Rule2024-31188
Extension of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in Specified Areas of the Sanaa Flight Information Region (FIR) (OYSC)
Primary source
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Published
December 30, 2024
Effective
December 30, 2024
Issuing agencies
Transportation DepartmentFederal Aviation Administration
Abstract
This action extends the prohibition against certain flight operations in specified areas of the Sanaa Flight Information Region (FIR) (OYSC) by all: U.S. air carriers; U.S. commercial operators; persons exercising the privileges of an airman certificate issued by the FAA, except when such persons are operating U.S.-registered aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and operators of U.S.-registered civil aircraft, except when the operator of such aircraft is a foreign air carrier, for an additional three years, from January 7, 2025, until January 7, 2028. The FAA finds this action necessary to address significant, unacceptable safety-of-flight risks to U.S. civil aviation operations in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) stemming from heightened regional tensions associated with Houthi weapons employment and operational activities. Most recently, Houthi forces have engaged in increased weapons employment and operational activities related to the Israel-Gaza Conflict, leading in some cases to air defense responses. The FAA also takes into account the Houthis' recent history of having conducted long-range attacks emanating from the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) in other directions, notably against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2022. The FAA also republishes the approval process and exemption information for this Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR), consistent with other recently published flight prohibition SFARs.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 89 Issue 249 (Monday, December 30, 2024)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 249 (Monday, December 30, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 106301-106307]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-31188]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 91
Docket No. FAA-2015-8672; Amdt. No. 91-340E]
RIN 2120-AL96
Extension of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in Specified
Areas of the Sanaa Flight Information Region (FIR) (OYSC)
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This action extends the prohibition against certain flight
operations in specified areas of the Sanaa Flight Information Region
(FIR) (OYSC) by all: U.S. air carriers; U.S. commercial operators;
persons exercising the privileges of an airman certificate issued by
the FAA, except when such persons are operating U.S.-registered
aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and operators of U.S.-registered
civil aircraft, except when the operator of such aircraft is a foreign
air carrier, for an additional three years, from January 7, 2025, until
January 7, 2028. The FAA finds this action necessary to address
significant, unacceptable safety-of-flight risks to U.S. civil aviation
operations in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) stemming from
heightened regional tensions associated with Houthi weapons employment
and operational activities. Most recently, Houthi forces have engaged
in increased weapons employment and operational activities related to
the Israel-Gaza Conflict, leading in some cases to air defense
responses. The FAA also takes into account the Houthis' recent history
of having conducted long-range attacks emanating from the Sanaa FIR
(OYSC) in other directions, notably against Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2022. The FAA also republishes the approval
process and exemption information for this Special Federal Aviation
Regulation (SFAR), consistent with other recently published flight
prohibition SFARs.
DATES: This final rule is effective on December 30, 2024.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bill Petrak, Flight Standards Service,
through the Washington Operations Center, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591;
telephone (202) 267-3203; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#5e6773181f1f7311283b2c2d3b3f2d18323739362a0e2c3136373c372a3731302d1e383f3f70393128"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="98a1b5ded9d9b5d7eefdeaebfdf9ebdef4f1fff0ecc8eaf7f0f1faf1ecf1f7f6ebd8fef9f9b6fff7ee">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Executive Summary
This action extends the expiration date of SFAR No. 115, title 14
Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 91.1611, from January 7, 2025,
until January 7, 2028. SFAR No. 115 prohibits certain flight operations
in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) by all: U.S. air
carriers; U.S. commercial operators; persons exercising the privileges
of an airman certificate issued by the FAA, except when such persons
are operating U.S.-registered aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and
operators of U.S.-registered civil aircraft, except when the operator
of such aircraft is a foreign air carrier. Since the start of the
Israel-Gaza Conflict, Houthi forces have launched numerous long-range
weaponized unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), missiles, and rockets out
of Houthi-controlled territories in Yemen toward intended targets in
Israel, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea. These
attacks have been likely attempts to strike Israel and hold maritime
shipping in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea at risk.
Prior to the 2022 UN brokered ceasefire,
[[Page 106302]]
which has expired, the Houthis conducted similar long-range attacks
against Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Additionally, Houthi forces armed
with advanced anti-aircraft weapons systems capable of targeting
aircraft at or above standard cruising altitudes have successfully
engaged Western intelligence and surveillance aircraft operating over
Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen and over the Red Sea.
