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Proposed Rule2025-03718

Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks; Schedule of Application Fees

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Published

March 13, 2025

Issuing agencies

Federal Communications Commission

Abstract

The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") takes another important step to protect the Nation's submarine cable infrastructure from threats in an evolving national security and law enforcement landscape by undertaking the first major comprehensive review of the Commission's submarine cable rules since 2001. This review seeks to develop forward-looking rules to better protect submarine cables, identify and mitigate harms affecting national security and law enforcement, and facilitate the deployment of submarine cables and capacity to the market. Among other things, the Commission proposes to adopt a three-year periodic reporting requirement for submarine cable landing licenses; in the alternative, the Commission seeks comment on shortening the current 25-year submarine cable license term or adopting a shorter license term in combination with periodic reporting. The Commission also proposes or seeks comment on codifying the Commission's legal jurisdiction and other legal requirements in its rules to provide regulatory certainty to submarine cable owners and operators. Additionally, the Commission proposes and seeks comment on appropriate applicant and application requirements to account for the evolution of technologies and facilities and changes in the national security landscape over the last two decades and to ensure the Commission has targeted and granular information regarding the ownership, control, use of a submarine cable system, and other things, which are critical to the Commission's review to assess potential national security risks and other important public interest factors. Further, the Commission seeks comment on improving the quality of the circuit capacity data and facilitating the sharing of such information with other Federal agencies. Through these proposals, the Commission seeks to ensure that the Commission is exercising appropriate oversight of submarine cables to safeguard U.S. communications networks.

Full Text

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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 48 (Thursday, March 13, 2025)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 12036-12103]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-03718]

[[Page 12035]]

Vol. 90

Thursday,

No. 48

March 13, 2025

Part II

Federal Communications Commission

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47 CFR Parts 0, 1, and 43

Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To
Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and
Trade Policy Risks; Schedule of Application Fees; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 48 / Thursday, March 13, 2025 /
Proposed Rules

[[Page 12036]]

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Parts 0, 1, and 43

[OI Docket No. 24-523, MD Docket No. 24-524; FCC 24-119; FR ID 282229]

Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To
Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and
Trade Policy Risks; Schedule of Application Fees

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Communications Commission (``FCC'' or
``Commission'') takes another important step to protect the Nation's
submarine cable infrastructure from threats in an evolving national
security and law enforcement landscape by undertaking the first major
comprehensive review of the Commission's submarine cable rules since
2001. This review seeks to develop forward-looking rules to better
protect submarine cables, identify and mitigate harms affecting
national security and law enforcement, and facilitate the deployment of
submarine cables and capacity to the market. Among other things, the
Commission proposes to adopt a three-year periodic reporting
requirement for submarine cable landing licenses; in the alternative,
the Commission seeks comment on shortening the current 25-year
submarine cable license term or adopting a shorter license term in
combination with periodic reporting. The Commission also proposes or
seeks comment on codifying the Commission's legal jurisdiction and
other legal requirements in its rules to provide regulatory certainty
to submarine cable owners and operators. Additionally, the Commission
proposes and seeks comment on appropriate applicant and application
requirements to account for the evolution of technologies and
facilities and changes in the national security landscape over the last
two decades and to ensure the Commission has targeted and granular
information regarding the ownership, control, use of a submarine cable
system, and other things, which are critical to the Commission's review
to assess potential national security risks and other important public
interest factors. Further, the Commission seeks comment on improving
the quality of the circuit capacity data and facilitating the sharing
of such information with other Federal agencies. Through these
proposals, the Commission seeks to ensure that the Commission is
exercising appropriate oversight of submarine cables to safeguard U.S.
communications networks.

DATES: Comments are due on or before April 14, 2025; and reply comments
are due on or before May 12, 2025. Written comments on the Paperwork
Reduction Act proposed information collection requirements must be
submitted by the public, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
other interested parties on or before May 12, 2025.

ADDRESSES: Pursuant to Sec. Sec. 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's
rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and
reply comments on or before the dates indicated in the DATES section of
this document. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic
Comment Filing System (ECFS). You may submit comments, identified by OI
Docket No. 24-523 and MD Docket No. 24-524, by any of the following
methods:
<bullet> Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically
using the internet by accessing the ECFS: <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs">https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs</a>.
<bullet> Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and one copy of each filing.
<bullet> Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by
commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be
addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
<bullet> Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for
the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.
by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with
rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of
before entering the building.
<bullet> Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the
U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701.
<bullet> Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail,
Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street
NE, Washington, DC 20554.
<bullet> People with Disabilities. To request materials in
accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print,
electronic files, audio format), send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#12747171272226527471713c757d64">[email&#160;protected]</a> or
call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530
(voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY).
Send a copy of your comment on the proposed information collection
to Cathy Williams, FCC, via email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ebbbb9aaab8d8888c58c849d">[email&#160;protected]</a> and to
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#430022372b3a6d142a2f2f2a222e30032520206d242c35">[email&#160;protected]</a>. Include in the comments the OMB control number
3060-0944.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Desiree Hanssen, Attorney Advisor,
Telecommunications and Analysis Division, Office of International
Affairs, at (202) 418-0887 or via email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#afebcadcc6ddcaca81e7cec1dcdccac1efc9cccc81c8c0d9">[email&#160;protected]</a>. For
additional information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act
information collection requirements contained in this document, send an
email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#3d6d6f7c7d5b5e5e135a524b">[email&#160;protected]</a> or contact Cathy Williams, Office of Managing
Director, at (202) 418-2918 or <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#94d7f5e0fcedbac3fdf8f8fdf5f9e7d4f2f7f7baf3fbe2">[email&#160;protected]</a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), in OI Docket No. 24-523 and MD Docket
No. 24-524; FCC 24-119, adopted on November 21, 2024, and released on
November 22, 2024. The full text of this document is available on the
FCC's website at <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-119A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-119A1.pdf</a>. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is adopted pursuant to
sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 201-255, 303(r), 403, 413 of the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 201-255,
303(r), 403, 413, and the Cable Landing License Act of 1921, 47 U.S.C.
34-39, and Executive Order 10530, section 5(a) (May 12, 1954) reprinted
as amended in 3 U.S.C. 301.
To request materials in accessible formats for people with
disabilities, send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection" class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d99f9a9aece9ed99bfbabaf7beb6af">[email&#160;protected]</a> or call the Consumer &
Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 (voice), (202) 418-0432
(TTY).
Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act. Consistent with
the Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act, Public Law 118-
9, a summary of this document is available on <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings">https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings</a>.
Initial Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis. This document
contains proposed information collection requirements. The Commission,
as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites
the general public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
comment on the information collection requirements contained in this
document, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public
Law 104-13. Public and agency comments are due May 12, 2025.
Comments should address: (a) whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of
the Commission, including whether the information shall have practical
utility; (b) the accuracy of the Commission's

[[Page 12037]]

burden estimates; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity
of the information collected; (d) ways to minimize the burden of the
collection of information on the respondents, including the use of
automated collection techniques or other forms of information
technology; and (e) way to further reduce the information collection
burden on small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees. In
addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002,
Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), the Commission seeks
specific comment on how the Commission might further reduce the
information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer
than 25 employees.

Synopsis

I. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

1. In the NPRM, the Commission initiates a comprehensive review of
its submarine cable rules to develop forward-looking rules to better
protect submarine cables, identify and mitigate harms affecting
national security and law enforcement, and facilitate the deployment of
submarine cables and capacity to the market. The Commission believes
this proceeding will improve Commission review and oversight of
submarine cable landing licenses and ensure each licensee continues to
serve the public interest in an evolving national security and law
enforcement landscape.

A. Legal Authority Under the Cable Landing License Act of 1921

1. Commission Jurisdiction
a. General License Requirement
2. As an initial matter, the Commission proposes to codify in its
rules when a submarine cable license is required under the Cable
Landing License Act. The Cable Landing License Act states that ``[n]o
person shall land or operate in the United States any submarine cable
directly or indirectly connecting the United States with any foreign
country, or connecting one portion of the United States with any other
portion thereof, unless a written license to land or operate such cable
has been issued by the President.'' The Cable Landing License Act
further states that ``[t]he conditions of sections 34 to 39 of this
title shall not apply to cables, all of which, including both
terminals, lie wholly within the continental United States.'' \1\
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\1\ In 1921, the definition of ``United States'' included ``the
Canal Zone, the Philippine Islands, and all territory, continental
or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States of
America.'' In 1946, following the proclamation of the independence
of the Philippines by the President, the definition was amended to
remove the Philippines. In 1959, Hawaii and Alaska became part of
the United States and were admitted as states. The Cable Landing
License Act definition, however, was not later amended to
incorporate Hawaii and Alaska as part of the continental United
States, or other territories or possessions.
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3. Specifically, the Commission proposes to adopt a rule stating
that a submarine cable landing license must be obtained prior to
landing a submarine cable that connects:
(1) the continental United States with any foreign country;
(2) Alaska, Hawaii or the U.S. territories or possessions with a
(i) foreign country,
(ii) the continental United States, or
(iii) with each other; or
(3) points within the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or
a territory or possession in which the cable is laid in international
waters.
Although the Commission believes that the scope of the Cable
Landing License Act has been well-understood, the Commission also
believes that codifying these requirements will bring additional
clarity to the application process and provide regulatory certainty to
submarine cable owners and operators.
b. Submarine Cable System Definition
4. For the same reasons the Commission proposes to codify in its
rules when a submarine cable landing license must be obtained, the
Commission seeks comment generally on whether to adopt a definition of
a submarine cable system. Conceptually and in simple terms, a submarine
cable system is comprised of a cable laid beneath the water that
carries telecommunication transmission signals between two or more
cable landing stations containing equipment that converts submarine
cable signals to terrestrial signals.\2\ The wet segment of the
submarine cable system makes landfall at the beach manhole or beach
joint that, in turn, connects to the dry segment and submarine cable
landing stations. A submarine cable landing station is a dry land
facility where submarine cables terminate traffic, allowing voice,
data, and internet to be transmitted to terrestrial or local
networks.\3\ At the terminal, equipment such as Submarine Line Terminal
Equipment (SLTE),\4\ converts cable signals to terrestrial signals
allowing the cable to interconnect to terrestrial facilities in the
United States.
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\2\ In the Technical Appendix, the Commission provides a
technical description of a submarine cable system for informational
purposes.
\3\ Cable landing stations contain equipment that supplies power
to optical submarine cables and equipment that receives signals from
submarine cables and transmits signals to a backhaul network that
terminates at a Point of Presence (PoP). A data center can serve as
a cable landing station, and PoPs can be located within a cable
landing station or data center.
\4\ The SLTE determines the cable's data throughput or
performance.
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5. Based on the description above, the Commission seeks comment on
whether it is necessary to adopt a definition of submarine cable for
purposes of the Commission's licensing process. If so, should the
Commission define a submarine cable as a cable(s) laid beneath the
water \5\ that transmits voice, data, and internet between terminal
cable landing stations that, among other functions, contain the SLTE
located in the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or the U.S.
territories or possessions. The Commission believes that defining a
submarine cable accordingly would account for a submarine cable system
that may have more than one terminal landing point

[[Page 12038]]

located on or near the coast. Moreover, the Commission believes this
definition is sufficiently flexible to also account for the various
technical options available to cable owners and operators for routing
traffic from a cable landing station located near the coast--which may
have only certain equipment such as Power Feed Equipment (PFE) \6\--to
another cable landing station to connect to a PoP, or similar facility.
The Commission seeks comment on this definition and whether it would
capture the current state of submarine cable systems and account for
the evolution and upgrades of submarine cable technologies.
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\5\ The Cable Landing License Act does not apply to submarine
cables wholly within the continental United States, such as a cable
traversing a river or a lake located wholly within the continental
United States. A submarine cable landing license is required under
the Cable Landing License Act, however, if a cable connects the
United States to a foreign country, such as Canada or Mexico. The
Commission has granted cable landing licenses, for instance, (1) to
land and operate a submarine cable under the Rio Grande River
connecting the United States and Mexico, (2) to land and operate a
submarine cable located within a tunnel traversing the Detroit River
between the United States and Canada, and (3) to land and operate a
submarine cable across Lake Ontario connecting the United States and
Canada. File No. SCL-LIC-20210930-00042, Actions Taken Under Cable
Landing License Act, Public Notice, Report No. SCL-00376, 37 FCC Rcd
7380, 7381-82 (IB 2022) (granting a cable landing license to Neural
Networks USA LLC ``for the purpose of landing and operating a non-
common carrier fiber optic submarine cable, the Neutral Networks
Laredo Cable, that connects Laredo, Texas and Nuevo Laredo,
Tamaulipas, Mexico,'' which ``will consist of three fiber optic
cables in a seven duct conduit extending 251 feet under the Rio
Grande River''); GTE Sprint Communications Corp.; Application for a
license to land in the United States a submarine cable extending
between the United States at Detroit, Michigan and Canada at
Windsor, Ontario, S-C-L-85-002, Cable Landing License, 1986 WL
292524 at *1, paras. 2, 4 (CCB Jan. 10, 1986) (granting to GTE
Sprint Communications Corp. a cable landing license ``to land and
operate a submarine cable between Detroit, Michigan and Windsor,
Ontario, Canada,'' which ``will be located within the conduit space
of the Detroit-Windsor tunnel which traverses the Detroit River
between Detroit[,] Michigan and Windsor, Ontario''); File No. SCL-
LIC-20180216-00002, Actions Taken Under Cable Landing License Act,
Public Notice, Report No. SCL-00226, DA 18-1026, 2018 WL 4851455 at
*2 (IB 2018) (granting a cable landing license to Crosslake Fiber
USA LP ``for the purpose of constructing, landing and operating a
private fiber-optic submarine cable network, the Crosslake Fibre
cable system, connecting Toronto, Ontario, with Cambria, New York,''
which ``will consist of a single, unrepeatered segment across Lake
Ontario'').
\6\ The PFE, in general, provides the electrical current that
powers submarine cable system repeaters and/or optical branching
units, and are located in or close to terminal landing stations.
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c. Public Interest Standard
6. The Commission proposes to codify in its rules the longstanding
practice that applicants seeking a submarine cable landing license or
modification, assignment, transfer of control, and renewal or extension
of a cable landing license must include in their application
information demonstrating how the grant of the application will serve
the public interest, convenience, and necessity, consistent with the
Commission's authority to withhold or revoke any license where doing so
``will assist in securing rights for the landing or operation of cables
in foreign countries, or in maintaining the rights or interests of the
United States or of its citizens in foreign countries, or will promote
the security of the United States.'' The Commission has long found that
national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy
concerns are important to its public interest analysis of submarine
cable applications, and these concerns warrant continued consideration
in view of evolving and heightened threats to the Nation's
communications infrastructure.\7\ The Commission's determination
assesses whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity would
be served by the grant of an application for a cable landing license or
modification, assignment, transfer of control, and renewal or extension
of a cable landing license and is based on the totality of the
circumstances presented by each application, supplemented with
additional information as necessary. The Commission seeks comment on
this proposed codification.
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\7\ See Executive Branch Review Report and Order, 85 FR 76360
(November 27, 20220), 35 FCC Rcd at 10928-29, para. 3 (``In adopting
rules for foreign carrier entry into the U.S. telecommunications
market over two decades ago in its Foreign Participation Order, the
Commission affirmed that it would consider national security, law
enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy concerns in its public
interest review of application for international section 214
authorizations and submarine cable landing licenses and petitions
for declaratory ruling under section 310(b) of the Act.''); see,
e.g., Applications of T-Mobile US, Inc. and Sprint Corporation for
Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, et al.,
WT Docket 18-197, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Declaratory Ruling,
and Order of Proposed Modification, 34 FCC Rcd 10578, 10732-33,
para. 349 (2019) (``When analyzing a transfer of control or
assignment application that involves foreign investment, we also
consider public interest issues related to national security, law
enforcement, foreign policy, or trade policy concerns.'').
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d. Character Qualifications
7. The Commission proposes to codify in its rules regarding
submarine cable applications the Commission's longstanding practice
regarding the character qualifications of applicants for Commission
licenses and authorizations. Specifically, the Commission proposes that
it will consider whether an applicant seeking a cable landing license
or modification, assignment, transfer of control, and renewal or
extension of a cable landing license has the requisite character
qualifications, including whether the applicant has violated the Cable
Landing License Act, the Communications Act, or Commission rules,
including making false statements or misrepresentations to the
Commission; whether the applicant has been convicted of a felony; and
whether there is an adjudicated determination that the applicant has
violated U.S. antitrust or other competition laws, has been found to
have engaged in fraudulent conduct before another government agency, or
has engaged in other non-FCC misconduct the Commission has found to be
relevant in assessing the character qualifications of a licensee or
authorization holder.\8\ The Commission has found in other contexts
that such conduct demonstrates that an applicant may fail to comply
with the Commission's rules and policies as well as any conditions on
its authorization.\9\ The public interest may therefore require, in a
particular case, that the Commission deny an application for a cable
landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, and
renewal or extension of a cable landing license because the applicant
has violated the Cable Landing License Act, the Communications Act, or
the Commission rules, or other laws that may be indicative of the
applicant's truthfulness and reliability, or that the Commission revoke
a cable landing license on such grounds. The Commission believes
consideration of an applicant's or cable landing licensee's regulatory
compliance and adherence to other relevant laws is also consistent with
the Commission's review of applications in other contexts and is
important to the Commission's assessment as to whether the public
interest, convenience, and necessity would be served by grant of the
applications. The Commission seeks comment on this proposed
codification.
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\8\ The term ``non-FCC misconduct'' refers to misconduct other
than a violation of the Rules or the Act. The Commission and the
courts have recognized that ``[t]he FCC relies heavily on the
honesty and probity of its licensees in a regulatory system that is
largely self-policing.'' Reliability is a key, necessary element to
operating a broadcast station in the public interest. An applicant
or licensee's propensity to comply with the law generally is
relevant because a willingness to be less than truthful with other
government agencies, to violate other laws, and, in particular, to
commit felonies, is potentially indicative of whether the applicant
or licensee will in the future conform to the Commission's rules or
policies.
\9\ See also MCI Telecommunications Corp.; Petition for
Revocation of Operating Authority, 3 FCC Rcd 509, 512, n.14 (1988)
(stating that character qualifications standards adopted in the
broadcast context, while not applicable to common carriers, can
provide guidance in the common carrier context).
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e. Process To Withhold or Revoke a Cable Landing License
8. In the NPRM, the Commission proposes and seeks comment on
adopting a procedural framework that it may use to consider whether
withholding a grant of a cable landing license or revocation of a cable
landing license is warranted pursuant to the Cable Landing License Act
and Executive Order 10530. The Commission has specific statutory
authority to withhold or revoke cable landing licenses under the Cable
Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530. Section 35 of the Cable
Landing License Act states that ``[t]he President may withhold or
revoke such license when he shall be satisfied after due notice and
hearing that such action will assist in securing rights for the landing
or operation of cables in foreign countries, or in maintaining the
rights or interests of the United States or of its citizens in foreign
countries, or will promote the security of the United States . . . .''
In addition, section 5 of Executive Order 10530 states that the
Commission is ``designated and empowered to . . . withhold[ ] or revoke
licenses to land or operate submarine cables in the United States . . .
.'' The Commission has not prescribed specific procedures applicable to
withholding or revocation of a cable landing license, yet in the
Executive Branch Review Report and Order, it has stated that if it is

