
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During a Major Event, the Disruption Rules authorize the Clearing
Agencies to (i) disconnect the subject DTCC Systems Participant from
DTCC Systems; (ii) suspend the receipt and/or transmission of files or
communications to/from the DTCC Systems Participant and DTCC Systems;
or (iii) take, or refrain from taking, or require a DTCC Systems
Participant to take, or refrain from taking, any actions the Clearing
Agencies consider appropriate to prevent, address, correct, alleviate,
or mitigate the event and facilitate the continuation of the Clearing
Agencies' services as may be practicable.\16\
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\16\ Id. at Section 3.
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The Disruption Rules also require the DTCC Systems Participant to
immediately notify the Clearing Agencies when they become aware of a
Major Event, to cooperate with the Clearing Agencies in addressing the
Major Event, and that the Clearing Agencies notify a DTCC Systems
[[Page 13944]]
Participant of any action that the Clearing Agencies take, or intend to
take, against the Respective Participant under the rule.\17\
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\17\ Id. at Section 4.
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Finally, the Disruption Rules provide certain indemnities, clarify
powers available to the Clearing Agencies under the Disruption Rules,
highlight confidentiality requirements, and include a conflicts
provision.\18\
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\18\ Id. at Section 5.
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Based on the Clearing Agencies' experience applying the Disruption
Rules, they are proposing a number of changes, as noted above and
described in detail below, to make the rules more efficient, effective,
and clear in their governance, authorities, application, and
requirements, so that the Clearing Agencies are better situated to
address the events that require action under the rules to protect the
Clearing Agencies, and their Respective Participants, Affiliates, and
the industry more broadly. The proposed changes also would enable a
DTCC Systems Participant to better understand and prepare for their
obligations to the Clearing Agencies in the event that they experience
a Participant System Disruption.
Proposed Rule Changes
First, the Clearing Agencies propose to rename Section 1 of the
Disruption Rules from ``Major Event'' to ``Definitions,'' which more
accurately states its purpose, and then update and add definitions to
the section. In addition to various technical, ministerial, and other
conforming and clarifying changes to existing definitions, the Clearing
Agencies propose the following changes:
<bullet> Update the existing definition of ``DTCC Systems'' to
include systems, equipment and technology networks of all DTCC
Affiliates and expand the types of systems connectivity to include
hardware and applications such that, in the event of a Participant
System Disruption, all of DTCC's potentially impacted connections, and
any means of connectivity, are incorporated into such definition.
<bullet> Broaden the existing definition of ``DTCC Systems
Participant'' to include a more specific list of Respective
Participants and Affiliates thereof, as well as entities that are
similar to third-party service providers or service bureaus, which are
already covered by the rule, that directly or indirectly connect with
DTCC Systems on behalf of or for the benefit of one of the Respective
Participants. This proposed change is necessary to be more specific
about the type of Respective Participants subject to the rule and
because in the Clearing Agencies' experience, Affiliates and third
parties may share systems that are directly or indirectly connected to
DTCC Systems, such that if, for example, a Respective Participant is
experiencing a Participant System Disruption, an Affiliate or third
party may be experiencing the same. Therefore, it is important to
include these additional entities to address the risk they present.
<bullet> Add the definition ``Best Practices'' to mean, the
``policies, procedures, practices or similar standards and guidelines
that are reasonably designed and consistent with then current
financial-sector cybersecurity standards issued by an authoritative
body that is a U.S. governmental entity or agency, an association of a
U.S. governmental entity or agency, or a widely recognized industry
organization.'' The purpose of adding this definition is to clearly
state the standards that the Clearing Agencies would require a Third-
Party Cybersecurity Firm (as defined below) to employ when such firm is
engaged, as would be required by the Disruption Rules and discussed
further below. Much of the language of this proposed definition comes
directly from Section 1001(a)(4) of the Commission's Regulation Systems
Compliance and Integrity (``Reg SCI'').\19\
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\19\ 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(4).
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<bullet> Delete the existing definition ``Major Event'' and replace
it with the definition ``Major System Event'' to mean, ``a Participant
System Disruption that has or is reasonably anticipated to, for
example, disrupt, degrade, cause a delay in, interrupt or otherwise
alter the normal operation of DTCC Systems; result in unauthorized
access to DTCC Systems; result in the loss of control of, disclosure
of, or loss of DTCC Confidential Information; or cause a strain on,
loss of, or overall threat to the Corporation's resources, functions,
security or operations.'' Although the new definition is similar to the
prior definition, the new definition more appropriately ties the
disruption at issue to the effect on the normal operation of DTCC
Systems and less so on any subsequent effect to the Clearing Agencies'
operations.