Consistent with other recently published flight prohibition SFARs,
this action also republishes the approval process and exemption
information for this flight prohibition SFAR.
II. Authority and Good Cause
A. Authority
The FAA is responsible for the safety of flight in the U.S. and for
the safety of U.S. civil operators, U.S.-registered civil aircraft, and
U.S.-certificated airmen throughout the world. Section 106(f) of title
49, U.S. Code (U.S.C.), subtitle I, establishes the FAA Administrator's
authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle VII of title 49,
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's
authority. Section 40101(d)(1) provides that the Administrator shall
consider in the public interest, among other matters, assigning,
maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the highest
priorities in air commerce. Section 40105(b)(1)(A) requires the
Administrator to exercise this authority consistently with the
obligations of the U.S. Government under international agreements.
The FAA is promulgating this rule under the authority described in
49 U.S.C. 44701, General requirements. Under that section, the FAA is
charged broadly with promoting safe flight of U.S. civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing, among other things, regulations and
minimum standards for practices, methods, and procedures that the
Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national
security.
This regulation is within the scope of the FAA's authority because
it continues to prohibit the persons described in paragraph (a) of SFAR
No. 115, Sec. 91.1611, from conducting flight operations in the
specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) due to the continuing
significant hazards to the safety of U.S. civil flight operations, as
described in the preamble to this final rule.
B. Good Cause for Immediate Adoption
Section 553(b)(B) of title 5, U.S.C., authorizes agencies to
dispense with notice and comment procedures for rules when the agency
for ``good cause'' finds that those procedures are ``impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' Also, section 553(d)
permits agencies, upon a finding of good cause, to issue rules with an
effective date less than 30 days from the date of publication. In this
instance, the FAA finds good cause to forgo notice and comment and the
delayed effective date because they would be impracticable and contrary
to the public interest.
Providing notice and the opportunity for the public to comment here
would be impracticable. The FAA's flight prohibitions, and any
amendments thereto, need to include appropriate boundaries that reflect
the agency's current understanding of the risk environment for U.S.
civil aviation. This allows the FAA to protect the safety of U.S.
operators' aircraft and the lives of their passengers and crews without
over-restricting or under-restricting U.S. operators' routing options.
However, the risk environment for U.S. civil aviation in airspace
managed by other countries with respect to safety of flight is fluid in
circumstances involving fighting, violent extremist and militant
activity, or periods of heightened tensions, particularly where weapons
capable of targeting or otherwise negatively affecting U.S. civil
aviation are or may be present. This fluidity, and the potential for
rapid changes in the risks to U.S. civil aviation, significantly limits
how far in advance of a new or amended flight prohibition the FAA can
usefully assess the risk environment. The delay that would be
occasioned by providing an opportunity to comment on this action would
significantly increase the risk that the resulting final action would
not accurately reflect the current risks to U.S. civil aviation
associated with the situation and thus would not establish boundaries
for the flight prohibition commensurate with those risks.
While the FAA sought and responded to public comments, the
boundaries of the area in which unacceptable risks to the safety of
U.S. civil aviation existed might change due to: evolving military or
political circumstances; violent extremist and militant group activity;
the introduction, removal, or repositioning of more advanced anti-
aircraft weapon systems; or other factors. As a result, if the
situation improved while the FAA sought and responded to public
comments, the rule the FAA finalized might be over-restrictive,
unnecessarily limiting U.S. operators' routing options and potentially
causing them to incur unnecessary additional fuel and operations-
related costs, as well as potentially causing passengers to incur
unnecessarily some costs attributed to their time. Conversely, if the
situation deteriorated while the FAA sought and responded to public
comments, the rule the FAA finalized might be under-restrictive,
allowing U.S. civil aviation to continue operating in areas where
unacceptable risks to their safety had developed. Such an outcome would
endanger the safety of these aircraft, as well as their passengers and
crews, exposing them to unacceptable risks of death, injury, and
property damage that could occur if a U.S. operator's aircraft were
shot down (or otherwise damaged) while operating in the specified areas
of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC).
Alternatively, if the FAA made changes to the area in which U.S.
civil aviation operations would be prohibited between a notice of
proposed rulemaking and a final rule due to changed conditions, the
version of the rule the public commented on would no longer reflect the
FAA's current assessment of the risk environment for U.S. civil
aviation.