[[Page 12039]]

considering revoking a license that was granted following referral to
the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United
States Telecommunications Services Sector (the Committee) or its
predecessor pursuant to Executive Order 13913, it will provide ``such
notice and an opportunity to respond as is required by due process and
applicable law, and appropriate in light of the facts and
circumstances.'' \10\ The Commission seeks to adopt a process
applicable to withholding or revocation of cable landing licenses that
will enable it to fulfill its statutory responsibilities--including,
among other things, promotion of the national and economic security of
the United States and other public interest considerations, such as
character issues--while ensuring procedural safeguards to protect
licensees' due process rights.
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\10\ Section 6 of Executive Order 13913 provides that the
Committee may at any time ``review existing licenses to identify any
additional or new risks to national security or law enforcement
interests of the United States.'' Executive Order 13913 defines
``license'' as ``any license, certificate of public interest, or
other authorization issued or granted by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) after referral of an application by the FCC to the
Committee established by subsection 3(a) of this order or, if
referred before the date of this order, to the group of executive
departments and agencies involved in the review process that was
previously in place.''
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9. Specifically, the Commission seeks comment on integrating the
approach it utilized in recent section 214 revocation proceedings--and
which the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld \11\--where the
Commission exercised its discretion to ``resolve disputes of fact in an
informal hearing proceeding on a written record,'' and reasonably
determined that the issues raised in those cases could be properly
resolved through the presentation and exchange of full written
submissions before the Commission itself.\12\ The Commission
tentatively finds that it may exercise similar procedural discretion in
its evaluation of each case as to whether withholding or revocation of
a cable landing license is warranted. The Commission believes that the
statutory language ``withhold . . . such license'' is identical to the
concept of denying an application. For purposes of submarine cable
licenses, withholding of a license would apply to the Commission's
consideration of a grant of an initial application for a cable landing
license and an application to modify, assign, transfer control of, or
renew or extend a cable landing license.\13\ The Commission seeks
comment on whether it may use the same informal hearing process or an
alternative process if it considers termination of a cable landing
license due to a licensee's failure to comply with any condition of the
license.
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\11\ China Telecom. (Ams.) Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.4th at 262 (citing
Procedural Streamlining of Administrative Hearings, Report and
Order, 35 FCC Rcd 10729, 10732-33, para. 11 (2020) (Administrative
Hearings Order) (`` `The Communications Act gives the Commission the
power of ruling on facts and policies in the first instance. In
exercising that power, the Commission may resolve disputes of fact
in an informal hearing proceeding on a written record. And the
Commission may reach any decision that is supported by substantial
evidence in the record.' '')).
\12\ China Telecom (Ams.) Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.4th at 256, 269
(``As explained above, the FCC has broad discretion to craft its own
rules `of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of
permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.' Schreiber,
381 U.S. at 290, 85 S.Ct. 1459 (internal quotations omitted); see
also Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543, 98 S.Ct. 1197). The Commission
has exercised this discretion to `resolve disputes of fact in an
informal hearing proceeding on a written record.' Streamlining
Order, 35 FCC Rcd. at 10732. Here, the Commission reasonably
determined that the issues raised in this case could be properly
resolved through the presentation and exchange of full written
submissions before the Commission itself.'').
\13\ Section 1.767(g)(15) sets forth that ``[t]he cable landing
license shall expire twenty-five (25) years from the in-service
date, unless renewed or extended upon proper application. Upon
expiration, all rights granted under the license shall be
terminated.'' The Commission notes that within the category of
applications for modifications, different procedures might be
appropriate based on the nature of the modification. For example,
procedures for reviewing an application seeking to incorporate a
revised mitigation agreement may be more streamlined than procedures
applicable to modifications to update facilities or add a submarine
cable landing station.
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10. Further, the Commission proposes to modify the Office of
International Affairs' (OIA) existing delegated authority to codify the
Commission's existing ability to deny an application and to revoke and/
or terminate a submarine cable landing license under the Cable Landing
License Act and Executive Order 10530.\14\ The Commission also proposes
to delegate authority to OIA to implement these procedures described
above for denial, revocation, and/or termination, as required by due
process and applicable law and in light of the relevant facts and
circumstances, including providing the applicant or licensee with
notice and opportunity to respond.\15\
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\14\ The Commission's proposed delegation of authority to OIA
would broaden OIA's existing delegated authority to act pursuant to
Sec. 0.19(q) and (r).
\15\ OIA's implementation could include, for example,
establishing response and pleading cycle deadlines, addressing
waiver requests, addressing requests for live hearing procedures,
seeking additional information, and providing for additional
pleading cycles.
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(i) Due Process and Procedural Requirements
11. The Commission tentatively finds that the process it seeks to
apply in cases involving withholding or revocation of cable landing
licenses--which, in effect, would constitute an informal hearing
process through the presentation and exchange of full written
submissions before the Commission--is consistent with due process and
procedural requirements under relevant statutes including the Cable
Landing License Act, the Communications Act, and the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). The Cable Landing License Act sets forth, among
other things, that ``[t]he President may withhold or revoke such
license when he shall be satisfied after due notice and hearing that
such action will assist in securing rights for the landing or operation
of cables in foreign countries, or in maintaining the rights or
interests of the United States or of its citizens in foreign countries,
or will promote the security of the United States . . . .'' The
authority vested in the President, including the authority to withhold
or revoke cable landing licenses, is delegated to the Commission
pursuant to Executive Order 10530, on the condition that ``[n]o such
license shall be granted or revoked by the Commission except after
obtaining approval of the Secretary of State and such advice from any
executive department or establishment of the Government as the
Commission may deem necessary.'' \16\ Currently, the Commission's rules
codify as a condition of such license that ``[t]he cable landing
license is revocable by the Commission after due notice and opportunity
for hearing pursuant to Section 2 of the Cable Landing License Act, 47
U.S.C. 35, or for failure to comply with the terms of the license or
with the Commission's rules.'' \17\
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\16\ Executive Order 10530, sec. 5(a).
\17\ Except as otherwise ordered by the Commission, the rules in
Sec. 1.767(g) apply to each licensee of a cable landing license
granted on or after March 15, 2002.
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12. The Cable Landing License Act, which is the source of authority
from which authority to withhold or revoke a cable landing license
emanates, states that the President may ``withhold or revoke such
[cable landing] license . . . after due notice and hearing,'' but does
not identify particular procedures that must be followed. As the
Commission has stated, where an agency's enabling statute does not
expressly require an ``on the record'' hearing and instead calls simply
for a ``hearing,'' a ``full hearing,'' or uses similar terminology,

[[Page 12040]]

the statute does not trigger the APA's formal adjudication procedures
absent clear evidence of congressional intent to do so.\18\ Agencies
must adhere to the formal hearing procedures in sections 554, 556, and
557 of the APA only in cases of ``adjudication required by statute to
be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.''
\19\ In addition to the Cable Landing License Act, neither the
Communications Act, the Commission's rules, nor the APA requires trial-
type hearing procedures. Congress has granted the Commission broad
authority to ``conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best
conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of
justice.'' The Commission has broad discretion to craft its own rules
``of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting
them to discharge their multitudinous duties.'' \20\ Furthermore, the
Communications Act gives the Commission the power of ruling on facts
and policies in the first instance. In exercising that power, the
Commission may resolve disputes of fact in an informal hearing
proceeding on a written record. For instance, the Commission's subpart
B hearing rules provide procedures for hearings in appropriate
circumstances, including procedures for the revocation of station
licenses and construction permits.\21\ In the 2023 VoIP Direct Access
to Numbers Report and Order (88 FR 80617, November 20, 2023), the
Commission delegated authority to the Wireline Competition Bureau and
the Enforcement Bureau to determine appropriate procedures and initiate
revocation and/or termination proceedings and to revoke and/or
terminate a direct access authorization, as required by due process and
applicable law and in light of the relevant facts and circumstances,
including providing the direct access authorization holder with notice
and opportunity to respond.
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\18\ See United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 410
U.S. 224, 234-38 (1973) (the words ``after hearing'' in the
Interstate Commerce Act do not require formal APA adjudication); see
also, e.g., City of W. Chicago, Ill. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 701 F.2d 632, 641 (statutory requirement of a ``hearing''
does not trigger formal, on-the-record hearing provisions of the
APA); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480-83 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (no presumption that ``public hearing'' means ``on the
record'' hearing); Farmers Union Cent. Exch. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486,
1499 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (``after full hearing'' is ``not
equivalent to the requirement of a decision `on the record' '')
(internal citation omitted).
\19\ 5 U.S.C. 551(7) (defining ``adjudication'').
\20\ Numbering Policies for Modern Communications et al., WC
Docket No. 13-97 et al., Second Report and Order (88 FR 80617,
November 20, 2023) and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(88 FR 74098, October 30, 2023), 38 FCC Rcd 8951, 8972, para. 64
(2023) (delegating authority to the Wireline Competition Bureau and
the Enforcement Bureau to determine appropriate procedures and
initiate revocation and/or termination proceedings and to revoke
and/or terminate a direct access authorization, as required by due
process and applicable law and in light of the relevant facts and
circumstances, including providing the direct access authorization
holder with notice and opportunity to respond).
\21\ Section 1.91 of the Commission's rules applies subpart B
hearing rules to revocations of ``station license[s]'' or
``construction permit[s],'' which refer to spectrum licenses issued
under title III of the Communications Act.
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13. The Commission proposes an informal written process for
Commission actions on denial of applications and revocation and
termination of cable landing licenses.\22\ The Commission seeks comment
on the procedural measures necessary to ensure the development of an
adequate administrative record, including procedures for participation
by other interested parties, and on the appropriate procedural
safeguards to ensure due process. To determine what process is due, the
Commission considers the factors set forth in the Mathews v. Eldridge
three-part test: (1) ``the private interest that will be affected by
the official action;'' (2) ``the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;'' and (3) ``the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.'' With regard to the first Mathews factor
(the nature of the private interest), while the Commission recognizes
that denial of a cable landing license application or revocation of a
cable landing license will have an impact on the applicant(s) or on the
licensee(s) and any customers, the Commission tentatively finds that
private companies have no unqualified right to land or operate a
submarine cable in the United States. On the contrary, the Cable
Landing License Act sets forth that a cable landing license may be
withheld or revoked, stating that the President may ``withhold or
revoke such license when he shall be satisfied after due notice and
hearing that such action will assist in securing rights for the landing
or operation of cables in foreign countries, or in maintaining the
rights or interests of the United States or of its citizens in foreign
countries, or will promote the security of the United States.'' The
Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530, which delegates
this denial and revocation authority to the Commission, thereby puts
regulated parties on notice that any application for a cable landing
license is subject to denial by the Commission and any grant of a cable
landing license is contingent on the Commission's authority to revoke
such license. Further, whereas licensees facing revocation have a
private interest in continuing to operate licensed facilities,
applicants typically have no such interest.
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\22\ In the 2020 Executive Branch Review Report and Order, the
Commission addressed how it would handle modifications and
revocations requested by the executive branch. See Executive Branch
Review Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd at 10963-64, para. 92
(``Consistent with current practice, the Commission will provide any
affected authorization holder or licensee an opportunity to respond
to the Committee's recommendation prior to any action by the
Commission. This will address the commenters' concern that the
Commission might proceed with modification or revocation of an
existing authorization or license without warning or the opportunity
to comment. [The Commission finds] that new rules or a separate
proceeding are unnecessary to address Committee reviews of existing
licenses as the Commission already has procedural safeguards in
place to protect licensees' due process rights, and that until such
time as the Commission has more experience with such Committee
recommendations, it is more appropriate to tailor such procedures to
the facts and circumstances of a particular Committee
recommendation.'').
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14. With regard to the second Mathews factor (risk of erroneous
deprivation without additional procedures and their probable value),
the Commission tentatively finds that the process it seeks to apply
would provide cable landing licensees with sufficient due process--
notice and the opportunity to be heard ``at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.'' \23\ Neither the Cable Landing License Act, the
APA, nor the Communications Act requires the conduct of evidentiary
hearings for denial of cable landing license applications or revocation
of cable landing licenses. The Commission tentatively finds it
sufficient due process to provide applicants or cable landing licensees
with timely and adequate notice of the reasons for any denial or
revocation action, and opportunity to respond with their own evidence
and to make any factual, legal, or policy arguments. Further, the
process the Commission proposes would provide any other interested
parties, including any joint applicants or licensees or other proposed
or existing owners of a submarine cable, with notice and the
opportunity to be heard. Finally, as noted above, the

[[Page 12041]]

private interests in grant of an application typically are less than
the private interests in continued use of licensed facilities, thus,
the Commission believes that it may appropriately deny an application
with fewer procedures than would be appropriate for revocation. The
Commission seeks comment on this analysis. Would the Commission's
proposed process for denying initial applications be appropriate for
renewal and extension applications \24\ or for modification,
assignment, or transfer of control applications? If not, what is the
due process rationale for using different procedures in these
circumstances?
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\23\ See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (citing Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); cf. 5 U.S.C. 558(c)(1) and (2)
(permitting ``revocation . . . of a license'' following ``notice by
the agency in writing'' of any basis for revocation and an
``opportunity to demonstrate compliance'').
\24\ For purposes of this proceeding, the Commission refers to
applications to renew or extend a cable landing license collectively
as ``renewal applications.''
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15. With regard to the third Mathews factor (the Government's
interest), the Commission tentatively finds that ``the fiscal and
administrative burdens'' on the Commission and the relevant executive
branch agencies, including the Committee, weigh in favor of the
Commission's proposal to base its procedures on those it utilized in
the denial of an international section 214 application of China Mobile
USA and in subsequent section 214 revocation proceedings involving
Chinese state-owned entities. As the Commission stated in the China
Telecom Americas Order on Revocation and Termination, China Unicom
Americas Order on Revocation, and Pacific Networks and ComNet Order on
Revocation and Termination,\25\ courts have recognized that hearings
before an administrative law judge, with live testimony and cross
examination, impose significant temporal and cost burdens on agencies.
The Commission determined, among other things, that the fiscal and
administrative burden on the Government would be especially heavy in
those cases, as a trial before an administrative law judge could
require participation by officials from other agencies and take time
away from their essential duties to participate in additional
administrative proceedings. For these same reasons, the Commission
tentatively finds that the administrative burden on the Government
would be heavy in cases involving denial of cable landing license
applications or revocation of cable landing licenses. More importantly,
given the national security issues that may be at stake, any resulting
unwarranted delay could be harmful. The Commission also believes that
traditional live hearing procedures involving testimony and cross-
examination could entail significant administrative burdens on the
Commission even in cases involving other issues that do not involve the
executive branch agencies, such as character concerns, or other
Commission rule violations. The Commission seeks comment on this
assessment.
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\25\ China Telecom (Americas) Corporation, GN Docket No. 20-109,
File Nos. ITC-214-20010613-00346, ITC-214-20020716-00371, ITC-T/C-
20070725-00285, Order on Revocation and Termination, 36 FCC Rcd
15966, 15958, para. 27 (2021) (China Telecom Americas Order on
Revocation and Termination), aff'd, China Telecom. (Ams.) Corp. v.
FCC, 57 F.4th 256 (D.C. Cir. 2022); China Unicom (Americas)
Operations Limited, GN Docket No. 20-110, File Nos. ITC-214-
20020728-00361, ITC-214-20020724-00427, Order on Revocation, 37 FCC
Rcd 1480, 1499, para. 35 (2022) (China Unicom Americas Order on
Revocation), appeal pending sub nom China Unicom (Americas)
Operations Limited v. FCC, No. 22-70029 (9th Cir.); Pacific Networks
Corp. and ComNet (USA) LLC, GN Docket No. 20-111, File Nos. ITC-214-
20090105-00006 and ITC-214-20090424-00199, Order on Revocation and
Termination, 37 FCC Rcd 4220, 4242, para. 29 (2022) (Pacific
Networks and ComNet Order on Revocation and Termination) (``A
detailed procedural history of Pacific Networks' and ComNet's
authorizations can be found in the Order to Show Cause.''), aff'd,
Pacific Networks Corp. v. FCC, 77 F.4th 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2023); see,
e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d at 1485; G.E. v. EPA,
595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 38-39 (D.D.C. 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