<bullet> Add the definition ``Third-Party Cybersecurity Firm'' to
mean, ``a firm that, in [the Clearing Agencies'] reasonable judgement,
(A) (i) is well-known and reputable; (ii) is not affiliated with DTCC,
[the Clearing Agencies], an Affiliate of DTCC or [the Clearing
Agencies], a DTCC Systems Participant, or an Affiliate of a DTCC
Systems Participant; (iii) specializes in financial-sector
cybersecurity; and (iv) employs Best Practices; or (B) is otherwise
determined to be a Third-Party Cybersecurity Firm by [the Clearing
Agencies].'' The purpose of adding this definition is to clearly state
the type of firm that the Clearing Agencies would require the subject
DTCC Systems Participant to engage under the Disruption Rules, as
discussed further below.
<bullet> Delete the existing definition ``Systems Disruption'' and
replace it with the definition ``Participant System Disruption'' to
mean, ``the actual or reasonably anticipated unauthorized access to, or
unavailability, failure, malfunction, overload, corruption, or
restriction (whether partial or total) of one or more systems of a DTCC
Systems Participant.'' Although similar to the existing definition, the
new definition focuses more appropriately on what has actually
happened, or is reasonably anticipated to happen, to the DTCC Systems
Participant system, and less on subsequent operation of the system. For
example, it is possible that a DTCC Systems Participant system is
corrupted or compromised, but that corruption or compromise has not
affected the normal operation of the system at that time.
Second, the Clearing Agencies propose to move current Section 4 of
the Disruption Rules up to create a new Section 2, which would be
renamed ``Notifications of a Participant System Disruption.'' This move
would better align the structure of the Disruption Rules with the
expected sequence of events of a Participant System Disruption.
The new Section 2 would delete the notification language of current
Section 4 and replace it with enhanced notification requirements
applicable to any DTCC Systems Participant, not only Respective
Participants of the Clearing Agencies. More specifically, the Clearing
Agencies propose that the subject DTCC Systems Participant, as defined
in the proposed rule and above, provide the Clearing Agencies with
immediate written notice, to include certain DTCC Systems Participant
and Participant System Disruption information, if known, but in any
event within two hours of experiencing or having actual knowledge, and
legal permission to disclose such knowledge, of an unaffiliated DTCC
Systems Participant that is experiencing a Participant System
Disruption or is otherwise affected or potentially affected by the
Participant System Disruption. The information required to be provided
in the notice, if known, includes (i) the legal entity names of the
[[Page 13945]]
subject DTCC Systems Participant experiencing or otherwise affected or
potentially affected by the Participant System Disruption; (ii) contact
information of key, applicable DTCC Systems Participant personnel and
agents; and (iii) key details about the Participant System Disruption,
such as event type, event effect, start date, end date (if applicable),
discovery date, scope,and any other notices given, which would provide
additional context regarding the Participant System Disruption.
The purpose of these proposed changes in the new Section 2 is to
(i) enable a DTCC Systems Participant to better understand and prepare
for their obligations to the Clearing Agencies in the event that they
experience a Participant System Disruption; and (ii) facilitate the
Clearing Agencies' timely receipt of key information that could enable
a more efficient and effective review and response by the Clearing
Agencies to a Participant System Disruption, all in an effort to help
mitigate the risk presented by a Participant System Disruption.
Third, the Clearing Agencies propose to redesignate current Section
2 of the Disruption Rules as Section 3 and rename the section from
``Powers of [the Clearing Agencies]'' to ``Declaration of a Major
System Event,'' which would more accurately describe the purpose of the
section. In addition to various technical, ministerial, and other
conforming and clarifying changes to the new Section 3, the Clearing
Agencies propose to no longer (i) provide a list of specific persons
that may determine that the Clearing Agencies have a reasonable basis
to conclude that there is a Major System Event, nor (ii) require,
within five Business Days, that such determination be reviewed by a
management committee on which all of such listed people serve, and the
Board. Instead, the Clearing Agencies propose that such determination
be made by two or more members of the Clearing Agencies' ``senior most
management committee,'' \20\ in their reasonable judgement, and then,
after such determination is made, the Board, any remaining members of
that senior management committee, and the Commission be promptly
notified \21\ of such determination.