In addition, seeking comment would be contrary to the public
interest because some of the rational basis for the rulemaking is based
upon classified information and controlled unclassified information not
authorized for public release. In order to meaningfully provide comment
on a proposal, the public would need access to the basis for the
agency's decision-making, which the FAA cannot provide. Disclosing
classified information or controlled unclassified information not
authorized for public release in order to seek meaningful comment on
the proposal would harm the public interest. Accordingly, the FAA
meaningfully seeking comment on the proposal is contrary to the public
interest.
Therefore, providing notice and the opportunity for comment would
be impracticable as it would hinder the FAA's ability to maintain
appropriate flight prohibitions based on up-to-date risk assessments of
the risks to the safety of U.S. civil aviation operations in airspace
managed by other countries. It would also be contrary to the public
interest, as the FAA cannot protect classified information and
controlled unclassified information not authorized for public release
and meaningfully seek public comment.
For the same reasons discussed above, the potential safety impacts
and the need for prompt action on up-to-date information that is not
public would make delaying the effective date impracticable and
contrary to the public interest.
[[Page 106303]]
Accordingly, the FAA finds good cause exists to forgo notice and
comment and any delay in the effective date for this rule.
III. Background
In its most recent extension of the prohibition against certain
flights in specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC),<SUP>1 2</SUP> the
FAA continued to assess the situation in the specified areas of the
Sanaa FIR (OYSC) as presenting significant, continuing safety-of-flight
risks for U.S. civil aviation due to the ongoing conflict between the
Saudi-led Coalition (SLC) and Houthi forces and the enduring extremist
or militant threat to U.S. civil aviation operations in those areas.
Houthi forces had continued to develop, acquire, and employ advanced
weapons capabilities, including and nontraditional air defense
capabilities, UAS, and missile capabilities. Collectively, such
capabilities posed risks to U.S. civil aviation operations at all
altitudes in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) and at
airports in Yemen.
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\1\ Extension of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in
Specified Areas of the Sanaa Flight Information Region (FIR) (OYSC)
final rule, 86 FR 69167 (Dec. 7, 2021).
\2\ Subsequent to the publication of the 2021 final rule, the
FAA became aware the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) Middle East Air Navigation Planning and Implementation
Regional Group approved an update to the Regional Air Navigation
Plan to amend certain waypoints. Some of the amendments affected
waypoints used by the FAA to demarcate the boundary between the
airspace in which U.S. operators are prohibited from conducting
operations and the airspace in which U.S. operators are permitted to
operate. To address the amendments of waypoints, on September 22,
2023, the FAA published a technical amendment in the Federal
Register identifying the new waypoint names and locations to clarify
where U.S. operators are prohibited from conducting operations due
to flight safety risks associated with the conflict in Yemen and
where they are permitted to operate. 88 FR 65319.
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Houthi forces operated multiple air defense systems capable of
targeting aircraft at various altitudes. They had employed increasingly
capable Iranian-supplied surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and electro-
optical/infrared seeker air-to-air missiles modified for use as SAMs to
engage aircraft. Houthi air defense capabilities posed an inadvertent
risk to U.S. civil aviation operations due to the potential for
misidentification or miscalculation by irregular forces using advanced
air defense capabilities for which they may not have received adequate
training and may not have had adequate air surveillance information to
distinguish accurately between civil aircraft and potential airborne
threats. In the preamble to the December 2021 final rule, the FAA
stated that it continued to assess, at that time, that Houthi forces in
Yemen did not possess functional medium-/long-range strategic SAM
capabilities. Houthi forces have subsequently acquired longer range
anti-aircraft weapon systems.
Additionally, as described in the preamble to the December 2021
final rule, Houthi forces had targeted international airports in the
region using weaponized UAS, ballistic, and cruise missiles. Although
the FAA noted that some Houthi offensive weapons systems had range
capabilities that would allow them to reach the limited areas of the
Sanaa FIR (OYSC) in which the FAA permits U.S. civil aviation to
operate, Houthi forces had not demonstrated an intent to conduct
weaponized UAS or missile attacks in those areas. Instead, they had
focused these types of attacks primarily on targets in Saudi Arabia and
in contested areas of Yemen. In addition, in the preamble to the
December 2021 final rule, the FAA assessed Houthi weaponized UAS
operations would only present a safety-of-flight hazard to civil
aircraft operating off the Yemeni coast if such aircraft were operating
below cruising altitudes.