16. The Commission seeks comment generally on its Mathews analysis
and whether the process it proposes herein would provide applicants and
cable landing licensees with sufficient due process and notice and
opportunity to respond. The Commission notes that the process that it
proposes to apply in cases involving denial of cable landing license
applications or revocation of cable landing licenses is distinct from
the Commission's subpart B hearing rules, including the written hearing
rules codified in Sec. Sec. 1.371 through 1.377. The Commission has
never applied its subpart B hearing rules to every adjudication,\26\
and has never had an established practice of requiring subpart B
hearings for denial of cable landing license applications or revocation
of cable landing licenses. Indeed, the Commission does not believe it
would be appropriate to require subpart B rules and procedures,
including the written hearing rules providing for discovery and the
ability to request an oral hearing before a presiding officer, in all
proceedings to deny cable landing license applications or to revoke
cable landing licenses, particularly in cases involving national
security issues, where the Commission has previously concluded that the
burdens on the Government of implementing such procedures outweighed
the private interest and the probable value of additional procedures.
Moreover, under the subpart B hearing rules, if the Commission were to
delegate initial responsibility to an administrative law judge, the
resulting decision could be appealed to the full Commission--which
would be required to review the record independently and would not owe
any deference to the administrative law judge's determinations.\27\ The
Commission tentatively concludes that the extra step of appointing an
administrative law judge to preside prior to the Commission's
independent review, rather than simply proceeding directly before the
Commission, will not be necessary for nor will enhance the ability of
the Commission, which will be the ultimate arbiter, to decide matters
that may arise in its evaluation of applications for a cable landing
license or existing cable landing licenses. Further, courts have held
that the question of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is ``within
[the agency's] discretion, and it may `properly deny an evidentiary
hearing if the issues, even disputed issues, may be adequately resolved
on the written record, at least where there is no issue of motive,
intent or credibility.' '' Nevertheless, the Commission seeks comment
on whether it should provide a process by which an applicant for a
cable landing license or a cable landing licensee may request a live
hearing in certain cases. The Commission also seeks comment on whether
it should use different procedures for matters that do not involve
executive branch expertise. If so, what due process or administrative
considerations are relevant to this determination?
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\26\ In fact, Sec. 1.201 of those rules provides that subpart B
applies only to cases that ``have been designated for hearing.'' An
explanatory note makes clear that the new procedures for written
hearings are a subset of such cases.
\27\ See Kay v. FCC, 396 F.3d 1184, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(explaining how ``an agency reviewing an ALJ decision is not in a
position analogous to a court of appeals reviewing a case tried to a
district court'').
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17. Furthermore, unlike revocations of title III station licenses
and construction permits, the Commission may not revoke a cable landing
license ``except after obtaining approval of the Secretary of State and
such advice from any executive department or establishment of the
Government as the Commission may deem necessary.'' Therefore, in
contrast to subpart B hearings, any revocation procedures for cable
landing licenses must integrate approval or objection by the State
Department before the Commission may issue a final decision. The
Commission notes that the Commission and the State Department have
existing procedures by which the State Department approves

[[Page 12042]]

the Commission's grant of a cable landing license application or
revocation of a cable landing license, as required by Executive Order
10530, and these procedures would continue to apply to any revocation
of a cable landing license. Such procedures would not apply to the
Commission's denial of a cable landing license application, given
Executive Order 10530 does not require the State Department's approval
of a denial action and expressly states that ``no such license shall be
granted or revoked by the Commission except after obtaining approval of
the Secretary of State . . . .'' The Commission notes that the language
in Executive Order 10530 appears inconsistent with Sec. 1.767(b) of
the existing rules, which states that cable license applications are
``acted upon by the Commission after obtaining the approval of the
Secretary of State.'' The term ``acted upon'' would appear to include
denial of an application. The Commission proposes to amend the rule so
that it does not state that denial of an application requires approval
by the Secretary of State. The Commission seeks comment on the change.
While the procedures under subpart B do not automatically apply to
denial of cable landing license applications or revocation of cable
landing licenses, the Commission seeks comment on whether it should
incorporate these or similar procedures, including hearings before an
administrative law judge, should the Commission determine they are
appropriate in a specific case, for example where a matter does not
involve executive branch participation. Under what circumstances, if
any, should any such procedures be incorporated in denial or revocation
proceedings involving cable landing licenses? The Commission further
seeks comment on whether its procedures for denial of an application
might be more streamlined than the Commission's procedures for
revocation of an existing license, consistent with the Cable Landing
License Act, the APA, and due process.\28\ Should the Commission's
procedures for denial of an application to modify, assign, or transfer
control of a license, or for renewal and extension applications mirror
the Commission's procedures or denial of an initial application? What
considerations are relevant to this determination?
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\28\ The Commission notes, for example, that it denied China
Mobile USA's application for an international section 214
authorization after review of the executive branch recommendation,
China Mobile USA's opposition, and the executive branch reply. In
contrast, when the Commission subsequently revoked the international
section 214 authorizations of CTA, the Commission provided notice
and an opportunity to respond before it instituted a revocation
proceeding. Similarly, under the APA, the procedure for denying an
application need not mirror the procedure for revoking a license.
Compare 5 U.S.C. 558(c) (``When application is made for a license
required by law, the agency, with due regard for the rights and
privileges of all the interested parties or adversely affected
persons and within a reasonable time, shall set and complete
proceedings required . . . by law and shall make its decision'')
with id. (``Except in cases of willfulness or those in which public
health, interest, or safety requires otherwise, the withdrawal,
suspension, revocation, or annulment of a license is lawful only if,
before the institution of agency proceedings therefor, the licensee
has been given--(1) notice by the agency in writing of the facts or
conduct which may warrant the action; and (2) opportunity to
demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful requirements.'').
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(ii) Denial and Revocation Proceedings
18. Under the Commission's existing rules, the filing of an initial
application for a cable landing license or an application to modify,
assign, transfer control, or renew or extend a cable landing license
after the Commission places the application on an Accepted for Filing
public notice commences a proceeding in which the Commission may grant
or deny an application. Commission staff may seek additional
information after an application is filed, and once complete, the
application is placed on public notice.\29\ Any executive branch
recommendation to deny or condition the grant of an application is
included in the record of the proceeding, and the Commission provides
the applicant a written opportunity to respond. The Commission
considers the entire record in reaching its determination. The
Commission or OIA, pursuant to its delegated authority, can deny
applications for cable landing licenses.\30\ Consistent with the
Commission's rules, applicants may seek reconsideration of a denial of
an application. The Commission seeks comment on the extent to which
existing procedures for denial of applications should be modified in
any respect. The Commission tentatively concludes that additional
procedures are not warranted but that OIA should have delegated
authority to adopt additional procedures on a case-by-case basis as
circumstances warrant, and consistent with due process. The Commission
proposes that it may commence a revocation proceeding either on its own
initiative or upon the filing of a recommendation by the executive
branch agencies, including the Committee, to revoke the license of a
cable landing licensee. To the extent the Commission considers whether
revocation of a cable landing license is warranted, the Commission
proposes to implement the approach it used in the most recent section
214 revocation proceedings. Specifically, in those revocation
proceedings, the Commission exercised its discretion to ``resolve
disputes of fact in an informal hearing proceeding on a written
record,'' and reasonably determined that the issues raised in those
cases could be properly resolved through the presentation and exchange
of full written submissions before the Commission itself. The
Commission explained that although it adopted regulations prescribing
certain procedures for the revocation of station licenses and
construction permits pursuant to part 1, subpart B of its rules, those
regulations do not apply to the revocation of a section 214
authorization. To provide affected carriers with due process, the
Commission allowed them to submit evidence and arguments in writing and
determined the need for the revocation and/or termination of section
214 authorizations on the basis of a written record. The court of
appeals affirmed the Commission's use of these procedures.\31\ The
Commission seeks comment on whether it should incorporate similar
procedures to determine whether revocation of a cable landing license
is warranted. The Commission also seeks comment on whether it should
retain authority to modify these procedures on a case-by-case basis as
circumstances warrant, as long as any alternative procedures provide
adequate due process.
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\29\ See 47 CFR 1.767(a)(10) (requiring ``[a]ny other
information that may be necessary to enable the Commission to act on
the application.'').
\30\ 47 CFR 0.351(a)(9) (delegating authority to OIA ``[t]o act
upon applications for cable landing licenses pursuant to Sec. 1.767
of this chapter'').
\31\ China Telecom (Americas) Corp., 57 F.4th at 262 (citing
Administrative Hearings Order, 35 FCC Rcd at 10732-33, para. 11) (``
`The Communications Act gives the Commission the power of ruling on
facts and policies in the first instance. In exercising that power,
the Commission may resolve disputes of fact in an informal hearing
proceeding on a written record. And the Commission may reach any
decision that is supported by substantial evidence in the record.'
'')); id. at 268-71 (holding that discovery and live hearing
procedures, and an opportunity to achieve or demonstrate compliance
were not required ``by statute, regulation, FCC practice, or the
Constitution'').
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19. The Commission seeks comment on whether it may use the same
process or an alternative process if it considers termination of a
cable landing license due to a licensee's failure to comply with any
condition of the license. Under section 5 of Executive Order 10530, the
Commission is ``designated and empowered to . . . withhold[ ] or revoke
licenses to land or operate submarine cables in the United States . . .
.'' Separate and apart from revocation, the Commission uses the term

[[Page 12043]]

``termination'' where a license or authorization is terminated based on
the licensee's or authorization holder's failure to comply with a
condition of the license or authorization, and has determined that the
procedures applicable to termination need not mirror the procedures
used for revocation of licenses or authorizations.\32\ The Commission
proposes to delegate authority to OIA to determine appropriate
procedures, within the framework authorized by the Commission and
consistent with Commission precedent and guidance, and initiate
revocation and/or termination proceedings and revoke and/or terminate a
cable landing license, as required by due process and applicable law
and in light of the relevant facts and circumstances, including
providing a licensee with notice and opportunity to respond and, where
appropriate, to achieve compliance with all lawful requirements.\33\
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\32\ See China Telecom Americas Order on Revocation and
Termination, 36 FCC Rcd at 15988, para. 35; see also id. at 15989,
para. 36 (``[S]ection 558(c)(2) does not grant a substantive right
to escape from a condition that terminates a license.''); Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. United States, 774 F.2d 1193, 1200-01 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (holding that the procedural requirements of section 558(c)
apply only where ``the licensee [may] be able to establish
compliance with all legal requirements or . . . change its conduct
in a manner that will put its house in lawful order'') (internal
quotation and citations omitted).
\33\ See China Telecom. (Ams.) Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.4th at 270
(``Given the futility of offering China Telecom even more of an
opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance than they received,
the Commission did not err in denying it.''); Pacific Networks Corp.
v. FCC, 77 F.4th at 1166 (``In short, the FCC reasonably explained
why no realistic agreement could have worked given the carriers'
proven lack of trustworthiness.'').
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20. The Commission seeks comment on whether this procedural
framework would provide cable landing licensees and any other affected
parties with sufficient notice of the basis for any denial, revocation,
or termination action, an opportunity to present evidence and arguments
that support their respective positions, and an opportunity to respond
to opposing evidence and arguments. The Commission also seeks comment
on whether this process would ensure the development of an adequate
administrative record, including procedures for participation by other
affected individuals and entities, and appropriate procedural
safeguards to ensure due process.
21. Cable Landing Licenses/Licensees That are Insolvent or No
Longer Exist. Section 1.767(m)(2) of the rules requires that ``[a]ny
licensee that seeks to relinquish its interest in a cable landing
license shall file an application to modify the license.'' The
Commission's records in the International Communications Filing System
(ICFS) and other records, indicate that some submarine cables licensed
by the Commission may not have commenced service and/or some cable
landing licensees of record may be insolvent or no longer in
operation.\34\ Furthermore, some licensees that may be insolvent or no
longer exist did not file a modification application to relinquish
their interest in the cable landing license or otherwise notify the
Commission. The Commission seeks comment on what processes it should
adopt when submarine cables and/or licensees are insolvent or no longer
exist generally. The Commission seeks comment on whether the same
process proposed above is appropriate in all cases involving cable
landing licenses, or whether the Commission should consider alternative
processes. For example, should the Commission adopt a similar
cancellation process as proposed in the Evolving Risks NPRM (88 FR
50486, August 1, 2023) for international section 214 authorization
holders that are no longer in business, where failure to timely respond
to an information collection or other inquiry by the Commission may be
deemed presumptive evidence that the cable landing licensee is no
longer in operation? \35\ In these instances, the Commission or OIA may
assess whether the cable landing licensee no longer complies with
certain terms of the license or the Commission's rules,\36\ and thus
revocation and/or termination of the license or the licensee's rights
under the license and the Cable Landing License Act is warranted.\37\
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\34\ See, e.g., Letter from Peter J. Schildkraut, Counsel for
AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC
at 2-3 (Feb. 5, 2020) (on file in File No. SCL-MOD-20191202-00038)
(filing supplement to modification application and addressing, among
other things, that the corporate status of certain licensees is void
according to state records).
\35\ See Evolving Risks NPRM, 38 FCC Rcd at 4363, paras. 25-26;
id. at 4377, para. 66.
\36\ 47 CFR 1.767(g)(14) (``The cable landing license is
revocable by the Commission after due notice and opportunity for
hearing pursuant to section 2 of the Cable Landing License Act, 47
U.S.C. 35, or for failure to comply with the terms of the license or
with the Commission's rules . . . .'').
\37\ For instance, the Commission's rules require, as a
condition of a cable landing license, that ``[t]he licensee, or in
the case of multiple licensees, the licensees collectively, shall
maintain de jure and de facto control of the U.S. portion of the
cable system, including the cable landing stations in the United
States, sufficient to comply with the requirements of the
Commission's rules and any specific conditions of the license.'' See
also 47 CFR 1.767(m)(2).
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22. For consortium cables, if any of the cable landing licensees no
longer exists and was unable to file an application to modify the
license to relinquish its interest in the license, should the
Commission adopt rules requiring the remaining joint licensee(s) of the
cable, if any, to collectively file a modification application to
remove the licensee from the license by demonstrating and certifying
that (1) the licensee no longer exists as a legal entity, and (2) the
remaining licensee(s) will retain collectively de jure and de facto
control of the U.S. portion of the cable system sufficient to comply
with the requirements of the Commission's rules and any specific
conditions of the license? Or, should the Commission adopt rules
requiring joint licensees of a submarine cable system to identify the
lead licensee responsible for administrative matters concerning the
cable system, including directing the lead licensee to submit a filing
in the record demonstrating and certifying whether or not an identified
licensee is insolvent or has ceased to exist and that the remaining
licensee(s) will retain collectively de jure and de facto control of
the U.S. portion of the cable system?
2. Three-Year Periodic Reporting
23. Currently, a cable landing license expires ``twenty-five (25)
years after the in-service date for the cable, unless renewed or
extended upon proper application'' pursuant to Sec. 1.767(g)(15) of
the Commission's rules.\38\ The Commission, however, does not routinely
require a submarine cable landing licensee to provide updated ownership
and related submarine cable system information during the 25-year term
with the exception of annual circuit capacity data. The annual circuit
capacity data, however, lacks critical ownership and facilities
information that would allow the Commission and other Government
agencies to assess for evolving national security and law enforcement
concerns. To ensure that the Commission has the information it needs to
timely monitor and continually assess national security or other risks
that may arise over the course of a licensee's 25-year license term,
the Commission proposes to require