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\20\ The current ``senior most management committee'' of the
Clearing Agencies is the Executive Committee, which includes each of
the six persons listed in the existing Disruption Rules that can
determine the existence of a Major Event (i.e., the Chief Executive
Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, the Group Chief Risk Officer,
the Chief Information Officer, the Head of Clearing Agency Services,
and the General Counsel), plus the Chief Client Officer, Global Head
of DTCC Digital Assets, Head of Enterprise Services, and the Chief
Human Resources Officer.
\21\ ``Prompt notification'' means the notification is to be
made without undue or unreasonable delay, as is consistent with the
use of ``prompt'' in Reg SCI.
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In addition, the Clearing Agencies propose to provide the Board an
update on the status of the Major System Event and any action taken
pursuant to the Disruption Rules on the earlier of 45 calendar days
from the date of declaration of the Major System Event or the next
scheduled Board meeting, or more frequently following material changes
to the status of a Major System Event.
The purpose of these changes is multifaceted. One, it shifts the
authority to make such a determination from only one of the Clearing
Agencies' most senior officers to two of the Clearing Agencies' most
senior officers. Two, the proposed changes eliminate two subsequent
reviews, after the determination is already made, that are
administratively burdensome and may complicate managing the event in
terms of ratifying, modifying, or rescinding the disconnection of a
DTCC Systems Participant that has already happened. Instead, the
proposed changes would set clear communication standards and provide
more timely transparency to the remaining senior most management
committee members, the Board, and the Commission, which could still act
in response to the notice without the need for formal meetings pursuant
to the Disruption Rules.
Fourth, the Clearing Agencies propose to redesignate current
Section 3 of the Disruption Rules as Section 4, ``Authority to Take
Action and Required Cooperation,'' and make other various technical,
ministerial, conforming, and clarifying changes to the section.
Additionally, the Clearing Agencies propose to clarify and broaden, in
what would be Subsections 4(a)(i) and (ii), the systems of the subject
DTCC Systems Participant that can be disconnected and the
transmissions, communications, or access that can be suspended. The
purpose of these changes is to help ensure that the Clearing Agencies
can adequately address all potential connectivity and communication
types for each DTCC Systems Participant in an effort to help mitigate
the risk presented by the Participant System Disruption and associated
Major System Event.
New Subsection 4(a)(iii) would continue to provide from current
Subsection 3(c) of the Disruption Rules \22\ the authority for the
Clearing Agencies to (A) act or not act, or require the subject DTCC
Systems Participant to act or not act, as the Clearing Agencies
consider appropriate to help mitigate the risk of the Major System
Event, as well as (B) facilitate the continuation of services of the
subject DTCC Systems Participant, as appropriate and practical, which
may require issuing instructions to the DTCC Systems Participant and,
as proposed, requiring such instructions to be followed. The Clearing
Agencies believe adding the requirement that their instructions be
followed is important not only to help facilitate the continuation of
services for the subject DTCC Systems Participant but also for any
downstream effects that may have or could have resulted from the
disruption.
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\22\ Disruption Rules, supra note 4, Section 3.
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For new Subsection 4(b), the Clearing Agencies propose to reinstate
language from current Subsection 4(b), which, as described above, would
be deleted as part of the proposed move of all of current Section 4 up
to new Section 2. Specifically, the Clearing Agencies propose to
reinstate similar language that states they will promptly notify the
subject DTCC Systems Participant of any disconnection, suspension, or
other material action the Clearing Agencies take with respect to such
DTCC Systems Participant pursuant to the authority provided in new
Section 4. Additionally, the Clearing Agencies propose to add new
language to clarify that notwithstanding any action the Clearing
Agencies take pursuant to new Section 4, the subject DTCC Systems
Participant must continue to meet its obligations to the Clearing
Agencies and comply with their rules, as applicable.
The Clearing Agencies also propose to add a new Subsection (c) to
new Section 4. Proposed Subsection 4(c) would expand upon the
cooperation requirement in current Section 4(a) of the Disruption Rules
to require the DTCC Systems Participant to cooperate ``fully and
completely'' with the Clearing Agencies, to the Clearing Agencies'
reasonable satisfaction, regarding the Participant System Disruption in
whole, instead of limiting such cooperation to the root cause and
resolution. Such cooperation would include, for example, (i) conducting
timely investigations and inquiries relating to the Participant System
Disruption; (ii) promptly notifying the Clearing Agencies of any
material changes, updates, or new information learned regarding the
Participant System Disruption; and (iii) to the extent legally
permitted, promptly providing any documentation or information
requested by the Clearing Agencies regarding the Participant System
Disruption.