Besides the safety-of-flight risks associated with the SLC-Houthi
conflict, in the preamble to the December 7, 2021 final rule, the FAA
assessed extremist or militant groups operating in Yemen likely had
access to anti-aircraft-capable weapons, including man-portable air
defense systems (MANPADS), which pose risks up to 25,000 feet. Al-
Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continued to operate in Yemen
and historically had attempted to attack Western civil aviation through
novel improvised explosive devices, including the failed 2009 underwear
bombing attempt on a U.S.-bound flight and the 2010 printer cartridge
plot that targeted U.S.-bound cargo flights. Additionally, Islamic
State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) cells remained active in Yemen.
IV. Discussion of the Final Rule
The FAA has assessed the situation in the specified areas of the
Sanaa FIR (OYSC) and determined that it continues to be hazardous for
U.S. civil aviation. Since the beginning of the Israel-Gaza Conflict in
October 2023, Houthi forces have launched numerous attacks likely
targeting Israel and maritime shipping in the Red Sea, the Gulf of
Aden, and the Arabian Sea using a variety of weapons including cruise
missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and weaponized UAS. Such
attacks present significant risks to safety-of-flight of U.S. civil
aviation in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) addressed by
this flight prohibition SFAR. Although the majority of these attacks
primarily pose low-altitude risks, Houthi-launched ballistic missiles
pose risks to aircraft operating at or above standard cruising
altitudes, as ballistic missile trajectories may ascend through or over
established air routes. Additionally, ballistic missile operations can
negatively affect flight safety in the event of a missile failure, as
falling debris may descend through air routes.
Houthi forces are also equipped with a variety of advanced anti-
aircraft weapons--including various MANPADS, SAMs, and Iranian-
proliferated loitering munition systems--capable of targeting aircraft
at or above standard cruising altitudes. In 2023 and 2024, the Houthis
used these systems to successfully intercept multiple U.S.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance UAS over Yemen and the
Red Sea. These weapon systems pose risks to civil aviation operations
over Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, with ranges extending beyond
the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC). For example, in November
2023, the Houthis claimed responsibility for having allegedly shot down
a MQ-9 Reaper off the western coast of Yemen. Additionally, in late May
2024, the Houthis claimed responsibility for shooting down another MQ-9
near Marib, Yemen. Houthi air defense operations have continued over
Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen and off Yemen's west coast, in
likely attempts to intercept Western military reconnaissance
operations. The FAA remains concerned that Houthi forces operating
advanced anti-aircraft weapons may not have adequate training or
adequate air surveillance information to distinguish accurately between
civil aircraft and potential airborne threats. There are concerns that
Houthi forces may now possess functional medium-range SAMs. These
circumstances present an unacceptable inadvertent risk of aircraft
misidentification, which could result in the accidental shoot down of a
civil aircraft, in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC).
Additionally, AQAP and ISIS have remained active in Yemen and
likely have access to a variety of weapons, including small arms; small
commercially-available UAS, which can be weaponized; and potentially
legacy MANPADS, posing risks to aircraft up to 25,000 feet.
Collectively, the various threat actors' existing capabilities,
coupled with their demonstrated intent to use these weapons, presents a
continued, significant, and unacceptable level of risk to U.S. civil
aviation operations at
[[Page 106304]]
all altitudes in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC). Houthi
cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia and the UAE ceased following an
April 2022 United Nations (UN)-brokered temporary ceasefire between the
Houthis and the SLC, even though the temporary ceasefire expired in the
fall of 2022 without the Houthis and the SLC agreeing to a longer-term
formal ceasefire. However, SLC-Houthi cross-border attacks could resume
with little or no warning--a risk that has significantly increased
since the start of the Israel-Gaza Conflict in October 2023 due to
increased regional volatility.
Therefore, the FAA extends the expiration date of SFAR No. 115,
Sec. 91.1611, from January 7, 2025, until January 7, 2028, without any
changes to the boundaries of the SFAR.
If the risk to U.S. civil aviation safety and security decreases to
an acceptable level, then further amendments to SFAR No. 115, Sec.
91.1611, might be appropriate. The FAA will continue to monitor the
situation and evaluate the extent to which persons described in
paragraph (a) of this rule might be able to operate safely in the
specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC).
The FAA also republishes the details concerning the approval and
exemption processes in sections V and VI of this preamble, consistent
with other recently published flight prohibition SFARs, to enable
interested persons to refer to this final rule for comprehensive
information about requesting relief from the FAA from the provisions of
SFAR No. 115, Sec. 91.1611.
