Ratification of Security Directives
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Abstract
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is publishing official notice that the Transportation Security Oversight Board (TSOB) ratified Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01D and Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02E, applicable to owners and operators of critical hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline infrastructure (owner/operators). Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01D, issued on May 29, 2024, extended the requirements of the Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 series for an additional year, with minor revisions. Security Directive Pipeline- 2021-02E, issued on July 26, 2024, extended the requirements of the Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02 series for an additional year, with amendments to strengthen their effectiveness and provide additional clarity.
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 11 (Friday, January 17, 2025)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 11 (Friday, January 17, 2025)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 5491-5493]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2025-01243]
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Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
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This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.
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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 11 / Friday, January 17, 2025 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 5491]]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
6 CFR Chapter I
49 CFR Chapter XII
Ratification of Security Directives
AGENCY: Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).
ACTION: Notice of ratification of security directives.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is publishing
official notice that the Transportation Security Oversight Board (TSOB)
ratified Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Security
Directive Pipeline-2021-01D and Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02E,
applicable to owners and operators of critical hazardous liquid and
natural gas pipeline infrastructure (owner/operators). Security
Directive Pipeline-2021-01D, issued on May 29, 2024, extended the
requirements of the Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 series for an
additional year, with minor revisions. Security Directive Pipeline-
2021-02E, issued on July 26, 2024, extended the requirements of the
Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02 series for an additional year, with
amendments to strengthen their effectiveness and provide additional
clarity.
DATES: The TSOB ratified Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01D on June
28, 2024 and Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02E on August 23, 2024.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas McDermott, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Cyber, Infrastructure, Risk and Resilience Policy, at
202-834-5803 or <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#b1c5d9dedcd0c29fdcd2d5d4c3dcdec5c5f1d9c09fd5d9c29fd6dec7"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d0a4b8bfbdb1a3febdb3b4b5a2bdbfa4a490b8a1feb4b8a3feb7bfa6">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
A. Cybersecurity Threat
The cyber threat to the country's critical infrastructure has only
increased in the time since TSA issued its initial cybersecurity-
related security directives to pipeline entities in 2021 in response to
the Colonial Pipeline incident. Cyber threats to surface transportation
systems, including hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines and
facilities, continue to proliferate, as both nation-states and criminal
cyber groups target critical infrastructure in order to cause
operational disruption and economic harm.\1\ In addition to the
Colonial Pipeline incident, cyber attackers have maliciously targeted
surface transportation modes in the United States, including freight
railroads, passenger railroads, and rail transit systems, with multiple
cyberattack and cyber espionage campaigns.\2\ Cyber incidents,
particularly ransomware attacks, are likely to increase in the near and
long term, due in part to vulnerabilities identified by threat actors
in U.S. networks.\3\ Especially in light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine
conflict,\4\ these threats remain elevated and pose a risk to the
national and economic security of the United States.
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\1\ Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2024 Intelligence
Community Assessment), 11, 16 (dated Feb. 5, 2024) (last accessed
July 23, 2024, at <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf">https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf</a>).
\2\ These activities include the January 2023 breach of the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; the January 2023
breach of San Francisco's Bay Area Rapid Transit System; and the
April 2021 breach of New York City's Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (the nation's largest mass transit agency) by hackers
linked to the Chinese government. This threat is ongoing: on
February 7, 2024, CISA published an advisory warning of the threat
posed by PRC state-sponsored actors. See Cybersecurity Advisory
(AA24-038A), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain
Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure.
\3\ Alert (AA22-040A), 2021 Trends Show Increased Globalized
Threat of Ransomware, released by CISA on February 10, 2022 (as
revised).
\4\ Joint Cybersecurity Alert--Alert (AA22-110A), Russian State-
Sponsored and Criminal Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure,
released cybersecurity authorities of the United States, Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom on April 20, 2022 (as
revised).
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In its 2023 annual assessment, the Intelligence Community noted
that ``China almost certainly is capable of launching cyber attacks
that could disrupt critical infrastructure services within the United
States, including against oil and gas pipelines, and rail systems.''
\5\ And the 2024 annual assessment notes that, ``[i]f Beijing believed
that a major conflict with the United States were imminent, it would
consider aggressive cyber operations against U.S. critical
infrastructure and military assets. Such a strike would be designed to
deter U.S. military action by impeding U.S. decision-making, inducing
societal panic, and interfering with the deployment of U.S. forces.''
\6\ In addition, ``Russia maintains its ability to target critical
infrastructure . . . in the United States as well as in allied and
partner countries'' and ``Tehran's opportunistic approach to cyber-
attacks puts U.S. infrastructure at risk for being targeted.'' \7\
Furthermore, ``malicious cyber actors have begun testing the
capabilities of AI-developed malware and AI-assisted software
development--technologies that have the potential to enable larger
scale, faster, efficient, and more evasive cyber-attacks--against
targets, including pipelines, railways, and other U.S. critical
infrastructure.'' \8\
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\5\ Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2023) (2023
Intelligence Community Assessment), 10 (dated February 6, 2023)
(last accessed July 23 2024, at <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf">https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf</a>.