[[Page 13946]]
Fifth, the Clearing Agencies propose to insert a new Section 5 to
the Disruption Rules titled ``Reconnection Requirements.'' This new
Section 5 would set forth the information that the subject DTCC Systems
Participant would be required to provide to the Clearing Agencies, in
form and substance that is reasonably satisfactory to the Clearing
Agencies,\23\ prior to the Clearing Agencies ``reconnecting'' a
disconnected DTCC Systems Participant. Specifically, the Clearing
Agencies propose that they receive three things: (i) a detailed,
comprehensive, and auditable report, from a Third-Party Cybersecurity
Firm; (ii) an attestation from a Participant Officer of the DTCC
Systems Participant; \24\ and (iii) an executed indemnity from the DTCC
Systems Participant to the reasonable satisfaction and judgement of the
Clearing Agencies in consideration of the facts and circumstances.
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\23\ Whether the information provided is ``reasonably
satisfactory'' would be a determination by the applicable Clearing
Agency in consideration of the facts and circumstances, such as the
severity of the disruption, thoroughness of and confidence in the
information provided, any outstanding questions or concerns, etc.,
all within the context of reasonableness.
\24\ Pursuant to this proposed rule change, ``Participant
Officer'' would be defined as a member of the board of directors, a
senior executive officer, or other member of senior management of
the subject DTCC Systems Participant.
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As stated in proposed Subsection 5(a)(i), the Clearing Agencies
would require the report by the Third-Party Cybersecurity Firm to
include the following information:
<bullet> a timeline of the Participant System Disruption, including
all material actions, events, and decisions taken for or relating to
the Participant System Disruption;
<bullet> a description of the Participant System Disruption and how
it was corrected and resolved;
<bullet> root cause analysis of the Participant System Disruption;
<bullet> confirmation that any severe, critical, or moderate items,
or comparable categorizations, identified by the Third-Party
Cybersecurity Firm have been resolved;
<bullet> confirmation of the normal or intended operation of the
subject DTCC Systems Participant's systems, including, but not limited
to, the return or replacement of key systems and datastores to pre-
Participant System Disruption resilience, in a safe, secure, and proper
manner for at least 72 hours;
<bullet> a description of any short- and long-term preventive
monitoring and detection recommendations by the Third-Party
Cybersecurity Firm; and
<bullet> any other information reasonably requested to be included
by the Clearing Agencies.
As stated in proposed Subsection 5(a)(ii), the Clearing Agencies
would require the Participant Officer to attest to the following:
<bullet> the Third-Party Cybersecurity Firm's report is, to the
best of the Participant Officer's knowledge, accurate and complete;
<bullet> all short-term preventive monitoring and detection
controls recommended by the Third-Party Cybersecurity Firm have been
implemented;
<bullet> all medium- and long-term preventive monitoring and
detection controls recommended by the Third-Party Cybersecurity Firm
will be promptly implemented;
<bullet> the Participant Officer recommends Reconnection to DTCC
Systems; and
<bullet> the DTCC Systems Participant will continue to oversee
remediation efforts and monitor the systems of the DTCC Systems
Participant, and immediately, but in any event within two hours, notify
the Clearing Agencies if there is any indication of the continuation of
a Participant System Disruption or an existence of a new Participant
System Disruption.
Lastly, Subsection 5(b) would require the subject DTCC Systems
Participant to promptly provide, upon the applicable Clearing Agency's
request, any other documentation or information and/or require the
subject DTCC Systems Participant to take other actions to the Clearing
Agency's reasonable satisfaction, including obtaining a second Third-
Party Cybersecurity Firm onsite validation of the subject DTCC Systems
Participant, all of which would be decided by the Clearing Agency in
consideration of the facts and circumstances.
