Notice2024-31319
Samreen Riaz, D.D.S.; Decision and Order
Primary source
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Published
December 30, 2024
Issuing agencies
Justice DepartmentDrug Enforcement Administration
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 89 Issue 249 (Monday, December 30, 2024)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 249 (Monday, December 30, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 106590-106591]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-31319]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Samreen Riaz, D.D.S.; Decision and Order
On February 27, 2024, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Samreen Riaz,
D.D.S., of Hawthorne, California (Registrant). Request for Final Agency
Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 2, at 1, 3. The OSC proposed the
revocation of Registrant's Certificate of Registration No. FR4257792,
alleging that Registrant's registration should be revoked because
Registrant is ``currently without authority to prescribe, administer,
dispense, or otherwise handle controlled substances in the State of
California, the state in which [she is] registered with DEA.'' Id. at 2
(citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).
The OSC notified Registrant of her right to file a written request
for hearing, and that if she failed to file such a request, she would
be deemed to have waived her right to a hearing and be in default. Id.
(citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not request a hearing.
RFAA, at 3.\1\ ``A default, unless excused, shall be deemed to
constitute a waiver of the [registrant's] right to a hearing and an
admission of the factual allegations of the [OSC].'' 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
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\1\ Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated May
23, 2024, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on Registrant was
adequate. The included declaration from a DEA Diversion Investigator
(DI) indicates that on March 12, 2024, the DI attempted to serve
Registrant with the OSC at Registrant's registered address, a
clinic. RFAAX 1, at 1. However, the clinic manager who was at the
registered location claimed to not know Registrant, despite working
at the location for nearly five years. Id. The DI then left several
voicemails with the clinic's Human Resources department, which went
unanswered. Id. at 2. On March 19, 2024, the DI mailed a copy of the
OSC to a different address Registrant had on file with DEA; however,
as of April 5, 2024, the mailing was never claimed by Registrant and
was scheduled to be returned to DEA. Id. Finally, on April 5, 2024,
the DI emailed a copy of the OSC to Registrant's registered email
address. Id.; see also id., Attachment A. The DI did not receive any
error message in response to the email. Id. at 2. Accordingly, the
Agency finds that Registrant was successfully served the OSC by
email. Mohammed S. Aljanaby, M.D., 82 FR 34552, 34552 (2017)
(finding that service by email satisfies due process where the email
is not returned as undeliverable and other methods have been
unsuccessful). Further, the Agency finds that the DI's efforts to
serve Registrant by other means were ```reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise [Registrant] of the pendency of
the action.''' Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006) (quoting
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950)). Therefore, due process notice requirements have been
satisfied.
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Further, ``[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be
in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action
with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In
such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order
pursuant to [21 CFR] Sec. 1316.67.'' Id. Sec. 1301.43(f)(1). Here,
the Government has requested final agency action based on Registrant's
default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c), (f), 1301.46. RFAA, at 1; see
also 21 CFR 1316.67.
Findings of Fact
The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the
factual allegations in the OSC are admitted. According to the OSC,
effective September 1, 2023, the Dental Board of California revoked
Registrant's California dental license. RFAAX 2, at 2. According to
California online records, of which the Agency takes official notice,
Registrant's California dental license remains revoked.\2\ California
DCA License Search, <a href="https://search.dca.ca.gov">https://search.dca.ca.gov</a> (last visited date of
signature of this Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds that Registrant
is not licensed to practice as a dentist in California, the state in
which she is registered with DEA.
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\2\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ``may take
official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--even in the
final decision.'' United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e),
``[w]hen an agency decision rests on official notice of a material
fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is
entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to show the
contrary.'' Accordingly, Registrant may dispute the Agency's finding
by filing a properly supported motion for reconsideration of
findings of fact within fifteen calendar days of the date of this
Order. Any such motion and response shall be filed and served by
email to the other party and to Office of the Administrator, Drug
Enforcement Administration at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#294d4c4807484d4d4607485d5d465b474c505a694d4c48074e465f"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="5b3f3e3a753a3f3f34753a2f2f3429353e22281b3f3e3a753c342d">[email protected]</span></a>.
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Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 ``upon a
finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license or
registration suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State
authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . .
. dispensing of controlled substances.'' With respect to a
practitioner, DEA has also long held that the possession of authority
to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which
a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental
condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner's registration.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (``The Attorney General
can register a physician to dispense controlled substances `if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under
the laws of the State in which he practices.' . . . The very definition
of a `practitioner' eligible to
[[Page 106591]]
prescribe includes physicians `licensed, registered, or otherwise
permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he
practices' to dispense controlled substances. Sec. 802(21).''). The
Agency has applied these principles consistently. See, e.g., James L.
Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71,371, 71,372 (2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 F.
App'x 826 (4th Cir. 2012); Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR 27616,
27617 (1978).\3\
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\3\ This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the
CSA. First, Congress defined the term ``practitioner'' to mean ``a
physician . . . or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise
permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . ,
to distribute, dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a controlled
substance in the course of professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C.
802(21). Second, in setting the requirements for obtaining a
practitioner's registration, Congress directed that ``[t]he Attorney
General shall register practitioners . . . if the applicant is
authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of
the State in which he practices.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because
Congress has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess state
authority in order to be deemed a practitioner under the CSA, DEA
has held repeatedly that revocation of a practitioner's registration
is the appropriate sanction whenever he is no longer authorized to
dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which
he practices. See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71371-72;
Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A.
Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR
11919, 11920 (1988); Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR 27617.
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According to California statute, ``dispense'' means ``to deliver a
controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject by or
pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner, including the
prescribing, furnishing, packaging, labeling, or compounding necessary
to prepare the substance for that delivery.'' Cal. Health & Safety Code
section 11010 (West 2024). Further, a ``practitioner'' means a person
``licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, to distribute,
dispense, conduct research with respect to, or administer, a controlled
substance in the course of professional practice or research in [the]
state.'' Id. section 11026(c).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant
currently lacks authority to practice as a dentist in California. As
discussed above, an individual must be a licensed practitioner to
dispense a controlled substance in California. Thus, because Registrant
currently lacks authority to practice as a dentist in California and,
therefore, is not currently authorized to handle controlled substances
in California, Registrant is not eligible to maintain a DEA
registration. Accordingly, the Agency will order that Registrant's DEA
registration be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No.
FR4257792 issued to Samreen Riaz, D.D.S. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR
0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I
hereby deny any pending applications of Samreen Riaz, D.D.S., to renew
or modify this registration, as well as any other pending application
of Samreen Riaz, D.D.S., for additional registration in California.
This Order is effective January 29, 2025.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
December 20, 2024, by Administrator Anne Milgram. That document with
the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document
of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect
of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2024-31319 Filed 12-27-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on December 30, 2024.
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