\6\ 2024 Intelligence Community Assessment at 11.
\7\ 2024 Intelligence Community Assessment at 16, 20.
\8\ DHS Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), Homeland Threat
Assessment (2024) at 18 (last accessed July 23, 2024, at <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/23_0913_ia_23-333-ia_u_homeland-threat-assessment-2024_508C_V6_13Sep23.pdf">https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/23_0913_ia_23-333-ia_u_homeland-threat-assessment-2024_508C_V6_13Sep23.pdf</a>).
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B. Regulatory History
Following the Colonial Pipeline incident in May 2021, TSA issued
two security directives requiring owners and operators of critical
hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines or liquefied natural gas
facilities (owner/operators) to implement cybersecurity measures
necessary to prevent disruption and degradation to their critical
infrastructure. On May 27, 2021, TSA issued the first directive
(Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01), which required covered owner/
operators to: (1) report cybersecurity incidents to CISA; (2) designate
a cybersecurity coordinator to be available 24/7 to coordinate with TSA
and CISA; and (3) conduct a vulnerability assessment of cybersecurity
practices, identify any
[[Page 5492]]
gaps, and develop a plan and timeline for remediation. TSA issued the
second directive (Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02) on July 19,
2021, which required owner/operators to implement additional specific
cybersecurity measures to prevent disruption and degradation to their
infrastructure.
Due to the continuing cyber threat to pipeline infrastructure, the
requirements of both Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 and Security
Directive Pipeline-2021-02 have been renewed and extended beyond their
original expiration dates by subsequent directives, creating two
security directive ``series'' (the Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01
series and the Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02 series). In several
instances, as TSA renewed each of these security directive series, TSA
also amended their requirements to strengthen their effectiveness and
address emerging cyber threats. Most significantly, TSA transitioned
the requirements of the Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02 series to
be more performance-based and less prescriptive. The performance-based
approach enhances security by mandating that critical security outcomes
are achieved while allowing owner/operators to choose the most
appropriate security measures for their specific systems and
operations. Under the performance-based framework of the Security
Directive Pipeline-2021-02 series, TSA identified critical security
outcomes that covered parties must achieve. To ensure that these
outcomes are met, the directives in this series now require owner/
operators to:
<bullet> Establish and implement a TSA-approved Cybersecurity
Implementation Plan (CIP) that describes the specific cybersecurity
measures employed and the schedule for achieving the security outcomes
identified;
<bullet> Develop and maintain an up-to-date Cybersecurity Incident
Response Plan (CIRP) to reduce the risk of operational disruption, or
the risk of other significant impacts on business critical functions,
as defined in the directive, should the Information and/or Operational
Technology systems of a gas or liquid pipeline be affected by a
cybersecurity incident; and
<bullet> Establish a Cybersecurity Assessment Program (CAP) and
submit an annual plan that describes how the owner/operator will
proactively and regularly assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity
measures and identify and resolve device, network, and/or system
vulnerabilities.
The table below provides a list of each the security directives
issued within the Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 and Security
Directive Pipeline-2021-02 series. All of the security directives in
both series are available online in TSA's Surface Transportation
Cybersecurity Toolkit.\9\
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\9\ TSA Surface Transportation Cybersecurity Toolkit, available
at <a href="https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/surface-transportation-cybersecurity-toolkit">https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/surface-transportation-cybersecurity-toolkit</a>.
Table 1--TSA Security Directives Applicable to Critical Pipeline Systems
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Federal Register
Security directive Date issued Effective date Date ratified by TSOB Set expiration date citation of
ratification
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Pipeline-2021-01................... May 27, 2021.......... May 28, 2021.......... July 3, 2021......... May 28, 2022......... 86 FR 38209.
Pipeline-2021-01A.................. Dec. 2, 2021.......... Dec. 2, 2021.......... Dec. 29, 2021........ May 28, 2022......... 87 FR 31093.
Pipeline-2021-01B.................. May 27, 2022.......... May 29, 2022.......... June 24, 2021........ May 29, 2023......... 88 FR 36919.\10\
Pipeline-2021-01C.................. May 22, 2023.......... May 29, 2023.......... June 21, 2023........ May 29, 2024......... 89 FR 28570.
Pipeline-2021-01D.................. May 29, 2024.......... May 29, 2024.......... June 28, 2024........ May 29, 2025......... *Current.
Pipeline-2021-02................... Jul. 19, 2021......... Jul. 26, 2021......... Aug. 17, 2021........ Jul. 26, 2022........ 86 FR 52953.
Pipeline-2021-02B.................. Dec. 17, 2021......... Dec. 17, 2021......... Jan. 13, 2022........ Jul. 26, 2022........ 87 FR 31093.
Pipeline-2021-02C.................. Jul. 21, 2022......... Jul. 27, 2022......... Aug. 19, 2022........ Jul. 27, 2023........ 88 FR 36919.