[[Page 12044]]

licensees to provide certain information to the Commission every three
years (hereinafter, ``periodic reporting''). Alternatively, the
Commission seeks comment on whether a different time period would
support the Commission's goals.
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\38\ 47 CFR 1.767(g)(15) (``The licensee must notify the
Commission within thirty (30) days of the date the cable is placed
into service. The cable landing license shall expire twenty-five
(25) years from the in-service date, unless renewed or extended upon
proper application. Upon expiration, all rights granted under the
license shall be terminated.''). See 2001 Cable Report and Order, 67
FR 1615 (January 14, 2002), 16 FCC Rcd 22167 (codifying the 25-year
license term condition in Sec. 1.767(g)(14), and which is currently
codified in Sec. 1.767(g)(15)). The 25-year license term is one of
the routine conditions the Commission adopted in 2001 that applies
to ``each licensee of a cable landing licenses granted on or after
March 15, 2002.''
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24. As a fundamental matter, it is critical that the Commission has
a continuous and systematic understanding of who owns and controls
submarine cables and how they are used because submarine cables are a
significant component of the global communications ecosystem. Submarine
cables serve as the foundation for the global internet infrastructure
and carry over 99% of transoceanic digital communications. Submarine
cables are also critical infrastructure that historically have carried
more than 95% of all U.S.-international voice, data, and internet
traffic, including civilian and military U.S. Government traffic. And
increasing demand for capacity \39\ has spurred the deployment of more
submarine cables.
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\39\ Telegeography reports that, ``[a]s recently as 2016,
internet backbone providers accounted for the majority of demand.''
At that time, internet backbone providers or internet Service
Providers (ISPs) included businesses, such as AT&T, Verizon,
Comcast, Tata Communications, CenturyLink, Cogent Communications,
Deutsche Telekom, GTT, NTT Communications, and Sprint, among others.
Now, internet backbone providers no longer dominate the demand for
global submarine cable capacity. According to TeleGeography, ``a
handful of major content and cloud service providers--namely Google,
Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft--have become the primary sources of
demand. As of 2020, these companies are the dominant users of
international bandwidth, account for two-thirds of all used
international capacity.'' These entities ``led the way in building
mega Data Centers to meet th[e] growing demand [for data processing
and storage capacity.'' Moreover, the ``data demands of
hyperscalers' subsea cable is surging 45% to 60% per year.'' Indeed,
as of 2023, content and cloud networks accounted for more than 70%
of all bandwidth usage.''
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25. Because the Commission does not ordinarily receive updated
information about changes in the ownership of licensees or the
submarine cable system over the course of the 25-year license term, the
Commission likely has incomplete and outdated information regarding
submarine cable landing licensees with foreign ownership and the
submarine cable system itself. The Commission does receive such
information when an applicant/licensee (1) seeks Commission consent to
the substantial transfer of control and/or assignment or modification
of its existing cable landing license, (2) the licensee undergoes a pro
forma transfer of control and/or assignment that require(s)
notification to the Commission, (3) files a foreign carrier affiliation
notification, or (4) files a renewal application.\40\ The information
obtained from substantial or pro forma assignment and/or transfer of
control applications and foreign carrier affiliation notifications,
however, is limited to that particular licensee and does not provide
updated information about the other licensees. In the case of renewal
applications, the information obtained is based on the end of the
license term. The Commission also has authority to conduct an ad hoc
assessment of whether a licensee's cable landing license presents
national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy
risks that warrant revocation. Reliance on sporadic submissions of
applications and ad hoc assessments for important information regarding
this critical infrastructure, however, creates an information gap that
limits the Commission's knowledge of the licensees, updated information
on the cable itself, and its ability to assess any national security,
law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy concerns.
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\40\ The Commission notes that submarine cable landing licensees
are required to submit annual circuit capacity data under Sec.
43.82 of its rules.
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26. The Commission tentatively concludes that the periodic
reporting requirement would improve the Commission's oversight of
submarine cable licenses and ensure the license continues to serve the
public interest. In this regard, the Commission tentatively finds that
the information the Commission would obtain from its proposed three-
year periodic reporting requirement provides crucial information about
submarine cables that complements the capacity information the
Commission already receives from the annual Sec. 43.82 circuit
capacity reports provided by filing entities. Among other things, the
Commission tentatively concludes information derived from the periodic
reports such as updated contact information for licensees and cable
landing stations and geographic coordinates of the cable landing
stations, coupled with information from the Commission's annual circuit
capacity reports, would better enable the Commission to carry out its
public interest responsibilities such as assessing capacity information
and conducting time-sensitive outreach to licensees during a natural
disaster or in a state of emergency.\41\ Importantly, the Commission
believes the updated information regarding this critical infrastructure
would improve consistency in the Commission's consideration of evolving
public interest risks (including national security risks), completeness
of the Commission's information regarding submarine cable landing
licensees, and timely Commission attention to issues that warrant
heightened scrutiny.
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\41\ See Proposed Rules, Sec. 1.70016(b) (setting forth the
contents that must be included in the proposed periodic report).
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27. Additionally, the Commission tentatively concludes the periodic
reporting requirement would ensure a more consistent and complete
referral of relevant evolving issues to the executive branch agencies,
including the Committee, for their review and ultimately, improved
protection of U.S. communications infrastructure. With updated
information regarding this critical infrastructure, the Commission
tentatively concludes it, in coordination with the relevant executive
branch agencies, could assess national security and other public
interest risks and, if necessary, pursue remedial action and/or
initiate a revocation or termination proceeding. As noted above, the
executive branch agencies recommended that the Commission revoke
certain international section 214 authorizations that posed
unacceptable risks to national security and law enforcement interests
of the United States. Ultimately, the Commission believes that its
proposed periodic reporting requirement would meet the Commission's
principal goal of providing it with updated critical information
regarding licensees and the cable systems and ``promote the security of
the United States . . . .'' in accordance with the Cable Landing
License Act.
28. Accordingly, as discussed below, the Commission proposes to
adopt and codify in its rules a routine condition that would require
all submarine cable landing licensees to jointly or separately submit
to the Commission every three years updated information about, among
other things, the licensee and its ownership, points of contact for the
submarine cable system, use of foreign owned Managed Network Service
Providers (MNSPs), as well as cybersecurity and regulatory compliance
certifications. The Commission also proposes that failure to timely
submit a periodic report would constitute a breach of this condition
that could warrant Commission enforcement action or revocation, the
procedures of which are discussed above. The Commission tentatively
concludes that the proposed reporting requirement would address the
aforementioned information gap by providing the Commission with updated
critical information necessary to fulfill its national security and
other public interest responsibilities on a more

[[Page 12045]]

regular and systematic basis. The Commission seeks comment on this
proposal and the impact on small entities, as well as any alternatives.
29. Under the Commission's proposed approach, the submarine cable
landing license would continue in force throughout its term. To the
extent circumstances in any particular situation raise national
security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy or other
concerns (for example, due to incompleteness of the periodic report or
new foreign ownership), the Commission could initiate a further inquiry
to assess the risks and concerns raised and coordinate with the
relevant executive branch agencies that may, in turn, result in
Commission enforcement action, executive branch mitigation efforts,
and/or a revocation or termination proceeding. The Commission's
proposed periodic reporting requirement would not supplant existing
Commission authority to conduct an ad hoc assessment of whether a
licensee's cable landing license presents public interest concerns,
including national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or
trade policy risks nor would this proposed approach replace the 25-year
license term. The Commission proposes that each periodic report would
be submitted through a filing in ICFS, or any successor system, under
each licensee's license file number and would not require action from
the Commission, i.e., a grant or confirmation. The Commission proposes
that licensees with reportable foreign ownership as of thirty (30) days
prior to the date of the submission or that have a mitigation agreement
with the Committee or particular agencies must also file a copy of the
report directly with the Committee.
30. The Commission seeks comment generally on this approach and
whether a three-year period is the appropriate timeframe. The
Commission proposes a three-year period because it strikes an
appropriate balance between the Commission's need for current
ownership, location and facilities information and the reporting burden
on the Commission's licensees. The Commission can also stagger the
reviews over three years, reducing the workload on the Commission and
on the Committee. The Commission seeks comment on whether it should
adopt a time period that is longer or shorter for purposes of assessing
national security, law enforcement, and other risks. The Commission
notes, however, that because the marketplace changes quickly, it
believes requiring periodic information longer than three years might
result in the Commission missing significant changes in ownership and
changes in facilities, thus potentially endangering national security
and other concerns.
31. The Commission proposes that any new report would reflect
updated information since the report three-years prior or other
substantive filing. If no changes have occurred since the licensee's
last periodic report or other substantive filing--which may be an
application for a cable landing license or modification, assignment,
transfer of control, and renewal or extension of a cable landing
license--should the licensee have to provide only a periodic statement
that its license remains in compliance with the Commission's rules and
with its most recent periodic report, or other substantive filing? How
should the Commission account for a situation where the substantive
filing does not require all of the same information that would be in a
periodic report? Lastly, should the licensee re-certify, such as to the
character qualification requirements, among other requirements?
32. The Commission seeks comment on how to properly account for
multiple licensees on a submarine cable system. The Commission proposes
to require joint licensees to submit one joint periodic report per
submarine cable system, subject to the proposed filing contents
requirements. In what the Commission expects will be the unlikely event
of potential issues that may prevent a joint filing, the Commission
seeks comment on whether to permit an individual licensee to file its
own report. Should the Commission adopt a rule that joint licensees or
consortium members must identify a lead licensee that would be required
to file the periodic report on behalf of the joint licensees or
consortium? How can joint licensees or consortium members provide the
periodic information while remaining accountable for providing
truthful, complete, and accurate information? Additionally, how can the
Commission minimize burdens on licensees while balancing the
Commission's policy considerations with administrative efficiency for
the Commission and the relevant executive branch agencies, including
the Committee? What other options should the Commission consider given
evolving national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or
trade policy risks?
a. Prioritizing the Periodic Reporting and Other National Security and
Law Enforcement Concerns
33. The Commission proposes to adopt a schedule that prioritizes
the filing and review of periodic reports based on whether the cable's
licensee(s) have reportable foreign ownership and the length of the
time since the Commission's most recent review of the license. The
proposal would structure the timing of the submission of periodic
reports to minimize burdens on licensees, the Commission,\42\ and the
executive branch staff, while ensuring that the Commission receives the
information it needs to protect this critical infrastructure. The
Commission also proposes to delegate authority to OIA to establish and
modify, as appropriate, the filing categories and associated deadlines,
and if needed, to consult with the relevant executive branch agencies
concerning prioritization of the periodic reports.
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\42\ See Review of the Commission's Assessment and Collection of
Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 2024 Assessment and Collection of
Space and Earth Station Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 2024, MD
Docket Nos. 24-85 and 24-86, Second Report and Order, 89 FR 78452
(September 25, 2024), FCC-24-93, para. 45 (2024) (2024 Regulatory
Fee Second Report and Order) (noting that ``in the Office of
International Affairs, there are eight Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs)
within the Telecommunications and Analysis Division that work on
international bearer circuit-related issues, including the services
provided over submarine cables . . . .'').
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34. The Commission proposes to assign each of the existing licensed
cable systems to one of four categories with a different deadline for
each, and with the deadlines separated by six months. The Commission
proposes to require that licensees of submarine cable systems in
Category 1 shall submit their initial periodic report by six months
following the effective date of new rules adopted in this proceeding,
and licensees of submarine cable systems in Categories 2, 3, and 4,
respectively, shall submit their initial periodic reports thereafter in
fixed intervals separated by six months.
<bullet> Category 1: Submarine cable systems that: (1) have a
licensee that is directly or indirectly wholly or partially owned by a
government of, or other entities with a place of organization in, a
``foreign adversary'' country, as defined in the Department of
Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4; (2) have a licensee with a place of
organization in a ``foreign adversary'' country; or (3) land in a
``foreign adversary'' country.\43\
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\43\ 15 CFR 7.4 (stating ``[t]he Secretary has determined that
the following foreign governments or foreign non-government persons
have engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct
significantly adverse to the national security of the United States
or security and safety of United States persons and, therefore,
constitute foreign adversaries solely for the purposes of the
Executive Order, this rule, and any subsequent rule'' promulgated
pursuant to the Executive Order); see 15 CFR 7.2 (``Foreign
adversary means any foreign government or foreign non-government
person determined by the Secretary to have engaged in a long-term
pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the
national security of the United States or security and safety of
United States persons.'').

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[[Page 12046]]

<bullet> Category 2: Submarine cable systems where the Commission's
most recent review of the license \44\ occurred 4 or more years ago
\45\ and where a licensee has reportable foreign ownership.
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\44\ The Commission refers to its review of the license to
include the grant of an initial application for a cable landing
license or an application for modification, substantial assignment,
substantial transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable
landing license.
\45\ For purposes of prioritizing the filing and review of
periodic reports, the Commission refers to its most recent review of
the license as its most recent action, which would include grant of
an initial application for a cable landing license or an application
for modification, substantial assignment, substantial transfer of
control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license and
ensure that the Committee or particular executive branch agencies
also reviewed the cable system for any national security, law
enforcement, and other concerns.
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<bullet> Category 3: Submarine cable systems where the Commission's
most recent review of the license occurred less than 4 years ago and
where a licensee has reportable foreign ownership.
<bullet> Category 4: All other submarine cable systems, including
those where no licensee has reportable foreign ownership.
35. FCC's Preliminary Review of Existing Licensed Submarine Cables.
Commission staff have conducted a preliminary review of its records,
and based on this review, the Commission assesses that eight of the 84
licensed submarine cable systems would meet one or more of the criteria
under Category 1: (1) Americas-1 Cable System, (2) Asia-America Gateway
(AAG), (3) FASTER Cable System, (4) Japan-U.S. Cable Network,\46\ (5)
Jupiter, (6) New Cross-Pacific (NCP), (7) PPC-1, and (8) Trans-Pacific
Express (TPE) Cable Network. Based on the Commission's preliminary
review of the 84 licensed cables to date,\47\ Category 1 would include
eight submarine cable systems; Category 2 would include 21 submarine
cable systems; Category 3 would include 36 submarine cable systems; and
Category 4 would include 19 submarine cable systems. The full set of
categories and the licensed submarine cable systems associated with
each category are set forth in the table labeled ``Three-Year Periodic
Reporting Prioritization Schedule.'' The Commission seeks comment on
the results of its preliminary review.
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\46\ On June 18, 2024, the current licensees of the Japan-U.S.
Cable Network filed an application to modify the license to remove
all licensees except Verizon Business Global LLC (Verizon) from the
license, and request a waiver of Sec. 1.767(h)(1) to replace AT&T
Enterprises, LLC with Verizon as the licensee that controls the
cable landing facilities in Makaha, Hawaii. On July 25, 2024,
Verizon and Hawaiian Telcom Services Company, Inc. filed an
application for a license to land and operate the California-Hawaii
S1, which will consist of Segment 1 of the Japan-U.S. Cable Network.
To the extent the Commission grants these applications prior to the
adoption of any final Report and Order in this proceeding, the
Commission proposes that it would adjust the categorization of the
Japan-U.S. Cable Network accordingly in such Report and Order.
\47\ This number of 84 licensed cables does not include cables
for which the license expired and has not been renewed or extended,
including where an application is pending before the Commission to
renew or extend the license. See, e.g., File No. SCL-STA-20240626-
00028, Actions Taken Under Cable Landing License Act, Report No.
SCL-00484, DA 24-926 (OIA 2024) (granting the request for special
temporary authority (STA) filed by GCI Communication Corp. to
continue operation of the Alaska United East Cable System (AU-East)
(SCL-LIC-19961205-00615, SCL-LIC-19980602-00008, SCL-MOD-20020409-
00018, SCL-MOD-20020409-00019) while the Commission considers an
application for a new cable landing license for the cable system
(SCL-LIC-20240815-00036)). To the extent the Commission grants any
application to renew or extend a cable landing license prior to the
adoption of any final Report and Order in this proceeding, the
Commission proposes that it would include or adjust the
categorization of the respective cable system accordingly in such
Report and Order.
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36. FCC's Review of Future Licensed Submarine Cables. The
Commission proposes to require that cable landing licensees of
submarine cable systems that are licensed after the effective date of
new rules shall submit their initial periodic report by a deadline of
three years following the date of the grant of authority. The
Commission proposes to require licensees of future licensed submarine
cable systems to file the periodic reports every three years after the
deadline of their initial periodic report. The Commission seeks comment
on whether a cable landing licensee should file the required report
every three years based on the date of such grant of authority, until
and unless the Commission grants a subsequent application filed by the
licensee, at which point the three-year reporting cycle would commence
anew as of the date of the new grant.
37. The Commission believes these approaches would simplify the
reporting requirement and minimize administrative burdens while
prioritizing the Commission's consideration of those licensees that
most likely raise national security, law enforcement, foreign policy,
and/or trade policy concerns. Prioritizing the Commission's review in
the manner described above ensures the Commission focuses on those
cables that potentially raise concerns and those that have not been
reviewed by the Commission and the Committee. The Commission believes
this approach would accomplish its national security objectives and
provide regulatory certainty to licensees. What are the benefits and
potential drawbacks of this approach? Should the Commission instead
follow the Evolving Risks NPRM proposal and factor in mitigation
agreements? Why or why not? The Commission seeks comment generally on
this and other approaches for periodic reporting of licensed submarine
cables.
b. Shorten the 25 Year License Term
38. As an alternative to the proposed periodic reporting
requirement the Commission seeks comment on whether shortening the
current 25-year submarine cable license term or adopting a shorter
license term in combination with periodic reporting would similarly
account for evolving national security, law enforcement, and other
risks. Like the Commission's proposed periodic reporting requirement,
the Commission would codify either of these options as a routine
condition in its rules. The Commission notes that by rule, a submarine
cable landing licensee's failure to renew its license would cause the
license to expire, and ``[u]pon expiration, all rights granted under
the license shall be terminated.'' \48\
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\48\ See 47 CFR 1.767(a)(9) (requiring applicants to certify
``that the applicant accepts and will abide by the routine
conditions specified in paragraph (g) of this section''); 47 CFR
1.767(g)(15) (``[T]he cable landing license shall expire twenty-five
(25) years from the in-service date, unless renewed or extended upon
proper application. Upon expiration, all rights granted under the
license shall be terminated.'').
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39. Given changed circumstances since the Commission codified the
25-year license term, the Commission believes that a shortened license
term or a shortened term in combination with periodic reporting, would
be consonant with its public interest responsibilities under the Cable
Landing License Act regarding national security. The Commission notes
that the 25-year license term appears to relate to operational aspects
of submarine cable systems.\49\ Also, in light of the