The purpose of these proposed changes is to (i) provide each DTCC
Systems Participant with notice of what information they would need to
provide to the Clearing Agencies in order to be Reconnected under the
Disruption Rules; (ii) ensure that the Clearing Agencies have all the
necessary information regarding the Participant System Disruption and
its remediation from an independent, reputable, and knowledgeable third
party, so that the Clearing Agencies can make an informed decision
about whether Reconnection is appropriate; (iii) confirm that an
appropriate senior officer at the subject DTCC Systems Participant is
sufficiently informed and responsible for the DTCC Systems
Participant's systems and the information being provided to the
Clearing Agencies; and (iv) ensure that the Clearing Agencies are
properly indemnified for actions or inactions, as needed, all to help
mitigate the risk presented by a Reconnection.
Sixth, the Clearing Agencies propose to insert a new Section 6
titled ``Reconnection Testing and Approval.'' New Section 6 would do
two things. First, Subsection 6(a) would require, prior to approval of
the Reconnection, that the subject DTCC Systems Participant
demonstrate, as applicable, to the Clearing Agencies' reasonable
satisfaction, that it:
<bullet> can operate in a test environment, including, but not
limited to, sending and receiving messages and transactions;
<bullet> can replay or resubmit previously submitted messages or
transactions;
<bullet> can reverse or void previously submitted messages or
transactions;
<bullet> can confirm the integrity of messages and transactions;
<bullet> has alternative communication methods with the Clearing
Agency to facilitate the exchange of messages, transactions, and
reports; and
<bullet> can complete any other such requirements as are reasonably
requested by the Clearing Agencies.
Subsection 6(b) would authorize two or more members of the Clearing
Agencies' senior most management committee, in their reasonable
judgement, to approve the Reconnection of a DTCC Systems Participant
that was the subject of action taken pursuant to the Disruption Rules,
after the Clearing Agencies have received and reviewed to their
satisfaction all information believed necessary for a safe Reconnection
and certain testing has occurred, pursuant to Subsection 6(a).
Similar to the governance process for determining a Major System
Event, the Clearing Agencies believe it appropriate that approval of a
Reconnection be made by at least two of the Clearing Agencies' most
senior officers to help ensure that information regarding the
Reconnection has been escalated to the highest management level. But,
it is essential that such approval not be made until the Clearing
Agencies have (i) received, to their satisfaction, all necessary
Participant System Disruption information and (ii) confirmed that the
subject DTCC Systems Participant can safely perform the capabilities
necessary for submitting, receiving, and correcting information
appropriately, confidently, and in a manner unaffected by the
Participant System Disruption, so as to help mitigate the risk
presented by the Reconnection.
Seventh, the Clearing Agencies propose to redesignate current
Section 5
[[Page 13947]]
of the Disruption Rules as Section 7, which would continue to address
``Certain Miscellaneous Matters.'' In addition to various technical,
ministerial, and other conforming and clarifying changes to newly
designated Section 7, the Clearing Agencies propose to remove the
existing ``conflicts'' provision and replace it with a ``failure to
comply'' provision. The new ``failure to comply'' provision would
authorize the Clearing Agencies to (i) subject a DTCC Systems
Participant that is a Respective Participant to any and all
disciplinary action permitted under the rules of the Clearing Agencies,
if such Respective Participant fails to comply with the Disruption
Rules; (ii) subject a DTCC Systems Participant that is not a Respective
Participant to any and all actions, obligations, or rights permitted
under any agreement made between the entity and the Clearing Agencies,
if such entity fails to comply with the Disruption Rules; and (iii)
require a DTCC Systems Participant that has authorized another party to
access and use DTCC Systems to assume responsibility for such
authorized party's compliance or compliance failure. The purpose of
these changes is to emphasize the importance in complying with the
Disruption Rules and highlight the actions that the Clearing Agencies
may take if there is a failure to comply, as applicable to the subject
party.
Finally, the Clearing Agencies propose to rename the Disruption
Rules from ``Systems Disconnect: Threat of Significant Impact to [the
Clearing Agencies'] Systems'' to ``Participant System Disruption,''
which the Clearing Agencies believe is a more appropriate description
of the rule, particularly in consideration of the proposed changes.
Such name change requires Article III, Rule 1, Section 5 of the EPN
Rules to be updated accordingly to reference the correct title
associated with FICC-MBSD Rule 40A.