V. Approval Process Based on a Request From a Department, Agency, or
Instrumentality of the United States Government
A. Approval Process Based on an Authorization Request From a
Department, Agency, or Instrumentality of the United States Government
In some instances, U.S. Government departments, agencies, or
instrumentalities may need to engage U.S. civil aviation to support
their activities in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC). If a
department, agency, or instrumentality of the U.S. Government
determines that it has a critical need to engage any person described
in paragraph (a) of SFAR No. 115, Sec. 91.1611, including a U.S. air
carrier or commercial operator, to transport civilian or military
passengers or cargo or conduct other operations in the specified areas
of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC), that department, agency, or instrumentality
may request the FAA to approve persons described in paragraph (a) of
SFAR No. 115, Sec. 91.1611, to conduct such operations.
The requesting U.S. Government department, agency, or
instrumentality must submit the request for approval to the FAA's
Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety in a letter signed by an
appropriate senior official of the requesting department, agency, or
instrumentality.\3\ The FAA will not accept or consider requests for
approval from anyone other than the requesting U.S. Government
department, agency, or instrumentality. In addition, the senior
official signing the letter requesting FAA approval must be
sufficiently positioned within the requesting department, agency, or
instrumentality to demonstrate that the organization's senior
leadership supports the request for approval and is committed to taking
all necessary steps to minimize aviation safety and security risks to
the proposed flights. The senior official must also be in a position
to: (1) attest to the accuracy of all representations made to the FAA
in the request for approval, and (2) ensure that any support from the
requesting U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality
described in the request for approval is in fact brought to bear and is
maintained over time. Unless justified by exigent circumstances,
requesting U.S. Government departments, agencies, or instrumentalities
must submit requests for approval to the FAA no less than 30 calendar
days before the date on which the requesting department, agency, or
instrumentality wishes the operator(s) to commence the proposed
operation(s).
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\3\ This approval procedure applies to U.S. Government
departments, agencies, or instrumentalities; it does not apply to
the public. The FAA describes this procedure in the interest of
providing transparency with respect to the FAA's process for
interacting with U.S. Government departments, agencies, or
instrumentalities that seek to engage U.S. civil aviation to operate
in the area in which this SFAR would prohibit their operations in
the absence of specific FAA approval.
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The requestor must send the request to the Associate Administrator
for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591. Electronic submissions are acceptable,
and the requesting entity may request that the FAA notify it
electronically as to whether the FAA grants the request for approval.
If a requestor wishes to make an electronic submission to the FAA, the
requestor should contact the Washington Operations Center by telephone
at (202) 267-3203 or by email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#2e1703686f6f0361584b5c5d4b4f5d68424749465a7e5c4146474c475a4741405d6e484f4f00494158"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="9da4b0dbdcdcb0d2ebf8efeef8fceedbf1f4faf5e9cdeff2f5f4fff4e9f4f2f3eeddfbfcfcb3faf2eb">[email protected]</span></a> for submission instructions. The
requestor must not submit its letter requesting FAA approval or related
supporting documentation to the Washington Operations Center. Rather,
the Washington Operations Center will refer the requestor to an
appropriate staff member of the Flight Standards Service for further
assistance.
A single letter may request approval from the FAA for multiple
persons described in SFAR No. 115, Sec. 91.1611, or for multiple
flight operations. To the extent known, the letter must identify the
person(s) the requester expects the SFAR to cover on whose behalf the
U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality seeks FAA
approval, and it must describe--
<bullet> The proposed operation(s), including the nature of the
mission being supported;
<bullet> The service the person(s) covered by the SFAR will
provide;
<bullet> To the extent known, the specific locations in the
specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) where the proposed operation(s)
will occur, including, but not limited to, the flight path and altitude
of the aircraft while it is operating in the specified areas of the
Sanaa FIR (OYSC) and the airports, airfields, or landing zones at which
the aircraft will take off and land; and
<bullet> The method by which the requesting department, agency, or
instrumentality will provide, or how the operator will otherwise
obtain, current threat information and an explanation of how the
operator will integrate this information into all phases of the
proposed operations (i.e., the pre-mission planning and briefing, in-
flight, and post-flight phases).