[[Page 12047]]

constantly changing national security environment, 25 years is a long
time period in which a license is not reviewed. Shortening the license
term by itself or in combination with periodic reporting, could enable
the Commission to assess--earlier than the current 25-year license
term--whether a particular cable landing licensee complies with the
relevant statutory and rule requirements, whether there are any rule-
compliant but unreported changes in ownership or operations, or other
factors that present national security, law enforcement, foreign policy
and/or trade policy concerns, and whether the license continues to
serve the public interest.
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\49\ For example, according to a working group report of
Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council
(CSRIC) IV, ``[t]he normal planned commercial lifespan of the cables
is 25 years, though they often get used for longer periods of time.
Nevertheless, the commercial lifespan of submarine cable systems may
extend well beyond 25 years, particular where the systems have been
upgraded or redeployed. Consistent with these characteristics, the
Federal Communications Commission (`FCC') grants cable landing
licenses for a term of 25 years (subject to renewal) from
commencement of commercial service.'' TeleGeography, Submarine Cable
Frequently Asked Questions, <a href="https://www2.telegeography.com/submarine-cable-faqs-frequently-asked-questions">https://www2.telegeography.com/submarine-cable-faqs-frequently-asked-questions</a> (last visited Nov.
12, 2024) (``[c]ables are engineered with a minimum design life of
25 years . . .'').
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40. The Commission tentatively concludes that a shortened license
term or a shortened term in combination with periodic reporting would
provide the Commission and the relevant executive branch agencies the
ability and opportunity to assess in a more timely and systematic
manner, the evolving national security, law enforcement, foreign
policy, and/or trade policy risks associated with cable landing
licenses.\50\ The Commission seeks comment on an appropriate time frame
to better account for evolving risks while minimizing burdens on
licensees, recognizing the significant capital expenditures and long
lead times in planning and constructing submarine cable systems. What
is the current lifespan of a modern submarine cable system, and should
that factor into the Commission's analysis? The Commission also seeks
comment on the economic impact of shortening the 25-year license term.
Would a 5-year or 10-year license term alter investment incentives in
new submarine cable infrastructure? Would shortened license terms
impact the upgradation and maintenance of existing submarine cable
systems? The Commission notes that it has adopted various license terms
for differing services. For example, wireless and broadcast licensees
have renewal terms. For Miscellaneous Wireless Communications Services
(WCS), the license term varies according to spectrum band, which
results in different license periods such as 10, 12, or 15 years.
License terms for satellites also vary. Space stations licensed under
part 25 of the Commission's rules have a 15-year license term, except
that small satellites have a 6-year license term and certain Satellite
Digital Audio Radio Service (SDARS) and Direct Broadcast Satellite
(DBS) space stations have an 8-year license term.\51\ In the context of
broadcast licensing, each license granted for the operation of a
broadcasting station is limited to a term not to exceed eight years. In
the Evolving Risks NPRM, the Commission tentatively concluded that a
10-year timeframe is reasonable under the proposed renewal framework
for structuring a formalized and systemic reassessment of carriers'
international section 214 authority.\52\
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\50\ See Executive Branch Review Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd at
10934-35, para. 17 (discussing executive branch referral process for
those applications for international section 214 authorizations and
submarine cable licenses or to assign, transfer control or modify
such authorizations and licenses where the applicant has reportable
foreign ownership filed pursuant to Sec. Sec. 1.767, 63.18, and
63.24 of the rules, 47 CFR 1.767, 63.18, and 63.24).
\51\ For geostationary space stations that are issued an initial
license term for a period of 15 years, licensees may apply for a
modification to extend the license term in increments of five years
or less.
\52\ In the Evolving Risks NPRM, the Commission tentatively
found that a renewal timeframe of 10 years--in conjunction with the
proposal in that NPRM to require authorization holders to provide
updated ownership information, cross border facilities information,
and other information every three years--would ensure that the
Commission and the relevant executive branch agencies can
continually reassess and account for evolving national security, law
enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy concerns associated
with international section 214 authorizations. Moreover, the
Commission noted that a 10-year timeframe would minimize burdens on
authorization holders and balance the Commission's policy
considerations with administrative efficiency for the Commission and
the relevant executive branch agencies, including the Committee.
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41. Would a shortened license term similar to the terms for a
broadcast or wireless license or the proposed 10-year timeframe
proposed for international section 214 authorizations be appropriate,
and if so, why? Would adopting a 15-year license term similar to
geostationary space station licenses under part 25 be more appropriate
given the large capital investment typically required to launch these
satellites and deploy submarine cable systems? Would a 10- to 15-year
renewal time frame, as opposed to a 25-year term, better ensure that
the Commission and the relevant executive branch agencies can
continually reassess and account for evolving national security and
other concerns? The Commission also seeks comment on whether licensees
should or could ask for different renewal terms prior to the expiration
of their current license term based on their particular circumstances.
What is the capital investment and lifespan of current fiber optic
cable infrastructure and how should that impact the Commission's
proposal? While most cable landing licensees have asked for a renewal
term of 25 years, a few have asked for a shorter term.\53\ Should the
Commission adopt a rule reserving its discretion to impose a shorter
license term on a case-by-case basis based on risk factors where the
Commission deems it would be in the public interest? \54\ Should a
license term reset if a submarine cable landing licensee undergoes a
complete review, such as during the review of a substantial assignment
or transfer of control application? \55\ What factors should the
Commission take into consideration in its analysis of whether to
shorten the submarine cable landing license term and renewal process?
The Commission seeks comment on whether to adopt a renewal expectancy
standard for submarine cable licenses, subject to any approval of or
objection to a proposed grant of an application by the State
Department. Should such a standard apply only in the event the
Commission shorten the license term? Should a specific showing at
renewal be required, such as certification that the licensee has been
in operation consistent with their initial application

[[Page 12048]]

for a license? \56\ Commenters should address the burdens that will be
placed on the licensees based on the length of the license term and
identify the costs and benefits overall and impact, if any, on small
businesses.
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\53\ File No. SCL-MOD-20190305-00007, Actions Taken Under Cable
Landing License Act, Public Notice, Report No. SCL-00238, 34 FCC Rcd
2810 (IB 2019) (granting Hawaiian Telecom, Inc.'s application to
modify the cable landing license for the Hawaiian Interisland Cable
System, to extend the license term for an additional five-year
period).
\54\ The Commission's rules expressly preserve its discretion to
grant individual broadcast station licenses for less than the
standard license term if the public interest, convenience, and
necessity would be served by such action. See 47 CFR 73.1020(a)
(``Both radio and TV broadcasting stations will ordinarily be
renewed for 8 years. However, if the FCC finds that the public
interest, convenience and necessity will be served thereby, it may
issue either an initial license or a renewal thereof for a lesser
term.''); id. Sec. 74.15(d) (``Lower power TV and TV translator
station and FM translator station licenses will ordinarily be
renewed for 8 years. However, if the FCC finds that the public
interest, convenience or necessity will be served, it may issue
either an initial license or a renewal thereof for a lesser term.
The FCC may also issue a license renewal for a shorter term if
requested by the applicant.''); 1997 Broadcast License Terms Order,
62 FR 5339 (February 5, 1997), 12 FCC Rcd at 1729, 1739, n.24, Appx.
A. See also 47 U.S.C. 309(k)(2) (where applicant fails to meet the
standards for renewal, the Commission may grant the application ``on
terms and conditions as are appropriate, including renewal for a
term less than the maximum otherwise permitted.'').
\55\ For example, assuming the Commission were to adopt a 10-
year license term, if an entity that is granted a license in 2025,
so that its 10-year renewal period would be 2035, subsequently files
a substantial transfer of control application which is granted in
2030, should the 10-year renewal period be reset to 2040?
\56\ The Commission notes that broadcast licenses must be
renewed unless the Commission makes one of the findings enumerated
by statute. See also Amendment of Parts 1, 22, 24, 27, 74, 80, 90,
95, and 101 to Establish Uniform License Renewal, Discontinuance of
Operation, and Geographic Partitioning and Spectrum Disaggregation
Rules and Policies for Certain Wireless Radio Services, WT Docket
No. 10-112, Second Report and Order (82 FR 41530, September 1, 2017)
and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (82 FR 41580, September 1,
2017), 32 FCC Rcd 8874 (adopting rules that, among other things,
establish a consistent standard for renewing wireless licenses).
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42. The Commission tentatively affirms that, regardless of whether
it adopts any new license term separately or in combination with
periodic reporting, the Commission will continue to exercise its
existing authority, as it deems necessary, to conduct ad hoc reviews of
submarine cable landing licenses at any time during any license term.
For instance, if the Commission were to adopt a license term of 10
years combined with periodic reporting, it might still elect to
exercise its existing authority to review and, if necessary, modify or
revoke or terminate licenses at any time during the 10-year license
term. The Commission seeks comment on its proposed approach.
43. Potential Rules Would Apply to All Licensees. The Commission
generally seeks comment on the application of any new license term it
may adopt to all submarine cable landing licensees. In particular, the
Commission seeks comment on whether all submarine cable landing
licenses, regardless of issuance date, should be subject to any new
license term.
44. Licensees Whose License is Granted After the Effective Date of
New Rules. With respect to licensees whose license is granted after the
effective date of any new rules adopted in this proceeding, the
Commission tentatively concludes that it would apply any new license
term adopted in this proceeding to such licensees. If the Commission
adopts a new license term, it proposes to direct OIA to include a
condition in submarine cable landing licenses granted after the
effective date of any new rules requiring compliance with any new
license term. The Commission seeks comment on this approach.
45. Licensees Whose License Was or is Granted Prior to the
Effective Date of New Rules. With respect to licensees whose license
was or is granted prior to the effective date of the new rules, the
Commission seeks comment on whether their existing license term should
remain the same, but that at the time of renewal, the Commission would
apply any new license term it adopts in this proceeding. The Commission
also seeks comment on whether any license granted after the issuance of
the NPRM and before the effective date of the new rules should be
subject to any shortened term the Commission may adopt in this
proceeding.\57\ If the Commission applies a shortened license term to
existing licenses, how should it handle situations in which an existing
license has been in effect for a period that exceeds the new license
term?
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\57\ The Commission notes that applicants seeking licenses after
issuance of the NPRM will be aware of the possibility that the
Commission may adopt a shortened license term and that any new
license term may be a condition of grant of their application.
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46. Other Matters. The Commission seeks comment on whether to apply
any shortened license term as a condition of granting an application
for a substantial and/or pro forma assignment or transfer of control of
an existing submarine cable landing license. The Commission also seeks
comment on whether cable landing licensees that have a pending renewal
application prior to the effective date of any shortened license term
should be subject to any new license term the Commission might adopt.
47. Due Process and Retroactivity. The Commission seeks comment on
due process and retroactivity concerns--including ``primary'' versus
``secondary'' retroactivity--that may arise from modifying existing
licenses to conform the license term with any shorter term that may be
adopted in final rules or from applying a new, shorter license term as
a condition of granting applications for modification, assignment,
transfer of control, and renewal or extension of existing licenses.\58\
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\58\ See, e.g., Mobile Relay Assocs. v. FCC, 457 F.3d 1, 11
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (non-renewal resulting from a new regulatory
framework may ``upset[ ] expectations based on prior law,'' but that
is not primarily retroactive).
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48. The courts have established a distinction for rules between
``primary'' retroactivity and ``secondary'' retroactivity. A rule is
primarily retroactive if it (1) ``increase[s] a party's liability for
past conduct''; (2) ``impair[s] rights a party possessed when he
acted''; or (3) ``impose[s] new duties with respect to transactions
already completed.'' The standard for primary retroactivity assesses
whether a rule has changed the past legal consequences of past actions.
In contrast, a rule would be ``secondarily'' retroactive if it
``affects a regulated entity's investment made in reliance on the
regulatory status quo before the rule's promulgation.'' Secondary
retroactivity will be upheld ``if it is reasonable.''
49. The Commission tentatively concludes that any shorter license
term it ultimately adopts would not be ``primarily'' retroactive, as
the mere adoption of such a requirement would not make past conduct
unlawful, alter rights the licensee had at the time when it acted, or
impose new duties with respect to completed transactions.
50. The Commission recognizes, however, that such a requirement
could upset the expectations of existing submarine cable landing
licensees. To the extent that applying any new license term may
constitute ``secondary'' retroactivity, the Commission seeks comment on
any impact of applying a new license term to existing licensees. How
would such an impact compare to the benefits of applying a shortened
license term to existing submarine cable landing licenses, including
those granted before the issuance of the NPRM, such as providing for a
more timely, systematic, and uniform review process that will enable
the Commission to consider pertinent issues, including national
security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy
concerns, in the context of a renewal application without waiting for
current licenses to expire, potentially decades from now? The
Commission also seeks comment on whether and under what circumstances
denial of a submarine cable landing license renewal application or an
application for assignment/transfer of control would trigger primary or
secondary retroactivity concerns. For example, if the Commission adopts
a shorter license term and applies it to existing licensees, would non-
renewal of a submarine cable landing license based on evolving national
security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy risks,
regardless of that submarine cable landing licensee's prior compliance
with the Commission's rules, have primary or secondary retroactive
effect? Additionally, would the application of a new license term to
existing cable landing licensees require different standards or
procedures based on retroactivity, reliance interests, or fair notice
concerns? How would application of a new license term to existing
licensees affect those licensees' operations, financial position, or
investment incentives?

[[Page 12049]]

B. Updated Application Requirements for National Security and Other
Purposes

51. In this section, the Commission proposes and seeks comment on
appropriate applicant and application requirements to account for the
evolution of technologies and facilities and changes in the national
security landscape over the last two decades. The Commission's goal is
to update and improve its rules to ensure it has targeted and granular
information regarding the ownership, control, use of a submarine cable
system, and other things, which are critical to the Commission's review
to assess potential national security risks and other important public
interest factors.
1. Requirements To Be an Applicant/Licensee
52. The Commission seeks comment on modernizing its existing rules
setting forth minimum applicant/licensee eligibility requirements to
ensure that the Commission identifies and captures information on those
entities that own and control the submarine cable system and connect
with terrestrial networks in the United States.\59\ Currently, Sec.
1.767(h) of the Commission's rules identifies the following as those
entities that, at a minimum, shall be applicants for and licensees on a
cable landing license: (1) ``[a]ny entity that owns or controls a cable
landing station in the United States[,]''and (2) ``[a]ll other entities
owning or controlling a five percent (5%) or greater interest in the
cable system and using the U.S. points of the cable system.'' \60\ The
Commission seeks comment generally on an appropriate rule that would
capture who should be an applicant/licensee on a cable landing license
under the Cable Landing License Act today and in the future to ensure
the Commission meets its public interest responsibilities.
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\59\ The Commission has reserved the ability to expand the
minimum requirements as to who must apply for and become a licensee
on a cable landing license. 47 CFR 1.767(h) (``Except as otherwise
required by the Commission, the following entities, at a minimum,
shall be applicants for, and licensees on, a cable landing license .
. . .''). Although the Commission prescribes the minimum
requirements concerning who must be an applicant for and licensee on
a cable landing license, this does not foreclose entities that do
not meet the minimum requirements from applying to be joint
applicants for and licensees on a cable landing license.
\60\ The Commission has reserved the ability to expand the types
of entities who must be applicants and licensees on a cable landing
license. Section 1.767(h) (stating that ``Except as otherwise
required by the Commission . . . .''). Thus, other entities are not
foreclosed from applying to be a joint applicant and licensee.
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53. Entities that Own or Control a U.S. Landing Station or
Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTE). The Commission seeks comment
on whether to require not only entities that own or control the U.S.
cable landing station, but also entities that own or control the SLTE
or equivalent equipment to be applicants for and licensees on a cable
landing license. The SLTE is among the most important equipment
associated with the submarine cable system and this modification to the
Commission's rule would enable it to know and assess any national
security and law enforcement concerns related to the entities that will
deploy SLTE and thus who can significantly affect the cable system's
operations. Specifically, the Commission seeks comment on whether to
expand the applicant/licensee requirement to include any entity that
owns or controls or operates a cable landing station(s) or the SLTE or
equivalent that converts submarine signals into terrestrial signals
located in the U.S. portion of a cable system. The Commission believes
that including the term ``submarine line terminal equipment'' and a
general description of the functionality of the equipment would better
reflect technological advances in submarine cable systems. Would this
be consistent with the statutory requirement that ``[n]o person shall
land or operate . . . any submarine cable'' without a license as
specified in the Cable Landing License Act? Moreover, the Commission
believes that including such language would capture the potential of a
submarine cable system to have more than one cable landing station or a
cable landing station that includes multiple SLTEs that could be
located farther inland such as in another facility (e.g., a data
center). A proposed cable system could also have multiple locations
where SLTE is deployed. The Commission seeks comment on whether and if
so, how, to incorporate entities with ownership and control of SLTE
into the Commission's regulatory framework. Lastly, the Commission
seeks comment on how this potential change could impact existing
entities, including small business entities, that were not previously
required to obtain a cable landing license but now would be required to
do so because they own or control SLTE. Should the Commission apply any
new requirement to such existing entities and if so, when should it
require such existing entities to submit applications? The Commission
seeks comment on the burdens this potential change could have on such
existing entities, as well as existing licensees, which may include
small entities, including how long it would take them to comply with
this potential requirement.
54. This option would require any entity with ownership or control
of a cable landing station or SLTE or equivalent equipment to be
applicants/licensees for a submarine cable landing license. Under this
option, Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) \61\ holders or grantees likely
meet these requirements. As background, companies that own and operate
submarine cable systems may choose to use the capacity on their
submarine cable systems themselves or seek to lease, sell, or swap
unused or unowned capacity to recoup their investment in the submarine
cable project. Internet Content Providers (ICPs) that are licensees may
use the capacity themselves to connect to their data centers abroad to
serve customers globally. Alternatively, they may choose to sell,
lease, or swap capacity of the submarine cable fiber to
telecommunications companies or other entities in need of capacity
along a certain route, such as research institutions, education
institutions, governments, banks, and enterprises, among others.
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\61\ See also Katie Terrell Hanna, TechTarget, Definition:
Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) (March 2022), <a href="https://www.techtarget.com/searchunifiedcommunications/definition/Indefeasible-Right-of-Use">https://www.techtarget.com/searchunifiedcommunications/definition/Indefeasible-Right-of-Use</a> (``In telecommunications, the Indefeasible
Right of Use (IRU) is a contractual agreement (temporary ownership)
of a portion of the capacity of an international cable. As the name
suggests, the contract provides an indefeasible right to use a cable
and cannot be annulled or voided. IRU contracts are specified in
terms of a certain number of channels of a given bandwidth.'') (IRU
Definition); id. (``Large-scale internet service providers (ISPs)
are typical IRU owners. This gives ISPs the ability to assure their
own customers of international telecom service on a long-term basis.
IRU fibers are also referred to as dark fibers. Here, dark fiber
means fiber between two locations that has no electronics attached
to it. This needs to be lit by the IRU grantee rather than the cable
provider.'').
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55. Although IRUs can be short-term, they more typically constitute
long-term contracts of 20 years or longer and provide a holder or
grantee with a certain amount of bandwidth of capacity or fiber on a
submarine cable system.\62\ These contracts provide holders or grantees
with the rights to use the capacity, which includes equipment, fibers,
or capacity, and may constitute assets as well, even though legal title
is held by the grantor.\63\ Holders or