2. Statutory Basis
The Clearing Agencies believe that the proposal is consistent with
the requirements of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder
applicable to each of the Clearing Agencies. In particular, the
Clearing Agencies believe that the proposed rule change is consistent
with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act,\25\ and Rules 17ad-22(e)(2) and
(e)(17) promulgated under the Act,\26\ as described below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
\26\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(2) and (e)(17).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistency With Section 17A(b)(3)(F)
Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act \27\ requires, in part, that the
rules of the Clearing Agencies be designed to promote the prompt and
accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions, and to
assure the safeguarding of securities and funds which are in the
custody or control of the Clearing Agencies or for which they are
responsible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As described above, the proposed rule change would (i) update and
add definitions used throughout the Disruption Rules; (ii) update the
provisions and governance for declaring a Major System Event; (iii)
clarify and enhance the requirements of a DTCC Systems Participant to
notify the Clearing Agencies of a Participant System Disruption; (iv)
add provisions incorporating the reporting, testing and approval
requirements, process, and governance necessary to Reconnect a DTCC
Systems Participant that was the subject of action pursuant to the
Disruption Rules; and (v) make technical, ministerial, and other
conforming and clarifying changes, including updating the name of and
references to the Disruption Rules.
The Clearing Agencies believe that these proposed changes would
enhance, clarify, streamline, and improve the Clearing Agencies'
ability to identify a Participant System Disruption, take action
because of such disruption, and then appropriately and safely Reconnect
a subject DTCC Systems Participant under the Disruption Rules. The
Clearing Agencies also believe that the level of detail and clarity
provided by the proposed changes provides greater transparency and
notice to all parties that would be subject to the Disruption Rules.
Ultimately, these proposed changes help mitigate risk and better
protect the Clearing Agencies, their Respective Participants, each DTCC
Systems Participant, and the industry more broadly from a Participant
System Disruption and associated Major System Event, by providing
advance transparency to the DTCC Systems Participant of their
obligations in the event of a Participant System Disruption and more
detailed and timely notification of such disruption to the Clearing
Agencies, which would afford the Clearing Agencies more time and
information to help manage risks presented. By helping to mitigate risk
and better protect those parties, the Clearing Agencies would be better
situated to successfully manage a Participant System Disruption, which,
in turn, helps promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement
of securities transactions and enables the Clearing Agencies to better
safeguard securities and funds that are in their custody or control,
consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistency With Rule 17ad-22(e)(2)(i) and (v)
Rule 17ad-22(e)(2) promulgated under the Act \29\ requires, in
part, that the Clearing Agencies establish, implement, maintain and
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to provide
for governance arrangements that, among other things, (i) are clear and
transparent (i.e., Subsection (e)(2)(i) of Rule 17ad-22) and (ii)
specify clear and direct lines of responsibility (i.e., Subsection
(e)(2)(v) of Rule 17ad-22).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As described above, the Clearing Agencies propose to no longer (a)
provide a list of specific persons that may determine the Clearing
Agencies have a reasonable basis to conclude that there is a Major
System Event, nor (b) require, within five Business Days, that such
determination be reviewed by a management committee on which all such
listed people serve, and the Board. Instead, the Clearing Agencies
propose that such determination be made by two or more members of the
Clearing Agencies' senior most management committee and then, after
such determination is made, that the Board, any remaining members of
that senior management committee, and the Commission be promptly
notified of such determination.
The Clearing Agencies believe that these proposed changes to
identify the subset of senior officers that would have the authority to
declare a Major System Event, while also providing for prompt notice to
the remaining members of the senior most management committee, the
Board, and the Commission would make such governance procedures more
clear and transparent, while specifying clear and direct lines of
responsibility with respect to such determination, consistent with Rule
17ad-22(e)(2)(i) and (v) promulgated under the Act.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(2)(i) and (v).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistency With Rule 17ad-22(e)(17)(i)
Rule 17ad-22(e)(17)(i) promulgated under the Act \31\ requires that
the Clearing Agencies establish, implement, maintain, and enforce
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to manage
operational risks by identifying
[[Page 13948]]
plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and
mitigating their impact through the use of appropriate systems,
policies, procedures, and controls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(17)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As described above, the Clearing Agencies propose to (a) expand the
definition of DTCC Systems Participant to specifically name the
applicable Respective Participant types, and include Affiliates of such
Respective Participants and entities similar to third-party service
providers and service bureaus; (b) clarify and enhance the requirements
of each DTCC Systems Participant to notify the Clearing Agencies of a
Participant System Disruption; and (c) add provisions incorporating the
reporting, testing and approval requirements, process, and governance
necessary to Reconnect a DTCC Systems Participant that was the subject
of action taken pursuant to the Disruption Rules.