The request for approval must also include a list of operators with
whom the U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality
requesting FAA approval has a current contract(s), grant(s), or
cooperative agreement(s) (or its prime contractor has a subcontract(s))
for specific flight operations in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR
(OYSC). The requestor may identify additional operators to the FAA at
any time after the FAA issues its approval. Neither the operators
listed in the original request, nor any operators the requestor
subsequently seeks to add to the approval, may commence operations
under the approval until the FAA issues them an Operations
Specification (OpSpec) or Letter of Authorization (LOA), as
appropriate, for operations in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR
(OYSC). The approval conditions discussed below apply to all operators.
Requestors should contact the Washington Operations Center by telephone
at (202) 267-3203 or by email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#cdf4e08b8c8ce082bba8bfbea8acbe8ba1a4aaa5b99dbfa2a5a4afa4b9a4a2a3be8dabacace3aaa2bb"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="0831254e494925477e6d7a7b6d697b4e64616f607c587a6760616a617c6167667b486e6969266f677e">[email protected]</span></a> for instructions on how to submit
the names of additional
[[Page 106305]]
operators the requestor wishes to add to an existing approval to the
FAA. The requestor must not submit the names of additional operators it
wishes to add to an existing approval to the Washington Operations
Center. Rather, the Washington Operations Center will refer the
requestor to an appropriate staff member of the Flight Standards
Service for further assistance.
If an approval request includes classified information or
controlled unclassified information not authorized for public release,
requestors may contact the Washington Operations Center for
instructions on submitting it to the FAA. The Washington Operations
Center's contact information appears in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this final rule.
FAA approval of an operation under SFAR No. 115, Sec. 91.1611,
does not relieve persons subject to this SFAR of the responsibility to
comply with all other applicable FAA rules and regulations. Operators
of civil aircraft must comply with the conditions of their
certificates, OpSpecs, and LOAs, as applicable. Operators must also
comply with all rules and regulations of other U.S. Government
departments, agencies, or instrumentalities that may apply to the
proposed operation(s), including, but not limited to, regulations
issued by the Transportation Security Administration.
B. Approval Conditions
If the FAA approves the request, the FAA's Aviation Safety
organization will send an approval letter to the requesting U.S.
Government department, agency, or instrumentality informing it that the
FAA's approval is subject to all of the following conditions:
(1) The approval will stipulate those procedures and conditions
that limit, to the greatest degree possible, the risk to the operator,
while still allowing the operator to achieve its operational
objectives.
(2) Before any approval takes effect, the operator must submit to
the FAA:
(a) A written release of the U.S. Government from all damages,
claims, and liabilities, including without limitation legal fees and
expenses, relating to any event arising out of or related to the
approved operations in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC); and
(b) The operator's written agreement to indemnify the U.S.
Government with respect to any and all third-party damages, claims, and
liabilities, including without limitation legal fees and expenses,
relating to any event arising out of or related to the approved
operations in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC).
(3) Other conditions the FAA may specify, including those the FAA
might impose in OpSpecs or LOAs, as applicable.
The release and agreement to indemnify do not preclude an operator
from raising a claim under an applicable non-premium war risk insurance
policy the FAA issues under chapter 443 of title 49, U.S. Code.
If the FAA approves the proposed operation(s), the FAA will issue
an OpSpec or LOA, as applicable, to the operator(s) identified in the
original request and any operators the requestor subsequently adds to
the approval, authorizing them to conduct the approved operation(s). In
addition, as stated in paragraph (3) of this section V.B., the FAA
notes that it may include additional conditions beyond those contained
in the approval letter in any OpSpec or LOA associated with a
particular operator operating under this approval, as necessary in the
interests of aviation safety. U.S. Government departments, agencies,
and instrumentalities requesting FAA approval on behalf of entities
with which they have a contract or subcontract, grant, or cooperative
agreement should request a copy of the relevant OpSpec or LOA directly
from the entity with which they have any of the foregoing types of
arrangements, if desired.