[[Page 12050]]

grantees of these rights may further lease out capacity to other
companies that need only a portion of the holder's capacity. The
contracts to lease unused or unowned capacity typically constitute
short-term contracts of five years or may be shorter or longer and,
unlike IRUs, generally do not require an upfront payment. However,
these lease contracts do typically require monthly payments during the
course of the lease term and provide a grantee with a certain amount of
bandwidth of capacity or spectrum of a fiber on a submarine cable
system. Importantly, as noted above, some IRU holders or grantees, such
as dark fiber IRU holders, may own, control, and use specific SLTE at
the ends of the cable system to interconnect with their terrestrial
networks,\64\ and such SLTE could be physically or logically accessed
by IRU holders or grantees, thus potentially raising national security
and law enforcement concerns arising from the Commission's lack of
information about and regulatory oversight of these relationships and
the ownership of the IRU holder or grantee.
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\62\ Understanding IRU Fiber: A Comprehensive Guide, 123NET
(Mar. 15, 2024), <a href="https://www.123.net/blog/understanding-iru-fiber-a-comprehensive-guide/">https://www.123.net/blog/understanding-iru-fiber-a-comprehensive-guide/</a> (``An Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) agreement
is a legal contract that grants the buyer a permanent right to use a
portion of a fiber-optic cable's capacity for a set period.'').
\63\ Fernando Margarit et al., IRUS AND FIBER OPTIC CABLES: An
Overview and Examination of Associated Risks, Submarine Telecoms
Forum, <a href="https://subtelforum.com/telecom-indefeasible-rights-of-use/">https://subtelforum.com/telecom-indefeasible-rights-of-use/</a>
(last visited Aug. 11, 2024) (``These critical instruments grant
exclusive, long-term rights to use specific assets, such as fiber
cables, closely mirroring actual ownership without the transfer of
legal title.'').
\64\ Open Submarine Cables Handbook at 4 (``Apart from increased
competition for the SLTE supply and deployment of the latest SLTE
technology, the open cable model is also more adapted to new
business models by providing multiple system owners more
independence. Many recent new cables have been built with a per-
fiber pair ownership model allowing multiple cable systems owners to
use different SLTE (including management systems) on their own fiber
pairs. Spectrum sharing within a fiber pair can also be supported.
Lastly, when the different owners want to upgrade, they can do so
independently from the other owners.'').
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56. Would requiring entities with ownership or control of a cable
landing station or SLTE to be applicants/licensees for a submarine
cable landing license appropriately address national security and law
enforcement concerns regarding physical and/or logical access? Would
this be consistent with the statutory requirement that ``[n]o person
shall land or operate . . . any a submarine cable'' without a license
as specified in the Cable Landing License Act? Does the Commission's
legal authority to withhold or grant a cable landing license \65\
extend to authorizing such purchases or sales of capacity? Would this
be consistent with the statutory requirement to obtain a license to
``land or operate . . . any submarine cable''? If the Commission
requires such entities that meet this requirement to become applicants/
licensees for a submarine cable landing license, how should this
requirement be implemented as to such existing entities as well as
existing licensees? The Commission seeks comment on the burdens this
potential change could have on affected entities, including small
entities, and to identify how long it would take them to comply with
this potential requirement.
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\65\ 47 U.S.C. 35.
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57. The Commission notes that with respect to the entities that own
or control the cable landing stations, it frequently receives waiver
requests from entities, such as data center owners, that do not seek to
become an applicant or licensee. These entities state that they own the
real property/facility in which the cable landing station is located
but do not have any ability to significantly affect the cable system's
operation.\66\ The Commission has granted such waiver requests, based
on its review of the particular circumstances raised in each waiver
request and done so in coordination with the Committee, as
necessary.\67\ The Commission seeks comment generally on the
applicability of its rules to data center owners, including the access
they have over submarine cables and the site operations, such as
physical security, power, backup power, HVAC, and other environmental
support essential to proper operations of cable landing systems housed
in their facilities.
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\66\ The Commission has seen instances where a submarine cable
system will land in an internet exchange, PoP, data center, or a
like facility that is owned by a company that leases colocation
space and services to submarine cable owners and operators but does
not have any ability to significantly affect the cable system's
operation.
\67\ See e.g., File No. SCL-LIC-20210329-00020, Actions Taken
Under Cable Landing License Act, Public Notice, Report No. SCL-
00353, DA 22064 (IB 2022) (granting the applicants' request for a
waiver of 47 CFR 1.767(h)(1)).
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58. Own or Control a 5% or Greater Interest in the Cable System and
Using the U.S. Points of the Cable System. The Commission seeks comment
on whether it should retain the requirement that an entity that owns or
controls a 5% or greater interest in the cable and uses the U.S. points
of the cable system shall be an applicant for and licensee on a cable
landing license. Prior to the rules adopted in 2001, there was no
exception for those entities that owned less than a 5% interest in the
cable. In the 2001 Cable Report and Order, the Commission recognized
that ``the greater a firm's investment in a cable system, the greater
ability the firm has to influence the way in which a cable is operated
. . . [and] observed that entities with minimal investment in a cable
system, on the other hand, do not have the same ability to affect the
operation of the cable system[.]'' \68\ The Commission concluded that
``there is not the same need, therefore, to subject these entities to
the conditions and responsibilities that come with a cable landing
license'' unless such entities had at least a 5% or greater ownership
interest in the cable system and used the U.S. points of the cable
system. At the time of that proceeding, it was commonplace for
consortia of many telecommunications companies to join to co-fund and
own and operate a submarine cable system. Now, it is less common for
consortia of more than a few entities to jointly pursue a submarine
cable project. Moreover, the 5% ownership threshold was created in part
to not unduly burden small carriers or investors that lacked the
ability to significantly affect the operation of a cable system, such
as those consortia members that entered the consortia to obtain
capacity on the cable system, but held minimal investments in the cable
system and did not have any ability to control the submarine cable
system.
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\68\ 2001 Cable Report and Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 22167, n.131
(citing 2000 Cable NPRM, 65 FR 41613 (July 6, 2000), 15 FCC Rcd at
20824, para. 82); see id. at 22194-95, paras. 53-54 (modifying the
rules to require any entity that could exert influence or control
over the cable system or who owned or controlled the cable landing
station(s), or the facilities that would permit the cable to
interconnect to a terrestrial network in the United States, to be an
applicant and licensee on a cable landing license).
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59. Should the Commission retain the 5% or greater interest
threshold requirement for the same reasons noted above? Is the same
rationale to retain the 5% threshold reasonable in today's national
security environment? Do commenters believe the Commission can
accomplish its goals in this proceeding by retaining the 5% threshold?
At this level of ownership, can the Commission continue to properly
assess whether certain applicants present any national security and law
enforcement risks? If the Commission retains the 5% threshold, will it
be able to assess whether entities should not obtain a submarine cable
license based on public interest assessments? Or should the Commission
instead adopt a lower or higher threshold, and if so, why? If the
Commission retains a threshold for when an owner of the cable must be
an applicant/licensee, the Commission seeks comment on whether it
should require the applicant(s) to identify all of the owners of the
cable, and for those owners that are not applicants, provide an
explanation for each one as to why it is not required to be an
applicant/licensee.

[[Page 12051]]

60. The Commission also seeks comment on how entities are currently
calculating ownership interests to determine if they hold a 5% or
greater interest.\69\ Should the Commission specify a method for making
this calculation? If so, what is an appropriate basis for the
calculation given all of the varying pieces of infrastructure in a
cable system--the U.S. cable landing station(s) that has the terminal
equipment, including the SLTE and the dry segment; the wet segment
(including the U.S. beach manhole and every segment and branching unit
of the cable system to the foreign beach manhole(s)); and ultimately,
the foreign dry plant(s) terminating with the SLTE in the cable landing
station(s)? Should the calculation be based on the number of fiber
pairs owned by each entity, the percentage of capacity held by each
entity, the percent of the total cost of the cable system that each
applicant is contributing, or the percentage of the total distance of
the cable system from SLTE to SLTE or from beach manhole to beach
manhole? \70\ The Commission seeks comment on these and other bases for
making this calculation.
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\69\ 47 CFR 1.767(h)(2) (``All other entities owning or
controlling a five percent (5%) or greater interest in the cable
system and using the U.S. points of the cable system'' shall be
applicants for, and licensees on, a cable system). The Commission
has reserved the ability to expand the types of entities who must be
applicants and licensees on a cable landing license. 47 CFR 1.767(h)
(stating that ``Except as otherwise required by the Commission. . .
.''). Thus, other entities are not foreclosed from applying to be a
joint applicant and licensee.
\70\ For example, assuming that the total cable system distance
was 20,000 km, and Company A owns a segment of a cable system that
is 1,000 km in length and will use the U.S. points of the cable
system, should Company A be attributed with a 5% ownership (1,000
km/20,000 km = 0.05) and required to be an applicant/licensee?
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61. In discussing the basis for adopting the 5% requirement in the
2000 Cable NPRM, the Commission stated that it intended for an entity
that has a ``five percent or greater ownership interest in the proposed
cable . . . and . . . will use the U.S. points of the cable system in
any capacity, unless that use was simply to hard patch through the
United States and would not drop traffic in the United States or would
use the U.S. points to re-originate traffic,'' to be included as an
applicant. The Commission, however, did not further define the phrase
``use of the U.S. points of the cable system'' in the 2001 Cable Report
and Order. Since the Commission adopted this rule over two decades ago,
are there new developments in the landing and operation of submarine
cable systems that the Commission should take into account when
providing guidance on what it means to use the U.S. points of the cable
system? In addition, how should the Commission consider use of the U.S.
points of the cable system when the traffic's destination is not the
United States? The Commission seeks comment on whether and how it
should consider ``use of the U.S. point'' today and for the benefit of
any public interest concerns.
62. Any Entity that Owns the Submarine Cable System. The Commission
seeks comment on whether it should instead require any entity that owns
the submarine cable system to be an applicant/licensee, even if the
entity does not use the cable system. Should the Commission require
that any entity that owns any interest in the cable to become a
licensee similar to the Commission's rules prior to 2001? Prior to the
rules adopted in 2001, there was no exception for those entities that
owned less than a 5% interest in the cable. Would this approach be
consistent with the statutory requirement that no person shall ``land
or operate . . . any submarine cable'' without a license as specified
in the Cable Landing License Act? Given the importance of this critical
infrastructure and to protect against national security and law
enforcement threats, would a rule requiring entities that have any
ownership in the cable system to become applicants/licensees be more
appropriate today and into the future? Could the Commission better
accomplish its goals by adopting this requirement? What are the
benefits and concerns with adopting this rule and how would this
increase the number of applicants/licensees? What burdens would be
imposed on existing and future applicants/licensees, including any
implementation concerns? How would this option affect investment
incentives and what would be the impact for implementation of this
option on existing licenses? How long would it take for entities to
come into compliance? How would this change affect small entities? If
the Commission were to adopt this rule, would it be able to better
assess applicants/licensees for any public interest concerns, including
national security or law enforcement risks?
63. Any Entity that Has Capacity on the Submarine Cable System. The
Commission seeks comment generally on whether to require any entity
that holds capacity on the submarine cable to be an applicant/licensee.
Would this be consistent with the statutory requirement that no person
shall ``land or operate . . . any submarine cable'' without a license
as specified in the Cable Landing License Act? Any entity that holds
capacity on the submarine cable system, such as an entity that leases
capacity and may not own the terminal equipment or SLTE, may still have
an ability to operate a portion of the cable system. Would this broader
requirement better facilitate the Commission's public interest
assessment? Would small entities be affected by this rule change? For
example, the Commission seeks comment on whether holding capacity on
the cable system should be defined to include the leasing, purchasing,
selling, buying, or swapping of a fiber (spectrum, capacity, partial
fiber pair, or a full fiber pair, among others) for transmission of
voice, data, and internet over the cable system to interconnect with a
U.S. terrestrial network. The Commission seeks comment on whether the
rule should be limited to entities that hold capacity and are selling,
leasing, and/or swapping spectrum or capacity, or extend to those
entities that enter into contracts or arrangements to receive spectrum
or capacity or a fiber pair. The Commission seeks comment on the same
implementation questions as above. For example, what burdens would be
imposed on existing and future applicants/licensees? How would this
option affect investment incentives and what would be the impact for
implementation of this option on existing licenses? How long would it
take for entities to come into compliance? How would this change affect
small entities? Should the rule apply to entities that lease or employ
SLTE in the U.S. point(s) of the cable system for operation of spectrum
or capacity? The Commission intends that the rule should not extend to
customers on the edge of a network and should instead apply to entities
that hold capacity and are using the U.S. end of a submarine cable,
which may include ICPs, telecommunications providers, or other
businesses.
2. Presumption of Entities Not Qualified To Become a New Submarine
Cable Landing Licensee
64. To protect U.S. communications networks from national security
and law enforcement threats, the Commission proposes to adopt a
presumption that certain entities and their current and future
affiliates and subsidiaries shall not be qualified to become a new
submarine cable landing licensee. The Commission proposes that such
entities shall bear the burden of overcoming this presumption if they
file an application for a cable landing license. The Commission also
seeks comment on whether it should instead adopt a categorical
qualifying condition that would preclude the grant of a cable

[[Page 12052]]

landing license application filed by any applicant: (1) that is
directly and/or indirectly owned or controlled by, or subject to the
influence of a government organization of a foreign adversary country,
as defined under 15 CFR 791.4; (2) that is directly and/or indirectly
owned or controlled by, or subject to the influence of an individual or
entity that has a citizenship(s) or place(s) of organization in a
foreign adversary country; (3) that is directly and/or indirectly owned
or controlled by, or subject to the influence of an individual or
entity on the Commission's Covered List; and/or (4) that is using or
will use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered
List in the proposed submarine cable infrastructure. Should the
Commission also adopt a categorical qualifying condition based on other
U.S. Government determinations that certain individuals and entities
pose national security or other risks, such as the Consolidated
Screening List from the Departments of Commerce, State, and Treasury?
\71\
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\71\ The Consolidated Screening List is a list of parties for
which the United States Government maintains sanctions or
restrictions on certain exports, reexports, or transfers of items.
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65. Specifically, the Commission proposes to adopt a presumption
that any entity whose application for international section 214
authority was previously denied or whose domestic or international
section 214 authority was previously revoked in view of national
security and law enforcement concerns, and its current and future
affiliates and subsidiaries, shall not be qualified to become a new
cable landing licensee. The Commission proposes to apply the
definitions of affiliate and subsidiary that are set out in Sec.
2.903(c) of the rules and seeks comment on this approach.\72\ The
Commission proposes that such entities shall bear the burden of
overcoming this presumption if they file an application for a cable
landing license. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to adopt this
presumption with respect to the following entities and their current
and future affiliates and subsidiaries--China Mobile USA, CTA, CUA,
Pacific Networks, and ComNet.\73\ In the China Mobile USA Order, China
Telecom Americas Order on Revocation and Termination, China Unicom
Americas Order on Revocation, and Pacific Networks and ComNet Order on
Revocation and Termination,\74\ the Commission found that these
entities are subject to exploitation, influence, and control by the
Chinese government, and that mitigation would not address the national
security and law enforcement concerns. Further, in the 2024 Open
internet Order (89 FR 45404, May 22, 2024), the Commission excluded
China Mobile USA, CTA, CUA, Pacific Networks, ComNet, and their current
and future affiliates and subsidiaries from grant of blanket section
214 authority for the provision of broadband internet access service
(BIAS). Consistent with the Commission's findings in those proceedings,
it believes that allowing entities whose authorizations have been
denied or revoked on national security and law enforcement grounds to
access critical communications infrastructure would present significant
and unacceptable risks.\75\ Furthermore, the Commission proposes to
adopt this presumption with respect to any entity whose application
(including an application for any authorization or license) is or was
previously denied or whose authorization or license is or was
previously revoked and/or terminated on national security or law
enforcement grounds, and its current and future affiliates and
subsidiaries.
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\72\ 47 CFR 2.903(c) (defining ``affiliate'' as ``an entity that
(directly or indirectly) owns or controls, is owned or controlled
by, or is under common ownership or control with, another entity;
for purposes of this paragraph, the term `own' means to have,
possess, or otherwise control an equity interest (or the equivalent
thereof) of more than 10 percent''); id. (defining ``subsidiary'' as
``any entity in which another entity directly or indirectly: (i)
Holds de facto control; or (ii) Owns or controls more than 50
percent of the outstanding voting stock'').
\73\ The Commission's proposed approach would not modify the
cable landing licenses currently held by affiliates of these
identified entities. The Commission retains the authority to revoke
a licensee's cable landing license when warranted.
\74\ See China Telecom Americas Order on Revocation and
Termination; China Unicom Americas Order on Revocation; Pacific
Networks and ComNet Order on Revocation and Termination.
\75\ 2024 Open Internet Order at *131, paras. 339-340; see also
id. at para. 32 (``There can be no question about the importance to
our national security of maintaining the integrity of [the
Commission's] critical infrastructure, including communications
networks . . . Disruptions of communications can easily have
significant cascading effects on other critical infrastructure
sectors that rely on communications.'').
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66. The Commission tentatively finds that its proposal to adopt a
presumption that these entities shall not be qualified to become a new
cable landing licensee is consistent with the Commission's statutory
authority to withhold cable landing licenses under the Cable Landing
License Act and Executive Order 10530. The Cable Landing License Act
sets forth, among other things, that the President ``may withhold or
revoke such license when he shall be satisfied after due notice and
hearing that such action . . . will promote the security of the United
States.'' \76\ The authority vested in the President is delegated to
the Commission pursuant to Executive Order 10530.\77\ The Commission
tentatively finds that it has authority to adopt this presumption with
respect to a class of entities, and to assign them the burden of
overcoming the presumption in any cable landing license application,
where it relates to the Commission's evaluation as to whether
withholding a cable landing license from such entities would ``promote
the security of the United States.'' The Commission seeks comment on
these tentative findings.
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\76\ 47 U.S.C. 35 (``The President may withhold or revoke such
license when he shall be satisfied after due notice and hearing that
such action will assist in securing rights for the landing or
operation of cables in foreign countries, or in maintaining the
rights or interests of the United States or of its citizens in
foreign countries, or will promote the security of the United States
. . . .'') (emphasis added).
\77\ Executive Order 10530, section 5(a) (The Federal
Communications Commission is hereby designated and empowered to
exercise, without the approval, ratification, or other action of the
President, all authority vested in the President by the act of May
27, 1921, ch. 12, 42 Stat. 8 (47 U.S.C. 34 to 39), including the
authority to issue, withhold, or revoke licenses to land or operate
submarine cables in the United States: Provided, That no such
license shall be granted or revoked by the Commission except after
obtaining approval of the Secretary of State and such advice from
any executive department or establishment of the Government as the
Commission may deem necessary. The Commission is authorized and
directed to receive all applications for the said licenses.).
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67. In the recent section 214 denial proceeding and revocation
proceedings, the Commission extensively evaluated national security and
law enforcement considerations raised by existing section 214
authorizations and determined, based on thorough record development,
that the present and future public interest, convenience, and necessity
was no longer served by those carriers' retention of their section 214
authority. The Commission believes the same national security and law
enforcement concerns identified in those proceedings equally exist with
respect to these entities seeking to land or operate a submarine cable
in the United States. The Commission therefore believes that its
determinations in those proceedings are directly relevant to the
determination as to whether grant of a new cable landing license to the
identified entities and their current and future affiliates and
subsidiaries would serve the public interest. The Commission seeks
comment on this proposal.
68. The Commission also proposes to presume that any entity whose