By more explicitly naming and expanding the parties that are
subject to the Disruption Rules, and also clarifying and enhancing who
has to report information to the Clearing Agencies in the event of a
Participant System Disruption, when the disruption has to be reported,
and what disruption details have to be reported, the Clearing Agencies
would be improving their ability to identify and collect information
about disruptions experienced by the entities connected to DTCC
Systems, which, in turn, would enable the Clearing Agencies to react
more quickly and effectively to the disruption, in protection of their
systems, as well as the systems of other entities connected to the
Clearing Agencies. Then, by adding the proposed Reconnection and
associated testing requirements and governance prior to Reconnection of
the DTCC Systems Participant, the Clearing Agencies would be better
assured the operational disruption had been sufficiently mitigated such
that it no longer presents a risk to the Clearing Agencies or their
Respective Participants.
For these reasons, the Clearing Agencies believe these proposed
changes would better position the Clearing Agencies to identify and
address operational risk presented by a Participant System Disruption,
consistent with the requirements of Rule 17ad-22(e)(17)(i) promulgated
under the Act.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) Clearing Agency's Statement on Burden on Competition
The Clearing Agencies believe that three of the proposed changes
could have an impact on competition: (i) expanding the definition of
DTCC Systems Participant to include Affiliates of the Respective
Participants, and entities similar to third-party service providers and
service bureaus; (ii) establishing the Reconnection requirements in new
Section 5; and (iii) establishing the testing requirements, prior to
Reconnection, in new Section 6, as described above. The Clearing
Agencies believe the impact of these proposed changes could impose a
burden on competition but that such burden is necessary and appropriate
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as explained below.
The Clearing Agencies believe that expanding the definition of DTCC
Systems Participant could impose a burden on competition on such
entities because they would now be explicitly subject to the
requirements of the Disruption Rules, including being the subject of a
disconnection and all subsequent Reconnection requirements. The
Clearing Agencies acknowledge and appreciate that being disconnected
from DTCC Systems could place a disconnected entity at a competitive
disadvantage, as the disconnection could effectively halt the entity's
post-trade processing or other related activity transacted through the
Clearing Agencies. However, the Clearing Agencies do not believe such
expansion would create a significant burden because, in the Clearing
Agencies' experience, such entities are already indirectly subject to
the requirements of the Disruption Rules because of the often close
relationship and interconnectivity between such entities and the
Respective Participants. In other words, if one or more of the
Respective Participants is disconnected from DTCC Systems under the
current Disruption Rules, it is very likely that the entities
associated with the disconnected Respective Participant, particularly
Affiliates, also will be disconnected. Therefore, although not
explicitly named in the current Disruption Rules, such entities are
already indirectly subject to the rule through the Respective
Participant. Additionally, as would continue to be provided for in the
Disruption Rules, under new Subsection 4(a)(iii), the Clearing Agencies
would endeavor to facilitate the continuation of their services, in
some manner, for a DTCC Systems Participant that was the subject of
action under the Disruption Rules, as appropriate and practical.
The Clearing Agencies believe establishing the Reconnection
requirements in newly proposed Section 5 and, similarly, establishing
the testing requirements prior to Reconnection in newly proposed
Section 6, each of which are described above, could each impose a
burden on competition on a subject DTCC Systems Participant because the
changes create steps that the subject DTCC Systems Participant would
need to take in order to be Reconnected to DTCC Systems. The Clearing
Agencies appreciate that these additional steps could mean the DTCC
Systems Participant remains ``disconnected'' from DTCC Systems longer
than it believes necessary or longer than it may otherwise be
disconnected but for these additional steps, which could be a
competitive burden for that DTCC Systems Participant. However, the
Clearing Agencies do not believe the burden on competition from the
proposed Reconnection and testing requirements is significant because,
in the Clearing Agencies' experience, these additional steps are
standard practice to ensure that Reconnections are appropriate and
safe. In other words, although not explicitly required under the
current Disruption Rules, a disconnected DTCC Systems Participant would
likely need to complete the proposed Reconnection and testing
requirements. Additionally, as noted in the preceding paragraph, under
new Subsection 4(a)(iii) of the Disruption Rules, the Clearing Agencies
would have endeavored to facilitate the continuation of services of a
disconnected DTCC Systems Participant in some manner, as appropriate
and practical, prior to Reconnection.