Pipeline-2021-02D.................. Jul. 26, 2023......... Jul. 27, 2023......... Aug. 24, 2023........ Jul. 27, 2024........ 89 FR 28570.
Pipeline-2021-02E.................. Jul. 26, 2024......... Jul. 27, 2024......... Aug. 23, 2024........ Jul. 27, 2025........ *Current.
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C. Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01D
In light of the continuing threat, TSA determined that the
cybersecurity measures required by the Security Directive Pipeline-
2021-01 series, as amended and extended, remain necessary to protect
the Nation's critical pipeline infrastructure beyond Security Directive
Pipeline-2021-01C's expiration date of May 29, 2024. On May 29, 2024,
TSA issued Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01D to extend the
requirements of Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 series for an
additional year. Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01D became effective
May 29, 2024, and expires on May 29, 2025. Security Directive Pipeline-
2021-01D contains minor revisions refining existing requirements to
clarify applicability, compliance timelines, and reporting
requirements, as well as updated definitions to ensure standardization
across TSA's cybersecurity requirements applicable to different
transportation modes.
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\10\ Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01B also extended the
deadline by which cybersecurity incidents must be reported to CISA
from 12 hours to 24 hours after an incident is identified. This
change aligned the reporting timeline for critical pipeline entities
to mirror the reporting requirements applicable to other surface
transportation entities and aviation entities.
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D. Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02E
Considering the continuing threat, TSA also determined that the
measures required by the Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02 series, as
amended and extended, remain necessary to protect the Nation's critical
pipeline infrastructure beyond Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02D's
expiration date of July 27, 2024. On July 26, 2024, TSA issued Security
Directive Pipeline-2021-02E to extend the requirements of Security
Directive Pipeline-2021-02 series for an additional year. Security
Directive Pipeline-2021-02E became effective July 27, 2024, and expires
on July 27, 2025.
In addition to extending the existing requirements, Security
Directive Pipeline-2022-02E contains several amendments to strengthen
the effectiveness of certain requirements and provide further clarity.
The revisions include new and modified definitions clarifying certain
terms and harmonizing terminology across TSA's cybersecurity
requirements applicable to different transportation modes; clarifying
when responsibility for compliance with the directive's requirements is
shared between an owner/operator and a third party; and clarifying
requirements regarding submission of CAP and related annual reports.
II. TSOB Ratification
TSA has broad statutory responsibility and authority to safeguard
[[Page 5493]]
the nation's transportation system.\11\ The TSOB--a body consisting of
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Transportation,
the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Director of National Intelligence, or their designees,
and a representative of the National Security Council--reviews certain
TSA regulations and security directives as consistent with law.\12\ TSA
issued Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01D and Security Directive
Pipeline-2021-02E under 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(2)(A), which authorizes TSA to
issue emergency regulations or security directives without providing
notice or the opportunity for public comment where ``the Administrator
determines that a regulation or security directive must be issued
immediately in order to protect transportation security . . . .''
Security directives issued pursuant to the procedures in 49 U.S.C.
114(l)(2) ``shall remain effective for a period not to exceed 90 days
unless ratified or disapproved by the Board or rescinded by the
Administrator.'' \13\
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\11\ See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 114(d), (f), (l), (m).
\12\ See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 115; 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(2)(B).
\13\ 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(2)(B).
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Following the issuance of Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01D on
May 29, 2024, and Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02E on July 26,
2024, the chair of the TSOB convened the board to review the
directives.\14\ In reviewing each Security Directive, the TSOB reviewed
the required measures extended and amended by the directives and the
continuing need for TSA to maintain these requirements pursuant to its
emergency authority under 49 U.S.C. 114(1)(2) to prevent the disruption
and degradation of the country's critical transportation
infrastructure. The TSOB also considered whether to authorize TSA to
extend each security directive beyond their current expiration dates
subject to certain conditions, should the TSA Administrator believe
such an extension is necessary to address the evolving threat that may
continue beyond the original expiration date.
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\14\ The Secretary of Homeland Security serves as the TSOB
Chairperson, 49 U.S.C. 115(b)(2), and has further delegated that
responsibility to the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Secretary. DHS
Delegation No. 7071.1.
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Following its review, the TSOB ratified Security Directive
Pipeline-2021-01D on June 28, 2024, and Security Directive Pipeline-
2021-02E on August 23, 2024. The TSOB also authorized TSA to extend
each of the security directives beyond their current expiration dates,
should the TSA Administrator determine such an extension is necessary
to address the evolving threat that may continue beyond the original
expiration date. Such an extension is subject to the following
conditions: (1) there are no changes to the security directive other
than an extended expiration date; (2) the TSA Administrator makes an
affirmative determination that conditions warrant the extension of the
directive's requirements; and (3) the TSA Administrator documents such
a determination and notifies the TSOB.
Kristie Canegallo,
Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary of
Homeland Security & Chairman of the Transportation Security Oversight
Board.
[FR Doc. 2025-01243 Filed 1-15-25; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-9M-P
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