VI. Information Regarding Petitions for Exemption
Any operations not conducted under an approval the FAA issues
through the approval process set forth previously may only occur in
accordance with an exemption from SFAR No. 115, Sec. 91.1611. A
petition for exemption must comply with 14 CFR part 11. The FAA will
consider whether exceptional circumstances exist beyond those described
in the approval process in the previous section. To determine whether a
petition for exemption from the prohibition this SFAR establishes
fulfills the standards described in 14 CFR 11.81, the FAA consistently
finds necessary the following information:
<bullet> The proposed operation(s), including the nature of the
operation;
<bullet> The service the person(s) covered by the SFAR will
provide;
<bullet> The specific locations in the specified areas of the Sanaa
FIR (OYSC) where the proposed operation(s) will occur, including, but
not limited to, the flight path and altitude of the aircraft while it
is operating in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) and the
airports, airfields, or landing zones at which the aircraft will take
off and land;
<bullet> The method by which the operator will obtain current
threat information and an explanation of how the operator will
integrate this information into all phases of its proposed operations
(i.e., the pre-mission planning and briefing, in-flight, and post-
flight phases); and
<bullet> The plans and procedures the operator will use to minimize
the risks identified in this preamble to the proposed operations, to
support the relief sought and demonstrate that granting such relief
would not adversely affect safety or would provide a level of safety at
least equal to that provided by this SFAR. The FAA has found
comprehensive, organized plans and procedures of this nature to be
helpful in facilitating the agency's safety evaluation of petitions for
exemption from flight prohibition SFARs.
The FAA includes, as a condition of each such exemption it issues,
a release and agreement to indemnify, as described previously.
The FAA recognizes that, with the support of the U.S. Government,
the governments of other countries could plan operations that may be
affected by SFAR No. 115, Sec. 91.1611. While the FAA will not permit
these operations through the approval process, the FAA will consider
exemption requests for such operations on an expedited basis and in
accordance with the order of preference set forth in paragraph (c) of
SFAR No. 115, Sec. 91.1611.
If a petition for exemption includes information that is sensitive
for security reasons or proprietary information, requestors may contact
the Washington Operations Center for instructions on submitting it to
the FAA. The Washington Operations Center's contact information is
listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this final
rule. Requestors must not submit their petitions for exemption or
related supporting documentation to the Washington Operations Center.
Rather, the Washington Operations Center will refer the requestor to
the appropriate staff member of the Flight Standards Service or the
Office of Rulemaking for further assistance.
VII. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
Federal agencies consider the impacts of regulatory actions under a
variety of executive orders and other requirements. First, Executive
Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and Executive Order 14094
(``Modernizing Regulatory Review'') direct that each Federal agency
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the
[[Page 106306]]
intended regulation justify the costs. Second, the Regulatory
Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze
the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the
Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting
standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of
the United States. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that
include a Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State,
local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private
sector, of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in
any one year. The current threshold after adjustment for inflation is
$183 million using the most current (2023) Implicit Price Deflator for
the Gross Domestic Product. This portion of the preamble summarizes the
FAA's analysis of the economic impacts of this final rule.
In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined this final
rule has benefits that justify its costs. This rule is a significant
regulatory action, as defined in section 3(f)(4) of Executive Order
12866 as amended by Executive Order 14094. As 5 U.S.C. 553 does not
require notice and comment for this final rule, 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604 do
not require regulatory flexibility analyses regarding impacts on small
entities. This rule will not create unnecessary obstacles to the
foreign commerce of the United States. This rule will not impose an
unfunded mandate on State, local, or Tribal governments, or on the
private sector, by exceeding the threshold identified previously.
A. Regulatory Evaluation
This rule prohibits U.S. civil flights in the specified areas of
the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) due to the significant hazards to U.S. civil
aviation described in this preamble. The alternative flight routes
result in some additional fuel and operations costs to the operators,
as well as some costs attributed to passenger time. Accordingly, the
incremental costs of the extension of this flight prohibition SFAR are
minimal. By prohibiting unsafe flights, the benefits of this rule will
exceed the minimal flight deviation costs. Therefore, the FAA finds
that the incremental costs of extending SFAR No. 115, 14 CFR 91.1611,
will be minimal and are exceeded by the benefits of avoided risks of
deaths, injuries, and property damage that could occur if a U.S.
operator's aircraft were shot down (or otherwise damaged) while
operating in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC).
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), in 5 U.S.C. 603, requires an
agency to prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis describing
impacts on small entities whenever 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law
requires an agency to publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking
for any proposed rule. Similarly, 5 U.S.C. 604 requires an agency to
prepare a final regulatory flexibility analysis when an agency issues a
final rule under 5 U.S.C. 553 after that section or any other law
requires publication of a general notice of proposed rulemaking. The
FAA concludes good cause exists to forgo notice and comment and to not
delay the effective date for this rule. As 5 U.S.C. 553 does not
require notice and comment in this situation, 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604
similarly do not require regulatory flexibility analyses.