Regardless of the significance of the burden, the Clearing Agencies
strongly believe that the burden on competition from explicitly
including Affiliates of the Respective Participants, and entities
similar to third parties in the Disruption Rules, and the addition of
the proposed Reconnection and testing requirements is necessary and
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as permitted by
Section 17A(b)(3)(I) of the Act.\33\ Specifically, the Clearing
Agencies believe these changes are necessary and appropriate in
furtherance of Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act \34\ and Rule 17ad-
22(e)(17) promulgated under the Act,\35\ as each are described above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(I).
\34\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
\35\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(17).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These changes are necessary because, by covering Affiliates and
additional third parties and requiring Reconnection and testing
requirements, the Clearing Agencies would be helping to ensure that the
breadth of the Disruption Rules is broad enough to
[[Page 13949]]
address all likely subject parties of a Participant System Disruption,
and that the Clearing Agencies receive adequate information, which
includes adequate testing of the subject DTCC Systems Participant, to
determine that Reconnection is safe. Similarly, these changes are
appropriate because, from the Clearing Agencies' experience, they are
consistent with actual practice in the event of a Participant System
Disruption. Therefore, ensuring that the right parties are covered and
that the Clearing Agencies have adequate information would help promote
the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities
transactions, and assure the safeguarding of securities and funds which
are in the custody or control of the Clearing Agencies, consistent with
Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act,\36\ and would help mitigate the impact
of the operational risk presented by a Participant System Disruption,
consistent with Rule 17ad-22(e)(17) promulgated under the Act.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
\37\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(17).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Clearing Agencies do not believe any of the other proposed
changes would have an impact on competition because the remaining
changes are various technical, ministerial, conforming, or clarifying
changes, or are related to the Clearing Agencies' governance practices
for the Disruption Rules, which would not impact a DTCC Systems
Participant's competitive position.
(C) Clearing Agency's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change
Received From Members, Participants, or Others
The Clearing Agencies have not received or solicited any written
comments relating to this proposed rule change. If any written comments
are received, the Clearing Agencies will amend their respective filings
to publicly file such comments as an Exhibit 2 to this filing, as
required by Form 19b-4 and the General Instructions thereto.
Persons submitting written comments are cautioned that, according
to Section IV (Solicitation of Comments) of the Exhibit 1A in the
General Instructions to Form 19b-4, the Commission does not edit
personal identifying information from comment submissions. Commenters
should submit only information that they wish to make available
publicly, including their name, email address, and any other
identifying information.
All prospective commenters should follow the Commission's
instructions on How to Submit Comments, available at <a href="https://www.sec.gov/regulatory-actions/how-to-submit-comments">https://www.sec.gov/regulatory-actions/how-to-submit-comments</a>. General
questions regarding the rule filing process or logistical questions
regarding this filing should be directed to the Main Office of the
Commission's Division of Trading and Markets at
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#66121407020f08010708020b07140d0312152615030548010910"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d1a5a3b0b5b8bfb6b0bfb5bcb0a3bab4a5a291a2b4b2ffb6bea7">[email protected]</span></a> or 202-551-5777.
The Clearing Agencies reserve the right to not respond to any
comments received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change, and Timing for
Commission Action
Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register or within such longer period up to 90 days (i) as the
Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be
appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to
which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
(A) by order approve or disapprove such proposed rule change, or
(B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule
change should be disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
<bullet> Use the Commission's internet comment form (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml">https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml</a>); or
<bullet> Send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#88fafde4eda5ebe7e5e5ede6fcfbc8fbedeba6efe7fe"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="1664637a733b75797b7b737862655665737538717960">[email protected]</span></a>. Please include
file number SR-FICC-2025-006 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
<bullet> Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.
All submissions should refer to file number SR-FICC-2026-006. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml">https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml</a>). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549 on official business days between the hours of 10
a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal office of FICC and on DTCC's
website (<a href="https://dtcc.com/legal/sec-rule-filings.aspx">https://dtcc.com/legal/sec-rule-filings.aspx</a>). Do not include
personal identifiable information in submissions; you should submit
only information that you wish to make available publicly. We may
redact in part or withhold entirely from publication submitted material
that is obscene or subject to copyright protection. All submissions
should refer to file number SR-FICC-2025-006 and should be submitted on
or before April 17, 2025.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2025-05208 Filed 3-26-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
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This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.