[[Page 12053]]

application for a Commission authorization is or was previously denied,
or whose license or authorization for any service is or was previously
revoked and/or terminated, for national security and/or law enforcement
reasons, and their current and future affiliates and subsidiaries, is
presumptively unqualified to hold a cable landing license. The
Commission notes this approach would supplement the Commission's
existing character qualifications policy, which looks to whether an
applicant has violated the Communications Act or Commission rules, has
been convicted of a felony, or has engaged in other specified types of
misconduct indicating that the applicant is not trustworthy or
reliable. The Commission also seeks comment on whether there are other
types of entities that also pose national security, law enforcement, or
other concerns and to which the Commission should apply a similar
presumption that such entities shall not be qualified to become cable
landing licensees and must overcome such a presumption in any cable
landing license application that they file with the Commission. What
factors or criteria should inform the Commission's determination of any
such types of entities and whether they pose national security, law
enforcement, and other concerns that warrant adoption of such a
presumption? The Commission also seeks comment on whether it should
apply a standard in assessing whether such entities have overcome this
presumption in any application that is filed for a new cable landing
license.
69. The Commission seeks comment on whether it should instead adopt
a categorical qualifying condition that would preclude grant of any
submarine cable application--including an application for a cable
landing license or the modification, assignment, transfer of control,
or renewal or extension of such license--filed by any applicant that is
directly and/or indirectly owned or controlled by, or subject to the
influence of, (1) a government organization of a ``foreign adversary''
country, and/or (2) an individual or entity that has a citizenship(s)
or place(s) of organization in a ``foreign adversary'' country, as
defined under 15 CFR 791.4. If so, what ownership threshold should the
Commission apply to any categorical condition precluding the grant of a
cable landing license application filed by applicants that are owned by
foreign interest holders associated with a foreign adversary country?
For example, should the Commission preclude grant of a cable landing
license application filed by any applicant that is directly and/or
indirectly majority-owned by such foreign interest holders? Or should
the Commission preclude grant of a cable landing license application
filed by any applicant that has a direct and/or indirect 10% or greater
foreign interest holder associated with a foreign adversary country? Is
10% the appropriate threshold, or should the Commission adopt a greater
or lesser threshold?
70. The Commission seeks comment on whether it should prohibit
cable landing licensees from entering into arrangements for IRUs or
leases for capacity on submarine cables landing in the United States,
with any entity that has a citizenship(s) or place(s) of organization
in a ``foreign adversary'' country, as defined under 15 CFR 791.4. The
Commission also seeks comment on whether it should prohibit cable
landing licensees from entering into such arrangements with any entity
that is directly and/or indirectly owned or controlled by, or subject
to the influence of, (1) a government organization of a foreign
adversary country, and/or (2) any individual or entity that has a
citizenship(s) or place(s) of organization in a ``foreign adversary''
country, as defined under 15 CFR 791.4. What ownership threshold should
the Commission apply to the extent it prohibits cable landing licensees
from entering into arrangements for IRUs or leases for capacity with
entities that are owned by foreign interest holders associated with a
foreign adversary country? For example, should the Commission prohibit
licensees from entering into such arrangements with any entity that is
directly and/or indirectly majority-owned by such foreign interest
holders? Or should the Commission prohibit licensees from entering into
such arrangements with any entity that has a direct and/or indirect 10%
or greater foreign interest holder associated with a foreign adversary
country? Is 10% the appropriate threshold, or should the Commission
adopt a greater or lesser threshold? Additionally, the Commission seeks
comment on whether to adopt rules that prohibit cable landing licensees
from landing a cable licensed by the Commission in certain locations,
such as landing points in a ``foreign adversary'' country, as defined
under 15 CFR 791.4.
3. Five (5) Percent Threshold for Reportable Interests
71. The Commission seeks comment on whether to lower the current
10% ownership reporting threshold to five percent (5%) or greater
direct and indirect equity and/or voting interests in the applicant(s)
and licensee(s). The 5% threshold would apply to initial applications
for cable landing licenses and applications for modification,
assignment, transfer of control, and renewal or extension of submarine
cable licenses. Currently, applicants for a submarine cable landing
license must submit the information required in Sec. 63.18(h) of the
rules, including identification of ``any individual or entity that
directly or indirectly owns ten percent or more of the equity interests
and/or voting interests, or a controlling interest, of the applicant,
and the percentage of equity and/or voting interest owned by each of
those entities (to the nearest one percent).''
72. The Commission believes that greater insight into the ownership
of applicants and licensees who own, control, and operate submarine
cable systems is crucial to responding to the evolving threat
environment, and that the current reporting threshold of 10% may not
capture all interests that may present national security and policy
concerns. When the Commission adopted the Standard Questions in the
2021 Standard Questions Order (86 FR 68428, December 2, 2021), it
incorporated input from the Committee staff recommending a 5% ownership
reporting threshold. The Commission noted the views of the Committee
staff that it was important because ``when ownership is widely held,
five percent can be a significant interest'' and ``a group of foreign
entities or persons, each owning nine percent and working together,
could easily reach a controlling interest in a company without having
to disclose any of their interests.''
73. Moreover, both the Commission and other Federal Government
entities use a 5% reporting threshold. The Commission notes that the
Commission uses a 5% ownership threshold in the broadcast context.\78\
Additionally, a reporting threshold of 5% applies to information that
U.S. public companies and their shareholders provide to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). The regulation at 17 CFR 240.13d-1
(Exchange Act Rule 13d-1) requires a person or ``group'' that becomes,
directly or indirectly, the

[[Page 12054]]

``beneficial owner'' of more than 5% of a class of equity securities
registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act to report the
acquisition to the SEC. The Commission notes that various SEC forms
filed by issuers, including their annual reports (or proxy statements)
and quarterly reports, require the issuer to include a beneficial
ownership table that contains, among other things, the name and address
of any individual or entity, or ``group,'' who is known to the issuer
to be the beneficial owner of more than 5% of any class of the issuer's
voting securities. A reporting threshold of 5% would also be consistent
with that required by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS) \79\ from parties to a voluntary notice filed with
CFIUS. The 5% threshold thus appears to be a generally accepted
benchmark for understanding the investors in an entity. The Commission
also anticipates, based on this fact, that entities generally will or
should already know their 5% interest holders. Thus, the Commission
tentatively concludes that its proposal to adopt a reporting threshold
of 5% would be consistent with the reporting requirements of other
Federal agencies and would impose minimal burdens on applicants.
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\78\ 47 CFR 73.3555, n.2 (``[t]he sum of the interests other
than those held by or through `passive investors' is equal to or
exceeds 5 percent.''); FCC Form 323 Instruction for Ownership
Reports for Commercial Broadcast Stations, at 5 (``Each officer,
director, and owner of stock accounting for 5 percent or more of the
issued and outstanding voting stock of the Respondent is considered
the holder of an attributable interest, and must be reported.''),
<a href="https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/323.pdf">https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/323.pdf</a> (last visited Oct.
22, 2024).
\79\ CFIUS is ``an interagency committee authorized to review
certain transactions involving foreign investment in the United
States and certain real estate transactions by foreign persons, in
order to determine the effect of such transactions on the national
security of the United States.''
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74. The Commission seeks comment on whether a reporting threshold
of 5% equity and/or voting interest adequately captures the
relationship, association, and/or extent of influence that an investor
may have in an applicant. Would a reporting threshold of 5% equity and/
or voting interests sufficiently account for powers held by
shareholders with less than 5% equity and/or voting interests but who
may hold other special privileges or powers in the corporate structure?
For instance, would the reporting threshold account for a situation
where a foreign government interest holder with a smaller ownership
and/or voting interest, below the 5% threshold, may wield a
disproportionately significant influence on the applicant through
``golden shares?'' \80\ Should the Commission require additional
information about an applicant's reportable interest holders? Should
the Commission expand the reportable interests beyond percentages of
equity and/or voting interests, for example, by requiring applicants to
identify other types of interests or interest holders, such as
management agreements? What other indicia of significant influence or
control should the Commission consider in order to fully identify
interest holders that are either foreign governments or foreign state-
owned entities? What additional information would fully inform and
assist the Commission's assessment of any national security, law
enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy risks raised by such
interest holders?
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\80\ See, e.g., In re Franchise Services of North America, Inc.
v. U.S. Trustee, 891 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 2018) (``Generally
speaking, a `golden share' is `[a] share that controls more than
half of a corporation's voting rights and gives the shareholder veto
power over changes to the company's charter.' E.g., Golden Share,
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also Mariana Pargendler,
State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 2917,
2967 (2012) (noting that in the context of formerly stated-owned
entities, `[g]olden shares are essentially a special class of stock
issued to the privatizing government that grants special voting and
veto rights that are disproportionate to, or even independent of,
its cash-flow rights in the company').''); see also Reuters,
Fretting about data security, China's government expands its use of
``golden shares'' (Dec. 15, 2021), <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/china-regulationdata-idCAKBN2IU2B7">https://www.reuters.com/article/china-regulationdata-idCAKBN2IU2B7</a> (``Seeking influence, Beijing
began taking golden shares in private online companies--usually
about 1% of a firm--some five years ago. The stakes are bought by
government-backed funds or companies which gain a board seat and/or
veto rights for key business decisions.'').
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75. The Commission seeks comment on what, if any, potential burdens
would be imposed on applicants if they were required to report direct
and indirect equity and/or voting interests at a 5% threshold. The
Commission also seeks comment on ways for the Commission to minimize
those burdens. While the Commission anticipates that most entities
should readily be able to identify their 5% interest holders given
other existing reporting requirements at that threshold, the Commission
seeks comment on this belief. The Commission likewise invites comment
on whether this lower reporting threshold will generally result in the
identification of a substantially, or only marginally, greater number
of interest holders.\81\
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\81\ To the extent that the lower reporting threshold results in
a substantial increase in the number of interest holders
identified--or as otherwise required by other proposals in the
NPRM--the Commission will make necessary changes to applicable
Privacy Act System of Records Notices (SORNs).
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76. Commenters should also address whether there are any privacy
concerns implicated by the lower reporting threshold, and whether this
information is ``financial information'' of a privileged and
confidential nature. Do licensees and interest holders view this
information as confidential? What, if any, privacy or other harms,
would result from disclosure of these interest holders? \82\ The
Commission tentatively concludes that the privacy interest of 5%
interest holders, if any, in not being identified in applications and
any interest in withholding privileged and confidential financial
information of this nature is outweighed by national security and other
public interest benefits from such reporting. Moreover, the Commission
believes that these interests can be otherwise protected. For instance,
if the Commission adopts a 5% reporting threshold, filers can seek
confidential treatment, as is the case under the Commission's current
reporting threshold. The Commission seeks comment on whether it should
instead treat the disclosure of certain ownership interests of 5% and
up to less than 10% as presumptively confidential,\83\ without
requiring the applicant to file a request for confidentiality. The
Commission notes that the ownership information must not be publicly
available elsewhere either in this country or another country for us to
treat it as presumptively confidential. Alternatively, should the
Commission require public disclosure of ownership interests of 5% and
up to less than 10% of only those interest holders that are citizens,
entities, or government organizations of foreign adversary countries,
as defined in the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4?
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\82\ Commenters should identify any harms from disclosure that
would warrant the withholding of this information under the
Commission's rules and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
\83\ Other Commission requirements, such as supply chain annual
reporting, provide for a checkbox certification and the submission
of information that is presumptively confidential. 2020 Protecting
Against National Security Threats Order, 86 FR 2904, January 13,
2021, 35 FCC Rcd at 14369-70, para. 214 (``We believe that the
public interest in knowing whether providers have covered equipment
and services in their networks outweighs any interest the carrier
may have in keeping such information confidential . . . . Other
information, such as location of the equipment and services; removal
or replacement plans that include sensitive information; the
specific type of equipment or service; and any other provider
specific information will be presumptively confidential.''). In
order to request confidential treatment of the Circuit Status Report
(the predecessor of the Circuit Capacity Report), a submitter simply
has to check a box that appears on the certification form
accompanying all submissions.
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4. Submarine Cable Infrastructure Information
77. Consistent with the Commission's goal of ensuring it has
sufficient information concerning this critical infrastructure, the
Commission proposes to require applicants \84\ for a cable

[[Page 12055]]

landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, and
renewal or extension of a license, and licensees seeking to submit
their periodic reports, to provide additional detailed information
concerning the submarine cable infrastructure. Currently, Sec.
1.767(a)(4) of the Commission's rules requires applicants for a cable
landing license to provide ``[a] description of the submarine cable,
including the type and number of channels and the capacity thereof[.]''
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\84\ For purposes of the information requirements proposed in
the NPRM, unless otherwise indicated, the Commission uses the terms
``applicant'' or ``applicants'' to refer to an applicant or licensee
that files an application or notification under Sec. 1.767 of the
Commission's rules, as well as the proposed rules for certain types
of applications: (1) applicants that file an initial application for
a cable landing license or an application for modification,
substantial assignment, substantial transfer of control, or renewal
or extension of a cable landing license; (2) cable landing licensees
that file a notification of pro forma assignment or transfer of
control of a cable landing license; and/or (3) applicants that file
a request for an STA related to the operation of a submarine cable.
47 CFR 63.24(e) (referring to ``substantial'' transactions); 47 CFR
63.24(d) (defining ``Pro forma assignments and transfers of
control''). Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission uses the term
``application'' or ``submarine cable application'' to refer to an
initial application for a cable landing license; an application for
modification, substantial assignment, substantial transfer of
control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license; and a
pro forma assignment or transfer of control notification.
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78. The Commission proposes to also require that the detailed
information regarding the submarine cable system include (1) the
states, territories, or possessions in the United States and the
foreign countries where the cable will land; \85\ (2) the number of
segments in the submarine cable system and the designation of each
(e.g., Segment A, Main Trunk, A-B segment); (3) the length of the cable
by segment and in total; (4) the location, by segment, of branching
units; (5) the address and county or county equivalent of each U.S. and
non-U.S. cable landing station, (6) the number of optical fiber pairs,
by segment, of the submarine cable; (7) the design capacity, by
segment, of the cable system, and (8) anticipated time frame when the
applicant intends to place the submarine cable system into service. The
Commission also proposes to modify the requirement for applicants and
licensees to provide the geographic coordinates of cable landing
stations as well as beach manholes, to the extent they differ from
cable landing station coordinates.\86\ Under the Commission's proposal,
applicants would provide a specific description of the submarine cable
system, including a map and geographic data in generally accepted
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) formats or other formats. The
Commission seeks comment on the specific information and the file
formats and specific data fields that should be submitted. For example,
applicants could provide a specific description of the dry plants,
including geographic data in generally accepted GIS formats (e.g.,
GeoJSON, Shapefile, Geopackage, etc.) with a map that specifies the
location of (1) each beach manhole, (2) each cable landing station,
including locations of each PFE and each SLTE, and (3) each Network
Operations Center (NOC) \87\ providing remote access to the submarine
cable system. For example, the GIS data could include the routing of
the optical fiber cable from the beach manhole to the cable landing
station or like facility/facilities and location of the PFE, SLTE, and
NOC. The map could specify the geographic coordinates (longitude and
latitude) and street address, county and county equivalent, if
applicable, of each beach manhole and cable landing station or similar
facility. Should applicants provide maps and geographic coordinates of
the location of the dry plant components that are located at the U.S.
and foreign ends of the submarine cable system? The Commission proposes
to delegate authority to OIA, in coordination with the Office of
Economics and Analytics, to determine the file formats and specific
data fields in which data will ultimately be collected. The Commission
seeks comment on the proposals and approaches above.
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\85\ Section 1.767(a)(5) of the rules requires, among other
things, ``[a] specific description of the cable landing stations on
the shore of the United States and in foreign countries where the
cable will land.'' In addition to revisions to Sec. 1.767(a)(5) on
which the Commission seeks comment below, the Commission proposes to
specifically require that applicants must include in their
description of the submarine cable the states, territories, or
possessions in the United States and the foreign countries where the
cable will land.
\86\ The Commission seeks comment on whether it should modify
the part of that rule that states, ``[t]he applicant initially may
file a general geographic description of the landing points;
however, grant of the application will be conditioned on the
Commission's final approval of a more specific description of the
landing points, including all information required by this
paragraph, to be filed by the applicant no later than ninety (90)
days prior to construction. . . .'' The Commission proposes to
redesignate this part of Sec. 1.767(a)(5) under a new Sec.
1.70005(f)(1).
\87\ A NOC is a centralized location where information
technology administrators can continuously monitor the performance
of the wet and dry segments of the submarine cable system, either on
site or from a remote location. The role of a NOC is to ``provide
full visibility'' into the infrastructure and equipment. Id. (``From
a security perspective, the NOC functions as the first line of
defense that enables the organization to monitor network security
and recognize and address any attacks or disruptions to the
network.'').
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79. Route Position Lists. Relatedly, the Commission seeks comment
on whether it should require applicants for cable landing licenses and
cable landing licensees to file with the Commission route position
lists containing the geographic coordinates of the wet segment of the
submarine cable. The Commission notes that maps showing the exact
location of submarine cables are treated as presumptively confidential
under the Commission's rules.\88\ The Commission's rules require
applicants for cable landing licenses to submit ``a map showing
specific geographic coordinates . . . of each landing station'' and
``the coordinates of any beach joint where those coordinates differ
from the coordinates of the cable station.'' Should the Commission also
require applicants and licensees to submit the geographic coordinates
of the entire wet segment of the submarine cable (for example,
including the U.S. and foreign portions of the cable) and/or other
components of the cable? Would such data enhance the ability of the
Commission and other Federal agencies to identify, prevent, or mitigate
spatial conflicts affecting submarine cables and further ensure the
protection of this critical infrastructure?
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\88\ 47 CFR 0.457(c)(1)(i) (withholding from public inspection
``[m]aps showing the exact location of submarine cables'').
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80. Confidential Treatment of Submarine Cable Landing Geographic
Coordinates and Other Information. The Commission proposes to provide
confidential treatment for the exact addresses and specific geographic
coordinates of cable landing stations, beach manholes, and other
location information associated with a submarine cable system under the
Commission's rules. Given the risks associated with the public
availability of critical aspects of these cable systems, the Commission
believes the exact addresses and geographic coordinates and other
specific location information should be treated as presumptively
confidential. The Commission seeks comment on the extent to which, if
any, this information is treated as privileged and confidential, and
what impacts might the public availability of this information have on
the commercial interests of cable system owners and users.
81. Among the most sensitive parts of a submarine cable system are
the wet segment as it approaches the shore, the submarine cable as it
reaches the beach manhole, and the dry segment including the cable
landing station(s), such as where the SLTE is located. At present,
several applicants for initial cable landing licenses have requested
that such information should be confidential and filed under a request
for