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to this Act, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this final rule and
determined that its purpose is to protect the safety of U.S. civil
aviation from risks to their operations in the specified areas of the
Sanaa FIR (OYSC), a location outside the U.S. Therefore, the rule
complies with the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and Tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $183 million in lieu of $100
million.
This final rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the
requirements of title II of the Act do not apply.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
the FAA to consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens it imposes on the public. The FAA has determined no
new requirement for information collection is associated with this
final rule.
F. International Compatibility and Cooperation
In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, the FAA's policy is to conform to
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has
determined no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices correspond to
this regulation. The FAA finds this action is fully consistent with the
obligations under 49 U.S.C. 40105(b)(1)(A) to ensure the FAA exercises
its duties consistently with the obligations of the United States under
international agreements.
While the FAA's flight prohibition does not apply to foreign air
carriers, DOT codeshare authorizations prohibit foreign air carriers
from carrying a U.S. codeshare partner's code on a flight segment that
operates in airspace for which the FAA has issued a flight prohibition
for U.S. civil aviation. In addition, foreign air carriers and other
foreign operators may choose to avoid, or be advised or directed by
their civil aviation authorities to avoid, airspace for which the FAA
has issued a flight prohibition for U.S. civil aviation.
G. Environmental Analysis
The FAA has analyzed this action under Executive Order 12114,
Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, and DOT Order
5610.1C, Paragraph 16. Executive Order 12114 requires the FAA to be
informed of environmental considerations and take those considerations
into account when making decisions on major Federal actions that could
have environmental impacts anywhere beyond the borders of the United
States. The FAA has determined this action is exempt pursuant to
Section 2-5(a)(i) of Executive Order 12114 because it does not have the
potential for a significant effect on the environment outside the
United States.
[[Page 106307]]
In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts:
Policies and Procedures, paragraph 8-6(c), the FAA has prepared a
memorandum for the record stating the reason(s) for this determination
and has placed it in the docket for this rulemaking.
VIII. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this rule under the principles and criteria of
Executive Order 13132. The agency has determined this action will not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the relationship
between the Federal Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
Therefore, this rule will not have federalism implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13211. The agency
has determined it is not a ``significant energy action'' under the
Executive order and will not be likely to have a significant adverse
effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy.
C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation
Executive Order 13609 promotes international regulatory cooperation
to meet shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of
Executive Order 13609 and has determined that this action will have no
effect on international regulatory cooperation.
IX. Additional Information
A. Electronic Access
Except for classified and controlled unclassified material not
authorized for public release, all documents the FAA considered in
developing this rule, including economic analyses and technical
reports, may be accessed from the internet through the docket for this
rulemaking.
Those documents may be viewed online at <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a>
using the docket number listed above. A copy of this rule will be
placed in the docket. Electronic retrieval help and guidelines are
available on the website. It is available 24 hours each day, 365 days
each year. An electronic copy of this document may also be downloaded
from the Office of the Federal Register's website at <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov">https://www.federalregister.gov</a> and the Government Publishing Office's website
at <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov">https://www.govinfo.gov</a>. A copy may also be found at the FAA's
Regulations and Policies website at <a href="https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies">https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies</a>.
Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9677.
B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
(SBREFA) (Pub. L. 104-121) (set forth as a note to 5 U.S.C. 601)
requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information or
advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its
jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document may
contact its local FAA official, or the persons listed under the FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble.
To find out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit <a href="https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/">https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/</a>.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 91
Air traffic control, Aircraft, Airmen, Airports, Aviation safety,
Freight, Yemen.
The Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES
0
1. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40101, 40103, 40105, 40113, 40120,
44101, 44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716,
44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 47508,
47528-47531, 47534; Pub. L. 114-190, 130 Stat. 615 (49 U.S.C. 44703
note); Sec. 828 of Pub. L. 118-63, 138 Stat. 1330 (49 U.S.C. 44703
note); articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), (126 Stat. 11).
0
2. Amend Sec. 91.1611 by revising paragraph (e) to read as follows:
Sec. 91.1611 Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 115--Prohibition
against certain flights in specified areas of the Sanaa Flight
Information Region (FIR) (OYSC).
* * * * *
(e) Expiration. This SFAR will remain in effect until January 7,
2028. The FAA may amend, rescind, or extend this SFAR, as necessary.
Issued in Washington, DC, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 106(f),
40101(d)(1), 40105(b)(1)(A), and 44701(a)(5).
Michael G. Whitaker,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2024-31188 Filed 12-27-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.