[[Page 12056]]

confidential treatment.\89\ The Commission proposes to withhold the
exact location information from public inspection. The Commission
proposes to only release publicly more general location information,
such as the city, state/province/department, and country in which the
submarine cable system will land. The Commission seeks comment on
applicants' commercial interests in this information, the extent to
which such information is treated as confidential by the applicants,
and what harms would result to applicants' commercial interests if the
information were disclosed to the public. The Commission seeks comment
on how to treat such information if it is already publicly available
from another source.
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\89\ See, e.g., Letter from Craig J. Brown, Assistant General
Counsel, Lumen to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal
Communications Commission at 1 (Feb. 15, 2023) (requesting
confidential treatment of coordinate information, citing security
risks to the cable) (on file in File No. SCL-LIC-20230222-00005);
Letter from Ulises R. Pin and Brett P. Ferenchak, Counsel for GU
Holdings, Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal
Communications Commission at 1-2 (June 9, 2023) (requesting
confidential treatment of coordinate and address information, citing
security risks to the cable) (on file in File No. SCL-LIC-20230511-
00013); Letter from Ulises R. Pin and Brett P. Ferenchak, Counsel
for Starfish Infrastructure Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary,
Federal Communications Commission at 1-2 (July 8, 2024) (requesting
confidential treatment of coordinate and address information, citing
security risks to the cable) (on file in File No. SCL-LIC-20240621-
00030).
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82. Sharing with Federal Agencies. To the extent confidential
treatment is requested for submarine cable infrastructure information,
any sharing of the information with other Federal agencies would be
subject to the procedures set out in Sec. 0.442 of the rules. Under
Sec. 0.442, the Commission may disclose to other Federal agencies,
upon the Commission's own motion or another agency's request, records
that have been submitted to the Commission in confidence, subject to
providing the filer notice of the proposed sharing and ten (10) days to
object. In general, under Federal law, the Commission may share
information it has collected pursuant to an information collection with
other Federal Government agencies. If it does, all provisions of law
that relate to the unlawful disclosure of information apply to the
employees of the agency to which the information is released ``to the
same extent and in the same manner'' as they do to employees of the
collecting agency. The Commission seeks comment on whether to adopt a
rule that would allow the Commission to share submarine cable landing
geographic coordinates, the route position lists, and other information
with relevant Federal agencies, including information for which
confidential treatment is requested, without the pre-notification
procedures of Sec. 0.442(d). The Commission notes that it is seeking
comment on this same process for sharing cybersecurity risk management
plans and annual circuit capacity data. The Commission seeks comment
generally on this process to ensure the Commission and other Federal
agencies have adequate information on submarine cable infrastructure to
assess for any national security, law enforcement, and other concerns.
5. Current and Future Service Offerings
83. The Commission proposes to require applicants for an initial
application for a cable landing license or an application for
modification, assignment, transfer of control, and renewal or extension
of such license to include in their application information about the
capacity services they currently provide or plan to provide through the
submarine cable system. This information includes the capacity they
currently own or lease, the amount of capacity they intend to sell or
lease, and the capacity management services they will provide. The
Commission also proposes to require applicants for a cable landing
license, licensees, assignees, and transferees (as appropriate) to
disclose current and expected future service offerings as part of their
application for a cable landing license or modification, assignment,
transfer of control, and renewal or extension of a submarine cable
landing license. Collecting such information will help the Commission
properly evaluate national security and other risks and the robustness
of submarine cable infrastructure on an ongoing basis. Such
requirements would bring the Commission's approach for submarine cable
landing licenses in line with proposals for international section 214
authorization holders in the Evolving Risks NPRM, and incorporate
insights from the executive branch agencies' efforts to obtain
information about services from applicants with reportable foreign
ownership.\90\
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\90\ See, e.g., 2021 Standard Questions Order, 36 FCC Rcd at
14912, Attach. C (stating in the Instructions for Standard Questions
for a Submarine Cable Landing License Application, ``[t]he questions
seek further details regarding the Applicant and its security-
related practices, and some questions are particularly directed at
identifying and assessing the complete scope of the equipment that
the Applicant will be operating and the services the Applicant will
be offering should the FCC grant those authorities'').
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84. Specifically, the Commission proposes to require applicants to
provide the following information regarding services that they
currently provide and/or will provide through the submarine cable
system: (1) identify and describe the capacity services and capacity
management services, including the amount of fiber, spectrum, or
capacity by selling, leasing, or swapping; (2) identify the types of
customers that currently are served and/or will be served, including
those with whom the applicant leases, sells, shares, or swaps fiber,
spectrum, or capacity and/or plans to lease, sell, share, or swap
fiber, spectrum, or capacity; (3) identify whether the applicant
currently owns or controls and/or will own or control the U.S. portion
of the submarine cable system, including the submarine cable landing
station(s), through an IRU or leasehold interest; (4) identify where
the applicant currently markets, offers, and provides services and/or
expects to market, offer, and provide services; and (5) identify the
general terms and conditions that currently apply and/or will apply to
the services, such as contract duration, minimum capacity/bandwidth
requirements, IRU requirements, termination clauses, security
requirements, delivery or Service Level Agreement (SLA) requirements,
dispute resolution, and other applicable provisions. This information
might be provided as service tiers, ranges, or other applicable frames
of reference. The Commission seeks comment on whether this information
should be considered presumptively confidential, similar to the
Commission's proposal with respect to the exact addresses and specific
geographic coordinates of certain sensitive components of a submarine
cable system, such as the cable landing stations and beach manholes,
among others. If so, what is the basis for why the information should
be treated as presumptively confidential under the Commission's rules
and the FOIA? \91\ In other words, to what extent does this information
constitute privileged or confidential trade secrets or commercial or
financial information? To what extent, if any, is this information
already publicly available?
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\91\ Commenters should identify any harms from disclosure that
would warrant the withholding of this information under the
Commission's rules and the FOIA.
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6. Regulatory Compliance Certifications
85. Given concerns about ensuring the security and integrity of
this critical infrastructure, the Commission proposes new
certifications to protect against national security, law enforcement,
and other risks. The Commission tentatively

[[Page 12057]]

concludes that such requirements would help mitigate national security,
economic security, law enforcement, and other concerns associated with
threats to the security of submarine cable infrastructure. The
Commission also expects that requiring applicants to provide these
certifications will help to expedite Commission review. The Commission
seeks comment on the proposals below.
86. Compliance with FCC Rules. The Commission proposes that all
applicants seeking a cable landing license or modification, assignment,
transfer of control, and renewal or extension of such license, and
licensees filing their three-year periodic reports, must certify in the
applications and the reports whether or not they are in compliance with
the Cable Landing License Act, the Communications Act, the Commission's
rules, and other laws. Specifically, the Commission proposes to require
each applicant to certify in its application whether or not the
applicant has violated the Cable Landing License Act, the
Communications Act, or Commission rules, including making false
statements or misrepresentations to the Commission; whether the
applicant has been convicted of a felony; and whether there is an
adjudicated determination that the applicant has violated U.S.
antitrust or other competition laws, has been found to have engaged in
fraudulent conduct before another government agency, or has engaged in
other non-FCC misconduct the Commission has found to be relevant in
assessing the character qualifications of a licensee or authorization
holder. The Commission seeks comment on these proposals. The Commission
also seeks comment on whether it should require applicants to disclose
any pending FCC investigations, including any pending Notice of
Apparent Liability, and any adjudicated findings of non-FCC misconduct.
In addition, the Commission seeks comment on whether it should require
applicants to disclose any violations of the Communications Act,
Commission rules, or U.S. antitrust or other competition law, or any
other non-FCC misconduct only where there has been adjudication or
notification of a violation by an agency or court.
87. Cybersecurity Certifications. The Commission proposes to
require all applicants for a cable landing license or modification,
assignment, transfer of control, and renewal or extension of a cable
landing license, and licensees filing their three-year periodic
reports, to certify in the application or report that they have
created, updated, and implemented cybersecurity risk management plans.
The Commission also proposes to require that existing licensees shall
certify to the same for the first time based on the prioritization
schedule set out in the NPRM. To facilitate the Commission's review of
existing cable landing licenses, the Commission proposes to require
that existing licensees provide this cybersecurity certification in
their respective periodic reports consistent with the categories and
deadlines to be established by OIA as proposed in the NPRM. The
Commission also proposes to require these applicants and licensees to
certify that they take reasonable measures to protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their systems and
services that could affect their provision of communications services.
In this regard, the Commission proposes that applicants' and licensees'
cybersecurity risk management plans must identify the cyber risks they
face, the controls they use or plan to use to mitigate those risks, and
how they ensure that these controls are applied effectively to their
operations. The plans would also describe how the applicant or licensee
employs its organizational resources and processes to ensure the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its systems and
services. The Commission seeks comment on these proposals.
88. Given the importance of cybersecurity, the Commission believes
that the operation of submarine cable systems should meet baseline
security requirements to safeguard systems against threats. The
Commission believes these proposals are consistent with the National
Cybersecurity Strategy and, in that connection, are in keeping with a
whole-of-government effort to ``establish cybersecurity requirements to
support national security and public safety.'' \92\ The Commission
expects that creating, updating, and implementing cybersecurity risk
management plans would help protect applicants' and licensees' systems
and services from serious threats to national security, public safety,
and the economy. These proposals would require specific actions to
protect communications networks and infrastructure and collaborating
with communications sector industry members to identify best practices.
The Commission seeks comment on these expectations and on any national
security, economic, or public safety benefits of effective
cybersecurity practices and cybersecurity risk management for
applicants and licensees.
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\92\ Other Federal agencies are likewise either requiring or
proposing to require their regulated entities to take cybersecurity
measures to protect their systems. For example, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) requires registrants to establish
and maintain information security controls as part of their
mandatory system safeguards and to implement five types of security
testing through ongoing risk assessments and board oversight: (1)
vulnerability testing; (2) penetration testing; (3) controls
testing; (4) security incident response plan testing; and (5)
enterprise technology risk assessment. The SEC has proposed periodic
cybersecurity reporting requirements that include disclosing a
registrant's policies and procedures to identify and manage
cybersecurity risks. The SEC adopted cybersecurity reporting
requirements that include disclosing a registrant's policies and
procedures to identify and manage cybersecurity risks.
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89. The Commission proposes that each applicant or licensee have
flexibility to structure its cybersecurity risk management plan in a
manner that is tailored to its organization, provided that the plan
demonstrates that the applicant or licensee is taking affirmative steps
to analyze security risks and improve its security posture. While the
Commission believes there are many ways that applicants or licensees
may satisfy this requirement, the Commission proposes that they could
successfully demonstrate compliance with this proposed requirement by
following an established risk management framework, such as the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity
Framework (CSF). The NIST CSF is designed to be scalable and adaptable
to the needs and capabilities of companies both large and small, is
well understood by industry, and is flexible. The Commission seeks
comment on this flexible approach, including whether it would reduce
the costs imposed on applicants and licensees. What other risk
management frameworks do applicants and licensees implement other than
the NIST CSF? To the extent commenters believe the Commission should
mandate a particular risk management framework or take a less flexible
approach, the Commission seeks comment on their proposed alternative,
as well as their rationale and why it would serve the public interest.
For example, should the Commission require applicants and licensees to
apply the NIST CSF, as the Commission has done in other proceedings?
\93\ The

[[Page 12058]]

Commission further seeks comment on how an applicant should demonstrate
that it has taken affirmative steps to analyze security risks and
improve its security posture after it has implemented a cybersecurity
risk management plan.
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\93\ See Connect America Fund: A National Broadband Plan for The
Commission's Future High-Cost Universal Service Support et al., WC
Docket No. 10-90 et al., Report and Order, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, and Notice of Inquiry, 38 FCC Rcd 7040, 7086-87 para.
111 (2023) (Enhanced A-CAM Order); (requiring Enhanced A-CAM support
recipients to implement cybersecurity risk management plans that
reflect the latest version of the NIST CSF as a condition of
receiving support); Establishing a 5G Fund for Rural America, GN
Docket No. 20-32, Second Report and Order, Order on Reconsideration,
and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 24-89, at 64-
65, para. 122 (Aug. 14, 2024) (5G Fund Second Report and Order)
(requiring 5G Fund support recipients to implement cybersecurity
risk management plans that reflect the NIST CSF as a condition of
receiving 5G Fund support).
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90. The Commission proposes that an applicant's Chief Executive
Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Technology Officer
(CTO), or a similarly situated senior officer responsible for
governance of the organization's security practices would be required
to sign the applicant's cybersecurity risk management plan. The
Commission believes that a signatory with visibility into the full
network and organization is essential to ensure the plan encompasses
all necessary elements and is executed throughout the organization. In
recommendations made to Microsoft after the Cyber Safety Review Board's
investigation of an incident resulting in compromise of Microsoft's
systems as a result of a threat actor associated with the Chinese
government, the Board noted the importance of ``rigorous risk
management'' and focus on security at the executive level. The
Commission seeks comment on this approach. Are there additional steps
that the Commission should take to ensure that cybersecurity is an
integral part of corporate governance for applicants and licensees?
91. The Commission seeks comment on whether to require applicants'
and licensees' cybersecurity risk management plans to include
provisions for identifying, assessing, and mitigating supply chain
cybersecurity threats. According to NIST, ``[g]iven the complex and
interconnected relationships in this ecosystem, supply chain risk
management . . . is critical for organizations.'' To what extent do
applicants' and licensees' cybersecurity risk management plans already
identify and mitigate supply chain cybersecurity risks? The Commission
notes that the Commission already requires participants in the Enhanced
A-CAM and 5G Fund programs to submit separate supply chain risk
management plans that incorporate best practices published by NIST,
such as those discussed in Key Practices in Cyber Supply Chain Risk
Management: Observations from Industry (NISTIR 8276), and Cybersecurity
Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations
(NIST 800-161), in addition to cybersecurity risk management plans.
Should the Commission require all applicants and licensees to certify
to having created, updated, and implemented cybersecurity supply chain
risk management plans, either as part of their cybersecurity risk
management plan or as a separate document?
92. The Commission proposes to require applicants and licensees to
describe in their risk management plans their implementation of
security controls sufficient to ensure the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of all aspects of their communications systems and
services. While the Commission believes there are many ways for
applicants and licensees to satisfy this aspect of the requirement, the
Commission proposes that applicants and licensees will satisfy it if
they demonstrate they have successfully implemented an established set
of cybersecurity best practices, such as the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Cross-Sector Cybersecurity
Performance Goals (CPGs) or the Center for internet Security Critical
Security Controls (CIS Controls).\94\ The Commission expects that
compliant cybersecurity risk management plans will not be limited to a
predetermined set of specific measures, but instead plans will vary
based on individual applicants' and licensees' needs and circumstances
sufficient to protect against cyber threats.\95\ The Commission seeks
comment on this proposal.
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\94\ See Center for internet Security, Critical Security
Controls Version 8, <a href="https://www.cisecurity.org/controls">https://www.cisecurity.org/controls</a> (last
visited Oct. 22, 2024) (providing security controls grouped by
priority and feasibility for different sizes and resources of
businesses in Implementation Groups).
\95\ The Commission notes that it has also sought comment on
whether applicants for international section 214 authority and
modification, assignment, transfer of control, and renewal of
international section 214 authority should be required to certify in
the application that they will undertake to implement and adhere to
baseline cybersecurity standards based on universally recognized
standards such as those provided by CISA or NIST. The Commission
seeks comment on this assessment.
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93. In conjunction w

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